The U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Accord of October 1994: Background, Status, and Requirements of U.S. Nonproliferation Law

This document also available in PDF Image . Congress plays a critical role in the ability of the Clinton Administration to carry out an October 21, 1994, executive agreement between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that defused a confrontation over the latter's suspected nuclear weapons program. Under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its existing nuclear program and eventually to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out inspections designed to account for all of its nuclear material, after which its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities are to be dismantled. The United States, in return, agreed to lead in arranging for the replacement of North Korea's existing nuclear reactors with two 1,000 megawatt light-water power reactors (LWRs) that would be less useful for obtaining weapons grade material. Other provisions include the progressive normalization of U.S.-DPRK political and economic relations and the initiation of a North-South dialogue. Notwithstanding periodic deadlocks in what is a sequentially staged process, the nuclear-related parts of the agreement have moved forward. As provided for in the Agreed Framework, the United States took the lead in setting up an international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to carry out the LWR project. A supply contract and five of 14 required protocols have been negotiated. Construction activity could begin as early as April 1997. Whether this actually happens will likely depend as much on the state of North-South relations as any other issue, since South Korea is responsible for a major share of construction funding. Congress, which generally has been highly skeptical of the Agreed Framework, has two principal sources of influence. First, U.S. contributions towards the cost of providing interim heavy oil supplies and KEDO's administrative overhead are dependent on the willingness of Congress to appropriate the necessary funds -- about $30 million per year. Second, Congress has statutory authority to disapprove or attach conditions to any nuclear cooperation agreement with North Korea via a joint resolution, subject to normal veto and override procedures. Such an agreement is likely to be required because the South Korean prime contractor depends on a U.S. company, Combustion Engineering, Inc., for some critical components. The viability of the nuclear accord and the achievement of its underlying objectives of ending the nuclear proliferation threat and promoting the peaceful resolution of Korean Peninsula issues are threatened by Pyongyang's continued refusal to enter into a dialogue with Seoul, and uncertainties about its willingness to accept IAEA inspections of suspicious undeclared nuclear sites. North Korea's policies towards the South in particular are likely to be major determinants of whether South Korea and Japan will play the roles that are expected of them in underwriting most of the estimated $5-6 billion cost of constructing the LWRs.