Congressional Veto of Executive Actions

Statutory provisions by which Congress authorizes a Federal program to be administered by the Executive but retains the legal authority to disapprove all or part of the program before final implementation have become increasingly frequent in recent years. These statutory provisions which subject a variety of proposed executive actions to congressional review are commonly known as "congressional veto" devices.

CONGRESSIONAL VET@ OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB76006 AUTHOR: Thomas J. Nicola American Law Division Clark F. Norton Government DivisiDn THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED 02/03/76 DATE UPDATED 11/05/82 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 1105 CRS- 1 ISSUE DEFINIT1,ON Statutory provisions by which Congress authorizes a Federal program to be administered by the Executive but retains the legal authority to disapprove all or part of the program before final implementation have become increasingly frequent in recent years. These statutory provisions which subject a variety of proposed executive actions to congressional review are common1 y known as "congressional veto" devices. Although the Constitutionality of the congressional veto has yet to be finally resolved by the Supreme Court, it has been the object of considerable discussion since the beginning of its use in the 1930s. BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS Some cases challenging the constitutionality of the CongreSsional Vet0 device have been decided. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 19771, involved a challenge against a "one House" CongressiOnal veto (2 U.S.C. 438(c); 26 U.S.C. 9009(c) and 9039(c)) in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976. The case was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Jan. 2 1 , 1 9 7 7 , on the ground that it was not ripe for judicial decision. On June 6 , 1 9 7 7 , the Supreme Court, without hearing the case or issuing an opinion, affirmed the action of the Court of Appeals. In Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1 0 2 8 (Ct. C1. 1977), the Court of Claims by a vote of 4-3 held that the congressional veto provision contained in the Federal Salary Act (2 U.S.C. 351, et seq.) was C O n ~ t i t U t i O n a l . On July 26, 1977, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, affirming a district court dismissal, declined to reach the C O n ~ t i t U t i O n a lallegation that the "one-House" veto provision of the Federal Salary Act, 2 U.S.C. 359(1) (B), was a n unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court on Jan. 9 , 1 9 7 8 , denied petitions for review of Atkins and McCorkle. On Dec. 2 2 , 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that the "one House" congressional veto provision in (2)) was the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. sec. 1254 unconstitutional i n Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 6 3 4 F.2d. 4 0 8 (9th Cir. 1980). This provision authorized either House of Congress to disapprove a decision to suspend deportation of a n alien. Although the Supreme Court heard arguments on this case in the last term, it did not reach a decision. The Court is scheduled to rehear the case on Dec. 7, 1982. (c) On Dec. 1 6 , 1 9 8 2 , the U.S. District Court in Montana in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 50 U.S.L.W. 2394 (Jan. 1 2 , 19821, held that section 204(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (43 U.S.C. sec. 1714(e)0, authorizing a congressional committee to notify the Secretary of the Interior of a n "emergency situation" regarding public lands and to direct him "immediately" to withdraw such lands from mineral leasing activities, is constitutional only if it is construed to allow the Secretary of the Interior to establish the scope and dureation of such emergency withdrawals. On Jan. 2 9 , 1 9 8 2 , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Consumer Energy Council of America v. =Federal Energy Commission, 673 F. 2d 425 (1982),, unanimously held unconstitutional the "one-House" congressional veto provision, section 202(c) of the National Gas Policy Act o f , 1978 (15 U.S.C. sec. 3342 (c)). This section authorized either House to disapprove CRS- 2 IB76006 UPDATE-ll/C5/82 incrementai pricing rules issued by the Commission. A petition f o r review by the Supreme Court has been filed. U.S. Senate v. Consumer Energy Council of America and =U.S. House of Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council o f America=, 51 U.S.L.W. 3212 (Nos. 82-177 and 82-209) (Aug. 2 and 6 , 1982). On Oet. 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District o f unanimously held unconstitutional the "$wo--Hou~e~' Columbia Circuit c o n g r e s s i ~ n a lveto provision, section 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C, sec. 2881(c)) in Consumers Union of the United S t a t e s , Inc. et al. v. Federal T r a d e Commission, et -dl., (D.C. Civ. Action. No. 82-1737). T h i s provision authorized both Houses to disapprove rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission. T h e congressional veto was first employed in the Legislative Appropriation Act of 1 9 3 2 (47 Stat. 413) to grant President Hoover the authority to recrganize executive departments and a g e n c i e s subject to a congressional veto provision allowing either House t o disapprove any r e o r g a n ~ z a t i o n proposal before it goes i n t o effect. When President Hoover submitted his reorganization o r d e r , it was disapproved by a House resolution (H.Res. 334, 72d Congress, 2d session). Although t h e congressional veto was originally most widely employed in executive reorganization legislation, it has i n recent years been increasingly used in a great variety of o t h e r areas a s well. The congressional veto device was employed in the War P o w e r s Act (P.L. 93-148) to restrict the authority of t h e President to utilize American troops i n combat operations i n foreign nations. It was also used to subject t h e rulemaking authority granted to t h e administrator i n such a r e a s a s petroleum allocation (P.L. 93-159); a c c e s s to P r e s i d e n t i a l - materials (P.L. 93-526); campaign reform practices (P.L. 93-443); a n d education standards (P.L. 93-380) to congressional review of such proposed rules before they become legally effective. The congressional veto was a l s o employed in the (P.L. 93-344) t o Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1 9 7 4 restrict t h e President's deferral, rescission, and reservation o f budgetary authority. T h e extension o f the congressional veto device to these n e w uncharted areas h a s raised additional l e g a l and practical o b j e c t i o n s to i t s use. T h e recent case of Buckley v. Valeo, 4 2 4 U.S. 1 (1976), presented perhaps the first opportunity for a Federal Court to pass upon the constitutionality of the congressional veto device. H o w e v e r , t h e Court in Buckley expressly disclaimed deciding this issue, stating in i t s per curiam o p i n i o n t h a t "[blecause of our holding that the manner of appointment of the members of the Commission precluded them from exercising the rule-making powers in q u e s t i o n , we have n o occasion to a d d r e s s this separate c h a l l e n g e here." (Buckley, 4 2 4 U.S., a t 1 4 0 , fn. 176.) J u s t i c e White, concurring i n this part of the Court's holding, a g r e e d t h a t since the Commission itself was unconstitutional because of i t s manner o f a p p o i n t m e n t , rules a n d regulations issued by the Commission w e r e invalid without regard to t h e congressional v e t o mechanism. However, J u s t i c e White indicated i n strongly worded dicta that if the Commission were constitutionally appointed, the congressional veto device would be constitutional. (424 U.S., a t 284-286.) CRS- 3 Although there a r e many types of congressional veto provisions, t h e y typically r e q u i r e t h e Executive t o submit proposed a c t i o n s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the enabling statute to both o r either House of Congress or to o n e o r m o r e o f i t s c o m m i t t e e s within a specified period of t i m e , usually 3 0 , 6 0 , o r 90 d a y s before t h o s e a c t i o n s become legally effective. T h e proposed a c t i o n b e c o m e s legally e f f e c r i v e a t the end of the specified period unless t h e C o n g r e s s either disapproves the proposed a c t i o n by "vetoing" i t (the usual situation) (a l e s s c o m m o n o r a p p r o v e s t h e e p r o p o s e d action by affirmative a c t i o n occurrence). If c o n g r e s s i o n a l consideration of the proposed action takes t h e form of a c o n c u r r e n t r e s o l u t i o n , which must b e passed by both Houses of C o n g r e s s , t h e If t h e measure c a n be defined a s a n t w o - H o u s e w c o n g r e s s i o n a l Veto. c o n g r e s s i o n a l consideration takes t h e form of a s i m p l e resolution passed by either H o u s e , t h e measure c a n be termed a "one-House*' congressional veto. If t h e proposed a c t i o n i s submitted t~ o n e or more congressional committees f o r their C o n s i d e r a t i o n , then t h e d e v i c e c a n be defined a s a cornnittee veto. Under t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s , congressional vetoes include only those statutory provisions which enable t h e Congress to legally a p p r o v e or d i s a p p r o v e proposed executive a c t i o n s without requiring t h a t such approval or d i s a p p r o v a l be submitted to the P r e s i d e n t f o r his signature. Thus this definition would not include many similar provisions such a s r e p o r t i n g provisions o r conditional legislation which a r e sometimes characterized a s c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o e s but do n o t legally preveni Executive a c t i o n if c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l or disapproval i s not given d u r i n g t h e period of t i m e specified by t h e statute. Congress c o u l d , of c o u r s e , e n a c t legislation t o r e p e a l o r alter a c t i o n s taken by t h e E x e c u t i v e , but such legislation w o u l d r e q u i r e submission to the P r e s i d e n t f o r his signature. Should the P r e s i d e n t v e t o t h e e n a c t m e n t , a two-thirds o v e r r i d e vote by both H o u s e s of C o n g r e s s would b e required f o r the enactment to becoae law. Many c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto provisions enacted in recent y e a r s c o n t a i n p r o c e d u r e s f o r expedited treatment s o that a n y Member can i n s u r e f u l l c o n g r e s s i o n a l consideration on t h e proposed a c t i o n , s u b j e c t t o the v e t o within t h e t i m e l i m i t specified by t h e statute. V a r i o u s a r g u m e n t s have been raised attacking t h e constitutionality o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o device. the T h e f i r s t a r g u m e n t is that the u s e o f the congressional v e t o v i o l a t e s t h e " P r e s e n t a t i o n n c l a u s e of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , which r e q u i r e s t h a t e v e r y o r d e r , r e s o l u t i o n , o r v o t e t o which t h e concurrence of the H o u s e and S e n a t e may be necessary shall be presented to the President f o r his signature (Article I , The use of a congressional veto d e v i c e permits the section 7, c l a u s e 3). C o n g r e s s t o d i s a p p r o v e executive a c t i o n taken pursuant to a s t a t u t e by passing a concurrent o r s i m p l e resolution o r , i n t h e c a s e o f a c o m m i t t e e v e t o , by a c o m m i t t e e vote without t h e necessity of presenting that c o n c u r r e n t o r s i m p l e r e s o l u t i o n or committee vote to the President for his consideration. T h e second a r g u m e n t i s that t h e congressional v e t 0 infringes upon t h e g e n e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l responsibilities granted t o t h e President u n d e r A r t i c l e I 1 a n d especially t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s responsibility to " f a i t h f u l l y e x e c u t e t h e laws." Opponents of t h e congressional veto d e v i c e w o u l d particularly o b j e c t t o the u s e of a general c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto to r e v i e w a l l proposed r u l e s and regulations promulgated by t h e E x e c u t i v e on t h e ground t h a t such a blanket review i n f r i n g e s upon i n h e r e n t e x e c u t i v e functions. CRS- 4 IB76006 UPDATE-11/05/82 Although t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s never explicitly defined the boundaries between l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s , the e a s e of Springer v. in support of P h i l i p p i n e I s l a n d s , 2 7 7 U,S. 1 8 9 ( 1 9 2 8 1 , i s f r e q u e n t l y C i t e d t h i s view. I n S p r i n g e r , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d that the Philippine Territorial L e g i s l a t u r e i l l e g a l l y usurped an executive fanczion i n v i o l a t i o n of the P h i l i p p i n e O r g a n i c Act b y p r o v i d i n g c h a t members of the territorial corporation owned b y the legislature vote the stock i n a commercial t e r r i t o r i a l government. The C o u r t h e l d t h a t the voting of s t o c k was a n executive function. Opponents of t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o would a r g u e t h a t p r o p o s e d w i d e s p r e a d c o n g r e s s i o n a l r e v i e w of e x e c u t i v e r u l e s a n d regulations c o n s t i t u t e s an analagous l e g i s l a t i v e intrusion into inherently executive f u n c t i o n s and t h u s v i o l a t e s t h e s e p a r a t i o n of powers d o c t r i n e . P r o p o n e n t s o f t h e C O n ~ t i t U t i O n a l i t yo f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e ~ o a r g u e t h a t t h e " P r e s e n t a t i o n N c l a u s e has been complied with in that the underlying The r e t e n t i o n o f a c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o statute i s presented to the President. o v e r t h e e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y g r a n t e d t o t h e P r e s i d e n t i s , p r o p o n e n t s would a r g u e , a c o n d i t i o n s u b s e q u e n t which must be s a t i s f i e d i n o r d e r f o r t h e terms of t h e e n a b l i n g S t a t u t e t o become l e g a l l y e f f e c t i v e . The C o n s t i t u t i o n g r a n t s Congress c o n s i d e r a b l e enumerated powers and t h e a u t h o r i t y t o e n a c t a l l laws "necessary and proper* t o e f f e c t u a t e these powers. The r e t e n t i o n of a congressional "vetow t o review executive action taken pursuant to a d e l e q a t ~ o no f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r s t o the Executive is, proponents of the device argue, merely conditional l e g i s l a t i o n well within the conscitutional powers of Congress t o e n a c t . Proponents of t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o would argue that the Springer decision i s not controlling. While proponents of the congressional veto might concede t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n l n h e r e n t e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s g r a n t e d to a t h e P r e s i d e n t b y A r t i c l e 11, t h e y w o u l d a l s o a r g u e t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f clear constitutional directive, the division between legislative and e x e c u t i v e powers i s n e c e s s a r i l y f l e x i b l e . A s s t a t e d by J u s t i c e J a c k s o n , i n a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n , Youngstown Co. v . S a w y e r , 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which d e a l t w i t h , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e p o w e r s v e s t e d i n t h e P r e s i d e n t by A r t i c l e 11: " T h e a c t u a l a r t of g o v e r n i n g u n d e r o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t and cannot conform t o j u d i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e power o f a n y o f i t s b r a n c h e s b a s e d on i s o l a t e d c l a u s e s o r even s i n g l e A r t i c l e s t o r n from c o n t e x t . While t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d i f f u s e s power t h e b e t t e r t o secure l i b e r t y , it a l s o contemplates t h a t practice w i l l i n t e g r a t e t h e d i s p e r s e d powers i n t o workable government. I t e n j o i n s upon i t s b r a n c h e s s e p a r a t e n e s s b u t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , autonomy b u t r e c i p r o c i t y . " Lower c o u r t s h a v e d i s p o s e d o f some c a s e s c n a l l e n g i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto. The f i r s t c a s e was C l a r k v. V a l e o , 5 5 9 F.2d 642 (D.C. C i r . 1977). A l t h o u g h t h e s u i t was o r i g i n a l l y b r o u g h t b y R a m s e y Clark, a c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e Democratic s e n a t o r i a l nomination i n New York, t h e J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t i n t e r v e n e d on b e h a l f o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , also challenging the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s e same p r o v i s i o n s . Defendants were F r a n c i s R. V a l e o , S e c r e t a r y o f t h e S e n a t e , a n d Edmund H e n s h a w , C l e r k of the House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , who h a d m i n i s t e r i a l duties in regard to the challenged p r o v i s i o n s , and t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission, which had t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Appeals of a d m i n i s t e r i n g them. The f i v e q u e s t i o n s c e r t i f i e d t o t h e C o u r t o f CRS- 5 IB76006 UPDATE-11/05/82 a r e summarized a s foliows: (1) D o e s t h i s action challenging the constitutionality of various congressional veto provisions contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act present a justiciable c a s e or controversy? (2) D o t h e congressional veto provisions i n the Act which permit a "One H o u s e " congressional veto of rules a n d regulations promulgated by the Federal Election Commission violate the Constitution i n that they (a) violate the doctrine of separation of powers, (b) i n f r i n g e upon the F r e s i d e n t ' s veto authority o r , (c) are i n excess of t h e g r a n t of legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution? ( 3 ) D o c h e challenged provisions violate d u e process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution in that a candidate for F e d e r a l o f f i c e i s (a) deprived of t h e right to have l a w s affecting h i s candidacy enacted by the f u i l l e g i s l a t i v e process, including passage by both Houses of C o n g r e s s , with a n opportunity for Presidential v e t o , (b) invidiously discriminated against by allowing i n c u m b e n t congressmen, but not challengers, t o veto rules and regulations which affect the conduct of their campaigns? (4) D o t h e challenged provisions v i o l a t e t h e Constitution in delegation o f t h e right to veto rules a n d regulations by one Congress i s n o t accompanied by sufficient standards a n d criteria their exercise of discretion? that t h e House of to guide (5) D o t h e challenged provisions which permit a s i n g l e House of Congress to v e t o r u l e s and regulations, o r selected parts o f such rules and regulations, promulgated by the Federal Election Commission violate t h e Constitution i n that they create a n extra-Constitutional l e g i s l a t i v e process in violation o f Article I of ths Constitution? T h e plaintiffs in the Clark suit raised a l l of t h e traditional arguments challenging t h e constitutionality of t h e congressional V e t 0 d e v i c e outlined above. Both plaintiffs raised specific a r g u m e n t s challenging t h e "one-Housew veto provision o n t h e ground that it violates the conception of a bicameral Congress which i s required f o r legislative activity. Plaintiff Clark also made t h e a r g u m e n t that t h e right o f incumbent CongressiOnal c a n d i d a t e s to v e t o rules a n d regulations which a f f e c t their campaigns violates d u e process of law i f s u c h a right i s denied to non-incumbent candidates. T h e d e f e n d e n t s i n the case, Secretary Vale0 a n d t h e F e d e r a l Election Commission, f i l e d briefs challenging t h e a c t i o n on the ground t h a t the suit d o e s not present a "case o r c o n t r o v e r s y w because o f lack of standing, mootness, r i p e n e s s , the prohibition a g a i n s t advisory o p i n i o n s , and the political q u e s t i o n doctrine. T h e defendants' briefs did n o t a d d r e s s the merits of t h e plaintiffs' contentions. On Jan. 2 1 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e Court of Appeals dismissed t h e a c t i o n in a 6-2 decision. T h e court held that t h e c a s e w a s n o t r i p e f o r judicial intervention with respect to plaintiff Clark o r to t h e plaintiff Department of J u s t i c e s u i n g in the name of t h e United States. T h e court indicated that even i f the a c t i o n were r i p e , i t would r e f u s e to reach t h e m e r i t s of t h e dispute b e c a u s e o f t h e doctrine of judicial restraint. T h i s decision was affirmed by t h e Supreme C o u r t , without a hearing or o p i n i o n , on J u n e 6 , 1 9 7 7 (Clark v. K i m m e t t , 4 3 1 U.S. 950). Atkins v. United S t a t e s , 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct.Cl. 1977), involved a suit CRS- 6 IB76006 UPDATE-11/05/82 140 members of t h e Federal judiciary which c h a l l e n g e d the brought by eonstitutionalaty o f various salary payments made to them in a l l e g e d derogation of the compensation guarantees contained in Art. 1 1 1 , Sec. 1 , of the Constitution. Part of the plaintiff's case turned on the constitutionalicy of t h e congressional V e t 0 provision i n t h e F e d e r a l S a i a r y P l a i n t i f f s raised the t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s Act ( 2 U.S.C. 351, e c seq.). that have been advanced agaanst the c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto device. In a 4-3 per curiam opinion decided o n May 1 8 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e C o u r t of C l a i m s held constitutional this "one House" congressional veto. Confining its analysis to the c o n g r e s ~ i ~ n aveto l provision of that A c t , a n d stating t h a t it would not attempt to suggest or forecast the f a t e of o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s or statutes, the court helC that this device i s a Valid e x e r c i s e of t h e authority of Congress to make a l l l a w s necessary and proper f o r executing 6 of the Constitution). The legislative powers (Art. I , Sec. 1 , cl. conclusions of the majority a r e summarized below. T h i s provision does not violate t h e p r i n c i p l e of bicameralism e m b o d i e d i n Art. I , Sec. 1 , which vests a l l legislative powers in a C o n g r e s s consisting of a Senate and House. Rejecting presidential r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o i n c r e a s e or decrease salaries 1 s a form of legislative a c t i v i t y which does not require the affirmative concurrence of both H o u s e s because the effect of that activity i s not to m a k e law but rather t o preserve the s t a t u s quo. As used in this A c t , the congressional v e t o d o e s not v i o l a t e Art. I , Sec. cl. 3 , which mandates that every o r d e r , r e s o l u t ~ o n ,or v o t e to which the concurrence of each House may b e necessary must be presented to t h e P r e s i d e n t for a p p r o v a l or disapproval. T h i s constitutional c l a u s e i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e because the concurrence of both Houses i s n o t necessary to d i s a p p r o v e a presidential recommendation. 7, T h e doctrine of separation of powers, specifically Art. 11, Sec. 1 , which vests executive power i n a President, i s not infringed by t h i s c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto because the pay-setting function i s Dasically legislative. The delegation of authority to the P r e s i d e n t to recommend a d j u s t m e n t s m a k e s him a n a g e n t of Congress f o r this purpose. T h e d e v i c e permits either H o u s e to supervise his exercise of this delegated authority. T h r e e dissenting judges rejected each o f t h e s e f i n d i n g s , h o l d i n g t h a t t h e congressional veto violates the principle o f b i c a m e r a l i s m , t h e " P r e s e n t a t i o n " clause, a n d the doctrine of separation o f powers. McCorkle v. United States, 5 5 9 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1978), affirmed a district court dismissal of a suit brought by a high l e v e l c i v i l s e r v a n t on behalf of Federal employees in grades 1 5 t h r o u g h 1 8 of t h e G e n e r a l Schedule. T h e appellants had been denied a salary i n c r e a s e recommended by t h e P r e s i d e n t because the Senate i n March 1 9 7 4 exercised a l e g i s l a t i v e veto. McCorkle asked t h e court to d e c l a r e unconstitutional t h e " o n e House" v e t o p r o v i s i o n , 2 U.S.C. 3 5 9 , (1)( B ) , of the Federal Salary Act of 1 9 6 7 o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it abridged bicameralism, separation of powers, and t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l veto. He a l s o a s k e d the court to declare that t h e G e n e r a l S c h e d u l e e m p l o y e e s were entitled to damages based on the salary i n c r e a s e they would h a v e r e c e i v e d if the recommendation had become effective. T h e court refused to reach the question of constitutionality o f the provision because it found that Congress would n o t h a v e passed t h e Act without retaining authority to v e t o presidential recommendations. "Voiding t h e one-house veto a s unconstitutional w h i l e l e a v i n g p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y CRS- 7 IB76006 U P D A T E - ~ ~ / C ~ intact would i n c r e a s e the President's power over salaries far beyond the intention of Congress." (McCorkle, p. 1262.) T h e court concluded t h a t the "one-House" v e t o w a s inseparable from p a r t s of the statute which empowered t h e President to m a k e potentially binding recommendations and t h a t provisions for the recommendations t o become e f f e c t i v e could n o t stand in isolation. Accordingly, McCorkle and the other e m p l o y e e s were not entitled to damages based on the recommendation. As noted previously, the Supreme C o u r t denied petitions to r e v i e w both cases on Jan. 9 , 1 9 9 8 (Atkins v. United S t a t e s (434 U.S. 1009), and McCorkle v. United States ( 4 3 4 U.S. 1Q11)). T h e effect of t h i s d e n i a l was to let stand the l o w e r court dispositions. On Dec. 2 2 , 1 9 8 0 , a 3-judge panel of t h e Court of Appeals for t h e Ninth of the Circuit unanimously voided as unconstitutional section 244(c) ( 2 ) S e e C h a d h a v. Immigration a n d Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. sec. 1 2 5 4 (c) (2)) . Immigration and Naturalization S e r v i c e , 6 3 4 F. 2d 408 (9th C i 1990). Under this p r o v i s i o n , either House c o u l d disapprove a decision of the Attorney General to suspend deportation t h a t would c a u s e of hardship t o an alien. T h e H o u s e had disapproved suspension of deportation of a n a l i e n whose r a c e would have m a d e his return to his n a t i v e country extremely d i f f i c u l t , if n o t impossible. T h e court f o u n d that t h e statutory scheme Violated the d o c t r i n e of separation o f powers. T h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto f o l l o w i n g administrative proceedings t o suspend deportation w a s deemed to b e a n impermissible intrusion on f u n c t i o n s constitutionally granted to t h e executive and judicial branches. T h e twin purposes of separation of powers a r e to prevent concentrations o f power and to promote g o v e r n m e n t a l efficiency by a s s i g n i n g many functions t o designated authorities. T h e court defined a violation of this doctrine a s r n assumption by one b r a n c h of powers that a r e c e n t r a l or essential to t h e operation o f a c o o r d i n a t e branch, provided a l s o t h a t t h e assumption disrupts the coordinate branch i n the performance o f i t s duties a n d i s unnecessary t o implement a l e g i t i m a t e governmental policy. T h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto of a suspension o f deportation could be viewed: (1) a s a c o r r e c t i o n o f judicial o r executive misapplication of the (2) as a means for sharing the Immigration a n d Nationality Act; administration o f t h e statute .with t h e e x e c u t i v e branch o n a n o n g o i n g b a s i s ; o r ( 3 ) a s a n e x e r c i s e of a residual l e g i s l a t i v e power to define substantive r i g h t s under t h e l a w , a n exercise that f a l l s short o f statutory amendment. By performing a corrective function, Congress would encroach upon an ordinarily judicial or internal a d m i n i s t r a t i v e function t h a t would in effect render judicial interpretations i m p e r m i s s i b l e advisory opinions. Sharing administration o f a statute by addition o f more precise statutory criteria on a n accretive, case-by case basis i s impermissible because i t i s l a w To enforcement, a f u n c t i o n the Constitution a s s i g n s to t h e executive branch. a l t e r the a l i e n ' s right not to be d e p o r t e d , his status f o l l o w i n g a decision t o suspend d e p o r t a t i o n , would require a c t i o n by both H o u s e s of C o n g r e s s and presentation t o t h e President; disapproval of suspension by a s i n g l e House is n o t sufficient under the Constitution. T h e court concluded that the single H o u s e disapproval scheme rendered meaningless t h e executive's duty to f a i t h f u l l y execute t h e l a w and rendered equally nugatory t h e role of judicial r e v i e w in determining the procedural or substantive f a i r n e s s of administrative action. Despite i t s rejection of th.is particular congressional veto, the court CRS- 8 l i m i t e d t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of i t s opinion. The d e c i s i o n n o t e d t h a t t h e court was n o t a n a l y z i n g a situation i n which the "unforeseeability of future c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r t h e b r o a d s c o p e and c o m p l e x i t y of t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of an agency's rulemaking authority preclude t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a i n t h e governing s t a t u t e i t s e l f , " S u c h f a c t o r s may d i c t a t e a d i f f e r e n t resule. On O c t . 5 , 1981, t h e Supreme Comt granted a petition to review the O r a l a r g u m e n t s w e r e h e a r d o n F e b . 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , b u t a d e c i s i o n was n o t i s s u e d . The c a s e h a s b e e n s c h e d u l e d f o r r e a r g u m e n t on Dec. 7 , 1 9 8 2 . I n P a c i f i c L e g a l F o u n d a t i o n v . . W a t t , 5 0 U.S.L.W. 2 3 9 4 ( J a n . 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 ) , t h e U.S. D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r M o n t a n a r e v i e w e d s e c t i o n 2 0 4 ( e ) o f t h e F e d e r a l L a n d P o l i c y a n d M a n a g e m e n t A c t ( 4 3 U.S.C. s e c . 1 7 1 4 ( e ) ) i n l i g h t o f t h e r u l i n g of t h e Ninth C i r c u i t i n Chadha. T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e I n t e r i o r s h a l l i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h d r a w p u b l i c l a n d s f r o m l e a s i n g a c t i v i t i e s when jurisdiction over he determines o r t h e House o r Senate committee with i n t e r i o r matters n o t i f i e s h i m t h a t an emergency e x i s t s and t h a t e x t r a o r d i n a r y The measures must be t a k e n t o p r e s e r v e v a l u e s t h a t would o t h e r w i s e be l o s t . S e c r e t a r y m a d e t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f l a n d s i n c e r t a i n w i l d e r n e s s a r e a s i n M-ontana b e c a u s e a r e s o l u t i o n a d o p t e d by t h e House Committee on I n t e r i o r a n d Insular A f f a i r s d i r e c t e d h i m t o do s o . B o t h t h e p l a i n t i f f s , who w e r e a p p l i c a n t s f o r o i l a n d g a s l e a s e s , and t h e S e c r e t a r y a l l e g e d t h a t t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i r e c t i v e was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s a v i o l a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of s e p a r a t i o n of powers. The c o u r t a g r e e d u n d e r c e r t a i n i n ' e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e committee's a u t h o r i t y . I f t h e p r o v i s i o n were i n t e r p r e t e d as a d e v i c e f o r c o r r e c t i n g e x e c u t i v e m i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e , judicial or t h e c o m m i t t e e would be p e r f o r m i n g a r o l e t h a t i s o r d i n a r i l y a internal administrative responsibility. I f i t were viewed a s a means for sharing t h e administration of wilderness and public lands s t a t u t e s with the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h on a n o n g o i n g b a s i s , t h e c o m m i t t e e would be performing an could be executive function. F i n a l l y , a n u n r e s t r i c t e d emergency withdrawal s e e n a s a n e x e r c i s e of a r e s i d u a l l e g i s l a t i v e power t h a t would be s u b j e c t to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of bicameralism. To a v o i d t h e s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i r m i t i e s , the court interpreted the provision t o authorize the Secretary rather than t h e committee t o e s t a b l i s h t h e scope and d u r a t i o n of a n emergency withdrawal. On J a n . 2 9 , 1 9 8 2 , a t h r e e - j u d g e p a n e l o f t h e Court of Appeals for the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia C i r c u i t , i n a broadly w r i t t e n o p i n i o n , unanimously h e l d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e c t i o n 2 0 2 ( c ) o f t h e N a t i o n a l Gas P o l i c y A c t ( 1 5 U . S . C . s e c . 3 3 4 2 ( c ) ) . S e e , Consumer E n e r g y C o u n c i l of America v. Federal Energy This section provides that natural sas C o m m i s s i o n , 6 7 3 F . 2d 4 2 5 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . p r i c i n g r u l e s would become e f f e c t i v e o n l y i f n e i t h e r House w i t h i n 30 d a y s adopted a resolution disapproving the rule. T h e House had d i s a p p r o v e d a r u l e t h a t would h a v e e x t e n d e d i n c r e m e n t a l p r i c i n g of n a t u r a l g a s t o a l l nonexempt i n d u s t r i a l u s e r s of n a t u r a l g a s as a b o i l e r f u e l . The c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e one-House v e t o of agency r u l e s a b r i d g e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s f o r lawmaking i n A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 7 and t h e d o c t r i n e of s e p a r a t i o n of powers. The c o u r t a s k e d w h e t h e r d i s a p p r o v a l o f a g e n c y r u l e s w a s a f o r m o f l a w m a k i n g a c t i o n a n d , i f s o , w h e t h e r t h e r e was a n y reason to for conclude t h a t it d i d n o t need t o conform t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s CRS- 9 IB76006 UPDATE-11/05/82 l a w m a k i n g , the principle of bicameralism and presentation tc t h e P r e s i d e n t for approval or disapproval. Rejecting t h e contention that the r u l e was a mere p r o p o s a l , t h e court held that it changed t h e l a w with respecz to incremental pricing; disapproval of i t , therefore, must meet the requirements for lawmaking. T h e court a l s o held that t h e veto violated the principle of separation of powers because i t permitted intrusion into a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ; and that t h e function of agency r u l e m a k i n g , once properly d e l e g a t e d , i s essentially o n e of administering and enforcing t h e law. A O n ~ - H o u s e veto represents a n unconstitutional attempt by Congress t o retain direct c o n t r o l o v e r delegated administrative power and insert o n e of i t s houses a s a n effective decisionmaker. Exercise of the v e t o was a l s o found to be a n unconstitutional intrusion on exercise of judicial power t o review agency action. A petition for review by the Supreme Court has been filed. v. Consumer Energy Council of America and U.S. House of U.S. S e n a t e Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 5 1 U.S.L.W. 3 2 1 2 (nos. 82-177 and 82-209) (Aug. 2 and 6 , 1982). On Oct. 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , the f u l l Court of Appeals for the D i s t r i c t of Columbia Circuit unanimously held unconstitutional section 21(a) of the Federal T r a d e See, Commission Improvements Act of 1 9 8 0 (15 U.S.C. sec. 2881 (c)) Consumers Union o f the United S t a t e s , Inc., e t al. v. Federal T r a d e C o m m i s s i o n , et al., (D.C. Civ. Action No. 82-1737). T h i s provision provides that f i n a l r u l e s promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission would become effective after 9 0 days of continuous session unless both Houses of Congress a d o p t a concurrent resolution disapproving it. In May of 1 9 8 2 , t h e House and Senate disapproved a r u l e r e l a t i n g to representations of warranty coverage and disclosures of accurate information i n connection with the sale of used automobiles. Stating only that i t was bas'ing i t s decision on reasons given i n the C o n s u m e r s Energy C o u n c i l c a s e , the court held that section 21(a) violated t h e principles of separation of powers established i n Articles I, 11, 2nd I11 of the Constitution and procedures established by Article I for t h e exercise of legislative powers. The court a l s o declined to express a n opinion a s to whether t h e section and S.Con.Res. 6 0 , the resolution disapproving i t , improperly delegated administrative power to Congress without a n y standards for t h e exercise of that power. . Some state legislative veto provisions have been declared unconstitutional. In State of Alaska v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, Inc., 606 P.2d 7 6 9 (1980), the Supreme C o u r t of Alaska by a three to t w o vote held that a provision a l l o w i n g both Houses of the legislature to a n n u l regulations by concurrent resolution violated t h e Constitution of Alaska. Focusing o n t h e fact t h a t t h e provisions allowed annulment of effective a s well a s proposed rules a n d regulations, the majority held that i t did n o t comply with the procedure f o r enactment of laws explicitly outlined in the state constitution. T h e Atkins c a s e was distinguished o n t h r e e grounds: first, that t h e C o u r t of Claims had limited i t s holding to a provision involving t h e narrow r o l e of establishing judicial salaries; second, the f a c t t h a t t h e procedure f o r legislative a c t i o n is n o t a s explicit in t h e United States in Constitution a s t h e Alaska Constitution; and finally, that a disapproval Atkins did n o t change existing law. In Barker v. Manchin, 5 0 L a w Week 2008 (June 1 5 , 1981), t h e Supreme C o u r t of West Virginia declared a committee veto statute unconstitutional. The statute provided that no a g e n c y rule o r regulation could become effective unless it had been presented to and approved by the joint legislative rulemaking review committee within six months after transmittal. T h e joint c o m m i t t e e , comprised of six members of each House of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , was empowered to a p p r o v e o r d i s a p p r o v e , in whole o r i n p a r t , proposed agency r u l e s and regulations. T h e court conceded that the l e g i s l a t u r e could void or amend administrative rules and regulations when it follows the constitutionally prescribed procedures for enactment of legislation. This c o m m i t t e e veto provision, h o w e v e r , was held to violate the doctrine of separation o f p o w e r s , because it permitted the legislature t o control a c t i o n s o f t h e executive branch without f o l l o w i n g thzt procedure. In a statement (see H - D o c . 95-35? o r t h e Congressional Record [ d a i l y e d , j 1 2 4 , J u n e 2 1 , 1978: H5879-H5890), President C a r t e r alleged that congressional v e t o e s which i n j e c t Congress into the d e t a i l s sf administering s u b s t a n t i v e programs and l a w s a r e unconstitutional D e c a u s e they infringe o n t h e President's duty to faithfully execute the laws a n d deny the C h i e f E x e c u t i v e the opportunity t o e x e r c i s e his r o l e to veto legislation. This d e v i c e , the P r e s i d e n t maintained, i s a l s o objectionable f o r policy r e a s o n s of regulaLions and prolongs t h e b e c a u s e it d e l a y s the implementation uncertainty over their effect. Th,e statement announced that congressional v e t o e s of this t y p e i n existing l e g i s l a t i o n would be treated a s "report and w a i t " provisions a n d that Congressional resolutions to v e t o executive a c t i o n s would n o t be considered legally binCing. v. O n Mar. 1 8 , 1 9 8 1 , Attorney G e n e r a l William French Smith stated that t h e Reagan Administration Views a s unconstitutional all congressional v e t o d e v i c e s that i n t r u d e on the power o f t h e President to m a n a g e t h e e x e c u t i v e branch. Specific pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n will be considered o n a n i n d i v i d u a l basis. D e p a r t m e n t of Justice P r e s s R e l e a s e , "Statement of Attorney G e n e r a l William French S m i t h in R e s p o n s e to New York Times i n q u i r i e s , " Mar. 1 8 , 1981. LEGISLATION S e v e r a l proposals to subject a d m i n i s t r a t i v e rules to r e v i e w h a v e been intraduced in t h e 9 7 t h Congress. These proposals following: H.R. by C o n g r e s s include the 1 7 7 6 (Levitas) P r o c e d u r e s f o r Congressional R e v i e w of Agency Rules. P r o v i d e s that a n y c o v e r e d r u l e or regulation must be transmitted to C o n g r e s s a n d c a n b e disapproved by t h e adoption of a concurrent resolution of disapproval. Such r u l e s or r e g u l a t i o n s may b e disapproved by adoption of a c o n c u r r e n t r e s o l u t i o n o f disapproval either by (1) both Houses within 9 0 calendar d a y s o f c o n t i n u o u s s e s s i o n or by (2) o n e House within 60 calendar d a y s of 30 c o n t i n u o u s session that i s n o t then disapproved by the o t h e r House within caleridar days. I f n o committee in either House reports o r i s discharged from such a disapproval resolution by t h e end of 60 calendar d a y s of c o n t i n u o u s s e s s i o n , a n d if n e i t h e r House w i t h i n that time adopts such a resolution, t h e r u l e o r regulation c a n g o i n t o e f f e c t immediately thereafter. H o w e v e r , i f a 60 c o m m i t t e e reports o r if either H o u s e a d o p t s such a r e s o l u t i o n within c a l e n d a r d a y s , t h e r u l e or r e g u l a t i o n cannot become e f f e c t i v e until after 90 calendar d a y s o f continuous session. Special rules of p r o c e d u r e a r e a l s o provided to e x p e d i t e consideration o f a disapproval resolution. H.R. 1 (Moakley) Regulation Reform disapproved within 60 joint resolution t h a t P r e s i d e n t or o v e r r i d e Act of 1981. Provides that a g e n c y rules may be days a f t e r transmittal to Congress by adoption o f a requires a c t i o n by both Houses a n d signature by the of h i s veto. H.R. 9 7 (Ashbrook), H.R. (Robinson) 3 1 4 (Hansen) , H.R. 363 (Moorhead), a n d H.R. 458 Uniform P r o c e d u r e :or Congressional R e v i e w of Agency Rules. Permits 60 either House to disapprove agency r u l e s , except emergency r u l e s , within legislative days after transmittal to Congress. H.R. 9 4 5 (White), H.R. 1 1 2 8 (Lagomarsino) T o Prevent Adoptioc o f Rules Contrary t o Law o r Inconsistent with Congressional Intent. P e r m i t s either House to disapprove proposed agency r u l e s wlthin 60 legislative days after transmittal to C o n g r e s s ; h o w e v e r , s u c h a r u l e may be given i m m e d i a t e effect a s soon a s b o t h H o u s e s a d o p t a Concurrent resolution approving it. H.R. 3 7 4 0 (Lott) R e q u i r e s each a g e n c y semiannually t o Regulatory Control Act of 1981. s u b m i t to the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of t h e H o u s e a n a g e n d a l i s t i n g a l l subject a r e a s i n which the agency intends t o propose major o r significant r u l e s within t h e next year. No major or significant r u l e c o u l d become effective for specified time periods after transmittal t o Congress. D u r i n g this period, any major or significant rule proposed by a n executive resolution a d o p t e d b y a g e n c y would b e , s u b j e c t to disapproval by concurrent both Houses if a n appropriate committee determines that i t i s contrary t o l a w , inconsistent with legislative i n t e n t , or exceeds jurisdictional authority. Any such rule would be subject t o disapproval by joint r e s o l u t i o n a d o p t e d by both Houses a n d signed by t h e President f o r a n y other reason. Any major or significant rule proposed by a n independent a g e n c y would b e s u b j e c t to disapproval by concurrent resolution regardless of t h e reason. S. 341 (Levin) Agency Accountability A c t of 1981. Provides that an a g e n d a d e s c r i b i n g a l l r u l e s under development must be transmitted semi-annually t o t h e chairmen o f a p p r o p r i a t e S e n a t e and H o u s e legislative committees. F i n a l r u l e s proposed by a n a g e n c y must be sent t o t h e appropriare committees a n d w i l l n o t become e f f e c t i v e f o r a t least 2 0 days. During t h e 20-day d e f e r r a l p e r i o d , a n y s u c h c o m m i t t e e may r e p o r t o u t o r be discharged from a joint resolution disapproving t h e r u l e , i n which case i t will not b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e u n t i l continuous s e s s i o n ; o r (2) 3 0 after: (1) 60 a d d i t i o n a l calendar days of a d d i t i o n a l calendar days o f continuous session if the House t o which the c o m m i t t e e reported or was discharged from consideration should r e j e c t a joint resolution of disapproval o r bill modifying the rule. If s u c h a joint r e s o l u t i o n o r bill were adopted by o n e H o u s e , o r if i t w e r e s t i l l pending in t h e o t h e r H o u s e , the r u l e could not become effective u n t i l t h e end of the 60 day period. S. 3 8 2 (Schmitt) Regulatory Reduction a n d Congressional Control Act. Provides that proposed rules a n d regulations must be transmitted to Congress. They will not become effective if either House within 6 0 days a d o p t s a r e s o l u t i o n o f disapproval a n d t h e other House does n o t disapprove the r e s o l u t i o n of the f i r s t House within 3 0 d a y s thereafter. R e q u i r e s that proposed and e x i s t i n g r u l e s be reviewed by appropriate committees to determine w h e t h e r they c o m p l y A resolution for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f with a number o f specific criteria. existing rules may be adopted by either Xouse and will go into effect unless the other House within 3 0 days adopts a resolution disapproving the action sf she first House. A rule f o r whien a resolution of reconsideration has been adopted will l a p s e in 1 8 3 days unless it i s recommended again by tne a g e n c y , in which case i t can be subjeec to congressional review a s a proposed rule. NOTE: For a Comprehensive listing of bills considered the 97th see IB81138 -- Congressional Veto Legislation: 97th Congress. Congress, HEARINGS U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations. Congressional review of administrative rulemaking. Hearings, 94th Congress, %st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995. " S e r i a l no. 30" REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS Constitutionality of the committee veto. In remarks of Sam Ervin. Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 1 1 3 , Oct. a l , 1967: 28578-28589. D r y , Murray. T h e congressional veto, the Constitution, and administrative oversight. In remarks 0.f Lee H. Hamilton. Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 1 2 4 , Apr. 6 , 1978: H2587-H2594. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Extension of reorganization authority of the President. [ ~ a s h i n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 95-105) U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Administrative Rulemaking Reform Act of 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. (94th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1014) U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Government Operations. Reorganization Bill of 1939. [washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1939. (76th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 120) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Reorganization Act of 1949. [ ~ a s h i n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1949. (8bst Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 232) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Reorganization Act of 1977. [ ~ a s h i n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1 9 7 7 (95th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 95-32) ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES A contemporary response Abourezk, James. T h e congressional veto: t o executive encroachment on legislative prerogative. Indiana law journal, v . 5 2 , no. 2 , winter i977: 323-344. Bolton, John R. The legislative veto: Unseparating the powers. Washington, American Enterprise Institute fo,r Public Policy Research, 1977. Bruff, Harold, and Ernest Gellhorn. Congressional control of administrative regulation: A study of legislative vetoes. Harvard law review, v. 9 0 , no. 7 , May 1977: 1369-1440. Junior Members seek approval for wider use of Cohen, Richard E. the legislative veto. Washington, Nationa; journal, Aug. 6 , 1977: 1228-1232. Congressional veto bill being pushed in House but faces major hurdles. Washington, Congressional quarterly, 575-576. Mar. 4 , 1978: C O n g r e ~ s i O n a lveto of administrative action: response to a congressional challenge. Duke law journal, May 1976: 285-300. The probable (Note.) Cooper, Joseph and Ann. The legislative veto a n 8 the Constitution. George Washington law review, v. 3 0 , March 1962: 467-516. Dixon, Robert G., Jr. The congressional veto and separation of powers: The Executive on a leash. North Carolina law review, v. 56, January 1978: 423-496. A political context for legislative vetoes. Fisher, Louis. Political science quarterly, v. 9 3 , Summer 1978: 241-254. ----- The Constitution between friends. P r e s s , 1978. 274 p. New York, St. Martin's Ginnane, Robert W. The control of Federal administration by congressional resolutions and committees. Harvard law r e v i e w , v. 6 6 , February 1953: 569-611. Harris, Joseph P. Institution. Congressional control of administration. [1964] p. 217-248. Brookings Javits, Jacob K., and Klein, Gary J. Congressional oversight and the legislative veto: A constitutional analysis. New York University law review, v. 5 2 , no. 3 , June 1977: 455-497. McGowan, Carl. Congress, court, and control of delegated power. Columbia law review, v. 7 7 , no. 8 , December 1977: 1119-1174. The congressional veto: Miller, Arthur S., and George M. Knapp. Preserving the constitutional framework. Indiana l a w journal, 367-396. v. 5 2 , no. 2 , winter 1977: Nathanson, Nathaniel L. Separation of powers and administrative law: delegation, the legislative veto, and the "independent" agencies. Northwestern University law review, v . 7 5 , Feb. 1981: 1054-1111. 0p;bnlsns of the A:torneys General, v . 6 (1854) p. 6 8 0 ; v. 3 7 (1933) p. 56. Record of th@ A s s o c ~ a t i o n of the Bar s f the City of New York. Committee on Federal Legislation. T h e l e g ~ s l a t i v eveto. v . 3 4 , no. 3 , Mar. 1979: 208'-218. Rosenberg, Morton. Congressional review of administrative action. Federal bar n e w s , v. 2 8 , no. 3 , March 1981: 29-30, 36. S t e w a r t , Geoffre? S. Constitutionality of the legislative veto. Harvard journal on legislation, v. 1 3 , no. 3 , April 1975: 593-619. U.S. --------- Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Congressional r e v i e w , d e f e r r a l a n d disapproval of A summary a n d a n inventory of Executive actions: Apr. 30, 1976. statutory authority [ b y ] Clark F. Norton. 127 p . Washington, 1976. Multilith 76-88G Congressional vets provisions a n d amendments: 96th Congress [ b y ] Clark F. Norton. [ w a s h i n g t o n ] (Updated regularly) Issue Brief 7 9 0 4 4 T h e committee veto: I t s current u s e and a p p r a i s a l s of its validity [ b y ] Norman J. Small. Jan. 1 6 , 1967. Washington, 1967. 1 0 2 p. W a t s o n , H. Lee. Congress steps o u t ; a look a t congressional c a n t r o l of t h e Executive. California l a w r e v i e w , v. 6 3 , J u l y 1975: 983-1094.. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Office of the F e d e r a l R e g i s t e r , v. 1 1 , no. 2 2 (May 2 6 , 1 9 7 5 ) ; v. 1 1 , no. 3 3 (Aug. 1 1 , 1975); v. 1 2 , no. 1 9 (May 7 , 1976); v. 1 2 , no. 2 0 (May 1 1 , 1976).