Nuclear Freeze: Arms Control Proposals

NUCLEAR FREEZE: ARKS CONTROL PROPOSALS ISSULE B R I E F N U M B E R I B 8 2 0 5 9 AUTHOR: K a r k M. Lowenthal Foreign Affairs and Naticnal D e f e n s e Division J u d i t h A. Freedman Office of Senior S p e c i a l i s t s THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE O R I G I N A T E D 05/03/82 DATE UPDATED 12/06/82 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION C A L L 287-5700 1206 CRS- 1 ISSUE DEFINITION There is growing concern amidst the public in general a n d within Congress about the size of the nuclear arsenals of t h e United S t a t e s and the Soviet Union 2nd t h e f u t u r e of strategic a r m s control. Numerous localities across the nation have passed resolutions calling for a n i m m e d i a t e end to the strategic a r m s r a c e , and i n favor of renewed efforts t o achieve a n e w a r m s especially a s SALT I 1 control agreement between the U.S. and t h e U.S.S.R., remains o n the calendar i n the S e n a t e without plans for further Consideration. Kany Members of Congress have introduced resolutions intended to achieve the same or similar ends, s o m e of which h a v e attracted significant support i n both Houses i ~ c l u d i n gS.Z.Res. 212, which passed the S e n a t e Foreign Relations Committee o n J u n e 9 , 1 9 8 2 , a n d H.J.Res. 5 2 1 , which passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee o n June 2 3 , i982. T h e f u l l House considered H.J.Res. 521 on Au3. 5 , 1 9 6 2 , a n d voted not to a c c e p t t h e original l a n g u a g e , which would have called f o r a n immediate negotiated f r e e z e , voting instead in favor of suSstitute language in favor of a f r e e z e a f t e r the U.S. a n d U.S.S.R. have sharply reduced their strategic forces t o equal levels. President Reagan had endorsed a proposal similar t o that a p p r o v e d by the House a s part of his call for reCuctions in nuclear forces. A l s o , o n May 9 , 1 9 8 2 , the President revealed his two-stage START (Strategic A r m s Reduction Talks) proposal. He called for reductions, during the f i r s t p h a s e , of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels a t least one-third below current l e v e l s , with no morn than half of the renining warheads to be landbased. T h e second phase provides for equal ceilings on other ~ l e m e n t s ,including ballistic missile zhrowweight. Heightened public and congressional c o n c e r n , themselves, raise the following questions: and the various -- W h a t a r e the reasons for this growing concern? -- W h a t effect might a freeze have o n the d e f e n s e S u d g e t and o n the budget deficit? -- What a r e the possible effects o n President Reagan's strategic force modernization program? -- What a r e the possible effects o n the capabilities and survivability of U.S. s t r a t e g i c forces a n d on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance? --- Could a f r e e z e be successfully monitored? -- W h a t a r e the possible effects o n the U.S. negotiating position in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks? What a r e likely Soviet reactions? proposals CRS- 2 ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic M i s s i l e INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear F o r c e s IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiie KIRV Multiple Independently T a r g e t a S l e R e e n t r y Vehicle RV Reentry Vehicle SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SNDV S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Delivery Vehicle SSBN Ballistic Missile S u b m a r i n e , Nuclear-Poweree SACKGROUND AND POLICY A N A L Y S I S S t r a t e g i c a r m s control has been an ongoing p r o c e s s s i n c e t h e beginning of the S A L T n e g o t i a t i o n s i n 1969. T h e f i r s t f r u i t o f these n e g o t i a t i o n s w a s t h e so-called S A L T I a g r e e m e n t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , i n reality a d u a l agreement c o n s i s t i n g of: (a) t h e ABM T r e a t y , w h i c h , with its a s s o c i a t e d 1 9 7 4 protocol l i m i t s t h e U.S. t o o n e anti-ballistic missile system each with 100 and t h e U.S.S.R. launchers; a n d (b! a n Interim A g r e e m e n t , which s e t c e i l i n g s o n t h e a g g r e g a t e number o f I C S M a n d S L B M l a u n c h e r s for both powers (1,710 f o r t h e United S t a t e s ; 2 , 3 4 8 for t h e S o v i e t Union). SALT I w a s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , in and of i t s e l f , i n terms o f the n e g O t i a t i R g techniques used S y t h e Nixon Administration, e s p e c i a l l y by Henry Kissinger; t h e disparity in the n n m b e r of l a u n c h e r s in f a v o r of the S o v i e t Union (offset Multiple Independently by a U.S. a d v a n t a g e i n warheads because of MIRV technology employed by t h e U.S.); and Targetable Reentry Vehicles subsequent i s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g Soviet c o m p l i a n c e a n d U.S. verification. -- -- of Despite t h e s e i s s u e s , both powers entered i n t o a second p h a s e n e g o t i a t i o n s , which resulted in the S A L T I1 t r e a t y , signed in J u n e 1979. s e t c e i l i n g s on the overall Unlike i t s predecessor a g r e e m e n t , S A L T I1 inventory o f s t r a t e g i c a r m s (2,250 l a u n c h e r s , w h i c h would h a v e r e d u c e d S o v i e t launchers s i g n i f i c a n t l y , U.S. l a u n c h e r s minimally), a s well a s s u b l i m i t s in specific c a t e g o r i e s of w e a p o n s overall numbers of launchers and MIRVed ballistic missiles. Also, SALT I1 i n c l u d e d r e s t r i c t i o n s on q u a l i t a t i v e i m p r o v e m e n t s i n strategic systems. -- Although considered S y t h e Senate F o r e i g n Relations an8 Armed Services CRS- 3 IB82059 UPDATE-12/06/82 Committees, SALT I 1 became embroiled in other i s s u e s , including the presence This of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. iast issue proved t o be most significant, a s i t led Presidenf Carter to ask 9 e Senate to snspend consiceration of SALT 11 pending resolution of the Afghan situation. This suspension has continued since President C a r t e r ' s request i n January 1980. The S A L T I Interim Agreement had expired before the negotiations for S A L T I1 were complete, but the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. declared they would continue to abide by its terms. After the U.S. suspended consideration of S A L T 1 1 , i t stated publicly that i t would not take actions which would prejudice f u t u r e compliance with SALT I1 as long as the Soviets exercise similar restraint. The Soviets a r e also reported to have adopted a similar position o n S A L T 1 1 , although they have not made a n y public declarations concerning their compliance. T h e Reagan Administration c a m e into office highly critical of SALT 1 1 , and has not requested that the S e n a t e resume consideration o f that agreement. However, i t has not changed U.S. policy concerning compliance with SALT 11. At the s a m e t i m e , the Administration has not resumed negotiations with the Soviet Union, although the P r e s i d e n t has announced a different tack, renaming -- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks thus emphasizing the talks START reductions rather than limitations. However, the Administration is widely perceived to have taken a long time to complete its preferred negotiating position before resuming the t a i k s , which the President n o w hopes to begin by the end of June. -- T h e Administration's delay i n announcing a strategic arms csntrol proposal the left a void that proponents of a nuclear f r e e z e i n both Congress and a t grassroots level sought to fill. Congressional action on the nuclear weapons freeze issue intensified in March 1 9 6 2 , with the introduction o f a myriad of freeze-related resolutions, t h e most well known being S.J.Res. 163 (Kennedy-Hatfield) and S.J.Eies. 1 7 7 (Jackson-Warner). The House counterparts of these resolutions a r e Y.J.Res. 4 3 3 (Markey) and H.Con.Res. 297 (Carney), respectively. The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calls f o r a n immediate freeze on the testing, production a n d deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery "equal and vehicles. T h e Jackson-Warner resolution c a l l s f o r a freeze a t sharply reduced levels." President Reagan has endorsed S.J.Res. 177. The basic difference between these two resolutions is the per.ception of the strategic balance they embody. Advocates o f the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution believe there i s roagh parity, therefore n o w i s the time to initiate a freeze. C o n v e r s e l y , proponents of the Jackson-Warner approach believe the Soviet Union has advantages in k e y areas that must be rectfied before a freeze i s enacted. In addition to these two resolutions, there a r e many resolutions which a r e variations o n the f r e e z e i d e a , resolutions which call for specific r e d u c t i o n s , a s w e l l a s resolutiocs calling f o r compliance with o r ratification c f S A L T 11. Congressional Action T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations Committee held hearings o n these resolutions during the end o f April and beginning of May, and reported o u t a n original joint r e s o l u t i o n , S.J.Res 212. This resolution commends the Reagan START proposal, and c a l l s f o r sharp reductions to equal levels of I C B M s , S L B M s , and their warheads. It also calls o n the U.S. to refrain from undercutting SALT T h e n e w resolution passed the committee by a vote of 12-5 o n J u n e I or 11. 9 , 1982. This resolution d o e s not mention a " f r e e z e r w and has been CRS- 4 interpreted a s favorable to the Adminisrration. In September 1 9 8 2 , the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary C o m m i t t e e issued a report o n S.J.Res. 2 1 2 , i n which i t found "that the proposed resolution is a n unconstitutional Exercise of congressional power" and that it "should be rejected by the Senate." On J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 8 2 , the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a n original 28-8. T h i s resolution urges joint r e s o l u t i o n , H.J.Res. 5 2 1 , by a v o t e of that START r e s u l t i n a " m u t u a l , verifiable freeze o n the t e s t i n g , production and further deployment of nuclear w a r h e a d s , missiles, a n d other delivery systems," and then proceed t o " s u b s t a n t i a l , equitabie and verifiable reductions." T h e resolution a l s o states that the U.S. "shall promptly approve the S A L T I1 agreement provided a d e q u a t e verification capabilities a r e maintained." On Aug. 5 , 1 9 8 2 , the H o u s e debated H.J.Res. 521. Opponents of the resolution offered substitute language i n favor of sharp reductions in U.S. and Soviet s t r a t e g i c forces t o equal l e v e l s followed by a freeze. T h e House .voted 204-202 to accept the substitute l a n g u a g e , and then voted 175-229 not K O recommit t h e resolution to t h e House Foreign Affairs Committee. Finally, the House passed H.J.Res. 5 2 1 a s a m e n d e d , 273-125. Reasons f o r G r o w i n g PuSiic a n d Congressicnal Concern The i n i t i a l impscus f o r congressional nuclear weapons f r e e z e initiatives has c o m e from a grassroots movement which has grown dramatically over ths past several months. T h e main f o r c e behind this movement appears t o be a that the growing realization of the d a n g e r s of nuclear war a n d a belief to the a b s e n c e of likelihood of such a war is i n c r e a s i n g , perhaps related strategic a r m s negotiations. The roots of the nuclear f r e e z e movement in the Ucited S t a t e s can be traced to Massachusetts, where Randall F o r s b e r g , founder a n d director of the Institute f o r D e f e n s e a n d Disarmanent S t u d i e s , wrote a memorandum in 1980 entitled " C a l l to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," which has become the fundamental d o c u m e n t of the f r e e z e movement. The memorandum puts forth a freeze proposal, calling on t h e United States and the Soviet Union to freeze the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. T h i s has become t h e basis f o r various f r e e z e resolutions adopted across the country. T h e f r e e z e movement has spread significantly since initial referenda were passed i n s t a t e senatorial districts in western Massachusetts i n Nov. 1980. According to t h e Nuclear Weapons F r e e z e Campaign's National Clearinghouse, of organized f r e e z e efforts a r e ongoing i n 50 states a n d a majority congressional districts. Numerous New England town m e e t i n g s , various city councils a n d s e v e n state legislatures have passld f r e e z e resolutions to date. Freeze resolutions were o n 28 S t a t e o r l o c a l ballots i n Nov. 1 9 8 2 , winning in 25 of them. In a d d i t i o n to the general concern over the effects a n d likelihood of a r o l e i n the f r e e z e nuclear w a r , other concerns have apparently played movement. O n e i s the size a n d scope of President Reagan's defense build-up, which represents the largest peacetime d e f e n s e increase i n real terms,' a n d o f strategic improvements or specifically m a r k s f u n d s f o r an array modernizations. S o m e critics find these plans incompatible with s i n c e r e arms CRS- 5 IB82059 UPDATE-12/06/82 ccntrol efforts. Toncern has also been expressed by s o m e over comments by nembers of the Administration about limited and survivable nuclear war. F i n a l l y , some concern has also focused on the size of the d e f e n s e budget ;jersus curtailed domestic programs, and also the potential relationship between defense spending and the large estimated Federal deficit. A f i n a l factor which may have influenced the U.S. movement is the recent wave of anti-nuclear demonstrations in Western Europe. While these demonstrations were largeiy against the deployment of intermediate r a n g e nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe, the general concerns were similar, a n d there may have been some spill-over effect in the United states. Effects o n the Defense Budget and t h e Budget Deficit As n o t e d , concern over the size of the proposed defense budget ($258 biilion Total Obligational Authority, $215 billion outlays for F Y 8 3 , with a 5-year projection o f $1.6 trillion) and the large projected deficit a r e factors which may be prompting support for some of the freeze/moratorium proposals. Some proponents argue that if the strategic component of the defense S u d g e t were eliminated by a freeze this savings could be translated into a direct reduction of the budget deficit for FY83. T h e Reagan Administration n o w calculates that FY83 deficit to be around $101.9 billion; the C B O baseline projection is $ 1 8 2 billion. H o w e v e r , the FY83 request for budget authority for stratesic f o r c e s is $23.1 billion, o f which a t least $14.47 billion would be affected by a freeze. T h u s , for F Y 8 3 the savings within the defense budget, o r a s a sum f r e e t o be applied against the deficit, wonld be significant but q u i t e limited. T h e amount of money freed up by a freeze would be substantial over ths c o u r s e of che entire Reagan strategic modernization program. T h e total projected cost, FY82-FY87, would be $180.2 billion (in constant F Y 8 2 dollars), not a l l o f which would be affected by a freeze. Effects o n the Reagan Strategic F o r c e Modernization Program On Oct. 2 , 1 9 8 1 , President Reagan announced a program to modernize and upgrade U.S. strategic forces. T h e overall purpose of the program is to overcome perceived vulnerabilities and ShortcomiRgs a n d t o improve the survivability of U.S. forces, thus maintaining their capability a s a deterrent. There a r e five major elements to the program: manned bombers, MX basing, command systems (C3), submarines, and strategic defense. [Fcr more detail s e e MB 81254: T h e Reagan Plan for U.S. Strategic Forces: Issues for C0ngress.j -- Of t h e s e f i v e elements, for a t least three manned bombers, MX basing the a n d submarines -- growth and modernization would be suspended by proposals for a freeze. Some strategic defense programs involving nuclear weapons would a l s o be included. President Reagan opposes the proposals for a f r e e z e a t current l e v e l s , arguing that this would deny the U.S. any opportunity to close the "window of vulnerability" (discussed i n next section). T h e proposal Which the President has endorsed, H.Con.Res. 297 (Carney), S.J.Res. 1 7 7 (Jackson-Warner), would implement a f r e e z e only after mutual reduction t o e q u a l levels, allowing the U.S. to pursue these n e w strategic programs pending the outcome of negotiations. Critics n o t e that a t the s a m e time the S o v i e t Union would also be f r e e t o continue i t s strategic a r m s g r o w t h , thus making reductions more difficult. However, g i v e n the CRS- 6 IB82059 U P D A T E - ~ ~ / O ~ P r e s i d e n t ' s endorsement of this proposal i t would appear that the f r e e z e issue than the sequence o f concept itself has become less of a debating i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , i - e . , freezing n o w a n d then seeking reductions, or freezing c n c e reductions a r e achieved. Elements of the Reagan strategic program have also encountered opposition in (Congress not related to a r g u m e n t s o n freeze proposals. On Mar. 2 3 , 1 9 8 2 , the S e n a t e Armed Services S u b c o m m i t t e e on Strategic a n d Theater Nuclear and silo deployment of the MX Forces voted 9-0 not to fund manufacture a i s s i l e u n t i l the Administration d e c i d e s o n a suitable basing mode. The full c o m m i t t e e endorsed this position o n Mar. 2 9 , 1982. Other programs, such a s the B-l bomber and two Trident s u b m a r i n e s , may a l s o face s o m e congressional opposition. Effects o n U.S. Strategic F o r c e s a n d the U.S.-Soviet Balance Much of the debate over the various f r e e z e proposals centers perceived strategic vulnerability o f the U.S. a n d the nature o f the strategic balance. on the current T h e most often discussed term i s the "window of vulnerability," i.e., the vulnerability o f U.S. strategic f o r c e s based o n certain Soviet strategic weapons capabilities. T h e exact meaning of this vulnerability has become unzertain Fn recent weeks. T h e u s u a l description of the "window" i s that t h e S o v i e t MIRVed ICBMs present the d a n g e r of a potentially successful S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e a g a i n s t U.S. I C B M s , w h i l e leaving the Soviets with a s u f f i c i e n t second s t r i k e o r residual forces to deter a U.S. counterattack. Critics of would this perception have countered that even i n such ac instance t h e U.S. that c o u l d have sufficient residual f o r c e s -- manned bombers and S L B M s r e t a i l i a t e a g a i n s t Soviet targets. Those who feel that t h e "window o f vulnerability" i s a credible threat respond in turn that these remaining U.S. f c r c e s d o not have the accuracy o f ICBMs to attack hardened military t a r g e t s , leavlng the U.S. i n the position of having t o attack S o v i e t cities r a t h e r than military t a r g e t s , inviting S o v i e t retaliation i n kind. T h e main c o n c e r n i s perhaps less over a n actual S o v i e t attack than that this capability c o u l d be translated i n t o political l e v e r a g e a g a i n s t the U.S. and i t s allies. -- E o w e v e r , in his press conference of Mar. 3 1 , 1 9 8 2 , President Reagan stated that the Soviet advantage lies i n their ability to absorb a U.S. retaliatory strike a n d then strike a t the U.S. a second time. T h i s i s a different f o r m u l a t i o n than the f i r s t s t r i k e c o n c e r n , a n d has prompted criticism, even from s o m e who g i v e credence to t h e "window o f vulnerabilityl1 hypothesis. T h e r e i s no definitive solution t o the vulnerability i s s u e , which r e m a i n s , F u r t h e r m o r e , asymmetries i n the U.S.-Soviet i n p a r t , a perceptual argument. force'structure make direct comparisons difficult. In broad t e r m s , the U.S. has current advantages in ICBM a c c u r a c y , potential SLBM a c c u r a c y with the T h e Soviet U n i o n T r i d e n t D-5 m i s s i l e , and in the t o t a l number of warheads. has a n a d v a n t a g e i n the total n u m b e r of l a u n c h e r s , particularly ICBMs with Large throwweights ( e l the a m o u n t o f payload the missile can c a r r y , r o u g h l y number of warheads), overall throwweight translatable i n t o a larger capabilities a n d the related number of MIRVs per I C B M , a n d megatonage (total destructive power) in their ICBM force. T h e Soviets a l s o h a v e an a d v a n t a g e i n t h a t their f o r c e has been modernized more recently, which could be mean that U.S. systems would be m o r e i m p o r t a n t in a f r e e z e a s it would A f r e e z e a t current l e v e l s susceptible to uncertainties b r o u g h t on by aging. would m a k e more permanent these r e l a t i v e a d v a n t a g e s and disadvantages. Given the fact that each of the freeze proposals is dependent on successful reductions depends negotiations, the chance of implementing a freeze before on the willingness of both parties to accept the advantages and disadvantages of rhe current asymmetrical balance. Similary, a f r e e z e after reduction would nave a greater chance of success if both powers were willing to a c c e p t first force structures of more comparable composition. Monitoring a Freeze A c important concern in a l l arms control proposals i s the ability of the partles involved to monitor compliance successfully. Monitoring is t h e f i r s t technical step in the verification process. Tc a certain degree verification requirements have been a s much a determinant in the shaping of arms control agreenents a s they have been safeguards after implementation. SALT I , and to a large extent S A L T 1 1 , set limits on the number of launchers rather than weapons a s the de2loyment of launchers is more easily monitored and counted by national technical means. Yowever, the major freeze proposals would also include limitations on the production and testing of weapons as well a s their deployment. This impcses monitoring requirements far beyond those under SALT I a n d 11. Of the three maj3r attributes being f r o z e n , deployment is presumably the easiast tc monitor and adequately verify by nationai techcical m e a n s , given the types of ncticeable activity associated with weapons deployment. Testing of entire systerris (i.e., l a u n c h , separation cf RVs and their reentry), is alsc readily monitored. However, testing a t the component level has been a n d remains a serious problem, although component testing does not a l l o w the s a m e confidence in the reliability of a weapon system to be achieved. Therefore, while monitoring is more difficult, the potential f o r a military threat arising from undetected component testing activity is a l s o lessened. Some problems could be encountered in ambiguities between military missiles and missiles used f c r peaceful, i.e., scientific, purposes. Production, regardless of the level of reliability o f the system, i s a l s o difficult to monitor, especially if the weapons are not moved to launch s i t e s with or are produced near l a u n c h ' s i t e s . This could be a potential problem Soviet SS-17 a n d SS-18 missiles, which a r e "cold l a u n c h e d l w i.e., i n which the missile is fired above the silo, thus leaving the silo reusable f o r a n e w missile. However, the time required for a successful l a u n c h , reload a n d second launch remains in dispute. One suggested meafis around some of these monitoring problems has been This concept has often been resisted by the S o v i e t on-site inspection (OSI). Union and would need to be worked out in detail. ACDA Director Eugene R o s t o w has already expressed interest in "cooperative measuresw i n connection with the Reagan Adnir~istration's approach to strategic a r m s control, which emphasizes reductions rath~?r than limits. Thus, it c a n be assumed that either major variant of the freeze proposals would impose new monitoring and verification requirements, some of which may fall short of a d e q u a c y i n certain respects, or h a v e , in the past a t l e a s t , been unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Effects on U.S. Negotiating Position in INF and START The United States is already engaged i n talks xith the Soviet Union o n the reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces ( I N F ) in Europe a n d hopes to begjn START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) i n the summer o f 1982. Administration officials have expressed concern thst these varicus rzsolutions will adversely affect these negotiations. This a r g u m e n t i s made on two grounds. F i r s t , some major f r e e z e proposals would include I N F and strategic f o r c e s , thus combining those two talks a n d , according to the Administration, adding to tneir complexity. (Two other r e s o l u t i o n s , H. J. Res. 4 4 3 (Zablocki) a n d S. J.Res. 171 ( P e r c y ) , specifically c a l l f o r the strategic arms and INF talks to be combined.) S e c o n d , the Administration argues that the proposals f o r a freeze f i r s t l i m i t the flexibility of the U.S. position i n any negotiations, in part by giving the Soviet Union a n idea of what Congress is most likely to a c c e p t , or perhaps by encouraging the Soviets t o appeal directly to Congress a n d the U.S. public during the course of negotiations. Administration spokesmen point out thac thare can be no similar pressure effectively exerted o n the Soviet government. k third argument advanced by the Administratiop i s the need to proceed with the strategic f o r c e program while a l s o pursuing negotiations i n order for the U.S. to have a s strong a negotiating position a s possible a n d to give the Soviets incentive to negotiate. As n o t e d , this position has been attacked by advocates a s fallacious, and some critics argue that building weapons a s "bargaining chips" wastes resources or makes r e d u c t i o n s more difficult. Soviet Reactions The S o v i e t Union has welcomed the r i s e of the nuclear weapcns freeze movement i n the United States. Since the introduction of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution i n March, the Soviet press has given extensive coverage to the freeze Rovement. T h e two main themes o f this c o v e r a g e have been praise f o r the proponents of a n immediate nuclear weapons freeze and criticism cf t h e Reagan Administration for rejecting this course. The Soviets c i t e disagreement with the Administration's "militarist" poiicies as t h e Sriving f o r c e . b e h i n d the freeze movement: "In a matter of six months this i d e a has gained immense popularity among ordinary Americans, who are seriously alarmed by the militarist hysteria being whipped up by the White T h e Soviet Union portrays itself a s t h e ally House." [ ~ z v e s t i a , - A u g u s t24.1 of the movement: " t h e Soviet Union i s in the vanguard of the peace movement." [ ~ z v e s t i a ,J u n e 10.1 Soviet criticism of the Administration o n the f r e e z e issue w a s especially sharp after the House defeated the f r e e z e resolution on Aug. 5. The Soviet n e w s agency T A S S , on Aug. 7 , commented o n the outcome o f the vote: A s is k n o w n , the Reagan Administration has, by raw political bargaining, undisguised scare tactics a n d blackmail, succeeded in getting the Bouse of Representatives to vote down that document [ f r e e z e resolution] and adopt a resolution i n sup,port of i t s unconstructive position a t the Soviet-U.S. talks o n limiting a n d reducing strategic arms. T h e S o v i e t Union has not officially endorsed any specific U.S. freeze resolution, but has put forth its o w n freeze proposal. S o v i e t President Brezhnev f i r s t announced the Soviet proposal in a May 1 8 speech to the Komsomol Congress: CRS- 9 I t i s . . .v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o e f f e c t i v e l y b l o c k a l l the channels f o r t h e ccntinuation of t h e s t r a t e g i c a r n s r a c e i n any form. T h i s means t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of nex t y p e s of s t r a t e g i c weapons s h o u l d be e i t h e r banned o r r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e u t m o s t . . . We w o u l 6 b e p r e p a r e d t o r e a c h a g r e e m e n t s t h a t t h e s bh y , a- "L ~ g ia r~m a m e n t s o f t h e USSR a n d t h e U . S . a r e f r o z e n a l r e a d y now, a s s o o n a s t h e t a l k s [ S T A R T ] begin. Frozen q u a n t i t a t i v e l y . And t h a t t h e i r modernization i s limited t o t h e utmost... An A u g . freeze: 1 9 TASS r e l e a s e s u m m a r i z e d t h e r e a s o n s f o r Soviet support of a The m u t u a l f r e e z i n g o f n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s would be a n i m p o r t a n t f i r s t s t e p i n s t o p p i n g t h e n u c l e a r arms r a c e . T h i s wouid r u l e o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e b u i l d i n g up of n u c l e a r armaments and create favorable conditicns for the speediest adoption of e f f e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s t o r e d u c e and l i m i t n u c l e a r arms. Although t h e Soviet proposal c a l l e d f o r a f r e e z e a t the time the START those taiks has not hampered t a l k s were t o begin (June 2 9 ) , t h e s t a r t of The S o v i e t s are s t i l l c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e Reagan Soviet calls for a freeze. "a f r e e z e on nuclear rEarmament program a n d , t h e r e f o r e , are s t i l l s e e k i n g [Moscow W o r l d Service, July 1, weapons w h i l e t h e t a l k s a r e i n p r o g r e s s . " 1982. ] LEGISLATION 521 (Zablocki e t al.) S t a t e s t h a t START s h o u l d r e s u l t in a "mutual v e r i f i a b l e f r e e z e w on t e s t i n g , production and deployment, followed by " s u b s t a n t i a l , equitable and 11. An original v e r i f i a b l e reductions," and t h a t t h e U.S. approve SALT Committee, 28-8, June 23, r e s o l u t i o n , p a s s e d by t h e House F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Amendecl s o a s t o favor 1982, and r e p o r t e d J u l y 19, 1982 (H.Rept. 97-493). and Soviet f o r c e s t o equal levels followed by a sharp reductions i n U.S. f r e e z e , 204-202; a n d t h e n p a s s e d , 273-125, Aug. 5 , 1 9 8 2 . H.J.Res. S . J. R e s . 2 1 2 ( P e r c y ) new arms Commends P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s START p r o p o s a l , a n d s t a t e s t h a t a c o n t r o l agreement s h o u l d " s h a r p l y r e d u c e w numbers of missiles and warheads; mutual confidence t h a t U . S . s h o l i l d n o t u n d e r c u t SALT I a n d 1 1 ; a n d s u g g e s t s building measures. An o r i g i n a l r e s o l u t i o n , passed by the Senate Foreign (S.Rept. R e l a t i o n s Committee, 12-5, J u n e 9, 1982, a n d r e p o r t e d J u l y 1 2 , 1982 97-483). (Only t h o s e D i printed Appendix proposals.) on which some a c t i o n h a s b e e n t a k e n a r e n o t e d h e r e . See a tabul-ar comparison of the various legislative for l l s HEARINGS U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Strategic arms control and U.S. national security policy. Apr. 2-June 2 3 , 1982. Hearings and markup, 97th Ccnqress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 275 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear arms reduction proposals. Apr. 29-May i 3 , 1982. Hearings, 97tn Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 402 p. REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons and for approval of the SALT I 1 agreement; report, together With minority and supplemental views, to accompany H.J.Res. 521. July 1 9 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 21 p. (97th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 97-640) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear arms reductions; repcrt, together with minority and additional views, to accompany S.J.Res. 2i2. July 1 2 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 8 2 p. (97th Congress, 26 session. Senate. Report no. 97-493) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. Report on S.J.Res. 212. Sept. 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 1 2 p. (97th Congress, 2d session.) At head of title: Committee print.. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 11/02/82 -- Freeze resolutions won in 25 out of 28 jurisdictions where they appearea cn ballots. 09/22/82 -- Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers issuer2 a report finding S.J.Res. 212 to be unconstitutional and recommending it not be passed by the Senate. 08/05/82 -- House voted 204-202 to amend H.J.Res. 5 2 1 in favor of sharp reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces followed by a freeze, and then voted to pass the amended resolution, 273-125. 06/23/82 -- House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, 28-8, H.J.Res. substantial, 521, calling for a "mutual verifiable, equitable and verifiable reductions," and approval of SALT I 1 by the United States. ... 05/09/82 -- T h e Senate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e reported out an original joint r e a o l u t i o n , by a v o t e of 1 2 - 5 , commending President R e a g a n ' s S T A R T proposal, calling for reductions to equal l e v e l s of missiles and warheads, and asking the U.S. n o t to undercut SALT I and 11. T h e resolution does not mention a "freeze. " 05/13/82 -- President Reagan said the United S t a t e s would not undercut "existing strategic a r m s a g r e e m e n t s " a s long as the Scviet Union did the same. 35/18/82 -- 05/05/82 -- President Reagan proposed a two-step reduction of strategic nuclear forces: (1) reductions o f ballistic missile warheads to equal levels, with no more than half of t h e remaiRing warheads to be land based; (2) equal ceiling on other e l e m e n t s , including ballistic missile throwweight. 03/31/52 -- President Reagan called for r e d u c t i o n s i n ~ u c l e a rarms a n d endbrsed t h e Jackson-Warner-Carney f r e e z e proposal. 03/16/82 -- President Brezhnev offered a moratorium on deployment of S o v i e t medium-range nuclear missiles i n the European part of t h e S o v i e t Union. 11/18/81 -- President Reagan announced his ,"zero-option,'' calling for the elimination of a l l intermediate-range nuclear f o r c e s f r o m Europe. Soviet Fresident Brezhnev responded to President Fieaganps START proposal by welcoming the desire to negotiate but criticizing the s p s c i f i c s of the proposal. Brezhnev proposed a U.S.-Soviet freeze o n strategic weapons to f a k e e f f e c t " a s s o o n a s the talks [START] begin." APPmmIX CQMPARISONOFARMsOONJPWX.m~-9m00N(;IRESS I=/ SPECIFIC NEmTI- NEW!mnmS PIloHlSm FREEZE STRATBGIC RBXI(IT1ONS ATIONS AtumEZl H.Con,Res , 20 (Brown of CA) All testing, production & deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles & other delivery systems Both Encourages President on proposed START reductions; seeks staged disarmament For intl. disarmament Both Substantial until all are eliminated For USSoviet reductions, & a conference for reductions by all nuclear powers Both Until all nuclear weapons are disposed of US, Soviet & all other nations with potential nuclear capabi1ity Balanced, mutual & verifiable Special attention to destabilizing systems H.Con.Res. (Fish) 22 H.Con.Res. (Neal) 24 Ban development, testing possession, deployment or use of nuclear weapons of any kind H.J Res. 2 (Markey) All testing, Both production & deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles & other delivery systems H.J.Res. 3 (Bedell) All nuclear testing Both H.J.Res. 4 (Broomfield) At equal & substantially reduced levels Both For a corn prehensive test ban Substantial, to equal levels Supports START & I N F talks H.J.Res. 13 (Zablocki) All testing, Both production & deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles & other delivery systems Substantial & equitable, via numerical ceilings or annual % or other means Incorporate START & INF negotiations 34 All testing, Both production & deployment of nuclear warheads missiles & other delivery systems Substantial & equitable via numerical ceilings or annual % or other means Incorporate START & I N ' negotiations First strike weapons Reduce & eliminate first strike weapons H.J.Res. (Neal) US renounce first use of all nuclear weapons H.J.Res. (Gore) H.R. 408 (Stark) 61 Both Strategic To create a joint US-USSR Comnunications Center Reagan Strategic Arms Strategic Reduction in START two phases: (a) ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least 1/3 below current levels (to approx. 5000), with no more than 1/2 (2500) on ICBMs, with a total of 850 ICBMs and SLBMS; (b) equal ceiling on other elements of strategic forces, including ballistic missile throw weight Reagan Zero Option (INF) INF All US & Soviet INF missile systems reduced to zero INF INE' US does not deploy GLCMS & Pershing 2s, USSR reduces SS-20s to 162, = British & French missiles Andropov IN. US INF deployments INF