The Strategic Defense Initiative: Program Description and Major Issues

Y=b-87 Report No. 86-8 SPR THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND MAJOR ISSUES Cosmo DiMaggio A n a l y s t i n S c i e n c e and Technology A r t h u r F. M a n f r e d i , Jr. S p e c i a l i s t i n Aerospace P o l i c y Science P o l i c y Research Division S t e v e n A. H i l d r e t h A n a l y s t i n N a t i o n a l Defense F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and N a t i o n a l Defense D i v i s i o n NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY LIBRARY J a n u a r y 7 , 1986 T h e Congressional Research S e n ice works exclusi\eh for the Congress, conducting research. analt zing lepslation, a n d p r o ~ ~ d i ninformation g at the request of committees. Members. and their staffs. T h e Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in manv forms including studies, reports, compilations. digests. and background briefings. Upon request, CRS assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals a n d issues. and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals a n d their alternatives. T h e Service's senior specialists a n d subject analysts are also available for personal consultations in their respecti\,e fields of expertise. ABSTRACT The S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e (SDI) h a s prompted one o f t h e most h e a t e d n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y debates i n recent times. The c u r r e n t d e b a t e , w i t h i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l a s w e l l a s t h e d e f e n s e communities, h a s a l r e a d y and w i l l l i k e l y c o n t i n u e t o c a u s e e v o l u t i o n i n b o t h program o b j e c t i v e s and substance. o f t h e SDI. T h i s r e p o r t d e s c r i b e s t h e e v o l u t i o n , c o m p o s i t i o n , and m a j o r i s s u e s Among t h e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d a r e t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , t h e r a t e and l e v e l o f f u n d i n g , s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y and m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y , arms c o n t r o l , NATO A l l i a n c e r e a c t i o n s and i n v o l v e m e n t , t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r t o t h e S o v i e t Union, and t h e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f s p a c e . CONTENTS .................................................................iii INTRODUCTION............................................................. 1 THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE......................................... 5 STRUCTURE........................................................... 5 SURVEILLANCE. ACQUISITION. TRACKING. AND KILL ASSESSMENT ............ 6 DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.................................. 7 KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY .................................. 8 SYSTEMS CONCEPTS/BATTLE MANAGEMENT .................................. 8 SURVIVABILITY. LETHALITY. AND KEY TECHNOLOGIES...................... 9 ABSTRACT ................................. 1111 ......................................... ...................................... ............................................................11 23 ..............................................................13 SDI ARCHITECTURE ......................................................... 15 CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS ..................................................... 17 EFFECTIVENESS....................................................... 17 SURVIVABILITY....................................................... 18 COST ................................................................ 18 STABILITY...........................................................1 9 A DECISION IN THE EARLY 1990s ............................................2 1 POLICY ISSUES............................................................23 TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES................. 23 RATE OF FUNDING ..................................................... 27 STRATEGIC PoLICY/MILITARY UTILITY ................................... 29 ARMS CONTROL ........................................................3 1 ALLIANCE REACTIONS.................................................. 33 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONCERNS ........................................ 36 MILITARIZATION OF SPACE ............................................. 38 CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................. 4 1 APPENDIX A: COMMISSIONED STUDIES ........................................ 43 APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ........................................ 45 ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES ........................................ 47 RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WORK ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS (ASATs) SP-100 OTHERS INTRODUCTION I n a n a t i o n w i d e a d d r e s s on March 23, 1983, p r e s i d e n t Reagan d e s c r i b e d h i s v i s i o n o f a world no l o n g e r dependent upon t h e s t r a t e g y o f d e t e r r e n c e based upon t h e t h r e a t o f n u c l e a r r e t a l i a t i o n . H e c a l l e d f o r a "comprehensive and i n t e n s i v e e f f o r t t o d e f i n e a long-term r e s e a r c h and development program" t o p r o v i d e f u t u r e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s w i t h new d e f e n s i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s and s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n s " t o a c h i e v e our u l t i m a t e g o a l o f e l i m i n a t i n g t h e t h r e a t posed b y s t r a t e g i c nuclear missiles ." Following t h e s p e e c h , P r e s i d e n t Reagan commissioned two s t u d i e s ( t h e s o c a l l e d F l e t c h e r and Hoffman s t u d i e s ) t o examine t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f t h a t g o a l and t o make recommendations on how t o p r o c e e d . -11 Among t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e s t u d i e s found t h a t new t e c h n o l o g i e s a r e becoming a v a i l a b l e t h a t m i g h t p r o v i d e o p t i o n s t o defend a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s , and t h a t p u r s u i t o f t h o s e t e c h n o l - - o g i e s c o u l d enhance d e t e r r e n c e and i n c r e a s e s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . 2/ These r e p o r t s l e d t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n J a n u a r y 1984, t o e s t a b l i s h a r e s e a r c h program known a s t h e S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e (SDI). I t s p u r p o s e , ac- c o r d i n g t o t h e P r e s i d e n t , i s t o f i n d ways t o p r o v i d e a b e t t e r b a s i s f o r d e t e r r i n g a g r e s s i o n , s t r e n g t h e n i n g s t a b i l i t y , and i n c r e a s i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e United S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s . . According t o t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e SDI i s d e s i g n e d Dept o f D e f e n s e . The S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e : D e f e n s i v e 1 / U.S. ~ e c h n o l o g i e sStudy. Apr. 1984. Washington, U. S. Govt P r i n t . O f f . , 1984. 27 p . and U.S. Dept. o f D e f e n s e . Defense A g a i n s t B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s : An Assessment o f T e c h n o l o g i e s and P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s . Apr. 1984. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1984. 22 p . . 2/ The f u l l f i n d i n g s o f t h e F l e t c h e r amd Hoffman s t u d i e s a r e l i s t e d i n appenTix A . t o e x p l o r e , i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a l l U . S. t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s , t h e t e c h - - n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y o f a number o f d e f e n s i v e c o n c e p t s and t e c h n o l o g i e s . 3/ The t e c h n i c a l knowledge g a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e SDI w i l l b e used i n f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s by U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s on whether t o d e v e l o p and d e p l o y advanced d e f e n s e s . S i n c e t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s i n i t i a l s p e e c h on t h e s u b j e c t , t h e r e h a s b e e n much c o n f u s i o n and d i s a g r e e m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l o f t h e SDI and t h e means f o r attempting t o achieve i t . A p a r t i c u l a r point of contention concerns the meaning o f t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s c a l l upon t h e n a t i o n ' s s c i e n t i f i c community " t o g i v e u s t h e means o f r e n d e r i n g n u c l e a r weapons impotent and o b s o l e t e . " Some i n f e r from t h i s s t a t e m e n t t h a t t o b e s u c c e s s f u l , t h e SDI must d e t e n n i n e t h a t a 100 percent e f f e c t i v e defense against b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s i s possible. i b i l i t y o f a t t a i n i n g s u c h a g o a l i s argued on b o t h s i d e s . The f e a s - However, t h e r e a r e t h o s e who contend t h a t a p e r f e c t d e f e n s e i s n o t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e SDI. A/ They a r g u e t h a t n u c l e a r weapons c a n b e r e n d e r e d "impotent and o b s o l e t e " by d e f e n s e s t h a t s e v e r e l y r e d u c e t h e i r u t i l i t y ( i . e . , a rational a d v e r s a r y would not a d h e r e t o a n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y when o n l y a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e o f i t s f o r c e s would be a b l e t o p e n e t r a t e a d e f e n s e a g a i n s t them, e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e i t would b e i m p o s s i b l e t o know ahead o f t i m e which n u c l e a r weapons would a c t u a l l y reach t h e i r t a r g e t s ) . A r e l a t e d i s s u e , h e r e , i s how t h a t p o s i t i o n d i f f e r s from a s i m i l a r one h e l d d u r i n g t h e A n t i b a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e (ABM) d e b a t e o f t h e l a t e 1960s, when t h e p r e v a i l i n g p o s i t i o n was t h a t l e s s t h a n p e r f e c t d e f e n s e s would not enhance d e t e r r e n c e b u t , i n s t e a d , would c o m p l i c a t e s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y i s s u e s and promote a p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g arms r a c e . 3 1 U.S. P r e s i d e n t , 1981- (Reagan). The P r e s i d e n t ' s S t r a t e g i c Defense ~ n i t i y t i v e . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , J a n . 1985. 10 p . 41 See: C o n t r o v e r s y o v e r S t a r Wars, P r o : A View by C o l i n S. Gray. ~ h r i s F i a nS c i e n c e Monitor, Aug. 9 , 1985. p. 1 6 , 18. The T h i s r e p o r t i s meant t o s e r v e a s a p r i m e r on SDI. c o m p o s i t i o n , f u n d i n g , and m a j o r i s s u e s o f t h e SDI. It b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e s t h e Among t h e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d a r e t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , t h e r a t e and l e v e l o f f u n d i n g , s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y and m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y , arms c o n t r o l , NATO A l l i a n c e r e a c t i o n s and i n v o l v e m e n t , t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r t o t h e S o v i e t Union, and t h e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f s p a c e . i n f o r m a t i o n a p p e a r i n g i n t h e p a p e r i s from u n c l a s s i f i e d s o u r c e s . All THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE STRUCTURE I n a d d i t i o n t o beginning new programs, t h e SDI c o n s o l i d a t e d and expanded s e v e r a l r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s t h a t were being conducted s e p a r a t e l y and w i t h d i f f e r e n t emphases w i t h i n t h e v a r i o u s armed s e r v i c e s o r under t h e Defense Advanced Research P r o j e c t s Agency (DARPA). I n March of 1984, L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l James A. Abrahamson was named D i r e c t o r of t h e new SDI O r g a n i z a t i o n (SDIO) and g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r f o c u s s i n g and c o o r d i n a t i n g SDI program a c t i v i t i e s . He re- p o r t s d i r e c t l y t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense. A s envisaged by t h e SDIO, t h e r e s e a r c h program would c o s t on t h e o r d e r o f $26 b i l l i o n , o v e r a f i v e t o seven y e a r p e r i o d , l e a d i n g t o a d e c i s i o n i n t h e e a r l y 1990s on whether o r not t o proceed w i t h development. A s w e l l a s heightened vis- i b i l i t y , t h e program e n t a i l s c o n s i d e r a b l y more r e s e a r c h i n b o t h b r e a d t h and fund- 51 ing than the e a r l i e r , disaggregated e f f o r t . The SDI i s o r g a n i z e d i n t o f i v e r e s e a r c h program elements. The f u n d i n g l e v e l s f o r t h e s e e l e m e n t s p l u s SDIO h e a d q u a r t e r s management a r e a s f o l l o w s : 5 / One e s t i m a t e i s t h a t t h e Defense Department would have been a l l o c a t e d about-$12 b i l l i o n f o r r e s e a r c h and development on b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e f o r t h e same t i m e p e r i o d had t h e SDI n o t been formed. See: U.S. Congress. O f f i c e of Technology Assessment. B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense Technologies. Appendix F: BMD and t h e M i l i t a r y R&D Budget. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , S e p t . 1985. p. 292-293. And: U.S. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Budget O f f i c e . A n a l y s i s of t h e C o s t s of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e , 1985-1989. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . Off., May 1984. 19 p. CRS -6 FY 85 a/ Appropriation Surveillance, Acquisition, T r a c k i n g , and K i l l Assessment FY86 Request a / - 546 1,386 1,389 3,712 8 9 1,397 3,721 FY 86 Appropriation a/,b/ - FY87 Projected a/ D i r e c t e d Energy Weapons Technology K i n e t i c Energy Weapons Technology Systems C o n c e p t s / B a t t l e Management Survivability, Lethality and Kev T e c h n o l o g i e s T o t a l Research Management TOTAL Source: a/ -b/ - U.S. Dept. o f Defense. I n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s . A l l o c a t i o n o f t h e r e s e a r c h f u n d s was l e f t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e SDIO. --- - - - - - - A b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f e a c h program element f o l l o w s . 61 SURVEILLANCE, ACQUISITION, TRACKING, AND KILL ASSESSMENT (SATKA) The o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s program element i s t o i n v e s t i g a t e s e n s i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s t h a t can p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n t o a c t i v a t e t h e d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m , manage t h e b a t t l e , and a s s e s s t h e s t a t u s o f f o r c e s b e f o r e and d u r i n g a d e f e n s e engagement. Space, a i r , and ground-based technologies a r e being explored t o support t h e s e funct ions. 6/ F u l l d e t a i l s may b e found i n U.S. Dept. o f Defense. S t r a t e g i c Defense 1 n i t i a t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n . Report t o t h e Congress on t h e S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e , 1985. Washington, 1985. p. 23-74. CRS - 7 The most c h a l l e n g i n g t a s k f o r SATKA a p p e a r s t o b e d e v e l o p i n g t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o d i s c r i m i n a t e among enemy w a r h e a d s , d e c o y s , and c h a f f d u r i n g t h e m i d - c o u r s e and e a r l y t e r m i n a l phases o f t h e i r t r a j e c t o r i e s . The number o f o b j e c t s r e q u i r i n g a t l e a s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n c o u l d be i n t h e t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s d u r i n g a f u l l - s c a l e n u c l e a r attack. Without t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y w a r h e a d s , a n SDI-derived s y s t e m would, a t a minimum, need t o be more p o w e r f u l and e x t e n s i v e , which c o u l d b e p r o h i b i t i v e l y expensive. P a s s i v e , a c t i v e , and i n t e r a c t i v e t e c h n i q u e s a r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d f o r t a r g e t discrimination. Passive techniques involve detecting r a d i a t i o n ( e . g . , h e a t ) t h a t emanates from t h e t a r g e t . Active techniques ( e . g . , light or using lasers or r a d a r ) i n v o l v e a n a l y z i n g r e t u r n s i g n a l s from r a d i a t i o n s e n t t o t h e t a r g e t . And, i n t e r a c t i v e t e c h n i q u e s i n v o l v e d i r e c t i n g r a d i a t i o n o r m a t e r i a l a t t h e o f f e n s i v e t h r e a t t o s t r i p away e s s e n t i a l l y a l l b u t t h e s h i e l d e d , h e a v y w a r h e a d s . T h i s program e l e m e n t i s d e s i g n e d t o e x p l o r e t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r u s i n g l a s e r s and/or article beams f o r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e . D i r e c t e d e n e r g y weapons can d e l i v e r t h e i r d e s t r u c t i v e energy t o t a r g e t s a t o r near t h e speed of l i g h t , making them e s p e c i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e c a n d i d a t e s f o r u s e a g a i n s t m i s s i l e s a s t h e y r i s e through t h e atmosphere--the b o o s t and p o s t - b o o s t phases o f a s c e n t . S u c c e s s f u l engagement o f m i s s i l e s i n t h e s e i n i t i a l p h a s e s c o u l d a l l o w t h e d e f e n s e t o d e s t r o y m i s s i l e s b e f o r e t h e y r e l e a s e m u l t i p l e w a r h e a d s on t h e i r own independent t r a j e c t o r i e s . The c a p a b i l i t y f o r a c h i e v i n g s u c h a d e f e n s i v e a d v a n t a g e i s key t o t h e SDI c o n c e p t . Beam weapon c o n c e p t s now b e i n g s t u d i e d i n c l u d e s p a c e - b a s e d l a s e r s , ground- b a s e d l a s e r s u s i n g o r b i t i n g r e l a y m i r r o r s , s p a c e - b a s e d n e u t r a l p a r t i c l e beams, and endo-atmospheric ( w i t h i n atmosphere) charged p a r t i c l e beams g u i d e d by low-power lasers. I n a d d i t i o n t o r e s e a r c h on beam g e n e r a t i o n t e c h n o l o g i e s , advancements a r e a l s o s o u g h t i n beam c o n t r o l , o p t i c s , f i r e c o n t r o l , and a c q u i s i t i o n , p o i n t i n g , and t r a c k i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s . -7 / T h i s program element i n v o l v e s r e s e a r c h on some o f t h e most m a t u r e t e c h n o l o g i e s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n b y t h e SDIO. K i n e t i c e n e r g y weapons d e s t r o y t h e i r t a r g e t s b y impact r a t h e r t h a n by a n e x p l o s i o n . The g o a l o f t h i s program i s t o s t u d y ways t o a c c u r a t e l y d i r e c t r e l a t i v e l y l i g h t o b j e c t s a t v e r y h i g h v e l o c i t i e s t o i n t e r c e p t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s o r t h e i r warheads d u r i n g a n y phase of their trajectories. V a r i o u s means o f p r o p u l s i o n a r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d f o r achieving the v e l o c i t i e s required for t h i s task. Ground-launched k i n e t i c e n e r g y k i l l v e h i c l e s (KKVs) f o r endo- and exo- a t m o s p h e r i c i n t e r c e p t i o n o f n u c l e a r warheads a r e p e r h a p s t h e most advanced o f t h e KEW t e c h n o l o g i e s . space-based, (so-called Other KEW t e c h n o l o g i e s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n c l u d e chemically-launched "smart r o c k s " ) , p r o j e c t i l e s equipped with homing d e v i c e s - and space-based e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c r a i l g u n s . 8 / S t u d i e s performed under t h i s program element i n v e s t i g a t e o p t i o n s f o r d e f e n s i v e a r c h i t e c t u r e s t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o SDIO, a r e d e s i g n e d t o a l l o w f o r 7/ For f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n s e e U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l ~ e s e a r c hS e r v i c e . Weapons R e s e a r c h : S t a t u s and Outlook. Report no. 85-183 SPRY by Cosmo DiMaggio. 1985. 47 p . 8/ - U.S. Dept. o f Defense, Report t o C o n g r e s s , p. 24, 51-59. e v e n t u a l deployment o f a " h i g h l y r e s p o n s i v e , u l t r a r e l i a b l e , s u r v i v a b l e , endura b l e , and c o s t - e f f e c t i v e b a t t l e management/command, c o n t r o l , and communication ( ~ 3 )system.'' 9/ include: F a c t o r s t o c o n s i d e r i n d e s i g n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e system concepts mission objectives , analyses of offensive t h r e a t s , technical capabil- i t i e s , r i s k , and c o s t . An o p e r a t i o n a l s y s t e m w i l l r e q u i r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d a u t o m a t i o n a t a l e v e l beyond c u r r e n t computer c a p a b i l i t i e s t o : 1) i d e n t i f y and t r a c k a l l t a r g e t s from l a u n c h u n t i l t h e y a r e d e s t r o y e d ; 2 ) command and c o o r d i n a t e a l l e l e m e n t s o f t h e d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m ; and 3 ) a l l o w f o r human c o n t r o l b o t h p r i o r t o and d u r i n g i t s engagement. S i n c e t h e l a r g e r t h e s o f t w a r e program, t h e g r e a t e r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of d e b i l i t a t i n g e r r o r s , t h e degree of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n required f o r such a system i s a key i s s u e i n t h i s program. R e l a t i v e l y s m a l l , i n d e p e n d e n t s o f t w a r e programs f o r d i s t i n c t BMD components c o u l d l e a d t o a more f a u l t - t o l e r a n t o v e r a l l system. Examples o f computer h a r d w a r e and s o f t w a r e a d v a n c e s sought under SC/BM i n c l u d e v e r y h i g h speed p r o c e s s i n g , a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , computer w r i t t e n code, and s e l f t e s t and c o r r e c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s . A f a c i l i t y c a l l e d t h e N a t i o n a l T e s t Bed i s planned f o r s i m u l a t i n g and e v a l u - a t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e a r c h i t e c t u r e and b a t t l e management c o n c e p t s . Should t h e United S t a t e s d e c i d e t o d e v e l o p and d e p l o y a n SDI-derived d e f e n s e , t h e N a t i o n a l T e s t Bed c o u l d b e m o d i f i e d t o a l l o w f o r t e s t and e v a l u a t i o n o f a c t u a l s y s t e m components. T h i s program element p r o v i d e s s u p p o r t i n g r e s e a r c h and t e c h n o l o g y d e v e l o p ment t o improve system e f f e c t i v e n e s s and t o s a t i s f y s y s t e m l o g i s t i c a l r e q u i r e ments. 9/ - The s u r v i v a b i l i t y and l e t h a l i t y s t u d y e f f o r t s a r e d e s i g n e d t o y i e l d U.S. Dept. o f D e f e n s e , Report t o C o n g r e s s , p . 25. i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e x p e c t e d enemy t h r e a t a s w e l l a s about t h e a b i l i t y o f a n SDI-derived s y s t e m t o s u r v i v e e f f o r t s t o d e s t r o y o r d e f e a t i t . R e s u l t s o f t h e s e s t u d i e s d r i v e component and system r e q u i r e m e n t s . Work on s u p p o r t i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s i n c l u d e s , f o r example, r e s e a r c h i n s p a c e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s p a c e power, o n - o r b i t m a i n t e n a n c e , and e n e r g y s t o r a g e and conversion. SDI l o g i s t i c a l r e s e a r c h , e s p e c i a l l y t h a t c o n c e r n i n g t h e space-based a s s e t s o f a n e v e n t u a l s y s t e m , i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t f o r a s s e s s i n g and r e - - d u c i n g deployment and o p e r a t i o n s c o s t s . 101 101 - U.S. Dept. o f D e f e n s e , Report t o C o n g r e s s , p . 2 5 , 67-74. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS The f o l l o w i n g e f f o r t s a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e SDI i n t h a t t h e y would l i k e l y prov i d e i n f o r m a t i o n u s e f u l i n t h e development o f , o r become components o f , a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e defense system. They a r e c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e SDIO, b u t n o t i n c l u d e d i n SDI funding f i g u r e s . DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) WORK DOE c u r r e n t l y c o n d u c t s n u c l e a r weapons r e s e a r c h t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e SDI ($224.1 m i l l i o n was a p p r o p r i a t e d f o r t h i s i n FY85, and $307.1 m i l l i o n was r e q u e s t e d f o r FY86). x-ray The most p u b l i c i z e d e f f o r t underway i s t h e q u e s t f o r a n l a s e r powered by a low-yield n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n . weapon c o n c e p t (most n o t a b l y , Edward T e l l e r , one Proponents o f t h i s o f t h e o r i g i n a l h y d r o g e n bomb d e s i g n e r s ) b e l i e v e t h a t i t w i l l become a key element o f a b o o s t - p h a s e d e f e n s i v e layer. O t h e r s b e l i e v e t h a t i f t h e x-ray l a s e r p r o v e s t o b e w o r k a b l e , more l i k e l y i t w i l l b e a c a n d i d a t e f o r u s e i n mid-course d e f e n s e . The p r i m a r y f a c t o r i n t h i s d e b a t e i s t h e amount o f t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r l a u n c h i n g t h e x-ray b e f o r e i t c a n be aimed and f i r e d . laser into position I f t h e United S t a t e s c o n t i n u e s t o a b i d e b y e x i s t i n g t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s i n peacetime, t h e n i t could not be launched u n t i l j u s t p r i o r t o u s e i n a c t u a l b a t t l e b e c a u s e t h e O u t e r Space T r e a t y p r o h i b i t s s t a - - t i o n i n g nuclear explosives i n space. l l / I t r e m a i n s t o b e s e e n , however, * e t h e r t h e n u c l e a r pumped x-ray w i l l become w o r k a b l e . 111 T r e a t y on P r i n c i p l e s Governing t h e A c t i v i t i e s o f S t a t e s i n t h e E x p l o r a t i o n and Use o f Outer Space, I n c l u d i n g t h e Moon and Other C e l e s t i a l B o d i e s . Article IV. DOE i s a l s o c o n s i d e r i n g o t h e r n u c l e a r pumped ( o r f u e l e d ) weapon c o n c e p t s r e l a t e d t o t h e SDI but h a s n o t d i s c u s s e d t h e s e i n an u n c l a s s i f i e d f o r m a t . According t o t h e SDIO, t h e s e e f f o r t s a r e l a r g e l y d e s i g n e d t o m a i n t a i n a hedge a g a i n s t comparable S o v i e t development, r a t h e r t h a n f o r competing w i t h o t h e r near-term c o n c e p t s more c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h SDI. I n a d d i t i o n t o weapons development, WE i s a 1 so c o n d u c t i n g s u r v i v a b i l i t y s t u d i e s and t h r e a t a s s e s s m e n t s v i a n u c l e a r t e s t i n g and computer s i m u l a t i o n modeling. Such i n f o r m a t i o n i s used f o r d e f i n i n g c e r t a i n SDI t e c h n o l o g y research requirements. 121 - ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS (ASATs) The United S t a t e s h a s a n a c t i v e ASAT r e s e a r c h and t e c h n o l o g y development program focused on an a i r launched m i n i a t u r e homing v e h i c l e (MHV). c u r r e n t l y undergoing f l i g h t t e s t s launched from a n F-15. The MHV i s To d a t e , two t e s t s o f t h i s system have been conducted a g a i n s t a p o i n t i n s p a c e and o n e a g a i n s t a U.S. satellite. The t e s t r e s u l t s and t h e p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e program have been mixed. ASAT r e s e a r c h i s r e l a t e d t o b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e i n s e v e r a l ways. F i r s t , some o f t h e t e c h n o l o g i e s r e q u i r e d t o meet t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f b o t h a r e s i m ilar. For example, d i r e c t e d e n e r g y weapon c o n c e p t s b e i n g r e s e a r c h e d under t h e SDI may v e r y w e l l a t t a i n c a p a b i l i t y u s e f u l f o r ASATs i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . Second, ASAT weapons p r o b a b l y would p l a y a key r o l e i n enhancing t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y o f a n 121 For more i n f o r m a t i o n on SDI-related a c t i v i t i e s o f DOE, s e e U. S. ~ i b r a of F C o n g r e s s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e . The E f f e c t o f a Cornpreh e n s i v e T e s t Ban on t h e S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e . R e p o r t . n o . 85-972 SPR, Cosmo DiMaggio. Washington, 1985. 5 p . SDI-derived d e f e n s e s y s t e m . F i n a l l y , arms c o n t r o l i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o e a c h a r e 131 inextricably linked. - I n 1983, t h e United S t a t e s began a p r o j e c t , j o i n t l y managed by DOE, DARPA, and t h e N a t i o n a l A e r o n a u t i c s and Space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (NASA), t o d e v e l o p a comp a c t n u c l e a r power s y s t e m f o r u s e i n s p a c e c a l l e d t h e SP-100 program. Although d e s i g n e d f o r b o t h commercial and m i l i t a r y a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h e p r o j e c t h a s a t t a i n e d new s i g n i f i c a n c e b e c a u s e o f t h e h i g h e l e c t r i c power r e q u i r e m e n t s e n v i s i o n e d f o r some o f t h e space-based components o f a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e s y s t e m . SDIO h a s s i n c e t a k e n t h e p l a c e o f DARPA i n t h i s e f f o r t . and t e s t i n g o f a g r o u n d l b a s e d l i t h i u m - c o o l e d FY86 and r u n t h r o u g h about FY91 o r FY92. based p r o t o t y p e b y t h e mid-1990s. The The d e s i g n , f a b r i c a t i o n , r e a c t o r i s scheduled t o b e g i n i n The c u r r e n t p l a n c a l l s f o r a s p a c e - They FY86 a p p r o p r i a t i o n t o DOE f o r t h e SP-100 program i s $15 m i l l i o n . OTHERS DARPA and t h e Armed S e r v i c e s conduct some s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e r e s e a r c h t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y d o e s n o t f a l l under t h e SDI. Examples o f t h i s r e s e a r c h i n c l u d e some ongoing e f f o r t s i n t e r m i n a l d e f e n s e o f o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s , i n s t r a t e g i c a i r d e f e n s e , and i n ways t o c o u n t e r S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s . Concepts a r i s i n g 131 For more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h i s t o p i c , s e e U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress. c o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e . ASATs: A n t i s a t e l l i t e Weapon S y s t e m s . Issue B r i e f n o . IB85176, by A r t h u r F. M a n f r e d i , J r . , Cosmo DiMaggio, and M a r c i a Smith, Oct . 1, 1985 ( c o n t i n u a l l y u p d a t e d ) . Washington, 1985. 2 3 p . from these efforts would most likely be integrated with an SDI-derived system if a decision to proceed with such a system were reached. Also, the SDIO has established both formal and informal mechanisms with NASA to coordinate and exchange technical information on space science and space shuttle-related experiments. SDI ARCHITECTURE SDI, a s a b a s i c r e s e a r c h program, i s n o t supposed t o p r e - j u d g e s i v e concepts a r e o r a r e not t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e . wedded t o a p a r t i c u l a r s y s t e m d e s i g n . T h e r e f o r e , i t c a n n o t be However, i t s l a c k o f a n o v e r a l l c o n c e p t d e f i n i t i o n h a s f r u s t r a t e d p r o p o n e n t s and c r i t i c s a l i k e . t o a l l e v i a t e t h i s pr'oblem. what d e f e n - The SDIO i s working Ten a r c h i t e c t u r e s t u d y teams under c o n t r a c t t o SDIO h a v e completed t h e f i r s t phase o f s y s t e m d e s i g n s t u d i e s . SDIO h a s r e c e n t l y s e l e c t e d f i v e c o n t r a c t o r teams t o c o n t i n u e working i n t o t h e n e x t p h a s e o f s t u d y . These teams a r e headed by S p a r t a , TRW, S c i e n c e A p p l i c a t i o n s I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o r p . , Rockwell I n t e r n a t i o n a l , and M a r t i n - M a r i e t t a A e r o s p a c e . The SDIO r e c e n t l y d i s c u s s e d an u n c l a s s i f i e d v e r s i o n o f t h e p r e s e n t l y f a v o r e d a r c h i t e c t u r a l d e s i g n w i t h t h e New York Times. 14/ - The c u r r e n t c o n c e p t would c o n s i s t o f seven roughly independent l a y e r s of d e f e n s i v e i n t e r c e p t o r s . Ideally, each l a y e r would be d e s i g n e d t o p e r m i t no more t h a n about 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e o f f e n s i v e t a r g e t s t o pass through i t . T h i s c o n c e p t c a l l s f o r two l a y e r s o f weapons t o a t t a c k m i s s i l e s i n t h e i r b o o s t phase ( o n e o f d i r e c t e d e n e r g y weapons and one o f k i n e t i c e n e r g y weapons); t h r e e l a y e r s o f weapons t o a t t a c k warheads i n t h e mid-course phase ( o n e e a c h s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n t h e b o o s t p h a s e , p l u s o n e o f undetermined c h a r a c t e r such a s ground-based l a s e r s o r d e v i c e s t h a t f i r e masses of p e l l e t s o r a e r o s o l s ) ; and two l a y e r s o f ground-based rocket interceptors t o c o n t e n d w i t h any warheads g e t t i n g t h r o u g h t o t h e t e r m i n a l p h a s e . 141 New Mohr , Y GTimes, ~ C h a r l e s . A n t i m i s s i l e P l a n Seeks Thousands o f Space Weapons. Nov. 3 , 1985. p . 1 , 1 8 . Although t h e a r c h i t e c t u r e d e s c r i b e d above i s c u r r e n t l y f a v o r e d , t e c h n o l o g i c a l a n d / o r p o l i t i c a l developments may a l t e r t h e p r e f e r r e d scheme o v e r t i m e . With t h i s i n mind, SDIO i s c o n s i d e r i n g a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t s u s i n g d i f f e r i n g numbers and l o c a t i o n s o f t h e l a y e r s . F o r now, however, SDIO b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e s e v e n l a y e r c o n c e p t r e p r e s e n t s t h e b e s t s o l u t i o n f o r a c c o m p l i s h i n g SDI m i s s i o n objectives . CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS A key i s s u e f o r t h e SDI i s "how w i l l we know whether i t i s a s u c c e s s ? " The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s proposed two c r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i n g b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e t e c h n o l o g i e s and c o n c e p t s t h a t might b e d e r i v e d from t h e SDI. A s enumerated by S p e c i a l Advisor t o t h e P r e s i d e n t , P a u l H. N i t z e , t h e s e c r i t e r i a a r e t h a t a d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m must b e : t h e margin. 151 1 ) s u r v i v a b l e and 2) c o s t e f f e c t i v e a t Of c o u r s e , a n a d d i t i o n a l , i n h e r e n t c r i t e r i a i s t h a t t h e system be e f f e c t i v e i n performing i t s intended f u n c t i o n . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t e n d s t h a t a system t h a t m e e t s i t s two c r i t e r i a would, i f d e p l o y e d , promote s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y between t h e n u c l e a r s u p e r p o w e r s . 161 A b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n o f each c r i t e r i o n f o l l o w s . EFFECTIVENESS B e f o r e a d e c i s i o n t o proceed w i t h f u l l s c a l e e n g i n e e r i n g development and deployment c a n be made, t h e r e must e x i s t a h i g h d e g r e e o f c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e s y s t e m , once i n p l a c e , w i l l b e c a p a b l e o f d e s t r o y i n g oncoming enemy b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s or t h e i r re-entry vehicles. Given t h e u n a v o i d a b l e d e l a y between R&D and d e p l o y m e n t , e f f e c t i v e n e s s must b e judged v e r s u s a n a n t i c i p a t e d t h r e a t r a t h e r t h a n t h e one f a c e d a t d e c i s i o n t i m e . This c r i t e r i o n r a i s e s a t l e a s t 151 N i t z e , P a u l H. On t h e Road t o a More S t a b l e P e a c e . ~ e ~ a r t m e no ft S t a t e , Feb. 2 0 , 1985. . United S t a t e s 161 U.S. Dept o f S t a t e . The S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e . ~ e ~ o r t 129. ~ o . Washington, June 1985. 5 p . Special two as yet unanswered questions: 1) What total level of effectiveness is de- sired?; and 2) How is the actual system effectiveness to be measured or estimated ahead of time to yield the confidence necessary for making a development and deployment decision? SURVIVABILITY Strategic defenses must be able to survive a direct attack that might be launched just prior to or during a ballistic missile assault. tems are particularly vulnerable to such an attack. Space-based sys- Hence, SDIO is concentrat- ing its survivability efforts on projected space-based elements of a hypothetical defensive architecture. Typical survival techniques include shielding, distanc- ing the system from its potential attackers, maneuvering, proliferating, and shooting back. However, these and other techniques are not trivial to imple- ment. Survivability represents one of the major technical challenges of the SDI. In addressing this challenge, two critical questions must be resolved: 1) Can sensitive elements of a layered strategic defense (e.g., sensors, c3 hardware, and reflecting mirrors) be made survivable?; and 2) Can they be made survivable at a cost that does not encourage proliferation of attack weapons to beat the system? COST A goal of SDIO is to develop an effective strategic defense for the least cost. However, the Administration has stated a more stringent cost criterion for SDI, namely that "new defensive systems must be cost effective at the margin-that is, they must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to - overcome t h e d e f e n s e . " 171 This c r i t e r i o n r a i s e s several questions. Since a n e n t i r e system c a n n o t b e deployed i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y , i s t h i s c r i t e r i o n t o b e a p p l i e d f o r each phase o f deployment o r o n l y a f t e r a c o m p l e t e s y s t e m i s i n place? How, i f a t a l l , a r e n o n - q u a n t i f i a b l e s like the relative value t o society o f e i t h e r h a v i n g o r n o t h a v i n g a d e f e n s i v e system f a c t o r e d i n ? How w i l l a n ad- v e r s a r y ' s c o s t s b e d e t e r m i n e d and what f a c t o r s w i l l c o m p r i s e t h e i r c o s t s ? To what d e g r e e do we r e l y upon a n a d v e r s a r y ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f a r a t i o n a l economic p o s i t i o n ? Can we e x p e c t t h a t i f i n i t i a l l y s a t i s f i e d , t h i s c r i t e r i o n w i l l r e m a i n s a t i s f i e d over time? STABILITY Even i f t h e SDI shows t h a t a s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u l t i m a t e l y i s t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , g e n e r a l l y i t i s a g r e e d t h a t f o r some e x t e n d e d p e r i o d o f t i m e ( p e r h a p s d e c a d e s o r l o n g e r ) d e t e r r e n c e would n e c e s s a r i l y r e l y on a m i x o f o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e weapons. Managing t h e t r a n s i t i o n from o f fen- s i v e l y t o d e f e n s i v e l y dominated d e t e r r e n t s t r a t e g i e s , such t h a t , t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r a n s i t i o n n e i t h e r s i d e h a s o r i s perceived t o have an i n c e n t i v e t o s t r i k e t h e o t h e r , w i l l be d i f f i c u l t . most c o n t i n u o u s l y . Q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s t a b i l i t y must b e c o n s i d e r e d a l - A r m s n e g o t i a t i o n s and c o n t r o l w i l l l i k e l y h a v e t o p l a y v i t a l r o l e s i n maintaining s t a b i l i t y through t h i s t r a n s i t i o n . SDIO and o t h e r s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s t s a r e i n v e s t i g a t i n g how s t a b i l i t y c o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d u n d e r a v a r i e t y o f s c e n a r i o s , assuming c e r t a i n t e c h n i c a l b r e a k t h r o u g h s i n b o t h o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n sive technologies. B e f o r e p o l i c y m a k e r s c a n a s s e s s t h e impact o f SDI on p r e s e n t and f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y t h e y must u n d e r s t a n d and s c r u t i n i z e t h e a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t 171 - ~ i t z e ,Paul H. On t h e Road t o a More S t a b l e P e a c e . p. 2. d r i v e SDI s c e n a r i o s . For example, s c e n a r i o outcomes c a n v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y de- pending upon a s s u m p t i o n s o f U.S. and S o v i e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s and t h e i r l e v e l s o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s and s u r v i v a b i l i t y . A DECISION I N THE EARLY 1990s According t o t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e SDI r e s e a r c h program w i l l p r o v i d e t h e t e c h n i c a l knowledge i n t h e e a r l y 1990s n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t a d e c i s i o n on whether t o develop and deploy advanced d e f e n s i v e systems. ~ittle s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n i s c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e c o n c e r n i n g t h e t y p e s of o p t i o n s t h a t might be p r e s e n t e d t o Congress a t t h a t time. t h a t t h e r e w i l l be o n l y t h r e e o p t i o n s : A popular misconception i s 1) h a l t t h e SDI e f f o r t f o r t e c h n i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic, and/or o t h e r r e a s o n s ; 2 ) postpone a d e c i s i o n and do more r e s e a r c h ; o r , 3 ) move t o development and deployment of a system t h a t , once i n p l a c e , w i l l meet a l l U.S. s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e needs f o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . The f i r s t and second o p t i o n s a r e both p o s s i b l e non-deployment outcomes. However, t h e t h i r d option--"a once and f o r e v e r " deployment--is not l i k e l y t o be a r e a l i s t i c one f o r t h e 1990s ( i f e v e r ) . I n s t e a d , i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e would be a v a r i e t y of "pro-deployment" o p t i o n s f o r phasing i n d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s over time. These a l t e r n a t i v e s might be b a s e d , i n p a r t , on v a r y i n g assumptions concerning arms c o n t r o l . Each o p t i o n might be p r e s e n t e d w i t h e s t i m a t e s of c o s t s , r i s k s , and d e g r e e s of e f f e c t i v e n e s s , b o t h f o r d e t e r r i n g a n a g r e s s o r ' s a t t a c k and f o r d e f e n d i n g a g a i n s t an a t t a c k s h o u l d d e t e r r e n c e f a i l . An e s s e n t i a l element of each of t h e s e o p t i o n s probably would be a c o n t i n u e d , s t r o n g r e s e a r c h program f o r enhancing system e f f e c t i v e n e s s and f o r hedging a g a i n s t p o t e n t i a l enemy e f f o r t s t o c o u n t e r i t . A d e c i s i o n t o proceed w i t h one of t h e "pro-deployment" o p t i o n s would l i k e l y l e a d t o a d d i t i o n a l f u t u r e o p t i o n s based on more advanced t e c h n o l o g i e s . The SDIO r e f e r s t o t h i s e v o l u t i o n o f d e f e n s i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s and s t r a t e g i e s as t h e "path t o 'thoroughly r e l i a b l e ' defenses." However, SDI's c r i t i c s would a r g u e t h a t t h i s p a t h i s i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e and, t h e r e f o r e , should n o t b e t a k e n . POLICY ISSUES The SDI program h a s r a i s e d a h o s t o f i s s u e s , many o f which a r e r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h o s e r a i s e d i n t h e 1960s b e f o r e t h e 1972 A n t i - b a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e (ABM) T r e a t y . They i n c l u d e t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s , f u n d i n g , m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y , arms c o n t r o l i m p l i c a t i o n s , a l l i a n c e r e a c t i o n s , t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r , and t h e m i l i t a r i z a t ion of space. The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s a d d r e s s t h e s e i s s u e s . TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES The t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y o f d e f e n d i n g t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y and t h e NATO a l l i e s a g a i n s t a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a t t a c k i s a c e n t r a l i s s u e o f t h e SDI Program. S c i e n t i s t s have been v o c a l on b o t h s i d e s o f t h i s i s s u e . The f e a s i b i l i t y o f d e f e n d i n g m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s such a s Minuteman s i l o s i s somewhat l e s s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , w i t h most o b s e r v e r s b e l i e v i n g i t t o be a n e a s i e r t a s k . Beyond t h e i s s u e o f t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y per s e i s t h e p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e panoply o f r e a c t i v e countermeasures a v a i l a b l e t o p o t e n t i a l a d v e r s a r i e s . T h e r e seems l i t t l e d o u b t t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l b r e a k t h r o u g h s c a n b e a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t w i l l make s p e c i f i c e l e m e n t s o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e weapons s y s t e m s possible. But b r e a k t h r o u g h s a r e needed i n many a r e a s . The q u e s t i o n i s , c a n t h e r e q u i s i t e v a r i e t y o f weapons and s e n s o r s b e b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r i n t o a system--a s y s t e m t h a t i s r e l i a b l e , u n d e r human c o n t r o l , s u r v i v a b l e , and c o s t e f f e c t i v e . The s h e e r s c a l e o f t h e program a r g u e s t h a t a n answer t o t h a t q u e s t i o n now i s premature . S e v e r e a t t a c k s i t u a t i o n s would b e e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y s t r e s s f u l - m a n y m i s s i l e s (perhaps thousands), mostly with multiple independently-targeted reentry v e h i c l e s , launched from b o t h l a n d and s e a , c o u l d ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y ) b e launched a l m o s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and a r r i v e on U.S. t a r g e t s i n a t most t h i r t y m i n u t e s . One o f t h e g r e a t e s t t e c h n i c a l c h a l l e n g e s r e l a t e s t o t h e s o f t w a r e (computer c - e ) t h a t w i l l b e needed t o "manage" t h e system--the - f u n c t i o n . 181 The t a s k s i n c l u d e : s o - c a l l e d b a t t l e management d e t e c t i n g an a t t a c k , c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e type and s i z e o f t h e a t t a c k , t r a c k i n g t h e t a r g e t s , a s s i g n i n g weapons t o t h e t a r g e t s , a s s e s s i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f engagement, and ( p r e s u m a b l y ) r e a s s i g n i n g weapons t o r e place f a i l u r e s . Many c r i t i c s q u e s t i o n whether i t i s p o s s i b l e t o w r i t e and c h e c k t h e m i l l i o n s o f l i n e s o f computer code needed, t o b e s u r e i t i s e r r o r f r e e . This i s especially o f c o n c e r n , t h e y a r g u e , b e c a u s e i t w i l l be i m p o s s i b l e t o t e s t t h e c o d e r e a l i s t i c a l l y , and t o a n t i c i p a t e f u l l y a l l p o s s i b l e a t t a c k c o m b i n a t i o n s t o which t h e s y s tem might b e exposed. P r o p o n e n t s c o u n t e r t h a t , a s on o t h e r t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e program now i s j u s t a r e s e a r c h program t o d e t e r m i n e f e a s i b i l i t y and p o s s i b l e a p p r o a c h e s , s o f a i l u r e s h o u l d n o t b e assumed. On t h e q u e s t i o n o f computer c o d e s , f o r example, t e c h n i q u e s such a s d e c e n t r a l i z e d p a r a l l e l p r o c e s s i n g t o d e v e l o p f a u l t t o l e r a n t computer s y s t e m s a r e b e i n g i n v e s t i g a t e d . 191 - Another t e c h n i c a l c h a l l e n g e f o r SDI i s r e s p o n d i n g t o a h o s t o f p o t e n t i a l c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s a v a i l a b l e t o U.S. - a d v e r s a r i e s . 201 They r a n g e from p a s s i v e 1 8 1 S e e , f o r example: S n a g e r , David E. A Debate about ' S t a r Wars '--Can ~ o f t w z eBe Designed? New York Times, O c t . 23, 1 9 8 5 , p. D l , D7; P a r n a s , David Lorge. S o f t w a r e A s p e c t s o f S t r a t e g i c Defense Systems. American S c i e n t i s t , Sept - 0 c t . 1985, p . 432-440; and SDIO Computing O f f i c i a l Says S o f t w a r e f o r SDI Can Be Developed, Defense D a i l y , Dec. 5 , 1985, p . 169-170. . 191 For f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n , See U.S. L i b r a r y of Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l ~ e s e a z hS e r v i c e . Supercomputers and A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e : Recent F e d e r a l I n i t i a t i v e s . I s s u e B r i e f no. IB85105, by Nancy M i l l e r , Dec. 12, 1985 ( c o n t i n u a l l y u p d a t e d ) . Washington, 1985. 11 p . 20/ C a r a v e l l i , Jack. S o v i e t Countermeasures t o SDI. p. 45-47, 6 2 . & ~ i ~ K m a Mar. c ~ , 1985. J o u r n a l o f Defense countermeasures t h a t degrade t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f a s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e system, t o a c t i v e countermeasures t h a t a t t a c k t h e system. Representative ones a r e l i s t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e , a l o n g w i t h p o t e n t i a l c o u n t e r s t o them ( i . e . , c o u n t e r - c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ) and comments. POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES TO STRATEGIC DEFENSES Category Active Passive Potential Countermeasures Defense S u p p r e s s i o n Attack space sensors A t t a c k space c o m u n i c a t ions A t t a c k s p a c e weapons A t t a c k ground s i t e s P r o l i f e r a t ion Add ICBMs & SLBMs P o t e n t i a l CounterCountermeasures Hardening, redundancy, decoys It II S e c u r i t y , redundancy, hardening "attack" includes b l i n d i n g and j a ming S o v i e t s have deployed mobile ICBMs Evasion Decoy b o o s t e r s Penetration aids (penaids), e . g . , RV decoys Maneuvering RVs (MARVs) Soviets already h a v e some ASAT capability; Robust d e t e c t i o n and t r a c k i n g system Mobile ICBMs Fast-burn b o o s t e r s , booster coatings, rotating boosters Comments F a s t r e a c t i o n s y s t e m , more powerful weapons, o r s h i f t burden t o l a t e r tiers Good d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y A l l are costly to the offense (e.g., added weight o r p e r formance p e n a l t y ) II Capable i n t e r c e p t o r s Avoidance S h i f t t o " a i r b r e a t h e r s ,I1 i . e . , bombers and c r u i s e missiles Enhanced a i r d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i ties SDIC! s t u d y i n g t h i s problem; d e l i v e r y time f o r a i r b r e a t h e r s i s much longer than f o r ballistic missiles Emulation Develop a n a l o g o u s s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e system A l l t h e o t h e r countermeasures i n t h e p r e v i o u s column. Presumably a des i r e d outcome, i f o f f e n s i v e arms a r e reduced Given t h e many p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s , t h e SDIO h a s adopted a s one o f i t s c r i t e r i a f o r success t h e concept of "cost e f f e c t i v e a t t h e margin." The g o a l i s t o d e v e l o p a s y s t e m t o which i t would b e c h e a p e r f o r t h e United S t a t e s t u add d e f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y t h a n i t would f o r t h e p o t e n t i a l a d v e r s a r y t o add t o i t s c a p a b i l i t y v i a countermeasures. The d e f e n s i v e system m u s t , a s w e l l , be a b l e t o add c a p a b i l i t y f a s t e r t h a n t h e o f f e n s e , o r e l s e i t c o u l d become tempor a r i l y negated. As t h e above t a b l e s u g g e s t s , t h e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e system must b e v e r y r o b u s t i n o r d e r t o accommodate t h e v a r i e t y o f p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r measures. As w i t h many o f t h e S D I 1 s t e c h n i c a l c h a l l e n g e ~ , i t i s n o t y e t known whether t h i s w i l l b e p o s s i b l e . To enhance r e s e a r c h management, t h e SDIO i s u s i n g s o - c a l l e d "Red Teams'' o f e n g i n e e r s and s t r a t e g i s t s t o h y p o t h e s i z e potent i a l countermeasures. A l l r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s must be c r i t i q u e d by t h e Red Teams and d e m o n s t r a t e an a b i l i t y t o accomodate t h e c o u n t e r s t h e y advance. The r e s u l t s which w i l l d e r i v e from t h e SDI r e s e a r c h program a r e s t i l l uncertain. Yet s u p p o r t e r s and c r i t i c s have j o i n e d i n arguments t h a t a c a p a b l e BMD system i s p o s s i b l e o r i m p o s s i b l e . In t h e c u r r e n t c o n t e x t , i t i s worth noting t h a t h i s t o r y i s r e p l e t e with learned people e r r o n e o u s l y p r e d i c t i n g t h e possib i l i t y o r t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f some s c i e n t i f i c o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l b r e a k t h r o u g h by making p r e m a t u r e judgments. D i s c u s s i o n s o f fundamental f e a s i b i l i t y must o f n e c e s s i t y h i n g e on t h e p r e c i s e m i s s i o n o f whatever system c o n c e p t i s under cons i d e r a t i o n ( t h i s c a n r a n g e from a system t o d e f e n d a few m i s s i l e s i l o s t o a s y s tem t o defend t h e e n t i r e F r e e World). a b i l i t y i s already possible. Some l e v e l o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e cap- What i s n o t y e t c l e a r i s whether t h e SDI w i l l l e a d t o an enhanced s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e t h a t w i l l b e s u f f i c i e n t t o r e n d e r " n u c l e a r weapons impotent and o b s o l e t e , " o r even whether i t w i l l b e s u r v i v a b l e , c o s t e f f e c t i v e , and b e n e f i c i a l . RATE OF FUNDING A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , Members o f C o n g r e s s , and t h e ~ u b l i ca t l a r g e c u r r e n t l y d i f f e r i n t h e i r v i e w s on t h e need and o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e SDI. The r a n g e o f o p i n i o n e x t e n d s from a minimal program w i t h a d h e r e n c e t o t h e ABM T r e a t y w h i l e c o n d u c t i n g b a s i c l a b o r a t o r y r e s e a r c h a s a hedge a g a i n s t S o v i e t b r e a k o u t , t o a n a c c e l e r a t e d program aimed a t development and deployment o f a d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e time ( t h e so-called limited approach). technology--rather T h e r e a r e myriad a l t e r n a t i v e s i n between. than t h e resourceTo d a t e , t h e i s s u e o f how t h e r a t e o f f u n d i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e s t o SDI o b j e c t i v e s h a s n o t b e e n well defined. As n o t e d e a r l i e r , c u r r e n t SDIO e s t i m a t e s a r e t h a t t h e r e s e a r c h program w i l l c o s t about $ 2 6 b i l l i o n up t o t h e f i r s t deployment d e c i s i o n p o i n t i n t h e e a r l y 1990s. Lower f u n d i n g l e v e l s c o u l d d e l a y t h a t d e c i s i o n p o i n t . Cost e s t i m a t e s f o r a d e p l o y e d s y s t e m a r e h i g h l y s p e c u l a t i v e and depend on c r i t i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s on t h e t y p e o f s y s t e m b e i n g c o s t e d . Some r a n g e from s e v e r a l - hundred b i l l i o n t o o v e r 1$ t r i l l i o n . 21/ Even t h o s e opposed t o t h e SDI g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t some form and l e v e l o f r e s e a r c h i n s t r a t e g i c defense i s warranted. A c c o r d i n g l y , even w i t h o u t t h e SDI program, t h e f u n d i n g l e v e l i n t h i s a r e a would n o t go t o z e r o . Such a m i n i - mal f u n d i n g s c e n a r i o would e s s e n t i a l l y r e v e r t t o t h e s i t u a t i o n p r i o r t o P r e s i d e n t Reagan's s p e e c h i n March o f 1983. It c a n b e a r g u e d t h a t f o r s t a b i l i t y t o be m a i n t a i n e d , t h i s s c e n a r i o r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o monitor Soviet s t r a t e g i c defense e f f o r t s t o ensure a g a i n s t t h e i r negating the deterrent value of our offensive s t r a t e g i c forces. It presumably a l s o S e e , f o r example: Adam, John A. and J o h n Horgan. ~ e b a t i n gt h e IEEE Spectrum, S e p t . 1985, p. 56 and S c h l e s i n g e r , James R. Rhetoric and R e a l i t i e s i n t h e S t a r War Debate. I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , Summer 1985. p . 4. 21/ issuer assumes t h a t , f o r long-term s t a b i l i t y , t h e United S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t Union must a g r e e t o m e a n i n g f u l arms r e d u c t i o n s , o r t h e United S t a t e s must f i n d o t h e r ways t o r e s o l v e t h e problem o f ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y . The s h o r t - t e r m f u n d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h i s "monitoring" s c e n a r i o a p p e a r t o b e f a r l e s s t h a n t h o s e proposed by t h e SDIO i n p u r s u i t o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e . And, i t c a n be argued t h a t i f a u s e f u l BMD s h o u l d prove t e c h n i c a l l y u n a c h i e v a b l e , c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p e n d i t u r e s w i l l have been s a v e d . However, i t would be wrong t o assume t h a t b e c a u s e t h e r i s k s i n t a k i n g t h i s a p p r o a c h a r e n o t r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t , t h a t t h e y , i n f a c t , a r e s m a l l e r t h a n t h o s e o f t h e pro-SDI o p t i o n s . A l l options i n c l u d e t h e r i s k o f n u c l e a r weapons u s e f o r many y e a r s . Those i n f a v o r o f SDI do n o t a l l have t h e same c o n c e p t o f what SDI c o u l d o r should accomplish. Furthermore, proponents v a r y i n t h e i r assessments a s t o how much f u n d i n g i s r e q u i r e d and a t what r a t e t o meet t h e i r own o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e program. I n a world o f c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s and c o u n t e r - c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s , might b e t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r i n a c h i e v i n g t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y . time The r e l a t i o n - s h i p between SDI g o a l s and f u n d i n g c a n b e s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s . I f t h e g o a l o f t h e SDI i s t o r a p i d l y proceed w i t h r e s e a r c h t o a c h i e v e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o d e v e l o p and d e p l o y , u n i l a t e r a l l y o r o t h e r w i s e , a s y s t e m t h a t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y ahead o f o f f e n s i v e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s such t h a t i t p r o v i d e s a n e f f e c t i v e defense a g a i n s t t h e o f f e n s i v e t h r e a t t h a t i s i n place a t t h e time o f deployment, t h e n SDI p r o b a b l y must b e funded a t a h i g h r a t e , even p r i o r t o a s s e s s i n g t h e program's s u c c e s s . T h i s s c e n a r i o p l a c e s t h e g r e a t e s t b u r d e n on t e c h n o l o g i c a l development, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e a b s e n c e o f arms a g r e e m e n t s o r o t h e r s o l u t i o n s l i m i t i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e t h r e a t over time. However, i t s a p p e a l d e r i v e s p r i m a r i l y from t h e p o s s i b i l i t y i t h o l d s f o r t h e United S t a t e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y t o l e a d t h e superpowers t o a more s t r a t e g i c a l l y s t a b l e p o s i t i o n . c o u l d r e q u i r e a n o n g o i n g , f a s t p a c e d , highly-funded This scenario program f o r c o n t i n u a l l y e n h a n c i n g system e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n t h e f a c e o f presumed r i g o r o u s s o v i e t e f f o r t s t o counter defenses. I f , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e s t r a t e g i c need f o r some SDI-derived b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e defense e x i s t s , but i s not i m i n e n t ( i . e . , i f strategic s t a b i l i t y is n o t g r e a t l y t h r e a t e n e d i n t h e n e a r t e r m w i t h o u t s u c h a s y s t e m ) , and n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t s c a n be r e a l i z e d t h a t r e s u l t i n o f f e n s i v e f o r c e r e d u c t i o n s and v e r i f i a b l e agreements on development and deployment o f d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s , t h e n t h e p o s s i b l i t ~e x i s t s f o r s l o w i n g t h e r a t e o f f u n d i n g from a n a l l o u t t e c h n o l ogy-limited pace. However, g i v e n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t new s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s w i l l e v e n t u a l l y b e needed f o r s t a b i l i t y , i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r a t e o f f u n d i n g s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t o r s above and s h o u l d n o t b e slowed by r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s a l o n e . I f i t w e r e , t h e United S t a t e s would r u n t h e r i s k o f f a l l i n g b e h i n d t h e S o v i e t s b o t h o f f e n s i v e l y and d e f e n s i v e l y , s e r i o u s l y l i m i t i n g t h e a b i l i t y o f SDI e v e r t o d e v e l o p a s y s t e m t h a t would b e e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t a n e v e r c h a n g i n g s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t . Both o f t h e s e pro-SDI s c e n a r i o s seem t o d i c t a t e t h e need f o r l a r g e n e a r - term f u n d i n g t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . I f t h e assumptions behind t h e s e s c e n a r i o s a r e c o r r e c t , t h e n a d e c i s i o n t o p u r s u e e i t h e r o p t i o n w i t h o u t approp r i a t e f u n d i n g would l i k e l y doom them t o f a i l u r e . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e i s s u e of what c o n s t i t u t e s a p p r o p r i a t e f u n d i n g f o r e i t h e r c a s e r e m a i n s u n r e s o l v e d . STRATEGIC POLICY/MILITARY UTILITY The s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y and m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s o f SDI a r e a s y e t a r g u a b l e b e c a u s e t h e y depend on f o u r s p e c u l a t i v e i s s u e s : 1 ) t h e t y p e o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e system t h a t w i l l b e d e p l o y e d , i t s p r i m a r y m i s s i o n , and i t s effectiveness; 2) t h e e v o l u t i o n and c o m p o s i t i o n o f S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e and defensive forces; 3 ) arms c o n t r o l c o n s t r a i n t s i n p l a c e a t t h a t t i m e ; and 4 ) t h e impact o f b o t h U.S. and S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s on U.S. s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s and s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . P r e s i d e n t Reagan b e l i e v e s t h a t we c a n d.evelop s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e t e c h n o l o g i e s t h a t can d e s t r o y b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s i n f l i g h t , t h u s e i i m i n a t i n g t h e m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y o f n u c l e a r weapons and ending U.S. d e t e r r e n c e by t h r e a t 0 5 r e t a l i a t i o n . r e l i a n c e on t h e s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e o f These d e f e n s e s , t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n argues, w i l l lead t o s i g n i f i c a n t reductions i n s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s by rendering n u c l e a r weapons "impotent and o b s o l e t e compete i n 2 ." The superpowers would no l o n g e r n u c l e a r arms r a c e and n e i t h e r s i d e would have a n i n c e n t i v e t o - a t t a c k the other i n a c r i s i s . 221 O t h e r s , however, be1 i e v e t h a t t h e United S t a t e s c a n d e v e l o p , a t b e s t , a p a r t i a l v e r s i o n o f t h e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s y s t e m e n v i s i o n e d by P r e s i d e n t Reagan. Limited d e f e n s e s y s t e m s c o u l d defend a g a i n s t a c c i d e n t a l o r s m a l l S o v i e t a t t a c k s o r a t t a c k s from o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , and p r o t e c t m i s s i l e s i l o s o r c r i t i c a l m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s , they argue. These d e f e n s e s would s t r e n g t h e n d e t e r r e n c e and s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ( t h r o u g h t h r e a t o f r e t a l i a t i o n ) by e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e United S t a t e s would r e t a i n a s t r o n g p o s t - a t t a c k force r e t a l i a t o r y nuclear .23/ Some a r g u e though t h a t s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s a r e i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e d e f e n s e s c a n n o t be made p e r f e c t end t h a t t h e d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s o f n u c l e a r weapons c a n n o t b e changed. T h e r e f o r e , i m p e r f e c t d e f e n s e s t h a t would a l l o w even a few n u c l e a r weapons t o p e n e t r a t e would c a u s e widespread d e s t r u c t i o n . This ensures t h a t r e l i a n c e on o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r weapons t o d e t e r S o v i e t a t t a c k on t h e United S t a t e s w i l l continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . 22/ - U.S. President, S t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s a l s o c o u l d b e used t o The P r e s i d e n t ' s S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e , 10 p . 23/ S l o s s , Leon. The R e t u r n o f S t r a t e g i c Defense. v . 1 2 T ~ u m m e r1984. p . 37-44. S t r a t e g i c Review, p r o t e c t m i s s i l e s i n ways t h a t would p r o v e d e s t a b i l i z i n g , a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s v i e w . Limited d e f e n s e s c o u l d b e u s e d , f o r example, t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t a n y s u r v i v i n g m i s s i l e s t h a t might be launched by a n opponent a f t e r t h e o t h e r s i d e had a t t a c k e d first. 24/ T h i s would c r e a t e s t r o n g t e m p t a t i o n s i n a c r i s i s t o a t t a c k f i r s t . - A l l a g r e e , however, t h a t t h e p o t e n t i a l r i s k s o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s t o c r i s i s s t a b i l i t y ( t h e d e g r e e t o which d e t e r r e n c e i s r e s i s t a n t t o f a i l u r e i n a m a j o r c r i s i s ) a r e high. T h e r e f o r e , i f i t i s d e c i d e d t o d e p l o y any l e v e l o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s , most a g r e e t h a t c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s coupled w i t h w e l l - d e f i n e d f u r t h e r U.S. arms c o n t r o l c o n s t r a i n t s w i l l b e r e q u i r e d t o strategic policy goals. ARMS CONTROL The U.S. d e b a t e o v e r arms c o n t r 01 and SDI d i v i d e s i n t o n e a r - and l o n g - t issues. Near-term i s s u e s f o c u s on p e r m i s s i b l e a c t i v i t i e s and a r e t i e d p r i m a r i l y t o t h e ABM T r e a t y , w i t h which t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a y s t h e SDI w i l l comply. The ABM T r e a t y d o e s n o t r e s t r i c t r e s e a r c h , a l t h o u g h v i e w s d i f f e r on what c o n s t i t u t e s r e s e a r c h and whether some planned SDI a c t i v i t i e s a r e i n c l u d e d . does p r o h i b i t developing, t e s t i n g , o r deploying air-based, and m o b i l e land-based f i x e d , land-based sea-based The T r e a t y , space-based ABM s y s t e m s and components; and i t l i m i t s deployment o f s y s t e m s o r components. Near-term i s s u e s c a n b e summarized a s follows: o The c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r c e r t a i n T r e a t y d e f i n i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g what c o n s t i t u t e s an ABM "component", " t e s t i n g " i n an ABM mode, "devA t issue is elopment", and even " s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s t h e p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s e t e r m s and w h e t h e r c e r t a i n SDI a c t i v i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y " t e c h n o l o g y d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ' ' and f u t u r e ." 24/ Bundy, McGeorge, George F. Kennan, R o b e r t S. McNamara, and Gerard C . s m i t h . The P r e s i d e n t ' s Choice: ' S t a r Wars' o r Arms C o n t r o l . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v . 63, Winter 1984/85. p. 264-278. , t e s t s , a r e l i k e l y t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e T r e a t y by t h o s e who h o l d t o d i f f e r e n t views o f t h e s e t e r m s . o I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f "new p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s " ( e . g . , l a s e r s , p a r t i c l e beams, microwaves) a s d i s c u s s e d i n Agreed Statement D o f t h e T r e a t y . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a r g u e s t h a t a broad v i e w o f t h e T r e a t y i s j u s t i f i e d , which a l l o w s d e v e l o p i n g and t e s t i n g o f a l l s y s t e m s o r components based on f u t u r e t e c h n o l o g i e s , r a t h e r t h a n j u s t land-based s y s t e m s . O t h e r s , who n e g o t i a t e d t h e T r e a t y ( e . g . , Ambassador Gerard S m i t h ) , a r g u e t h a t such a v i e w i s wrong and t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l , r e s t r i c t i v e v i e w p r o h i b i t i n g t e s t i n g o f such technologies--which t h e United S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t Union have been f o l l o w i n g - - i s c o r r e c t . 2 5 1 The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s announced i t would a d h e r e t o t h e r e s t r i ~ t i v r i n t e r ~ r e t a t i o fno r now. 261 o The s o - c a l l e d non-circumvention p r o v i s i o n t h a t p r o h i b i t s deployment o r t r a n s f e r o f ABM components o r t e c h n o l o g y t o t h i r d parties. T h i s i s r e l e v a n t t o p o t e n t i a l a l l i e d involvement i n SDI and r e l a t e d r e s e a r c h , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e development o f t h e a t e r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e s with t h e A l l i e s . o The d u a l - u s e p o t e n t i a l o f c e r t a i n t e c h n o l o g i e s . These a r e t e c h n o l o g i e s t h a t h a v e ABM a p p l i c a t i o n s , b u t a r e employed i n s y s t e m s ( e . g . , p h a s e d - a r r a y r a d a r s , advanced a i r d e f e n s e s , a n t i - t a c t i c a l m i s s i l e s , and a n t i - s a t e l l i t e weapons) o u t s i d e t h e purview o f t h e ABM T r e a t y . The d e b a t e a l s o c o n s i d e r s t h e longer-term r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e and arms c o n t r o l . Some s u g g e s t t h a t s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s can l e a d t o d e e p arms r e d u c t i o n s and a more s t a b l e s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p among t h e n u c l e a r powers. The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t a k e s t h i s p o s i t i o n and o u t l i n e s a t h r e e - p h a s e t i o n t o a d e f e n s e dominated s t r a t e g y : near-term transi- SDI r e s e a r c h , l a t e r r e d u c t i o n s o f o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s , and f i n a l l y deployment o f e f f e c t i v e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s t h a t would r e n d e r n u c l e a r weapons "impotent and o b s o l e t e . ' I - 2 5 1 I n t e r v i e w w i t h Ambassador Gerard C . Smith. Nov. 10, 1985. 271 An o p p o s i n g Meet t h e P r e s s . 2 6 1 See: S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e George S h u l t z s p e e c h b e f o r e t h e North A t l a n t i c ~ s s e m San ~ ~ F, r a n c i s c o , C a l i f i o r n i a , Oct 14, 1985. E x c e r p t s r e p r i n t e d i n New York Times, O c t . 15, 1985. p . A6. . 2 7 1 See U.S. L i b r a r y o f C o n r e s s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e . S t r a t e g i c Concept. Report no. 85-134 F , by Robert J a c k s o n , Apr. 1 8 , The NZ 1985. 17 p. A l s o : N i t z e , P a u l , On t h e Road t o a More S t a b l e P e a c e . v i e w i s t h a t s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s and arms c o n t r o l a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e b e c a u s e , t h e y a r g u e , s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s w i l l l e a d t o a n o f f e n s e - d e f e n s e arms r a c e t h a t - arms c o n t r o l w i l l be u n a b l e t o c o n t a i n . 281 A t h i r d view a c c e p t s t h a t , although p e r f e c t d e f e n s e s a r e n o t l i k e l y , l i m i t e d d e f e n s e s under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a n enhance arms c o n t r o l s t a b i l i t y - - t h e d e g r e e t o which o p p o s i n g f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s a r e i n a b a l a n c e t h a t i s r e l a t i v e l y i m p e r v i o u s t o sudden a l t e r a t i o n from new arms deployments o r weapons t e c h n o l o g y innovation--by - r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e . 29/ ensuring a survivable Those who adopt t h e f i r s t two a p p r o a c h e s , c r i t i c i z e t h e t h i r d approach a s dangerous i n i t s p o t e n t i a l t o i n c r e a s e t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f n u c l e a r war b e c a u s e i t c o u l d c r e a t e , t h r o u g h m i x i n g d e f e n s i v e and o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s , s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e s t o u s e n u c l e a r weapons f i r s t i n a c r i s i s o r r i s k l o s i n g them. ALLIANCE REACTIONS The A l l i e d r e s p o n s e t o SDI h a s e v o l v e d o v e r t i m e from o p p o s i t i o n , which was i n i t i a l l y widespread and n o n - s p e c i f i c , t o one o f g e n e r a l ambivalence. On one h a n d , t h e r e i s s u p p o r t f o r SDI r e s e a r c h p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e t h e S o v i e t s a r e c o n d u c t i n g a v i g o r o u s s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e r e s e a r c h program o f t h e i r own. B u t , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e a r e s e r i o u s r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e United S t a t e s g o i n g beyond a r e s e a r c h program. sources: t ions. The c h a r a c t e r o f a l l i e d r e s e r v a t i o n s s t e m s from t h r e e main t h e a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p , European s e c u r i t y , and U.S.-Soviet rela- The A l l i e s have a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e d c o n c e r n o v e r t h e f u t u r e c a p e t i t i v e n e s s o f t h e i r "high-tech" i n d u s t r i e s and h a v e r e s p o n d e d w i t h two i n i t i a t i v e s o f t h e i r 28/ Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and S m i t h , The P r e s i d e n t ' s C h o i c e : W a r s ' o r Arms C o n t r o l , p. 264-278. 'Star 29/ Gray, C o l i n , S. D e t e r r e n c e , Arms C o n t r o l , and t h e D e f e n s e T r a n s i t i o n . 0 r b i s T v . 28, Summer 1984. p. 227-240. own: EUREKA (European Research C o o p e r a t i o n Agency) and E D 1 ( ~ u r o p e a nDefense Initiative). (1) These i s s u e s a r e a d d r e s s e d below. The o v e r a l l A l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . The A l l i e s d e s i r e e q u a l p a r t n e r - s h i p and e a r l y c o n s u l t a t i o n on m a j o r d e c i s i o n s t h a t a f f e c t t h e A l l i a n c e , s u c h a s SDI (which t h e y d i d n o t g e t ) . They a r e a l s o concerned t h a t l a c k o f m u t u a l l y - a g r e e d upon s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e o b j e c t i v e s f o r SDI ( ~ r i m a r i l ywhether o r how Europe would be d e f e n d e d ) p r o v i d e s t h e S o v i e t s w i t h propaganda o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o weaken t h e A l l i a n c e by e x p l o i t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s i n U.S.-European views over s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s and arms c o n t r o l . (2) European s e c u r i t y . The Europeans a r e concerned t h a t SDI i n t h e n e a r t e r m w i l l d i v e r t a t t e n t i o n from c o n v e n t i o n a l d e f e n s e needs ( i . e , m a t e r i e l t o support a conventional war). They a l s o f e a r t h a t SDI r e j e c t s t h e s t r a t e g y o f d e t e r r e n c e by t h r e a t o f a s s u r e d r e t a l i a t i o n , which forms t h e b a s i s o f European s e c u r i t y , because Soviet s t r a t e g i c defenses e v e n t u a l l y w i l l degrade t h e d e t e r r e n t r o l e o f B r i t i s h and French n u c l e a r f o r c e s and U.S. w i l l d e c o u p l e t h e United S t a t e s from European s e c u r i t y . s t r a t e g i c defenses Should t h i s o c c u r , i t i s a r g u e d , Europe becomes s a f e f o r superpower convent i o n a l war. ( 3 ) U.S.-Soviet relations. Many Europeans f e a r t h a t t h r o u g h SDI t h e United S t a t e s s e e k s s t r a t e g i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S o v i e t s , and t h a t e x i s t i n g arms r a c e c o n s t r a i n t s ( e . g . , m e n t s ) w i l l b e abandoned. t h e ABM T r e a t y and SALT a g r e e - Should t h i s happen, superpower r e l a t i o n s would become d e s t a b i l i z e d and Europe would b e caught i n a dilemma between t r y i n g t o m a i n t a i n A l l i a n c e commitments w i t h t h e United S t a t e s and t h e d e s i r e f o r s t a b l e r e l a t i o n s - w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union. 301 301 See U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e . The SDI a z U.S. A l l i a n c e S t r a t e g y , Report no. 85-48 F , Paul E . G a l l i s , Mark M. Lowenthal, and Marcia S. Smith, Feb. 1, 1985. Washington, 1985. 75 p . Even s o , t h e United S t a t e s h a s encouraged an a c t i v e A l l i e d r o l e i n SDIDefense S e c r e t a r y Weinberger s o l i c i t e d t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i t i n March 1985 when he s e n t a l e t t e r of i n v i t a t i o n t o U.S. A l l i e s . The A l l i e d r e s p o n s e h a s n o t been e n t h u s i a s t i c , except f o r some i n i n d u s t r y , who a r e e a g e r t o j o i n i n a l a r g e "high-tech" r e s e a r c h program. A l l i e d governments appear r e s o l v e d t h a t SDI i s g o i n g ahead, and have sought t o p r e s e r v e t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s and i n d u s t r i a l p o t e n t i a l i n s e v e r a l ways. One such way i s i n t h e i r formal r e s p o n s e t o t h e U.S. invitation. S e v e r a l governments ( F r a n c e , Canada, Denmark, N e t h e r l a n d s , and Norway) have s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i z e d t h e SDI and r e f u s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e , but have i n d i c a t e d t h a t p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y c o u l d do s o on i t s own. Other governments (Greece and A u s t r a l i a ) t h a t have r e f u s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e and a r e opposed t o SDI have not t a k e n a p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n . t h e r e a r e some government-to-government i p a t i o n i n SDI r e s e a r c h . Finally, discussions regarding i n d u s t r i a l partic- One agreement was r e c e n t l y s i g n e d w i t h B r i t a i n ; w h i l e t a l k s w i t h Germany and I t a l y c o n t i n u e . The J a p a n e s e a r e w i t h h o l d i n g a r e s p o n s e u n t i l a German d e c i s i o n i s made and f u r t h e r t a l k s a r e h e l d w i t h t h e United S t a t e s . The major o b s t a c l e s t o such agreements r e v o l v e around technology t r a n s f e r r e s t r i c t i o n s , r e s e a r c h r i g h t s , and f u n d i n g l e v e l s . Europe a l s o has responded t o t h e c h a l l e n g e s o f SDI t h r o u g h a French-led p r o p o s a l known a s EUREKA, which i s t o s t i m u l a t e c o o p e r a t i o n i n "high-tech" r e s e a r c h f o r c i v i l i a n commercial u s e s . EUREKA'S purpose i s t o h e l p c l o s e t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l gap w i t h t h e United S t a t e s and J a p a n by promoting t h e c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s of European "high-tech" goods i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e , and by s u p p o r t i n g t h e growth of European t e c h n o l o g i c a l e x p e r t i s e i n t h e f a c e o f c h a l l e n g e s from SDI and o t h e r U.S. "high-tech" r e s e a r c h programs. EUREKA w i l l emphasize European c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n developing supercomputers, a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e and robotics, lasers and particle beams, opto-electronics, new materials, and high-speed microelectronics. Although EUREKA currently lacks a coordinated structure and major funding, several pilot projects have been approved. EUREKA is officially endorsed throughout Europe. A third major response to SDI is a military program--the European Defense Initiative (EDI), Those countries most committed to this idea are France and Germany, but Britain and the Netherlands are also involved. are to develop: EDI's objectives 1) an integrated theater air-defense system for Europe (with U.S. help), including upgraded surface-to-air missiles and advanced anti-missile technologies; 2) "smart weapons" and modern real-time information and delivery systems for NATO defense; and, 3) a European surveillance satellite. ED1 appeals to European interests because it leads to a joint defense strategy, keeps European aerospace expertise in Europe and under European control, and helps keep European industry at a competitive level in the commercial space market. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONCERNS The SDI program is a broad-based and fundamental research effort involving advanced developments in science and technology (S&T). According to the SDIO, the program will be conducted "in the open" as much as possible, and Allied participation is actively being sought. The character of the program raises two concerns about technology transfer. One is that the program will be a priority target of the Soviet Union's effort to acquire Western technology that has potential military applications. and Allied countries. This will be a problem in both the United States The other is that Allied participation could give their industries access to technological breakthroughs which could enable them to compete with U.S. industry. Because o f t h e broad-based n a t u r e o f t h e SDI r e s e a r c h e f f o r t , some o f i t s r e - s u l t s w i l l p r o b a b l y have many p o t e n t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n s , b o t h m i l i t a r y ( b e s i d e s s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e ) and c i v i l i a n . The S o v i e t s h a v e had f o r many y e a r s a b r o a d s c a l e - e f f o r t t o a c q u i r e Western t e c h n o l o g y which h a s m i l i t a r y a p p l i c a t i o n s . 31/ The most r e c e n t r e p o r t i n g from t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community c a t e g o r i z e s S o v i e t r e q u i r e ments t o b e i n a r e a s which a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o a wide v a r i e t y o f weapons and s p a c e systems. 32/ Almost a l l o f t h e a r e a s a r e under s t u d y b y , and a r e r e l e v a n t t o many a s p e c t s o f , t h e SDI program. The problem o f p o t e n t i a l S o v i e t a c c e s s t o Western s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l a d v a n c e s h a s l o n g been r e c o g n i z e d . The U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s a v i g o r o u s program o f e x p o r t c o n t r o l l a w e n f o r c e m e n t , p u b l i c and i n d u s t r i a l a w a r e n e s s , and c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h o u r A l l i e s t o stem t h e l o s s e s . Concerns o v e r SDI r e s e a r c h h a v e b e e n r e - f l e c t ed i n A l l i e d d i s c u s s i o n s , b u t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s a p p e a r t o r e m a i n . A l l i e d i n d u s t r y i s pushing f o r maximum a c c e s s and minimal c o n t r o l s , w h i l e t h e United S t a t e s p r e f e r s more s t r i n g e n t s a f e g u a r d s . The A l l i e s want t o b e s u r e t h a t t h e i r i n d u s t r y w i l l b e a b l e t o t a k e maximum a d v a n t a g e o f r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s , w i t h o u t b e i n g encumbered by r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed on work funded by t h e United States. Concern i n t h e United S t a t e s about A l l i e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f economic c o m p e t i t i o n seems, a t p r e s e n t , l e s s w e l l r e c o g n i z e d . w i l l t h e U.S. Starkly put, t a x p a y e r be f u n d i n g r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s i n f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s t h a t w i l l i n p a r t enhance f o r e i g n a b i l i t y t o compete w i t h U.S. industry? The Europeans q u i c k l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e i n v e r s e problem; U.S. companies r e c e i v i n g SDI r e s e a r c h f u n d i n g c o u l d g a i n c o n s i d e r a b l e c o m p e t i t i v e a d v a n t a g e 31/ - S o v i e t A c q u i s i t i o n o f Western Technology. Apr. 1982. 15 p. 32/ S o v i e t A c q u i s i t i o n o f M i l i t a r i l y S i g n i f i c a n t Western Technology: u p d a t Z S e p t 1985. 34 p. . An over t h e i r firms. While some w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n S D I , a g r o u p o f 18 European c o u n t r i e s h a s launched a c o n c u r r e n t c i v i l i a n r e s e a r c h program c a l l e d EUREKA ( s e e above). I n summary, t h e United S t a t e s i s t h u s f a c e d w i t h a d i f f i c u l t b a l a n c i n g a c t t o perform. For p o l i t i c a l , s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n o l o g i c a l , and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , f i n a n c i a l r e a s o n s , t h e United S t a t e s wants t o conduct t h e SDI program a s much i n t h e open and w i t h a s much A l l i e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n a s p o s s i b l e . But, an open program w i t h f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a i s e s two t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r concerns--potential c i a l gain. S o v i e t a c c e s s f o r m i l i t a r y g a i n and A l l i e d a c c e s s f o r commer- These c o n c e r n s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p r e s e n t demanding c h a l l e n g e s f o r t h e United S t a t e s a s SDI p r o c e e d s . MILITARIZATION OF SPACE The i s s u e o f t h e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f s p a c e o f t e n g e n e r a t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e emctional reaction. S i n c e t h e dawn o f t h e s p a c e a g e , many have f e l t t h a t s p a c e s h o u l d b e used f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s o n l y . Several international t r e a t i e s , t o which t h e United S t a t e s i s a p a r t y , f o s t e r t h i s g o a l . For example, n u c l e a r wea- pons and n u c l e a r weapons t e s t s i n s p a c e a r e banned, and freedom o f s c i e n t i f i c - i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s u p h e l d . 33/ C i v i l i a n , e s p e c i a l l y manned, s p a c e a c t i v i t i e s a r e g e n e r a l l y w e l l known. Less w e l l known t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c a r e a c t i v i t i e s i n s p a c e f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y purposes. Both t h e United S t a t e s and S o v i e t Union r e c o g n i z e d t h e m i l i t a r y v a l u e o f s p a c e e a r l y on, and have made u s e o f i t e x t e n s i v e l y t o s u p p o r t t e r r e s t r i a l 3 3 1 See: U.S. C o n g r e s s . S e n a t e . Committee on Commerce, S c i e n c e , and ~ r a n s p r t a t i o n . Space Law-Selected Basic Documents, Second Ed., Committee P r i n t , 95th Cong., 2d S e s s . , Washington, U.S. Govt P r i n t . O f f . , 1878. 600 p. . , m i l i t a r y and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y n e e d s . Both c o u n t r i e s h a v e m i l i t a r y communica- t i o n s , n a v i g a t i o n , e a r l y warning and w e a t h e r s a t e l l i t e s . And b o t h h a v e photo- r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and o t h e r i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n s a t e l l i t e s which a r e u s e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t o m o n i t o r arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t s . Furthermore, t h e s o v i e t s have t e s t e d s e v e r a l m i l i t a r y s p a c e s y s t e m s which h a v e no U.S. counterpart. These i n c l u d e o p e r a t i o n a l s y s t e m s such a s a c o - o r b i t a l a n t i s a t e l l i t e (ASAT) system and a r a d a r ocean r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s a t e l l i t e (RORSAT), which h a s a n u c l e a r power r e a c t o r ; a now o b s o l e t e f r a c t i o n a l o r b i t a l bombardment s y s t e m (FOBS); - a n d , a s p a c e p l a n e under development. 34/ Thus, s p a c e i s a l r e a d y h e a v i l y m i l i t a r i z e d . The more s a l i e n t i s s u e w i t h r e - g a r d t o SDI i s whether i t s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o become weaponized, t h a t i s , whet h e r weapons s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o be p l a c e d i n E a r t h o r b i t . ( N o t e t h a t t h e 1967 O u t e r Space T r e a t y bans o n l y " n u c l e a r weapons o r any o t h e r k i n d s o f weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n " from s p a c e . ) Some a r g u e t h a t we s h o u l d keep s p a c e p r i s t i n e , n o t a l l o w i n g o u r t e r r e s t r i a l arms r a c e t o e x t e n d i n t o s p a c e . t o peaceful intentions f o r space. I n t h i s v i e w , n a t i o n s must c o n t i n u e t o a d h e r e Most who h o l d t h i s v i e w f e e l t h a t o n c e even a s i n g l e weapon i s a l l o w e d i n s p a c e , n a t i o n s w i l l f o r e c l o s e f o r e v e r any hope o f k e e p i n g s p a c e weapons-free. 35/ - S u p p o r t e r s o f SDI g e n e r a l l y s u b s c r i b e t o t h e v i e w t h a t s p a c e i s m e r e l y a n o t h e r realm f o r human e n d e a v o r . A s n a t i o n s h a v e e x t e n d e d t h e i r domain t o t h e s e a and t h e a i r , t h e y h a v e developed a need t o d e p l o y weapon s y s t e m s i n 34/ For more d e t a i l s on ASATs, s e e C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e , A n t i s a t e l x t e Weapon Systems. 35/ J u s t i n , J o s e p h E . Space: A S a n c t u a r y , t h e High Ground, o r a M i l i t a r y ~ h e a t z ? I n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Dimensions o f Space. Med f o r d , M a s s a c h u s e t t s , t h e F l e t c h e r School o f Law and Diplomacy o f T u f t s U n i v e r s i t y , 1984. p. 102-115. those realms. By e x t e n s i o n , i n t h e v i e w o f s u p p o r t e r s , i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t s p a c e b e used i n l i k e f a s h i o n ; some a v e r n a t i o n s would b e f o o l i s h t o deny themselves t h e chance. 361 The l a c k o f n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s i n s p a c e h a s p e r m i t t e d a h o s t o f p e a c e f u l , c i v i l i a n s p a c e e n d e a v o r s t o proceed unimpeded. One can make a n a n a l o g y w i t h A n t a r c t i c a , n o t i n g t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s have kept i t weapons-free. (Note, i t i s , l i k e space, an i n h o s p i t a b l e environment.) On t h e o t h e r h a n d , one c a n a l s o make a n a n a l o g y w i t h t h e s e a , n o t i n g t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w and agreed p r o c e d u r e s a l l o w many m i l i t a r y s h i p s t o o p e r a t e i n a g e n e r a l l y p e a c e f u l manner. "Rules o f t h e road" f o r s p a c e , some s u g g e s t s h o u l d b e developed a l o n g s i m i l a r lines. For example, n a t i o n s c o u l d a g r e e on a "keep-out zone" around s a t e l l i t e s . Any a p p r o a c h o f a n o b j e c t t o a s a t e l l i t e which came w i t h i n t h e zone would be considered a h o s t i l e a c t . A s t e c h n o l o g i e s a d v a n c e , a s n a t i o n s become more a d e p t a t s p a c e o p e r a t i o n s , and a s o u r dependence on s p a c e systems grows, t h e m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y o f m a i n t a i n ing assured access t o space w i l l undoubtedly i n c r e a s e . Even w i t h o u t SDI, t h e n , i t w i l l l i k e l y become i n c r e a s i n g l y a t t r a c t i v e from a m i l i t a r y s t a n d p o i n t f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o p o s s e s s some t y p e s o f weapons t o a s s u r e b o t h t h e l a u n c h o f new s a t e l l i t e s and t h e d e f e n s e o f t h o s e a l r e a d y i n o r b i t . Some weapons, such a s ASATs, c o u l d undoubtedly b e based on E a r t h ( t h e S o v i e t s ' ASAT a l r e a d y i s ) . ASATs a l o n e may n o t meet a l l o f t h e s e p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y n e e d s . But, I f t h e United S t a t e s r e f r a i n s from d e p l o y i n g weapons i n s p a c e , w i l l i t b e f o r e c l o s i n g a n opport u n i t y t o improve n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y by u s i n g s p a c e i n t h e long t e r m t o e l i m i n a t e 361 - Ibid ., p . ,104-106. n u c l e a r weapons on E a r t h ? O r , would U.S. long-term n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s b e b e t t e r s e r v e d by c o n t i n u i n g t o p r e c l u d e weapons i n s p a c e ? A key element i n t h e U.S. d e c i s i o n whether o r n o t t o d e p l o y weapons i n s p a c e i s t h e c o n f i d e n c e p l a c e d i n t h e United S t a t e s ' a b i l i t y t o m o n i t o r t h e s p a c e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e S o v i e t Union and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s f o r e v i d e n c e o f t h e i r c l a n d e s t i n e l y p l a c i n g weapons i n o r b i t , o r d e v e l o p i n g a c a p a b i l i t y t o do s o q u i c k l y . CONCLUDING REMARKS Congress d i r e c t s t h e r a t e and f o c u s o f t h e SDI p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h t h e DOD a u t h o r i z a t i o n and a p p r o p r i a t i o n s p r o c e s s . f u n d i n g i n c r e a s e s i n FY85 and FY86. The SDI h a s e n j o y e d s u b s t a n t i a l N o n e t h e l e s s , a p p r o p r i a t e d amounts h a v e f a l l e n s i g n i f i c a n t l y s h o r t o f DOD r e q u e s t s . I n FY86, $ 2 . 7 5 b i l l i o n was appro- priated out of a requested $3.7 b i l l i o n , following a $1.4 b i l l i o n appropriation the year before. A l l o c a t i o n of FY86 money a c r o s s t h e r e s e a r c h programs was l e f t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e SDIO D i r e c t o r . Many i s s u e s w i l l p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e SDI p o l i c y . Assessment o f t h e s e i s s u e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f S D I program d e f i n i t i o n and o b j e c t i v e s , w i l l l i k e l y l e a d Congress t o s c r u t i n i z e SDI program e l e m e n t s more c l o s e l y t h a n i n t h e p a s t . Furthermore, f u t u r e congressional a c t i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e SDI a r e l i k e l y t o b e a f f e c t e d b y two a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s t h a t a r e somewhat e x t r a n e o u s t o SDI. They a r e : 1) f i s c a l c o n s t r a i n t s imposed b y e f f o r t s t o r e d u c e t h e F e d e r a l b u d g e t d e f i c i t ; and 2 ) t h e p r e s e n c e o r a b s e n c e o f new arms agreements b e t w e e n t h e United S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t Union. CRS -4 3 APPENDIX A: COMMISSIONED STUDIES Two s t u d i e s were commissioned by t h e P r e s i d e n t t o make recommendations on how t o proceed f o l l o w i n g h i s s p e e c h . They were t h e D e f e n s i v e ~ e c h n o l o g i e s S t u d y and t h e F u t u r e S e c u r i t y S t r a t e g y S t u d y . The f o r m e r , a l s o known a s t h e F l e t c h e r Study (headed b y former NASA A d m i n i s t r a t o r James ~ l e t c h e r ) , assessed technical issues. It concluded t h a t : ( 1 ) t e c h n o l o g y d o e s n o t now e x i s t t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r a d e c i s i o n t o produce and d e p l o y a c t u a l weapon s y s t e m s t h a t a r e c a p a b l e o f satisfying the President's goals; ( 2 ) powerful new t e c h n o l o g i e s a r e becoming a v a i l a b l e , however, t h a t j u s t i f y a m a j o r t e c h n o l o g y development e f f o r t t o p r o v i d e f u t u r e t e c h n i c a l o p t i o n s t o defend a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s ; ( 3 ) r e s e a r c h and t e c h n o l o g y development s h o u l d b e i n i t i a t e d o f a m u l t i l a y e r e d d e f e n s e t o d e s t r o y incoming b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s a t a n y and a l l s t a g e s o f t h e i r t r a j e c t o r y ( e . g . , b o o s t , d u r i n g which t h e m i s s i l e i s launched and a s c e n d s i n t o s p a c e ; p o s t - b o o s t , d u r i n g which up t o p e r h a p s 10 i n d e p e n d e n t l y t a r g e t e d warheads m i g h t b e r e l e a s e d from t h e m i s s i l e ; mid-course, d u r i n g which t h e warheads o r r e - e n t r y v e h i c l e s (RVs) and p e r h a p s d e c o y s t r a v e l o n b a l l i s t i c t r a j e c t o r i e s t h r o u g h s p a c e ; and t e r m i n a l , d u r i n g which t h e RVs plummet toward t h e i r t a r g e t s on E a r t h ) ; ( 4 ) t h e a b i l i t y t o d e v e l o p s e n s o r s and b a t t l e management s y s t e m s many t i m e s more e f f e c t i v e t h a n t h o s e now i n u s e would b e needed f o r an e f f e c t i v e multi-layered d e f e n s e ; ( 5 ) t h e d e f e n s i v e system u l t i m a t e l y should have t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o y m i s s i l e s i n t h e boost phase b e f o r e m u l t i p l e warheads a r e d e p l o y e d , n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h a t c e r t a i n s y s t e m components b e b a s e d i n s p a c e ; and ( 6 ) a n informed d e c i s i o n o n system development c a n n o t b e made b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e d e c a d e , b u t t h e r e a r e n e a r - t e r m d e m o n s t r a t i o n s t h a t would i n d i c a t e p r o g r e s s a s w e l l a s U.S. r e s o l v e t o e x p l o r e t h e p o t e n t i a l o f a new b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e (BMD) s y s t e m . 371 - . 3 7 / U . S. Dept o f D e f e n s e . The S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e : Defensive ~ e c h n x o ~ i eS st u d y . Apr. 1984. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1984. p. 2. The l a t t e r s t u d y , a l s o known a s t h e Hoffman Study (headed by Fred Hoffman o f Pan H e u r i s t i c s ) , a d d r e s s e d p o l i c y i s s u e s . It concluded t h a t : ( 1 ) p u r s u i t o f advanced d e f e n s i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s c o u l d o f f e r o p t i o n s t o enhance d e t e r r e n c e and i n c r e a s e s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ; ( 2 ) some u n c e r t a i n t i e s remain r e g a r d i n g s t a b i l i t y and d e t e r r e n c e t h a t w i l l n o t b e r e s o l v e d f u l l y u n t i l more i s known about t h e t e c h n i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s and how t h e S o v i e t Union w i l l respond t o t h e U.S. i n i t i a t i v e ; ( 3 ) t h e s e u n c e r t a i n t i e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , o p t i o n s f o r deployment o f advanced BMD s h o u l d b e s t u d i e d f u r t h e r and a broad-based r e s e a r c h and development (R&D) e f f o r t would p r o v i d e a n e c e s s a r y and v i t a l hedge a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a one-sided S o v i e t deployment; ( 4 ) d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s must a f f o r d s e c u r i t y t o U.S. a l l i e s and c a n n o t r e d u c e America's c a p a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n commitments around t h e world s o t h a t , even a s R&D i s p u r s u e d , a s t r o n g and modern o f f e n s i v e d e t e r r e n c e c a p a b i l i t y w i l l s t i l l b e r e q u i r e d ; and ( 5 ) i n i t i a l l y , a b r o a d r e s e a r c h program on d e f e n s i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s w i l l b e e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e x i s t i n g U.S. arms c o n t r o l o b l i g a t i o n s . 36/ - Dept. o f D e f e n s e . Defense A g a i n s t B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s : An Assess38/ U.S. ment of T e c h n o l o g i e s and P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s . Apr 1984. Washington, U . S . Govt P r i n t . O f f . , 1984. p . 1-7. . . APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 12/19/85 -- FY86 DOD appropriations passed House and Senate as part of H.J. Res. 465 and was signed into law (P.L. 99-190). The SDI was appropriated $2.75 billion plus $9.222 million for SDI Headquarters management. 11/19/85 -- President Reagan met with Soviet Premier Gorbachev in Geneva. 11/08/85 -- FY86 DOD authorization bill was signed into law (P.L. 99-145). The SDI funding level authorized was $2.75 billion. 03/12/85 -- New arms control talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Geneva. 01/07/85 -- Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva. They agreed to new arms control talks in the strategic, theater, and space arenas. 05/18/84 -- Representative Fascell released an interim report from the House Foreign Affairs Committee calling for a new space arms control policy. 03/27/84 -- Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson was named director of the Strategic Defense Initiative. 03/23/83 -- President Reagan made a nationally televised address in which he announced the initiation of a comprehensive and intensive effort to define an R&D program leading to a defensive system to destroy ballistic missiles. began in ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES Carter, Ashton B. and David N. Schwartz, eds. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1984. Ballistic missile defense. 426 p. Council on Economic Priorities. The Strategic defense initiative: costs, contractors and consequences. New York, Council on Economic Priorities, 1985. Drell, Sidney D., Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway. The Reagan strategic defense initiative: a technical, political, and arms control assessment. Stanford, California, Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1984. Union of Concerned Scientists. The fallacy of star wars. Vintage Books, 1984. U.S. Department of Defense. Soviet military power, 1985. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985. New York, Washington, ----- Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Report to the Congress on the strategic defense initiative, 1985. Washington, 1985. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Directed energy weapons research: status and outlook. Report No. 85-183 SPR, by Cosmo DiMaggio. Aug. 30, 1985. 47 p. ----- The new strategic policy: issues for congressional consideration. Report No. 85-134 F,'by Robert L. Jackson. Apr. 18, 1985. 17 p. ----- SDI--a synopsis of major issues. Report No. 85-914 SPR, by Arthur F. Manfredi, Jr. Sept. 18, 1985. 6 p. ----- The strategic defense initiative and the United States alliance strategy. Report No. 85-48 F, by Paul E. Gallis, Mark M. Lowenthal, and Marcia S. Smith. Feb. 1, 1985. 75 p. ----- The strategic defense initiative: program facts. Issue Brief No. IB85170, by Steven A. Hildreth, Dec. 12, 1985 (continually updated). Washington, 1985. 8 p. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. Arms control in space; workshop proceedings. Washington, OTA, 1984. ----- Ballistic missile defense technologies. Washington, OTA, 1985. ----- Directed energy missile defense in space; background paper [by Ashton B. Carter]. Washington, OTA, 1984. Weinrod, W. Bruce, ed. Assessing strategic defense: six roundtable discussions. Washington, the Heritage Foundation, 1985.