The US Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush's Global Vision

91-294RCO The US Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush's Global Vision Stanley R. Sloan Senior Specialist in International Security Policy Research Coordination Office March 28, 1991 Congressional Research Service The Library of Gongress THE US.ROLJI IN A NEW WORLD ORDER: PROSPECTS FOR GEORGE BUSH'S GLOBAL VISION SUMMARY Thie report, deeigned to eupport congressional consideration of the "new world order" concept, tracee the rhetorical development of the concept in epeechee and etatements by Preeident Bueh and eenior Adminietration officiale, seeking to identify the main goale and characterietia eought in the Bueh approach. It extrapolatee, from Adminietration etatements, implied components of the "new world order" in areas where Adminietration statements have either been lacking or impreciee. It then analyze8 the main prerequieitee for realization of the Bueh vieion thue derived and the major obetaclee that could threaten its eucceee. At the early etagee of George Bueh'e Preeidency, hie Adminietration'e cautioue reaction to changed Soviet policiee in Europe led many obeervere to comment that the Preeident'e policiee lacked "vieion." Although the Adminietration initially rejected the criticism, Adminietration officiale euggeeted that changee in Soviet policy already permitted the United States to move "beyond containment." In answer to the queetion of what lie8 beyond containment, the Adminietration answered "a Europe whole and free." Late in 1989, the democratic revolution in Eastern and Central Europe appeared to be making that vieion a reality, creating what the Adminietration began acknowledging as "a new world." The Preeident'e advocacy over the last eix months of a "new world order" to replace the four-decadee-old Cold War etructure of international relatiom may be eeen as the culmination of this proceee of development in the Adminietration'e policiee a proceee that began in reaction to the end of the Cold War but which became a conceptual policy framework only in the crucible of the Peraian Gulf crieie and war. -- Key ingredients of a new world order as euggeeted by Preeident Bueh'e approach would include continuing US.-Soviet cooperation, the promotion of democratic values and free market economies on a global d e , effective deterrence of military threats to the new order, active diplomacy to prevent and reeolve disputee, and development programs to enhance support for and etakes in a more orderly international syetem. The concept of a "new world order" has already attracted wide attention among commentatore, foreign governments, academia, and Membere of Congress. Assumptions and epeculations on the content of the order contemplated have been wide-ranging. The concept has been criticized from 1he political left for what ie viewed as premature reliance on military force to reetore order as eeen in the Persian Gulf; it has been criticized from the political right as being too dependent on cooperation with the Soviet Union. The implication8 for the U.S. role in the world, defeme commitments and epending, allied relatiom, US.-Soviet relations, a m control, foreign aid and other policy areas could be profound. Congress therefore may wieh to examine and debate the concept and its meaning for U.S. international security policies. TABLEOFCONTENTS ................................... 1 BACKGROUND: THE VISION THING .......................... 5 ORIGINS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER CONCEPT ........... 5 The Gorbachev December 1988 United Nations Speech ........ 5 Gorbachev's Vieion versus Bush's Pragmatism .............. 7 A New World Built on a New Europe ..................... 11 THE CRUCIBLE OF THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS ............ 12 KEY ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISION ............... 21 GOALS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER ........................ 21 MEANS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER ....................... 21 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN A NEW WORLD ORDER ........................................... 22 CRITICAL DETERMINANTS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . 23 THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND ITS SKEPTICS ................. 25 CRITICISMS ........................................... 25 IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY ............................. 33 COUNTERPOINTS TO THE CRITICS ....................... 33 THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS IN A NEW WORLD ORDER . . . 35 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS THE US.ROLE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER: PROSPECTS FOR GEORGE BUSH'S GLOBAL VISION PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS The anewer to the frequently-asked question Is there a new world order?" is: no, a new world order is a goal not a reality. It ie a goal that was expressed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in hie speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988, and it has become the goal or "vieion" of the Bush Administration eince September 1990. There are many parallels between the Bush and Gorbachev concepts, but even though Gorbachev first articulated the goal, the Soviet Union has neither the political credibility nor the resources to lead the globe toward a new order. There certainly have been eufficient changes in global political and military relationships to suggest that there is at least a "new Europe" and perhaps a "new world." But the problem of bringing some sort of order to this new world is a much more complex and difficult challenge. A new world order, as described in epeeches by President Bush, would require a number of features that by no meane are guaranteed by the changes in the international system wrought by the democratic revolution in Europe and the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. The key ingredients of the new world order envisioned by President Bush would include: continuing U.S.-Soviet cooperation, at least at the levels experienced during the Persian Gulf crisis; the promotion of democratic values and w k e t trade on a global scale, based on the judgment that Western-style democracies with free market economies provide the best available form of government and economy; deterrence of threata to the new order, which is based on the assumption that just as democratic syeteme of government require police forces to ensure orderly eocieties, eo an orderly international eyetem requires both a set of rules of international conduct and ways to deter or, if necessary, resist and punieh those who violate the rules; effective diplomacy to prevent and resolve disputes, in recognition that deep politicaVideological, economic, religious and ethnic differences etill divide the globe, to minimize the necessity of resort to force to resolve differences; and development programs to enhance support for and etakes in a more orderly international system. This list of requirements illustrates the dificulty of achieving the implied ends of George Bush's vision. Progress toward a new world order, according to President Bush's approach, requires a degree of cooperation with the Soviet Union a t least sufficient to prevent a re-polarization of the international system. It also requires a more effective United Nations .as a vehicle for international consensus building and conflict resolution, and a strong U.S. leadership role. Given the turmoil in the Soviet Union, it will for some time be difficult or even unwiee to count on Soviet cooperation in dealing with international issues. In Europe, the United States has tried to eteer a course between constructing a more cooperative European security syetem in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and preserving a vital Western military alliance in NATO. It may be necessary to follow a eimilar "parallel paths" hedging strategy in pursuit of a new world order to allow for the potential vicissitudes of Soviet developmenta. The United Nations can be seen as a deficient instrument for a new world order, for example because the Security Council does not accurately reflect contemporary power relationships in the international system and the General Assembly is more a symbol of international divisions than of unity. But the United Nations does provide a focal point where international consensus can be identified and translated into action. There ie no inconsistency between trying to make the United Nations more effective and paying attention to the impact of power relationships in the international system. Further, the fact that the concept of a new world order draws on a certain moral tradition in U.S. foreign policy should be a strength, not a weakness, as long as policymakers underetand power relationships and factor them into their calculations. In addition, policymakers may wish to take into account the fact that to the extent that the United States commits itaelf to international cooperation in managing a new world order, it also may limit the scope of ita own potential for unilateral action. The question of the U.S. role in a new world order raisee a number of important issues for the Congress. At a time when the Congress is facing a variety of important budget dilemmas and issues concerning the cost of the Persian Gulf War, it is logical to ask how much the U.S. role in a new world order is going to cost and whether we can afford to play the role envisioned by the President. It appears impossible to project any price tag for a new wcrld order, to eay nothing of seeking to allocate thoee coeta internationally. Given the broad outlines of the President's concept, however, and the recent experience with the Persian Gulf War, the Congresa may wieh to help establish some broad parameters concerning the role of the U.S. military in enforcing a new order and the implications for U.S. force structure, deployment and defense spending, the ways in which foreign assietance might be used to support development of the order, the extent to which the United States expecta other countries to share the military and other burdena of a new order, and the role of traditional U.S. alliances and the United Nationa in a new order. BACKGROUND: THE VISION THING ORIGINS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER CONCEPT Much speculation haa focused on the origins of the Bush Adminiatration's advocacy of a new world order. Political cartoonists have seized on the sweeping scope of the term. Some commentators have noted the unfortunate rhetorical similarity to Adolph Hitler's call for a "neue Ordnung new order," a verbal similarity that reportedly troubled eome advieore to the President.' - More pitively, observers have noted that the term appeara in Latin (novus ordo seclorum) on the aeal of Yale University, President Bush's alma mater -perhape a clue to ita appeal to the President? The mme Latin phrase also appeara on the Great Seal of the United States, reproduced prominently on the one dollar bill. These references in their appropriate historical context were intended in the nation's infancy to dietinguish between the "new world" order and the "old world" European order. In the contemporary setting, President Bush's concept appears largely dependent on developmenta in the "old world" that are seen as opening the way toward new international security relationships. And according to press reporta, Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security advisor, suggested the vision of a new world order during a long ride on the President's speedboat off the coast of Kennebunkport, Maine, not long after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.~Scowcroft reportedly told an interviewer on August 25, 1990 that "we are already seeing the emergence of a new world ordernand the President referred to the concept in an interview five days later.3 The Gorbachev December 1988 United Nations Speech The most direct and interesting roota of the "new world order" rhetoric are found in Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988,' just one month after George Bush had been elected Preeident of the United States. This speech is best 'Fred Barnes, "Brave new gimmick," The New Republic, February 25,1991, p.15. ?Doyle McManus, "Bush's Vision of a 'New World Order' Still Unclear," Los Angeles Times, Zebruary 18, 1991, pA9. %m Weiner, "New World Order is Not Yet Defined," Philadelphia Enquirer, March 3,1991, p.2C. 'Statement by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, General Secretary of the Central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, December 7, 1988, official English translation provided by the government of the Soviet Union. remembered for Gorbachev's announcement of deep unilateral cuts in the Soviet Union's military forces and his intent to withdraw some forces from Warsaw Pact countriesa6 At the time, the portions of Gorbachev's United Nations speech that preceded the force reduction pledges were largely diemissed as boilerplate. But in light of President Bush's adoption of the "new world order" motif, the framework that Gorbachev suggested in his speech becomes much more interesting. After a brief introduction, Gorbachev aeeerkd that 'The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a powerful socio-political force." He went on to argue that "the scientific and technological revolution has turned many economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population problems, which only recently we treated as national or regional ones, into global problems." And he further acknowledged that, due to the advances in information technology and transportation, "the preservation of any kind of 'closed' societies is hardly poesible." Gorbachev argued that new approaches are required to deal effectively with the challenges to the international system. With phrases whose essence could have been uttered by a U.S. President as well as a Soviet leader, Gorbachev went on: Today, further world progress is only possible through a search for universal human consensus as we move forward to a new world order. [emphasis added] We have come to a point when the disorderly play of elemental forces leads into an impasse. The international community must learn how it can shape and guide developments in such a way as to preserve our civilization, to make it safe for all and more conducive to normal life.' In words that were more clearly from a beleaguered Soviet perspective, Gorbachev cautioned that interference in the internal affairs of other states in order to redirect their policies could destroy chances for establishing a "peaceful order." He then went on to present what has become a key principle of Soviet 6m., p. 21-24. Gorbachev said that by the end of 1990 the Soviet Union would reduce the numerical strength of Soviet armed forces by 600,000 men and withdraw six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and disband them. In addition, Gorbachev promised to: withdraw assault landing troops and other particularly offensively-oriented forces from Eastern Europe; reduce Soviet East European forces by 60,000 men and 6,000 tanks; restructure forces remaining in Eastern Europe toward a "clearly defensive" structure; cut Soviet forces in the Atlantic-tu-the-Urale area by a total of 10,000 tanks, 8,600 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft; and reduce "significantly" Soviet forcee stationed in Mongolia. policy in the post-Afghanistan era and which influenced the Soviet approach to the Persian Gulf War, arguing that "the use or threat of force no longer can or must be an instrument of foreign policy." In a message perhaps directed more to the home front than to the international community, as justification for the unilateral force reductions he was preparing to announce, Gorbachev argued that "one-sided reliance on military power ultimately weakens other components of national security."' . Gorbachev also noted the importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation t o make the "new world order" workB and the key role of the United Nations and of international law.'' This Gorbachev speech and the decisions reflected in it probably played a . major role in stimulating the unravelling of support for the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and, ultimately, in foretelling the demise of the Warsaw Pact. It also appears to have had a notable, albeit delayed, effect on the then-forming Bush Administration, beginning a process within the Administration that eventually led to President Bush's articulation of the new world order goal. Gorbachev's Vision versus Bush's P r a g m a t i s m George Bush and the top officials he gathered around him, particularly Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, were known, whether correctly or not, for their pragmatism rather than their political creativity when they assumed responsibilities in managing the nation's affairs in 1989. Moreover, they apparently believed that, with things in Europe and in U.S.-Soviet relations developing in ways beneficial to U.S. interests, there was no need for any particular "vision" to serve as a counterpart to that adopted by Gorbachev. Perhaps Bush and his advisors were reluctant to articulate prematurely a vision that could return to haunt them later, as the Reagan Administration had been plagued by President Reagan's advocacy of a nonnuclear world. President Bush did project a vision for the future of US.-Chinese relations quite early in his Administration, and chose to visit China in February 1989, soon after assuming office." The President's vision of a China whose interaction with the United States and the rest of the world would progressively move it toward a more open society with improved human rights, however, suffered a serious setback with the Tiananmen Square massacre just a few months later. Perhaps this tragedy and setback for the President's policy also "See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. The White House. Washington, D.C., 1989, p. 238-239; 246-250; 291; 403. discouraged the articulation of more broadly based vision for the Administrations'e policy toward evolving communist regimes. Nonethelese, key advisers to the President were obviously imtated by commentatore who observed that the Adminietration appeared to be losing a public relations game to the Savieta for lack of a clear vision. Administration oficiale privately critiqued Gorbachev's call for a "common European home," a key building block in Gorbachev'e new world order. The Preeident and other officials complained about "this vision thing," and euggested that the wellestablished and effective advocacy of a world of democratic and free nations was euficient articulation of U.S. foreign policy goals. By mid-1989, the Administration began to respond with some rhetoric of ita own, opting, however, for more pragmatic, leee grandioee visions, such as proclaiming that we had entered the "post-containment" world and advocating a Europe "whole and free." President Bueh articulated these themes in a seriee of speechee in May 1989. In a speech at Boston University on May 21, 1989, President Bush eaid that InTexas, I spoke to another group of graduatee of our new approach to the Soviet Union, one of moving beyond containment to seek to integrate the Soviets into the community of nations...."12 Addressing the graduating class a t the Coast Guard Academy on May 24, 1989, the President acknowledged that "There's an opportunity before us to shape a new world," describing this "new world" as one in which there is "a growing community of democraciee anchoring international peace and etability, and a dynamic freemarket wetem generating prosperity and progress on a global scale." The President noted that there was "dramatic"change going on in the Soviet Union, but mid that the change was "unfinished" and challenged the Soviet leadership to "restructure its relationships with the reet of the world" as well as in its internal affairs. The President was not prepared yet to undemrite residence of the Soviet Union in a common European house or to support a joint effort in the construction of a "new world order" as proposed by Gorbachev. But Bush opened the door to these options by proclaiming that "now we have a precious opportunity to move beyond containment" and that the goal of integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nationa was "every bit as ambitious as containment was a t its time."lS The "Europe whole and free" theme emerged prominently in President Bush's speech one week later in Mainz, Germany. The President's speech almost self-consciouely addressed the "vision" criticism first by noting that the process of change in Europe had begun with a Western vieion: '?be Future of Europe," an address by President George Bush a t the Boston University commencement ceremony, Boston, hhmachusetts, May 21, 1989, Department of State Current Policy No. 1177, p.1. lS"SecurityStrategy for the 1990e," an addrees by President George Bush at the Coast Guard Academy graduation ceremony, New London, Connecticut, May 24, 1989, U.S. Department of State Current Policy No. 1178, p. 1,2. At firet, there was the vieion, the concept of free peoplee in North America and Europe working to protect their valuee. And second, there was the practical eharing of rieks and burdene and a realietic recognition of Soviet expaneioniem. And finally, there was the determination to look beyond old animoaitiee. The NATO alliance did nothing less than provide a way for Weetern Europe to heal centurieeold rivalries, to begin an era of reconciliation and reetoration."14 After listing four propoeale for a "whole and free Europe," including progress toward greater political freedom in Eastern Europe, overcoming the divieion of Berlin, dealing with European environmental problem, and moving toward a less militarized Europe, Preeident Bueh described them as "each a noble goal" and declared that "taken together they are the foundation of our larger vieion a Europe that is free and a t peace with itaelf."lb - At thie point in mid-1989, even in a major epeech deeigned to have a poeitive effect on public opinion in Europe, the Adminietration was reluctant to look much beyond immediate goale and to articulate a vieion that went beyond Europe. In particular, the Adminietration remained defeneive concerning Gorbachev'e vieion and was reluctant to accept the Soviet Union as a partner in ehaping the future either of Europe or of the world. In epite of the Preeident'e Mainz epeech, o b e e ~ e r econtinued to note the abeence of anything that could compete with the ecope of Gorbachev'e approach. For example, an editorial in the Boeton Globe argued in mid-November 1989 that "The need for Bueh to project an American vieion of the future has nothing to do with domeetic politics, nor with a puerile popularity conteet between the leadere of the euperpowere. It ie a need that has been created by hietory by the beginning of the end of the Cold War."16 -- Preeident Bueh eeemed to eignal a eomewhat broader approach in his Thanksgiving addrees to the Nation on November 22,1989. Following as it did the breaching of the Berlin Wall, the epeech displayed a more ambitious rhetoric, eaying that "We now can dare to imagine a new world, with a new Europe, rieing on the foundatione of democracy." This language linked the developments in Europe with the potential for a global vieion, but etopped ehort of any further development of the concept. And in fact, the Preeident'e remarks eeemed to reflect eome reeidual defeneiveneee when he added that "Thie new - p~ ""Propoeale for a Free and Peaceful Europe," Addreee by Preeident George Bueh a t the Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31,1989, U.S. Department of State Current Policy No. 1179, p.1. '&The Vieion Thing," Editorial, The Boeton Globe, November 16,1989, p.18. world was taking ehape when my presidency began with these words: The day of the dictator ie over."17 Though there was an incremental formulation of future directiom in the Preeident's speeches, it did not create more than a regional framework for epeechee by other Admini&ration officiale. Secretary of State Baker made a major speech in Berlin on December 12, 1989 that became the central U.S. statement on the future organization of Europe, foreseeing major rolee for NATO, the European Community (EC), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the new European security architecture.18 But the Baker speech stopped short of linking this European architecture to a broader global vieion or structure. Early in 1990,Administration officiale continued to develop the themee that had initially been laid out by the President, mme of them reaching toward perspectives that implied that the changes in the Soviet Union and in Europe had broader implicatiom. The concept of a "new world" in addition to a "new Europe" became more and more prominent, but there was very little description of how the United States thought the new world should be ordered. Secretary Baker, testifying before the Houee Committee on Foreign Affairs in February 1990 emphasized the continuing importance of U.S. leadership "in fulfilling the promise of this new age of democracy..." and in bringing about "a new world of peace and freed~m."'~ Baker ale0 emphasized the importance of U.S. leaderehip in a speech in March 1990 saying that "In the new world struggling to be born, like the old world now rapidly paesing away, there is no substitute for American leadership." The main message of the speech, however, remained that "beyond containment liee demo~racy,"~~hard to argue against, but not widely perceived as the stuff of which new "vieiom" are made. - Meanwhile, other ofiiciale appeared to be contributing to the developing approach and applying it to other regions of the world. For example, Assietant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af'fairs Richard Solomon, in a 17"Europe's New Pilgrims: A Voyage to Freedom," President Bueh'e Thanksgiving Day addreee to the nation, Camp David, Maryland, November 22, 1989, Department of State Current Policy No. 1229, p.1. lbA New Europe, A New Atlanticiem: Architecture for a New Era," prepared addrees of Secretary of State Jamee Baker to the Berlin Preee Club a t the Steigenberger Hotel in Berlin, Germany, December 12, 1989, Department of State Current Policy No. 1233. '*A Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 1991," statement by Secretary of State James Baker before the House Foreign Af'faire Committee on February 22,1990, Washington, D.C., Department of State Current Policy No. 1256. wemocracy and American Diplomacy," addreee by Secretary of State James Baker before the World Affaire Council, Dallas, Texas, March 30, 1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 1266, p.1. epeech on April 10, 1990, included many themes that eubeequently were overtaken by or eubeumed within Preeident Bueh'e new world order rhetoric. The eventa of thie past year revealed how rapidly we are being propelled by global trencb toward a new era in international affairs. Communiem hm ahown itself to be bankrupt as an economic and political system. We are moving toward a eingle, integrated global economy eparked by epectacular technological change. Worldwide, there ie a seemingly inexorable trend toward democracy, away from statiem and toward democracy, away from etatiem and toward open market e c o n o m i ~ . ~ ~ The U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American Statee, Luigi R. Einaudi, teetifying before a Houee eubcommittee, linked affairs in the Weetern hemiephere to the emerging new world. According to Ambaaaador Einaudi, a wide range of activities of the Organization of American Statee "require practical, productive, and patient contributiom if we are to deal with the iseuee of the next century in a manner befitting the potential of the new w ~ r l d . " ~ A New World Built on a New Europe By mid-1990, the Adminietration'e concept of a new Europe "whole and free" had become a more explicit foundation for the assertion that there was a "new world" emerging. But no Administration etatement appeared to make the analyeie of thie jump from the European regional to the international level. Why ehould the emergence of a new Europe mean that a new world was emerging that would affect U.S. relations in Asia, Latin America, and eleewhere? One answer to thie question perhaps was provided even before the full emergence of the new world theme in a epeech by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Natiom, Thomas R. Pickering in November 1989.29 According to Pickering, 21"U.S.and Japan: An Evolving Partnership," addreee by Richard Solomon, Aseietant Secrehry for East Asian and Pacific Maire, before the Foreign Correepondenta Club of Japan, Tokyo, April 10, 1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 1268, p.1. w e United Statee and the OAS," etatement by Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative t~the Organization of American Statee, before the Subcommittee on Weetern Hemisphere Maire and the Subcommittee on Human Righta and International Organizatiom of the House Foreign M a i r e Committee, Washington, D.C., May 1,1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 1279. %The U.S. and UN: The Decade Ahead," address by Ambaseador Thomas R. Pickering, Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, before the United Nations Association of the United States National Conference on the United Statee and United Nations, Washington, D.C., November 9, 1989, Department of State Current Policy No. 1232. The remarkable thing is that today we see more clearly than ever the possibilities of fulfilling some of the goals which inspired us a t the end of the Second World War. At no time in the past have the five permanent members of the Security Council worked more closely together, thereby fulfilling the basic premise of the organization in maintaining international peace and security.% The most important consequence of change in Europe for the rest of the globe was the emergence of a more benign Soviet Union. President Gorbachev had promised such a development in his December 1988 United Nations speech, but the Bush Administration had essentially responded that the "proof is in the pudding." Pickering's speech nearly one year after the Gorbachev speech suggested that the Soviet Union's actions had reflected its words, at least a t the United Nations, allowing the UN Security Council to operate as it had been intended and giving more leeway for the UN Secretary General to maneuver.25 By mid-1990, the Administration had not yet explicitly accepted the goal of a new world order, but numerous Administration omcials had begun to use the concept of a "new world" as a n organizing and justifying theme for their presentations. The key ingredients for a new world order -- a more cooperative Soviet Union (and China) and a consequently more effective United Nations as a vehicle for action -- were in place. It remained for the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait to bring both the rhetoric and reality of U.S. policy into something recognizable as a possible new world order framework. TEIl3 CRUCIBLE OF THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS Had it not been for the improved prospects for U.S.-Soviet cooperation and the higher hopes for the United Nations, President Bush might not have been able to respond with so much confidence of international support when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. With the explicit support of the Soviet Union and the other permanent members26 of the Security Council, the Council meeting a t U.S. request on August 2 passed Resolution 660 calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. On August 3, the Soviet Union joined the United States in calling on the international community to halt all arms shipments to Iraq. On August 6, the Security Council passed Resolution 661 instituting broad economic, trade and financial sanctions against Iraq. Throughout the crisis, the Soviet Union largely supported U.S. diplomatic efforts and initiatives in the United Nations designed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Moscow's attempt to broker a cease fire prior to the initiation of 26Browne, Marjorie Ann, "Iraq-Kuwait: The United Nations Response," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 90147, Washington, D.C. [updated regularly]. 26Thepermanent members of the Security Council are China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). the ground war appeared a t least partially intended to ensure a continuing role for the Soviet Union in the post-war ~ e t t l e m e n t . ~ ' The month of August 1990 witnessed the first test of a new world order that had not yet even been proclaimed by the United States (although President Gorbachev had articulated such a vieion eome 20 m o n t h before). It did not take long for the Administration to produce an explanation of the broader questions a t issue. Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Maire on September 4, Secretary of State Baker mid that the international community would have to decide whether or not to tolerate or oppose aggression in the new era. The reference point, Baker argued, should be the "standards for civilized behavior found in the UN Chartern and the goal ehould be to "build on the promise of recent trends in Europe and elsewhere. We must seize this . opportunity to eolidify the ground rules of the new orderTm According to Baker, If we are to build a stable and more comprehensive peace, we must respond to the defining momenta of this new era, recognizing the emerging dangers lurking before us. We are entering an era in which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new violence and conflict. It is an era in which new hostilities and threata could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted.% Secretary Baker acknowledged explicitly that the "ground rulesn of a new order had not yet been agreed, but made it clear that the Gulf crisis could play a mqjor part in defining those rules. A week later, President Bush put some more meat on the still-meager bones of the Administration's new world order concept in his speech to a joint session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf crisis.g0 In order to work toward a new order, President Bush said that the United States and other countries must defend vital interesta, support the rule of law, and stand up to aggression. According to the President, nFor an initial assessment of the foreign policy "lessonsnof the Pereian Gulf War, see Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Persian Gulf War: Preliminary Foreign Policy "Leesonan and Perceptions," CRS Report 91-260, March 18, 1991. mAmerica's Stake in the Pereian Gulf Crisis," Secretary of State James Baker's prepared statement to the House Foreign rnairs Committee, September 4,1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 1297, p.1. *Toward a New World Order," address by President George Bush before a joint session of the Congress, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 1298. We stand today a t a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective--a new world order-can emerge; a new era-freer fkom the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, E a t and West, North and South can prosper and live in harmony?' The President emphasized the importance of the rule of law in international affairs, as Gorbachev had in his December 1988 UN speech: [the new world order should be] a world where the rule of law supplanta the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the righta of the weaka He described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as the first threat to the potential for a new world order: [the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait] is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despota around the worldaM And he justified the deployment of U.S.forces to the Gulf region along with those of coalition partners to defend the potential for the new world order: At this very moment, [Americans] serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africana in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order. That is why they sweat and toil in the sand and the heat of the sun." President Bush also emphasized the importance of American leadership to the new world order. This theme, which recurred fkequently in succeeding months, became one of the most important elementa of the Administration's approach. It reflected a shift from a more modest assertion of the U.S.role in the world that the Administration had taken upon assuming office, and it ran directly counter to those who were arguing that the relative decline in U.S. power and influence made it impossible for the United States to play the world leadership role that it had in the Throughout the Persian Gulf conflict, including the President's January 1991 State of the Union address and his speech to the Congress a t the end of the war, the new world order concept waa a recurring theme. But no one speech attempted to explain the concept'e genesis, defend ifs logic, deacribe ifs componenfs, or analyze ita requirements and implications for U.S. policy. Nonetheless, the sum total of the President's speeches did add incrementally to the concept's development. On September 26, 1990, President Bush linked the roles of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to his concept of a new world order. Bush argued that " a world where ideology no longer confronfs and big-power blocs no longer divide, the bank and the fund have become paradigms of international c~operation."'~ Explicit reference to the important role of the United Natione in any new world order came in President Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly on October 1, 199OnS7The President noted, aa Ambaseador Pickering had a year earlier, that the United Natione now might be able to function aa it had been intended in the security field. President Bush acknowledged the importance of the Soviet Union's role in permitting this change, saying that "The changes in the Soviet Union have been critical to the emergence of a stronger United Nations. The US-Soviet relationship is finally beyond containment and confrontation, and now we eeek to fulfill the promise of mutually shared ~nderstanding."~ The President went on to talk about a "vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War."s8 He then attempted to put some meat on the bones of the new world order concept, saying that his vision is of a new 96Fora variety of perspectives on this issue, see the proceedings of a seminar held by the Congressional Research Service on November 19-20, 1989 in: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Maim. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. U.S. Power in a Changing World. Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, lOlst Congress, 2d eession. Washington, G.P.O., May 1990,131 p. %dividual Choice and Economic Growth," remarks of President George Bush to the IMF-World Bank annual meeting, September 25,1990, Waahingon, D.C., Department of State Current Policy No. 1301, p.2. s7nTheUN: World Parliament of Peace," address by President George Bush before the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 1, 1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 1303. world order that: features open borders, open trade, open minds; celebrates humanity as well as hometown and homeland; is characterized by competitive spirit built on a "quest for excellence"; models democracy on the experience of the Americas, "the world's first completely democratic hemisphere"; and takes the emerging model of European unity and builds a "whole world whole and fiee."'O Aa the Persian Gulf crisis continued to move from confrontation toward war, major steps were taken to mark the end of the Cold War in Europe during the last montba of 1990. These steps included an agreement on the international conditiona for the reunification of Germany'l and the Paris Summit meeting of the leadera of the 34 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where Presidents George Bueh and Mikhail Gorbachev joined in signing a Treaty on Conventional Armed Forcee in Europe (CFE)12and a Taris Charter for a New Europe." The Paris Charter made specific reference to the link between the changes in Europe and the potential for more effective global cooperation in the United Nations. According to the Charter, The deetiny of our nationa is linked to that of all other nations. We eupport fully the United Nations and the enhancement of its role promoting international peace, eecurity and justice. We a i r m our commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn all violations of these principles. We recognize with satisfaction the gmwing m& of the United NrrHont in world affain and ftu incrwuing effectimnem, fiutemd by impmmment in mkrtbnt among our Stateu.(emphaeis added)" The Paris meeting marked a clear departure from Cold War relationships in Europe to new, more cooperative relationships among all European countries, the United States and Canada. The Charter of Paris did not guarantee such cooperation, but provided new venues for cooperation by making meetings of the CSCE members more routine, backed by some limited institutional foundations and staff. With most Central European countries moving in one degree or ''The so-called 2+4 treaty on the external aspects of German unification was signed on September 12, 1990 in Moecow by the foreign minieters of the two Germanye, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. '2The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, requiring eubstantial reductions in Soviet military forces in Europe and establishing a cooperative compliance regime among the signatories, was signed by the leaders of the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states on November 19,1990. '%e Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed in Paris, France, November 21,1990 by the leaders of 32 European countries, the United States and Canada. another toward reform of their political and economic syetems, the future of cooperative structures in Europe clearly depended on whether or not reform policies could be sustained in the Soviet Union. If so, the new Europe that was given birth in Paris could eventually transform European relationships a t all levels. If not, the new Europe might stretch not from the Atlantic to the Urals but only from the Atlantic to the Western bordera of the Soviet Union. And just as a cooperative aecurity w t e m in Europe depended heavily on the constructive contributions of a reforming Soviet Union, so would the potential for the emergence of any new world order as sought by George Bush. The United States and ita coalition partners, eupported by United Nations resolutions and congressional authorization of the uee of force to free Kuwait from Iraqi control, began attacking Iraqi targeta with massive air strikes on January 16, 1991. Two weeke later, President Bush went before the Congress to present his State of the Union address amidst great uncertainty concerning the ultimate costa of the ongoing hostilities. President Bush argued that the war in the Gulf was for much more than the defense of one small country. According to the President, What is a t stake [in the Persian Gulf War] is more than one small country, it is a big idea: a new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind peace and security, freedom and the rule of law....u - The President explicitly noted the potential deterrent effect of U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf, arguing that the willingness of the international community to respond decisively to aggression would serve as a lesson to othera who might consider such actions in the future: We will succeed in the gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggres~ion.'~ The use of force in defense of the new world order therefore became an explicit component of the President's concept, taking the U.S. approach down a somewhat different path than the one described by President Gorbachev in his UN speech, where he condemned resort to the use of military force in general. But Gorbachev did not account for collective military action in response to the use of force. During the Gulf crisis, Gorbachev supported, albeit with some reluctance, the use of force against Iraq. According to President Bush, the potential for collective military responses to aggression is critical to a new world order. uSt.ate of the Union [text], President George Bush, The Washington Post, January 30,1991, pA14. The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the longheld promise of a new world order where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective r e ~ i s t a n c e . ~ On the question of the U.S. role, President Bush suggested that the United States would be the principal leader toward and defender of the new order, saying. ... today, in a rapidly changing world, American leaderahip is indispensable .... Yes, the United States beam a major ehare of leaderahip in this effort. Among the nationr ofthe world, only the United ofAmerica ha8 both the m o d rtcrnding and the m a n r to back U up. [emphasis added] We're the only nation on this Earth that could assemble the forces of peace." Even though Mikhail Gorbachev took the initial lead toward "a new world order," George Bush in his State of the Nation address asserted the claim of the United States to leadership based on three main factore: The moral standine of the United States. This claim is given strength by the end of the Cold War which resulted in a victory for the democratic n o r m long advocated by the Western countries led by the United States. The militam capabilities of the United States. This claim preceded the impressive performance of a wide range of U.S. forces and weapons eystema in the Persian Gulf War, but appeam to have been in large part supported by the War's outcome. The coalition-building ca~acitvof the United States. This claim apparently is supported by the success of the United States in creating and sustaining a broadly-based international coalition against Iraq in the United Nations, among traditional allies, with Arab states, in the application of international sanctions against Iraq, and on the battlefield. When President Bush next addressed the Congress, proclaiming an end to the Gulf War, he once again referred to a new world order, on thie occasion recalling the words of Winston Churchill, a t an earlier time when hopes for a "new world" were equally high. According to President Bush, Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which the principles of justice ... ...." and fair play protect the weak against the strong A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, ie poised to fulfill the historic vision of ita founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human righta find a home among all ~ a t i o n s . ~ The President eaid that the war had put the new world to ita first test, and W e passed that test." He cautioned that "[elven the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace" but said that "...enduring peace must be our rni~ion."'~ Just aa on previous occaaione, the President slipped back and forth between phrases implying that not only a "new world" but also a "new world order" exist and worde describing the "new world order" as a goal, not an accomplished fact. . In spite of this rhetorical ambiguity, however, it appears that the sense of the President's approach is that the new world order ie eomething that "we seektw not something that we can necessarily count on. '&President Bush's Address to Congress on End of the Gulf War, New York Time, March 7, 1991, pA8. '%A. 60n. KEY ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISION Administration officials privately acknowledge that there has been no interagency study, nor even a substantial options paper, prepared to undergird the President's vision of new world order. There is not even one speech dedicated to outlining, explaining and defending the concept. The record that we have just traced through examination of speeches by President Bush and Administration officials therefore is a summary of the public record of its development. Even though none of these speeches or statements include much detail on the concept, it is possible without much extrapolation to describe the key elements of the approach. It might be useful to look a t these components in terms of three questions: 1. GOALS: What is a new world order intended to accomplish?; 2. MEANS: What are the means to be used toward that end, and what institutions will be critical to its effective functioning?; and 3. ROLES: What is the role of the United States in relation to that of other countries in creating and managing a new order? GOALS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER The main goal articulated by President Bush for the new world order is the maintenance of international peace. The President's speeches also imply, however, that in addition to peace, the new order should guarantee security, defend freedom, promote democracy and enforce the rule of law (justice). As such, these objectives do not differ in any substantial way from traditional U.S. foreign and defense policy objectives or from the aims articulated in the UN Charter or the Helsinki Final Act (of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), for example. MEANS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER The starting point for a new world order is the process of change in Europe. The democratic revolution in Europo and the emergence of a "new Europe" clearly was a necessary precedent to the concept of a "new world." Key institutions and processes in this "new Europe" therefore are also important institutions for the new world order. In the Bush vision, the key institutions are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The main roles of these three organizations, put most simply, are: for NATO, to help ensure military security in Europe; for the EC, to promote economic and political cooperation in Europe; and, for the CSCE, to promote cooperation among all "European" nations including the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union. Beyond Europe, the United Nations is the key diplomatic and political center for implementing and operating a new world order. The UN was the center of activity for trying, convicting and sentencing Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, and President Bush described this as a victory not just for the United States and the members of the anti-Iraq coalition but also for the United nation^.^^ By implication, a wide range of other international institutions will be instrumental in pursuing the goals of the new world order, none of them as politically central as the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, but all of them important in their specific areas of responsibilities. These include, for example, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Western Economic Summits, and so on. Extrapolating beyond what the Administration has said in its statements, one could conceive of regional cooperative security organizations in other parts of the globe as building blocks of the new order. For example, one could imagine sister organizations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the MediterraneadMiddle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America (where the Organization of American States may be said already to provide the core of such a structure). Each regional building block would be part of the United Nations system, attempting to promote cooperation and security in that region with ultimate reference to the United Nations for issues that cannot be settled on a regional basis. On the national U.S. level, the implication of the Bush approach is that the broad range of U.S. foreign and defense policy instruments would be a t least in part at the service of the new world order goal. This suggests that the requirements of the new world order would influence priorities in defense spending, force structure, military deployments, foreign military assistance, foreign aid, diplomacy, and so forth. In the post-Cold War and post-Persian Gulf War environments, the preferred tools of a new world order are diplomacy, economic development, negotiation and political settlement. But it is also clear that deterrence of aggression against the order requires military forces (U.S. and other) that are capable of respondingeffectively to aggression with sufficient political consensus to sustain the response, as in the reaction to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN A NEW WORLD ORDER The President has been quite explicit in outlining a leading role for the United States both in creating and maintaining a new world order. Even though Administration rhetoric has occasionally hedged by arguing that the United States must "help" establish or play a "major role" (versus the leading role) in a new order, the model of the Persian Gulf crisis is one of strong and effective American leadership. However, the fact that the United States took great pains to build an international coalition and, in particular, to ensure the support of the Soviet Union for the enterprise, reflects a much different set of policy assumptions than the reality encountered by the United States in its go-it-alone approach in Vietnam. In addition, the United States made it clear that it was not willing to pay all, or even most, of the financial costs of the response to Iraqi aggression. Protected Arab allies and traditional Cold War allies were expected to provide military or financial support or both. George Bush's new world order vision therefore appears to depend heavily on international support, if not complete consensus. The implication of the Persian Gulf War experience is that George Bush's vision includes the hope for continuing and expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union and more willing assistance from traditional allies, particularly the European countries and Japan, in supporting the new world order. CRITICAL DETERMINANTS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER A summary of George Bush's approach to a new world order might be expressed in terms of the following five critical determinants: The potential for a new world order was created by the changes in Europe, and particularly by the changed Soviet approach to the world that produced a new detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. The previous polarization of international relations, based on U.S.-Soviet and EastWest differences, tended to block possible settlements of regional security issues and encouraged some countries Iraq for example to take advantage of the polarization to gain access to weaponry that they might not have been sold or given if it were not for the polarized system. -- -- The advent of a new Europe emphasized the strong force of democracy in the world, and re-emphasized the validity of the goals set for the global order following World War II, based on democratic societies with free market economies cooperating to maintain peace. The Persian Gulf crisis, particularly the effective international response to Iraqi aggression, provides a strong deterrence foundation for a new order, suggesting that aggression will be met with an internationally-supported military response. The outcome of the war provides an opportunity for diplomacy to operate, seeking a peace process that would work toward a settlement in the Middle East and reinvigorating the United Nations as a vehicle for international conflict resolution and cooperation. Finally, although the Preeident has not explicitly linked the new world order concept to the growing gap between rich and poor natione in the world, it is clear that economic development ie essential to more orderly international relatione in the future. Without such a component in a new world order, the gap between rich and poor natione will leave the international eyetem divided and prone to crisis in Third World areas. According to this approach, then, the key ingrediente of the new world order would have to include continuing U.S.Soviet cooperation, the promotion of democratic values and free market economiee on a global d e , deterrence of threate to the new order, effective diplomacy to prevent and resolve disputes, and development programs to enhance support for and etakes in a more orderly international eyetem. TEE NEW WORLD ORDER AND ITS SmPTICS It is relatively easy to be skeptical about a concept as philosophically grand and politically, militarily, and financially demanding as a "new world order." And it is no surprise that the approach has attracted more or less equal portions of support, bemused curiosity and studied criticism. The concept emerged in the flow of international events rather than as the product of careful study, but in any case a synergistic process of criticizing, defending, refining and bounding the concept would be a necessary part of testing its logical integrity and its potential domestic and international support. ' The new world order concept has been criticized from a variety of political . perspectives. A number of observers have been disturbed by what they see as the approach's early reliance on the use of the military to enforce the order. Political cartoonists have lampooned various aspects of the approach, including the heavy reliance on U.S. leadership of the new world order.62 Other commentators have criticized what they see as the approach's unrealistic dependence on the actions of other powers and on the United Nations as a vehicle for implementing and managing the order. Some observers have worried about the extent to which President Bush's approach counts on Soviet (and Chinese) cooperation to make it work. These and other concerns raise important issues about a new world order. CRITICISMS The new world order concept places too much reliance on the use of military force. This criticism was virtually inevitable, given the fact that President Bush only articulated the concept when he was seeking to build support for the U.S. response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In fact, the military deterrence aspect of a new world order is one of the most prominent of the potential long term consequences of the Persian Gulf crisis. This fact clearly troubles some observers, including one columnist who wrote that although President Bush had not yet defined exactly what he means by "a new world order," "...he has chosen 6?or example, Gary Trudeau's "Doonesbury" strip of Sunday, February 17, 1991, spoofed the concept in a White House scene featuring a Trudeau-authored message on the Presidential answering machine: "Hello, you have reached the headquarters of the world's policeman. All our lines are busy now, but if you'll just stay on the line, a new world order representative will be with you shortly. Please rest assured we will carry any burden and pay any price in order to assist you. Please have your list of grievances handy so that we might better process your call... If you are currently being invaded, please press one. If you are experiencing a civil war, press two. Now enter your U.N. Resolution number ..." ' the old order, namely war, to bring it a b o ~ t . "Anti-war ~ protestors in New York City carried banners with skulls surrounding the slogan "welcome to the new world order." This perspective was prominent in anti-war protests in Europe as well as in the United States. A new world order would rely too heavily on U.S. leadership. The United States led the international coalition that defeated Iraq, and by the end of the war, the Administration's emphasis on the importance of American leadership in future had become prominent in its rhetoric. One observer has argued that "We have entered a period of Pax Americana. Why ~ deny it? Every other nation on earth would like to be in our p ~ s i t i o n . "But other observers have argued that the United States cannot afford to lead a new world order if the burdens of leadership prevent it from dealing effectively with U.S. domestic problems, such as the budget deficit, repair of the national infrastructure, deficient industrial productivity, drugs, health care, and so on. In the long run, according to this approach, domestic weakness would eventually undermine the U.S. ability to lead, particularly to the extent that the United States hopes to portray its social, economic and political system as a model for others to follow. A number of other observers have noted the political risks of an approach that relies too heavily on the United States. Robert Hunter, an expert on Europe and the Middle East who served on President Carter's National Security Council staff, has observed that "It won't work if the United States defines the new world order and the others are simply expected to salute."& Charles Lichenstein, a former Reagan Administration official, agreed that "A lot of people, including friends of ours, are becoming a little bit worried about the idea of a Pax Americana ...."M The approach could be well beyond U.S. capabilities, particularly if it is seen as primarily self-serving and U.S. leadership is resisted or opposed by others. Some might already argue that the United States used the Gulf crisis to establish U.S. dominance in the Middle East, undermine the Soviet Union's international influence a t a time when they have been weakened by internal turmoil, and undermine the United Nations by using it as a tool of U.S. policy rather than as an instrument of international cooperation. During the Persian Gulf crisis, the United States largely managed to convince coalition partners to accept recommended U.S. approaches while also convincing some of them to pick up most of the financial tab. In the future, particularly in peacetime operation of any new order or in response to a less w a r y McGrory, "Martial Arts," Washington Post, January 31, 1991, p.2. %harles Krauthammer, "Bless Our Pax Americana," Washington Post, March 22, 1991, p M 5 . 6 6 ~ u o t ein d Doyle McManus, owit., phlO. clear-cut good-vereue-evil ieeue, other countriee would likely ineiet on greater influence over decieione in return for their active support. If U.S. leaderehip is handicapped by a weak domeetic political or economic baae or if the United Statee ie not willing or able to ehare decieionmaking rolee effectively with international partnere, the foundatione of any new order will be in queetion. A new world order cannot count on forming and suetaining coalitione similar to that formed during the Peraian Gulf conflict. Virtually all observere have commented on the unique combination of circumtancee that allowed the United Statee to construct and hold together a coalition that included eo many diveree countries with otherwise conflicting intereata and prioritiee. Future aggreeeore could be larger, stronger and leee easily isolated than Iraq. No future crieie may provide euch a clear caee of right and wrong, or eo eaay a villain as Saddam Hussein. The ability to attract Syria to the coalition, for example, had much more to do with Syria'e antagoniem toward Hussein'e Iraq than ita common intereats with the United Statee. Even the moderate Arab partnere of the United Statee have a far different traditional outlook on Middle East peace ieeuee, particularly concerning Iarael'e future. China'e important acquieecence in the Security Council owed much to its lack of eerioue intereets in the Persian Gulf. The NATO alliee finiehed the crieie relatively united in their approach, but the unity and cooperation hid continuing difference8 over criteria governing the uee of force, the role of NATO outside Europe, the requirements for Middle East peace, and other ieeuee. Preeident Bueh'e concept ie too dependent on the cooperation of the Soviet Union. U.S.-Soviet confrontation haa been the principal defining characterietic of the international ayatem for the laat four decades. Thie divieion tended to polarize moet international iesuee and aleo prevented the United Nations Security Council from working as it waa originally intended. Aa already noted, one cle& attribute of Preeident Bueh'e approach ie its reliance on a cooperative Soviet Union to make a new world order work. Perhaps this wae demonetrated moet clearly as the United Statee moved toward a decieion to broaden the attack on Iraq a t the end of February 1991, when the Soviet leaderehip sought to negotiate with Iraq to produce a cease fire. Although a t no point did Soviet efforts appear cloee to mtiefying U.S. terma for a cease fire, and in epite of American concern about Soviet military attempts to repreee independence movements in the Baltic Republica, Preeident Bueh went out of hie way to thank and compliment Mikhail Gorbachev for hie attempts to win Iraqi compliance with the United Natione reeolutionrr, even as he impoeed an ultimatum on theae efforts. The U.S. apparently warned Gorbachev about the negative consequences of Soviet military intervention in the Baltica, but the Adminietration was careful not to mount a etrong public attack against Gorbachev on the iaaue. Gorbachev, for hie part, continued to negotiate from the position that Iraq must comply with all UN Reeolutione, aa the U.S. inaieted, even though the Soviets were not able to extract euch an outcome from the Iraqie. Both leaders appeared to be acting ae if US.-Soviet cooperation were . essential to their respective notions of what was required for an effective new world order. This aspect of President Bush'e approach attracta a variety of criticisms. The moet obvioue problem ie that Gorbachev is under attack on a wide range of issues by Soviet conservatives, including what they have seen ae excessive cooperation with the United States during the Gulf crieis. If conservative forces win the power etruggle in the Soviet Union, their much cooler, more competitive attitude toward the United States could make the vision of a new world order much more dificult or impossible to attain. Profeeeor Stanley Hoffmann has argued that the behavior of governrnenta internationally ie directly linked to their domestic conditions. A victory for the coneervativee in the Soviet power struggle, according to Ho£bann, might not bring about a return to aggressive Soviet behavior internationally, but could lead to policies designed to "prevent further triumph of Western ideals and interests, especially a t the expense of former Soviet ~lienta."'~ Some analyata argue that the problem is even more fundamental, and would apply even if the Soviet conservatives are beaten back. According to a British analyst, Christopher Coker, "The problem is that America's vision of the new world order is not necessarily one that the Soviet Union shares."" Another commentator argues that U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Persian Gulf crisis was an exception rather than the basie for a new rule. Near the end of the war, analyst Peter Schweizer wrote that "the recent diplomatic gymnastics in the gulf illustrate the vast difference between U.S. and Soviet objectives in the region, objectives that perestroika and the war have done nothing to change.... There is every reason to believe that the Soviet-Iraqi client relationship will be business-as-usual after the gulf war."" ... The President's approach ie too dependent on the United Nations and insufficiently attentive to differences among U.N. members on values and interesta and to the demande of balance of power politics. This criticism is, of course, closely linked to the previous one. A main reason for the importance of U.S.-Soviet ccroperation is the demonstrated fact that the United Nations Security Council does not work to the full extent of ita potential if all five permanent membere do not agree. The explicit hope of the Bush and Gorbachev visions of a new world order has been that the United Nations will assume a much more important role in the future. This hope for a revitalized United Nations has been critiqued as unrealistic from a number of 67Stanley Hoffmann, "Avoiding New World Disorder," New York Times, February 25,1991, pA19. "Christopher Coker, "The Flaw in Bush's New World Order," European Security Analyst, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, No. 11, February 1991. 'peter Schweizer, "Moscow's Hidden Gulf Agenda," New York Times, F e b r u q 18, 1991, p.23. different perspectivee, but for somewhat different reasons. One political commentator haa obeerved that the United Nations ie not exactly filled with representative democraciee eharing the same etandards of human freedom and righta advocated by the United Statee. According to William Pfaff, ...The vaet majority of the U.N.'e membere are unrepresentative governments, clam or intereat-bound oligarchiw or dictatorship with abominable records of human-righta abuee. It meme ecarcely the euitable agency for eetabliehing world democracy and reepect for human rightsea While Pfaff focueed on valuee, another obeerver concentrated on intereeta. Former U.S. repreeentative a t the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, obeerved that "The biggeet eingle problem with the U.N. ie that it involve8 in every decieion too many nations that don't have a etake in the outcome.... That'e a prerequieite for irreeponsible decision-rnakingQd' Former Secretmy of State Henry Kieeinger compliments Preeident Bush for hie performance during the Persian Gulf crieie, but ie greatly troubled by the idealiem expressed in the new world order concept. Kissinger and other obeervera liken the approach to Woodrow Wileon'e attempt to impoee a community of international intereeta on a balance of power ayatem with hie League of Nations propod. Noting that Wileon'e attempt failed, ae did the United Nationa vieion after World War II, Kissinger cautions Bueh to avoid the eame fate by accepting the reality of conflicting interwta in the international y t e m and the necessity for a balance of power etrategy. Kieeinger acknowledgee that a balance of power etrategy eits uncomfortably with Americana because of ita "apparent moral neutrality" and the fact that it "knows few permanent enemiee and few permanent And he notes that the United Statee cannot play the role of "balancer" by itself, but instead requires aseietance from othera and the ability to distinguish between eituationa in which U.S. involvement is critical and those where it is not. In eum, Kieeinger argues that the new world order is ahietorical in that it presumes that centuriee of balance of power politics can be overcome by the new ayatem. Further, other lees prominent but important problem could vex the goal of etrengthening the role of the United Nations. The communiet bloc may have collapsed in Europe, but it has not in Asia. The Government of China, aleo a permanent Security Council member, did not block any of the resolutions against Iraq. But there is no guarantee that Chinese cooperation could be won in future decieionmaking if U.S. and Chinese - or Chinese and Soviet intereeta clashed. There are aleo etructural problem. The Security Council was - William Pfaff, "The Illusion of Founding a New World Order," The Sun IBaltimorel, January 28, 1991. 6%enry Kieeinger, "False Dreams of a New World Order," Washington Poet, February 26,1991, p M 1 . conceived at a time when Germany and Japan were defeated and severely weakened powers. Today, it is dificult to imagine an effectively-functioning new world order without the active participation of these two economic giants. Even if both Germany and Japan are willing to take permanent (veto-holding) seats on the Security Council, Third World countries might want one or more of their membera added ae permanent membera of the Council. The task of bringing the Council up to date, M, that it more accurately represents global power realities, might in the end produce a Council where meaningful decisions and actions would almost never result from its deliberations. The United States did not use the United Nations eyetem during the Gulf criais m intended by the U.N. Charter and, if the U.N. is to play a meaningful part in a new world order, ite arrangements for collective security efforts will have to be improved and ueed. The United States relied heavily on the United Nations Security Council for political legitimization of ite positions during the Persian Gulf crisis. But the U.S. apparently rejected the option of using existing arrangements provided by the U.N. Charter for coordinating a military response through the Military Staff Committee which, according to Article 47, Section 3 of the Charter, is "responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." Brian Urquhart, a former Under Secretary General of the United Nations, has argued that "A credible international security system, or 'new world order,' will have to respond with appropriate collective action, through either regional or global organization, to the vast range of disputes, threate to, or breaches of the peace, or even acts of Urquhart maintains that "It is no longer acceptable that aggression international action is taken only when a situation threatens the interests of the most powerful nations.* Urquart goes on to recommend a variety of improvements to allow the United Natione to keep watch over "destabilizing developments" around the world and for the Security Council to act to settle disputes, help keep the peace, and enforce U.N. decisions. Urquart concludes that: ...." Governments, if they want the United Nations to be respected and taken seriously, will also have to respect its decisions and make decisions that can if necessary be enforced. Such changes in attitude would be the best practical test of a commitment to a "new world order.* wBrian Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," The New York Review, March 7, 1991, p.36. p.37. a Arrival a t a new world order is threatened by the prospect of continuing political, ideological, economic,ethnic and religious conflicts around the world, particularly in the Middle East. President Bush has frequently acknowledged that winning the war against Iraq will be a n incomplete victory unless greater peace and atability can be won in the Middle East. This ia no small order, as U.S.Adminietrationa throughout the last four decades have eought to encourage peace and atability in the region with little auccees. And yet, if the new world order can wage war but not promote peace, it will be of little lasting value. There is the hope, of course, that the combined fmita of the end of the Cold War and of the Peraian Gulf War will include sufficient pressure on Middle Eastern protagonists to induce a peace process leading toward guarantees for Israel's security, a homeland for the Palestinia., and a regional security syatem to promote an enduring peace. But the record of the region suggests that if such an outcome ia a prerequisite to the advent of a new world order, the order's chance of success may be no better than those of the League of Nations. . IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY COUNTERPOINTS TO THE CRITICS The Bush Administration'e concept of a new world order appear0 to have become the President'e over arching foreign policy vision for the future. This vision has developed incrementally going through varioue etagee eince January 1989: first, rejecting the need for a new vision; second, aeeerting a vision of a new Europe "whole and h e " ; third, acknowledging that a new Europe might also imply a new world; and currently, proclaiming the goal of a new world order. It ia clear that the Adminietration recognizes that a new order does not yet exist, even if the changes in Europe and elsewhere have undone the old world order. It ie reasonable to aasume that the concept ie also a "work in progress" that will be incrementally elaborated, tested and revised. The President's vision has many elements in common with that expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his December 1988 epeech to the United Nations General Assembly, including the "new world order" rhetoric, the goal of a peaceful order, the importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the acknowledgment of democrclcy's powerful force, and the enhanced potential for the United Nations. The Bush Administration originally dismissed the Gorbachev vision and then developed an American counterpart. It ie also ironic that Gorbachev is no longer in a position to be a credible advocate of his vision, given the magnitude of the Soviet Union's domestic political and economic problems. But the changes in Gorbachev's policies under the banner of the new world order helped open the door through which George Bush walked toward such a vision. And the success of President Bush's approach depends on whether or not a similar vision survives in the Soviet leadership. The criticisms of the approach noted above all have some salience. But there are other sides to virtually every critique. Yes, military force, or a t least the potential to employ military force, is an important component of an international system designed to maintain order, just as even highly developed civilizations still require police to enforce laws. But that does not mean that the new order will have to rely on the use of force on a regular basis. George Bush may be right in hoping that the Persian Gulf War and the success in holding the coalition together may have a deterrent effect creating a window of political opportunity to build toward a new order. The United States surely cannot build a new world order by itself or according to a uniquely American plan. But the United States does have far greater leadership potential a t this point in history than any other nation, and a t the end of two ware (the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War) there may be opportunities for diplomacy that are unique. Western Europe has not yet achieved sufficient political cohesion to lead, although our West European allies have much to contribute to international consensue building and problem eolving. The Soviet Union cannot lead, but ita acquieecence will be eseential. Reliance on the cooperation of the Soviet Union may be a eevere weakness of the Preaident'e approach to a new world order, but a more benign, cooperative and reforming Soviet Union helped create the circumetancee that even make it possible to contemplate a new order. Uncertainty about the Soviet Union'e future eimply requiree the United Statee to prepare for the contingency in which the Soviet Union'e internal and external policiee make it an ineffective or unhelpful partner. Until that point has been reached, Soviet cooperation can be extremely valuable. In Europe, the United States hae tried to eteer a c o u m between constructing a more cooperative European security eystem in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and preeerving a vital Weetern military alliance in NATO. It may be neceseary to follow a eimilar "parallel paths" hedging strategy toward the new world order to allow for the potential vicissitudes of Soviet de~elopmenta.~ The United Nations clearly has limita and deficiencies, and it does not have a life of ita own in the international ayatem. Rather, it is the focal point where the broadest international consensue can be fashioned ant tested and, if achieved, translated into action. But it is not the only venue for action and there ie no fatal inconsietency between trying to make the United Nations more effective and paying attention to the impact of power relationships in the international syetem. Further, the fact that the concept of a new world order draws on a certain moral tradition in U.S. foreign policy ehould be a strength, not a weakness, as long as policymakers understand and factor power relationships into their calculations. Policymakers may also wieh to take into account the fact that to the extent that the United States commita itaelf to international cooperation in managing a new world order, it also limita the scope of ita own potential for unilateral action. From some perspectivee this may be an acceptable price to pay for broader eharing of reeponsibility for an international eystem that facilitate8 peaceful change and discourages resort to the uee of force except in self defense. It may not be possible to hold the Persian Gulf coalition completely intact, or to form as effective coalitions in the future, but the cooperation achieved during the crisis provides a etarting point for overcoming old differences in the Near E a t region. =For discussion of such an approach toward Europe's future, see Stanley R. Sloan, "The United States and a New Europe: Strategy for the Future," CRS Report 90-245, May 14, 1990. The Middle Ehst in the post-war period will be a most important and &=cult test for most aspecta of a potential new order. But wen if, as seem likely, efforta at settlement do not resolve all problem in the region, the pmpecte for a new order are not entirely bleak. The question will be whether Middle Eastern politice will damage or destroy key elementa of a potential new order, such ae U.S. intent to play a leading role it the world, the Soviet Union's willingnees to cooperate, and the perception of greater potential for the United Nations. THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS IN A NEW WORLD ORDER The role of the Congress to date in the new world order hae largely been that of an interested onlooker. This is largely a product of continuing uncertainty about exactly what the Administration meam by the concept and how it intenda to translate it into U.S. policy initiatives and commitments. If the Administration continues to pursue the goal, the Congress will become critically and directly involved in its evolution, making decisions about the policies, priorities, and fun& required to underwrite the approach. An early issue will be whether the United Statee can still plan on a process of reductions in defense efforta over the next several yeam if it anticipates U.S. forces playing a major role in securing a new world order. In particular, what military forces will remain deployed in the Persian Gulf region as part of the U.S. commitment to post-war military stability in the region? A further question is that of what types of forces should receive priority funding in such a case. Also, should the anticipated reduction in the U.S. militmy presence overseas, particularly in Europe and in h i a , continue, or should U.S. overseas deployments be reconsidered in light of new world order roles? The Congress undoubtedly will also want to know how the Administration hopes to share the burdens of sustaining a new world order? The Persian Gulf War aroused strong burdensharing sentiments in the Congress. On the poeitive side of the ledger, the crisis saw the most intensive, extensive and successful cooperation with our European allies in dealing with a non-European security problem in the past four decades. Members of Congress will likely want to know how this experience can be tramlated into a reliable system of cooperation for the future, to ensure that the United Statee is not left alone defending the new order. One big question is whether the United States should insist that two of our economically strongest allies, Germany and Japan, aesume more prominent militmy roles in defense of a new order, or if they should specialize in nonmilitary areas, such as promoting economic development in the emerging democracies in Europe and in the Third World. Presuming that the United States does not want to become the provider of mercenary forces for a new world order, other partners will be required to take on specific burdens and responsibilities other than bankrolling U.S. operations. The Congress will also have to decide how much to invest in the nonmilitary requirements of a new world order. U.S. expenditure8 on foreign aid have traditionally been a target of much criticism, particularly given domestic financial requirements. But U.S. leadership in a new world order may require successful foreign assistance programs aa well aa credible military capabilities. Ifthis aapect of the new order is left entirely to other developed countries, the United States could find itself on the ehort end of acceee to developing foreign markets. U.S. advocacy of a cooperative approach to global order may also require new consideration of multilateral approaches to foreign mistance ae part of a new world order policy. The Congress will also have to decide whether or not to eupport actively the Adminiatration'e lead in seeking to etrengthen the United Nations. Such a policy will certainly require that the United Statee at least pay its m e a m and it its current dues in a timely faahion, if not increase its eupport. In addition, the Congresa will likely continue to exercise overnight regarding the wide range of foreign policy implications of a new world order concept, most particularly concerning U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. In epite of its grave internal problems, the Soviet Union etill is perhaps the eingle most important country for the United Statee in the world. The Soviet Union harr strategic nuclear forces capable of destroying the United States, enough nonnuclear military force to be a destabilizing influence in Europe and elsewhere, and a sufficiently clouded political future to be a cause of concern for many yeara to come. Continuing uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union presumably will require that the Administration, while eeeking cooperation with the Soviet leadership, keep open policy options to deal with contingencies that make Moscow an undependable ally in pursuing a new world order. None of these issues has been sharply posed for the Congress early in 1991, but just aa the Congress haa played a critical part in determining U.S. policy following both the first and second world wars, eo it will likely participate actively in shaping the U.S. role in the post-Cold War and Persian Gulf War world. crsphpgw