NATO Nuclear Forces: Modernization and Arms Controls

NATO NUCLEAR FORCES: MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB81128 AUTHOR: Stanley R. Sloan Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division T H E LIBRARY O F CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM D A T E ORIGINATED 08/04/81 D A T E UPDATED 01/24/83 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0 1 25 CRS- 1 I n December 1 9 7 9 , t h e United S t a t e s and 1 2 NATO p a r t n e r s agreed to I m o d e r n i z e NATO's t h e a t e r n u c l e a r f o r c e s by replacing existing Pershing b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s w i t h a more a c c u r a t e a n d l o n g e r r a n g e P e r s h i n g I1 (P-11) w h i l e a d d i n g new g r o u n d l a u n c h e d c r u i s e m i s s i l e s . T h e d e p l o y m e n t was s e e n a s necessary to: (1) s o l i d i f y t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e U . S . nuclear guarantee t o theater nuclear forces; Europe; (2) respond t o Soviet modernization of i t s ( 3 ) r e p l a c e obsolescent Western systems; and (4) provide bargaining leverage f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union. T h e d e c i s i o n was l i n k e d , t e c h n i c a l l y by and p o l i t i c a l l y , t o a commitment t o a t t e m p t t o d e a l w i t h t h e t h r e a t posed he new S o v i e t s y s t e m s b y negotiating limits on theater nuclear systems w i t h i n t h e SALT f r a m e w o r k . D e v e l o p m e n t s s i n c e December 1 9 7 9 h a v e e r o d e d t h e p o l i t i c a l base for the European countries has d e c i s i o n , a n d a n t i - n u c l e a r s e n t i m e n t i n a number o f c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e o r i g i n a l deployment plan. Furthermore, the P-I1 missile's t e s t f a i l u r e s l e d t h e 97th Congress t o deny procurement funds for t h e missile u n t i l i t s v i a b i l i t y i s demontrated. of W i t h d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e new N A T O m i s s i l e s s c h e d u l e d t o b e g i n b y t h e e n d critical phase. If 1983, U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva are in a n e g o t i a t i o n s d o n o t m o v e t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t , t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e West t o deploy t h e Soviet t h e new m i s s i l e s c o u l d d e p e n d o n w h e t h e r t h e United States or Union i s viewed as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f a i l u r e t o r e a c h a g r e e m e n t . CRS- 2 TABLE OF CCNTSNTS BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS N A T O ' S D e c e m b e r 1979 D e c i s i o n NATO'S Nuclear Dilemma Toward Preliminary Kegotiations A n t i - N u c l e a r S e n t i m e n t i n Europe: Soviet Responses U.S. and 2GLICY QUESTIONS AND VARIAaLES WHAT ROLE DOES THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE PLAY? W H A T I S T H E STATUS OF T H E DEPLOYMENT DECISION? The Netherlands Selgium Italy United Kingdom F e d e r a l Republic o f Germany United States In Sum THE NEGOTIATING FRAKEWORK U.S. a n d S o v i e t P o s i t i o n s Prospects W H A T I S T Y E OUTLOOK F O R THE NATO DECISION? THE ROLE OF T9E CONGRESS REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES CRS- 3 BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS NATO'S December 1979 Decision . In December 1 9 7 9 , the members of the North Atlantic Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n decided to modernize the Europe-based U.S. nuclear a r s e n a l by d e p l o y i n g (in 1 9 8 3 a t the earliest) a total of 572 n e w ground-launched systems c a p a b l e of reaching S o v i e t territory from West European sites. T h e d e p l o y m e n t would cruise consist of 1 0 8 Pershing I1 ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched missiles, a l l with single nuclear warheads. T h e m i s s i l e s would be d e p l o y e d i n f i v e European countreis: P-11s and cruise m i s s i l e s in W e s t G e r m a n y ; The cruise missiles only in the U.K., Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. a l l i e s a l s o a g r e e d to attempt to negotiate with the S o v i e t Union East-West limitations o n theater nuclear forces in the context of SALT. T h e NATO decision, therefore, was a n integrated or dual-track approach involving both modernization and a r m s control. (For a detailed d i s c u s s i o n of t h e d e c i s i o n s e e the C R S r e p o r t , entitled The Modernization of N A T O ' s Long-Range T h e a t e r 31, Nuclear F o r c e s , published by the House Foreign Affairs C o m m i t t e e , Dec. 1 9 8 0 , C.P. 1156.) T h e communique issued following the NATO decision stated that "all the nations currently participating i n t h e integrated d e f e n s e s t r u c t u r e w i l l participate i n t h e program." T h e consensus represented by this s t a t e m e n t had been achieved through a process of i n t e n s e preparation and C O n S ~ l t a t i ~ n during the t w o years preceding the decision. But the a p p a r e n t u n a n i m i t y o f t h e communique concealed serious reservations o n t h e p a r t o f several smaller c o u n t r i e s , caused by widespread uneasiness among significant s e c t i o n s of their public a n d parliamentary opinion toward the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l nuclear weapons into Europe. Governments of two c o u n t r i e s selected for deployment, Belgium and t h e Netherlands, agreed t o t h e decision but both submitted reservations concerning the deployment o f missiles o n their territory. The proposal to modernize NATO's nuclear forces r e v i v e d two b a s i c i s s u e s confronting t h e Alliance: f i r s t , how to sustain t h e credibility o f the American nuclear guarantee given differing American a n d European a t t i t u d e s toward the r o l e of nuclear weapons i n a l l i a n c e strategy; and s e c o n d , h o w to reconcile t h e demands o f NATO's dual policy of d e f e n s e a n d d e t e n t e , particularly how to determine the appropriate r o l e for a r m s control negotiations in ensuring Western security. NATO'S Nuclear Dilemma Almost s i n c e i t s inception the a l l i a n c e has struggled with t h e problem of h o w most effectively to extend t h e protection o f A m e r i c a n strategic n u c l e a r power to the defense of Western Europe. T h e United S t a t e s i s c o m m i t t e d to a s s i s t in t h e d e f e n s e of i t s European a l l i e s , though t h e u l t i m a t e f u l f i l l m e n t o f this commitment could r e s u l t i n the destruction of American society. This situation h a s inevitably produced different perceptions between E u r o p e and t h e United S t a t e s concerning what constitutes a n a p p r o p r i a t e and credible strategy of d e t e r r e n c e , a n d the forces needed to s u p p o r t it. -P - - y. e a n s~ , c3nsclous ~ ~ ~ that a z y w a r , nuclear or eonventional, could s e v a s ~ i z aZ d r c ~ e ,have zended to a d v o c a z e a scrategy of a b s o l u t e deterrence tzrougn the ~rnmedlace ~ h r e a tof all-out ncclear war. They have looked wlth susplclon at any development that appeared to distract from thls u l t i m a t e :Pareat, o r t2at appeared to "decouple" Europe from the American strategic nuclear quarantee. The United S t a t e s , equally conscious of the awesome consequences f o r American territory of strategic nuclear war, has sought to avoid being f a c e d wich the choice of all-out nuclear war or defeat. American officials have increasingly emphasized the need to deter conflict a t all possible l e v e l s through the provision of a wide range of capabilities and options. They h a v e endeavored to look "beyond" d e t e r r e n c e , a n d , i n the event that d e t e r r e n c e should f a i l , to facilitate :9e satisfactory termination of a n y conflict s h o r t of all-out nuclear war. This approach has led to a search for f l e x i b i l i t y and " c r e d i b l e , " or more usable options. T h e NATO decision attempted to deal with these conflicting perspectives by providing more flexible nuclear systems - - in response to t h e American n o n e t h e l e s s , in their ability to s t r i k e Soviet requirement - - which territory, could be seen a s strengthening the link between t h e European theater and the strategic nuclear standoff -- in response to t h e European requirement. According to the decision's rationale, deterrence for Europe would b e strengthened because the Soviet Union, in contemplating any attack o n Western E u r o p e , would be forced to calculate that the West might respond by striking Soviet territory with the new systems. A n d , i n using the s y s t e m s , t h e W e s t would k n o w that the Soviet Union might respond by striking American, n o t European, targets. T h e r e f o r e , both sides would be a w a r e t h a t hostilities i n the European theater might escalate rapidly to a strategic exchange that neither the United States nor t h e Soviet Union would desire. Toward Preliminary Negotiations As NATO moved toward its d e c i s i o n , Soviet President Brezhnev a n n o u n c e d , o n Oct. 6 , 1 9 7 9 , a package of arms control initiatives including a n offer t o limit deployment of S S - 2 0 missiles if NATO would defer its d e c i s i o n to deploy n e w Western systems. When NATO went ahead in any case, Moscow said that t h e decision had destroyed a n y possibility for negotiations o n theater nuclear systems. T h e potential for negotiations received another serious setback w h e n , o n As part o f t h e American December 24, the S o v i e t Union invaded Afghanistan. r e s p o n s e , President Carter asked the Senate to suspend consideration of t h e in S A L T I 1 treaty, effectively putting U.S.-Soviet a r m s control discussions limbo. T h e S o v i e t Union f o r the next s i x months continued to a s s e r t t h a t the NATO decision had removed all prospects for theater nuclear a r m s control. B u t , o n July 1 , 1 9 8 0 , during a visit by West German Chancellor S c h m i d t t o M o s c o w , P r e s i d e n t Brezhnev relented and said that the Soviet Union was prepared t o enter negotiations a t any time. Subsequent contacts between U.S. and S o v i e t representatives led t o preliminary negotiations in October 1980. 2 2 2 c z . 1 5 , 1 5 E 0 , U.S. and Sov;st re?resencatlves me^ ~ n Geneva for p r e l l m ~ n a r y n e g o t ~ a t l o n s . X e : t a k a c o n t ~ n u e df o r a S o d t a n o n t h b u t r s s d l t e d -pi a q r e e m e n ~ ~ o r e e t a q a l : i n t r . ~r ~ z , r e t o z o n z ~ n d e cne a~scussions. As e x p e c t e d , t n e t w o s ~ d e sd ~ s a g r e e ef r o m t n e o u t s e t c o n c e r n ~ n gw h l c h w e a p o n s ~ 3 ~e . S . / N A T O p o s l t l o n was s y s t e m s s h o u l d b e included l n t h e n e g o z ~ a t ; o n s . 2 unlts were t n a t , o n t h e W e s t e r n s l d e , o n l y ?Fie ~ l a n n e dG L C X a n d P e r s h l n g negotiable, a n d c a l l e d f o r l l ~ , l t a t ; o c s on t h e S o v l e t U n l o n l s L R T N ? potenclal - - p r l m a r l l y t n e S S - 2 0 S L a~l s o l n c l ~ d l n gt h e o l d e r S S - 4 a n 2 S S - 5 - - a n d o n t h e B a c k f ~ r eb o m S e r . T h e S c v l e t U n l o n s a l d t n a t a l l .Arnerlcan s y s t e m s c a p a b l e bases, such as FB-111 bombers o f s t r l k l r , g S o v r e t territory f r o m E u r o p e a n stationed 19 t h e U . K . , or frcn alrcraft carrlers ln the European reglon, sqould be l n c l u d e d ~ n t h e n e g o t l a t l o c s . Reagan over The Geneva t a l k s c l o s e d i n t h e w a k t of t h e v i c t o r y o f R o n a l d Jimmy C a r t e r i n t h e U . S . Presidential elections. The talks had clearly confirned that negotiations on theater systems would be complex and potentially prolonged. The f a c t t h a t t h e n e x t P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d o p p o s e d t h e SALT I 1 t r e a t y a n d was o p e n l y s k e p t i c a l about arms control NATO December r a i s e d even more s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e 1379 decision. Anti-Nuclear Sentiment i n Europe: U.S. and Soviet Responses has been a major factor The r e s u r g e n t a n t i - n u c l e a r m o v e m e c ~i n E u r o p e decision. In the a f f e c t i n g p r o s p e c t s f o r i m p l e r n e n t a t i c n o f t h e N A T O LRTNF l a t e 1 9 5 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 6 0 ~t h~e r e was an active anti-nuclear movement in Great Britain and i n some other West European countries. The movement Vietnam issues r e c e d e d as p r o t e s t movements f i r s t s w i t c h e d i n t h e 1 9 6 0 s t o the advent of the era of and then v i r t u a l l y disappeared from s i g h t w i t h d e z e n t e a n d t h e b e g i n n i n g o f SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . decision, the movement was attracting support In advance of t h e NATO a spillover assist m a i n l y from t r a d i t i o n a l a n t i - n u c l e a r q u a r t e r s i n c l u d i n g from t h e p r o t e s t a g a i n s t p e a c e f u l u s e s of n u c l e a r power. B u t by e a r l y 1981, t h e a n t i - n u c l e a r f o r c e s c o u l d c l a i m s ~ g n i f i c a n tp o p u l a r s u p p o r t i n a number of c r u c i a l West E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s . A number of factors have encouraged sentiment against new missile deployments. T h e f a i l u r e o f t h e SALT I 1 a g r e e m e n t , t h e Soviet invasion of States A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d s u b s e q u e n t e s c a l a t i c n of t e n s i o n s between t h e U n i t e d it was no longer a n d c h e S o v i e t U n i o n l e d many E u r o p e a n s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t p r u d e n t t o depend s o l e l y on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e S o v i e t Union t o C o n t r o l F u r t h e r ~ . o r e ,American pressures for increased t h e a c c e l e r a t i n g arms r a c e . stagnant economic growth European d e f e n s e spending a g a i n s t a Lackground of have c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c u t s i n s o c i a l programs t h a t might be required t o square the budgetary c i r c l e . The n u c l e a r i s s u e h a s p r o v i d e d a clear and emotive focus f o r t h a t a t t e n t i o n . Two a d d i t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s d u r i n ~ t h e Carter Administration increased E u r o p e a n c o n c e r n t h a t U.S. s t r a t e g y w a s m o v i n g t o w a r d a nuclear warfighting p o s t u r e f o r Europe. First, the on-and-off again decision of the Carter A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g deployment 3f e n h a n c e d r a d i a t i o n weapons ("neutron bombsn) in Europe suggested to many Europeans that American weapons warfightlng direction. Second, the t e c h n c l o g y was m o v i n g in a nuclear more flexible a n n o u n c e m e n t i n 1 9 8 0 o f a new U . S . n u z l o a r s t r ~ t e g yf e a t u r i n g -, -.a r g e t ~ n g options ( P i j 53) t e n d e d t c c~r?.f:rn z n a z s t r a z e q y a s w e l l a s weapons 2 e T J e l o p ~ , e c t>jere m o v l r c t o w a r d a p c s t u r e u n a c c e p t a b l e t o a a n y E u r o p e a n s . I n 1 3 8 i , c h e s e d o u b t s r e c e l v e d a d d ~ t l o n a l l m p e r u s f r c m :he d e l l b e r a t e p a c e t h a t characterized t h e r,ew A m e r l c a n A d n l n l s t r a t ; o n f s a p p r o a c h to developlnq E ~ r o p e a n s that tne a r n s c o c t r o l p o l ~ c ~ e s .This a p p r o a c h s u g g e s t e d t o m a n y Unlted States was not serlous absdt reduclng nuclear armaments, relnforclng President t?e a r g c n e n t s ~ a d e3 y tne l e a d e r s of t h e antl-nuclear movement. R e a g a n ' s r e m a r k s o n Oct. 1 6 concern:ng the potentla1 for llmized nuclear war ~n Europe provlded addltlonal ammunltlon for S o v ~ e t propaganda, a s drd s u b s e q u e n t s t a z e m e n t s by S e z r e t a r l e s E a ~ g and Wernberger. Sovlet leader Brezhnev responded t h a t , unlixe Preszdent Reagan, n e could not lmaglne a n > ~ c l e a rc o n f l l c t b e l n g i l m l t e d t o E n r o p e . The Soviet Union has actively sought to encourage the growth of a n t i - n u c l e a r s e n t i m e n t in W e s t e r n Z u r o p e . In h i s r e p o r t t o the 26th Party C o n g r e s s on F e b . 2 3 , 1 9 6 1 , t h e l a t e S o v i e t President Brezhnev proposed a n o r a t o r i u n o n d e p l o y m e n t i n E x r o p e of n e w m e d i u m - r a n g e n u c l e a r f a c i l i t i e s of t h e N A T O c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e S o v i e t Union. In a second major initiative, the Soviet Union for the first time suggested that it might be willing to include s o m e S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y i n a n u c l e a r f r e e z o n e i n the S c a n d i n a v i a n r e g i o n . In a d d i t i o n , a number of Soviet commentaries have emphasized the p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g a s p e c t s of t h e P e r s h i n g I 1 m i s s i l e . The Soviets a r g u e t h a t , w h i l e m o d e r n i z a t i o n of t h e i r t h e a t e r f o r c e s c o n s t i t u t e s n o t h r e a t to t h e v i a b i l i t y of U.S. central strategic capabilities, the extended-range "first-skrike" weapon, capable of striking P e r s h i n g I1 m i s s i l e w i l l b e a Soviet targets in less than five minutes flying time from West Germany. ( W h l i e t h e P e r s h i n g 11 d e p l o y m e n t c o u l d n o t t a k e o u t a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of Mascow's strategic f o r c e s , i t could threaten Soviet command and control a n d , w i t h c h a n g e s i n t h e p a y l o a d c o n f i g ~ r a t i o nt o e x t e n d t h e m i s s i l e ' s r a n g e , put in jeopardy t h e Russian national command authority. Configured a s planned, ?Toscow w o u l d n o t be w i t h i n t h e r a n g e of P e r s h i n g I1 m i s s i l e s f i r e d f r o m W e s t Germany). At t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l m i n i s t e r i a l m e e t i n g o n M a y 4 - 5 , 1 9 8 1 , U.S. Secretary of State Haig reported a decision by President Reagan which, a c c o r d i n g t o s o m e s o u r c e s , w a s r e a c h e d v i r t u a l l y on t h e e v e of the meeting following bloody infighting within the Administration. This decision was incorporated in the NATO communique which announced that the United States would "begin negotiations with the Soviet Union o n TNF arms control within t h e S A L T f r a m e w o r k by the end o f t h e year." O n S e p t . 24, t h e U n i t e d States 30 in and the Soviet Union announced that negotiations would begin on Nov. Geneva. On Nov. 1 8 , P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n a n n o u n c e d i n a m a j o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y address that the United States would in the Geneva negotiations seek total elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 mlssiles in return for cancellation of NATO's deployment plans - a so-called "zero-option.'' The P r e s i d e n t s a i d t h a t A m e r i c a n n e g o t i a t o r s w o u l d be w i l l i n g t o listen to and discuss Soviet proposals. H e a l s o said t h a t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d s e e k t o o p e n S t r a t e g i c A r m s R e d u c t i o n T a l k s (START) w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n "as s o o n a s possible" in 1982. CRS- 7 POLICY QUESTIONS A N D VARIABLES Implementation o f t h e December 1 9 7 9 decision remains the most sensitive security issue o n t h e NATO agenda. T h e issue t o u c h e s the c o r e of the U.S. commitment to the a l l i a n c e , exposes the d i f f e r i n g American a n d European perceptions of the r o l e of nuclear weapons in NATO s t r a t e g y , i s a severe t e s t of Western solidarity, and could h a v e long-term r a m i f i c a t i o n s for the f u t u r e of European a r m s c o n t r o l and East-West relations. There a r e a number of countervailing pressures on the d e c i s i o n , the combination of which raises serious questions a b o u t how the d e c i s i o n will be implemented. WHAT ROLE D O E S T H E T H E A T E R NUCLEAR BALANCE PLAY? No attempt is made h e r e to a n a l y z e the balance. T h e p u r p o s e i s simply to refer to the differing perspectives o n the n a t u r e of the b a l a n c e and to suggest some of t h e factors that m a k e d e f i n i n g the b a l a n c e a highly subjective process. First, theater n u c l e a r weapons s e r v e different purposes i n N A T O nuclear strategy than they d o i n Warsaw P a c t strategy. Given different strategic assumptions a b o u t t h e purposes such w e a p o n s would serve a n d w h a t missions they would be a s s i g n e d , neither NATO nor t h e W a r s a w Pact h a v e i n the past attempted to d e v e l o p systems that mirror those o f t h e opposition. In Soviet s t r a t e g y , the systems probably a r e intended to e n s u r e that no future war i s f o u g h t o n Soviet t e r r i t o r y , to h e l p deter W e s t e r n use of nuclear weapons a g a i n s t the Warsaw P a c t , and to ensure t h e best possible ratio of Eastern a n d Western f o r c e s i n peacetime a s well a s to provide coverage of k e y W e s t European t a r g e t s in a war. Nuclear weapons are fully integrated i n t o S o v i e t doctrine and f o r c e structures. Only in recent y e a r s has NATO attempted to d e v e l o p c o n c e p t s a n d plans t h a t integrate nuclear w e a p o n s into the potential battlefieid. N A T O planning h a s remained a c o m p r o m i s e between d e t e r r e n c e and warfighting requirements. Western sources f r e q u e n t l y explain t h e n e w NATO LRTNF a s a r e s p o n s e to t h e SS-20 deployments (now estimated a t 3 4 0 missiles with s o m e 1 , 0 2 0 warheads). This i s misleading. T h e n e w U.S. systems a r e intended in n o way as direct military counters t o t h e SS-20. R a t h e r , they a r e designed to serve NATO strategy by strengthening the l i n k a g e t o the U.S. strategic n u c l e a r g u a r a n t e e while providing W e s t e r n authorities with a more f l e x i b i l e r a n g e of o p t i o n s with which to deal with a n y Warsaw P a c t attack. The new systems are a response to the SS-20 primarily i n a symbolic political sense. Second, it i s i m p o s s i b l e to talk a b o u t the theater b a l a n c e i n i s o l a t i o n from the overall s t r a t e g i c balance. T o the S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e n e w N A T O systems would c o n s t i t u t e a strategic threat i n t h a t they c o u l d s t r i k e t a r g e t s o n Soviet territory. From the Western p e r s p e c t i v e , all t h e targets t h a t could be struck by t h e n e w Western theater s y s t e m s c o u l d be (or are) targetted by U.S. c e n t r a l strategic s y s t e m s a s w e l l . A n d , a s m a l l portion of the U.S. submarine ballistic missile f o r c e i s dedicated t o NATO theater missions i n time of war. Furthermore, P r e s i d e n t Reagan's s t r a t e g i c w e a p o n s program includes the stationing of l a r g e numbers of nuclear-armed cruise m i s s i l e s a t sea. Depending o n where t h e carriers of such m i s s i l e s a r e p a t r o l l i n g , t h e s e T h e a n a l y s e s o n w h i c h NATO h a s b a s e d i t s deploy men^ p l a n s a n d arms c o n t r c l approaches hava concluded t h a t t h e numerical advantage in the theacer now deter a e n j o y e d S y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i s a s e v e r e t h r e a t t o NATO's a b i l i t y t o c o n f l i c t i n Europe o r t o c o n t r o l nuclear e s c a l a t i o n should a c o n f l i c t begin. T h i s j u d g m e n t d e r i v e s i n p a r t f r o m ti-~e c a n c l u s i o n that NATO's conventional Pact assault and f o r c e s m i q h ~b e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o b l u n t a d e t e r m i n e d W a r s a w of t h a t NATO m i g h t b e f o r c e d e a r l y i n a c o n f l i c t t o c h o o s e b e t w e e n s a c r i f i c e l a r g e p o r t i o n s of t h e Federal Republic o r t h e i n i t i a t i o n of a t h e a t e r nuclear nev Western systems exchange. I n t h e o p i n i o n o f NATO e x p e r t s , w i t h o u t t h e t h e A l l i a n c e i s i n no p o s i t i o n t o i n i t i a t e t h e u s e of t h e a t e r n u c l e a r s y s t e m s without r e c e i v i n g a mcre damaging counter blow from S o v i e t t h e a t e r systems. Most Western a n a l y s e s a c c e p t t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e t h e a t e r n u c l e a r balance i s s h i f t i n g i n f a v o r o f t h e Warsaw P a c t . Western analysts find this shift disturbing, p a r t i c u l a r l y g i v e n t h e Warsaw P a c t ' s t r a d i t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e s over NATO i n c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s a n d t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e U.S. e d g e over the S o v i e t Union i n s t r a t e g i c s y s t e m s . The I n c e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s i n i t s most r e c e n t a n a l y s i s of t h e b a l a n c e concluded t h a t : even with t h e i n c l u s i o n of Poseiden/Trident on t h e Western a l l o c a t e d b y t h e U.S. t o NATO side and the continued exclusion of Soviet s t r a t e g i c systems, t h e balance is d i s t i n c t l y u n f a v o r a b l e t o NATO a n d i s b e c o m i n g m o r e s o . analyses include the (The I I S S a s well a s most o t h e r nuclear capabilities in their balance ~alCUlatiOnS.) British and French T!?e S o v i e t U n i o n , o n t h e o t h e r hand, contends that a theater nuclear Saiance already e x i s t s and t h a t Soviet depioyment of new systems has not upset that balance. President Brezhnev, i n his October 1979 speech said that: The number o f medium-range n u c l e a r d e l i v e r y weapons on t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e European p o r t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t Union h a s n o t been i n c r e a s e d by e v e n o n e m i s s i l e , o r o n e a i r p l a n e , over t h e past 10 years. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e number of l a u n c h e r s o f medium-range missiies and a l s o the yield of t h e nuclear charges of t h e s e missiles, have even been somewhat reduced. Great Britain w i l l Moscow a l s o a r g u e s t h a t b o t h F r a n c e and significantly t o t h e i r nuclear s t r i k i n g capability i n the next 10 t h a t t h e s e systems must be counted i n Western t h e a t e r f o r c e s . adding years and be I n conclusion, r a t h e r than asking whether an hypothetical "theater nuclear t o ask whether or not b a l a n c e " c a n b e a c h i e v e d , i t may b e m o r e i m p o r t a n t V a r i o u s p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s o f t h e NATO d e p l o y m e n t / a r m s c o n t r o l decision will the European theater -C o n t r i b u t e t o a more s t a b l e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n which, of course i s a f f e c t e d by t h e balance o f conventional f o r c e s as well. I n 3z.l c a s e , because of the intimate r e l a t i ~ n s h i ~S e t w e e n theater and CRS- 9 IE81128 U?C-%X-21/24/33 strategrc nuclear s y s t e m s and d o c ~ r l n e s - - f o r tne Unlted States and the Sovlet Un;on -- both questions c a n only be a n s w e r e d ;n the context of a s ~ a ~ lrelationsnrp e ~ e ~ w e e6 .nS . a n a S a ~ i e : s c r a z e g l c rcrces. 5 . and Sovlec strateglc f o r c e planning and the f a t e of s t r a t e g l c a r m s negotiations, therefore, will be essential components l n the evolution of the theater nuclear equatron. WHAT IS T H E S T A T U S OF T H E DEPLOYMENT D E C I S I O N ? T h e December 1 9 7 9 d e c i s i o n was taken by a l l the a l l i e s participating in NATO's integrated command s t r u c t u r e , but o n l y six c o u n t r i e s a r e directly and involved i n the deployment: t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , B e l g i u m , I t a l y , the U.K., West Germany, which were designated to a c c e p t s t a t i o n i n g of t h e systems on their territory; and the U.S., which i s developing and will c ~ n t r o l the systems. A number of f a c t o r s , some u n i q u e to i n d i v i d u a l c c u n t r i e s , and others shared i n c o m m o n , could r a i s e s e r i o u s p r o b l e m s for the current deployment plans. T h e Netherlands T h e Netherlands i s the weakest link i n the plan f o r deployment of new nuclear systems, even with t h e a d v e n t l a t e in 1 9 8 2 o f a center-right government which f a v o r s making preliminary preparations for eventual deployment i n Holland. The Dutch make consistently high quality contributions to NATO military programs a n d public o p i n i o n in the Netherlands strongly s u p p o r t s continued membership i n NATO. But t h e r e i s equally strong traditional opposition to nuclear w e a p o n s in Holland. This sentiment was taken into account in t h e o r i g i n a l Dutch a g r e e m e n t to t h e plan in the sense that Dutch participation w a s m a d e c o n t i n g e n t on t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n of the S A L T I1 agreement a n d the o u t c o m e o f n e g o t i a t i o n s o n t h e a t e r nuclear systems. T h e Dutch government h a s applauded t h e zero-option i n i t i a t i v e , but i t has postponed a final deployment d e c i s i o n pending results of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Barring unforeseen u p h e a v a l s i n E u r o p e a n threat perceptions, the only way t h a t c r u i s e missiles could b e deployed i n the Netherlands would likely be i n t h e context of a n a g r e e m e n t between the S o v i e t Union and the United States which limited such systems a n d offered t h e prospect for future reduction o r elimination o f theater n u c l e a r weapons. Belgium T h e Belgian government has a l s o postponed a f i n a l d e c i s i o n o n accepting cruise missiles and i s c o m m i t t e d to r e v i e w t h e q u e s t i o n every six months. Belgium nonetheless a p p a r e n t l y h a s t a k e n s o m e initial steps toward implementation o f the plan. coalition g o v e r n m e n t , led by Wilfried M a r t e n s , a Flemish Social Belgium's coalition g o v e r n m e n t has c o n f i r m e d i t s a d h e r e n c e to NATO's December 1 9 7 9 decision. T h e g o v e r n m e n t will r e a s s e s s the situation every six months based o n developments i n t h e U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Given that deployment of c r u i s e missiles i n Belgium i s unpopular with the public and is objected to by t h e s o c i a l i s t s , the m a i n opposition to the government in parliament, t h e g o v e r n m e n t will l i k e l y postpone a final decision a s long a s possible. Italy Italy still seems likely to accept stationing of new cruise missiles on l c s ~ e r r l t o r y ,and work Loward implementation of the deployment d e c ~ s i o n i s underway. T h e program of the coalition government forned i n the fall of 1982 by P r i m e Minister Amintore Fanfani, a Christian D e m o c r a t , includes adherence to the December 1 9 7 9 decision. T h e anti-nuclear movement has not yet posed a serious threat to Italy's continued willingness to accept cruise missiles, even though some public opinion surveys show that Itaiian opposing deployment of cruise missiles i n Sicily outnumber those in favor by a narrow margin. The Italian Communist Party opposes the deployment. The PCI's opposition has been muted by its continuing desire to be regarded a s a trustworthy partner in some future Italian government, but the growth of the anti-nuclear movement in northern Europe among non-communist parties appears now to h a v e emboldened the PCI. T h e Socialist Party i s participating i n the government and supports the N A T O decision. United Kingdom In spite of strong anti-nuclear opposition, work has begun toward preparation of c r u i s e missile deployment sites. T h e participation of the U.K. i n NATO's deployment plans coincides with the decision by the Thatcher government to modernize Britain's nuclear deterrent with the Trident missile system. These t w o d e c i s i o n s against the backdrop o f a guns-versus-butter debate i n the economically hard-pressed U.K. have revitalized the anti-nuclear movement. T h e movement finds political support primarily within the Labour Party which i n recent years has moved distinctly to the left. T h e commitment of a government formed by Labour to the deployment would b e uncertain, a t best. T h e term of the current parliament runs until May 1984, but Mrs. Thatcher, r i d i n g the crest of a wave of renewed electoral strength following victory in t h e Falklands, is widely expected to call elections early, perhaps in the f a l l of 1983. In sum, it would appear that deployment plans will be a b l e to proceed in the U.K. T h e government, h o w e v e r , cannot afford to be i n s e n s i t i v e to public pressure and would no doubt be pleased if U.S.-Soviet negotiations led to limitations o n the deployment of cruise missiles in the U.K. Federal Republic o f Germany T h e German g o v e r n m e n t has begun preparations for stationing cruise and Pershing I1 missiles on German territory. As in s o many NATO issues, Germany i s the pivotal participant i n the long-range theater nuclear force deployment. While other states a r e scheduled to receive only cruise missiles, Germany i s supposed to host both cruise missiles and the f u l l deployment of the P e r s h i n g I 1 missiles. A number of elements i n the NATO decision were designed t o take German requirements into account. West German leaders did not w a n t t h e Soviet Union to be a b l e to single Germany out a s the target for a campaign against the new systems. Bonn therefore required t h a t the NATO decision be unanimous and that a t least one other continental European non-nuclear weapons country accept stationing of systems. Bonn a l s o said that it did n o t want to participate in a two-key system of Control for the weapons. Germany already i s host to the highest concentration o f nuclear and conventional weapons of a n y NATO country other than the United States. It a l s o provides the territory that would be t h e major battleground for any It i s no surprise, therefore, that the N A T O decision f u t u r e war in Europe. r c F - i,,a v - a n e n o t ~ o n a la n d d i v i s i v e i s s u e i n G e r n a n y . f i l - z n r e e m a j o r L e s t Gaz~ai-.pol-:ica?arzl2s :ont,~de ~3 s u p p o r c the X A T 3 d u a l - c r a c ~ d e c l s l o n , a;though c l e a r d r f f e r e n c e s n a v e s u r f a c e d c o n c e r n r n g h o w t h a t d e c l s l o n s h o u l d S e rrnplemented. TP-ese d r f f e r e n c e s h a v e b e c o m e a n important e l e m e n t ~ n t h e carnpalgn f o r t h e p a r l r a m e n t a r y electrons scheduled f o r !$ar. 6 , 1 9 6 3 . If the radlcal "Green" party should replace the Llberals ( F D P ) a s t h e p l v o t a l t h r r d p a r t y l n t h e B u n d e s t a g , t h e p o l ~ t l c a lc o n t e x t f o r the INF could change fundamentally. T h e r u l i n g C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s , l e d by C h a n c e l l o r H e l m u t K o h l , s t r o n g l y support the decision, with some emphasis on the requirement for proceeding w i t h t h e d e p l o y m e n t i n v i e w o f t h e r a p i d S o v i e t d e p l o y m e n t o f SS-20s. The F r e e D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y , j u n i o r p a r t n e r i n t h e g o v e r n i n g c o a l i t i o n , i s l e d by Foreign Minister G e n s c h e r , who h a s been a strong supporter o f the decision but w h o n o w i s e n c o u r a g i n g a t t e m p t s a t c o m p r o m i s e i n t h e G e n e v a n e g o t i a t i o n s . A significant minority in Genscher's party sympathizes with the anti-nuclear movement and the party strongly favors an a r m s control solution to the Soviet theater nuclear threat. The opposition Social Democratic Party has been badly divided over the deployment issue. Former Chancellor Schmidt, who can personally claim a t l e a s t p a r t i a l c r e d i t f o r t h e e v o l u t i o n of N A T O ' s d e c i s i o n , r e m a i n s f i r m i n his support for the dual track approach. T o his left within the party, however, there is increasing resistance to the deployment of new nuclear weapons on German territory. In o p p o s i t i o n , t h e p a r t y ' s p o s i t i o n h a s b e c o m e more critical of deployment plans. The party's candidate for the Chancellorship, Hans Jochen Vogel, returned from a trip to Moscow encouraged that S o v i e t flexibility should m a k e some a r m s c o n t r o l agreement possible. Given the special security relationship between Germany and the United States, the West German government would find i t difficult to renege on its commitment t o a c c e p t n e w systems. But a political imperative for any German government, even o n e l e d by the Christian Democrats, would be a n alliance policy which places a high priority on arms control. Furthermore, given the mounting concern in Germany about uncertain prospects for arms control and increasing risks of nuclear war, it seems unlikely that any German government could afford politically to accept more s y s t e m s t h a n t h o s e a l r e a d y p r o g r a m m e d f o r d e p l o y m e n t in G e r m a n y . Therefore, s h o u l d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s (and p o s s i b l y Belgium) not accept cruise missile deployment, it currently seems unlikely that those systems could be shifted to G e r m a n sites. United States Prior to 1982, there had been relatively little political opposition in the United States t o t h e deployment of n e w theater nuclear systems in Europe. T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a m o r e g e n e r a l p e a c e m o v e m e n t w a s demonstratec! i n N o v e m b e r 1981 when anti-nuclear meetings were held a t universities across the country. And, i n March 1 9 8 2 , proposals f o r a nuclear "freezet' gained support among a substantial minority in the Congress and at the grass rools level i n town meetings in a number of States. Whether such a movement develops significant support will likely depend on the credibility of the Administration's arms control efforts. There are technical problems, however, that could affect the timing Of the It r e m a i n s a n o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e B e t h e r l a n e s w i l l a c c e p t s t a t i c z i r q of n e w c r u i s e m i s s i l e s on i t s t e r r i t o r y a n y t i m e i c t h e foreseeable future. There is also some queszion about stationing in Belgium. Deplayments in t h e s e t w o c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r , a r e not s c h e d u l e d u n t i l l a t e r i n t h e deploymen: C.K. and Wes: Germany does not prografi. A n t i - n u c l e a r s e n t i m e n t in t h e p r e s e n t l y t h r e a t e n t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d e p l o y m e n t , bct a decisisn by e i t h e r g c v s r n m e n t to a c c e p t additional systems i s probaSly ouz sf the question. In W e s t G e r m a n y , e l e c t i o n s in Yarch 1983 c o u l e h a v e a crucial effect o n S e r a a n policy toward deployments. P o s s i b l e s h i f t s in t h e p o l i c y of t h e S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s a n d t h e g r o w i n g s t r e n g t h of the anti-nuclear "Greenii m o v e m e n t a r e i m p o r t a n t v a r i a b l e s , but f o r he t i n e b e i n g 8 o n n 1 s c 3 n m i t m e n t t o N A T O d e p l o y m e n t p l a n s r e m a i n s firm. I t i s uncertain whether Italy would be T is w i l l i n g and/or a S l e co a c c e p t a d d i t i o n a l c r u i s e m i s s i l e d e p l o y m e n t s . c l e a r t h a t a l l t h e g o v e r n m e n t s ir.vo1ved would welcome the negotiation cf limits on o r elinination of Soviet and American long-range theater nuclear help keep f o r c e s , a n d t h e y n e e d a c r e d i b l e U.S. n e g o t i a t i n q p e r f o r x a n c e t o a n t i - n u c l e a r sentiment w i t h i n p o l i t i c a l l y m a n a g e a b l e l i m i t s . - L L- THE NZGOTIATING FRAXEUORK It i s a f a c t o f l i f e i n W e s t e r n democracies that imporcant decisions relating to national security must ultimately stand the test of popular acceptance, if not approval. This is without question true in the c a s e of NATO's dual track decision. In the e n s u i n g m o n t h s , a n u m b e r of f a c t o r s coal: viability of affect the NATO decision - - some could reinforce the political the decision; others could undermine its validity. U.S. a n C S o v i e t P o s i t i o n s Perhaps the most important variable currently affecting the deployment d e c i s i o n i s U.S. a n d S o v i e t p o l i c y t o w a r d a r m s control negotiations. This question has two aspects: first, the intrinsic political importance of negotiations f o r European public opinion; and second, the prospects for the negotiatlons themselves. F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of West E u r o p e a n p u b l i c o p i n i o n , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a s s i n c e m i d - 1 9 8 0 a s s e r t e d i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o e n g a g e in s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d has n a d e a number of proposals which, while substantively of limited i n t e r e s t t o t h e W e s t , h a v e n o n e t h e l e s s i n c r e a s e d the c r e d i b i l i t y o f Moscow's position. The Reagan Administration, however, came into office promising to r e v i e w t h e e n t i r e r a n g e of U.S. a r n s c o n t r o l p o l i c y a n d to g i v e a r m s ccntrol a lower priority relative to defense programs. This approach, combined with the Administration's deliberate pace i n shaping arns control policy, produced considerable skepticism in Western Europe concerning the intentions of ths Administration. In 1 9 8 1 , P r e s i d e n t 2 e a g a n c h o s e a n e g o t i a t i n g a p p r o a c h t h a c w a s responsive Bnt those in the t o s o x e of t h e c o n c e r n s of t h e a n t i - n u c l e a r p r o t e s t o r s . m o v e m e n t w h o a r e firm i n c 5 e i r c o n v i s t i o n t h z t t n e r e s n c u i d o e T L ~~ n Y western d e p l o y m e n t s a n d w L o r e m a i n s k e p t L c z l a b o u t U.S. i n t e n t i o n s u n d o u b t e e l y w i l l -. c ~ n c i nt o~ a~ q l t a t ~a g a l n s t c n e :,ex s y s t e m s . neir r a n ~ s z o u l Z ,?;.:e agzin EG s w e l l i f < h e k d m r n i s t r a t i o n d o e s n o t a p p e a r f o r t h c o m i n g i n i t s re;?onse Soviet arms concrcl overtures. It was W h a t n o w a r e t h e prospects f o r c o n t r o l o f t h e a t e r 3 u c l e a r a r n s ? a l w a y s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s o n t h e a t e r n u c l e a r s y s t e m s w o u l d be e v e n more complicated and difficult than on central strategic systems. The Reagan Administration has taken a "simple" approach in selecting the zero-option proposal. And, the negotiations began with both sides emphasizing thelr i n t e n t i o n t o n e g o t i a t e s e r i o u s l y a n d t h e i r d e s i r e t o r e a c h agreement. B u t i t w a s a l w a y s h a r d t o b e l i e v e that t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w o u l d a g r e e t o d i s m a n t l e a l l of i t s i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s i n r e t u r n f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h e NATO d e p l o y m e n t d e c i s i o n . In Z a n u a r y 1982, both sides formally presented proposals f o r a n eventual agreement. T h e United States put o n the table a draft treaty incorporating the zero-option proposal. The Soviet Union proposed a phased reduction of " a l l m e d i u m - r a n g e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , i.e., w i t h a r a n g e (the c o m b a t r a d i u s ) o f action of 1 , 0 0 0 KM a n d m o r e deployed in the territory of Europe a n d in c h e adjacent w a t e r s o r intended for use in Surope." While t h e details o f the negotiations a r e secret, both sides have made available basic information concerning their proposals. The following lines s u m m a r i z e t h e i n i t i a l n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n s of t h e t w o s i d e s , a s f a r a s t h e y are publicly known, on critical issues. (1) S t a r t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o n b a l a n c e - U.S.: S o v i e t Union has 6-1 advantage. Soviet: A p p r o x i m a t e b a l a n c e exists. (2) C o v e r a g e by s y s t e m s - U.S.: F i r s t - s t a g e a g r e e m e n t l i m i t e d t o U.S. a n d S o v i e t i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e m i s s i l e s ; i n c l u s i o n of a i r c r a f t viewed a s too complicated; noncircumvention clause regarding shorter range Soviet missiles. Soviet: Include medium-range missiles and "forward-based nuclear capable aircraft. (3) C o v e r a g e by t e r r i t o r y - U.S.: Global limits. Soviet: Only systems in Europe (4) C o v e r a g e by n a t i o n a l i t y (west of Ural mountains). -- U.S.: L i m i t e d to U.S. a n d S o v i e t s y s t e m s . Soviet: British and French systems included o n Western totals. (5) S c o p e (and t i m i n g ) o f r e d u c t i o n s -U.S.: Destruction of all Soviet SS-20, SS-4, SS-5 m i s s i l e s y s t e m s ; U.S. f o r g o e s d e p l o y m e n t of ground-launched cruise and 2ershing I 1 ballistic missiles. Soviet: Starting from current position of balance, both s i d e s reduce to total of 6 0 0 medium-range s y s t e m s b y 1 9 8 5 , 3 0 0 by 1 9 9 0 ; S o v i e t s w i l l i n g t o eliminate a l l nuclear weapons from Europe if West w o o i d a g r e e ; S o v l e ~ sw l l l ~ n gT O m a k e u n ~ l a t e r a l r e d u c t l e n s while n e g o t ~ a t i o n s l n p r o g r e s s ~ f N A T O i A A 1 d e f e r new g e p l o y m e c z s . (6) Verification -- U.S.: Z e r o - c p t i o n would s i n p i i f y problem. Soviet: Provisions assuring "adequate controlt1 over complicance w i t h comRitments. that the Soviet Union On Mar. 1 6 , 1 9 8 2 , S o v i e t P r e s i d e n t B r e z h n e v s a i d w o u l d u n i l a t e r a l l y f r e e z e d e p l o y m e n t s o f new m e d i u m - r a n g e armaments in the European p a r t of t h e S o v i e t Union. Brezhnev also said that during 1982, " u n l e s s t h e r e i s a new aggravation of the international situation," the missiles on S o v i e t Union would " r e d u c e a c e r t a i n number o f i t s medium-range i t s own i n i t i a t i v e . " The S o v i e t m o r a t o r i u m w o u l d b e i n f o r c e "either until an agreement i s reachedw i n t h e Geneva negotiations or until the United States begins "practical preparations to deploy Pershing-2 missiles and c r u i s e m i s s i l e s i n Europe." T h i s marked t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t a S o v i e t f r e e z e p r o p o s a l had n o t a s k e d f o r decision. a r e c i p r o c a l a c t i o n by t h e W e s t , s u c h a s p o s t p o n i n g i t s d e p l o y m e n t U.S. territory I t was a l s o t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t Moscow h a s t h r e a t e n e d t o p u t i n j e o p a r d y i f new U . S . m i s s i l e s a r e d e p l o y e d . Brezhnev said that Western deployments "would compel us t o t a k e r e t a l i a t o r y s t e p s that would put the o t h e r s i d e , including the United S t a t e s i t s e l f , i t s own territory, in an analogous position." This could be accomplished by stationing nuclear m i s s i l e s i n C u b a , f o r e x a m p l e , o r by e x t e n d i n g t h e p a t r o l s o f S o v i e t nuclear s u b m a r i n e s c l o s e r t o U.S. t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s . A t t h e same t i m e , Brezhnev a r g u e d f o r t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c nuclear a r m s t a l k s a n d s a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union was ready to expand "confidence b u i l d i n g " m e a s u r e s t o n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s , f o r e x a m p l e , by l i m i t i n g the patrol has formally p a t t e r n s of n u c l e a r m i s s i l e submarines. While neither side changed i t s n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n i n Geneva, t h e r e have been a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h agreement and s i g n s of f l e x i b i l i t y . Yuli I n m i d - 1 9 8 3 , U . S . a n d S o v i e t c h i e f INF n e g o t i a t o r s -- P a u l N i t z e a n d proposal which would have K v i t s i n s k y -- r e p o r t e d l y d i s c u s s e d a c o m p r o m i s e p e r m i t t e d a reduced deployment of new U.S. missiles while requiring the Soviet Union to reduce i t s intermediate missile force. The approach r e p o r t e d l y was r e j e c t e d i n Moscow a s w e l l a s i n W a s h i n g t o n . I n December 1 9 8 2 , Y u r i Andropov, t h e new Soviet leader, proposed that SS-20 d e p l o y m e n t s i n t h e E u r o p e a n p o r t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n b e reduced to a r o u n d 1 6 2 , a p p r o x i m a t i n g t h e number o f B r i t i s h a n d French missiles. This for a p r o p o s a l was r e j e c t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , F r a n c e , a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n number o f r e a s o n s . One c r i t i c i s m w a s t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a d not offered t o r e d u c e t h e number o f SS-20s, o n l y t o r e d e p l o y them t o A s i a n l o c a t i o n s f r o m crisis. In response to this where t h e y c o u l d be r e t u r n e d t o Europe i n a c r i t i c i s m , S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s r e p o r t e d l y t o l d a v i s i t i n g American c o n g r e s s i o n a l d e l e g a t i o n i n J a n u a r y 1983 t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union would consider destroying some SS-20 m i s s i l e s i n a n a r m s c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t . Prospects In the final analysis, t h e major problems confronting the negotiations r e l a t e z o t n e a s y ~ m e t r l e s Se'+'een tne z w o slies. ;he U n l z e d S t a t e s a n d t h e S o v ~ s rU n l o n n a v e o r a r e d e v e l s ? ~ c g Z ~ i f e r e n t x e a p o ~ s s y s t e m s w l t h unlque c a ? a c - ~ ~ ~ ; ease s z g ~ ~ e zo c s s r v e s z r a ~ e g l s s D a s e c o n 2 i a s 1 m ~ ~ aars s e s s m e n t s or s e c x r ~ r yr e q u ~ r e m e n t s . I l ; u s c r a t l v e ~ y , t h e U n ~ z e d S z a t e s n e e d s to ensure extended w a r d e t e r r e n c e f o r a l l l e s f r o m w n l c h L C i s geographically s e p a r a t e d . T h e S o v i e t U n l o n f a c e s n o s u c h problem. O n t h e o t h e r 9 a n d , t h e Soviet U n l o n f a c e s nunerous potentla1 enemles, the NATO a l l l e s , C h l n a , and Japan a s well a s some European neutrals, and a t least three nuclear powers - - F r a n c e , the States. The Unlted States, U.K., a n d C h ~ n a- - l n a d d l t z o n to t h e U n r t e d n e a n w h ~ l e ,f a c e s o n l y t h e S o v l e t U n r o n a n d ~ t sW a r s a w P a c t a l l l e s a n d n o n u c l e a r p o w e r o t h e r t h a n t h e S o v l e t Unron. F i n a l l y , p e r h a p s t h e g r e a t e s t u n c e r t a i n t y i s c r e a t e d by t h e c u r r e n t s t a t u s of strategic a r m s control. Negotiations on theater nuclear systems cannot l i k e l y c o n c l u d e w i t h o u t t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a n e w U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreement. This is true simply because there is a military and strategic continuum b e t w e e n l o n g - r a n g e t h e a t e r a n d s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r forces. Neither the United S t a t e s nor the Soviet Union could know what theater nuclear force levels would be acceptable until they k n e w with some greater certainty what the balance would look like a t the strategic levei. Until strategic negotiations proceed toward a new agreement, there will likely b e n o final outcome in theater arms control negotiations. W X A T IS T E E O U T L O O K F O R T H E N A T O D E C I S I O N ? T h e N A T O d u a l - t r a c k d e c i s i o n w a s t h e p r o d u c t of a number of compromises which attempted to rationalize competing military, political, and economic requirements and constraints. Followed through to i t s conclusion, successful implementation o f the decision would reduce the Soviet theater nuclear threat t o NATO and y e t permit deployment of sufficient new Western systems to strengthen extended deterrence. goal in T h e c h o i c e b y P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n o f t h e " z e r o - o p t i o n w a s t h e U.S. negotiations illustrates the complexity of the problem. This objective, while politically attractive, is not fully consistent with the original rationale of t h e NATO decision which sought to reestablish credible linkage between the European theater and American strategic systems. Nuclear weapons issues have severely strained NATO unity in recent years. T h e advent of negotiations with the Soviet Union o n strategic a s well a s intsrmediate nuclear weapons has reduced the pressure o n allied governments, a t least temporarily. The anti-nuclear movement will not g o away, but its growth may be slowed a s long a s negotiations seem to o f f e r some possibility of reducing nuclear systems. Perhaps the most important variable in the European nuclear equation is the political viability of American positions and performance. The Western allies will follow the United States, even down the road to deployment of new n u c l e a r w e a p o n s s y s t e m s , i f U.S. positions accommodate European concerns. Overstatements of the threat, and failure to take into account European perceptions of constraints on the Soviet will or ability to attack Western E u r o p e (for e x a m p l e , t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i r P o l i s h a l l y ) will t e n d t o u n d e r m i n e U.S. c r e d i b i l i t y i n E u r o p e a n eyes. Given that P r e s i d e n t Reagan's z e r o option proposal i s widely recognized a s anacceptable to the Russians, an inflexible American defense of that approach w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y u n d e r m i n e s u p p o r t o f t h e U.S. negotiating position. By the spring of 1983, there 'ay be significant pressure in Western Europe f o r modification of the U.S. arns control offer. TP.e Reagan Administration percaps could ensure conclnued allied support of :ne 1 9 7 9 aeclsion b y offering to present some compromise approaches i n Geneva in r e ~ u r n for renewed allied conmitments to proceed with deployment plans. Without some such sign of flexibility, it may become increasingly difficult to present a united NATO front a s the time for initial deployments draws near. In any c a s e , the debate on nuclear weapons has raised a number of questions which the theater nuclear and START negotiations will not a d d r e s s and which allied governments will not be able to s w e e p back under t h e carpet. These issues relate in particular to NATO's strategy of f l e x i b l e r e s p o n s e , the role o f shorter range and battlefield nuciear weapons, and NATO's conventional capabilities. It therefore seems likely that pressure will mount within the alliance for a full examination o f NATO nuclear posture and strategy. Combined with the U.S.-Soviet arms n e g o t i a t i o n s , this process of negotiation within the alliance will be of crucial importance to t h e f u t u r e of U.S.-European relations. T H E ROLE OF T H E CONGRESS The Congress has played a limited role to date with regard to the NATO decision, although President Reagan's zero-option speech was widely applauded by Democrats a s well a s Republicans. In 1 9 8 2 , increased c o n g r e s s i o n a l interest i n the subject was suggested by debate on nuclear f r e e z e proposals and House and Senate hearings on the European nuclear weapons issues. And, the changes early i n 1 9 8 3 in the Administration's a r m s Control management team have provoked increased congressional i n t e r e s t i n the potential implications of these changes for U.S. a r m s control policy. F u r t h e r m o r e , the Congress denied funding in F Y 8 3 defense a p p r o p r i a t i o n s for procurement of Pershing I1 missiles. The a c t i o n was i n response to dissatisfaction with the P-11's testing performance and the S e n a t e and House conferees agreed that funding might b e restored "following successful completion of full flight testing." LEGISLATION P.L. 97-377, H.J.Res. 6 3 1 Continuing Appropriation, 1983. Making continuing a p p r o p r i a t i o n s for the fiscal year ending Sept. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , and for other purposes. Reported to House by Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 97-959) Dec. 1 0 , 1982. Passed House Dec. 1 2 , 1982. Referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee. Reported t o Senate by Appropriations Committee (without written report) Dec. P a s s e d House and S e n a t e Dec. 15. Conference report filed in House Dec. 20. 20. Signed i n t o l a w Dec. 21. 1982. HEARINGS U.S. Congress. House. Committee o n Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East. O v e r v i e w of nuclear a r m s control and defense strategy i n NATO. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 225 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. C o m m i t t e e on Foreign Relations. Nsnination of Paul Fi. N l ~ z e . biashlngcon, U . S . Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 1 5 p. R E P O R T S AND CONGRESSIONAL D O C U M E N T S U.S. Congress. House. C o m m i t t e e on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe a n d the Middle East. The modernization of NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces. Prepared by the Congressional Research S e r v i c e , Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 80 p. At head of title: 96th Congress, 2d session. Committee print. U.S. Congress. Senate. C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n Relations. Interim r e p o r t o n nuclear weapons i n Europe. P r e p a r e d by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special C o m m i t t e e on Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 5 1 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n Relations. NATO today: t h e Alliance i n evolution. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 1 0 2 p. At head of title: 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2d session. Committee print. U.S. Congress. Senate. C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs. SALT and the NATO allies. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 5 7 p. (96th C o n g r e s s , 1st Session. C o m m i t t e e print) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 01/23/83 -- Frans Josef S t r a u s s , leader o f the Bavarian-based Christian Social Union in West G e r m a n y said in a radio interview t h a t he no longer supported t h e zero-option negotiating approach. 01/21/83 -- T h e Pershing I1 reportedly completed i t s first successful t e s t flight. 01/20/83 -- A f a u l t y computer that monitors safety conditions a t C a p e Canaveral a n d bad weather forced a postponement o f t h e third t e s t f i r i n g of t h e P-I1 missile. -- Reagan Administration source w e r e r e p o r t e d t o have said that S o v i e t negotiators had told their American counterparts a t t h e START n e g o t i a t i o n s i n G e n e v a i n Nov. 8 2 that strategic a r m s n e g o t i a t i o n s would be halted if a s i n g l e n e w intermediate r a n g e missile were deployed i n Europe. -- S o v i e t Foreign Minister G r o m y k o , visiting B o n n , West G e r m a n y , a c c u s e d the United S t a t e s o f trying 01/18/83 L o k i l l an a g r e e m e n t " 1 2 Z e n s v a r a t h e r c h a n t r y i n g t o ac5.ieve c n e . B r o n y k c c o ,n,s,'~ r n e 2 t h s S o v i e t 2 r i s n ' s v z i l i n g n e s s ta d e s z r ~ y s o m e 3 5 - 2 6 x ; s s ~ - e s i n a n a r m s c o n ~ r o la g r e e x e ~ t w h i l e r e d e p l o y i n g ochers "behind a line in Siberia where they could n o l o n g e r h i t t a r g e t s i n W e s c Ecrope." I! C Cl/l5/83 -- 01/13/93 -- Secretary of State George Shultz met wlth the press cugene Rostow, foraer head cf the Arms Control and D i s a r m a m e n t A g e n c y , acknob?ledged tha: U.S. a n d Soviet negotiators in Geneva had lasc year developed a n i n f o r m a l c o m p r o m i s e a p p r o a c h t o l i m i t i n g U.S. a n d S o v i e t intermediate r a n g e n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s in Europe. T h e a p p r o a c h , d e v e l o p e c b e t w e e n U.S. representative to the 1 x 7 negotiaticns, P a u l Nitze, and Soviet representative Yzli Kvitsinsky, reportedly w o u l d h a v e p e r m i t t e d a r e d u z e d fieployment o f n e w U.S. m i s s i l e s w h i l e r e q u i r i n g t h e S ~ v i e tU n i o n t o r e d u c e its intermediate range missiles. The approach was r e j e c t e d by 30th M o s c o w a n d W a s h i n g t o n . 7 o n e d a y following t h e o u s c e r o f Z u g e n e R o s t o w a s h e a d o f t h e A r m s C o n t r o l a n d D ~ s a r m a n e n tA g e n c y t o d l s p u t e clalms that the A d n l n z s t r a t ~ o n ' s a r m s c o n t r o l policzes w e r e i n d l s a r r a y a n d t o r e a f f ~ r a" t h e p r e s ~ d e n t ' s firm dedication t o p u r s u e a r m s c o n c r o l a g r e e m e n t s w l t h t h e S o v l e t Union. -- Hans Jochen Vogel, head of West Gernany's opposition Social Democratic Party, returning from talks in Moscow with Soviet leader Ycri A d r o p o v , said that the S o v i e t U n i o n w a s p r e p a r e d to n e g o t i a t e o n the n u m S e r o f w a r h e a d s , n o c just t h e n u m b e r o f m i s s i l e s , i n t h e INF negotiations. 01/11/83 -- Soviet arms control negotiators reportedly told a v i s i t i n g U.S. c o n g r e s s i o n a l d e l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union would consider destroying, rather than sinply re-deploying t o Asia, SS-20 missiles in the context of an arms control agreement with =he United States. 01/09/83 -- President Reagan ancounced that he would send Vice President Bush o n a 12-day trip to Europe starting o n January 3 0 to consult with the allies a n d address the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. 01/02/83 -- French President Mitterrand said that France would not reduce the numSer of its nuclear missiles and c a l l e d t h e U.S.-Soviet G e n e v a n e g o t i a t i o n s " n o n e o f o u r affair." 12/23/82 -- T h e U.S. A r m y a n n o u n c e d t h a t a f l i g h t t e s t o f t h e Pershing I1 missile scheduled fcr December had been p o s t p o n e d u n t i l J a n u a r y 1983. 12/21/82 -- S o v i e t l e a d e r A n d r o p o v , i n a ma:or Kremlin speech, m a d e p u b l i c a p r o p o s a l u n d e r w h z c h t h e Sovie: U n i o n would reduce the number of m e d i ~ n - r a n g esissiles :n E u r o p e t o a S o u t i 5 2 , e q x a i z o c k z n d r n ~ e r c f missiles deployed S y France and Greac 8 r ~ z a - c . The ;,r2;ecced 3n:;ea S = a z ? s , F r a n c s , - 2 3 (Greaz 5r:;;ln the proposal as unaccepkable. 12/19/82 - - Bouse a n d Senate Conferees agreed to provide no f u n c s The conference for procurement of Pershing I I missiles. r e p o r t , h o w e v e r , s a i d t h a t " T h e c o n f e r e e s nevertheless r e m a i n f i r m l y c o m m i t t e d t o m o d e r n i z a t i o n of t h e t h e a t e r nuclear forces" and agreed that "Pershing I1 p r o c u r e m e n t f u n d s m a y b e r e q u e s t e d by r e p r o g r a m m i n g or b u d g e t s u p p l e m e n t f o l l o w i n g s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i ~ no f f u l l f l i g h t testing.'' 12/07/82 -- The Danish parliament froze Denmark's contribution to NATO infrastructure expenses associated with the planned deployment of new intermediate-range missiles. 11/23/82 -- T h e A r m y r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e P e r s h i n g I 1 m i s s i l e t e s t of Nov. 1 9 h a d n o t b e e n a c o m p l e t e s u c c e s s a s i n i t i a l l y claimed. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e A r m y , t h e w a r h e a d f a i l e d to maneuver properly a n d "did not achieve the desired accuracy." 11/22/82 -- The new Dutch center-right coalition announced that it would proceed with "preparation f o r the deployment" o f U.S. m e d i u m r a n g e m i s s i l e s . P r i m e Minister LubSers told the Dutch parliament that a r m s control talks would b e a "very importan factor" influencing whether the missiles would ultimately be deployed in the Netherlands. 11/16/82 - - T h e H o u s e D e f e n s e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s S u b c o m m i t t e e v o t e d to deny funding for procurement of the Pershing I1 missile. 11/12/82 -- Yuri Andropov succeeded Leonid Srez9nev two days following Brezhnev's death. 10/01/82 -- The West German parliament voted to unseat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government and elected Christian D e m o c r a t i c l e a d e r H e l m u t K o h l t o s u c c e e d him. Kohl formed a coalition with the Free Democratic Party ( S c h m i d t ' s f o r m e r c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r ) a n d with B a v a r i a ' s C h r i s t i a n S o c i a l U n i o n , l e d by F r a n z Joseph Strauss. T h e n e w government pledged continued West German support f o r NATO's two-track decision o n intermediate-range nuclear weapons. 09/30/82 -- U.S. a n d S o v i e t n e g o t i a t o r s r e s u m e d t a l k s i n G e n e v a on medium-range missiles in Europe. 09/29/82 -- Britain's opposition Labour Party voted overwhelmingly t o a b o l i s h t h e U.K.'s n u c l e a r w e a p o n s if t h e p a r t y wins the next election (anticipated i n the autumn of 1983) a n d to reject t h e deployment of any American nuclear cruise missiles in England. 09/10/82 -- In a speech before the Los Anqeles World Affairs C o u n c i l , ACDA Director E u g e n e V. Rostow g a v e a aetalled a n a l y s i s of U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions in G e n e v a , concluding that "It i s clear that a potentiality exists for accomnodatinq the analytic c o n c e p t s used by both sides. What is not y e t clear i s whether the S o v i e t Union i s willing to accept a g r e e m e n t based exclusively o n the principle of deterrence." 63/08/82 -- NATO accused the S o v i e t Union of having completed t h r e e n e w SS-20 bases since mid-March, bringing t h e total of SS-20 missiles deployed to 3 2 4 with 9 7 2 w a r h e a d s , according to U.S. estimates. 07/22/82 -- S e v e n t e e n seconds i n t o the f i r s t f u l l test f l i g h t of t h e Pershing I 1 m i s s i l e , its f i r s t stage malfunctioned a n d t h e missile destroyed itself. 07/01/82 -- T h e S o v i e t Union denied that i t had deployed new S S - 2 0 missiles west of the Ural Mountains since a n n o u n c i n g a f r e e z e on such deployments l a s t March. (The denial c a m e i n response to charges made o n J u n e 3 0 by Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State-designate f o r European Affairs, that the S o v i e t Union had recently completed additional S S - 2 0 bases in s p i t e of the freeze.) 06/29/82 -- U.S. and Soviet negotiators began talks in Geneva o n reducing s t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons. -- A peace caravan a r r i v e d in R o m e from Sicily with petitions signed by 1 million Italians protesting p l a n s to station U.S. cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily. 06/14/82 -- T h e P e n t a g o n f o r m a l l y notified Congress that i t p l a n s to sell T r i d e n t submarine-launched missiles t o t h e U.K. in a $3.9 billion purchase intended t o modernize B r i t a i n ' s strategic nuclear forces. 06/10/82 -- M o r e than 300,000 persons rallied in opposition t o U.S. defense policies in Bonn across the R h i n e from the s i t e of the NATO summit meeting. (The summit session reaffirmed allied commitments to t h e December 1 9 7 9 modernization and a r m s control program for i n t e r m e d i a t e nuclear forces.) 05/20/82 -- T h e U.S.-Soviet negotiations o n intermediate nuclear w e a p o n s resumed i n G e n e v a f o l l o w i n g a two-month recess. 05/19/82 -- T h e U.S. Air F o r c e announced that it had successfully launched a T-omahawk cruise, t h e f o u r t h of 1 1 planned t e s t s before s c h e d u l e d deployment beginning in 1983. T h e missile f l e w f o r 9 0 6 m i l e s after being launched at t h e Dugway P r o v i n g Ground in Utah. 05/18/82 -- S o v i e t P r e s i d e r t S r e z h n e v , i n a Xoscow s p e e c h , a c c e p t e d Presides: Zeagan's c a i l f o r s t r a t e g i c a r a s c9ntrol t a i k s 9c: e x ~ r e s s e cs k e p t l c i s i n a a o u t t h e " i d e a s " Brezhnev i n c l u d e d I n t h e U.S. r e d u c t i o n p r o p o s a l . a l s o a n n o x n c e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union h a d begun t o reduce i t s intermediate-range m i s s i l e s i n t h e Western USSR a n d c o r i f i r n e d h i s o f f e r t o h a l t c o n s t r u c t i o n o f missile launch positions. He a g a i n r e j e c t e d t h e W e s t ' s c a l l f o r l i m i t a t i o n s on S o v i e t i n t e r m e d i a t e r a n g e m i s s i l e s "beyond t h e U r a l s " but s a i d t h a t s u c h m i s s i l e s would n o t t h r e a t e n Western Europe and t h a t no a d d i t i o n a l m i s s i l e s would be d e p l o y e d t h a t a r e capable of r e a c h i n g Western Europe. 05/09/E2 -- P r e s i d e n t Zeagan, i n a speech a t Eureka College, p r o p o s e d r e d u c t i o n s i n U.S. a n d S o v i e t n u c l e a r i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s i l e s by a p p r o x i m a t e l y one-third. 04/22/82 -- T h e n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s o f W e s t German C h a n c e l l o r Schmidt's S o c i a l Democratic P a r t y defeated a p r o p o s a l t o h a l t p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r d e p l o y m e n t o f new American i n t e r m e d i a t e r a n g e weapons w h i l e arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e underway i n Geneva. The m o t i o n on s e c u r i t y e v e n t u a l l y a d o p t e d c a l l e d f o r a r e v i e w of t h e q u e s t i o n a t a s p e c i a l c o n v e n t i o n i n 1983. 04/15/82 -- P r e s s r e p o r t s f r o m Rome i n d i c a t e d t h a t p r e p a r a t i o n s h a d begun a t Comiso i n S i c i l y on t h e p r o j e c t e d b a s e On A p r i l 4 , f o r U.S.-built c r u i s e missiles. a n t i - n u c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t o r s mounted a l a r g e p r o t e s t march t o t h e Magliocco m i l i t a r y a i r p o r t n e a r Comiso where t h e base i s t o be c o n s t r u c t e d . 04/09/82 -- Spokesman f o r b o t h t h e German S o c i a l D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y and t h e o p p o s i t i o n C h r i s t i a n Democrats e x p r e s s e d r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e p r o p o s a l by f o u r f o r m e r American o f f i c i a l s (McGeorge B u n d y , R o b e r t McNamara, G e o r g e Kennan, and Gerard Smith) t h a t NATO should renounce f i r s t u s e of n u c l e a r weapons i n d e f e n d i n g Europe against conventional attack. 04/07/82 -- P r e s s r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e U.S. 03/29/82 -- A 03/16/82 -- The Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n s r e c e s s e d , a s s c h e d u l e d , f o r two months t o p e r m i t b o t h s i d e s t o e v a l u a t e t h e s t a t u s of the talks. Army w a n t s t o b u i l d s u b s t a n t i a l l y more P e r s h i n g I1 m i s s i l e s t h a n i t n e e d s t o f u l f i l l t h e NATO r e q u i r e m e n t o f 1 0 8 . The Army r e p o r t e d l y w o u l d l i k e t o s e l l a " r e d u c e d r a n g e " v e r s i o n t o West Germany t o r e p l a c e e x i s t i n g nuclear-armed Pershing 1 missiles deployed w i t h t h e W e s t German A i r F o r c e . West German o f f i c i a l c o n f i r m e d i n a n i n t e r v i e w t h a t p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e u n d e r w a y f o r t h e s i t i n g o f new American i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e n u c l e a r weapons i n Germany. 12/28/51 - - I n a c o l u m n p u b l i s h e d i n t h e N e w Ycrk T i m e s , F l o r a Lewis reported that the Geneva negotiations had " g o t t e n off t o a g o o d s t a r t " w i t h S o v i e t negotiators putting their own estimaces of each s i d e ' s arsenal o n the table - - an uncommon practice f o r t h e S o v i e t Union. Lewis also reported that " T h e R u s s i a n s a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t m e e t i n g U.S. d e m a n d s f o r b e t t e r v e r i f i c a t i o n by t h e m u t u a l e x c h a n g e o f t a m p e r - p r o c f ' E l a c k S c x e s ' , instruments :o b e i n s t a l l e d by e a c h s i d e o n t h e o t h e r s i d e ' s l a u n c h e r s a n d t h e n c h e c k e d a g a i n s t cheating." 12/25/81 -- In a televised interview, President Reagan claimed that anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe were " b o u g h t a n d paid f o r by t h e S o v i e t Ucion." 12/18/81 -- T h e n e w Belgium g o v e r n m e n t l e d by F l e m i s h S o c i a l Christian Vilfried Martens announced its continued support for NATO's 1979 depioyment decision but said that Belgian acceptance o f cruise missiles w o u l d s t i l l be e x a m i n e d e v e r y s i x m o n t h s o n t h e basis of developments in arms control negotiations 12/17/81 -- Soviet and American negotiators recessed their talks o n intermediate n u c l e a r w e a p o n s s y s t e n s i n E u r o p e a n d s z h e ~ u l e d re=:rnpclon f o r S a r u a r y 1982. 12/12/81 -- In talks with West German Chancellor Schmidt, East G e r m a n l e a d e r E r i c h H o n e c k e r s a i C that t h e f u t u r e o f inter-German relations was linked to West G e r m a n y ' s p o s i t i o n o n d e p l o y m e n t of n e w A m e r i c a n n u c l e a r weapons. Honecker asserted chat "gocd n e i g h b o r l i n e s s c a n n o t f l o u r i s h i n t h e s h a d o w of U.S. a t o m i c missiles." 12/06/81 -- A n t i - n u c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w e r e held i n a n u m b e r o f W e s t European cities. 12/05/81 -- An estimated 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 protestors rallied in Bucharest, R o m a n i a , t o d e m o n s t r a t e f o r t h e r e m o v a l of a l i n u c l e a r w e a p o n s f r o m Europe. 12/01/81 -International Richard Perie, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, testifying before the Senate Armed Services C o m m i t t e e , said t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d n o " f a l l b a c k " p o s i t i o n if t h e S o v i e t s r e j e c t t h e z e r o - o p t i o n p r o p o s a l . P e r l e a l s o said t h a t a n y a g r e e m e n t m u s t a l s o l i m i t o t h e r S o v i e t t h e a t e r s y s t e m s t o p r e v e n t c i r c u m v e n t i o n of t h e agreement. On verification, P e r l e said that "any treaty a g r e e d upon m u s t i n c l u d e v e r i f i c a t i o n m e a s u r e s t h a t w i l l al-nos? cey+=F~:y ~9 5elTo?3 +.he Y a t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l m e a n s o f v e r i f i c a t i o n o n w h i c h t h e l e s s c o m p l e x a g r e e m e n t s of t h e p a s t h a v e relied." ii/30/81 -- T h e United States and the Soviet Union beqan talks in Geneva o n r e d u c i n g n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i n Europe. Paul Nitze, leader o f t h e U.S. d e l e g a t i o n , c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e m e e t i n g a s " c o r d i a l a n d b u ~ i n e s s l i k e a~n~d h i s S o v i e t c o u n t e r p a r t , Y u l i K v i t s i n s k y , said that the meeting had been "very constructive." 11/26/81 -- Soviet President Brezknev left Bonn, concluding talks with W e s t G e r m a n o f f i c i a l s t h a t b e g a n c n Nov. 22. BrezP.nev reiterated Moscow's proposal for a moratorium in new d e p l o y m e n t s of i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e m i s s i l e s i n E u r o p e a n d said that the Soviet Union was willing to make "radical" c u t s in its forces but viewed the Reagan "zero-option" proposal a s inequitable to the Soviet Union. A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of c h e t a l k s , it w a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t W e s t Germany and the Soviet Union would Consult regularly a b o u t n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i n E u r o p e d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. 11/21/31 -- An anti-nuclear demonstration in Amsterdam reportedly attracted over 300,000 demonstrators. 11/18/81 -- President Reagan, in a major foreign policy speech a t the National Press Club, announced that the United S t a t e s w o u l d s e e k t o t a l e l i m i n a t i o n of S o v i e t S S - 2 0 , S S - 4 , a n d S S - 5 m i s s i l e s in r e t u r n f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n o f N A T O ' S d e p l o y m e n t p l a n s -- a s o - c a l l e d " z e r o - o p t i o n . " The President said that American negotiators would be willing to listen to a n d discuss Soviet proposals in t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s schedules t o b e g i n i n G e n e v a o n Nov. 30. H e a l s o s a i d t h a t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d seek t o open Strategic Arms Reduction T a l k s (START) w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n " a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e " in 1 9 8 2 . 11/11/61 -- Anti-nuclear teach-ins were held a t more than 1 0 0 u n i v e r s i t i e s a r o u n d t h e U n i t e d States. 11/05/81 -- T h e government of Sweden said that it believed there were nuclear torpedo warheads aboard the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine that went aground i n Swedish t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s o n Oct. 27, p r e s u m a b l y i n t h e course of a spy mission near a Swedish military facility. -- Secretary of Defense Weinberger, testifying before t h e Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the i d e a o f a n u c l e a r w a r n i n g s h o t w a s o n l y a " s u g g e s t i o n " of military planners in the 1960s and that "there is no precise NATO military plan" for a nuclear demonstration shot. Later in the day, the White House, State Department, and Defense Department issued statements saying that "NATO a number of years a g o identified the s o - c a l l e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n u s e a s a p o s s i b l e option." The s t a t e m e n t said t h a t w h i l e " S e c r e t a r y H a i g w a s c o r r e c t i n noting that a demonstrative use is a n option that h a s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d by N A T O , S e c r e t a r y W e i n b e r g e r i s c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g t h a t i t h a s n e v e r been t r a n s f e r r e d :-/G;/“3: -- S e c r e t a r y o f Scaz? a a - G , c s s z i i y l n g c e f o r s t . l e S e n a t e Relaz2op.s C o m n l t ~ e e ,s a l d t h a t l n t h e e v e n t ci a S o v l e t i z v a s l o n o f W e s t e r n Z u r o p e , N A T G r n l g h t f l r e o f f a n n c l e a r " d e m o n s t r a t i o n f ' s h o t c o warn Moscow o f t h e r ~ s k so f continuing t h e conflict. Foreign 10/31/8i -- S o v i e t l e a d e r B r e z h n e v was q u o t e d i n t 3 e w e s t German magazine S e r Spiegel as saying t h a t "even though t h e r e a r e s o m e who h o p e t h a t a n u c l e a r was c o u l d b e c o n t a i n e d a l i m i t e d n u c l e a r was i s n o t on E u r o p e a n t e r r i t o r y possible." A c c o r d i n g t o B r e z h n e v , a n y n u c l e a r war, i n Europe o r e l s e w h e r e , "would i n e v i t a b l y and i n e s c a p a S l y t a k e on a w o r l d w i d e c h a r a c t e r . " Brezhnev a l s o commented on t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r a " z e r o o p t i o n " o u t c o m e i n TN? n e g o t i a t i o n s , s a y i n g t h a t w h i l e r e d u c t i o n s i n SS-20s c o u l d b e C o n t e m p l a t e d , i t was " a b s u r d " t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union would s c r a p a l l of i t s SS-20 m i s s i l e s i n r e t u r n f o r n o new W e s t e r n d e p l o y m e n t s . ... 1 ~ / 2 6 / 8 1 -- R o m a n i a n P r e s i d e n t N i c o l a e C e a u s e s c u , o n t h e e v e o f a v l s i t by West German P r e s i d e n t Karl K a r s t e n s t o R o m a n i a , c a l l e d i n i n t e r v i e w s w i t h two West German N e w s p a p e r s f o r t > e S o v i e t Union as w e l l a s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o remove n u c l e a r weapons from Europe. Ceausescu, advocating an e n d t o t h e n u c l e a r arms r a c e , s a i d t h a t " T h i s a p p l i e s j u s t a s much t o s t o p p i n g t h e s t a t i o n i n g o f r o c k e t s p r o d u c e d b y t h e United S t a t e s as t o withdrawing t h e S o v i e t r o c k e t s . " 10/25/81 -- A n t l - n u c l e a r 10/24/81 -- l0/21/81 -- F o l l o w i n g a s t r o n g r e a c t i o n i n E u r o p e a g a i n s t P r e s i d e n t demonstrations were held i n Brussels, P a r i s , T h e B r . ~ s s e l s demonstration O s l o , a n d East B e r l i n . reportedly a t t r a c t e d over 200,000. Anti-nuclear demonstrations a t t r a c t e d an estimated 200,000 p r o t e s t o r s i n Rome a n d 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 i n L o n d o n . R e a g a n ' s c o m m e n t s o n t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r l i n i t e d n u c l e a r war i n Europe, t h e White House i s s u e d a s t a t e m e n t t o c l a r i f y t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s t h o u g h t s on t h e s u b j e c t . The s t a t e m e n t s a i d t h a t " i n a n u c l e a r war, a l l m a n k i n d w o u l d l o s e . " Further, "The e s s e n c e o f U n i t e d S t a t e n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y i s t h a t no a g g r e s s o r s h o u l d b e l i e v e t h a t t h e u s e o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i n Europe could reasonably be l i m i t e d t o Europe." 10/16/8l -- T h e D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r s o f t h e M e m b e r s o f t h e NATO N u c l e a r Planning Group, meeting i n G l e n e a g l e s , S c o t l a n d , r e a f i r m e d U.S. S e c r e t a r y p l a n s f o r d e p l o y m e n t o f n e w N A T O LRTNF. o f D e f e n s e W e i n b e r g e r , i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e u r g i n g of some European d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r , went a l o n g w i t h t h e g r o u p ' s endorsement of a " z e r o - o p t i o n w as t h e i d e a l o b j e c t i v e of n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union on t h e a t e r n u c l e a r systems. I n such an approach, t h e United S t a t e s would f o r e g o d e p l o y m e n t o f n e w LRTNF i n r e t u r n f o r S c v i e t d i s m a n t l i n g of i t s medium-range n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s y s t e m s . -- P r e s i d e n t Reagan, a t a meeting with newspaper editors, was asked whether he believed that 2 nuclear weapors e x c h a n g e with t h e S o v i e t U n i o n c o u l d be l i m i t e d t c E u r o p e T h e L=reslien: o r w o a i d inevitably e s e a l a z e . I d o n ' c h o n e s t l y p now. I think a g a i n , until responded: someplace - - a l l over the world this is being, research g o i n g o n , to t r y a n d f i n d r h e d e f e n s i v e w e a p o n . There never has been a weapon that someone hasn't come up with a defense. B u t i t c o u l d -and t 9 e o n l y d e f e n s e i s , w e l l , y o u s h o o t y o u r s I could see where you could have and we'll shoot ours. the exchange of tactical wespons against troops i n the f i e l d w i t h o u t i t b r i n g i n g e i t h e r o n e of t h e m a j o r p o w e r s t o p u s h i n g t h e button." 10/10/81 -- A n a n t i - n u c l e a r demonstration i n B o n n , W e s t G e r m a n y a t t r a c t e d a n e s t i m a t e d 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 p a r t i c i p a n t s , i n c l u d i n g o n e m e m b e r of t h e P r e s i d i u m of X e l m u t S c h m i d t ' s S o c i a l D e m o c r a t i c ?arty. 10/05/81 -- NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Bernard Rogers, c o m m e n t i n g on P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s d e c i s i o n t o p l a c e n u c l e a r armed cruise missiles on attack submarines, said that the t h e d e c i s i o n w o u l d b e u s e d by E u r o p e a n a n t i - n u c l e a r f o r c e s to argue in favor of modernizing NATO's theater nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s by d e p l o y i n g n e w s y s t e m s a t s e a , n o t o n land. 10/02/81 -- T h e I t a l i a n C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s a p p r o v e d by a 244 t o 2 2 5 v o t e t h e I t a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s p l a n t o a l l o w d e p l o y m e n t of A m e r i c a n c r u i s e m i s s i l e s i n S i c z l y i f U.S.-Soviet a r m s reduction negotiations should fail. -- President Reagan announced a series of strategic weapons d e c i s i o n s i n c l u d i n g s c r a p p i n g t h e m u l t i p l e protective s h e l t e r s y s t e m f o r t h e MX m i s s i l e , c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e 5 - 1 b o m b e r , a n d b a s i n g n u c l e a r - a r m e d c r u i s e m i s s i l e s o n U.S. attack submarines. 09/24/81 -- I n a t e r s e U.S.-Soviet j o i n t a n n o u n c e m e n t , w o r k e d o u t t h e d a y b e f o r e by S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e H a i g a n d Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the two countries pledged "to spare no effort" t o reach an agreement on reducing medium-range theater nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe. Negotiations were scheduled The announcement t o b e g i n o n Nov. 3 0 i n G e n e v a . n o t e d t h a t t h e U.S. n e g o t i a t i n g t e a m w o u l d be l e d b y P a u l N i t z e a n d t h e S o v i e t s i d e by A m b a s s a d o r U.A. K v i t s i n s k y . 09/23/81 -- In a n address to a conference i n Brussels, Richard Burt, the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , s a i d t h a t t h e U.S. a g r e e d t o t h e NATO LRTNF decision "in the full knowledge that the Soviet Union would most likely respond to a n attack o n i t s h o m e l a n d by U.S. s y s t e m s i n E u r o p e w i t h a n a t t a c k o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h u s t h e e m p l a c e m e n t of l o n g - r a n g e U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes e s c a l a t i o n of a n y n u c l e a r w a r i n E u r o p e t o i n v o l v e a n intercontinental exchange more likely, not less." 09/16/81 -- According to a report published in the Washington P o s t , t h e West G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t a s k e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o consider postponing t h e f i r s t deployment o f P e r s h i n g 1 1 missiles o n G e r m a n t e r r i c c r y t o coincide with t h e i n i t i a l s t a t i o n i n g of c r u i s e m i s s i l e s on I t a l i a n t e r r i t o r y . (Both were s c h e d u l e d t o t a k e p l a c e i n December 1 9 8 3 , b u t some have suggested t h a t t e c h n i c a l f a c t o r s might d e l a y t h e I t a l i a n deployment u n t i l A p r i l 1984.) S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Haig, on S e p t . 1 4 i n Bonn, d e n i e d t h a t t h e U.S. h a d a g r e e d t o a n y d e l a y i n t h e Pershin9 deployments and s a i d t h a t t h e m i s s i l e d e p l o y m e n t p r o g r a m was o n s c h e d u l e . 0 ~ / 0 1 / ~ -1 A r e s e a r c h memorandum p u b l i s h e d by t h e U.S. I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i c a t i o n A g e n c y b a s e d o n new West E u r o F e a n p u b l i c o p i n i o n d a t a c o n c l u d e d t h a t there i s hard-core opposition t o t h e s t a t i o n i n g o f new l o n g - r a n g e t h e a t e r m i s s i l e s i n W e s t e r n Europe b u t t h a t t h e d a t a do n o t s u p p o r t t h e " c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom o f many j o u r n a l i s t s " a n a l y s e s t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r LRTNF s t a t i o n i n g i n Western Europe." 08/21/81 -- West German C h a n c e l l o r S c h m i d t r e a f f i r m e d h i s s u p p o r t f o r s t a t i o n i n g of enhanced r a d i a t i o n warheads i n Europe providing t h a t h i s e a r l i e r - s t a t e d t h r e e The t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s a r e t h a t conditions were m e t . t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c n o t b e t h e o n l y NATO c o u n t r y which a c c e p t s s t a t i o n i n g o f such weapons, t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n b e t a k e n b y NATO a s a w h o l e , a n d t h a t t h e d e p l o y m e n t t a k e p l a c e o n l y i f arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s with t h e S o v i e t Unicn f a i l t o achieve results. 08/06/81 -- P r e s i d e n t Reagan a u t h o r i z e d f u l l p r o d u c t i o n of enhanced r a d i a t i o n warheads f o r t h e Lance missile and 8-inch a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s . The P r e s i d e n t o r d e r e d t h a t t h e weapons be s t o c k p i l e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d said t h a t a n y f u t u r e d e p l o y m e n t i n Europe would be done o n l y after f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e a l l i e s . 07/23/81 -- A West German g o v e r n m e n t spokesman announced t h a t P r e s i d e n t Reagan had s e n t C h a n c e l l o r Schmidt a l e t t e r p l e d g i n g t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s on LRTNF w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w o u l d b e g i n b e t w e e n mid-November a n d mid-December 1 9 8 1 . 07/13/81 -- Secretary of S t a t e Haig, i n a major p o l i c y speech, o u t l i n e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Reagan Haig s a i d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n arms c o n t r o l p o l i c y . t h a t arms c o n t r o l " c a n n o t b e t h e p o l i t i c a l centerpiece o r t h e c r u c i a l barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations" and t h a t under t h e R e a g a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n arms c o n t r o l e f f o r t s " w i l l be an instrument o f , n o t a replacement Haig for, a coherent Allied security policy." r e i t e r a t e d t h e American commitment t o b e g i n TNF n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n b e t w e e n , - -- ; d r ; ~ t~s e v l s : : zo X S ~ Z Z X of P V E S C Zsrzan Sot-a: D e m c c r a z l c P a r t y C?,a;rvan J l l l y and^, S c v i e t ? r e s i d e n t 3 r e z h n e v rei:eratGd his offer t o d s c l a r e a rnoratorlum o n d e p i s y ~ e n t 3 5 n e w c h e a t e r n u c l e a r X I - s s ~ l es y s t e m s 5 u r 1 n g cegotiat;ons w i t h t h e U n ~ t e dS t a t e s if t h e West will agree also coy to deploy new systems during the course of tne ?iegotla~ions. 2 5 / 3 ~ / 8 1 - - I n a n i n t e r v z e w w l t h F r a n k f u r ~ e rl?undschau, a W e s ~G e r m a n n e w s p a p e r , C h a n c e l l o r Schrriec acknowleeged that hls governnenz had orlglnally f a v o r e d D a s ~ n gn e w N A T O t k e a t e r n u c l e a r s y s ~ e m s a t sea but had aaandonsd the position in view o f financial a n d a r m s c o n t r o l c o n s ~ d e r a t l o n s . 05/27/81 -- Soviet President Brezhnev, in response to q u e s ~ i o n s posed 3 y a F i n n i s h n e w s p a p e r , s o f t e n e d M o s c o w ' s t r a d i t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o i n c l c s i o n of S o v i e t t e r r i z c r y i n a n'lclear f r e e z o n e i n Northern Europe. Brezhnev reportedly said that the USSR "does not preclude the possiSility o f c o n s i d e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of s o m e o t h e r measures applying to our own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free z o n e in t h e n o r t h of Europe." The shift was interpreted by m a n y W e s t e r n o b s e r v e r s a s a n o t h e r e l e m e n t in a Soviet campaign to encourage splits between the United States and Zuropean countries on nuzlear issues. C5/22/81 -- In testimony before the Ssnate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e , E u g e n e R o s t o w , d e s i g n a t e d by P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n t o h e a d 'he U.S. A r m s C o n t r o l and Disarmacent Agency, suggested that the Administration might not be prepared to resume strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union until Karch 1982. C5/2:/81 -- O v e r :20,000 l e a d e r s a n d m e m b e r s o f W e s t Germany's major Protestant federation concluded a f o u r - d a y m e e t i n g i n Earnburg w h i c h f e a t u r e d demonstrations for a nuclear-free Europe and a g a i n s t N A T O ' s TN? m o d e r n i z a t i o n p l a n s . 06/17/81 -- At the eighth meeting of NATO's "Special Consultative Groap" which is responsible for developing and coordinating the Western approach t o T N 9 negotiations, the United States r e p o r t e d o n t h e s t a t u s o f U.S.-Soviet p r e p a r a t o r y c o n t a c t s o n t h e issue. C5/09/81 -- At a Kremlin dinner for the visiting Algerian p r e s i d e n t , P r e s i d e n t BrezP-nev q u e s t i o n e d t h e s i c c e r i t y of t h e R e a g a n A d n i n i s t r a t i o n ' s pledge to begin n e g o t i a t i ~ n son theater nuclear systems. 3rezhnev sale tnat Admlnlstratlon s t a t e m e n ~ sa r e " a e r e w o r d s " d e s l g n e c to " 1 ~ 1 1 J e crLar5ea c r . a ~ 1:s a - i l e s a n a put-LC o p l n l c n . " t n e J n ~ t e dS t a t e s h a d y e t t o t a k e "a s l n g l e r e a l s t e p " t o w a r d negot;atrons a c d a c e u s e d Washington o f e m D a r k ~ n g o n a n " u n p r e c e d e n t e e " arms race. 06/05/81 - - T h e N e w York T i m e s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S ~ a t e sa n d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a d a g r e e d t o begin talks in Washington in "the next few weeks" to prepare f o r negotiations later in the year on limiting medium-range theater nuclear forces. -- The West German magazine Der Speigel published an interview with Vadim Zagladin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet U n i o n , in which Zagladin said that once negotiations on medium-range missiles started, the Soviet Union would be prepared to refrain from deploying new weapons and to call a halt to a l l deployment programs. H e also said that the Soviet Union favored making Europe a denuclearized zone. 05/13/81 -- The NATO defense ministers concluded a meeting of t h e Defense Planning Committee with a communique that noted NATO's intention to "move ahead with its planned schedule o f l o n g - r a n g e t h e a t e r n n c l 2 a r f o r c e (LZTNF) modernization whilst a t the same time making efforts to reach balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements limiting s u c h forces..." T h e ministers also "welcomed the intention of t h e United States t o begin negotiations with t h e Soviet Union by t h e end of the year on theater nuclear force arms c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h e S A L T framework..." 05/05/81 -- NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Rome, emphasized in their communique that "in light of increasing Soviet LRTNF deployments which i n the case of the SS-20 already exceed the total LRTNF deployment planned by NATO, t h e modernizing of NATO's LRTNF i s more essential than ever, and offers the only realistic basis f o r p a r a l l e l T N F a r m s control..." 35/04/81 -- It was reported that President Reagan had sent a letter to Soviet President Brezhnev signaling his administration's willingness t o begin talks this year on limiting theater nuclear systems i n Europe. 04/19/81 -- An estimated 6,000 anti-nnclear demonstrators representing a number of West Europeac countries n a r c n e d t o N A T O headquarters 12 r ~ . e s u z s ~ ~ r z s o f B r u s s e l s t o p r o t e s t N A T O L2T::F d e p l ~ > ~ ~ e n z ;,ar.s. 04/08/81 - - D e f e n s e E i n i s t e r s of c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c i p a c ~ n g in N A T O ' s N u c l e a r 'lanning Group meeting in Sonn reaffirmed willingness to open negotiations w i t h t h e S o v i e t Unisn o n t h e a t e r n u c l e a r s y s t e m s b u t w a r n e d t h a t S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i c n in "laand "would gravely undermine t h e basis for effective a r m s control negotiation." 03/02/81 -- A r e p o r t i s s u e d by t h e G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n q C f f i c e concluded that Pershing I 1 testing to date h a d p r o d u c e d " e n c o u r a g i n g " r e s u l t s but t h a t most of the critical hardware tests were still t o b e a c c o m p l i s h e d i n a s c h e d u l e which h a s been compressed t o meet NATO deployment commitments. T h e report a l s o noted that several technical p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e G r o u n d L a u n c h e d C r u i s e ifissile remain to b e resolved and h a v e delayed the start o f o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t s a n d p r o d u c t i o n of t h e system. 02/23/81 -- In his report t o the 25th Soviet Party Congress, President Brezhnev proposed a m o r a t o r i u m o n d e p l o y m e n t i n E u r o p e of n e w medium-range nuclear missile facilities of the N A T O c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e S o v i e t Union. Accordicg to Erezhnev, "This moratorium could come into force immediately as soon a s negotiations on t h i s q u e s t i o n c o m m e n c e , a n d w o u l d be e f f e c t ~ v e until a permanent treaty o n limitation o r , evec b e t t e r , o n r e d u c t i o n of s u c h n u c l e a r f a c i l i t i e s in Europe i s concluded." 02/03/81 -- S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e W e i n b e r g e r , in a p r e s s conference, said that the Reagan Administration might g o ahead with production of enhanced radiation warheads (the so-called neutron bomb. ) 12/12/80 - - N A T O f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s m e e t i n g i n B r u s s e l s took note of preliminary discussions held between U.S. a n d S o v i e t n e g o t i a t o r s i n G e n e v a d u r i n g O c t o b e r a n d N o v e m b e r on t h e a t e r n u c l e a r f o r c e reductions. They agreed that "A date for r e s u m p t i o n o f U.S.-Soviet e x c h a n g e s n e x t y e a r will S e s e t through mutual consultations." The ministers a l s o noted that the withdrawal of 1 , 0 0 0 U.S. n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s f r o m E u r o p e a s a n integral part of the LRTNF modernization a n d a r m s c o n t r o l decision had been completed. 10/16/80 -- T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e S o v i e t Union o p e n e d p r e l i m i n a r y t a l k s in G e n e v a o n t h e a t e r n u c l e a r force limitations. T 5 e Belgian government lndeflnitely poscp3ned a final dec;slon on whether or not to a c c e p t s t a z ~ o n l n gof crxise r,;;s;~es on Se-glan t e r r ~ t o r y p e n d ~ n g the development of a r m s control negotiations between the Unlted S t a t e s and the S o v l e t Unlon. T h e government said that ~ t would reexamine the questlon every s l x months. -- It was r e p o r t e d that S o v i e t President Brezhnev had sent l e t t e r s to P r e s i d e n t Carter and other NATC l e a d e r s complaining t h a t the West had not responded to his offer to begin negotiations on theater nuclear systems. - - It was reported that Secretary of D e f e n s e Brown had s e n t a message to the NATO a l l i e s assuring them that the n e w U.S. nuclear strategy ontlined in Presidential D i r e c t i v e 59 did not r e p r e s e n t a major break in the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy a n d was intended to enhance deterrence. (Reports of a more f l e x i b l e U.S. targeting doctrine had led s o m e Europeans to believe that t h e United S t a t e s was moving toward a greater willingness to contemplate fighting l i m i t e d nuclear war in Europe.) -- During talks i n Moscow, S o v i e t President Brezhnev told Chancellor Schmidt that t h e Soviet Union would not persist with i t s insistence t h a t NATO r e n c u n c e its LRTNF deployment plans before U.S.-Soviet negotiations could begin to seek East-West limitations o n such systems. -- NATO established a Special Consultative Group o n Arms Control involving Theater Nuclear F o r c e s (to succeed the special study group f o r m e d i n 1979.) -- It was r e p o r t e d that t h e Soviet Union had sent a n o t e to the United States claiming that NATO's decision to deploy new theater nuclear s y s t e m s in Europe had "destroyed the basis f o r negotiations" o n limiting theater nuclear arms. -- T h e White H o u s e announced t h a t it had requested a postponement of the S e n a t e debate on t h e S A L T I 1 treaty in the wake of the S o v i e t invasion of Afghanistan. -- T h e S o v i e t Union invaded Afghanistan. - - At a s p e c i a l meeting of N A T O foreign a n d defense m i n i s t e r s , the N A T O countries d e c i d e d to go a h e a d with modernization of the W e s t ' s "rope-basee long-range t9eacer nuclear systems ?y yeployinq ( i n 1983, 2 : ~ 2 es a r l i e a t \ a t o t a l - ,- 5 7 2 n e e s y s c e n s i;'8 " " r s h ~ n g ,, a n - is* ground laanched cr:ise 'issiles capable o f s t r i k i ~ gS o v i e t t e r r i t o r y ) . ??e d e s l s i c n r e c o m m e n d e d d e p l o y n e n : i n 5 E u r o ~ e a nc o - n t r i e s : 1 0 8 P e r s h i n g 1 1 l a ' ~ n c h e r sa n d 2 4 GLCY l a u n c h e r s ( 9 6 ) m i S S i l ~ 3i n W e s t G e r n a n y ; 4 0 G L C F l a ~ n c h e r s ( 1 6 0 ) m i s s i l e s i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m ; 26 GLCK l a u n c h e r s ( 1 1 2 m i s s i l e s ) i n I r a l y ; 1 2 GLCX launchers (43 m i s s i l e s ) i n aelglum; and 1 2 GLCX l a u n c h e r s ( 4 8 m i s s i l e s ) i n The N e ~ n e r l a n d s . A t t h e s a n e t i m e , l<AFC e x p r e s s e d i t s willino::ess t o n e g o t i a t e l i m i t s on t h i s d e p l o y m e n t i n eXcr,ange f o r r e c i p r o c a l S o v i e t l i n i t a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y o n t h e new n o b i l e a n d a c c u r a 7 e SS-20 m i s s i l e s y s t e m b a s e d i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . The NATO a l l i e s a l s o announced t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would u n i l a t e r a l l y withdraw a t o t a l of 1 , 0 0 0 o b s o l e s c e n t n u c l e a r warheads from Western Europe. , - - 10/06/79 -- S o v i e t 06/18/79 -- T h e SALT I 1 t r e a t y w a s s i g n e d b y P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and P r e s i d e n t Brezhnev i n Vienna. 04/11/79 -- NATO e s t a b l i s h e d a S p e c l a 1 G r o u p L O s t u d y arms c o n t r o l a s p e c t s of t h e a t e r n u c l e a r sjrsterns. 10/28/77 -- West G e r m a n C h a n c e l l o r 10/12/77 -- NATO President B r e z h n e v o f f e r e d t o l l m l t d e p l o y m e n t o f SS-20 m i s s l l e s i f t h e Norzh A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n l z a t l o n would d e f e r a d e c i s i o n t o d e p l o y new W e s t e r n s y s t e m s . Schmidt, i n a speech t o the International Institute for S ~ r a t e g i c S t u d i e s i n L o n d o n , a r g u e d t h a t t h e new r e a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y , a s c o d i f i e d b y SALT, magnified t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h e a t e r n u c l e a r a n c c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons. He e m p h a s i e d t h a t s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n s c o n f i n e d t o U.S. a n d S o v i e t c e n t r a l s y s t e m s w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y i n p a i r t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e West European NATO a l l i e s . He c o n c l u d e d t h a t d i s p a r i t i e s of m i l i L a r y power i n E u r o p e would h a v e t o b e r e m o v e d i n p a r a l l e l w i t h t h e SALT negotiations. e s t a b l i s h e d a "High Level Group ( H L G ) " t o s t u d y d e f i c i e n c i e s i n NATO's t h e a t e r n u c l e a r posture. T h e g r o u p was d i r e c t e d z o s t c d y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r NATC1s s t r a t e g y o f t h r e e factors: t h e c o n d i t i o n of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y ; t h e ongoing modernization of S o v i e t t h e a t e r f o r c e s ; and t h e growing obsolescence of e x i s t i n g NATO t h e a t e r f o r c e s . ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOUZCES Bundy, McGeorge, George F. Kennan, R o b e r t S . KcNamara, a n d Gerard Smith. Nuclear weapons a n d t h e A t l a n t i c p. 753-768. Alliance. Foreign a f f a i r s , s p r i n g 1982. Cordesman, Anthony H. Europe's q u i e t p r o f i l e i n courage. Armed f o r c e s j o u r n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l , J u n e 1 9 8 1 : 3 8 - 1 0 9 . Dean, Jonathan. p. 37-53. Beyond f i r s t u s e . Foreign policy, f a l l 1982, Freedman, Lawrence. T h e d i l e m m a o f t h e a t r e n u c l e a r arms control. S u r v i v a l , J a n / F e b 1981: 2-10. G a r t h o i f , Raymond. Foreign policy, B r e z h n e v ' s o p e n i n g : t h e TNF t a n g l e . no. 4 1 , w i n t e r 1980-1981: 82-94. K a i s e r , Karl, George Leber, A l o i s M e r t e s , and Franz-Josef Schulze. a German N u c l e a r weapons and t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of Peace: F o r e i g n a f f a i r s , summer 1 9 8 2 , r e s p o n s e t o no f i r s t u s e . p. 1157-1170. I n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e n u c l e a r weapons. Lewis, Kevin N. S c i e n t i f i c American, v . 243, Dec. 1980: 63-73. The M i l i t a r y b a l a n c e , 1982-1983. "Theatre n u c l e a r f o r c e s i n Europe.'I London, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 134-137. I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1 9 8 0 . F. N u c l e a r w e a p o n s a n d p r e v e n t i n g war; i n t r o d u c t i o n b y J o h n Nott. E s s a y f r o m t h e U . K . s t a t e m e n t on t h e d e f e n s e estimates f o r 1981 NATO r e v i e w , v. 29, J u n e 1981: 24-33. S e e i n same i s s u e : (1) North A t l a n t i c Council f i n a l Documentation: communique; ( 2 ) E x t r a c t s f o r p u b l i c a t i o n from t h e minutes of t h e m i n i s t e r i a l meeting of t h e council; ( 3 ) D e f e n s e P l a n n i n g C o m m i t t e e f i n a l communique; ( 4 ) NATO N u c l e a r P l a n n i n g G r o u p f i n a l c o m m u n i q u e ; ( 5 ) Eurogroup communique. U.S. General Accounting Office. Most c r i t i c a l t e s t i n g s t i l l l i e s ahead f o r m i s s i l e s i n t h e a t e r nuclear modernization. Washington 1981. MASAD-81-15, 25 p. A t head of t i t l e : By t h e C o m p t r o l l e r G e n e r a l . Report t o t h e Congress of t h e United States. U.S. Library of Congress. Foreign A f f a i r s and National by Harry L. Defense Division. C r u i s e missiles Wrenn. Washington 1981. 1 5 p. I s s u e b r i e f IB-81080. ----- Enhanced r a d i a t i o n weapons H a r r y L. Wrenn. Washington I s s u e b r i e f 81148 ( t h e " n e u t r o n bomb") 1981. by SOVIET AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON THE BALANCE* United States Assessment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Balance U.S. - Soviet ...................... ......... .............:............ ................. ....................... Missiles F-111 fighter-bombers F-4s A-6s and A-7s FB-111s (Stationed in U.S. for use in Europe) 0 164 265 68 63 - ...................... SS-20s SS-4s and SS-5s SS-12s and SS-22s SS-N-5s TU-26 Backfire bombers TU-16 Badgers and TU-22 Blinders SU-17, SU-24 and MIG-27 fighter-bombers 340 ............. 250 ........... 100 ..................... 30 ...... 45 ........... 350 .......... 2,700 Soviet Union Assessment of Intermediate Range Theater Balance Soviet Western U.S. Fighter-bombers - .......................... 172 ......................... 65 ............................ 246 ....................... 240 ............... 64 I?-111 FB-111 F-4 A-6. A-7 U.K. Polaris missiles Vulcan bombers France Land-based missiles Submarine missiles Mirage-4 bombers ................. ............ ............. ............... * .......... 496 ........... ......... 46118 Land-based missiles (SS-203, SS-58, SS-4s) Submarine missiles Medium-range bombers (Backfire, Badger, ~linder) 55 18 80 46 From various sources including U.S. State Department, New York Times, Arms Control Association. -