Order Code 97-389
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Generalized System of Preferences
Updated March 30, 2006
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜
The Library of Congress
Generalized System of Preferences
Summary
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extends duty-free treatment to
certain products that are imported from designated developing countries. The
primary purpose of the program, which the United States and other industrial
countries initiated in the 1970s, is to promote economic growth and development in
these countries by stimulating their exports. The program was last reauthorized until
December 31, 2006, by section 410 of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The
second session of the 109th Congress may consider legislation to reauthorize the
program before it expires.
U.S. companies and consumers who use products that benefit from duty-free
treatment are strong supporters of legislation to reauthorize GSP. They argue that
GSP reduces costs of production for companies that import components and parts
under the program and lowers the prices that consumers pay. The program is also
supported by observers who think that GSP is an effective, low-cost means of
providing economic help to developing countries. They maintain that encouraging
trade by private companies stimulates economic development more effectively than
intergovernmental aid and other means of assistance.
There are several sources of opposition to GSP. Import-competing producers
complain that preferential tariff treatment generates unfair competition. Others are
concerned about the effects of GSP on the exporting countries. Some criticize the
program for benefitting higher income developing countries disproportionately and
providing too little assistance to the poorest countries. Some observers are concerned
that tariff preferences may encourage inefficient trade and production patterns in the
developing countries. Other critics maintain that U.S. officials have not vigorously
enforced the country practice provisions, such as protection of intellectual property
rights and observance of worker rights, which are required by the law. This report
will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Rationale for GSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The U.S. GSP Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Economic Effects of GSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Effects on Beneficiary Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Effects on the U.S. Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Diminishing Effects of GSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Imports Under GSP — Leading Beneficiaries and Total, 2005 . . . 7
Generalized System of Preferences
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides preferential tariff
treatment to certain products that are imported from designated developing
countries.1 The primary purpose of the program, which the United States and other
industrial countries initiated in the 1970s, is to promote economic growth in
developing countries and countries in transition by stimulating their exports. The
program was last reauthorized through December 31, 2006, by the 107th Congress in
section 4101 of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). Therefore, the second session
of the109th Congress may consider legislation to reauthorize the program before it
expires.
Rationale for GSP
The United States and other industrial countries2 established the Generalized
System of Preferences in the early 1970s to promote economic development in
developing countries through increased trade. The program extends preferential tariff
treatment — low or zero duties for designated products exported from beneficiary
countries — which provides a competitive advantage in the markets of industrial
countries. It is a unilateral grant of tariff concessions; developing countries are not
required to extend reciprocal tariff reductions. (They must, however, meet certain
conditions.) The program is intended to give preferential tariff treatment to
developing countries until their exporters are able to compete on world markets with
normal, nonpreferential tariffs.
The preferential and unilateral nature of GSP is a departure from the principles
that have guided post-World War II multilateral tariff reductions under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT provides that trade must be
conducted on a nondiscriminatory, or most-favored-nation (MFN), basis. Generally,
members of the World Trade Organization (the organization that replaced the GATT
Secretariat in 1995 and currently administers world trading rules) must extend any
tariff concessions to all trading partners. Tariff reductions under the GATT have also
been based on reciprocity: tariff concessions from each member country are
reciprocated by concessions from others. Since 1971, however, a GATT waiver has
allowed the industrial countries to extend preferential tariff treatment for developing
countries.
1 This report was originally written by George Holliday, Specialist in International Trade
and Finance.
2 In addition to the United States, the European Union and 13 other countries — Australia,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and the Russian Federation — currently have GSP programs.
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The U.S. GSP Program
Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), as amended,3 authorizes the U.S.
GSP program. It authorizes the President to provide duty-free treatment for any
eligible product from any beneficiary developing country (BDC) and spells out
criteria for designating eligible countries and products. Currently more than 4,600
products from over 140 BDCs are eligible for duty-free treatment under GSP and
another 1,783 product categories eligible for duty-free treatment to least developed
countries. In 2005, the United States imported $24.5 billion under the program.
Petroleum products, automobile parts, jewelry, and furniture were among the leading
imports.
In designating beneficiary countries, the President is directed to take into
account the level of economic development of the country, its commitment to a
liberal trade policy, the extent to which it provides adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and its observance of internationally recognized workers rights.4 The
law prohibits (with certain exceptions) the President from extending GSP treatment
to other industrial countries, Communist countries, countries that provide preferential
treatment to the products of a developed country, and countries that nationalize or
expropriate the property of U.S. citizens, or otherwise infringe on the property rights
of U.S. citizens. The Trade Act also restricts the President’s discretion in designating
eligible products. It lists categories of import-sensitive products — certain textile
and apparel products, watches, electronic articles, steel products, footwear, glass
products, and other items — that are not eligible for GSP treatment. In addition, the
act establishes “competitive need limits,” which require the President to suspend
GSP treatment when U.S. imports of a product from a single country reach a
specified threshold value or when 50% of total U.S. imports of the product come
from a single country.
The Trade Act authorizes the President to withdraw GSP treatment for any
article or any country. The program is reviewed annually by a subcommittee of the
Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC). It is chaired by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) and includes representatives from the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury. The subcommittee
meets annually to decide which countries are eligible and to consider petitions to add
or remove items from the list of eligible products. The subcommittee also resolves
questions about country practices — trade policies, protection of intellectual property
rights, observance of worker rights, and other matters — on which eligibility for GSP
is conditioned. Although some critics maintain that U.S. officials have not
vigorously enforced the country practice provisions, the subcommittee has
3 The GSP Program was reauthorized and amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
(P.L. 98-573). Seven subsequent laws have authorized GSP most recently through
December 31,2006.
4 Workers rights are defined by law for the purposes of GSP to include the right to
association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; a prohibition on the use of any
form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health.
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occasionally denied benefits because of country practices. In August 2001, for
example, Ukraine was suspended from the list of beneficiaries because it was not
making sufficient progress in protecting intellectual property rights. Some observers
maintain that the threat of losing benefits sometimes persuades beneficiary countries
to change objectionable policies or practices.
The subcommittee also makes recommendations about which products should
be removed from the list because they have become sufficiently competitive or
because they are import-sensitive. Since the law does not clearly define the terms
“import-sensitive,” or “sufficiently competitive,” the subcommittee must make a
judgement on a case-by-case basis for each product. Those who are affected by the
subcommittee’s decisions often complain that the lack of clear definitions or criteria
lead to subjective and inconsistent interpretations on product eligibility.5
The last major statutory change in the U.S. GSP program was enacted August
20, 1996 (P.L. 104-188). The 1996 law included several significant reforms of the
program and an extension of its authority to May 31, 1997. (The program was
extended retroactively because it had expired for over a year.) Among the most
important changes were provisions to redistribute the benefits of GSP among
beneficiary countries. It stipulated that, when the official statistics of the World Bank
demonstrate that a beneficiary developing country has become a “high income”
country, the President would terminate the country’s eligibility for GSP benefits.
(World Bank statistics include countries with per capita incomes of over $8600 in the
“high income” category. Under the previous law, the per capita income threshold for
graduation had been $11,800.) Since the new income per capita threshold is
considerably lower, countries will graduate from GSP sooner.
Another provision lowered the competitive need limit from $114 million in
1994 to $75 million in 1996 and increased it by $5 million each year after 1996. The
law provided specific authority for the President to designate additional articles from
the least developed beneficiary countries as eligible for GSP. It also prohibited
consideration of an article for GSP treatment for three years following formal
consideration and denial of that article.
Economic Effects of GSP
The GSP program affects trade flows and production patterns in both
beneficiary developing countries and the industrialized countries. The effects on
both groups of countries, however, are probably not large.
Effects on Beneficiary Countries
Supporters of GSP maintain that it is an effective, low-cost means of providing
economic help to developing countries. They argue that encouraging trade by private
5 U.S. General Accounting Office. Assessment of the Generalized System of Preferences
Program. November 1994, pp. 79-81. GAO/GGD-95-9. (Hereafter, cited as GAO.)
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companies stimulates economic development more effectively than government-to-
government aid or other means of assistance.
Empirical studies, based mostly on trade data from the late 1970s and mid-
1980s, provide some support for the view that GSP stimulates development. Most
suggest that GSP has modestly increased the exports of beneficiary countries. One
study, for example, found that the eligible exports of beneficiary countries to the
industrial countries increased by about 8% annually because of GSP.6 The increase
results mostly from creation of new trade opportunities, as relatively low-cost
producers in the beneficiary countries take advantage of lower tariffs to displace
higher cost producers in the markets of the industrialized countries.
The benefits of GSP to developing countries are limited by several features of
the program. In 2005, for example, only about 9.6% of U.S. imports from
beneficiary countries entered on preferential terms under GSP. Many products that
were technically eligible for GSP treatment were excluded, most often because they
exceeded the competitive need limit of a given product or because they did not meet
the rules of origin requirements of the law.7 Because the list of eligible products can
change and because different countries make different products eligible for GSP, it
is difficult for export industries in the developing countries to specialize to take
advantage of the tariff preferences.
GSP tariff cuts can also result in efficiency and welfare losses for the world
economy. Because GSP reduces tariffs in a discriminatory manner (that is, it favors
some producers in developing countries over other producers), it can divert trade
from more efficient producers in third countries to less efficient producers in
beneficiary countries. Such costs are borne by relatively more efficient producers
who compete with those exporters that benefit from tariff preferences and by
consumers in importing countries.
Trade diversion can harm not only producers in third countries but also the
domestic economy of the beneficiary country. Tariff preferences could encourage
exports of goods for which a country does not have a comparative advantage, thus
distorting the domestic allocation of resources. By diverting resources away from
potentially efficient producers, preferences could, over time, result in reduced exports
6 Laird, Samuel and Andre Sapir. Tariff Preferences. In Finger, J. Michael and Andrzej
Olechowski, eds. The Uruguay Round: A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Washington, World Bank, 1987. Pp. 101-109. See also, Sapir, Andre and Lars Lundberg.
The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences and Its Impacts. In Baldwin, Robert E., and
Anne O. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy. Chicago,
The University of Chicago Press, 1984. p. 195-231.
7 In 2002, of $33.6 billion in imports that were eligible for GSP, $17.7 billion actually
entered duty free. Some other U.S. imports from developing countries entered duty free
under other preferential tariff programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean
Trade Preference Act, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or because the MFN
tariff rate is zero.
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and growth. Although the costs of trade diversion are real, the empirical evidence
suggests that trade diversion from GSP is small.8
The lack of reciprocity in the GSP program may also result in long-term costs
for the beneficiary countries. In multilateral trade negotiations, the requirement for
reciprocal tariff reductions means that all signatories reduce their tariffs. By avoiding
reciprocal tariff reductions under GSP, however, some developing countries have
tended to keep in place protectionist, import-substitution trade policies that have
impeded their long-term growth.
Because preferential tariffs under GSP can lead to inefficient production and
trade patterns, most economists prefer multilateral, nondiscriminatory tariff cuts.
When tariffs are reduced in a nondiscriminatory manner, countries tend to produce
and export on the basis of their comparative advantage. That is, countries export
products that they produce relatively efficiently and import products that others
produce relatively efficiently. Multilateral tariff reductions such as those agreed to
in the Uruguay Round of GATT, redistribute the benefits of trade liberalization in
developing countries. Some exporters benefit because they face reduced tariffs in the
industrial countries, while others are hurt because the margin of preference under
GSP is reduced.
Effects on the U.S. Economy
Several factors suggest that the overall effects of GSP on the U.S. economy are
small. First, in 2005, only about 1.6% of total U.S. imports entered duty-free under
GSP. Second, most products that would otherwise have been eligible for GSP did
not come from GSP beneficiaries; they were imported from non-beneficiary countries
at MFN (or normal trade relations) tariff rates. Third, many imports that entered
duty-free under GSP would probably be competitive without preferential rates.
Since, for many products, U.S. MFN rates are not much higher than the GSP rates,
the effects of paying the higher rates would be small. Thus, the U.S. market for most
products is unlikely to be adversely affected by imports under GSP.
Nevertheless, some domestic producers and consumers benefit significantly
from GSP. For some companies that use parts, components, or materials that are
imported under GSP, the reduced tariffs can mean lower costs. Consumers who buy
products imported under GSP or products that are produced with GSP inputs may
benefit from significantly lower prices. Those who benefit from GSP have provided
a strong base of support for the program. Domestic producers who compete with
imports that enter duty free under GSP, however, can bear significant adjustment
costs. Adjustment costs include the costs to workers for retraining and finding new
employment and the costs to firms for retooling to become more competitive or to
shift capital to other uses. Such costs are ameliorated by the exclusion of import-
sensitive products and by the competitive need limits of the program. Nevertheless,
those who compete against GSP imports complain that preferential tariff treatment
generates unfair competition.
8 Laird and Sapir, p. 105.
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The Diminishing Effects of GSP
Two kinds of developments in the world trading system are reducing the effects
of GSP on the U.S. economy and the economies of beneficiary developing countries.
First, as multilateral trade agreements reduce tariffs worldwide, the margin between
the GSP preferential rates and MFN rates becomes smaller. For example, U.S. tariff
rates, which averaged 5.4% on industrial products before the Uruguay Round and
3.5% after the reductions competed . The then-General Accounting Office estimated
that the value of tariff relief on GSP-eligible products was reduced by about 40%
under the new reductions.9
Second, the growing number and size of other preferential tariff arrangements
are also diminishing the value of tariff relief under GSP. The United States, for
example, extends duty-free treatment to imports under the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, the Andean Initiative, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The
United States entered into a free trade agreements with Jordan and Chile and has
completed negotiations on a free trade agreement with Central American countries,
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The United States has
launched or soon will launch FTA negotiations with other developing countries,
further diminishing the effects of the GSP program. The European Union is also
expanding its preferential trading arrangements in Africa, Central and Eastern
Europe, and elsewhere. As the number of preferential tariff agreements expands, the
value of tariff preferences under GSP will decline. That is, beneficiaries of GSP are
increasingly either participating in alternative preferential arrangements or competing
with producers who enjoy preferential treatment under other arrangements.
9 GAO, p. 126.
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Table 1. U.S. Imports Under GSP —
Leading Beneficiaries and Total, 2005
(million dollars)
Total Imports
GSP Duty-Free Imports
Rank
Beneficiary Country
from Country
from Country
1
India
18,807
4,179
2
Angola
8,484
4,098
3
Brazil
24,437
3,628
4
Thailand
19,892
3,575
5
Indonesia
12,017
1,594
6
Equatorial Guinea
1,562
1,487
7
Turkey
5,177
1,068
8
South Africa
5,865
1,017
9
Philippines
9,248
1,008
10
Venezuela
33,965
745
Imports from Top 10
139,454
22,399
Beneficiaries
Total Imports from
278,029
26,747
all Beneficiaries
Source: USITC Database.