Defense Burdensharing: Is Japan's Host Nation Support a Model for Other Allies?

This document also available in PDF Image . Under an agreement announced in January 1991, the Government of Japan committed itself to increase substantially the amount of support that it provides for U.S. military forces based there. Among other things, Japan agreed by 1995 to absorb 100 percent of the cost of Japanese nationals employed at U.S. military facilities and to pay for all utilities supplied to U.S. bases, to increase the amount of military and family housing construction that it is providing to support U.S. forces, to continue to provide facilities at no charge to the United States, and to waive taxes and fees that might otherwise apply to U.S. activities. By FY1995, under the new agreement, the value of Japan's annual host nation support (HNS) for U.S. forces will rise to $4.1 billion, according to U.S. estimates, while U.S. military operating costs, excluding military pay and related personnel expenses, will amount to $1.3 billion. By these measures, Japan will provide 76 percent of the funding required to base roughly 45,000 U.S. military troops there. Using similar calculations, by 1995 Korea will contribute 70 percent of U.S. basing costs, but no other U.S. ally will provide more than 25 percent. In recent years, many Members in both Houses of Congress have repeatedly sought to induce other U.S. allies to absorb as large a share as Japan of U.S. overseas basing costs. Some estimates suggest that this approach could save the United States more than $3 billion a year by the end of the decade. Such calculations follow logically from the manner in which the Defense Department has presented data on host nation support contributions and on U.S. overseas basing costs to Congress. The data, however, suffer from a number of shortcomings. One problem is that much host nation support is in the form of land and facilities provided free of charge to U.S. forces. All major allies that host U.S. troops now provide land and facilities without charge. Disparities in the estimated value of these contributions, therefore, merely reflect differences in local costs rather than variations in allied levels of effort. These and many other elements of host nation support do not directly offset U.S. military operating costs abroad. Because of these conceptual problems, common estimates of potential savings from increased host nation support on the Japanese model appear to be substantially overstated. Clearly, some savings might be achieved. Estimates of foreign national labor compensation do appear comparable among the allies. If all allies were to match the share of foreign national labor costs that Japan absorbs, then savings to the United States could approach $1 billion a year. Further savings might be possible if other allies were to absorb some additional direct military operating costs. A reliable estimate of such savings, however, would require a detailed data on operating expenses in each host nation than DOD has provided.