ARKS CONTROL PROPOSALS
ISSULE B R I E F N U M B E R I B 8 2 0 5 9
K a r k M.
Foreign Affairs and Naticnal D e f e n s e Division
J u d i t h A.
Office of Senior S p e c i a l i s t s
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM
DATE O R I G I N A T E D 05/03/82
DATE UPDATED 12/06/82
INFORMATION C A L L 287-5700
There is growing concern amidst the public in general a n d within Congress
about the size of the nuclear arsenals of t h e United S t a t e s and the Soviet
Union 2nd t h e f u t u r e of strategic a r m s control.
Numerous localities across
the nation have passed resolutions calling for a n i m m e d i a t e end to the
strategic a r m s r a c e , and i n favor of renewed efforts t o achieve a n e w a r m s
especially a s SALT I 1
control agreement between the U.S. and t h e U.S.S.R.,
remains o n the calendar i n the S e n a t e
Kany Members of Congress have introduced resolutions intended to achieve
the same or similar ends, s o m e of which h a v e attracted significant support i n
both Houses i ~ c l u d i n gS.Z.Res. 212, which passed the S e n a t e Foreign Relations
Committee o n J u n e 9 , 1 9 8 2 , a n d H.J.Res. 5 2 1 , which passed the House Foreign
Affairs Committee o n June 2 3 , i982. T h e f u l l House considered H.J.Res.
on Au3. 5 , 1 9 6 2 , a n d voted not to a c c e p t t h e original l a n g u a g e , which would
have called f o r a n immediate negotiated f r e e z e , voting instead in favor of
suSstitute language in favor of a f r e e z e a f t e r the U.S.
a n d U.S.S.R.
sharply reduced their strategic forces t o equal levels.
President Reagan had
endorsed a proposal similar t o that a p p r o v e d by the House a s part of his call
for reCuctions in nuclear forces.
A l s o , o n May 9 , 1 9 8 2 , the President
revealed his two-stage START (Strategic A r m s Reduction Talks) proposal.
called for reductions, during the f i r s t p h a s e , of ballistic missile warheads
to equal levels a t least one-third below current l e v e l s , with no morn than
half of the renining warheads to be landbased.
T h e second phase provides for
equal ceilings on other ~ l e m e n t s ,including ballistic missile zhrowweight.
Heightened public and congressional c o n c e r n ,
themselves, raise the following questions:
W h a t a r e the reasons for this growing concern?
W h a t effect might a freeze have o n the d e f e n s e
S u d g e t and o n the budget deficit?
What a r e the possible effects o n President
Reagan's strategic force modernization program?
What a r e the possible effects o n the capabilities
and survivability of U.S. s t r a t e g i c forces
a n d on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance?
Could a f r e e z e be successfully monitored?
W h a t a r e the possible effects o n the U.S.
negotiating position in Strategic Arms
What a r e likely Soviet reactions?
Intercontinental Ballistic M i s s i l e
Intermediate-Range Nuclear F o r c e s
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiie
Multiple Independently T a r g e t a S l e R e e n t r y Vehicle
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
Ballistic Missile S u b m a r i n e , Nuclear-Poweree
SACKGROUND AND POLICY A N A L Y S I S
S t r a t e g i c a r m s control has been an ongoing p r o c e s s s i n c e t h e beginning
the S A L T n e g o t i a t i o n s i n 1969.
T h e f i r s t f r u i t o f these n e g o t i a t i o n s w a s t h e
so-called S A L T I a g r e e m e n t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , i n reality a d u a l agreement c o n s i s t i n g of:
(a) t h e ABM T r e a t y , w h i c h , with its a s s o c i a t e d 1 9 7 4 protocol l i m i t s t h e U.S.
t o o n e anti-ballistic
and t h e U.S.S.R.
launchers; a n d (b! a n Interim A g r e e m e n t , which s e t c e i l i n g s o n t h e a g g r e g a t e
number o f I C S M a n d S L B M l a u n c h e r s for both
(1,710 f o r t h e United
S t a t e s ; 2 , 3 4 8 for t h e S o v i e t Union).
SALT I w a s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , in and of i t s e l f , i n terms o f
the n e g O t i a t i R g
techniques used S y t h e Nixon Administration, e s p e c i a l l y by
t h e disparity in the n n m b e r of l a u n c h e r s in f a v o r of the S o v i e t Union (offset
by a U.S. a d v a n t a g e i n warheads because of
t h e U.S.);
subsequent i s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g Soviet c o m p l i a n c e a n d U.S. verification.
t h e s e i s s u e s , both
i n t o a second p h a s e
n e g o t i a t i o n s , which resulted in the S A L T I1 t r e a t y ,
in J u n e 1979.
s e t c e i l i n g s on
Unlike i t s predecessor
a g r e e m e n t , S A L T I1
inventory o f s t r a t e g i c a r m s (2,250 l a u n c h e r s , w h i c h would h a v e r e d u c e d S o v i e t
launchers s i g n i f i c a n t l y , U.S. l a u n c h e r s minimally), a s well a s
s u b l i m i t s in
specific c a t e g o r i e s of w e a p o n s
i n c l u d e d r e s t r i c t i o n s on q u a l i t a t i v e
i m p r o v e m e n t s i n strategic systems.
Although considered S y t h e Senate F o r e i g n
Committees, SALT I 1 became embroiled in other i s s u e s , including the presence
of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
iast issue proved t o be most significant, a s i t led Presidenf Carter
9 e Senate to snspend consiceration of SALT
This suspension has continued
since President C a r t e r ' s
request i n January 1980. The S A L T I Interim Agreement had expired before the
negotiations for S A L T I1 were
declared they would
to abide by
suspended consideration of S A L T 1 1 , i t stated publicly that i t would not take
actions which would prejudice f u t u r e compliance with SALT I1 as long as
Soviets exercise similar restraint.
The Soviets a r e also reported
adopted a similar position o n S A L T 1 1 , although they have not made a n y public
declarations concerning their compliance.
T h e Reagan Administration c a m e into office highly critical of SALT 1 1 , and
has not requested that the S e n a t e resume consideration o f
However, i t has not changed U.S. policy concerning compliance with
At the s a m e t i m e , the Administration has not resumed negotiations with
Soviet Union, although the P r e s i d e n t has announced a different tack, renaming
-- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
the talks START
reductions rather than limitations.
However, the Administration
perceived to have taken a long time to complete its preferred
position before resuming the t a i k s , which the President n o w hopes to begin by
the end of June.
T h e Administration's delay i n announcing a strategic arms csntrol proposal
left a void that proponents of a nuclear f r e e z e i n both Congress and a t
grassroots level sought to fill.
Congressional action on the nuclear weapons
freeze issue intensified in March 1 9 6 2 , with the introduction o f a myriad
resolutions, t h e most well
(Kennedy-Hatfield) and S.J.Eies. 1 7 7 (Jackson-Warner).
The House counterparts
of these resolutions a r e Y.J.Res. 4 3 3 (Markey) and H.Con.Res.
The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calls f o r a n immediate
testing, production a n d deployment of nuclear weapons and
T h e Jackson-Warner resolution c a l l s f o r a freeze a t
sharply reduced levels."
President Reagan has endorsed S.J.Res.
basic difference between these two resolutions is the per.ception of
strategic balance they embody.
Advocates o f the Kennedy-Hatfield
believe there i s roagh parity, therefore n o w
i s the time to initiate a
C o n v e r s e l y , proponents of the Jackson-Warner
Soviet Union has advantages in k e y areas that must
rectfied before a
freeze i s enacted.
In addition to these two
resolutions, there a r e many
resolutions which a r e variations o n the f r e e z e i d e a , resolutions which
for specific r e d u c t i o n s , a s w e l l a s resolutiocs calling f o r compliance with
o r ratification c f S A L T 11.
T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations Committee held hearings o n these resolutions
during the end o f April and beginning of May, and reported o u t a n original
joint r e s o l u t i o n , S.J.Res 212.
commends the Reagan
proposal, and c a l l s f o r sharp reductions to equal levels of I C B M s , S L B M s , and
It also calls o n the U.S. to refrain from undercutting
T h e n e w resolution passed the committee by a vote of 12-5 o n J u n e
I or 11.
9 , 1982.
d o e s not mention
" f r e e z e r w and has
interpreted a s favorable to the Adminisrration.
In September 1 9 8 2 , the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Judiciary C o m m i t t e e issued a report o n S.J.Res. 2 1 2 , i n which i t found
the proposed resolution is a n unconstitutional Exercise of
power" and that it "should be rejected by the Senate."
On J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 8 2 , the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a n original
T h i s resolution urges
joint r e s o l u t i o n , H.J.Res. 5 2 1 , by a v o t e of
that START r e s u l t i n a " m u t u a l , verifiable freeze o n the t e s t i n g , production
and further deployment of nuclear w a r h e a d s , missiles,
a n d other
t o " s u b s t a n t i a l , equitabie and
T h e resolution a l s o
that the U.S.
approve the S A L T I1 agreement provided a d e q u a t e verification capabilities a r e
On Aug. 5 , 1 9 8 2 , the H o u s e debated
resolution offered substitute language i n favor of sharp reductions
and Soviet s t r a t e g i c forces t o equal l e v e l s followed by a freeze.
T h e House
.voted 204-202 to accept the substitute l a n g u a g e , and then voted
K O recommit t h e resolution to t h e House Foreign Affairs Committee.
the House passed H.J.Res. 5 2 1 a s a m e n d e d , 273-125.
Reasons f o r G r o w i n g PuSiic a n d Congressicnal Concern
The i n i t i a l impscus f o r congressional nuclear weapons
f r e e z e initiatives
has c o m e from a grassroots movement which has grown
past several months.
T h e main f o r c e behind this movement
t o be a
growing realization of the d a n g e r s of nuclear war a n d a belief
to the a b s e n c e of
likelihood of such a war is i n c r e a s i n g , perhaps related
strategic a r m s negotiations.
The roots of the nuclear f r e e z e movement
in the Ucited
S t a t e s can be
traced to Massachusetts, where Randall F o r s b e r g , founder a n d director of the
Institute f o r D e f e n s e a n d Disarmanent S t u d i e s , wrote a memorandum
entitled " C a l l to Halt the Nuclear
fundamental d o c u m e n t of the f r e e z e movement.
freeze proposal, calling on t h e United States and the Soviet Union to
the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery
T h i s has become t h e basis f o r various
f r e e z e resolutions adopted
across the country.
T h e f r e e z e movement has spread significantly since initial referenda were
passed i n s t a t e senatorial districts in western Massachusetts i n Nov.
According to t h e Nuclear Weapons F r e e z e Campaign's National Clearinghouse,
organized f r e e z e efforts a r e ongoing
i n 50 states a n d a majority
Numerous New England town m e e t i n g s , various
councils a n d s e v e n state legislatures have passld f r e e z e resolutions to date.
Freeze resolutions were o n 28 S t a t e o r l o c a l ballots i n Nov. 1 9 8 2 , winning in
25 of them.
In a d d i t i o n to the general concern over
the effects a n d
a r o l e i n the f r e e z e
nuclear w a r , other concerns have apparently
O n e i s the size a n d scope of President Reagan's defense
which represents the largest peacetime d e f e n s e increase i n real terms,' a n d
o f strategic
specifically m a r k s
f u n d s f o r an array
S o m e critics find these plans incompatible with s i n c e r e arms
ccntrol efforts. Toncern has also been expressed by s o m e over comments by
nembers of the Administration
about limited and survivable nuclear war.
F i n a l l y , some concern has also focused on the size of the d e f e n s e budget
;jersus curtailed domestic programs, and also the potential
between defense spending and the large estimated Federal deficit.
A f i n a l factor which may have influenced the U.S.
movement is the recent
wave of anti-nuclear demonstrations
in Western Europe.
demonstrations were largeiy against the deployment of intermediate r a n g e
nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe, the general concerns were similar, a n d there may
have been some spill-over effect in the United states.
Effects o n the Defense Budget and t h e Budget Deficit
As n o t e d , concern over the size of the proposed
biilion Total Obligational Authority, $215 billion outlays for F Y 8 3 , with a
5-year projection o f $1.6 trillion) and the large projected
deficit a r e
factors which may be prompting support for some of the freeze/moratorium
Some proponents argue that if the strategic component of the
defense S u d g e t were eliminated by a freeze this savings could be translated
into a direct reduction of the budget deficit for FY83.
T h e Reagan
Administration n o w calculates that FY83 deficit to be around $101.9
the C B O baseline projection is $ 1 8 2 billion.
H o w e v e r , the FY83 request for budget authority for stratesic f o r c e s is
$23.1 billion, o f which a t least $14.47 billion would be affected by a
T h u s , for F Y 8 3 the savings within the defense budget, o r a s a sum
f r e e t o be applied against the deficit, wonld be significant but q u i t e
limited. T h e amount of money freed up by a freeze would be substantial over
ths c o u r s e of che entire Reagan strategic modernization program.
T h e total
cost, FY82-FY87, would be $180.2
(in constant F Y 8 2
dollars), not a l l o f which would be affected by a freeze.
Effects o n the Reagan Strategic F o r c e Modernization Program
On Oct. 2 , 1 9 8 1 , President Reagan announced a program to modernize and
upgrade U.S. strategic forces.
T h e overall purpose of the program
overcome perceived vulnerabilities and ShortcomiRgs a n d t o improve the
survivability of U.S.
forces, thus maintaining their capability a s a
There a r e five major elements to the program:
manned bombers, MX
basing, command systems (C3), submarines, and strategic defense.
detail s e e MB 81254:
T h e Reagan Plan for U.S. Strategic Forces:
Of t h e s e f i v e elements, for a t least three
manned bombers, MX basing
a n d submarines -- growth and modernization would be suspended by
proposals for a freeze. Some strategic defense programs involving nuclear
weapons would a l s o be included. President Reagan opposes the proposals for a
f r e e z e a t current l e v e l s , arguing that this would deny the U.S.
opportunity to close the "window of vulnerability"
(discussed i n next
T h e proposal Which the President has endorsed, H.Con.Res.
(Carney), S.J.Res. 1 7 7 (Jackson-Warner), would implement a f r e e z e only after
mutual reduction t o e q u a l levels, allowing the U.S.
to pursue these n e w
strategic programs pending the outcome of negotiations.
Critics n o t e that a t
the s a m e time the S o v i e t Union would also be f r e e t o continue i t s strategic
a r m s g r o w t h , thus making reductions more difficult.
However, g i v e n the
U P D A T E - ~ ~ / O ~
P r e s i d e n t ' s endorsement of this proposal i t would
that the f r e e z e
sequence o f
concept itself has become less of a debating
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , i - e . , freezing n o w a n d then seeking reductions, or
c n c e reductions a r e achieved.
Elements of the Reagan strategic program have also encountered opposition
in (Congress not related to a r g u m e n t s o n freeze proposals.
On Mar. 2 3 , 1 9 8 2 ,
the S e n a t e Armed Services S u b c o m m i t t e e on
Strategic a n d Theater
silo deployment of
Forces voted 9-0 not to fund manufacture
a i s s i l e u n t i l the Administration d e c i d e s o n a suitable basing mode.
c o m m i t t e e endorsed this position o n Mar. 2 9 , 1982.
such a s
the B-l bomber and two Trident s u b m a r i n e s , may a l s o face s o m e congressional
Effects o n U.S.
Strategic F o r c e s a n d the U.S.-Soviet
Much of the debate over
f r e e z e proposals
perceived strategic vulnerability o f the U.S. a n d the nature o f
T h e most often discussed term i s the "window of vulnerability," i.e.,
vulnerability o f U.S. strategic f o r c e s based
o n certain
weapons capabilities. T h e exact meaning of
unzertain Fn recent weeks.
T h e u s u a l description of the "window" i s that t h e
S o v i e t MIRVed ICBMs present the d a n g e r of a
successful S o v i e t
f i r s t s t r i k e a g a i n s t U.S. I C B M s , w h i l e leaving the Soviets with a s u f f i c i e n t
second s t r i k e o r residual forces to deter a U.S. counterattack.
this perception have countered that even i n such ac instance t h e U.S.
that c o u l d
have sufficient residual f o r c e s -- manned bombers and S L B M s
r e t a i l i a t e a g a i n s t Soviet targets.
feel that t h e
"window o f
vulnerability" i s a credible threat respond in turn that these remaining U.S.
f c r c e s d o not have the accuracy o f ICBMs to attack hardened military t a r g e t s ,
leavlng the U.S. i n the position of having t o attack
S o v i e t cities r a t h e r
than military t a r g e t s , inviting S o v i e t retaliation i n kind.
T h e main c o n c e r n
i s perhaps less over a n actual S o v i e t attack than that this capability c o u l d
be translated i n t o political l e v e r a g e a g a i n s t the U.S. and i t s allies.
E o w e v e r , in his press conference of Mar. 3 1 , 1 9 8 2 , President Reagan stated
that the Soviet advantage lies i n their ability to absorb a U.S.
strike a n d then strike a t the U.S.
T h i s i s a different
f o r m u l a t i o n than the f i r s t s t r i k e c o n c e r n , a n d has prompted
from s o m e who g i v e credence to t h e "window o f vulnerabilityl1 hypothesis.
T h e r e i s no definitive solution t o the vulnerability i s s u e , which r e m a i n s ,
F u r t h e r m o r e , asymmetries i n the U.S.-Soviet
i n p a r t , a perceptual argument.
force'structure make direct comparisons difficult.
In broad t e r m s , the U.S.
has current advantages in ICBM a c c u r a c y , potential
SLBM a c c u r a c y with
T h e Soviet U n i o n
T r i d e n t D-5 m i s s i l e , and in the t o t a l number of warheads.
has a n a d v a n t a g e i n the total n u m b e r of l a u n c h e r s , particularly
Large throwweights ( e l the a m o u n t o f payload the missile can c a r r y , r o u g h l y
i n t o a larger
capabilities a n d the related number of MIRVs per I C B M , a n d megatonage
destructive power) in their ICBM force.
T h e Soviets a l s o h a v e an a d v a n t a g e
i n t h a t their f o r c e has been
be m o r e
i m p o r t a n t in a f r e e z e a s it would
A f r e e z e a t current l e v e l s
susceptible to uncertainties b r o u g h t on by aging.
would m a k e more permanent these r e l a t i v e a d v a n t a g e s and disadvantages.
the fact that each of
the freeze proposals
negotiations, the chance of implementing a freeze before
on the willingness of both parties to accept the advantages and disadvantages
of rhe current asymmetrical balance.
f r e e z e after
would nave a greater chance of success if both powers were willing to a c c e p t
first force structures of more comparable composition.
Monitoring a Freeze
A c important concern in a l l arms control proposals i s the ability of the
partles involved to monitor compliance successfully. Monitoring is t h e f i r s t
technical step in the verification process.
Tc a certain degree verification requirements have been a s much
determinant in the shaping of arms control agreenents a s
safeguards after implementation.
SALT I , and to a large extent S A L T 1 1 ,
limits on the number of launchers rather than weapons a s the de2loyment
launchers is more easily monitored and counted by national
Yowever, the major freeze proposals would also include limitations on
production and testing of weapons as well a s their deployment.
monitoring requirements far beyond those under SALT I a n d 11.
Of the three maj3r attributes being f r o z e n , deployment is presumably
easiast tc monitor and adequately verify by nationai techcical m e a n s , given
the types of ncticeable activity associated with weapons deployment.
of entire systerris (i.e., l a u n c h , separation cf RVs and
alsc readily monitored.
However, testing a t the component level has been a n d
remains a serious problem, although component testing does not a l l o w the s a m e
confidence in the reliability of a weapon system to be achieved.
while monitoring is more difficult, the potential f o r a military
arising from undetected component testing activity is a l s o lessened.
problems could be encountered in ambiguities between military missiles
missiles used f c r peaceful, i.e., scientific, purposes.
Production, regardless of the level of reliability o f the system, i s a l s o
difficult to monitor, especially if the weapons are not moved to launch s i t e s
or are produced near l a u n c h ' s i t e s . This could be a potential problem
Soviet SS-17 a n d SS-18 missiles, which a r e "cold l a u n c h e d l w i.e.,
i n which
the missile is fired above the silo, thus leaving the silo reusable f o r a n e w
However, the time required for a
successful l a u n c h , reload a n d
second launch remains in dispute.
One suggested meafis around some of
This concept has often been resisted by the S o v i e t
on-site inspection (OSI).
Union and would need to be worked out in detail.
ACDA Director Eugene R o s t o w
has already expressed interest in "cooperative measuresw i n connection with
the Reagan Adnir~istration's approach
strategic a r m s
emphasizes reductions rath~?r than limits.
Thus, it c a n be assumed
either major variant of the freeze proposals would impose new monitoring
verification requirements, some of which
fall short of a d e q u a c y i n
certain respects, or h a v e , in the past a t l e a s t , been
Effects on U.S.
Negotiating Position in INF and START
The United States is already engaged i n talks xith the Soviet Union o n the
reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces ( I N F ) in Europe a n d
(Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)
i n the summer o f
officials have expressed
rzsolutions will adversely affect these negotiations.
This a r g u m e n t i s made
on two grounds.
F i r s t , some major f r e e z e proposals
I N F and
strategic f o r c e s , thus combining
two talks a n d , according
Administration, adding to tneir complexity.
r e s o l u t i o n s , H.
Res. 4 4 3 (Zablocki) a n d S. J.Res.
( P e r c y ) , specifically c a l l f o r the
strategic arms and INF talks to be
S e c o n d , the Administration
argues that the proposals f o r a freeze f i r s t l i m i t the flexibility of the
U.S. position i n any negotiations, in part by giving the Soviet Union a n idea
of what Congress is most likely to a c c e p t , or perhaps by
Soviets t o appeal directly to Congress a n d the U.S. public during the
Administration spokesmen point out thac thare
similar pressure effectively exerted o n the Soviet government.
k third argument advanced by the Administratiop i s
with the strategic f o r c e program while a l s o pursuing
i n order
for the U.S. to have a s strong a negotiating position a s possible a n d to give
the Soviets incentive to negotiate.
n o t e d , this position
attacked by advocates a s fallacious, and some critics argue
weapons a s "bargaining chips" wastes
resources or makes
r e d u c t i o n s more
The S o v i e t Union has welcomed the r i s e of the nuclear weapcns
i n the
Kennedy-Hatfield resolution i n March, the Soviet press
coverage to the freeze Rovement.
T h e two main themes o f this c o v e r a g e have
been praise f o r the proponents of a n immediate nuclear weapons
criticism cf t h e Reagan Administration
for rejecting this
Soviets c i t e disagreement with the Administration's "militarist" poiicies
t h e Sriving f o r c e . b e h i n d the freeze movement:
"In a matter
this i d e a has gained immense popularity among ordinary Americans,
seriously alarmed by the militarist hysteria being whipped up by
T h e Soviet Union portrays itself a s t h e ally
[ ~ z v e s t i a , - A u g u s t24.1
of the movement:
" t h e Soviet Union
i s in the vanguard
[ ~ z v e s t i a ,J u n e 10.1
Soviet criticism of the Administration o n the f r e e z e issue w a s
sharp after the House defeated the f r e e z e resolution on Aug. 5.
n e w s agency T A S S , on Aug. 7 , commented o n the outcome o f the vote:
A s is k n o w n , the Reagan Administration has,
by raw political bargaining, undisguised scare
tactics a n d blackmail, succeeded in getting the
Bouse of Representatives to vote down that
document [ f r e e z e resolution] and adopt a
resolution i n sup,port of i t s unconstructive
position a t the Soviet-U.S. talks o n limiting
a n d reducing strategic arms.
T h e S o v i e t Union has not officially endorsed
resolution, but has put forth its o w n freeze proposal.
S o v i e t President
Brezhnev f i r s t announced the Soviet proposal in a May
1 8 speech
I t i s . . .v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o e f f e c t i v e l y b l o c k a l l
the channels f o r t h e ccntinuation of t h e s t r a t e g i c
a r n s r a c e i n any form.
T h i s means t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of nex t y p e s of s t r a t e g i c weapons s h o u l d be e i t h e r
banned o r r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e u t m o s t . . .
We w o u l 6 b e p r e p a r e d t o r e a c h a g r e e m e n t s t h a t t h e
s bh y
, a- "L ~ g ia r~m a m e n t s o f t h e USSR a n d t h e U . S . a r e
f r o z e n a l r e a d y now, a s s o o n a s t h e t a l k s [ S T A R T ]
Frozen q u a n t i t a t i v e l y .
And t h a t t h e i r
modernization i s limited t o t h e utmost...
An A u g .
1 9 TASS r e l e a s e s u m m a r i z e d t h e r e a s o n s f o r
The m u t u a l f r e e z i n g o f n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s would
be a n i m p o r t a n t f i r s t s t e p i n s t o p p i n g t h e n u c l e a r
arms r a c e .
T h i s wouid r u l e o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
t h e b u i l d i n g up of n u c l e a r armaments and create
favorable conditicns for the speediest adoption
of e f f e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s t o r e d u c e and l i m i t n u c l e a r
Although t h e Soviet proposal c a l l e d f o r a f r e e z e a t
t a l k s were t o begin (June 2 9 ) , t h e s t a r t of
The S o v i e t s are s t i l l c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e
Soviet calls for a freeze.
f r e e z e on
rEarmament program a n d , t h e r e f o r e , are s t i l l s e e k i n g
[Moscow W o r l d
weapons w h i l e t h e t a l k s a r e i n p r o g r e s s . "
521 (Zablocki e t al.)
S t a t e s t h a t START s h o u l d r e s u l t
a "mutual v e r i f i a b l e f r e e z e w on
t e s t i n g , production and deployment, followed by " s u b s t a n t i a l ,
v e r i f i a b l e reductions," and t h a t t h e
r e s o l u t i o n , p a s s e d by t h e House F o r e i g n A f f a i r s
Amendecl s o a s
1982, and r e p o r t e d J u l y 19, 1982 (H.Rept. 97-493).
and Soviet f o r c e s t o equal
sharp reductions i n U.S.
f r e e z e , 204-202; a n d t h e n p a s s e d , 273-125, Aug. 5 , 1 9 8 2 .
S . J. R e s . 2 1 2 ( P e r c y )
Commends P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s START p r o p o s a l , a n d s t a t e s t h a t a
c o n t r o l agreement s h o u l d " s h a r p l y r e d u c e w numbers of missiles
t h a t U . S . s h o l i l d n o t u n d e r c u t SALT I a n d 1 1 ; a n d s u g g e s t s
An o r i g i n a l r e s o l u t i o n ,
R e l a t i o n s Committee, 12-5, J u n e 9, 1982, a n d r e p o r t e d J u l y 1 2 , 1982
(Only t h o s e D i
on which some a c t i o n h a s b e e n t a k e n a r e n o t e d h e r e .
a tabul-ar comparison of
l l s
House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.
arms control and U.S. national security policy.
Apr. 2-June 2 3 ,
1982. Hearings and markup, 97th Ccnqress, 2d session.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
Committee on Foreign Relations.
arms reduction proposals.
Apr. 29-May i 3 , 1982.
Hearings, 97tn Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 402 p.
REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in
nuclear weapons and for approval of the SALT I 1 agreement;
report, together With minority and supplemental views, to
accompany H.J.Res. 521. July 1 9 , 1982. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 21 p.
(97th Congress, 2d
House. Report no. 97-640)
Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
arms reductions; repcrt, together with minority and additional
views, to accompany S.J.Res. 2i2. July 1 2 , 1982. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
8 2 p.
(97th Congress, 26
session. Senate. Report no. 97-493)
Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary.
on Separation of Powers. Report on S.J.Res. 212.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
1 2 p.
Congress, 2d session.)
At head of title:
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Freeze resolutions won in 25 out of 28 jurisdictions
where they appearea cn ballots.
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers issuer2 a report finding S.J.Res. 212 to be
unconstitutional and recommending it not be passed by
House voted 204-202 to amend H.J.Res. 5 2 1 in favor
of sharp reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces
followed by a freeze, and then voted to pass the
amended resolution, 273-125.
House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, 28-8, H.J.Res.
521, calling for a "mutual verifiable,
equitable and verifiable reductions," and approval of
SALT I 1 by the United States.
T h e Senate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e reported
out an original joint r e a o l u t i o n , by a v o t e of
1 2 - 5 , commending President R e a g a n ' s S T A R T proposal,
calling for reductions to equal l e v e l s of missiles
and warheads, and asking the U.S. n o t to undercut
SALT I and 11.
T h e resolution does not mention a
President Reagan said the United S t a t e s would not
undercut "existing strategic a r m s a g r e e m e n t s " a s
long as the Scviet Union did the same.
President Reagan proposed a two-step
reduction of strategic nuclear forces:
(1) reductions o f ballistic missile warheads to
equal levels, with no more than half of t h e
remaiRing warheads to be land based; (2) equal
ceiling on other e l e m e n t s , including ballistic
President Reagan called for r e d u c t i o n s i n
~ u c l e a rarms a n d endbrsed t h e
Jackson-Warner-Carney f r e e z e proposal.
President Brezhnev offered a moratorium
on deployment of S o v i e t medium-range nuclear
missiles i n the European part of t h e S o v i e t
President Reagan announced his ,"zero-option,''
calling for the elimination of a l l
intermediate-range nuclear f o r c e s f r o m
Soviet Fresident Brezhnev responded to President
Fieaganps START proposal by welcoming the desire
to negotiate but criticizing the s p s c i f i c s of the
Brezhnev proposed a U.S.-Soviet
freeze o n strategic weapons to f a k e e f f e c t
" a s s o o n a s the talks [START] begin."
H.Con,Res , 20
(Brown of CA)
nuclear warheads, missiles &
other delivery systems
START reductions; seeks
& a conference for
are disposed of
& all other
Ban development, testing
use of nuclear
weapons of any
H.J Res. 2
At equal &
For a corn
I N F talks
annual % or
START & INF
annual % or
START & I N '
Reduce & eliminate first
To create a
to equal levels
at least 1/3
with no more
than 1/2 (2500)
on ICBMs, with a
total of 850 ICBMs
(b) equal ceiling
on other elements
All US &
systems reduced to
US does not
& Pershing 2s,
SS-20s to 162,
= British &
US INF deployments