Political Action Committees: Their Evolution, Growth and Implications for the Political System

Report No. 84-78 GOV POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION, GROWTH AND, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM Joseph E. Cantor Analyst in American National Government Government Division GENERAL LIBRARIES DEPOSlTORY November 6, 1981 Updated April 30, 1984 The Congressional Research Service works exclusively for the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and providing information at the request of committees, Members. and their staffs. The Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compilations, digests, and background briefings. Upon request, CRS assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals and issues, and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals and their alternatives. The Service's senior specialists and subject analysts are also available for personal consultations in their respective fields of expertise. ABSTRACT T h i s r e p o r t examines t h e campaign f u n d r a i s i n g v e h i c l e s commonly r e f e r r e d t o a s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. It t r a c e s t h e i r e v o l u t i o n and t h e i r growth, b o t h i n number and i n l e v e l of f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , and it a n a l y z e s t h e impact t h e y a r e having on t h e p o l i t i c a l system today. INTRODUCTION P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s (PACs) a r e t h e v e h i c l e s t h r o u g h which i n t e r e s t g r o u p s r a i s e and c o n t r i b u t e money t o p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e s . Although o r i g i n a l l y t h e a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e domain of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , t h e i r a p p e a l h a s e x t e n d e d s i n c e t h e e a r l y 1970s t o b u s i n e s s e s , t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s , and a wide r a n g e o f o t h e r i n t e r e s t groups. T h e i r p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n number and t h e i r growth i n l e v e l o f f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h i s period has occurred a t a r a p i d pace. I n 1982, t h e 3,371 PACs had r e c e i p t s i n e x c e s s of $199 m i l l i o n and c o n t r i b u t e d more t h a n $83 m i l l i o n t o c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n g r e s s . PACs h a v e t h u s become a major s o u r c e of campaign f i n a n c i n g i n modern c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaigns. The amount o f money PACs a r e p r o v i d i n g t o campaigns h a s r a i s e d q u e s t i o n s __ a8 t o whether t h e s e contributio_pssssare e n a b l i n x s p e c i a- l - i n t e r e s -t s- t o- - - g- a_i n - - d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e i n t h e l e g i s l a t -i -v- e p r o c e s s , by o b l i g a t i o n by t h e r e c i p i e n t s o f t h -e--i r p o l i t i c a l d o n a t i o n s . ---- These c o n c e r n s a r e c h a l l e n g e d by t h o s e who i n s i s t t h a t PAC money i s g e n e r a l l y g i v e n t o reward p u b l i c - .-. - . o f f i c i a l s who a r e b a s i c a l l y s y m p a t h e t i c w i t h t h e i s s u e g o a l s o f t h e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p , r a t h e r t h a n t o promote s h i f t s i n v o t i n g p a t t e r n s which a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e general philosophical o r constituency-based views of t h e l e g i s l a t o r . F u r t h e r m o r e , PACs a r e viewed by t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s a s s i m p l y a n o t h e r m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e p--l u- r a l i s m r e f l e c t e d i n i n t e r e s t g r o u p a c t i v i t y s i n c e t h e f o u n d i n g o f t h e Nation. T h i s d e b a t e r e v e a l s s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n outlook a s t o t h e r o l e of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i n p u b l i c p o l i c y - m a k i n g and t h e most d e s i r e d method f o r t h e f i n a n c i n g o f e l e c t i o n campaigns. T h i s r e p o r t examines t h e growth o f PACs i n r e c e n t y e a r s and a n a l y z e s t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e upon them i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaigns. It f o c u s e s on t h e r o l e o f PACs i n campaigns f o r t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s , e s s e n t i a l l y b e c a u s e i t i s t h e r e t h a t PAC a c t i v i t y h a s been most pronounced. Only a s m a l l f r a c t i o n o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s h a s been g i v e n t o P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s ( l a r g e l y b e c a u s e of p u b l i c f u n d i n g of s u c h e l e c t i o n s ) , and knowledge o f PAC a c t i v i t y a t t h e S t a t e and l o c a l l e v e l i s q u i t e l i m i t e d . I n any c a s e , t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by PAC a c t i v i t y a t t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l l e v e l h a v e a pronounced e f f e c t on t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m a s a whole. This study d i s c u s s e s t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e c o n t i n u i n g c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g PACs and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l system. C h a p t e r One d i s c u s s e s what i s meant by t h e term " p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o w i t t e e " and g i v e s a rough i d e a o f how i t f u n c t i o n s . Chapter Two p l a c e s PACs i n p e r s p e c t i v e by examining how b u s i n e s s and l a b o r were i n v o l v e d i n campaign f i n a n c i n g b e f o r e t h e modern PAC e r a and t r a c e s t h e l e g i s l a t i v e , e x e c u t i v e , and j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s which gave impetus t o t h e i r growth and development. Chapter Three p r e s e n t s t h e d a t a on t h e i r growth and ~ r o l i f e r a t i o n , i n t e r m s o f b o t h numbers and d o l l a r s , and r e v i e w s t h e most w i d e l y h e l d t h e o r i e s e x p l a i n i n g t h e i r growth. C h a p t e r Four a n a l y z e s t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by PACs i n t e r m s of t h e i r impact on t h e p o l i t i c a l system. C h a p t e r F i v e r e v i e w s r e c e n t c o n g r e s s i o n a l a t t e m p t s t o c u r t a i l PAC i n f l u e n c e , a n a l y z e s some of t h e c u r r e n t p r o p o s a l s t o l i m i t them, and d i s c u s s e s t h e p r o g n o s i s f o r t h e f u t u r e o f PACs i n o u r p o l i t i c a l system. b i b l i o g r a p h y and a p p e n d i x a r e i n c l u d e d f o r f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e . Finally, a Two e x p l a n a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g terminology used i n t h i s r e p o r t b e a r mentioning. F i r s t , t h e term " i n t e r e s t group" i s used t o r e f e r t o o r g a n i z a t i o n s which pursue p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y g o a l s t h r o u g h t h e p o l i t i c a l a r e n a , and i t encompasses c o r p o r a t i o n s , l a b o r u n i o n s , and t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s , a s w e l l a s t h e v a r i o u s i d e o l o g i c a l o r i s s u e groups. Second, because o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f and t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n t h o s e PACs which a r e i d e o l o g i c a l l y homogenous i n n a t u r e , t h i s r e p o r t makes r e f e r e n c e t o " l i b e r a l " and " c o n s e r v a t i v e " PACs. In v i r t u a l l y a l l instances, these labels r e f l e c t t h e s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n o f t h e groups themselves; a t t h e v e r y l e a s t , t h e y r e f l e c t t h e widespread and u n c o n t e s t e d c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s a p p e a r i n g i n t h e media and i n academic w r i t i n g s . F i n a l l y , s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l s deserve a note of thanks f o r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e i n the preparation of t h i s report. I n p a r t i c u l a r , Kent Cooper, Chief o f t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission's P u b l i c Records D i v i s i o n , provided i n v a l u a b l e and p a t i e n t h e l p i n t h e c o m p i l a t i o n o f d a t a f o r Chapter Three. He a l s o reviewed t h a t c h a p t e r , a s d i d P r o f e s s o r Herbert Alexander o f t h e C i t i z e n s v Research Foundation. S h e r r y S h a p i r o and Edkth S u t t e r l i n , C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e b i b l i o g r a p h e r s , a s s i s t e d i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y a t t h e end of t h i s r e p o r t . CONTENTS ............................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .............................................................. v ABSTRACT .. ............................ ............................................... .. .................................................. ........................................... . ................................. . ................................... . ............................................ CHAPTER TWO: EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES .................... I . Group Involvement P r i o r t o t h e 1970s ............................. A . Legal R e s t r i c t i o n s ........................................ B . How I n t e r e s t Groups Made P o l i t i c a l C o n t r i b u t i o n s .............. 1. Labor .................................................... 2 . Business ................................................... 3 . Conclusion ................................................. I1. S t i m u l i t o PAC Growth i n t h e 1970s Provided by L e g i s l a t i v e . J u d i c i a l . and A d m i n i s t r a t i v e D e c i s i o n s ......................... A . The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971 ..................... B . P i p e f i t t e r s Local 562 v . United S t a t e s ........................ C . The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campatgn Act Amendments o f 1974 .......... D . The FEC's SUN PAC Advisory Opinion ............................ E . The Supreme C o u r t ' s Buckley v . Valeo D e c i s i o n ................. F . The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act Amendments o f 1976 .......... G . Conclusion .................................................... WHAT I S A POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE AND HOW DOES I T WORK? CHAPTER ONE: I What i s a P o l i t i c a l Action Committee? 11 How a PAC O p e r a t e s A Organization B Records and Reports C S o l i c i t a t i o n of C o n t r i b u t i o n s D The Decision-Making P r o c e s s E R e g u l a t i o n of PACs . . . . . . CHAPTER THREE: GROWTH OF PACS SINCE 1972: TiIE NUMBERS. THE DOLLARS. AND THE REASONS I PAC Growth S i n c e 1974 I1 PAC Growth From 1972 1982: t h e D o l l a r s A PAC Spending Since 1972: t h e Aqgregate Data 1 The Overview from t h e PAC P e r s p e c t i v e 2 The Overview from t h e C a n d i d a t e s ' P e r s p e c t i v e B PAC Spending S i n c e 1972: Where Has t h e Money Come From? 1 E x p e n d i t u r e s and C o n t r i b u t i o n s by PAC Groupings S i n c e 1972 2 The L a r g e s t PAC C o n t r i b u t o r s and Spenders a Top 20 c o n t r i b u t o r s from 1972-1982 b Top 20 PAC s p e n d e r s from 1976-1982 c Comparison o f t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s among PACs C PAC Spending S i n c e 1972: Where t h e Money Has Gone 1 Candidate P r e f e r e n c e s from t h e PAC P e r s p e c t i v e 2 PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s from t h e C a n d i d a t e s ' P e r s p e c t i v e D Summary O b s e r v a t i o n s on PAC Growth I11 Reasons f o r PAC Growth S i n c e t h e 1370s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................................... ........................................... ........................ .................. ..................... ............. ...... .............................................. ................. ..................... ..................... ........................................... ............ ............ ........ ........................... .......................... 1 1 7 7 9 11 14 17 19 19 19 22 22 28 35 35 36 39 41 43 45 47 54 55 55 63 65 66 73 82 82 90 91 102 111 118 118 130 135 139 CHAPTER I I1 I11 IV FOUR: ISSUES SURROUNDING THE PAC ROLE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM The Role of Special Interests PAC Impact on the Political Parties The Role of Individuals in the Political Process Impact of PACs on the Congress A Paralysis of the Policy-Making Process B Linkage Between PAC Money and Legislative Votes C PACs as Protectors of Incumbents The Business-Labor Balance of Power V PACs and Political Accountability VI VII The Level of Money in Politics . . . . . . . . . . .. .................................. ............................ ............... ................................. ...................... ............. ............................ ............................ .............................. ................................. CHAPTER FIVE: CONGRESS' RESPONSE TO PACs AND THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE Legislation to Limit PACs in the 95th through 97th Congresses I A 95th Congress Legislation B 96th Congress Legislation C 97th Congress Legislation D 98th Congress Legislation Current Proposals to Limit PAC Influence I1 A Reduce PAC Contribution Limits B Reducing Candidate Dependence on PACs C Enhancing the Role of Other Participants in the Political Process D Public Funding of Congressional Elections I11 Prognosis for the Future of PACs ................................................................ .. .. ................................... ................................... . ................................... . ................................... . ....................... . .............................. . ....................... . ......................................... . ................... . ............................... APPENDIX ................................................................ BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................ General ............................................................ Historical Accounts ................................................ Congressional Documents ............................................ 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) ..................... 1974 FECA Amendments .......................................... 1976 FECA Amendments .......................................... Miscellaneous ................................................ Trends and Statistics on PAC Activity by Election Cycle ............ Pre-1970 ..................................................... 1972 .......................................................... 1974 .......................................................... 1976 ....................................................... 1978 .......................................................... 1980 .......................................................... 1982 .......................................................... Profiles on Specific PACs or Groupings of PACs ..................... How PACs Work ...................................................... The Impact of PAC Contributions .................................... Independent Expenditures ........................................... . 149 150 154 158 165 165 167 170 173 179 183 185 185 185 188 194 197 202 202 206 209 215 220 231 239 239 245 247 247 248 249 250 250 250 251 251 251 253 254 256 258 265 269 273 CHAPTER ONE: WHAT IS A POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE AND HOW DOES IT WORK? In s e t t i n g t h e s t a g e f o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n t o f o l l o w , t h i s c h a p t e r d e f i n e s t h e term " p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee" and s k e t c h e s t h e e s s e n t i a l o u t l i n e of how a PAC o p e r a t e s . T h i s i s not intended t o be an e x p l i c i t , d e t a i l e d g u i d e t o t h e f o r m a t i o n of a PAC; such g u i d e s do e x i s t and, i n f a c t , provided - c o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s o u t l i n e . 1/ Those c o n s i d e r i n g s e t t i n g up a PAC would be w e l l a d v i s e d t o o b t a i n c o p i e s of t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act, T i t l e 11 of t h e Code of F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n s ( p e r t a i n i n g t o F e d e r a l ~ l e c t i o n s ) ,and t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission's Campaign Guide f o r Nonconnected Committees o r Campaign Guide f o r C o r p o r a t i o n s and Labor O r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h i s c h a p t e r i s c o n f i n e d t o conveying some i d e a of what i s involved i n t h e mechanics of s e t t i n g up and o p e r a t i n g a PAC, s o a s t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e r o l e t h e s e v e h i c l e s p l a y i n American p o l i t i c s and t h e i s s u e s t h e y r a i s e f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l system. I. WHAT I S A POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE The term " p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee" i s w i d e l y used t o d e n o t e a l e g a l e n t i t y which i s e s t a b l i s h e d by an i n t e r e s t group t o r a i s e and spend money i n an a t t e m p t t o i n f l u e n c e e l e c t i o n s . In s p i t e of i t s common usage, t h e term 1/ Sudow, William E. O r g a n i z a t i o n and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : PAC Legal ~ o n s i z e r a t i o n s . I n P o l i t i c a l Action f o r Business: The PAC Handbook. Washington, F r a s e r A s s o c i a t e s , 1981. p. 192-218. S p r o u l , C u r t i s C. C o r p o r a t i o n s and Unions i n F e d e r a l P o l i t i c s : A P r a c t i c a l Approach t o F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Law Compliance. In P o l i t i c a l Action Committees and Campaign Finance: Symposium. Arizona Law Review, v . 2 2 , 1980: 465-518. i s , i n f a c t , a c o l l o q u i a l e x p r e s s i o n which does not a p p e a r i n F e d e r a l s t a t u t e s . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l e g a l framework i n which a PAC o p e r a t e s , one must e x p l o r e t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h r e e r e l a t e d , b u t not e q u i v a l e n t , l e g a l t e r m s : 11 p o l i t i c a l committee," " s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund," and " m u l t i c a n d i d a t e p o l i t i c a l V i r t u a l l y a l l PACs, a s we w i l l r e f e r t o them t h r o u g h o u t t h i s r e p o r t , a r e " p o l i t i c a l committees." Under t h e d e f i n i t i o n i n 2 U.S.C. 431 of t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act (FECA): ( 4 ) The term " p o l i t i c a l committee" means-(A) any c o m m i t t e e , c l u b , a s s o c i a t i o n , o r o t h e r g r o u p o f p e r s o n s which r e c e i v e s c o n t r i b u t i o n s a g g r e g a t i n g i n e x c e s s of $1,000 d u r i n g a c a l e n d a r y e a r o r which makes e x p e n d i t u r e s a g g r e g a t i n g i n excess of $1,000 d u r i n g a calendar year; o r (B) any s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 441b(b) of t h i s t i t l e ; o r (C) any l o c a l committee o f a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y which r e c e i v e s c o n t r i b u t i o n s a g g r e g a t i n g in excess of $5,000 d u r i n g a c a l e n d a r y e a r , o r makes payments exempted from t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n t r i b u t i o n o r e x p e n d i t u r e a s d e f i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h s ( 8 ) and ( 9 ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n a g g r e g a t i n g i n e x c e s s of $5,000 d u r i n z a c a l e n d a r y e a r , o r makes c o n t r i b u t i o n s a g g r e g a t i n g i n e x c e s s of $1,000 d u r i n g a c a l e n d a r y e a r o r makes e x p e n d i t u r e s aggregating i n excess of $1,000 during a calendar y e a r . For p u r p o s e s o f t h i s r e p o r t , t h e t h i r d t y p e of p o l i t i c a l cormnittee--ones a r e a f f i l i a t e d with a p o l i t i c a l party--will that not b e c o n s i d e r e d ; t h e s e a r e n o t what i s g e n e r a l l y meant a s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. Instead, t h i s report i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h what t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission r e f e r s t o a s "nonparty" p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s , which can t a k e t h e form of e i t h e r d e f i n i t i o n (A) o r ( B ) . The e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l committee ( A ) and p o l i t i c a l committee (B) i s t h e l a t t e r ' s a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h an e x i s t i n g , s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t with t h e former's o s t e n s i b l y independent s t a t u s . It i s p o l i t i c a l committee (B), t h e s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d , which h a s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e f o r e r u n n e r a n d , i n a s e n s e , t h e moving f o r c e behind t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs. U n t i l r e c e n t l y , t h e t e r m " s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund" was v i r t u a l l y synonymous w i t h t h e t e r m " p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee ," a n d , even t o d a y , w i t h t h e i n c r e a s i n g growth o f and a t t e n t i o n f o c u s e d on t h e u n a f f i l i a t e d , i n d e p e n d e n t PACs, s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s a c c o u n t f o r n e a r l y 80 p e r c e n t o f PAC s . A s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund i s " l i t t l e more t h a n a bookkeeping c o n c e p t which i s n o t d e f i n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n l a w s . 21 ," As w i l l b e e x p l o r e d i n C h a p t e r Two, i t d e v e l o p e d o u t of t h e l e g a l p r o h i b i t i o n s on t h e s p e n d i n g of g e n e r a l t r e a s u r y f u n d s f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by u n i o n s and c o r p o r a t i o n s . Such p r o h i b i t i o n s l e d l a b o r u n i o n s ( a n d u l t i m a t e l y o t h e r s ) t o e s t a b l i s h and u n d e r w r i t e t h e o p e r a t i n g e x p e n s e s of d i s t i n c t c o m m i t t e e s ( m a i n t a i n i n g a c c o u n t s s e p a r a t e from t h e u n i o n s ' ) t o c o l l e c t and d i s t r i b u t e v o l u n t a r y p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s from t h e i r members, w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g d i r e c t union c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o candidates. I n such a manner, t h e c o n c e p t of a s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund came i n t o b e i n g . The law a u t h o r i z e s t h r e e s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s which can b e c o n d u c t e d w i t h g e n e r a l t r e a s u r y f u n d s of u n i o n s and c o r p o r a t i o n s . 2 U.S.C. While 441b(a) p r o h i b i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Federal candidates by n a t i o n a l b a n k s , c o r p o r a t i o n s , and l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , S e c t i o n 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 2 ) s t a t e s t h a t t h i s p r o h i b i t i o n s h a l l not include-(A) communications by a c o r p o r a t i o n t o i t s s t o c k h o l d e r s and e x e c u t i v e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l and t h e i r f a m i l i e s o r by a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n t o i t s members and t h e i r f a m i l i e s on any s u b j e c t ; (B) n o n p a r t i s a n r e g i s t r a t i o n and g e t - o u t - t h e - v o t e campaigns by a c o r p o r a t i o n aimed a t i t s s t o c k h o l d e r s and e x e c u t i v e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l and t h e i r f a m i l i e s , o r by a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n aimed a t i t s members and t h e i r f a m i l i e s ; and -21 S p r o u l , C o r p o r a t i o n s and Unions i n F e d e r a l P o l i t i c s , p. 4 9 3 . ( c ) t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and s o l i c i t a t i o n o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund t o be u t i l i z e d f o r p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e s by a c o r p o r a t i o n , l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n , membership o r g a n i z a t i o n , c o o p e r a t i v e , o r c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h o u t c a p i t a l stock. P a r t C t h u s s a n c t i o n s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s by c o r p o r a t i o n s , u n i o n s , membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s , c o o p e r a t i v e s , and c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t c a p i t a l s t o c k ; i n a d d i t i o n , t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s a r e g r a n t e d t h e same r i g h t i n 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 4 ) ( ~ ) . These e n t i t i e s r e p r e s e n t s i x of t h e s e v e n t y p e s o f PACs r e c o g n i z e d under law, and t h e y w i l l be d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h i n C h a p t e r T h r e e , which p r e s e n t s d a t a on s p e n d i n g by t h e v a r i o u s t y p e s o f PACs. A key f e a t u r e o f a l l t h r e e s a n c t i o n e d a c t i v i t i e s ( p a r t s A, B, and C o f s e c t i o n 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 2 ) ) i s t h a t t h e y must b e c o n f i n e d t o t h e a u d i e n c e s s p e c i f i e d i n t h e law; t h i s h a s an i m p o r t a n t b e a r i n g on t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f PACs and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e e l e c t o r a l process. The k i n d s o f e x p e n s e s which may be p a i d o u t o f t h e g e n e r a l t r e a s u r i e s o f t h e s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e e l a b o r a t e d upon i n t h e r e g u l a t i o n s promulgated by t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commmission. 11 C.F.R. 114.l(b) s t a t e s : " E s t a b l i s h m e n t , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and s o l i c i t a t i o n c o s t s ' ' means t h e c o s t s o f o f f i c e s p a c e , phones, s a l a r i e s , u t i l i t i e s , s u p p l i e s , l e g a l and a c c o u n t i n g f e e s , f u n d r a i s i n g and o t h e r e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d i n and r u n n i n g a s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund .... These c o s t s need n o t b e r e p o r t e d t o t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commmission. Having d e s c r i b e d t h e p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f PACs which a r e s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s , o n e must t a k e n o t e o f o t h e r p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s which a r e e s t a b l i s h e d a s i n d e p e n d e n t , p o l i t i c a l f u n d r a i s i n g and s p e n d i n g v e h i c l e s . These c o m m i t t e e s must s i m p l y meet t h e c r i t e r i a o f r a i s i n g o r s p e n d i n g o v e r $1,000 i n a c a l e n d a r y e a r and t h e n f i l e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e forms w i t h t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. These u n a f f i l i a t e d PACs a r e not governed by t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s , i n t e r m s o f whom t h e y may s o l i c i t f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s , nor a r e t h e y a b l e t o r e l y upon a s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n t o b e a r t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and f u n d r a i s i n g c o s t s ; such c o s t s must b e p a i d o u t o f t h e v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h e y r a i s e . Therein l i e s the paramount a d v a n t a g e and d i s a d v a n t a g e a c c r u i n g t o what t h e FEC d e s c r i b e s a s t h e "non-connected" PACs, t h e s e v e n t h and f i n a l PAC c a t e g o r y . As w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n t h i s r e p o r t , t h e u n a f f i l i a t e d ( o r non-connected) g r o u p i n g i s l a r g e l y comprised o f i d e o l o g i c a l and i s s u e - o r i e n t e d i n t e r e s t groups. One a d d i t i o n a l b i t o f l e g a l t e r m i n o l o g y - - t h e p o l i t i c a l commit tee1'--needs term "multicandidate t o b e e x p l a i n e d i n o r d e r t o round o u t o n e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what a PAC i s and why i t i s such a much-discussed vehicle. T h i s t e r m a r i s e s from t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p l a c e d on p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s under S e c t i o n 441a of t h e FECA. S u b s e c t i o n ( a ) ( 1 ) l i m i t s " p e r s o n s " t o c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f $1,000 per e l e c t i o n t o any F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e o r h i s a u t h o r i z e d c o m m i t t e e s , $20,000 p e r y e a r t o n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y c o m m i t t e e s , and $5,000 a y e a r t o o t h e r p o l i t i c a l committees. As d e f i n e d i n 2 U.S.C. 4 3 1 ( 1 1 ) , t h e t e r m "person" includes: an i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t n e r s h i p , committee, a s s o c i a t i o n , c o r p o r a t i o n , l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n , o r any o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n o r g r o u p of p e r s o n s , b u t s u c h t e r m d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e F e d e r a l Government o r any a u t h o r i t y o f t h e F e d e r a l Government. Thus, t h e l i m i t s above a p p l y t o a n i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n a s w e l l a s t o an o r g a n i z a t i o n o r group. The law makes p r o v i s i o n , however, f o r a s p e c i a l t y p e o f p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e , t o which d i f f e r e n t c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s a p p l y ; t h i s t y p e o f PAC i s t h e " m u l t i c a n d i d a t e p o l i t i c a l committee," which i s d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 441(a)(4) as: a p o l i t i c a l committee which h a s been r e g i s t e r e d under s e c t i o n 433 o f t h i s t i t l e f o r a p e r i o d o f n o t l e s s t h a n 6 months, which h a s r e c e i v e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s from more t h a n 50 p e r s o n s , a n d , e x c e p t f o r any S t a t e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n , h a s made c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o 5 o r more c a n d i d a t e s f o r F e d e r a l o f f i c e . By meeting these three additional criteria, the multicandidate PAC may, under 2 U.S.C. 441a(2), contribute $5,000 per election to a Federal candidate, $15,000 to a national political party cornittee, and $5,000 to any other political committee. Whereas the last limitation is the same as for the basic political committee and the second is actually lower, the $5,000 limit on contributions to candidates, in contrast with the $1,000 limit applicable to basic political committees and individuals, provides greater opportunities for influence and, hence, greater incentive for a political committee to attempt to meet the three additional criteria for multicandidate status. With these criteria being relatively easy to meet, it is hardly surprising that most nonparty committees today are multicandidate committees. What this means is that, for all intents and purposes, most PACs may contribute more money to Federal candidates than can individual citizens (this difference is accentuated by the imposition of a $25,000 aggregate limit on political contributions by individuals, with no such limit on political committees). This distinction has had a significant bearing on the growth of PACs, as well as on the debate surrounding their influence on American politics. In summary, virtually all PACs are political committees, most, but not all, are separate segregated funds, and most, but not all, are multicandidate political committees. Because of the implications for public policy and in the interests of greatest consistency with common usage, the term "PAC," for purposes of this report, will generally refer to nonparty, multicandidate political committees which may be either separate segregated funds or unaffiliated entities. The sections which follow in this chapter will have particular applicability to separate segregated funds, although they will be broadly relevant to all types of PACs. 11. A. HOW A PAC OPERATES Organization A PAC is required to file a statement of organization with the Federal Election Commission within ten days after its establishment. 3/ For a separate segregated fund, the regulations suggest several alternative events which can be considered to constitute "establishment": a vote by the board of directors or comparable governing body of an organization to create a separate segregated fund to be used wholly or in part for federal elections; selection of initial officers to administer such a fund; or payment of the 41 initial operating expenses of such a fund. For an unaffiliated PAC, "establishment" is considered to have occurred when it meets the requirements of a political committee (i.e., when an organization - or group raises or spends more than $1,000 in a year). 51 In order to register with the FEC, the newly-formed PAC must file a Statement of Organization, FEC Form 1 [a copy is provided in Appendix A ] , which contains the following information: (1) name, address, and type of committee; (2) name, address, relationship, and type of connected organization; (3) name, address, and committee position of custodian of records (may be the treasurer); ( 4 ) name and address of treasurer; -3/ 4/ -5 / 11 C.F.R. 102.1 11 C.F.R. 102.l(c) 11 C.F.R. 100.5(a); 102.l(d) ( 5 ) listing of depositories used by committee (at least 61; one must be designated) - The one officer required by law in a PAC is the treasurer, who plays a pivotal role in the committee. As stated in 2 U.S.C. 432(a): Every political committee shall have a treasurer. No contribution or expenditure shall be accepted or made by or on behalf of a political committee during any period in which the office of treasurer is vacant. In selecting the name, a separate segregated fund must include the name of its connected organization in its Statement of Organization, on all reports filed, and in all advertisements and communications. 7/ Beyond the requirements above, there are virtually no other steps required for the establishment of a PAC. Those in charge of the PAC may or may not decide to incorporate. By-laws which set forth the goals, organizational structure, and guidelines for PAC operations are recommended by many authorities, but they are not required by law. 81 Regarding the tax status of a PAC, the law states that political organizations are not entirely exempt from income taxation and are required to 91 However, a PAC qualifies for a limited tax-exempt status file tax returns. "as long as it is organized and operated primarily for the purpose of receiving - contributions and making expenditures within the meaning of the Act." 101 61 - 11 C.F.R. -7/ -8/ -9/ 11 C.F.R. 102.14 102.2(a) Sudow, Organization and Administration, p. 199-200. 26 U.S.C. 6012(a)(6) lo/ Sudow, Organization and Administration, p. 207. Although money raiserfrom contributions for political expenditures is tax-exempt, political organizations must pay taxes on income from investments. B. Records and R e p o r t s Under 2 U.S.C. 432, t h e t r e a s u r e r i s r e q u i r e d t o keep an account of t h e PAC's f i n a n c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s and t o s t o r e t h e s e r e c o r d s f o r t h r e e years a f t e r the relevant reports a r e f i l e d . I n terms of r e c e i p t s , t h e s e r e c o r d s must i n c l u d e : ( 1 ) an account of a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n s r e c e i v e d ; ( 2 ) t h e name and a d d r e s s of persons who c o n t r i b u t e more t h a n $50; ( 3 ) employment s t a t u s of persons c o n t r i b u t i n g over $200 i n a y e a r ; ( 4 ) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of any c o n t r i b u t i o n by a p o l i t i c a l c o r n i t t e e . For i t e m s 2-4, well. t h e d a t e and amount of c o n t r i b u t i o n must be i n c l u d e d , a s For a l l PAC d i s b u r s e m e n t s , t h e r e c o r d s must provide: ( 1 ) name and a d d r e s s of e v e r y r e c i p i e n t ; ( 2 ) d a t e , amount, and purpose; ( 3 ) name of c a n d i d a t e (and o f f i c e s o u g h t ) on whose b e h a l f disbursement was made. A r e c e i p t , i n v o i c e , o r c a n c e l l e d check i s r e q u i r e d t o be kept f o r d i s b u r s e m e n t s exceeding $200. S e c t i o n 434 of t h e FECA r e q u i r e s PACs t o r e p o r t i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e i r f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y t o t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s ; 2 U.S.C. 439 a l s o r e q u i r e s r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n s of r e p o r t s t o be f i l e d w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n t h o s e S t a t e s where c a n d i d a t e s have r e c e i v e d PAC contributions. Appendix B) C u r r e n t r e g u l a t i o n s r e q u i r e them t o use FEC Form 3-X. (See . These r e p o r t s e l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n on PAC r e c e i p t s through two methods. The f i r s t , c a t e g o r i e s of r e c e i p t s , r e q u i r e s t h e r e p o r t i n g of t o t a l amounts i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l s , p a r t y committees, o t h e r p o l i t i c a l committees, and a l l t h e s e s o u r c e s combined; i n a d d i t i o n , t o t a l amounts o f t r a n s f e r s from a f f i l i a t e d c o m m i t t e e s , l o a n s , o f f s e t s t o o p e r a t i n g e x p e n s e s , and o t h e r r e c e i p t s must be r e p o r t e d i n t h e c a t e g o r i e s s e c t i o n . The second s e c t i o n of t h e r e c e i p t s r e p o r t p r o v i d e s a n i t e m i z e d a c c o u n t ( w i t h d a t e s and amounts) of c o n t r i b u t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l s who c o n t r i b u t e more t h a n $200 i n a y e a r and from a l l c o m m i t t e e s ( p o l i t i c a l and o t h e r w i s e ) ; i n a d d i t i o n , i t e m i z e d a c c o u n t i n g i s r e q u i r e d f o r t r a n s f e r s from a f f i l i a t e d c o m m i t t e e s , a l l l o a n s t o t h e PAC, a l l r e b a t e s t o o f f s e t o p e r a t i n g c o s t s i n e x c e s s o f $200, and d i v i d e n d s o r i n t e r e s t i n amounts o v e r $200. E/ With r e g a r d t o PAC d i s b u r s e m e n t s , t h e same two methods a r e u s e d . The c a t e g o r i e s o f d i s b u r s e m e n t s p r o v i d e t h e t o t a l amounts s p e n t on o p e r a t i n g expenses, t r a n s f e r s t o a f f i l i a t e d committees, l o a n repayments, o f f s e t s , c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o o t h e r p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s , l o a n s made by t h e PAC, i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , and o t h e r e x p e n s e s . An i t e m i z e d a c c o u n t i n g ( w i t h d a t e s and amounts) i s r e q u i r e d f o r e a c h d i s b u r s e m e n t of more t h a n $200 i n a y e a r ( s t a t i n g t h e purpose o f t h e e x p e n d i t u r e ) , e a c h t r a n s f e r t o an a f f i l i a t e d c o m m i t t e e , e a c h l o a n repayment, each r e f u n d o r o f f s e t , e a c h c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a p o l i t i c a l committee ( w i t h name and o f f i c e s o u g h t , i f t o a c a n d i d a t e ' s a u t h o r i z e d c o m m i t t e e ) , e a c h l o a n , and e a c h i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e of more t h a n $200. 12/ F i n a l l y , t h e r e p o r t s f i l e d must a l s o d i s c l o s e such i n f o r m a t i o n a s c a s h on hand, o u t s t a n d i n g d e b t s and o b l i g a t i o n s , and summaries o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s - and o p e r a t i n g e x p e n d i t u r e s . 1 3 1 11/ 12/ 13/ - 11 C.F.R. 1 0 4 . 3 ( a ) ( 2 ) and ( 4 ) 11 C.F.R. 1 0 4 . 3 ( b ) ( l ) and ( 3 ) 11 C.F.R. 104.3(a)(l), ( c ) , and ( d ) PACs may choose one of two s c h e d u l e s f o r f i l i n g t h e i r d i s c l o s u r e r e p o r t s . The f i r s t o p t i o n r e q u i r e s e l e c t i o n - y e a r r e p o r t s on a q u a r t e r l y b a s i s (due J a n u a r y 31, A p r i l 15, J u l y 1 5 , and October 1 5 ) , a p r e - e l e c t i o n r e p o r t (due 12 days b e f o r e a primary o r g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ) , and a p o s t - e l e c t i o n r e p o r t (due 30 days a f t e r a g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ) ; i n n o n - e l e c t i o n y e a r s , two semi-annual r e p o r t s a r e r e q u i r e d under t h i s system (due J u l y 31 and J a n u a r y 31). The second r e p o r t i n g o p t i o n r e q u i r e s monthly r e p o r t s (due by t h e 20th day of t h e f o l l o w i n g month) i n b o t h e l e c t i o n and n o n - e l e c t i o n y e a r s ; d u r i n g e l e c t i o n y e a r s , however, pre- and p o s t - e l e c t i o n r e p o r t s and a year-end r e p o r t (due J a n u a r y 31) a r e r e q u i r e d i n l i e u of t h e November and December monthly reports. 141 S o l i c i t a t i o n of Contributions A t t h e c o r e of a PAC's e x i s t e n c e is i t s a b i l i t y t o r a i s e money. The FECA and i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s o f f e r d e t a i l e d g u i d e l i n e s which must be followed by t h e v a r i o u s t y p e s of s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d funds i n t h e i r a p p e a l s for voluntary contributions. One o v e r r i d i n g r u l e , a t l e a s t w i t h r e s p e c t t o union o r c o r p o r a t e employers who s o l i c i t t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s , i s t h a t a l l s o l i c i t a t i o n s must inform t h e employee of t h e p o l i t i c a l purposes of t h e PAC - and of h i s r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o c o n t r i b u t e without f e a r of r e p r i s a l . 151 C o r p o r a t i o n s may s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e i r PACs o n l y from t h e i r - s t o c k h o l d e r s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r e x e c u t i v e p e r s o n n e l , and f a m i l i e s . 161 141 151 161 - 11 C.F.R. 104.5(c) 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 3 ) ( ~ ) and ( c ) 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) The law defines "executive or administrative personnel" as: individuals employed by a corporation who are paid on a salary, rather than hourly, basis and who have policymaking, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities. 171 - Labor unions may only solicit contributions from their members and their families. 181 Such solicitations by unions and corporations may be in written or oral form and may occur at any time, with no 1imitatioh.on the number of times per year. In addition to the above guidelines, the law permits corporations and unions to solicit each other's solicitation pools twice a year. This type of solicitation must be in writing and be sent to the residence of the 191 The regulations further require that these written prospective donor. solicitations inform the reader that a custodial arrangement exists to protect the anonymity of those who do not contribute, those who make a single contribution of $50 or less, and those whose aggregate contributions in a year do not exceed $200; the corporation or union may not be informed of those who fail to contribute, and those who contribute less than $50 at a time or $200 - in the aggregate may send their contributions to the custodian. 201 The law requires that whatever methods a corporation uses in its fundraising efforts must be made available at cost to a labor union which represents its employees. 2 1 The regulations suggest that such methods of 171 - 2 U.S.C. 441b(7) 181 191 201 211 - 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii) 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(B) 11 C.F.R. 114.6(c) 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(6) and (d) s o l i c i t a t i o n i n c l u d e b u t a r e n o t l i m i t e d t o a p a y r o l l d e d u c t i o n o r check-off s y s t e m , c o m p u t e r s f o r a d d r e s s i n g e n v e l o p e s f o r home s o l i c i t a t i o n s , and t h e u s e of c o r p o r a t e f a c i l i t i e s f o r f u n d r a i s i n g e v e n t s . 221 The r u l e s g o v e r n i n g s o l i c i t a t i o n by membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( o t h e r t h a n t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s ) , c o o p e r a t i v e s , and c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t c a p i t a l s t o c k a r e much s i m p l e r t h a n t h o s e f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s and u n i o n s . Any o f t h e t h r e e former t y p e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s may s o l i c i t i t s members a t any t i m e and i n any manner, - w i t h o u t any r e s t r i c t i o n on number o f s o l i c i t a t i o n s per y e a r . 231 The g u i d e l i n e s g o v e r n i n g a t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n p e r m i t i t t o s o l i c i t t h e s t o c k h o l d e r s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r e x e c u t i v e p e r s o n n e l (and f a m i l i e s ) o f member c o r p o r a t i o n s , p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n g r a n t s s p e c i f i c , p r i o r a p p r o v a l and t h a t i t n o t p e r m i t such s o l i c i t a t i o n s by any o t h e r a s s o c i a t i o n t h a t y e a r . The c o r p o r a t i o n i s f r e e t o l i m i t t h e number o f s o l i c i t a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e y e a r b y t h e a u t h o r i z e d t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n and t o f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t t h e s o l i c i t a t i o n - p o o l . 241 The law h a s l i t t l e t o s a y r e g a r d i n g s o l i c i t a t i o n s by non-connected PACs, e x c e p t t h a t t h e y must i d e n t i f y any communications a s b e i n g p a i d f o r by - them. 2 5 1 Beyond t h a t , a s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , t h e y may s o l i c i t anyone f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h r o u g h any v e h i c l e , any number o f t i m e s . One f i n a l comment r e g a r d i n g PAC s o l i c i t a t i o n of c o n t r i b u t i o n s d e s e r v e s mention h e r e . 221 231 241 251 - C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a PAC a r e g e n e r a l l y e l i g i b l e f o r t h e 50 p e r c e n t 11 C.F.R. 114.5(k) 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 4 ) ( C ) ; 11 C.F.R. 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 4 ) (Dl; 11 C.F.R. 11 C.F.R. 110.11 114.7 114.8 t a x c r e d i t a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; a maximum c r e d i t of $50 may b e t a k e n by a s i n g l e t a x p a y e r and $100 by t h o s e f i l i n g a j o i n t r e t u r n . T h i s p r o v i s i o n i s commonly mentioned by PACs i n t h e i r f u n d r a i s i n g a p p e a l s . D . The Decision-Making P r o c e s s Of a l l t h e a s p e c t s o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , t h e i r o p e r a t i o n and t h e i r r o l e i n o u r p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , t h e one which i s p r o b a b l y t h e l e a s t u n d e r s t o o d i s t h e PAC decision-making process. T h e r e i s a d e a r t h of l i t e r a t u r e on how PACs a r r i v e a t d e c i s i o n s on which c a n d i d a t e s t o s u p p o r t , and t h e r e i s no s y s t e m a t i c , comprehensive e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s q u e s t i o n . What l i t e r a t u r e d o e s e x i s t i s l a r g e l y c o n f i n e d t o examples of s e l e c t e d PACs and i s h e a v i l y anecdotal i n nature. Furthermore, t h e i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e inner workings of PACs f o c u s e s p e c i a l l y on c o r p o r a t e PACs. This i s perhaps a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e e f f o r t s o f c o r p o r a t e spokesmen t o p u b l i c i z e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s , i n o r d e r t o h e l p s h a p e a s y m p a t h e t i c p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n o f them. Thus, n o t o n l y a r e t h e e x i s t i n g a c c o u n t s o r i e n t e d t o t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r b u t t h e y may be l a c k i n g i n objectivity, as well. Although t h i s s e c t i o n a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e some u s e f u l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s on t h e PAC d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d by t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d c o n s t r a i n t s . The fundamental r e a s o n f o r t h e g e n e r a l l y vague p e r c e p t i o n of PAC i n t e r n a l workings i s t h e a b s e n c e of d e t a i l e d l e g a l g u i d e l i n e s and d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s , s u c h a s t h o s e t h a t a p p l y t o t h e PAC's f i n a n c i a l o p e r a t i o n s . I n t h e c a s e of t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f PACs which a r e a f f i l i a t e d , i t i s known t h a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n h a s broad a u t h o r i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e s p e n d i n g d e c i s i o n s o f t h e i r PACs. A board o f d i r e c t o r s i s u s u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d a s t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g body of t h e PAC, and management-level o f f i c e r s of t h e company or union typically serve on the PAC board. The day-to-day operations of the PAC are generally handled by a designated manager, who may serve only part-time in that capacity and whose principal occupation might be government affairs specialist of the connected organization. 261 The PAC board may also rely on standing comrnittees to assist with such specific tasks as fundraising, monitoring legislators' votes, or voter education. 271 The number of people actually involved in the decision-making process will also vary. It appears that some actively encourage input from the contributors, which may involve an earmarking system, while others reserve the decisions on whom to support to the PAC board of directors or a subgroup thereof. Some may place particular emphasis on the advice of Washington representatives of the connected organization; others may solicit input from local affiliates before making decisions for the national body. 281 Most of the literature stresses the wide number of options open to PAC decision-makers. Some of these options are summarized below as a means of illustrating how varied the operations and foci of PACs are likely to be. Through these choices, a PAC assumes its own identity: (1) to limit contributions to local races or to support candidates across the Nation; (2) to pursue an incumbent-oriented approach or to take more risks on challengers; 261 Cohen, Richard E. Congressional Democrats Beware--Here Come the corpo=te PACs. National Journal, v. 12, August 9, 1980: 1306. 271 Sudow, Organization and Administration, p. - 197. 281 Budde, Bernadette. Business Political Action Committees. In J. Malbin (ed. ) ~ichax Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. p. 22-23. . ( 3 ) t o c o n c e n t r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s on incumbents i n l e g i s l a t i v e l y s t r a t e g i c p l a c e s , such a s key committee posit ions; ( 4 ) t o c o n t r i b u t e e a r l y i n t h e e l e c t i o n c y c l e (perhaps t a k i n g more r i s k s ) o r w a i t u n t i l l a t e r i n t h e campaign ( p e r h a p s t o a s s e s s who i s most l i k e l y t o w i n ) ; (5) t o c o n t r i b u t e i n primaries o r only i n general e l e c t i o n s ; ( 6 ) t o c o o r d i n a t e g i v i n g w i t h o t h e r PACs o r t o work a l o n e ; ( 7 ) t o g i v e a s m a l l number of l a r g e d o n a t i o n s o r t o g i v e a l a r g e r number of t o k e n c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; (8) t o contribute t o Presidential candidates, t o parties, t o o t h e r PACs, a s w e l l a s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s ; ( 9 ) t o g i v e t o S t a t e and l o c a l o r o n l y F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s ; ( 1 0 ) t o a l l o w c o n t r i b u t o r s t o earmark c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o designated candidates; ( 1 1 ) t o make p o s t - e l e c t i o n d o n a t i o n s t o h e l p e a s e a c a n d i d a t e ' s campaign d e f i c i t ; ( 1 2 ) t o make in-kind d o n a t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s ( s u c h a s p r o v i d i n g goods and s e r v i c e s ) o r o n l y f i n a n c i a l contributions ; ( 1 3 ) t o make i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s o r l i m i t s p e n d i n g t o d i r e c t c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 291 - One f i n a l p o i n t might b e made h e r e r e g a r d i n g PAC d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . Often, i f n o t most of t h e t i m e , t h e i n i t i a l s u g g e s t i o n f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o a p a r t i c u l a r C o r p o r a t e PACs: Step-by-step Formation and 291 K e n d a l l , Don R. ~ r o u b z f r e eO p e r a t i o n . Campaigns and E l e c t i o n s , v . 1, S p r i n g 1980: 18; Kayden, Xanda. The Impact o f t h e FECA o n t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees. I n U.S. Congress. House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact o f t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t , 1972-1978. From t h e I n s t i t u t e of P o l i t i c s . J o h n F. Kennedy School of Government. Harvard U n i v e r s i t y . Committee P r i n t , 9 6 t h Cong., 1 s t S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 101. w ere after c i t e d a s U.S. Congress. An A n a l y s i s o f t h e Impact of t h e FECA) c a n d i d a t e e m a n a t e s from t h e c a n d i d a t e h i m s e l f . 301 The p r a c t i c e o f c a n d i d a t e s - making a p p e a l s f o r PAC money h a s become s o w i d e s p r e a d t h a t a d v i c e on how t o maximize t h e i r c h a n c e s f o r o b t a i n i n g PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s a p p e a r s t o have become - a s t a n d a r d p a r t o f t h e t r a i n i n g f o r modern-day c a n d i d a t e s . 31/ E. R e g u l a t i o n o f PACs PACS a r e F e d e r a l l y r e g u l a t e d by t h r e e p r i m a r y s o u r c e s . The f i r s t i s t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971 and i t s 1974, 1976, and 1979 Amendments: P u b l i c Laws 92-225, 93-443, c o d i f i e d i n law a s 2 U.S.C. 94-283, and 96-187, 431 e t s e q . respectively. The FECA i s S e c o n d l y , T i t l e 11 of t h e Code o f F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n s i n c l u d e s r e g u l a t i o n s promulgated by t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission which a r e b a s e d on t h e s t a t u t e s and which s e r v e a s more d e t a i l e d g u i d e l i n e s f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e campaign f i n a n c e p r o c e s s ; t h e s e a l s o have t h e advantage of being w r i t t e n with t h e i n t e n t of e a s i e r comprehensibility than s t a t u t o r y language. F i n a l l y , t h e FEC i s a u t h o r i z e d under 2 U.S.C. 437f t o i s s u e a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n s , a t t h e r e q u e s t of i n d i v i d u a l s , c a n d i d a t e s , o r c o m m i t t e e s , which a r e i n t e n d e d t o c l a r i f y q u e s t i o n s o r p e r c e i v e d a m b i g u i t i e s a b o u t t h e law. These a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n s a r e compiled and indexed by t h e FEC; t h e i n d e x i s updated p e r i o d i c a l l y and i s a v a i l a b l e from t h e Commission. PACs. 7-9. 3 0 1 Kayden, Xanda. I n U.S. Congress. 31/ - Campaign F i n a n c e : The Impact on P a r t i e s and An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact o f t h e FECA, p. 86. How t o S o l i c i t PACs. Campaigning R e p o r t s , v . 1, J u l y 26, 1979: CHAPTER TWO: EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES Although t h e y have o n l y r e c e n t l y become a major s o u r c e o f campaign f u n d i n g i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s a r e not a r e c e n t phenomenon. F u r t h e r m o r e , i n t e r e s t g r o u p involvement i n t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s i s n o t a new development. indirectly--to Groups have a l w a y s s o u g h t - - l e g a l l y and i l l e g a l l y , d i r e c t l y and maximize t h e i r i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e s e l e c t i o n o f p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . The f i r s t s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r o u t l i n e s t h e laws g o v e r n i n g g r o u p involvement i n F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s p r i o r t o t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971 and d i s c u s s e s t h e t y p e s of a c t i v i t i e s i n which t h e g r o u p s were engaged. The second s e c t i o n t r a c e s t h e key laws and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and j u d i c i a l r u l i n g s o f t h e 1 9 7 0 ' s which s e r v e d t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f PACs a s t h a t d e c a d e advanced. GROUP INVOLVEMENT PRIOR TO THE 1970s A. Legal R e s t r i c t i o n s D i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e l e c t i o n s by c o r p o r a t i o n s and l a b o r u n i o n s , t h e foremost t y p e s o f i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , h a s been c i r c u m s c r i b e d f o r much of t h i s century. - The T i l l m a n Act o f 1907 321 p r o h i b i t e d a l l c o r p o r a t i o n s and n a t i o n a l banks from making "money c o n t r i b u t i o n [ s l " i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . It was e n a c t e d a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f P r e s i d e n t Theodore R o o s e v e l t i n t h e wake of c h a r g e s d u r i n g h i s 1904 campaign t h a t he had r e c e i v e d l a r g e c o r p o r a t e 321 - 34 S t a t . 864 ( 1 9 0 7 ) contributions from prospective government contractors and in light of increased - public cynicism over the role of large corporations in the electoral process. 33/ - This prohibition was extended by the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 34/ to all contributions (not just monetary ones). That law, however, excluded primary elections and nominating conventions from its restrictions, in accordance with the prevailing interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision in Newberry v. United States. 351 The role of labor unions in election campaigns was not circumscribed until - 1943, with the enactment of the War Labor Disputes (or Smith-Connally) Act. 36/ Prior to that, most labor campaign contributions had come from union dues of members. What had prompted the move to curtail labor's political giving was the marked upsurge of such activity in and following the 1936 elections, as described in the following account: The 1936 elections saw an eruption of political activity by organized labor. Reported political expenditures by interstate labor organizations ran to over $750,000. This exceeded by eight times the sum raised by the American Federation of Labor for political purposes during the previous 30 years. Labor dove into active campaigning and into campaign contributing on behalf of Democratic candidates. The move provoked a fierce howl that clearly marked 1936 as a watershed year,in the political 371 alignment of social and economic interests. - 331 Epstein, Edwin M. Corporations, Contributions, and Political campaZns: Federal Regulation in Perspective. Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies, May 1968. p. 11-12. 341 - 43 Stat. 1074 (1925) 351 256 U.S. 232 (1921); the Newberry decision was seen as placing limitson the Federal Government ' s authority to control party primaries and conventions. 361 - 57 Stat. 167 (1943) 371 Heard, Alexander. The Costs of Democracy. university of North Carolina Press, 1960. p. 169. Chapel Hill, The In addition to the concern over the growing power of unions among opponents of labor's political philosophy, there developed a desire to protect the rights of union members from having their dues monies given to candidates with whom 381 they differed politically. - Consequently, the 1943 Act prohibited unions from making contributions in connection with elections for Federal office. An important distinction to note is that although unions were barred from using their treasuries for campaign contributions, they interpreted the law as not applying to their separate segregated funds. The 1943 Act was in effect only until six months after the end of World War 11, and, in 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations (or TaftHartley) Act which made permanent the restrictions on labor's political activities. 391 Furthermore, it extended the ban for both corporations and labor unions to expenditures as well as contributions, in light of efforts by the CIO's Political Action Committee in 1944 to circumvent the Smith-Connally prohibition on union contributions. 401 The 1947 Act also extended coverage (for corporations and unions) to primaries and conventions. This appeared to 41/ be consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Classic, which was interpreted as overruling the Newberry decision by sanctioning Federal 421 regulation of the nominating process. - 381 391 - Ibid., p. 190. 61 Stat. 159 (1947) 401 Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns, p. 147 411 - 313 U.S. 299 (1941) 421 Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns, p. 15r152 [fn. 431 The 1925 C o r r u p t P r a c t i c e s A c t , a s amended by t h e 1947 T a f t - H a r t l e y Act and c o d i f i e d a t 18 U.S.C. 610, was t h e p r i n c i p a l law g o v e r n i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s o f c o r p o r a t i o n s and l a b o r u n i o n s u n t i l t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign The 1925 law, however, was w i d e l y c o n s i d e r e d t o b e Act t o o k e f f e c t i n 1972. vague, w h i l e t h e j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were s e e n t o b e i n s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e t o o f f e r a c l e a r " l i n e o f d e m a r c a t i o n " between p e r m i s s i b l e and i m p e r m i s s i b l e - c o r p o r a t e and l a b o r a c t i v i t i e s . 4 3 1 F u r t h e r m o r e , r u l i n g s by t h e Supreme C o u r t and lower c o u r t s i n s i x c a s e s d u r i n g t h e 25-year d o u b t on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f 18 U.S.C. p e r i o d had c a s t s u f f i c i e n t 610 t h a t t h e J u s t i c e Department was - r e l u c t a n t t o p r o s e c u t e presumed o f f e n d e r s o f t h e law. 441 A s d e p i c t e d by o n e observer : V i r t u a l l y no c o r p o r a t i o n o r l a b o r union t h a t wished t o d o s o was d e t e r r e d d e f a c t o from making campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s . 451 - B. How I n t e r e s t Groups Made P o l i t i c a l C o n t r i b u t i o n s 1. Labor -- Labor u n i o n s had been engaged i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y f o r q u i t e some t i m e , b u t u n t i l 1936, u n i o n s had c o n t r i b u t e d o n l y s m a l l amounts d i r e c t l y t o p o l i t i c a l campaigns. The American F e d e r a t i o n o f Labor (AFL), t h e major u m b r e l l a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a t t h a t t i m e , m a i n t a i n e d a p r a c t i c e o f ------431 - Ibid., p. 56-57. 441 E p s t e i n , Edwin. C o r p o r a t i o n s and Labor Unions i n E l e c t o r a l ~ o l i t z s . I n A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t ( e d . ) . P o l i t i c a l F i n a n c e : Refonn and R e a l i t y . P h i l a d e l p h i a , The Annals of t h e American Academy o f P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l S c i e n c e , v . 425, May 1976. p. 37. 451 - Ibid., p. 39. not using its general funds for political purposes. 461 The enormous increase in union contributions in 1936 (noted earlier) emanated almost exclusively fr& unions affiliated with the more politically aggressive Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO), established in 1935. The preponderance of contributions by the CIO affiliated unions were made from union funds, as authorized by convention votes. 471 1 , In response to the Smith-Connally Act's prohibition on labor contributions in 1943, the Congress of Industrial Organization--as the CIO was later called-made the first foray into the field of political action committees, as we now know them. Labor unions had operated political committees in the past (most notably Labor's Non-Partisan League, which began a brief existence in 19361, but the CIO-PAC, established in July 1943, constituted the earliest effort at successfully maintaining what is today known in law as a "separate segregated fundH--a separate account for transfering voluntary contributions from members to political candidates. In addition to the CIO-PAC, the CIO, under the direction of Sidney Hillman, established the National Citizen's Political Action Cornittee (NC-PAC) in 1944, in order to collect political funds from progressive individuals 481 outside of labor's ranks. The CIO-PAC entered the political arena during the election of 1944. Prior to the Democratic Convention, it raised $647,903 from the general funds of its affiliated unions, of which it spent $478,499 on primary campaigns and "political education" of its members on issues. Given that the 1943 law did not cover 461 Overacker, Louise. Presidential Campaign Funds. ~ o s t o n ~ n i v e r s iPress, t~ 1946. p. 50. Ibid., p. 50-51. 481 - Ibid., p. 57-58. Boston, primary elections, it was an allowable expenditure for CIO-PAC. But once the convention was held and the general election campaign was considered to have begun, the existing PAC funds were frozen. Thereafter, the CIO-PAC launched its "A Buck for Roosevelt" drive to collect one dollar in voluntary contributions from its five million members; half of the money was to be used by the PAC and the other half was to be channeled to the union's State or local political action committees. The PAC raised $470,852 in this manner. 491 It is important to bear in mind that the CIO-PAC's activities were controversial at the time (indeed the primary contributions led to the tighter restrictions in the 1947 Act), but they played a major role in establishing precedents for later--and modern--modes of political activity by labor unions (and other groups). As the following passage reveals, the principal focus was, from the outset, on the maintenance of separate and distinct accounts for channeling political contributions: The status of the PAC committees also posed some legal conundrums. Union officials argued that these were not "labor organizations" within the meaning of the Smith-Connally Act as they were separately organized, under different sets of officers, and maintained independent treasuries. Nevertheless, the connection between the PAC and the CIO was very close on every level of organization. Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, an important CIO affiliate, was chairman of both the CIO-PAC and the NC-PAC; the State political action committees frequently utilized the existing mechanism of CIO State councils; and local political action committees were similarly set up as cormnittees of CIO locals. At the national level, and in most of the States, financial separation was strictly observed, and at the local level union personnel assigned to full-time PAC work were transferred to the PAC payroll. But when CIO personnel were assigned to the PAC on a part-time basis it was frequently impossible to distinguish the services which were political and which should be charged to the PAC. In California the separation between CIO and CIO-PAC was never very clearly defined. The State PAC was set up as a subcommittee of the 49/ - Ibid., p. 57-59. CIO, funds were not separate, and no separate records were kept. After the trade union fund was "frozen," the financial support of the CIO-PAC came from individual trade union members. CIO membership lists were, of course, used in soliciting contributions, and in some instances the "voluntary" character of these gifts was questioned. However, the modest size of the funds would seem to indicate that if compulsion was used, it was surprisingly ineffective. 50/ - With the CIO breaking ground in establishing and operating separate political funds in order to comply with Federal law, other labor unions followed suit. The AFL, the other major labor organization, set up its Labor's League for Political Education in 1947. 51/ In 1955, these two umbrella organizations merged to become the AFL-CIO, and their PACs were united as the Committee on Political Education (COPE). COPE quickly established itself as the foremost source of labor-oriented political giving, although other national unions added considerably to the overall political war chest of the American labor movement. In 1956, seventeen national labor political committees made disbursements of some $2.1 million; in addition, 155 State and local union affiliates had political committees in operation that year, although much of the local groups' 52/ By 1968, there funds constituted transfers from the national committees. were 37 national labor political committees making disbursements of $7.1 - million. 531 The most visible manifestation of labor's political giving took the form of "free fundsu--direct contributions to candidates from voluntary donations 501 511 52/ - Ibid., p. 60-61. Heard, The Costs of Democracy, p. 192 (fn). Ibid., p. 189. 531 Alexander, Herbert. Financing the 1976 Election. ~ o n ~ r z s i o n aQuarterly l Press, 1979. p. 559. Washington, by union members. C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s f o r F e d e r a l o f f i c e by i n t e r s t a t e committees ( l i m i t e d t o amounts o f $5000) were r e q u i r e d t o b e r e p o r t e d under t h e F e d e r a l C o r r u p t P r a c t i c e s A c t , t h u s making i t p o s s i b l e t o gauge (however i n e f f e c t i v e l y ) t h e l e v e l of c o n t r i b u t i o n s by such g r o u p s a s l a b o r u n i o n s . But f r e e f u n d s a l o n e d i d n o t r e f l e c t t h e t r u e l e v e l of l a b o r ' s p o l i t i c a l g i v i n g , and t h r e e o t h e r major avenues were w i d e l y u s e d - - a l l of which were funded from t h e g e n e r a l t r e a s u r i e s of u n i o n s : ( 1 ) C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s f o r S t a t e and l o c a l o f f i c e s c o u l d be made from union t r e a s u r i e s i n t h o s e S t a t e s which d i d not p r o h i b i t such p r a c t i c e s (few d i d ) . I n some S t a t e s , Democratic c a n d i d a t e s c o u l d e x p e c t t o r e c e i v e 10-20 p e r c e n t of t h e i r campaign f u n d s from u n i o n s . ( 2 ) Union t r e a s u r i e s were used f o r " e d u c a t i o n a l " technically non-political e x p e n d i t u r e s , which were ( t h u s not s u b j e c t t o F e d e r a l laws p r o h i b i t i n g union d u e s money f o r p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e s ) b u t which t y p i c a l l y i n v o l v e d such a c t i v i t i e s a s get-out-the-vote d r i v e s , v o t e r r e g i s t r a t i o n d r i v e s , and d i s t r i b u t i o n of v o t i n g records of elected o f f i c i a l s . The f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e i n d i c a t e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s c a t e g o r y of l a b o r a s s i s t a n c e t o c a n d i d a t e s : O r g a n i z e d l a b o r ' s r e g i s t r a t i o n d r i v e s may be o f more v a l u e t o t h e Democrats t h a n d i r e c t money c o n t r i b u t i o n s . I n 1968 COPE s p e n t more t h a n $1 m i l l i o n on r e g i s t r a t i o n a l o n e , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on m a r g i n a l C o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t s . L o c a l and s t a t e l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r i e d t o match t h i s n a t i o n a l o u t l a y . L a b o r ' s r e g i s t r a t i o n drives, naturally, are carried out selectively in 541 h e a v i l y Democratic p r e c i n c t s . - ( 3 ) P u b l i c s e r v i c e a c t i v i t i e s , such a s union newspapers and r a d i o programs, c o u l d be funded from t h e union t r e a s u r i e s , and t h e y were a b l e 541 A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E . ~ f f a i Pz r e s s , 1972. p. 170. Money i n P o l i t i c s . Washington, P u b l i c t o d i s s e m i n a t e i n f o r m a t i o n and views s u p p o r t i v e of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l philosophy. 551 I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e c h a n n e l s of a c t i v i t y open t o l a b o r unions d i s c u s s e d above, t h e unions enjoyed wide l a t i t u d e i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y a s a r e s u l t of v a r i o u s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s . Common p r a c t i c e s i n c l u d e d union employees' r e c e i v i n g compensation w h i l e p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s t o c a n d i d a t e s and a d v o c a t i n g - c a n d i d a t e s ' e l e c t i o n o r d e f e a t i n TV o r r a d i o time paid from union funds. 561 The above d i s c u s s i o n r e v e a l s t h e range of o p t i o n s open t o l a b o r unions which sought t o i n f l u e n c e t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s p r i o r t o t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws e n a c t e d d u r i n g t h e 1970s. While p i o n e e r i n g i n t h e f i e l d of s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d funds and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees f o r d i r e c t c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h e unions found many o t h e r v a l u a b l e means of making t h e i r influence f e l t . A s t h e c o s t s of many of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s were n o t r e q u i r e d t o be r e p o r t e d under t h e f i n a n c i a l d i s c l o s u r e laws i n e x i s t e n c e through 1972, i t was e x c e e d i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n a c c u r a t e d a t a on t h e d e g r e e of l a b o r u n i o n s ' f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y i n F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . T h i s d i f f i c u l t y was compounded by t h e e a s e with which t h e d i s c l o s u r e laws could be l e g a l l y circumvented, a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e p r a c t i c e by n a t i o n a l l a b o r committees of t r a n s f e r r i n g funds - t o S t a t e a f f i l i a t e s , not s u b j e c t t o F e d e r a l r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s . 571 However u n c e r t a i n one may be a s t o t h e e x t e n t of l a b o r spending i n t h e y e a r s l e a d i n g up t o t h e FECA o f 1971, one may s a f e l y conclude t h a t t h e unions were p l a y i n g a v i t a l r o l e i n t h e f i n a n c i n g of e l e c t i o n campaigns. 551 - 561 571 - Ibid., p. 170-171; and Heard, The C o s t s of Democracy, p. 177-178. Alexander, Money i n P o l i t i c s , p. 171. I b i d . , p. 172. 2. Business The c h a n n e l s f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r p r i o r t o t h e 1970s were a l s o w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e l e v e l of b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d a l t h o u g h i t i s even more d i f f i c u l t t o gauge a c t i v i t y than it is f o r labor a c t i v i t y . Corporate i n t e r e s t s d i d n o t e n t e r t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee f i e l d u n t i l t h e 1 9 6 0 s , h a v i n g i n s t e a d become accustomed t o d o n a t i n g l a r g e amounts o f money t o campaigns t h r o u g h c o r p o r a t e e x e c u t i v e s and o t h e r w e a l t h y i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h - l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s . 581 While t h i s was p e r h a p s t h e most v i s i b l e way o f s p e n d i n g p o l i t i c a l money i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of b u s i n e s s , i t was by no means t h e o n l y way. C o r p o r a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s were p r o h i b i t e d from s p e n d i n g t r e a s u r y money on c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s , b u t , a s w i t h l a b o r u n i o n s , t h e r e was a wide r a n g e of a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s on which g e n e r a l funds could be s p e n t . Here a g a i n , t h e l i n e between p a r t i s a n and b i p a r t i s a n , p e r m i s s i b l e and i m p e r m i s s i b l e , was o f t e n b l u r r e d enough t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e u n d e r t a k i n g o f a c t i v i t i e s by a c o r p o r a t i o n which had a d i s t i n c t s l a n t toward an i n t e n d e d b e n e f i c i a r y o r p o i n t of view. Such e l e c t i o n - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s a s v o t e r r e g i s t r a t i o n and g e t - o u t - t h e - v o t e d r i v e s among employees, p r o v i s i o n o f employee and s t o c k h o l d e r l i s t s t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , p a y r o l l d e d u c t i o n systems f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , and campaign f u n d - r a i s i n g d r i v e s among employees were conducted by v a r i o u s c o r p o r a t i o n s , a p p a r e n t l y n o t i n v i o l a t i o n of 18 U.S.C. - 610. 591 A s i d e from t h e above-mentioned "educational" a c t i v i t i e s , corporations had some leeway i n e n g a g i n g i n more p a r t i s a n e n d e a v o r s , such a s t o : 581 E p s t e i n , Edwin M. ~ a ~ / ~ 1979. = e p. 35. 591 - An I r o n y of E l e c t o r a l Reform. Regulation, v. 3 , E p s t e i n , C o r p o r a t i o n s , C o n t r i b u t i o n s , and P o l i t i c a l Campaigns, p. 45. ( 1 ) s u p p o r t o r oppose c a n d i d a t e s , p a r t i e s and i s s u e s i n t h e i r r e g u p u b l i c a t i o n s , c i r c u l a t e d t o t h e i r employees, s t o c k h o l d e r s , s u p p l i e r s and customers; ( 2 ) d i s t r i b u t e i n f o r m a t i o n a l l i t e r a t u r e t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c which s t a t e d t h e i s s u e s and c a n d i d a t e s ' r e c o r d s , b u t which d i d n o t a d v o c a t e t h e e l e c t i o n o r d e f e a t of c a n d i d a t e s ; ( 3 ) engage i n p u b l i c s e r v i c e a d v e r t i s i n g on p u b l i c i s s u e s ; ( 4 ) wage a d v e r t i s i n g campaigns w i t h r e g a r d t o p u b l i c p o l i c y i s s u e s n o t on t h e b a l l o t a s r e f e r e n d a o r i n i t i a t i v e s ; ( 5 ) a d v e r t i s e i n program books of n a t i o n a l p a r t y c o n v e n t i o n s - - a popular p r a c t i c e f o r which c o r p o r a t i o n s c o u l d r e c e i v e a t a x d e d u c t i o n ; and ( 6 ) u s e c o r p o r a t e f a c i l i t i e s and p e r s o n n e l t o s e e k v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s - t o an a f f i l i a t e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee ( d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r b e l o w ) . 601 The d i s c u s s i o n u n t i l t h i s p o i n t h a s been c o n f i n e d t o c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s a p a r t from d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s . But t h i s a s p e c t was n o t n e g l e c t e d by t h o s e s e e k i n g t o i n j e c t b u s i n e s s ' p o i n t o f view i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l process. T h e r e were b o t h d i r e c t (and l e g a l ) and i n d i r e c t ( a n d e x t r a - l e g a l ) methods f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o c a n d i d a t e s . A s u r v e y o f t h e N a t i o n ' s businessmen i n 1959 found t h a t h a l f o f t h o s e i n t e r v i e w e d c l a i m e d t o have c o n t r i b u t e d t o e l e c t i o n campaigns i n 1958--a high f i g u r e f o r a n o n - P r e s i d e n t i a l y e a r and markedly h i g h e r t h a n t h a t of t h e o v e r a l l - p o p u l a t i o n i n any y e a r . 6 1 1 C o r p o r a t e o f f i c i a l s gave c o n s i d e r a b l y t o e l e c t i o n campaigns, w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n would r e c e i v e t h e c r e d i t i n t h e e y e s o f t h e campaign o f f i c i a l s . practice: --601 I b i d . , 611 Ibid., - pp. 46-55. p. 6 9 . The f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e d i s c u s s e s t h i s S i n c e , o b v i o u s l y , t h e r e i s no o f f i c i a l r e c o r d of " c o r p o r a t e g i v i n g , " an i n d e x OF company c o n t r i b u t i o n s i s u s u a l l y compiled by a g g r e g a t i n g t h e " i n d i v i d u a l " d o n a t i o n s o f c o r p o r a t e o f f i c e r s and d i r e c t o r s . The u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n o f such c o m p i l a t i o n s i s t h a t c o r p o r a t e o f f i c i a l s a c t a s c o n d u i t s f o r company c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o p a r t i e s o r c a n d i d a t e s . 621 - I n 1956, f o r example, 199 o f f i c i a l s of some o f t h e 225 l a r g e s t c o r p o r a t i o n s - c o n t r i b u t e d $1.9 m i l l i o n i n amounts o f $500 o r more t o i n t e r s t a t e c o m m i t t e e s . 6 3 1 Both p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s made an e f f o r t t o a t t r a c t w e a l t h y ( o f t e n c o r p o r a t e a f f i l i a t e d ) d o n o r s , by c r e a t i n g such p r e s t i g i o u s c o n d u i t s a s t h e Democrats' P r e s i d e n t ' s Club--which r a i s e d around $3.8 m i l l i o n i n 1964--and t h e Republican - C o n g r e s s i o n a l B o o s t e r s Club. 641 A s i m p r e s s i v e a s t h e s e and o t h e r d a t a may b e , t h e y r e f l e c t o n l y a s h a r e o f t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s from c o r p o r a t i o n - a s s o c i a t e d individuals. By g i v i n g c a s h c o n t r i b u t i o n s o r g i v i n g t o i n t r a s t a t e c o m m i t t e e s , d o n o r s c o u l d and d i d a v o i d Federal r e p o r t i n g requirements. By g i v i n g t o i n t r a s t a t e c o m m i t t e e s , w e a l t h y d o n o r s c o u l d a l s o c i r c u m v e n t t h e F e d e r a l c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t of $5000. This l i m i t was a l s o c i r c u m v e n t e d t h r o u g h t h e p r a c t i c e of g i v i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h r o u g h members o f o n e ' s own f a m i l y . An example o f t h i s p r a c t i c e can be found i n 1956, when 12 f a m i l i e s commonly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p a r t i c u l a r c o r p o r a t i o n s gave o v e r $ 1 . 1 m i l l i o n t o i n t e r s t a t e p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s . (The f a m i l i e s were DuPont, F i e l d , F o r d , Harriman, Lehman, M e l l o n , O l i n , Pew, Reynolds, R o c k e f e l l e r , - V a n d e r b i l t , and Whitney.) 651 Hence, l a r g e amounts of money c o u l d be g i v e n l e g a l l y , d e s p i t e t h e l i m i t s , and l a r g e amounts c o u l d go u n r e p o r t e d l e g a l l y , d e s p i t e the disclosure requirements. 621 - Ibid., p. 61. 631 - Ibid., p. 64. 641 - I b i d . , p. 67. 651 Ibid., 7 p. 68. The i n d i r e c t c o r p o r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h o s e made i l l e g a l l y with c o r p o r a t e t r e a s u r y f u n d s , a r e , not s u r p r i s i n g l y , more d i f f i c u l t t o gauge. Such d o n a t i o n s d i d n o t appear on any l i s t s f i l e d w i t h governmental a g e n c i e s , nor were t h e y mentioned i n annual r e p o r t s t o s t o c k h o l d e r s . Most businessmen were u n d e r s t a n d a b l y d i s i n c l i n e d t o d i s c u s s t h e i r campaign a c t i v i t i e s . 661 I n 1960, Alexander Heard wrote: It i s n o t unusual f o r c o r p o r a t e funds t o make up 10 p e r c e n t of t h e campaign fund of a c a n d i d a t e f o r s t a t e o r l o c a l o f f i c e , and t h e p e r c e n t a g e has gone h i g h e r . In a l l , i n a p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n y e a r , s e v e r a l m i l l i o n d o l l a r s of c o r p o r a t e money f i n d s i t s way by one p r o c e s s o r a n o t h e r i n t o p o l i t i c a l campaigning. 671 - When read i n t h e wake of t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of t h e 1972 Nixon r e - e l e c t i o n campaign, t h i s passage u n d e r s t a t e s t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c h a n n e l l i n g c o r p o r a t e money i n t o p o l i t i c a l campaigns. According t o Edwin E p s t e i n , an e s t i m a t e d $30 m i l l i o n was c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h a t campaign from t h e b u s i n e s s sector--through i l l e g a l channels. both l e g a l and There were widespread a l l e g a t i o n s of s t r o n g p r e s s u r e t a c t i c s a p p l i e d t o c o r p o r a t e o f f i c i a l s , and some 20 c o r p o r a t i o n s and o f f i c i a l s were i n d i c t e d ( w i t h most p l e a d i n g g u i l t y o r nolo c o n t e n d e r e ) on c h a r g e s o f making i l l e g a l corporate p o l i t i c a l contributions. Thus, t h e 1972 campaign i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r c o u l d b e a l u c r a t i v e s o u r c e of campaign funds g i v e n - a s y s t e m a t i c s o l i c i t a t i o n e f f o r t by a campaign. 681 S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e 1972 e x p e r i e n c e s were a major impetus i n t h e amending of t h e campaign f i n a n c e law 661 - I b i d . , p. 69. 671 - Heard, The C o s t s of Democracy, p. 130. 6 8 / E p s t e i n , Edwin M. Labor and F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s : The New Legal ~ r a m e K r k . I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s , v . 15, October 1976. p. 262. According t o Heard, t h e v a r i o u s , commonly-used methods o f i n d i r e c t c o r p o r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s s t r e s s e d concealment o f c o r p o r a t e f u n d s : ( 1 ) e x p e n s e a c c o u n t s were used t o r e i m b u r s e c o r p o r a t e o f f i c i a l s f o r campaign-related e n t e r t a i n i n g and t r a v e l i n g ; (2) c o n t r i b u t i o n s "in-kind," whereby goods and s e r v i c e s were l o a n e d o r d o n a t e d by a b u s i n e s s t o a campaign ( e . g . , o f f i c e equipment, company airplanes, etc. ); ( 3 ) a d v e r t i s e m e n t s i n p o l i t i c a l j o u r n a l s , p a i d f o r from c o r p o r a t e funds but with t h e source concealed; ( 4 ) c o r p o r a t e money " l a u n d e r e d " t h r o u g h p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s f i r m on r e t a i n e r , w i t h money t h e n f u n n e l e d i n t o campaigns; ( 5 ) f e e s t o lawyers re-routed t o campaigns; ( 6 ) s a l a r i e s and bonuses t o employees, g i v e n w i t h t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e y , i n t u r n , w i l l make p o l i t i c a l d o n a t i o n s ( s a i d t o be a p a r t i c u l a r l y notorious practice); ( 7 ) c o n t r i b u t i o n s c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , such a s t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s ; and (8) d i r e c t c o r p o r a t e payments, e . g . , - from p e t t y c a s h . 691 One p r a c t i c e o m i t t e d i n H e a r d ' s l i s t was t h a t o f c o r p o r a t e o f f i c i a l s ' r e c e i v i n g r e m u n e r a t i o n w h i l e d o i n g campaign work, a widespread o c c u r r e n c e a c c o r d i n g t o most a c c o u n t s . The p i c t u r e t h a t emerges i s of c o r p o r a t e a c t i v i t i e s r e s e m b l i n g t h o s e o f l a b o r u n i o n s i n e x p l o r i n g avenues f o r p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t . The f i n a l avenue o f b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h e pre-1970's p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee. e r a was t h e The f i r s t major PAC i n t h e b u s i n e s s (and p r o f e s s i o n a l ) s e c t o r was t h e American Medical P o l i t c a l A c t i o n Committee (AMPAC), 691 - Heard, The C o s t s o f Democracy, p. 133-134 founded in 1961 by the American Medical Association to further the goal of "minimizing government control over the medical profession." 701 It was followed in August 1963, by the Business-Industry Political Action Comnittce (BIPAC), which was established by the National Association of Manufacturers "to provide financial support to Congressional candidates who support the principles of constitutional government." 711 Both of these PACs followed the lead of COPE and created two separate accounts--one for administrative costs for which corporate funds could be used and the other for the contributions themselves for which only voluntary funds could be sought. The system was described by the then-President of BIPAC, Robert Humphrey, before House hearings in the 89th Congress: [ ~ l ehave two distinct funds. We have two distinct divisions of operation. One is political education, and the other is political action. We maintain separate bank accounts. The political education funds are used for our administrative overhead. We do not intermingle the funds. We have a small political education budget and the money in our education account comes from corporate contributions and from subscriptions to our publication. 72/ - During the 1964 elections, BIPAC spent $203,283 and AMPAC spent $402,052 (compared - with the $988,810 spent that year by COPE). 731 In 1968, B1PAC's spending jumped - to $519,700 and AMPAC1s to $682,000 (COPE spent $1,207,000 that year). 74/ BIPAC 701 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1968 Election. ~ e a t h y n dCompany, 1971. p. 202. 711 - Lexington, D.C. Ibid., p. 201. 721 U .S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. ~ubcoGitteeon Elections. Election Reform Act of 1966. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 21, Aug. 17, 22, and 25, 1966. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. p. 120. 731 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1964 Election. Princeton, citiz=s1 Research Foundation, 1966 [study number 91. p. 64-65. 741 - Alexander, Financing the 1968 ~lection,p. 195, 201-202. and AMPAC together accounted for 61 percent of total expenditures by the 33 national business and professional committees then in existence. 751 Those 33 represented a three-fold increase in the number of business and 761 and by 1972, there were some professional committees registered in 1964, 771 Furthermore, as more business-oriented groups were 200 such committees. formed, the enormous gap between reported business and labor spending (nationally) was narrowed significantly. Gross disbursements by the 37 national-level labor committees totaled $7.1 million in 1968; a little over $2 million was spent by the 33 business and professional committees that year--a gap of around three and one-half in labor's favor. 781 By 1972, the national labor committees spent $8.5 million, while the business/professiona1 committees spent $6.8 million--an 791 Of course, the labor totals do advantage by labor of around 33 percent. not reflect the substantial value in additional services which unions have traditionally provided, as indicated in this 1972 account: . . . it would be difficult to exaggerate the political value of labor's enormous manpower pool, particularly for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities on election day. The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department and affiliates may put as much as $4 to $5 million into citizenship activities, including registration drives. 801 - By the same token, the spending data do not reflect the additional resources of the business sector which was channeled into political campaigns through - 751 761 - Ibid., p. 200-201. Ibid., p. 200. 771 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1972 Election. D.C. Heath and Company, 1976. p. 461. 781 791 801 - Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election, p. 194, 201. Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election, p. 504, 461. Ibid., p. 506. Lexington, t h e many avenues d e s c r i b e d above. The d a t a i s i n d i c a t i v e , however, of t h e growing, open r o l e of c o r p o r a t i o n s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s d u r i n g t h e decade preceding t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act. 3 . Conclusion B u s i n e s s and l a b o r h a v e , a s n o t e d , long sought t o i n f l u e n c e t h e e l e c t o r a l process. I n examining t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs i n t h e 1970s and beyond, i t i s important t o b e a r i n mind t h a t t h e i r u n d e r l y i n g r a i s o n d ' e t r e - - t h e furthering of t h e g r o u p ' s p o l i c y g o a l s and t h e maximizing of i t s i n f l u e n c e through t h e e l e c t i o n of s y m p a t h e t i c p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s - - h a s b e f o r e t h e modern-day e r a of PACs. been a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e long Groups sought i n f l u e n c e and s p e n t money i n l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s , through l e g a l and e x t r a - l e g a l channels. The PAC evolved a s a means of l e g a l l y circumventing t h e p r o h i b i t i o n on c o r p o r a t e and, l a t e r , union contributions t o candidates. Once l a b o r unions were f o r c e d t o t u r n t o t h i s method, t h e y q u i c k l y developed a p a t t e r n of e f f e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s through t h e use of s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d funds. It was o n l y a m a t t e r of time b e f o r e t h e b u s i n e s s c o r n u n i t y began t o emulate l a b o r ' s s u c c e s s e s . The fundamental p o i n t i s t h a t i n t e r e s t group involvement g e n e r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee a c t i v i t y s p e c i f i c a l l y pre-dated t h e campaign f i n a n c e reforms of t h e 1 9 7 0 ' s . Indeed, t h e y s e t t h e p r e c e d e n t s f o r t o d a y ' s PACs. 11. STIMULI TO PAC GROWTH I N THE 1970s PROVIDED BY LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS A number of a c t i o n s by t h e t h r e e b r a n c h e s of t h e F e d e r a l Government s e t t h e s t a g e f o r t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees d u r i n g t h e 1970's. E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s a l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f t h e i m p o r t a n t PAC p r o v i s i o n s , s p e c i f i c a l l y f o c u s i n g on t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971 and i t s 1974 and 1976 Amendments. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s 1971 d e c i s i o n i n P i p e f i t t e r s L o c a l 562 v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t s 1976 d e c i s i o n i n Buckley v . V a l e o , and t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission's 1975 a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n i n t h e Sun O i l Company c a s e w i l l be examined, f o r t h e i r r e l e v a n c e t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y and t h e i r r o l e i n PAC growth o f t h e 1970s. These a c t i o n s o c c u r r e d a g a i n s t a b a c k d r o p i n which PACs had e x i s t e d and were growing i n number b u t i n which u n c e r t a i n t y e x i s t e d o v e r what t y p e s o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y were p e r m i s s i b l e . Such c o n c e r n s were h e i g h t e n e d by i n c o n c l u s i v e j u d i c i a l r u l i n g s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e law ( 1 8 U.S.C. 6 1 0 ) , and t h e y s e r v e d t o hamper i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i n e x p l o r i n g t h e f u l l p o t e n t i a l o f t h e PAC v e h i c l e . By c l a r i f y i n g t h e a m b i g u i t i e s i n t h e law and by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g t h e PAC a s a r e c o g n i z e d v e h i c l e under t h e law, t h e s e l e g i s l a t i v e and o t h e r a c t i o n s c r e a t e d t h e c l i m a t e i n which p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n conunittees c o u l d f l o u r i s h . A. The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971 - The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971 ( P u b l i c Law 92-225) 811 marked t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee was c o d i f i e d i n t o F e d e r a l law. S e c t i o n 205 of t h a t Act amended 18 U.S.C. 610 t o e x c l u d e t h r e e s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s from t h e l e g a l r e s t r a i n t s on c o r p o r a t e and union p o l i t i c a l expenditures. A s s t a t e d i n t h e amended v e r s i o n o f S e c t i o n 610, t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i v i t i e s c o u l d b e funded from c o r p o r a t e o r union g e n e r a l t r e a s u r i e s : 811 - 86 S t a t . 3 . communications by a corporation to its stockholders and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their families on any subject; nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; [and] the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation or labor organization .... While thus opening the door for the political action committee, the amended section added the following language to ensure that only truly voluntary contributions be made to the PAC: .... Provided, that it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial transaction. The above amendments to 18 U.S.C. 610 were initially offered as an amendment to H.R. 11060 (the House version of the FECA) by Representative Orval Hansen. The Hansen amendment passed the House by a 233-147 vote, 821 replacing a section of the House Administration Committee's bill which also sanctioned the separate segregated fund but which was seen as prohibiting the use of union (and corporate) funds in registration and get-out-the-vote drives. Supporters of the Hansen amendment argued that its intended effect was - to codify in law what 18 U.S.C. 610 had been interpreted to mean. 831 Describing his amendment as consistent with the then-existing statute, Hansen stated: For the underlying theory of section 610 is that substantial general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political 821 Federal Election Reform. [Vote in the House] ~ e c o r Kv. 117, November 30, 1971. p. 43391. ~ouse: Congressional 831 Steiger, William. Federal Election Reform. Remarks in the Congressional Record, v. 117, November 30, 1971. p. 43388. p u r p o s e s , b o t h because of t h e e f f e c t on t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s o f such aggregated w e a l t h and o u t of concern f o r t h e d i s s e n t i n g member o r s t o c k h o l d e r . Obviously, n e i t h e r of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c u t s a g a i n s t a l l o w i n g v o l u n t a r y p o l i t i c a l funds. For no one who o b j e c t s t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s p o l i t i c s has t o lend h i s s u p p o r t , and t h e money c o l l e c t e d i s t h a t i n t e n d e d by t h o s e who c o n t r i b u t e t o be used f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes and not money d i v e r t e d from a n o t h e r s o u r c e . 841 - The S e n a t e ' s v e r s i o n of t h e FECA--S. 382--had c o n t a i n e d no p r o v i s i o n comparable t o t h e Hansen amendment, and t h e c o n f e r e e s on t h e l e g i s l a t i o n accepted t h e House-passed - language. 851 Thus t h e Hansen amendment became law. S e c t i o n 206 of t h e FECA amended 18 U.S.C. 611, which p r o h i b i t e d p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by Government c o n t r a c t o r s , t o extend t h e ban t o i n d i r e c t , a s w e l l - a s d i r e c t , c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 861 Because PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s could be viewed a s i n d i r e c t l y emanating from t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s t r e a s u r y f u n d s , t h i s s e c t i o n a p p a r e n t l y had a c h i l l i n g e f f e c t on Government c o n t r a c t o r s i n t e r e s t e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g PACs. Furthermore, t h e f a c t t h a t many of t h e most i m p o r t a n t c o r p o r a t i o n s and unions were engaged i n some form of Government c o n t r a c t i n g meant t h a t t h e new p r o v i s i o n s of 18 U.S.C. - wide range of i n t e r e s t groups. 871 611 would c o n c e i v a b l y a f f e c t a It was i r o n i c t h a t , w h i l e one s e c t i o n of t h e new campaign f i n a n c e law provided t h e l e g a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees, t h e n e x t s e c t i o n may have caused s u f f i c i e n t c o n f u s i o n s o a s t o i n h i b i t many p o t e n t i a l s p o n s o r s of PACs from e s t a b l i s h i n g them. 841 Hansen, O r v a l . F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Reform. Remarks i n t h e House. ~ o n ~ r z s i o n Record, al v . 117, November 30, 1971. p. 43381. 851 U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federal Election c a m p a Z n Act of 1971. Conference Report t o accompany S. 382. House Report No. 92-752, 92nd Cong., 1st S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1971. p. 30-31. 861 871 - E p s t e i n , C o r p o r a t i o n s and Labor Unions, p. 40-41. Alexander, F i n a n c i n g t h e 1976 E l e c t i o n , p. 560. B. P i p e f i t t e r s L o c a l 562 v . U n i t e d S t a t e s The Supreme C o u r t ' s J u n e 1972 r u l i n g i n t h e c a s e o f v. United S t a t e s 18 U.S.C. 881 p r o v i d e d t h e f i r s t l e g a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e r e v i s e d 6 1 0 , and i t v a l i d a t e d t h e c o n c e p t of u n i o n s ' and c o r p o r a t i o n s ' maintaining s e p a r a t e voluntary funds f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . The c a s e i n v o l v e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e union and t h r e e o f f i c e r s f o r t h e i r m a i n t a i n i n g c o n t r o l o v e r a s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d fund f o r which s o l i c i t a t i o n s were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y made a t job s i t e s . The C o u r t of A p p e a l s had upheld t h e i r - c o n v i c t i o n 891 on t h e grounds t h a t t h e fund was compulsory and u n i o n - f i n a n c e d r a t h e r t h a n v o l u n t a r y and member-financed. 901 The Supreme C o u r t ' s 6-2 r e v e r s a l of t h e Court of Appeals r u l i n g c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , which had played a key r o l e i n t h e p a s s a g e of t h e Hansen amendment, a p p a r e n t l y w i t h t h e pending Supreme Court r u l i n g i n mind. According t o one a c c o u n t : U n c e r t a i n a s t o what d i r e c t i o n t h e Supreme C o u r t would t a k e , t h e AFL-CIO s o u g h t l e g i s l a t i v e l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of t h e key a s p e c t s o f i t s e l e c t o r a l r o l e s i n c e t h e 1940s: u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee d e v i c e t o r a i s e and d i s t r i b u t e p o l i t i c a l monies; communicating p o l i t i c a l l y w i t h i t s members; and, f i n a l l y , membero r i e n t e d r e g i s t r a t i o n and g e t - o u t - t h e - v o t e a c t i v i t i e s . 911 - Thus, t h e P i p e f i t t e r s c a s e s e r v e d , w h i l e i t was s t i l l p e n d i n g , a s t h e c a t a l y s t f o r t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e Hansen amendment a n d , l a t e r , a s t h e f i r s t j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n t h a t o b s e r v e r s saw a s l e g i t i m i z i n g t h e t h r u s t o f t h e Hansen amendment. 881 891 901 - 407 U.S. 385 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 434 F. 2d 1127 (CCA 8 t h , 1 9 7 0 ) . E p s t e i n , Labor and F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s , p. 261. 9 1 1 E p s t e i n , Edwin M. The Emergence o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees. I n P o l i t i c a l F i n a n c e . B e v e r l y H i l l s , Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , ~ l e x a z e ,r H e r b e r t ( e d . ) 1979. p. 265. . The Supreme Court h e l d t h a t no v i o l a t i o n of t h e (amended) law had o c c u r r e d , i n view o f t h e f a c t t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n s were s o u g h t f o r t h e PAC on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s ( w i t h no r e p r i s a l s t h r e a t e n e d 1, t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d p o l i t i c a l purpose o f t h e d o n a t i o n s was c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d , and t h a t t h e money was k e p t s e g r e g a t e d from t h e union t r e a s u r y ( d u e s money). That t h e union o f f i c i a l s were i n v o l v e d i n c o l l e c t i n g t h e f u n d s and r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n was not viewed by t h e C o u r t a s a v i o l a t i o n of t h e law. Nowhere, however, h a s Congress r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s be f o r m a l l y o r f u n c t i o n a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t of union c o n t r o l o r t h a t union o f f i c i a l s b e b a r r e d from s o l i c i t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s o r even p r e c l u d e d from d e t e r m i n i n g how t h e monies r a i s e d w i l l be s p e n t 921 - .... By g i v i n g i t s s a n c t i o n t o t h e v o l u n t a r y , s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d , t h e C o u r t a c c o r d e d primacy t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t o c k h o l d e r o r union member from h a v i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e t o c a n d i d a t e s opposed t o t h e i r p e r s o n a l p h i l o s o p h i e s o v e r t h e sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g g o a l of l i m i t i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e o f - u n i o n s and c o r p o r a t i o n s i n e l e c t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e i r a g g r e g a t e d w e a l t h . 931 Court s t a t e d : When Congress p r o h i b i t e d l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s from making c o n t r i b u t i o n s o r expenditures i n connection with f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , i t was, of c o u r s e , concerned n o t o n l y t o p r o t e c t m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n t h e union b u t t o e l i m i n a t e t h e e f f e c t of a g g r e g a t e d w e a l t h on e l e c t i o n s . But t h e a g g r e g a t e d w e a l t h i t p l a i n l y had i n mind was t h e g e n e r a l u n i o n t r e a s u r y - - n o t t h e f u n d s d o n a t e d by union members of t h e i r own f r e e and knowing c h o i c e . 941 - - Although i t r e f u s e d t o d e a l w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s , 951 t h e C o u r t ' s 921 - 407 U.S., 931 941 951 - E p s t e i n , C o r p o r a t i o n s and Labor Unions, p. 4 2 . a t 415. 407 U.S., a t 415-416. 407 U.S., a t 407. The ruling in the Pipefitters case nonetheless offered a sense of legitimacy to the operation and concept of the separate segregated fund--the essence of the PAC--and particularly to the practice of union (or corporate) control over the disposition of the funds. Without the right to involve themselves in this aspect of the process, the political influence of business and labor would be sharply curtailed. C. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 96/ The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (public Law 93-443) - constituted a response of Congress to the Watergate scandal and is principally remembered for its imposition of limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures, and the establishment of the Federal Election Commission. With regard to PACs, the FECA Amendments of 1974 made three changes, relating to penalties, contribution limits, and Government contractors; the basic intent of 18 U.S.C. 610, as amended by the 1971 Act, was not affected by the 1974 legislation. Section 101(a) of Public Law 93-443 amended 18 U.S.C. 608 to impose a limitation of $5000 on the amount a "political committee" (other than a candidate's principal campaign committee) could donate per election to a candidate for Federal office, while any other "person" was limited to giving $1000. As defined in the amended section (b)(2), a "political committee" met the criteria of what the 1976 Amendments later defined as a "multicandidate committee"--one that is registered for at least six months with the FEC, receives contributions from more than 50 persons, and makes contributions to 96/ - 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). five or more Federal candidates. Hence, the term "political committee" under the 1974 Amendments can be read as "multicandidate committee" or "political action committee ," the terms used today; the term "person" under the 1974 Amendments would today refer to both an "individual" or a (non-multicandidate) "political committee." Thus, the 1974 Amendments made the critical distinction for purposes of the contribution limit between the political action committee and the individual. The opportunity for greater leverage accorded the PAC has had a definite impact on the financing of congressional elections, as will be discussed later. The second PAC-related provision in the 1974 Amendments was in Section 101(e) which amended 18 U.S.C. 610 to impose higher penalties for violations of the ban on corporate and union contributions. The penalty for organizations convicted of violating the ban was raised from $5000 to $25,000 and from $10,000 to $50,000 for officers of those organizations who were found guilty of such violations. The third provision, and the one which may well have had the biggest impact on PAC development in the 1970s, was the authorization for Government contractors to set up PACs. The confusion over this question steming from the 1971 Act was exacerbated by a 1972 law suit by Common Cause against TRW, Inc., which alleged that the company, a major Government contractor, violated the law by setting - up a PAC. 971 Both the House Administration Committee, in its report on H.R. 16090, 981 and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, in its report on ------971 - Epstein, Corporations and Labor Unions, p. 49. 981 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. ~ e d e r xElection Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Report to accompany H.R. 16090. House Report no. 93-1239, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 20-21. - S. 3044, 991 recommended amending 18 U.S.C. 611 to allow Government contractors to establish separate segregated funds. These provisions were passed by the respective chambers, and the following language was reported by the conference - committee 1001 and was written into Public Law 93-443 as Section 103, amending 18 U.S.C. 611 to read: This section does not prohibit or make unlawful the establishment or administration of, or the solicitation of contributions to, any separate segregated fund by any corporation or labor organization for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal office, unless the provisions of section 610 of this title or make unlawful the establishment or administration of, or the solicitation of contributions to, such fund. This provision removed a major stumbling block to the establishment of PACs by those companies and unions doing business with the Federal Government. The FEC's SUN PAC Advisory Opinion On November 18, 1975, the newly-created Federal Election Commission issued an advisory opinion in response to a request from the Sun Oil Company which had a dramatic effect on the rise of the corporate political action committee. Sun Oil had requested permission from the FEC to expend corporate funds in seeking employee and stockholder contributions to two separate political programs: a trustee payroll deduction plan (SUN EPA), which would act as a conduit for political contributions to candidates designated by the donor, and a political 991 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. ~ e d e r a r ~ l e ion c t Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Report to accompany S 3044. Senate Report no. 93-689, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 17. . 1001 U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Conference Report to accompany S. 3044. House Report no. 93-1438, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 67-69. 7 a c t i o n committee (SUN PAC), t h r o u g h which c o n t r i b u t i o n s would be g i v e n t o c a n d i d a t e s a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n of company o f f i c i a l s . I n A d v i s o r y O p i n i o n 1975-23, t h e FEC approved t h e proposed Sun O i l Company programs a n d , i n s o d o i n g , e s t a b l i s h e d s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t p r e c e d e n t s : ( 1 ) t h a t g e n e r a l t r e a s u r y f u n d s c o u l d b e used t o e s t a b l i s h , a d m i n i s t e r , and s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o b o t h SUN PAC and SUN EPA; ( 2 ) t h a t Sun c o u l d s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o SUN PAC from employees, a s well a s stockholders; ( 3 ) t h a t Sun c o u l d e s t a b l i s h m u l t i p l e PACs w i t h s e p a r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n and e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i t s ( a s long a s t h e f u n d s came s o l e l y from v o l u n t a r y - c o n t r i b u t i o n s ) ; 1011 and ( 4 ) t h a t t h e p a y r o l l deduction (automatic check-off) p l a n was a l e g i t i m a t e v e h i c l e w i t h which t h e company c o u l d s e e k c o n t r i b u t i o n s , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e p r o h i b i t i o n on such a p l a n f o r l a b o r u n i o n s engendered i n t h e 1947 - T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t . 1021 C l e a r l y , t h e major ground broken by' t h e SUN PAC r u l i n g was t h e p e r m i s s i o n g r a n t e d f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s t o s o l i c i t employees, i n a d d i t i o n t o s t o c k h o l d e r s ( a s s p e c i f i c a l l y p e r m i t t e d i n 1 8 U.S.C. 610). T h i s was s e e n by l a b o r u n i o n s and t h e two d i s s e n t i n g FEC Commissioners a s u p s e t t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l b a l a n c e Congress had sought t o e s t a b l i s h between c o r p o r a t i o n s and u n i o n s . Sun O i l , f o r example, had 126,555 s t o c k h o l d e r s and 27,707 employees, few of whom were u n i o n i z e d ; t h u s , w h i l e t h e company c o u l d s o l i c i t o v e r 150,000 p e r s o n s , t h e union c o u l d s o l i c i t - j u s t a s m a l l f r a c t i o n o f t h a t . 1031 1011 1021 - L03/ - The FEC d i d s e e k t o a l l e v i a t e some o f t h e E p s t e i n , The Emergence of P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 167. E p s t e i n , Labor and F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s , p. 268. E p s t e i n , The Emergence of P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 168. CRS -4 5 p o t e n t i a l problems c a u s e d by a l l o w i n g employees t o be s o l i c i t e d by t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , and i t recommended t h e f o l l o w i n g g u i d e l i n e s i n i t s o p i n i n r l : F i r s t , no s u p e r i o r s h o u l d s o l i c i t a s u b o r d i n a t e . Second, t h e s o l i c i t o r s h o u l d i n f o r m t h e s o l i c i t e d employee of t h e p o l i t i c a l . p u r p o s e of t h e fund f o r which t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n i s s o l i c i t e d . T h i r d , t h e s o l i c i t o r s h o u l d i n f o r m t h e employee of t h e employee ' r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o c o n t r i b u t e w i t h o u t r e p r i s a l of any k i n d . -104/ --- ~ . The g u i d e l i n e s a p p a r e n t l y d i d l i t t l e t o a s s u a g e t h e c o n c e r n s of organized l n b n r t h a t employees would b e p r e s s u r e d , however s u b t l y by t h e i r e m p l o y e r s , 111 g ~ r l sc L~, u n i o n s were d i s t r e s s e d by t h e SUN PAC (and SUN EPA) r u l i n g , w h i l e t h e b L ~ s i ~ l c ~ c s sector hailed it. I n i t s d e t a i l e d p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t and o p e r a t i o n o f c o r p o r a t e PACs, t h e FEC h e l p e d c r e a t e a c l i m a t e more c o n d u c i v e t o t h e i r establishment. As one a c c o u n t s t a t e d : While i t was t h e 1971 and 1974 amendments t h a t provided t h e leg?.l a u t h o r i t y f o r b u s i n e s s PACs, i t was SUN PAC t h a t provided t h e imprimatur f o r t h e e x p l o s i o n i n t h e i r s i z e and numbers. 105/ E. The Supreme C o u r t ' s Buckley v . V a l e o D e c i s i o n On J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1976, t h e Supreme C o u r t i s s u e d i t s d e c i s i o n i n t h e c a s e -- of Buckley v . V a l e o , 106/ i n which t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of many cE t h e c ~ ~ r r ~ p a i g n f i n a n c e r e f o r m s of 1974 were a t i s s u e . Most n o t a b l y , t h e C o u r t upheld t h e 1;mlr.s on c o n t r i b u t i o n s , while n u l l i f y i n g t h e expenditure l i m i t s . Although 18 IT.!; I:, 610 and 6 1 1 were n o t d i r e c t l y a t i s s u e , t h e Buckley d e c i s i o n d i d h a v e a b e n t i v g on p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s i n t h r e e a r e a s . - 1041 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. A d v i s o r y O p i n i o n 1.975-23. R e g i s t e r , v . 4 0 , no. 233, Dec. 3 , 1975. p. 56584-56588. 1051 - E p s t e i n , An I r o n y o f E l e c t o r a l Reform, p. 36. 106/ - 424 U. S. 1 (1976) F'ede~a~ I n two i n s t a n c e s , t h e C o u r t r e l i e d upon, and i t s d e c i s i o n c o i n c i d e d w i t h , t h e FEC's r u l i n g i n t h e SUN PAC c a s e . I n i t s d e f e n s e o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n on c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h e Court argued t h a t ample o p p o r t u n i t i e s remained f o r i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s t o h a v e an impact on t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s . The PAC was h e l d up a s an example i n t h e f o l l o w i n g f o o t n o t e , i n which t h e Court made r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a b i l i t y o f c o r p o r a t i o n s t o s o l i c i t employees ( t h e prime c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e SUN PAC d e c i s i o n i n t h e view of many c o m m e n t a t o r s ) : While p r o v i d i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e a b i l i t y of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s t o c o n t r i b u t e l a r g e amounts o f money t o c a n d i d a t e s , t h e A c t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n c e i l i n g s do not f o r e c l o s e t h e making of s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s by some major s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t h r o u g h t h e combined e f f e c t o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s from a d h e r e n t s o r t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l f u n d s e a c h a u t h o r i z e d under t h e Act t o c o n t r i b u t e t o c a n d i d a t e s . As a prime example, 5610 p e r m i t s c o r p o r a t i o n s and l a b o r u n i o n s t o e s t a b l i s h s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s t o s o l i c i t v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o be u t i l i z e d f o r p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e s . C o r p o r a t e and union r e s o u r c e s w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n may b e employed t o a d m i n i s t e r t h e s e f u n d s and t o s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s from employees, s t o c k h o l d e r s , and union members. Each s e p a r a t e fund may c o n t r i b u t e up t o $5,000 per c a n d i d a t e per e l e c t i o n s o l o n g a s t h e fund q u a l i f i e s a s a p o l i t i c a l committee under 5 6 0 8 ( b ) ( 2 ) 1071 - ... A s t h e f o o t n o t e c o n t i n u e d , t h e C o u r t a p p e a r e d t o adopt a n o t h e r a s p e c t of t h e SUN PAC r u l i n g - - c o n c e r n i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o l i f e r a t i o n , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of m u l t i p l e PACs w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n : The Act p l a c e s no l i m i t on t h e number of f u n d s t h a t may be formed t h r o u g h t h e u s e of s u b s i d i a r i e s o r d i v i s i o n s of c o r p o r a t i o n s , o r o f l o c a l and r e g i o n a l u n i t s of a n a t i o n a l l a b o r union. The p o t e n t i a l f o r p r o l i f e r a t i o n of t h e s e s o u r c e s of I n 1972, a p p r o x i m a t e l y c o n t r i b u t i o n s i s not i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 1 , 8 2 4 , 0 0 0 a c t i v e c o r p o r a t i o n s f i l e d f e d e r a l income t a x I n t h e same y e a r , 71,409 l o c a l u n i o n s were returns c h a r t e r e d by n a t i o n a l u n i o n s The Act a l l o w s t h e maximum c o n t r i b u t i o n t o be made by e a c h u n i t ' s fund provided t h e d e c i s i o n o r judgment t o c o n t r i b u t e t o p a r t i c u l a r c a n d i d a t e s i s made by t h e fund i n d e p e n d e n t l y of c o n t r o l .... 1071 - 424 U.S., a t 28 [ f n . 311. .... o r d i r e c t i o n by t h e p a r e n t c o r p o r a t i o n o r t h e n a t i o n a l o r r e g i o n a l u n i o n . 1081 The t h i r d r e s p e c t i n which t h e Buckley d e c i s i o n had an impact on PACs concerned t h e i s s u e of independent expenditures. The Court d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e FECA's l i m i t a t i o n s on i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , t h o s e made i n s u p p o r t o f o r o p p o s i t i o n t o c a n d i d a t e s w i t h o u t p r i o r a p p r o v a l o f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h a c a n d i d a t e ' s own campaign. 1091 By l i f t i n g t h e l i m i t s on s u c h e x p e n d i t u r e s , w h i l e l e a v i n g i n t a c t t h o s e on d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s , t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g c r e a t e d a major avenue f o r i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s s e e k i n g t o i n f l u e n c e e l e c t i o n s beyond t h e l e v e l p e r m i t t e d under t h e FECA. I n t h e y e a r s s i n c e 1976, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 1980 and 1982, t h e i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e r o u t e h a s become i n c r e a s i n g l y p o p u l a r , w i t h t h e l e a d e r s i n t h e f i e l d being t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. t h e independent expenditure--are f i n a n c e d i n t h e 1980s. These two v e h i c l e s - - t h e PAC and c h a n g i n g t h e way i n which o u r p o l i t i c s a r e And t h e i n c r e a s i n g c o n v e r g e n c e o f t h e two methods h a v e compounded t h e i r impact on t h e system. F. The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act Amendments o f 1976 On May 11, 1976, t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act Amendments o f 1976 ( p u b l i c Law 94-283) 1101 were s i g n e d i n t o law. Although t h e new amendments were n e c e s s i t a t e d by t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n t h e B u c k l e y v . Valeo c a s e , which d i d n o t d e a l d i r e c t l y w i t h PACs, t h e 1976 law c o n t a i n e d numerous and i m p o r t a n t p r o v i s i o n s which had a d i r e c t b e a r i n g on PACs and t h e i r e v o l u t i o n . 1081 109/ - Ibid. 1101 - 90 S t a t . 475 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . Ibid., a t 47-48. These p r o v i s i o n s . d i t t m p t L O c l a r i f y t h e laws r e l a t i n g t o PACs t h r o u g h g r e a t e r . , s 5 r ~ ~ e dli t ~ ,. i I - 1 who c o u l d e s t a b l i s h s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s and how t h e y il:: L W 1 [ : 1 P ~ i ~ - L h e ~ - m o tr he ,e PAC p r o v i s i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d a compromise . . i w ~ : ~ he : ~ ~I ~ t k er2sLs l I o f b u s i n e s s and l a b o r , i n v i e w of c h a r g e s by l a b o r t h a t {I, L J ~ ~ I I L C power between t h e s e c t o r s had been t i l t e d toward b u s i n e s s by tic 51l~;iPA( .,. . e.iat' I 11 kTIII I 1 ,31 ,jtl!,., - ~ p ,, lt r i, pol ~11, it ILYI , e ( i tit/ L,,,.!~', t ommi t t e e " ; and, new l i m i t s a f f e c t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s by b o t h a ampaign f i n a n c e laws were r e c o d i f i e d w i t h t h e removal o f a l l Code and t h e i r r e a s s i g n m e n t t o i o n 6 1 0 , d e a l i n g w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s by u n i o n s , c o r p o r a t i o n s , and became 2 U.S . C . liriltlcb m t ~ 1 1 t L Irndei n t r i b u t i ot on si t s PACs; t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e t e r m s from T i t l e 18 of t h e U.S. i be,.^ ,llrdl p e r m i s s i o n f o r u n i o n s t o make u s e of p a y r o l l d e d u c t i o n [ . t e e and a m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committee. t.hta scc t I,. L iISt ; t h e r e s t r i c t i o n on t y p e s o f e s of s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s ; a l i m i t on t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs a i ~ l i ~~ ~~ ~ t clC~lalit 1'1 1 1 l ~ d lc o u m r i k ing from t h e 1976 Amendments i n c l u d e d : t h e e x p l i c i t t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s , membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and o t h e r o rg . c l t l i ~ dito n ; i t J L I ;Lint ~ " I J ~1 f to - f o l l o w i n g t h a t a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n . 111/ , t # r pot a t i o n s c o u l d s o l i c i t ; g u i d e l i n e s f o r s o l i c i t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s cgoi t o ,,ialtt, ~ t PACS j ~ b d tl ) i~s h s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d funds I : [ p t ~ di L~~ gdiilte,: lt:es t ~ J I.,), I Ly i ;g s u c h c o n c e r n s by l a b o r had been h e i g h t e n e d by t h e s i g n i f i c a n t L l i d ~ l g ~ise b u l t L ~jar d LL L t ~ ll~ 441b; S e c t i o n 6 1 1 , d e a l i n g w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s o n t r a c t o r s , became 2 U .S.C. 441~. s e c t on 441b, t h e p r o h i b i t i o n on p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t?,peLlciit u i e s b y unions and c o r p o r a t i o n s was r e c o d i f i e d a s s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) . i'titz d L t l rll I icjrl o f " c o n t r i b u t i o n o r e x p e n d i t u r e v t and t h e e x c l u s i o n s became .1! - 1/ k p s t e i r ~ , The Emergence of P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 169-170. subsection (b)(2), with alterations made in the wording of each of the three excluded activities--those that could be conducted with the organization's general treasury. The permission for internal communications [(b)(2)(A)] nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives [(b)(2)(B)] and were amended to allow corporations to direct such activities at executive or administrative personnel (and their families), in addition to stockholders (and their families); no change was made affecting the eligible pool for unions (members and their families) . The third exclusion--separate segregated funds--was amended to give specific authority for such funds to organizations other than unions and corporations; section 441b (b)(2)(C) excluded from the term "contribution or expenditure": ... the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock. The original FECA prohibition against coercion in the solicitation of contributions to PACs was transferred intact to subsection (b)(3)(A). Furthermore, two prohibitions, based on the FEC's guidelines for solicitation in the SUN-PAC ruling, were added. Subsection (b)(3)(~) required employees to be informed of the political purposes of the fund when solicited, while subsection (b)(3)(~) required that the solicited party be informed of his right to refuse to contribute, without reprisal. (The FEC suggestion that supervisors not solicit their subordinates was not incorporated into the 1976 Amendments.) Subsection (b)(4)(A) made it unlawful, unless specifically permitted, for corporations to solicit anyone other than stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families [ (b)(4)(A)(i)] and for unions to solicit anyone other than union members and their families [(b)(4)(A)(ii)]. This provision was generally seen as a defeat for the business sector by curtailing the blanket permission to solicit all employees in a corporation. Subsection (b) (4)(B) granted permission for unions and corporations to make two written solicitations per year of each other's pool of potential contributors, the solicitations to be conducted by a third party to protect the confidentiality of membership lists. The guidelines for groups other than unions and corporations were outlined in subsection (b)(4)(C) and (D). In the former, membership organizations, cooperatives, and corporations without capital stock were authorized to solicit their members for contributions to a separate segregated fund. In the latter subsection, trade associations were granted permission to solicit the executive or administrative personnel and stockholders (and families) of member corporations, provided that the corporations gave prior approval and permitted no more than one affiliated trade association to make such solicitations a year. Organized labor received a substantial boost from subsections (b)(5) and ( 6 ) , which gave them permission to solicit contributions in the same manner that corporations did and required corporations to make available such systems to unions at cost. This meant that the payroll deduction plan approved for corporations by the SUN PAC Opinion but denied to labor unions by the Taft-Hartley Act was now available to labor, as well. Thus, a fundraising system which greatly facilitated the collection of donations would be available to unions, with the corporations required to assist in the mechanics of the operation. The final subsection of the new 2 U.S.C. 441b defined what was meant by the terms "executive or administrative personnel." Subsection (b)(7) defined them as : individuals employed by a corporation who are paid on a salary, rather than hourly, basis and who have policymaking, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities. Overall, Section 441b underscores one of the basic issues in the discussion of PACs--who can be solicited for contributions. Although PACs may accept contributions from any source generally permitted to contribute to American elections, they are strictly limited as to whom they may solicit to contribute. For example, organized labor has argued that the definition of "executive or administrative personnel" is so broad that the vast majority of corporate employees can be considered eligible to receive company solicitations. At issue is the potential for influence; the greater the audience to whom one can direct one's appeals and communications, the greater the potential harvest of funds and, in turn, political clout. The provisions relating to Government contractors were recodified as 2 U.S.C. 441c. The prohibitions on political contributions and expenditures by contractors were moved to subsection (a), and the explicit authority for Government contractors to maintain separate segregated funds was placed in subsection (b). PACs set up by contractors would be treated as they would by any other organization and would abide by the same principles as elaborated in section 441b. The framework in which PACs were to operate following the 1976 Amendments was completed by that section of the new law which established the limitations on contributions and expenditures. Section 441a added new limits on contributions and expenditures, introduced the term "multicand\idate committee," and imposed anti-proliferation rules on PACs established withiq a single organization. Whereas the 1974 Amendments had already establis'hed three criteria which a political committee had to meet in order to qualify for the $5000 limit on contributions, the 1976 Amendments simply gave this preferentially-treated political committee a new name. section 441a(a)(4) For purposes of the contribution limitations, defined the term "multicandidate political committee" as: a political committee which has been registered under section 433 of this title for a period of not less than 6 months, which has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal office. The distinctions between the multicandidate political committee and the political committee lies principally in the different contribution limits imposed on each. Section 441a(a)(2) imposed the following limits on multicandidate committees: (A) $5,000 to any candidate or his authorized political committee; (B) $15,000 to national political party committees; and (C) $5,000 to any other political committee. The $5,000 limit on candidate contributions was unchanged from the 1974 Amendments, whereas the limits on national party committees and on other political committees were imposed for the first time in 1976. In contrast with the multicandidate committee, the limits on the ordinary political committee were, in all but one respect, the same as those imposed on the individual. Section 441a(a)(l) imposed the following limits on contributions by persons (including both an individual and a political committee): (A) $1,000 to any candidate or his authorized political committee; (B) $20,000 to national political party committees; and (C) $5,000 to any other political committee. The $1,000 limit remained unchanged from 1974, but the limits affecting national party committees and other committees were innovations of the 1976 legislation. While a multicandidate committee may give less than an individual or an ordinary political committee to national party committees, this feature imposed little hardship on the multicandidate committees which have strongly preferred contributing directly to candidates. The one distinction in limits which has had a g r e a t impact on t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s i s t h a t a f f e c t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s , t h e $5,000 v e r s u s t h e $1,000 l i m i t . As mentioned above, o n l y i n one r e s p e c t a r e i n d i v i d u a l s and p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y under t h e l a w f o r p u r p o s e s o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Under S e c t i o n 4 4 1 a ( a ) ( 3 ) , t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s l i m i t e d t o an a g g r e g a t e o f $25,000 f o r a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n a c a l e n d a r y e a r ( t o c a n d i d a t e s , p a r t i e s , PACs, e t c . ) . T h e r e i s no a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s ; nor i s t h e r e f o r m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committees. Thus, i n t h i s c r u c i a l r e s p e c t , any p o l i t i c a l committee, whether o r n o t i t q u a l i f i e s a s a m u l t i c a n d i d a t e c o m m i t t e e , i s g i v e n a g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o a f f e c t t h e outcome o f e l e c t i o n s t h a n i s any i n d i v i d u a l ( a t l e a s t through t h e d i r e c t candidate c o n t r i b u t i o n r o u t e ) . S e c t i o n 4 4 1 a ( a ) ( 5 ) e s t a b l i s h e d t h e a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n r u l e s , which declared that: I n any c a s e i n which a c o r p o r a t i o n o r any of i t s s u b s i d i a r i e s , branches, divisions, departments, o r local u n i t s , or a labor o r g a n i z a t i o n and any of i t s s u b s i d i a r i e s , b r a n c h e s , d i v i s i o n s , departments, o r local u n i t s e s t a b l i s h o r finance or maintain o r c o n t r o l more t h a n one s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d , a l l such s e p a r a t e segregated funds s h a l l be t r e a t e d a s a s i n g l e s e p a r a t e segregated fund f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p r o v i d e d by p a r a g r a p h ( 1 ) and p a r a g r a p h ( 2 ) . T h i s p r o v i s i o n o v e r r u l e d t h e SUN PAC O p i n i o n which a l l o w e d s e p a r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s f o r e a c h PAC e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n a s i n g l e o r g a n i z a t i o n . t o r e s t r i c t t h e a c t i v i t i e s of b o t h l a b o r and b u s i n e s s . It was i n t e n d e d As d e s c r i b e d i n t h e c o n f e r e n c e r e p o r t on t h e 1976 Amendments: The a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n r u l e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o n f e r e n c e s u b s t i t u t e a r e intended t o prevent c o r p o r a t i o n s , labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s , o r o t h e r p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s o f p e r s o n s from e v a d i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s of t h e c o n f e r e n c e s u b s t i t u t e . Such r u l e s a r e d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 1. A l l o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s s e t up by a s i n g l e c o r p o r a t i o n and i t s s u b s i d i a r i e s a r e t r e a t e d a s a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l committee. 2. All of the political committees set up by a single international union and its local unions are treated as a single political committee. 3. All of the political committees set up by the AFL-CIO and all its State and local central bodies are treated as a single political committee. 4. All the political committees established by the Chamber of Commerce and its State and local Chambers are treated as a single political committee. 5. The anti-proliferation rules stated also apply in the case of multiple committees established by a group of persons. 1121 The 1976 Amendments were considered at the time a victory for labor, whereas business groups expressed concern over their impact. 1131 In fact, II they gave the business community far greater running room in the electoral process than theretofore.'' 1141 Furthermore, the explicit authority given to trade associations, membership organizations and others to establish PACs adds to the overall impression that all types of PACs benefitted from the 1976 Amendments. G. Conclusion Each law and judicial and administrative ruling discussed above added new and more detailed guidelines for the establishment and operation of PACs. Each one served to reduce barriers to their existence, thus individually and cumulatively contributing to their proliferation. 1121 U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976. Report to accompany S. 3065. 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Report no. 94-1057. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. p. 58. 1131 - Epstein, Labor and Federal Elections, p. 268. 1141 - Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, p. 37. CHAPTER THREE: GROWTH OF PACs SINCE 1972: THE NUMBERS, THE DOLLARS, AND THE REASONS The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t r a c e d t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee a s i t e v o l v e d i n F e d e r a l law d u r i n g t h e 1970s. T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l p r e s e n t and a n a l y z e t h e d a t a which document t h e PAC growth f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e changes i n t h e law. In f a c t , i t must b e remembered i n r e v i e w i n g t h e s e d a t a t h a t not o n l y was PAC growth made p o s s i b l e by t h e laws b u t t h a t t h e laws were n e c e s s i t a t e d by t h e growth i n PACs; t h e p r o c e s s of amending t h e FECA was c o u p l e d w i t h t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs which t h e s e s t a t i s t i c s r e v e a l . S e c t i o n I p r e s e n t s t h e growth o f PACs s i n c e 1974 i n terms o f t h e numbers. S e c t i o n I1 o f f e r s e v i d e n c e o f PAC growth i n terms of f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y . It examines t h e l e v e l s o f PAC s p e n d i n g i n e v e r y e l e c t i o n from 1972 t o 1982, p l a c i n g t h e f i g u r e s i n t h e c o n t e x t of o v e r a l l campaign s p e n d i n g a c t i v i t y . In addition, i t p r o v i d e s such i n f o r m a t i o n a s which t y p e s of PACs h a v e grown t h e most r a p i d l y , who h a s b e n e f i t t e d from t h e i r g r o w t h , and which PACs have s p e n t t h e most money i n each e l e c t i o n y e a r . F i n a l l y , S e c t i o n 111 o f f e r s a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e a s o n s f o r PAC growth i n t h e p a s t d e c a d e , i n l i g h t o f t h e f o r e g o i n g d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f t h e l e g a l and s t a t i s t i c a l b a s e s f o r i t . I. PAC GROWTH SINCE 1974 On A p r i l 6 , 1972, t h e d a y t h e FECA o f 1971 t o o k e f f e c t , t h e r e were 113 PAC9 i n e x i s t e n c e ( a c c o r d i n g t o u n p u b l i s h e d FEC d a t a ) . By J a n u a r y 1, 1975, when t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission was e s t a b l i s h e d and began s y s t e m a t i c a l l y k e e p i n g t a b s on PACs, t h e number s t o o d a t 608. In the nine years since then, the number of nonparty committees (PACs) registered with the FEC has nearly sextupled, increasing to 3,525 by the end of 1983. The following table presents the numbers of nonparty committees registered with the FEC from 1974 through 1983. The data is broken down by type of PAC, using the categories the Commission devised in 1977: corporate, labor, trade/membership/ health, non-connected, cooperative, and corporation without stock. Prior to the year-end figures for 1977, all PACs other than corporate and labor were included in the trade/membership/health grouping (thus explaining the drop in that category from December 31, 1976, to December 31, 1977). TABLE 1. Corp. 89 Labor 201 Number of Registered PACs: - 1974-1983 1/ Trade/ Memb.1 318 Health 2/ NonConn . Coop. Corp. w/o stock -- Total 608 11 - Data as of December 31 for every year except 1975 (November 24). 2/ - Includes all non-corporate and non-labor PACs through 12/31/76. Source: U.S. Federal ~lectionCommission. FEC Releases New PAC Figures (~ressrelease): Jan. 20, 1984. Although t h e numbers r e l a t i n g t h e n e t growth i n PACs shown i n Table 1 a r e largely self-explanatory, some o b s e r v a t i o n s may be a p p r o p r i a t e . The s h a r p e s t p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e o c c u r r e d between November 24, 1975, and December 31, 1976. The e a r l i e r d a t e i s s i g n i f i c a n t because i t marked t h e i s s u a n c e o f Advisory Opinion 1975-23--the SUN PAC r u l i n g . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g 1 3 months, PACs e x p e r i e n c e d a n e t i n c r e a s e of 59 p e r c e n t , from 722 t o 1,146. T h e r e a f t e r , PACs grew i n e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g increments: 214 i n 1977, 293 i n 1978, 347 i n 1979, and 551 i n 1980. The n e t growth i n 1980, t h e l a r g e s t n u m e r i c a l i n c r e a s e d u r i n g t h e six-year p e r i o d , i s a t t r i b u t a b l e i n l a r g e measure t o t h e enormous amount o f p u b l i c i t y accorded PACs i n t h e media s i n c e t h e 1978 e l e c t i o n s . S i n c e 1980, t h e r a t e of PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n h a s slowed n o t a b l y . From a n a v e r a g e a n n u a l i n c r e a s e of 21 p e r c e n t between 1974 and 1980, t h e r a t e f e l l t o 1 4 p e r c e n t i n 1981 ( a n i n c r e a s e o f 352 PACs) and r o s e s l i g h t l y i n 1982 t o 16 p e r c e n t ( a n i n c r e a s e of 470 PACs). PACs had r e g i s t e r e d - - a n A t t h e end o f 1983, o n l y 154 a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e o f less t h a n 5 p e r c e n t f o r t h e y e a r . It a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs h a s t a p e r e d o f f from t h e r a p i d growth i n t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s , a l t h o u g h one can h a r d l y i n t e r p r e t t h i s a s a n i n d i c a t i o n o f a d e c r e a s e i n importance of o r i n t e r e s t i n PACs. Beyond t h e o v e r a l l growth i n PACs, Table 1 r e p o r t s t h e r e l a t i v e growth of t h e v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s of PACs. C l e a r l y , t h e c o r p o r a t e committees have demonstrated t h e most enormous growth i n t h e i r ranks--with a n i n c r e a s e of more t h a n 1600 p e r c e n t i n n i n e y e a r s , from 89 i n 1974 t o 1,536 i n 1983. Here, t h e SUN PAC r u l i n g can be s e e n a s having had a p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t e f f e c t on t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f c o r p o r a t i o n s t o e s t a b l i s h s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d f u n d s ; c o r p o r a t e PACs more t h a n t r i p l e d i n number i n t h e 1 3 months f o l l o w i n g t h a t a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n . A s o f 1983, 4 4 p e r c e n t of a l l PACs were grouped i n t h e "corporate" category. As n o t a b l e a s t h e d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e i n c o r p o r a t e PACs, t h e r e h a s been r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y i n t h e a r e a of l a b o r PACs. Having i n c r e a s e d j u s t 88 p e r c e n t i n n i n e y e a r s , l a b o r PACs a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d a n e t d e c l i n e i n s e v e r a l of t h o s e y e a r s . Unlike i n t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r i n c r e a s e i n l a b o r PACs i s d i s t i n c t l y l i m i t e d . Most of t h e l a r g e , p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e u n i o n s have o p e r a t e d PACs f o r many y e a r s . I n c o n t r a s t , most o f t h e r e m a i n i n g u n i o n s a r e e i t h e r t o o s m a l l o r not s u f f i c i e n t l y p o l i t i c a l o r , as a f f i l i a t e s o f n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i o n s , a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e same s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t a s t h e i r parent bodies, thus reducing the i n c e n t i v e s - t o e s t a b l i s h PACs. 1151 Thus, t h e d a t a r e v e a l t h a t w h i l e l a b o r u n i o n s p i o n e e r e d t h e f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , e s t a b l i s h i n g p r e c e d e n t s f o r o t h e r s t o i m i t a t e , t h e y have been i n c r e a s i n g l y dwarfed by t h e PAC growth i n o t h e r sectors. I n 1974, l a b o r PACs c o n s t i t u t e d o n e - t h i r d of a l l PACs; a t t h e end o f 1983, t h e y c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y o n e - n i n t h . I n 1974, t h e r e were o v e r t w i c e a s many l a b o r PACs a s t h e r e were c o r p o r a t e PACs; by 1983, c o r p o r a t e PACs exceeded t h o s e of l a b o r u n i o n s by a 4 t o 1 r a t i o . The growth of t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c a t e g o r y i s more d i f f i c u l t t o document, i n v i e w of t h e i n c l u s i o n between 1974 and 1977 of PACs which were ultimately assigned separate categories. t h e growth h e r e h a s been s i g n i f i c a n t . Nonetheless, it i s f a i r t o say t h a t I f a l l 318 PACs i n t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c a t e g o r y i n 1974 were a p p r o p r i a t e l y l i s t e d t h e r e under t h e s t a n d a r d s i n t r o d u c e d i n 1977, one can s a y t h a t t h e y i n c r e a s e d by 94 p e r c e n t a s of 1983. I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e 138 PACs s e p a r a t e d i n t o new c a t e g o r i e s i n 1977 were - 115/ E p s t e i n , Edwin M. B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971. I n M a l b i n , P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 143. i n e x i s t e n c e i n 1974, t h e a c c u r a t e 1974 c o u n t of t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs would b e 180, t h u s i n d i c a t i n g an i n c r e a s e o f 243 p e r c e n t t h r o u g h 1983. In f a c t , t h e c o r r e c t e s t i m a t e o f growth i n t h i s c a t e g o r y l i k e l y f a l l s somewhere between t h e 94 p e r c e n t and t h e 243 p e r c e n t f i g u r e s - - n o t a s h i g h a s t h e 480 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n PACs o v e r a l l , b u t h i g h enough t o add m e a s u r a b l y t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g b u s i n e s s o r i e n t a t i o n o f PACs t o d a y . (See f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s a s p e c t below. ) The "non-connected" c a t e g o r y ( t h o s e PACs n o t a f f i l i a t e d w i t h an e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n ) h a s e x p e r i e n c e d e x t r e m e l y r a p i d growth i n t h e s e v e n y e a r s i t h a s been used by t h e FEC. As a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n which PACs o p e r a t e t o d a y , t h e s h a r p i n c r e a s e of non-connected PACs i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g , comprised, a s they a r e , l a r g e l y of i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t groups. y e a r s , PACs i n t h i s g r o u p i n g have more t h a n septupled--from In j u s t s i x 110 i n 1977 t o 821 i n 1983, d u r i n g which t i m e t h e o v e r a l l number of PACs i n c r e a s e d by two-andone-half-fold. The d a t a p r e s e n t e d and d i s c u s s e d above o f f e r s p a r t i a l e v i d e n c e o f t h e growth of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees i n g e n e r a l and t h e growth of c o r p o r a t e , non-connected, and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs i n p a r t i c u l a r . It a l s o o f f e r s p a r t i a l e v i d e n c e of t h e overshadowing of l a b o r PACs by o t h e r i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . A l l o f t h e s e phenomena w i l l b e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d a s t h e f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y d a t a is presented l a t e r i n t h i s chapter. The r e l a t i v e power o f l a b o r and b u s i n e s s t o i n f l u e n c e o u r p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s i s an age-old struggle. Thus, a c l o s e r l o o k a t r e l e v a n t s t a t i s t i c s which may shed l i g h t on t h i s s t r u g g l e i s w a r r a n t e d . As b l e a k a p i c t u r e a s t h e d a t a d e p i c t f o r o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , t h e y , i n f a c t , do not a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t t h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g g a p between l a b o r PACs and t h o s e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e b u s i n e s s sector. A comparison o f t h e numbers f o r c o r p o r a t e v s . l a b o r PACs d o e s not t e l l the whole story. There is a strong business orientation in the trade/membership/ health category, as represented by such powerful trade groups as the National Association of Realtors and such important health groups (largely professional associations) as the American Medical Association. Among non-connected PACs, is the Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC), the first major business PAC. Inc. (AMPI), Among cooperatives are the PACs of the Associated Milk Producers, and the Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. The corporations without stock are, by definition, business-oriented, as exemplified by the California Almond 1161 Thus, many business-oriented PACs are classified in Growers Exchange. categories other than the "corporate" one. In an attempt to construct a system which more accurately reflects the number of PACs which promote a basically pro-business philosophy, political scientist Edwin Epstein has estimated that one-half of all non-labor and non-corporate PACs under the FEC scheme can be classified as business-related, along with all of the "corporate" PACs. 1171 Based on this system and using the data in Table 1, one can construct the following chart of labor and business-related PACs. 116/ 117/ - Ibid., p. 118. Ibid., p. 116. TABLE 2. Numbers o f Labor and B u s i n e s s - R e l a t e d PACs: 1974-1982 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 20 1 224 21 7 297 3 80 248 6 78 1100 1729 2229 Category Labor Businessoriented11 - 1/ B u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d e q u a l a l l c o r p o r a t e PACs p l u s one-half of a l l t r a d e / m e m b e ~ s h i p / h e a l t h , non-connected, c o o p e r a t i v e , and c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t s t o c k . While t h e s e d a t a do p r e s e n t a more a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e o f b u s i n e s s s t r e n g t h i n t h e PAC movement, t h e r e a r e many t o o l s which o r g a n i z e d l a b o r u s e s t o compensate f o r t h i s perceived imbalance; of c o u r s e , t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r has o t h e r strengths, as well. These a p p r o a c h e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n C h a p t e r Four. More f u n d a m e n t a l l y , one may q u e s t i o n t h e e x t e n t t o which i s s u e s which f a c e modern s o c i e t y l e n d t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l framework o f a c o n f l i c t e s s e n t i a l l y between b u s i n e s s and l a b o r i n t e r e s t s . I n c r e a s i n g l y , one f i n d s p u b l i c p o l i c y i s s u e s which p i t v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t t h e combined f o r c e s o f l a b o r and business, with unpredictable r e s u l t s . T h i s , t o o , w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n Chapter Four. I n c o n c l u d i n g t h i s s e c t i o n on t h e n u m e r i c a l growth o f PACs, it i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o examine t h e d a t a i n graph f o r m a t ( f r o m 1974-19841, a s p r e p a r e d by t h e FEC. Number of PACs Source: PAC GROWTH U.S. Federal E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC Record, March 1984, p . 6 . 11. PAC GROWTH FROM 1972-1982: THE DOLLARS T h i s s e c t i o n of t h e r e p o r t p l a c e s t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o r m n i t t e e s w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h e p a s t The t a b l e s o f d a t a and t h e accompanying a n a l y s i s w i l l e x p l o r e many decade. f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g PAC s p e n d i n g . P a r t A w i l l examine t h e a g g r e g a t e d a t a on PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s s i n c e 1972, from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of b o t h t h e PACs and t h e c a n d i d a t e s . Part B w i l l address the q u e s t i o n o f where t h e money o r i g i n a t e d , b y l o o k i n g a t t h e r e l a t i v e l e v e l s o f a c t i v i t y among t h e v a r i o u s t y p e s o f PACs and a t t h e l e a d i n g PACs i n e a c h election year. P a r t C w i l l e x p l o r e t h e q u e s t i o n o f where t h e money h a s been g o i n g , from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of b o t h t h e PACs and t h e c a n d i d a t e s . Finally, P a r t D w i l l summarize t h e major f i n d i n g s o f t h i s ( a n d t h e p r e v i o u s ) s e c t i o n . The c o m p i l a t i o n o f t h e d a t a p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n ' s t a b l e s h a s been made d i f f i c u l t by many f a c t o r s , n o t t h e l e a s t of which i s t h e a b s e n c e o f a s i n g l e , uniform s o u r c e f o r t h e v a r i o u s s t a t i s t i c s . The s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e d a t a h a s i n c r e a s e d enormously i n t h e l a s t t h r e e e l e c t i o n c y c l e s , a s a r e s u l t of t h e e f f o r t s by t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n C o m i s s i o n t o impose s y s t e m a t i c and comprehensive methods of c o m p i l i n g t h e v a r i o u s s t a t i s t i c s from t h e d i s c l o s u r e s t a t e m e n t s f i l e d w i t h t h a t agency. Before t h e FEC was e s t a b l i s h e d and b e f o r e i t e s t a b l i s h e d i t s primacy a s t h e s o u r c e of campaign f i n a n c e d a t a , p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s assumed t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of reporting the aggregate d a t a t o the public. Common Cause m a i n t a i n e d campaign f i n a n c e m o n i t o r i n g p r o j e c t s d u r i n g t h e e l e c t i o n s o f 1972, 1974, and 1976. The C i t i z e n s R e s e a r c h F o u n d a t i o n , under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r H e r b e r t A l e x a n d e r , compiled i t s own d a t a f o r t h e 1972 and 1976 e l e c t i o n s . Each o f t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a d o p t e d i t s own methods f o r o r g a n i z i n g d a t a , a n d , a s a r e s u l t , t h e y r e a c h e d v a r y i n g c o n c l u s i o n s about s p e n d i n g l e v e l s i n t h e years t h e i r r e s e a r c h overlapped. I n 1976, t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission was o p e r a t i o n a l , b u t i t s r e p o r t s d i d not r e f l e c t t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s o f i t s more r e c e n t s t u d i e s . Thus, f o r each of t h e t h r e e e a r l i e s t e l e c t i o n s c o v e r e d i n t h i s chapter--1972, 1974, and 1976--between one and t h r e e sources a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r information. F o r 1972, t h e r e i s t h e a d d i t i o n a l h a n d i c a p o f two d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m s o f campaign d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e d d u r i n g t h a t y e a r . The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act d i d n o t t a k e e f f e c t u n t i l A p r i l 7 , 1972, p r i o r t o which t i m e d i s c l o s u r e was governed by t h e 1925 C o r r u p t P r a c t i c e s A c t , which had long s i n c e been regarded a s an i n e f f e c t i v e system. F u r t h e r m o r e , f i v e changes i n t h e e l e c t i o n law o v e r t h e p a s t t w e l v e y e a r s and t h e c o n c o m i t a n t changes i n t h e d i s c l o s u r e forms, have made c o m p i l i n g uniform, comparable d a t a even more d i f f i c u l t . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h r e e o r g a n i z a t i o n s which compiled campaign f i n a n c e d a t a d u r i n g t h e p a s t t w e l v e y e a r s , s e v e r a l s c h o l a r s have a l s o s o u g h t t o c o m p i l e d a t a i n u s e f u l ways, o f t e n b a s i n g t h e i r work on t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e t h r e e o r g a n i z a t i o n s b u t sometimes e x p l o r i n g on t h e i r own. The work of t h e s e s c h o l a r s , n o t a b l y among them Edwin E p s t e i n , Michael M a l b i n , and Gary J a c o b s o n ( a l l c i t e d i n t h e e n s u i n g p a g e s ) , h a s g e n e r a l l y c l a r i f i e d t h e d a t a from o t h e r s o u r c e s . unfortunately, Sometimes, t h e i r f i n d i n g s a p p e a r t o c o n f l i c t , e i t h e r w i t h one a n o t h e r o r w i t h t h o s e o f Common C a u s e , t h e C i t i z e n s R e s e a r c h F o u n d a t i o n , o r t h e FEC. Journalists, t o o , have p r e s e n t e d u s e f u l campaign f i n a n c e d a t a , which o f t e n h i g h l i g h t e d e v e n t s o r s t a t i s t i c s a t a g i v e n t i m e , w i t h o u t a n a l y s i s of o v e r a l l t r e n d s ; o f t e n t h e y c l a r i f i e d , but other times they confused, t h e o v e r a l l p i c t u r e . T h i s c h a p t e r makes use o f t h e f i n d i n g s of a l l of t h e above s o u r c e s . In a t t e m p t i n g t o r e c o n c i l e s e e m i n g l y c o n f l i c t i n g d a t a , t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s have been s i m p l i c i t y , u n i f o r m i t y o f d a t a , a v a i l a b i l i t y of d a t a i n u s e f u l breakdowns, and c o m p a r a b i l i t y w i t h o t h e r d a t a w i t h i n a t a b l e o r w i t h d a t a i n o t h e r t a b l e s . Because o f t h e v a r i e t y o f s o u r c e s and t h e d i f f e r e n t methods of c a t e g o r i z i n g d a t a from s o u r c e t o s o u r c e o r from y e a r t o y e a r , f r e q u e n t l y d a t a w i t h i n a t a b l e a r e n o t e x a c t l y comparable w i t h o t h e r d a t a i n t h a t t a b l e . Consequently, t h e t a b l e s a r e f i l l e d w i t h e x p l a n a t i o n s and c a v e a t s ; t h e accompanying a n a l y s i s o f f e r s b r o a d e r e x p l a n a t i o n s and c a v e a t s . Such q u e s t i o n s a s why some t a b l e s o f f e r d a t a f o r o n l y House r a c e s o r why some o f f e r d a t a o n l y f o r c a n d i d a t e s i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s w i l l b e e x p l a i n e d w i t h i n t h e s e pages. One o b v i o u s and o v e r r i d i n g r e a s o n i s t h a t s u c h t y p e s of d a t a may have been a l l t h a t were compiled by any o f t h e v a r i o u s s o u r c e s c i t e d . I n t e r m s o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s , t h i s c h a p t e r c o n f i n e s i t s e l f e x c l u s i v e l y t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s . S i n c e 1976, PACs (and o t h e r s ) have been p r o h i b i t e d from making c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s a c c e p t i n g p u b l i c funds i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . Although t h e y h a v e been allowed t o c o n t r i b u t e i n t h e p r i m a r i e s , t h e y have n o t t a k e n much a d v a n t a g e o f t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y ; a s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , PACs g e n e r a l l y s a v e t h e i r money f o r t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t s . I n 1980, o n l y 3 p e r c e n t o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s went t o P r e s i d e n t i a l c o n t e n d e r s , a c c o r d i n g t o FEC d a t a on PAC a c t i v i t y . For t h i s r e a s o n and b e c a u s e most PAC a c t i v i t y i n r e c e n t y e a r s h a s been d i r e c t e d a t t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s , i t i s t h e r o l e o f PACs i n t h o s e e l e c t i o n s on which t h i s c h a p t e r w i l l focus. A. PAC S p e n d i n g S i n c e 1972: The A g g r e g a t e D a t a T h i s s u b s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e broad o v e r v i e w o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e PAC phenomenon i n American p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h e p a s t t w e l v e y e a r s . Data and CRS -6 6 a n a l y s i s p r e s e n t e d i n P a r t 1 o f f e r t h e s p e n d i n g f i g u r e s from t h e PACsl p e r s p e c t i v e : "How much h a s been s p e n t by PACs?" The d a t a and commentary i n P a r t 2 a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n from t h e c a n d i d a t e s ' perspective: "How r e l i a n t have c a n d i d a t e s become on PAC money, i n v i e w o f t h e i r o t h e r s o u r c e s o f funding?" A l l of t h e t a b l e s and d i s c u s s i o n t h a t f o l l o w i n C h a p t e r T h r e e must b e viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h i s overview. The Overview from t h e PAC P e r s p e c t i v e T a b l e 3 p r o v i d e s a g g r e g a t e d a t a on PAC r e c e i p t s , e x p e n d i t u r e s , and c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i n each e l e c t i o n c y c l e s i n c e 1972. Although some o f t h e r e c e i p t and e x p e n d i t u r e f i g u r e s f o r t h e t h r e e e a r l i e r years a r e e i t h e r non-existent o r of l i m i t e d r e l i a b i l i t y ( a s i n t h e 1974 expenditure f i g u r e ) , t h e o v e r a l l trend i s unmistakable. PACs s p e n t a l m o s t 900 p e r c e n t more i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s t h a n t h e y d i d i n t h e 1972 e l e c t i o n s , from $19.2 m i l l i o n i n 1972 t o $190.2 m i l l i o n i n 1982. PACs c o n t r i b u t e d n e a r l y 900 p e r c e n t more t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i n 1982 t h a n t h e y d i d i n 1972, from $8.5 t o $83.6 m i l l i o n . I n terms of t h e r a t e of i n c r e a s e , t h e r i s e i n both d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s and s p e n d i n g was t h e s h a r p e s t from 1974 t o 1976, an 80 p e r c e n t and 100 p e r c e n t increase, respectively--certainly SUN PAC r u l i n g . a f u n c t i o n t o some e x t e n t of t h e FEC's 1975 The second h i g h e s t jump was from 1978 t o 1980, when t h e l e v e l o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s r o s e by some 57 p e r c e n t and t h e l e v e l of a d j u s t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s r o s e by an even h i g h e r 69 p e r c e n t . The i n c r e a s e i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1974, 1978, and 1982 was i n e a c h c a s e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 50 p e r c e n t - - s i g n i f i c a n t r i s e s , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t n e y d i d not e q u a l t h e magnitude o f i n c r e a s e w i t n e s s e d i n 1976 and 1980. TABLE 3. Election c y c l e 1/ - F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees: 1972-1982 ( f u l l election cycle data) Adjusted r e c e i p t s 21 - Adjusted e x p e n d i t u r e s 21 - Contributions t o congressional candidates 11 The p e r i o d s covered by t h e e l e c t i o n c y c l e s v a r y . Data f o r 1972 i s l i m i t F d f o r t h e p e r i o d p r i o r t o A p r i l 7 , 1972, t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e f o r d i s c l o s u r e under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971. U n t i l t h e n , campaign f i n a n c e d i s c l o s u r e was governed by t h e F e d e r a l C o r r u p t P r a c t i c e s Act o f 1925, under which much a c t i v i t y went u n r e p o r t e d . 1974 d a t a c o v e r s S e p t . 1, 1973, t o Dec. 3 1 , 1974. 1976 d a t a c o v e r s J a n . 1, 1975, t o Dec. 3 1 , 1976. 1978 d a t a c o v e r s J a n . 1, 1977, t o Feb. 2 2 , 1980. 1980 d a t a c o v e r s J a n . 1, 1979, t o Dec. 3 1 , 1980. 1982 d a t a c o v e r s J a n . 1, 1981, t o Dec. 3 1 , 1982. 1982 d a t a c o v e r s J a n . 1, 1 9 8 1 , t o Dec. 3 1 , 1982. 21 A d j u s t e d d a t a e x c l u d e monies t r a n s f e r r e d between a f f i l i a t e d committees and aFe t h u s more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of l e v e l s of f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y . * ** Excludes c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o candidates defeated i n primaries. T h i s i s a rough e s t i m a t e and d o e s n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e d e t a i l e d b r e a k downs i n T a b l e 8 . S o u r c e : For 1972 e x p e n d i t u r e s : A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E. F i n a n c i n g t h e 1972 E l e c t i o n . L e x i n g t o n , D.C. Heath and Company, 1976: p. 9 3 , 95. T o t a l r e p r e s e n t s t h e sum o f t h e t o t a l s f o r l a b o r , o t h e r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t , and i d e o l o g i c a l s p e n d i n g . F o r 1972 c o n t r i b u t i o n s : Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g Project. 1972 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s : I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . w a s d i n g t o n , 1974, v . 1. p. v i . For 1974 e x p e n d i t u r e s : [ N a t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r on P o l i t i c a l ~ i q a n c e ] . I n t e r e s t Groups: B i g g e r S p e n d e r s on ' 7 4 Races. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y Weekly R e p o r t s , v . 31, September 2 8 , 1974: 2583-2584. Estimate r e f l e c t s $ 1 3 . 3 m i l l i o n i n a d j u s t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s p l u s t h e g r e a t b u l k of t h e $13.0 m i l l i o n i n c a s h on hand. TABLE 3. F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y of P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees: 1972-1982 ( f u l l e l e c t i o n c y c l e data)--Continued F o r 1974 C o n t r i b u t i o n s : Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g Project. 1974 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1976. p. x i i . For 1976 r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s : F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission, unpublished d a t a . F o r 1976 c o n t r i b u t i o n s : Common Cause d a t a . I n I n t e r e s t Group G i f t s t o 1976 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaigns. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y Weekly R e p o r t s , v . 3 5 , A p r i l 1 6 , 1977. p. 710. For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. F i n a l R e p o r t . P a r t y and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l Committees. Vol. 1--Summary T a b l e s . A p r i l 1980. p. 1 3 8 , 140, 142. For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l PAC Report f o r 1979-80 E l e c t i o n C y c l e ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Feb. 21, 1982. For 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC P u b l i s h e s F i n a l 1981-82 PAC S t u d y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Nov. 2 9 , 1983. The gap between a d j u s t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i s r e a d i l y o b s e r v e d i n T a b l e 3. e v e r y e l e c t i o n i n d o l l a r amounts ( $ 1 0 . 7 , While t h e gap widened s u b s t a n t i a l l y $12.5, $30.3, $42.2, $75.9, and $106.6 m i l l i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , t h e p e r c e n t a g e of e x p e n d i t u r e s c o n s t i t u t e d by c o n t r i b u t i o n s remained a t a r a t h e r c o n s t a n t l e v e l i n e v e r y e l e c t i o n : 42-50 percent--the low f i g u r e i n 1980 and t h e h i g h i n 1974, which, b e i n g based on e s t i m a t e d d a t a , i s n o t an e s p e c i a l l y r e l i a b l e f i g u r e . The somewhat l e s s t h a n 1 t o 2 r a t i o o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o e x p e n d i t u r e s i s a key f i n d i n g of T a b l e 3 , o n e which h a s a b e a r i n g on d a t a p r e s e n t e d i n t h e pages t h a t f o l l o w . The f o l l o w i n g l i s t of commonly-made PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s s p e c i f i e s t h e components o f PAC s p e n d i n g o t h e r t h a n c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s . It t h u s h e l p s a c c o u n t f o r t h e gap d i s c u s s e d above. ( 1 ) c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o S t a t e and l o c a l c a n d i d a t e s ( t h e s e must b e d i s c l o s e d w i t h i n t h e v a r i o u s S t a t e s , b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t o t h e FEC); ( 2 ) c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o P r e s i d e n t i a l candidates ( i n primaries); t h e s e play a s m a l l e r r o l e t h a n t h e y d i d p e r h a p s i n 1972 and e a r l i e r , b e f o r e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a c c e p t i n g p r i v a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s was imposed on g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n candidates taking public funds. As mentioned above, only 3 percent of PAC contributions to Federal candidates in 1980 went to Presidential contenders; (3) contributions to national party comittees and other political (noncandidate) comittees, including other PACs e.g., PACs gave $6 million to political parties in 1982); ( 4 ) administrative costs--a particularly significant budget item for the non-connected PACs, which cannot have such costs borne by a sponsoring organization (as can corporate, labor, and trade/membership/health PACs); ( 5 ) fundraising costs--again, a particularly large factor for non-connected PAC8 which are not limited in terms of who they may solicit to any sponsoring organization's membership lists. As they are permitted to solicit funds from the general population, they have turned increasingly to the direct-mail route-a method of growing sophistication and growing costs, as well. Estimates of the cost of raising money through direct-mail range as high as 90 percent of the 1181 and total receipts; - (6) independent expenditures--funds spent directly on communication with voters, for or against candidates and without any advance consultation with candidates, are not subject to any limits under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Consequently, these have been a growing force in American politics in the past three elections. The FEC reported that a little over $2 million 1191 the level of independent was spent independently in the 1976 elections; - - 118/ Shaw, Robert D., Jr. Direct-Mail Pleas Raise Thousands for Fundraisers, Little for Causes. Miami Herald, March 30, 1981: LA, 4A. - 1191 U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Information on Independent Expenditures (press release): October 9, 1980. - e x p e n d i t u r e s r o s e t o $ 1 6 . 1 m i l l i o n i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s . 120/ This large i n c r e a s e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e s u b j e c t o f PACs s i n c e a l l b u t about 12 p e r c e n t o f t h e s e f u n d s were s p e n t by PACs. (The g r e a t m a j o r i t y of t h i s s p e n d i n g , however, was by a h a n d f u l of PACs, and most of i t was c o n c e n t r a t e d in Presidential contests.) Of g r e a t e r r e l e v a n c e f o r c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaigns, t h e l e v e l o f i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s i n House and S e n a t e r a c e s r o s e from $ 2 . 3 m i l l i o n i n 1980 t o $5.8 m i l l i o n i n 1982 ( a g a i n , m o s t l y b y PACs). 121/ The growing amounts o f money s p e n t on f u n d r a i s i n g and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s a r e t h e two most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s i n t h e widening gap i n r e c e n t y e a r s between PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s and PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s . T h i s i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g , i n v i e w of t h e heavy use o f d i r e c t - m a i l and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s by t h e i d e o l o g i c a l ( g e n e r a l l y non-connected) PACs, which, a s w i l l b e d e m o n s t r a t e d l a t e r , have c o n s t i t u t e d of l a t e t h e f a s t e s t growing component o f o v e r a l l PAC s p e n d i n g . T a b l e 4 t a k e s t h e l a s t column o f t h e p r e v i o u s t a b l e - - c o n t r i b u t i o n s c o n g r e s s i o n a l candidates--and to p r e s e n t s t h e breakdown of how much of t h e money (and what p e r c e n t a g e ) went t o House v s . S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . Furthermore, because those figures represent financial a c t i v i t y during the e n t i r e election cycle ( u s u a l l y t h e e l e c t i o n y e a r and t h e one p r e c e d i n g i t ) , t h e t a b l e a l s o p r e s e n t s t h e d a t a ( w i t h s i m i l a r House and S e n a t e breakdowns) f o r o n l y t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s who competed i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s . It e x c l u d e s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s d e f e a t e d i n p r i m a r i e s and, i n some of t h e y e a r s , c a n d i d a t e s who r a n i n s p e c i a l - 120/ U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. E x p e n d i t u r e s Top $16 ~ i l l i o n \ ( p r e s sr e l e a s e ) : 0 82 1211 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. I n d e p e n d e n t Spending ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : O c t . FEC S t u d y Shows I n d e p e n d e n t Nov. 29, 1981. FEC I s s u e s F i n a l R e p o r t on 19811 4 , 1983. e l e c t i o n s ; primary e l e c t i o n c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e included f o r o n l y t h o s e c o n t e n d e r s who appeared on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t . TABLE 4. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House and S e n a t e Candidates i n General E l e c t i o n s and i n F u l l E l e c t i o n Cycles: 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s and p e r c e n t a g e s ) I / - Year 1/ based-on Full Election Cycle 2/ - House Senate General Election 3/ - House Senate D o l l a r amounts rounded o f f t p t h e n e a r e s t t e n t h ; percentages a r e rounded d o l l a r amounts and a r e rounded o f f t o n e a r e s t whole p e r c e n t . 2/ F u l l e l e c t i o n c y c l e i n c l u d e s d a t a f o r a l l c a n d i d a t e s i n p r i m a r i e s and s p e c i a l and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s f o r t h e e l e c t i o n year and t h e year preceding i t ( e x c e p t f o r 1974 which.goes back t o September 1, 1973). These d a t a correspond t o t h o s e i n ~ a d l e3 , i n f r a . 3/ General e l e c t i o n d a t a excludes d e f e a t e d c a n d i d a t e s i n p r i m a r i e s ( a n d , perhaps, c a n d i d a t e s i n s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n s ) . These d a t a correspond t o t h o s e i n Table 5, i n f r a . TABLE 4. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House and S e n a t e C a n d i d a t e s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s and i n F u l l E l e c t i o n C y c l e s : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s and p e r c e n t a g e s ) 11--Continued - Source: For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1972 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s : I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1974. v . 1. p. v i . The P a t t e r n o f 1972 breakdowns e x t r a p o l a t e d from: J a c o b s o n , Gary C. Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e U.S. House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 1972-78. I n U.S. C o n g r e s s . House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact of t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t , 1972-78. From t h e I n s t i t u t e o f P o l i t i c s , John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y . Committee P r i n t , 9 6 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , October 1979. p. 25 ( T a b l e 6 ) . For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1974 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1976. p. i x , x i i . F o r 1976 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n d a t a : Common Cause. 1976 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . I n t e r e s t Group and P o l i t i c a l P a r t y C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s . Washington, 1978. v . 1. p. v i i i . For 1976 f u l l e l e c t i o n c y c l e : Common Cause d a t a . I n I n t e r e s t Group G i f t s t o 1976 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaigns. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y Weekly R e p o r t s , v . 35, A p r i l 1 6 , 1977: p. 710. For 1978 f u l l e l e c t i o n c y c l e : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. F i n a l R e p o r t : P a r t y and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l Committees. Vol. 1--Summary T a b l e s . Washington, A p r i l 1980. p. 142. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. For 1978 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n d a t a : U.S. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. I n t e r i m R e p o r t No. 5--U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J u n e 1979. p. 3 2 , 34. F o r 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l S t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Races ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : March 7 , 1982. F o r 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l R e p o r t on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2 , 1983. Although t h e g a p between t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n and t h e f u l l e l e c t i o n c y c l e f i g u r e s h a s i n c r e a s e d s i n c e 1974, s i g n a l i n g a g r e a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s on t h e p a r t o f PACs t o c o n t r i b u t e i n p r i m a r i e s , t h e c h a r t d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e g r e a t b u l k o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e c o n t r i b u t e d ( d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e two-year cycles) to c a n d i d a t e s who w i l l be i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s ( t h i s c o u l d be shown more c l e a r l y i f i t were p o s s i b l e t o s o r t o u t o n l y t h o s e f u n d s c o n t r i b u t e d i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n , per s e ) . I n some of t h e t a b l e s which f o l l o w , d a t a i s p r e s e n t e d o n l y f o r t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ( a g a i n , i n c l u d i n g primary c o n t r i b u t i o n s which may have been g i v e n t o c a n d i d a t e s who l a t e r a p p e a r e d on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t ) . Although i t might h a v e been p r e f e r a b l e t o s e e t h e r e l e v a n t breakdowns on a p a r t i c u l a r c h a r t f o r t h e e n t i r e e l e c t i o n c y c l e , it can be j u s t i f i e d n o n e t h e l e s s by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n d a t a d o e s c o n s t i t u t e most o f t h e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s . The second s a l i e n t f e a t u r e i n T a b l e 4 i s t h a t , r e g a r d l e s s of whether t h e d a t a i s f o r t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n o r t h e f u l l c y c l e , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of f u n d s g o i n g t o House v s . S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s r e m a i n s c o n s t a n t , a s i t h a s r o u g h l y s i n c e A p p r o x i m a t e l y 70 p e r c e n t o f PAC money g o e s t o House c a n d i d a t e s , a s 1974. compared w i t h 30 p e r c e n t t o S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . O f c o u r s e , i t must be n o t e d t h a t t h e r e a r e many more House c a n d i d a t e s t h a n S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s i n any g i v e n y e a r , t h u s a c c o u n t i n g i n l a r g e measure f o r t h e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e g o i n g t o one of t h e two b o d i e s . The g r e a t e r amounts of PAC money g i v e n t o House c a n d i d a t e s , combined w i t h t h e g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e of House c a n d i d a t e s on PAC money ( a s w i l l b e d e m o n s t r a t e d s h o r t l y ) , p r o v i d e some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e f o c u s on o n l y House e l e c t i o n s i n some l a t e r c h a r t s . 2. The Overview from t h e C a n d i d a t e s ' P e r s p e c t i v e While t h e o v e r a l l d o l l a r f i g u r e s r e f l e c t t h e magnitude o f PAC g i v i n g , one must examine t h e d a t a from t h e c a n d i d a t e s ' p e r s p e c t i v e t o round o u t a b a s i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r o l e PAC money h a s been p l a y i n g i n e l e c t i o n s . T a b l e s 5-7 o f f e r e v i d e n c e t h a t PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s have grown s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e among t h e v a r i o u s s o u r c e s o f c a n d i d a t e f u n d i n g and t h a t t h i s t r e n d h a s been p a r t i c u l a r l y pronounced i n House r a c e s , and t h a t 1980 marked a n o t a b l y i n c r e a s e d l e v e l of S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e r e l i a n c e on PAC g i v i n g . As T a b l e 5 i n d i c a t e s , PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s a s a p e r c e n t a g e o f a l l c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s h a s r i s e n from 1 3 . 7 p e r c e n t i n 1972 t o 26.6 p e r c e n t i n 1982. t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n - - 5 . 6 The s h a r p e s t p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e o c c u r r e d i n p e r c e n t o v e r 1978. The second h i g h e s t i n c r e a s e was t h e 3 . 9 p e r c e n t jump from 1974 t o 1976, which, a s T a b l e 3 r e v e a l e d , marked t h e h i g h e s t i n c r e a s e i n PAC s p e n d i n g and c o n t r i b u t i n g . It i s t o o soon t o t e l l whether t h e l e s s t h a n one p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n 1982 may s i g n a l a l e v e l i n g o f f o f t h i s a s p e c t of PAC g r o w t h . TABLE 5. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a P e r c e n t a g e o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s ' O v e r a l l R e c e i p t s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s : 1972-1982 11 - Candidate 21 Receipts - Year PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s 21 31 - - P e r c e n t Given by PACs 11 Data combines House and S e n a t e r e c e i p t s ( a d j u s t e d , where p o s s i b l e ) o n l y T o r c a n d i d a t e s who r a n i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ; d a t a f o r d e f e a t e d p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n c a n d i d a t e s i s excluded. 21 - I n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s 31 These amounts c o r r e s p o n d w i t h t h o s e i n t h e t h i r d from l a s t column i n infra. able-4, S o u r c e : For 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1978 r e c e i p t s : M a l b i n , Michael J. Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s : PACs, Campaigns, and P u b l i c P o l i c y . I n His P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws. Washington, American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y R e s e a r c h , 1980. p . 154-155 ( T a b l e 1 ) . F o r 1972 c o n t r i b u t i o n s : Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g Project. 1972 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s : I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1974. v . 1, p. v i . F o r 1974 c o n t r i b u t i o n s : Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g Project. 1974 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t Groups a d P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1976. p. i x . TABLE 5. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a P e r c e n t a g e o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s ' O v e r a l l R e c e i p t s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s : 1972-1982 11--Continued - F o r 1976 c o n t r i b u t i o n s : Common Cause. 1976 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . I n t e r e s t Group and P o l i t i c a l P a r t y C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s . w a s h i n g t o n , 1978. v. 1. p. v i i i . F o r 1978 c o n t r i b u t i o n s : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. I n t e r i m R e p o r t No. 5--U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J u n e 1979. p. 3 4 . For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l S t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Races ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : March 7 , 1982. F o r 1982: U S . F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l Report on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2 , 1983. T a b l e 6 p r e s e n t s f o r e a c h t h e House and S e n a t e t h e p e r c e n t a g e s of o v e r a l l r e c e i p t s which were c o n s t i t u t e d between 1972-1982 by t h e f o u r p r i n c i p a l s o u r c e s of c a n d i d a t e funding: PACs, i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t o r s , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e i r own campaigns. This t a b l e a m p l i f i e s t h e f i n d i n g s i n T a b l e 5 by showing how t h e PAC component o f c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s compared w i t h t h e o t h e r key f u n d i n g s o u r c e s and how t h a t component f a c t o r e d i n t o House v e r s u s S e n a t e campaigns. It s h o u l d b e n o t e d a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e d a t a i n t h i s t a b l e i s s u b j e c t t o d i s p u t e among v a r i o u s s o u r c e s and may, i n f a c t , b e o f l i m i t e d u t i l i t y b e c a u s e of changes i n t h e way i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e p o r t e d and d i v e r g e n t t h e o r i e s about t h e c o r r e c t way t o c o m p i l e i n f o r m a t i o n . I n d e e d , f o r a l l b u t t h e PAC and p a r t y c a t e g o r i e s , t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n a p p e a r s t o b e much l e s s r e l e v a n t t o d a y t h a n i t d i d f o u r o r s i x y e a r s ago. Hence, t h e t a b l e i s o f f e r e d f o r p u r p o s e s of rough e s t i m a t i o n s of r e l a t i v e r o l e s of f u n d i n g s o u r c e s and w i t h o n l y l i m i t e d c l a i m of a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s . (r At a g l a n c e , one n o t i c e s t h a t PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s have c o n s i s t e n t l y a c c o u n t e d Q f o r a g r e a t e r s h a r e o f House c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s t h a n of S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s . The p r o p o r t i o n o f PAC money among a l l s o u r c e s o f f u n d i n g h a s i n c r e a s e d s t e a d i l y f o r House c a n d i d a t e s , from 14.0 p e r c e n t i n 1972 t o 31.5 p e r c e n t i n 1982--with t h e s h a r p e s t r i s e o c c u r r i n g i n 1976, f o l l o w e d by t h e r i s e i n 1980; a s of 1982, n e a r l y o n e - t h i r d o f House c a n d i d a t e s ' f u n d s came from PACs. I n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e House, no d e f i n i t i v e t r e n d on t h e PAC r o l e i s r e v e a l e d i n t h e d a t a on S e n a t e campaigns. Although i t a p p e a r e d a f t e r t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s t h a t PACs might p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r r o l e t h a n i n t h e p a s t ( t h e p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e a c t u a l l y s u r p a s s e d t h a t i n t h e House i n 19801, i t was followed by a d e c l i n e i n t h e i m p o r t a n c e of PAC money i n 1982. The 4 p e r c e n t jump i n 1976 was i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e o v e r a l l growth i n t h e i m p o r t a n c e and l e v e l of PAC s p e n d i n g t h a t y e a r , b u t t h e i n c r e a s e was t r a n s i t o r y , a s t h e PAC p e r c e n t a g e f e l l a g a i n i n 1978. ( S e n a t e d a t a i s made even more d i f f i c u l t t o a n a l y z e i n view of a much l o n g e r f u n d r a i s i n g p e r i o d t h a n f o r House r a c e s . ) A commonly o f f e r e d e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House c a n d i d a t e s r e l a t e s t o t h e lower v i s i b i l i t y of House Members and campaigns v i s - a - v i s t h e i r Senate counterparts. It i s f a r more d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e t y p i c a l House Member t o a t t r a c t t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e news m e d i a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f s o many Members i n t h e same media m a r k e t s , t h a n i t i s f o r t h e t y p i c a l S e n a t e Member. As news of t h e o f f i c i a l a c t i v i t i e s and e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t s o f t h e l a t t e r i s more w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d t h a n f o r t h e i r House c o u n t e r p a r t s , i t g e n e r a t e s a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f c i t i z e n i n t e r e s t i n and e n t h u s i a s m f o r t h e S e n a t e e l e c t i o n and i t s c o n t e s t a n t s ; from t h i s e n t h u s i a s m f l o w s a h i g h e r l e v e l of i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , which, i n t u r n , r e n d e r s PAC d o n a t i o n s l e s s i m p o r t a n t i n t h e scheme of t h i n g s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e much l a r g e r p o p u l a t i o n of S t a t e s , a s compared t o t h e a v e r a g e c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t , combined w i t h t h e g r e a t e r r e s o u r c e s g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o S e n a t e c o n t e n d e r s , makes t h e d i r e c t - m a i l s y s t e m o f f u n d r a i s i n g more v i a b l e i n a S e n a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a n i n a congressional d i s t r i c t . Direct-mail i s a key component of modern e f f o r t s t o r a i s e s m a l l i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Lacking b o t h t h e same d e g r e e o f c i t i z e n i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r c o n t e s t s and t h e means t o f i n a n c e c o s t l y d i r e c t - m a i l campaigns, House c a n d i d a t e s may be more r e l i a n t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s from groups ( p a r t i e s o r PACs), through which t h e y can r a i s e money i n l a r g e r amounts from fewer s o u r c e s . TABLE 6. Funding Sources f o r Candidates i n House and Senate General E l e c t i o n s : 1972-1982 Source ( i n p e r c e n t a g e s ) Year Candidate 1/ Receipts - PACs ---- ----- Parties 21 Individuals Candidates 31 Unknown House 1972 $ 38.9 14-0 17 60 1974 $ 45.7 17.1 4 73 1976 $ 65.7 22.4 8 59 1978 $ 92.2 24.8 5 61 1980 $ 124.6 28.9 4 67 1982 S 183.9 31.5 3 66 $ 116.0 18.8 1 81 Senate 1982 -------.----.--------- --- --- ----1/ I n m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s , a d j u s t e d where p o s s i b l e - 21 Excludes p a r t y e x p e n d i t u r e s on b e h a l f o f c a n d i d a t e s . A l s o , some o f t h e f r g u r e s h e r e i n a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y u n r e l i a b i e , most n o t a b l y t h e 17% i n 1972 which e x a g g e r a t e s t h e p a r t y r o l e because o f t h e l a r g e amounts of u n r e p o r t e d p r i v a t e money p r i o r t o A p r i l 7 o f t h a t y e a r a s compared w i t h p a r t y money which i s g e n e r a l l y g i v e n l a t e r i n t h e campaign season. TABLE 6. 3/ - * ** Funding S o u r c e s of C a n d i d a t e s i n House and S e n a t e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s : 1972-1982--Continued I n c l u d e s c a n d i d a t e loans unrepaid a t time of f i l i n g . I n c l u d e s c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o own campaign. Includes candidate contributions, l o a n s and o t h e r i t e m s . S o u r c e : For 1972 - 1976 r e c e i p t s d a t a : Malbin, Michael J . Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s : PACs, Campaigns, and P u b l i c P o l i c y . I n P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws. Washington, American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y R e s e a r c h , 1980. p. 154-155 ( T a b l e 1 ) . The P a t t e r n of Campaign For 1972 - 1978 d a t a : J a c o b s o n , Gary C. C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 1972-78. I n U.S. C o n g r e s s . House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An A n a l y s i s o f t h e Impact of t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t , 1972-1978. From t h e I n s t i t u t e o f P o l i t i c s , John F. Kennedy School o f Government, Harvard University. Committee P r i n t , 9 6 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 20 able 1 ) . "Money i n t h e 1980 and 1982 For 1980 - 1982 d a t a : J a c o b s o n , Gary C. Congressional Elections." I n Michael J . Malbin ( e d . ) . Money and E l e c t i o n s : F i n a n c i n g Pol i t i c s i n t h e 1980s. American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e l c h a t h a m House, f o r t h c o m i n g 1984. For 1972 - 1974 PAC d a t a (House): J a c o b s o n , The P a t t e r n of Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e U.S. House, p. 20 ( T a b l e 1 ) . I b i d . , p. 24 ( T a b l e 5 ) . For 1972 - 1976 PAC d a t a ( S e n a t e ) : For 1976 PAC d a t a (House): F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e S e r i e s . No. 9: 1976 House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Campaigns, R e c e i p t s and E x p e n d i t u r e s . Washington, September 1977. p. 4 . For 1978 PAC and r e c e i p t s d a t a : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. I n t e r i m Report No. 5. U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J u n e 1979. p. 31-32. For 1980 PAC and r e c e i p t s d a t a : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l S t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Races ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Mar. 7 , 1982. For 1982 PAC and r e c e i p t s d a t a : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l Report on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2 , 1983. Because of t h e problems w i t h t h e c o m p a r a b i l i t y o f d a t a i n t h i s t a b l e ( a s mentioned a b o v e ) , t h e r e i s l i t t l e t o b e g a i n e d from any e x t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s . S e v e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn, however. F i r s t , by f a r t h e l a r g e s t s o u r c e of a l l campaign f u n d s h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y been i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s g i v i n g d i r e c t l y t o campaigns ( a s opposed t o c o n t r i b u t i n g t o i n t e r m e d i a r i e s such a s PACs and political parties). Because t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission d i d not s e p a r a t e c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n i t s c o m p i l a t i o n s f o r 1980 and 1982, one c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e what p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e " i n d i v i d u a l s " e n t r y f o r t h o s e y e a r s i s c a n d i d a t e f u n d i n g and what p r o p o r t i o n i s , i n f a c t , i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s . Hence, we c a n n o t know f o r s u r e whether t h e i n d i v i d u a l r o l e i n f u n d i n g campaigns h a s d e c l i n e d d u r i n g t h e p a s t t e n y e a r s . I f one assumes t h a t t h e l e v e l of c a n d i d a t e s u p p o r t h a s remained a t t h e 1978 l e v e l s , i t would f o l l o w t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l component h a s s h r u n k ; t h i s would make s e n s e g i v e n t h e d e m o n s t r a b l y i n c r e a s i n g r o l e of t h e PACs. We c a n o n l y s a y f o r s u r e t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l g i v e r s d o c o n s t i t u t e t h e g r e a t e s t s h a r e of campaign f u n d s and t h a t t h i s component h a s been a g r e a t e r f a c t o r i n S e n a t e campaigns t h a n i n House campaigns. The r o l e of p a r t i e s h a s become an i s s u e o f some c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e b r o a d e r campaign f i n a n c e d e b a t e i n t h e l a s t few y e a r s . C e r t a i n l y c h a r t s such a s t h i s one show a d e c l i n i n g r o l e f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n t h e f u n d i n g of c a n d i d a t e s , even d i s c o u n t i n g t h e w i d e l y d i s c r e d i t e d , i n f l a t e d f i g u r e s f o r 1972 ( s e e f o o t n o t e 2 in table). Rather than attempt t o analyze t h i s apparent d e c l i n e i n t h e p a r t y f u n d i n g r o l e , i t might b e more h e l p f u l t o u n d e r s t a n d more f u l l y t h e b a s i s f o r computing t h i s d e c l i n e and t o o f f e r a l t e r n a t i v e methods of such c a l c u l a t i o n . The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act ( i n 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 a ) imposes l i m i t a t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l p a r t y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o i t s own c a n d i d a t e s - - e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same $5,000 p e r c a n d i d a t e , per e l e c t i o n a s a p p l i e s t o PACs, e x c e p t t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l c o m m i t t e e s o f a p a r t y may g i v e a s much a s $17,500 t o i t s S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . These l i m i t a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1974 and have n e v e r been a d j u s t e d f o r inflation. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Act c r e a t e d a s p e c i a l c a t e g o r y o f p a r t y f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e t o candidates--coordinated e x p e n d i t u r e s , i n which t h e p a r t y pays f o r c e r t a i n campaign s e r v i c e s on b e h a l f o f and i n c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e affected candidate. As s u c h , t h e s e e x p e n d i t u r e s a r e n e i t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s , wherein t h e c a n d i d a t e i s g i v e n a u t h o r i t y t o spend t h e f u n d s , n o r i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , w h e r e i n no advance c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e c a n d i d a t e i s p e r m i t t e d . These c o o r d i n a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s , which commonly i n c l u d e such t h i n g s a s t h e ~ r o d u c t i o nc o s t s of TV commercials o r p o l l i n g s e r v i c e s , a r e l i m i t e d by 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 a ( d ) t o $10,000 p l u s c o s t - o f - l i v i n g a l l o w a n c e (COLA) i n House r a c e s and t h e g r e a t e r of $20,000 o r two c e n t s t i m e s t h e S t a t e v o t i n g age p o p u l a t i o n ( p l u s COLA) i n S e n a t e r a c e s ; t h e s e e x p e n d i t u r e s may o n l y be made i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s , and t h e l i m i t s a p p l y s e p a r a t e l y t o t h e n a t i o n a l and t h e S t a t e p a r t i e s . In 1982, f o r example, a House c a n d i d a t e c o u l d have b e n e f i t t e d from a s much a s $36,880 ( $ 1 8 , 4 4 0 s p e n t by each t h e S t a t e and n a t i o n a l p a r t y c o m m i t t e e s ) , w h i l e t h e s e c o m m i t t e e s may have s p e n t between $73,760 and $ 1 . 3 m i l l i o n on b e h a l f of S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s ( d e p e n d i n g on t h e s i z e of t h e S t a t e ) . Clearly, the c o o r d i n a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s have become a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n t h e f u n d i n g o f House and S e n a t e campaigns. They a r e , however, not a c c o u n t e d f o r i n t h e t o t a l r e c e i p t s f i g u r e s f o r t h e s e c a n d i d a t e s ; t h e r e i n l i e s t h e u n d e r s t a t e m e n t of t h e party r o l e i n Table 6 . The d a t a i n T a b l e 7 i s d e r i v e d from an a l t e r n a t e method of c a l c u l a t i n g t h e s o u r c e s of f u n d i n g f o r c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s . The p a r t y c o o r d i n a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s were added t o t h e t o t a l r e c e i p t s a s t h e b a s e f i g u r e , w h i l e t h e p a r t y c o n t r i b u t i o n s were added t o t h e c o o r d i n a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s t o d e r i v e t h e p a r t y funding f i g u r e . Because t h e b a s e f i g u r e h a s changed from T a b l e 6 t o T a b l e 7 , a l l of t h e r e s u l t i n g component p e r c e n t a g e s a r e changed, a s w e l l . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e f o r t h e p a r t y funding f i g u r e s . Only d a t a f o r t h e y e a r s 1978 t h r o u g h 1982 a r e i n c l u d e d i n t h i s c h a r t , b e c a u s e FEC d a t a i n u s e f u l breakdowns were a v a i l a b l e o n l y f o r t h o s e y e a r s . TABLE 7. A l t e r n a t e C a l c u l a t i o n of Funding S o u r c e s of C a n d i d a t e s i n House and S e n a t e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s : 1978-1982* Source ( i n percentages) Candidate R e c e i p t s 11 - Year PAC s Parties Individuals, Candidates, and O t h e r House $ 1978 93.6 24.5 68.9 12.9 Senate 1978 * I n c l u d e s p a r t y e x p e n d i t u r e s on b e h a l f of c a n d i d a t e s ( 4 4 1 a [ d ] f u n d s ) i n t h e b a s e . r e c e i p t s f i g u r e and i n t h e p a r t y f u n d i n g p e r c e n t a g e . -11 I n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s , a d j u s t e d . S o u r c e : F o r 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. P r e s s R e l e a s e , J u n . 29, 1979. For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l S t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Races ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Mar. 7 , 1982. F o r 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l R e p o r t Dec. 2 , 1983. on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : The most s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two companion t a b l e s i s t h e r e l a t i v e role indicated for the p o l i t i c a l parties. Whereas t h e p a r t y r o l e i s shown t o have d e c r e a s e d t o m i n i s c u l e l e v e l s i n t h e f i r s t t a b l e , t h e second i n d i c a t e s a more c o n s t a n t l e v e l f o r House c a n d i d a t e s and a d i s t i n c t l y growing r o l e i n Senate races. P a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t i s t h e gap between t h e two; t h e 3 p e r c e n t f o r t h e House i n 1982 i n T a b l e 6 compares w i t h a 6 . 2 p e r c e n t f i g u r e i n T a b l e 7 , w h i l e t h e 1 p e r c e n t i n S e n a t e r a c e s i n T a b l e 6 t h a t same y e a r p a l e s i n comparison w i t h t h e n e a r l y 10 p e r c e n t l e v e l i n d i c a t e d i n T a b l e 7. When one c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s even o u t s i d e t h e framework of t h e d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t h e c o o r d i n a t e d expenditures e.g., p a r t y - b u i l d i n g TV a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , c a n d i d a t e t r a i n i n g s c h o o l s , r e s e a r c h a s s i s t a n c e ) , t h e r o l e of t h e major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n t h e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t of t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s looms even l a r g e r t h a n T a b l e 7 r e v e a l s . Regarding t h e o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s , t h e PAC p r o p o r t i o n s d e c l i n e by one p e r c e n t o r l e s s f o r House r a c e s and by l e s s t h a n two p e r c e n t i n S e n a t e races--not significant enough a d i f f e r e n c e t o undermine c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e r e s t o f t h e PAC d a t a i n t h i s r e p o r t ( a l l computed by t h e method used i n T a b l e 6 ) . Regarding t h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y , i t s " c a t c h - a l l 1 ' n a t u r e makes i t e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o a n a l y z e . B. PAC Spending S i n c e 1972: Where Has t h e Money Come From? T h i s s e c t i o n examines t h e components of t h e v a s t i n c r e a s e s i n PAC s p e n d i n g s i n c e 1972. S u b s e c t i o n 1 t r a c e s t h e growth o f e a c h c a t e g o r y o f PAC ( l a b o r , corporate, etc.), i n t e r m s o f a d j u s t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o congressional candidates. S u b s e c t i o n 2 examines t h e b i g g e s t s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s among PACs between 1972 and 1982, p r i m a r i l y a s a means o f i l l u s t r a t i n g b r o a d e r t r e n d s i n t h e PAC a r e n a . 1. E x p e n d i t u r e s and C o n t r i b u t i o n s by PAC Groupings S i n c e 1972 T a b l e s 8 and 9 c o n t r i b u t e t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of where t h e PAC money h a s been coming from, by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e t r e n d s i n s p e n d i n g and c o n t r i b u t i n g among t h e v a r i o u s s e c t o r s o f t h e PAC community. Because of d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s and s t a n d a r d s f o r g r o u p i n g PACs i n t h e t h r e e e a r l i e r y e a r s , t h e r e e x i s t s i g n i f i c a n t l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p a r a b i l i t y of d a t a w i t h i n and between t h e s e two t a b l e s . While a l l o f t h e breakdowns a r e comparable f o r 1978-1982, only the figures for l a b o r PACs a r e based on f a i r l y c o n s i s t e n t s t a n d a r d s o f i n c l u s i o n i n 1972-1976. C o n c l u s i o n s c a n b e drawn a f f e c t i n g l a b o r PACs and t h e t o t a l PAC community f o r 1972-1982 and a f f e c t i n g e v e r y PAC g r o u p i n g f o r 1978-1982, b u t o b s e r v a t i o n s about t h e b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d , subject t o dispute. non-connected, and o t h e r PACs f o r 1972-1976 a r e A l l of t h e t o t a l s i n b o t h t a b l e s c o r r e s p o n d t o t h o s e i n T a b l e 3 , e x c e p t f o r t h e 1974 e x p e n d i t u r e s , which, a s e x p l a i n e d i n t h e n o t e s t o T a b l e 8 , a r e t h o u g h t t o b e low. D e s p i t e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f T a b l e s 8 and 9 , t h e y p r o v i d e i m p o r t a n t i n s i g h t s i n t o s o u r c e s o f PAC growth. According t o T a b l e 8 , s p e n d i n g by l a b o r PACs q u a d r u p l e d i n t h e s i x - e l e c t i o n period. However, w i t h o v e r a l l PAC s p e n d i n g i n c r e a s i n g by t e n - f o l d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , one s e e s f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e of t h e e r o s i o n of l a b o r ' s preeminent r o l e i n t h e PAC community s i n c e 1972. While l a b o r PACs a c c o u n t e d f o r r o u g h l y h a l f o f PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s i n 1972 and 1974, t h e i r s h a r e of t o t a l s p e n d i n g f e l l t o one-third 1982. i n 1976, o n e - f o u r t h i n 1978, and l e s s t h a n o n e - f i f t h i n 1980 and Although l a b o r ' s s h a r p e s t s p e n d i n g i n c r e a s e o c c u r r e d i n 1982, a l l o f t h e o t h e r t h r e e major PAC g r o u p i n g s e x h i b i t e d an even h i g h e r d o l l a r r i s e t h a t y e a r o v e r t h e i r 1980 s p e n d i n g . I n c o n t r a s t t o l a b o r , t h e c o r p o r a t e PACs e x p e r i e n c e d a m e t e o r i c r i s e i n e x p e n d i t u r e l e v e l s i n j u s t t h e l a s t f o u r e l e c t i o n s , a more t h a n s e v e n - f o l d i n c r e a s e , which, i n 1980, a l l o w e d them t o o v e r t a k e l a b o r PACs a s a g r o u p f o r t h e f i r s t time. It i s l i k e l y , i n f a c t , t h a t 1976 marked t h e p o i n t a t which the "business-related" PACs f i r s t o u t s p e n t t h e l a b o r PACs. Recent c o r p o r a t e s p e n d i n g i n c r e a s e s a r e a r e f l e c t i o n , t o some d e g r e e , o f changes i n methods o f r e p o r t i n g S t a t e and l o c a l c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s ( i . e . , F e d e r a l PAC, r a t h e r t h r o u g h s e p a r a t e S t a t e PACs). through t h e The t r e n d among t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h g r o u p i n g i s made more d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n b e c a u s e of u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a breakdown f o r 1976, a l t h o u g h one might e s t i m a t e t h a t between $15-$20 m i l l i o n ( o f t h e amount l i s t e d f o r " o t h e r " ) was s p e n t by t h e s e PACs. They ranked f i r s t i n e x p e n d i t u r e s i n 1978, second i n 1980, and a c l o s e t h i r d t o t h e c o r p o r a t e g r o u p i n 1982. E x p e n d i t u r e s by t h e non-connected PACs i n c r e a s e d a t an even g r e a t e r r a t e from 1978-1982 t h a n d i d t h o s e o f t h e c o r p o r a t e PACs, a $47 m i l l i o n d o l l a r i n c r e a s e and more t h a n t h r e e t i m e s t h e amount of s p e n d i n g i n f o u r y e a r s . It i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e i r l e v e l of e x p e n d i t u r e s a s much a s doubled from 1976 t o 1978, a s w e l l , b u t , a g a i n , t h e a b s e n c e of breakdowns makes such e s t i m a t e s d i f f i c u l t to substantiate. Non-connected PACs r o s e from t h i r d t o f i r s t p l a c e i n s p e n d i n g by t h e f o u r major g r o u p s i n 1980 and h e l d t h e l e a d e a s i l y i n 1982. TABLE 8 . A d j u s t e d E x p e n d i t u r e s of PACs by C a t e g o r y : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s ) 11 -- - ------- ----.-------- 1972 19 74" 1976 1978 1980 1982 $ 8.5 11.O 17.5 18.6 25.1 34.8 8.0 8.1 --- --- --- --- 15.2 31.4 43.3 --- 23.8 32 .O 41.9 29.6 2.4 4 .O 5.8 Type o f PAC Labor Businessrelated 2/ Corporate --- --- Trade/ Membership/ Health --- --- Other 4/ Total 51 --- 1.1 5.8 -- -- -- --- -- ----.- $19.2 $20.9 $52.9 $77.4 $131.2 $190.2 TABLE 8. A d j u s t e d E x p e n d i t u r e s o f PACs by C a t e g o r y : 1972-1982 11--Continued ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s ) - 1/ A d j u s t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s e x c l u d e s t r a n s f e r s o f monies between a f f i l T a t e d committees. 2/ T h i s c a t e g o r y i s based on a l a r g e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y of It PACs Tt encompasses do indeed have a b a s i c a l l y p r o - b u s i n e s s o r i e n t a t i o n . i s i n c l u d e d h e r e f o r t h e purpose of l i s t i n g t h e d a t a f o r 1972 and 1974, b e f o r e t h e s p e c i f i c breakdowns were d e v i s e d by t h e FEC f o r t h e c o r p o r a t e and o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s , and i t i s o n l y r o u g h l y comparable t o t h e combined c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h d a t a i n 1978-1982. F o r 1972, i t i n c l u d e s PACs l i s t e d by t h e C i t i z e n s Research Foundation a s b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a l , d a i r y , e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h , and r u r a l ; f o r 1974, i t i n c l u d e s t h o s e PACs grouped by Common Cause under t h e h e a d i n g s of b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a l , h e a l t h , and a g r i c u l t u r e / d a i r y . Most o f t h e s e PACs would t o d a y f a l l i n t o t h e c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c a t e g o r i e s used by t h e FEC, a l t h o u g h some would be b e s c a t t e r e d i n t h e non-connected, c o o p e r a t i v e , and c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h o u t s t o c k c a t e g o r i e s . 3/ F o r 1972 and 1974, t h i s r e p r e s e n t s s p e n d i n g by i d e o l o g i c a l PACs, a s groupzd by t h e C i t i z e n s R e s e a r c h F o u n d a t i o n (1972) o r Common Cause ( 1 9 7 4 ) . A f t e r 1976, i t c o r r e s p o n d s d i r e c t l y t o t h e FEC c a t e g o r y by t h a t name (which i s dominated by t h e i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p s ) . 4 / T h i s i s a c a t c h - a l l c a t e g o r y , f o r which o n l y t h e 1978-1982 f i g u r e s a r e comparable w i t h one a n o t h e r . For 1974, t h i s r e p r e s e n t s PACs grouped a s II m i s c e l l a n e o u s 1 ' by Common Cause and i n c l u d e s such g r o u p s a s t h e NEA (and a f f i l i a t e s ) , e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s , and some c o o p e r a t i v e s . For 1976, it i n c l u d e s a l l PACs now grouped by t h e FEC a s t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h , non-connected, c o o p e r a t i v e , and c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h o u t s t o c k . For 1978-1982, i t combines t h e FEC c a t e g o r i e s o f c o o p e r a t i v e s and c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t s t o c k . 5 1 T o t a l s (which a r e keyed t o t h o s e i n T a b l e 3 ) may not add up e x a c t l y b e c a u s e of r o u n d i n g o f f . * D a t a f o r 1974 d o e s n o t c o r r e s p o n d w i t h t h a t i n T a b l e 3 . The l a t t e r r e f l e c t s an e s t i m a t e d amount, b e c a u s e t h e d a t a i n T a b l e 8 was t h o u g h t t o b e low. S o u r c e : For 1972: A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E . F i n a n c i n g t h e 1972 E l e c t i o n . L e x i n g t o n , D . C . Heath and Company, 1976. p. 93, 95. F o r 1974: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1974 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1976. T o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s d e r i v e d by a d d i n g t h e f i g u r e s f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s by e a c h t y p e o f PAC ( o n page x i i ) t o t h e amounts each t y p e gave t o S t a t e and l o c a l c a n d i d a t e s and t o o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a s l i s t e d on t h e summary pages ( 1 , 1 6 , 135, 214, 396, and 4 2 5 ) . F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e For 1976 ( l a b o r ) : U.S. S e r i e s . No. 10: Labor-Related P o l i t i c a l Committees. R e c e i p t s and Expenditures. 1976 Campaign. Washington, J a n u a r y 1978. p. 6 . TABLE 8 . A d j u s t e d E x p e n d i t u r e s of PACs by C a t e g o r y : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s ) 11--Continued For 1976 ( c o r p o r a t e ) : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e S e r i e s . No. 8: C o r p o r a t e - R e l a t e d P o l i t i c a l Committees. R e c e i p t s and Expenditures. 1976 Campaign. Washington, September 1977. p. 8 . For 1976 ( o t h e r ) : U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission, u n p u b l i s h e d d a t a . For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. F i n a l R e p o r t : P a r t y and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l C o m i t t e e s . Vol. 1--Summary T a b l e s . A p r i l 1980. p. 140. ( a d j u s t e d d i s b u r s e m e n t s column). F o r 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l PAC Report For 1979-80 E l e c t i o n C y c l e ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Feb. 21, 1982. For 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC P u b l i s h e s F i n a l 1981-82 PAC S t u d y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Nov. 2 9 , 1983. T u r n i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e growth o f PACs i n terms of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s , T a b l e 9 p r o v i d e s c o n t i n u e d e v i d e n c e of t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs, of t h e d i m i n i s h e d power o f l a b o r PACs ( a l b e i t l e s s d i m i n i s h e d t h a n i t a p p e a r e d from t h e o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e p a t t e r n s ) , and, i n t h e one d i v e r g e n c e from t h e d a t a i n T a b l e 8 , t h e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l r o l e played by non-connected PACs i n t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l candidates. As t h e y d i d i n T a b l e 8 , l a b o r PACs e x p e r i e n c e d a s t e a d y growth i n t h e amount of money t h e y c o n t r i b u t e d t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s , even w h i l e becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y dwarfed by t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f o t h e r s e c t o r s of t h e PAC community. The p e r c e n t a g e of o v e r a l l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s which was c o n s t i t u t e d by l a b o r d e c l i n e d s t e a d i l y from t h e h i g h p o i n t i n 1974 (50 p e r c e n t ) t o t h e i r 1980 l e v e l of n e a r l y 24 p e r c e n t , w i t h a f r a c t i o n a l i n c r e a s e above 24 p e r c e n t i n 1982. Nevertheless, l a b o r accounted f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r s h a r e of a l l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s t h a n of a l l PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s . It can be surmised from T a b l e 9 t h a t l a b o r PACs were i n f i r s t p l a c e a s l a t e a s 1976 i n terms of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g t h i s s t a t u s o n l y t h r o u g h 1974 i n t e r m s o f o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s . (This ignores the "business-related" c a t e g o r y , b a s i n g t h e r a n k i n g i n s t e a d on t o d a y ' s PAC g r o u p i n g s . ) By 1978, l a b o r PACs ranked second among c o n t r i b u t o r s , a n d , i n 1980 and 1982, t h e y ranked t h i r d . A l i t t l e more t h a n h a l f o f l a b o r e x p e n d i t u r e s t o o k t h e form o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n b o t h 1978 and 1980; an even g r e a t e r s h a r e o f t h e s e e x p e n d i t u r e s t o o k t h e form of d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1982. C o r p o r a t e PACs c o n t r i b u t e d t h e t h i r d h i g h e s t amount t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i n 1978, jumping t o f i r s t p l a c e i n 1980 and 1982. T a b l e 1 may p r o v i d e some i n s i g h t i n t o t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t ; t h e s h e e r numbers o f c o r p o r a t e PACs and t h e growth t h e r e o f a c c o u n t i n l a r g e measure f o r t h e a b i l i t y t o r a n k f i r s t i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s today. 1982 came from c o r p o r a t e PACs. I n f a c t , o n e - t h i r d of a l l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n C o r p o r a t e PACs s p e n t a b o u t t h r e e - f i f t h s of t h e i r money i n 1978, 1980 and 1982 on c o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , a h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n t h a n was g i v e n by l a b o r . T r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h g r o u p s c o n t r i b u t e d t h e most i n 1978, f a l l i n g t o second p l a c e i n 1980 and 1982. I n e a c h of t h e l a t t e r y e a r s , a b o u t o n e - h a l f of t h e i r money was s p e n t i n t h e form of c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , a s m a l l e r p r o p o r t i o n t h a n was g i v e n by e i t h e r t h e l a b o r o r c o r p o r a t e PACs. P e r h a p s t h e most s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e a r i s i n g from a comparison of T a b l e s 8 and 9 i s t h e f i r s t p l a c e r a n k i n g of t h e non-connected PACs i n terms of o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s i n 1982 and t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l of d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t same y e a r . I n s h a r p c o n t r a s t t o t h e s p e n d i n g p a t t e r n s of a l l t h r e e of t h e o t h e r major PAC g r o u p i n g s , o n l y 17 p e r c e n t of non-connected expenditures t o o k t h e form o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e d o n a t i o n s ( a l t h o u g h t h e comparable f i g u r e f o r 1980 was o n l y 13 p e r c e n t ) . of s p e n d i n g by t h e s e PACs--largely a s f u n d r a i s i n g by d i r e c t - m a i l T h i s s u g g e s t s once a g a i n a h i g h e r d e g r e e i d e o l o g i c a l i n nature--on and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . a c t i v i t i e s such T h i s w i l l be c o n f i r m e d i n l a t e r i l l u s t r a t i o n s of some o f t h e l a r g e s t non-connected PACs. TABLE 9. - C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s o f PACs by C a t e g o r y : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s ) 1/ --------- Type of PAC 1972 1974 1976 197 8 1980 1982 Labor $3.6 6.3 8.2 10.3 13.2 20.3 2.7 4.4 1 0 .O --- --- --- --- --- --- 11.3 15.9 21.9 2.2 1.O 2.8 1.O 2 .O 3.2 $8.5 $12.5 $22.6 $35.2 $55.2 $83.6 Businessr e l a t e d 21 - Trade embers ship/ Health 4/ Other - - T o t a l 51 1 / A l l d a t a i s f o r f u l l e l e c t i o n c y c l e , e x c e p t f o r 1972, w h e r e i n p r i m a r y l o s e r s a r e excluded. 2/ T h i s encompasses t h e Common Cause c a t e g o r i e s f o r b u s i n e s s , h e a l t h , a n d , i n 1976, l a w y e r s . T h i s c a t e g o r y i s i n c l u d e d h e r e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of l i s t i n g t h e d a t a f o r 1972-1976, b e f o r e t h e s p e c i f i c breakdowns were d e v i s e d by t h e FEC f o r t h e c o r p o r a t e and o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s , and i t i s b a s e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f PACs i t i n c l u d e s have a b a s i c a l l y p r o - b u s i n e s s o r i e n t a t i o n . It i s o n l y r o u g h l y comparable t o t h e combined c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h g r o u p s i n 1978-1982, b u t most of t h e b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d PACs would f a l l i n t o t h o s e two FEC c a t e g o r i e s (some would be s c a t t e r e d i n t h e non-connected, c o o p e r a t i v e , and c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h o u t s t o c k g r o u p i n g s ) . For 1974 and 1976, t h e non-connected c a t e g o r y , a s d e f i n e d by t h e FEC, t e s w i t h t h e i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p used by Common Cause f o r t h o s e two y e a r s . Most of t h e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs a r e t o d a y l i s t e d i n t h e non-connected g r o u p i n g , b u t t h e l a t t e r a l s o i n c l u d e s PACs not i d e o l o g i c a l i n n a t u r e . Thus, t h e d a t a f o r 1974 and 1976 a r e n o t e x a c t l y comparable t o t h o s e f o r 1978-1982, i n v i e w o f t h e d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s a p p l i e d t o t h e non-connected and t h e i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p i n g s . ( I d e o l o g i c a l PACs i n 1972 were lumped i n t o Common C a u s e ' s " m i s c e l l a n e o u s " g r o u p . ) TABLE 9. C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s of PACs by C a t e g o r y : ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s ) 11--Continued 1972-1982 - 4 1 T h i s i s a c a t c h - a l l c a t e g o r y , i n which t h e e a r l i e r f i g u r e s a r e o n l y r o u g h i y comparable t o t h e l a t e r o n e s . For 1972-1976, t h e d a t a r e p r e s e n t s Common C a u s e ' s " m i s c e l l a n e o u s " c a t e g o r y , which i n c l u d e d such g r o u p s a s t h e NEA (and a f f i l i a t e s ) , e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s , and some c o o p e r a t i v e s , and i t s a g r i c u l t u r e 1 d a i r y c a t e g o r y . I n 1972, Common Cause i n c l u d e d t h e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs under " m i s c e l l a n e o u s , " p r i o r t o t h e i r s e p a r a t e l i s t i n g i n 1974; t h u s 1972 i n c l u d e s more t y p e s of PACs t h a n t h e 1974 and 1976 d a t a d i d . For 1978-1982, t h e " o t h e r " d a t a e q u a t e s d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e FEC's c o o p e r a t i v e s and c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t s t o c k g r o u p s . Thus, t h e d a t a f o r 1972 i s n o t e x a c t l y comparable w i t h t h o s e f o r 1974 and 1976, which, i n t u r n , a r e n o t h i g h l y comparable w i t h t h o s e f o r 1978-1982. The common t h r e a d i s t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e major d a i r y PACs--ADEPT, C-TAPE, and SPACE--in " o t h e r " f o r a l l s i x e l e c t i o n y e a r s . 5 1 T o t a l s (which a r e keyed t o T a b l e 3 ) may n o t add up e x a c t l y , b e c a u s e o f roTnding o f f . S o u r c e : For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1972 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s : I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1974. v. 1. p. v i . F o r 1974: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1974 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1976. p. x i i . For 1976: Common Cause d a t a . I n I n t e r e s t Group G i f t s t o 1976 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaigns. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y Weekly R e p o r t s , v . 3 5 , A p r i l 1 6 , 1977: p. 710. For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. F i n a l R e p o r t . P a r t y and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l Committees. Vol. 1--Summary T a b l e s . Washington, A p r i l 1980. p. 142. F o r 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l PAC R e p o r t For 1979-80 E l e c t i o n C y c l e ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Feb. 21, 1982. F o r 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC P u b l i s h e s F i n a l 1981-82 PAC S t u d y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Nov. 2 9 , 1983. T a b l e s 8 and 9 p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e of t h e growing s t r e n g t h o f t h e c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e PACs, t h e d i m i n i s h e d b u t r e s i d u a l power o f l a b o r PACs, and t h e "wild card" r o l e l e f t t o t h e non-connected PACs. Having a s s e s s e d t h e major components o f a g g r e g a t e PAC s p e n d i n g , t h e s e can n e x t be compared w i t h t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e major i n d i v i d u a l PACs. 2. The L a r g e s t PAC C o n t r i b u t o r s and S p e n d e r s T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s f o r each e l e c t i o n s i n c e 1972 a l i s t i n g of t h e l a r g e s t PACs i n terms o f t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s and, f o r each e l e c t i o n s i n c e 1976, a l i s t i n g of t h e l a r g e s t PACs i n t e r m s of t h e i r overall expenditures. T h i s i n d i c a t e s how l a r g e c o n t r i b u t o r s changed i n r a n k over the s i x - e l e c t i o n p e r i o d and how t h e l a r g e s p e n d e r s changed i n r a n k o v e r t h e l a s t f o u r e l e c t i o n s , w h i l e comparing t h e l i s t i n g s of t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f PACs r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s e two a r r a n g e m e n t s . A t t h e o u t s e t , i t must be s t a t e d t h a t t h e t o p 20 l i s t s t e l l o n l y p a r t o f t h e o v e r a l l PAC s t o r y . They a r e u s e f u l i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g which PACs may have t h e most power, i f one e q u a t e s power w i t h a h i g h l e v e l of f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y . They a l s o h e l p t o d e m o n s t r a t e which s e c t o r s of t h e s o c i e t y have most s u c c e s s f u l l y employed t h e PAC r o u t e . Finally, they are helpful in i l l u s t r a t i n g i n y e t a n o t h e r form t h e v a r i o u s s t a n d a r d s which a r e used t o gauge PAC a c t i v i t y and t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s of t h e r e s p e c t i v e s t a n d a r d s . These l i s t s c a n n o t , i n and of t h e m s e l v e s , t e l l t h e r e a d e r where power l i e s i n American p o l i t i c s t o d a y . The f a c t t h a t not a s i n g l e c o r p o r a t e PAC a p p e a r s on any o f t h e s e l i s t s i s one of most i m p o r t a n t o v e r a l l o b s e r v a t i o n s one c a n make. B u t , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g i n d i c a t i v e of an a b s e n c e of c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t o r i n f l u e n c e , i t i s more t h e r e s u l t of t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs among a wide number of c o r p o r a t i o n s . While few c o r p o r a t e PACs r e a c h s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of s p e n d i n g on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s , t h e y may have a s i g n i f i c a n t combined e f f e c t on b e h a l f of p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s . Furthermore, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t some c o r p o r a t i o n s s p o n s o r numerous PACs ( d e s p i t e t h e s i n g l e o v e r a l l l i m i t a t i o n on c o n t r i b u t i o n s ) , i t goes u n n o t i c e d on c h a r t s such a s t h e s e , a r r a n g e d by PAC i n s t e a d of by s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n . The c o n c l u s i o n f o r t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l r e t u r n t o t h i s p o i n t , w h i l e o f f e r i n g comparative comments on t h e two t y p e s of l i s t i n g s used i n T a b l e s 10-19. Top 20 PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s from 1972-1982 T a b l e s 10-15 p r e s e n t t h e l a r g e s t 20 PACs i n each b i e n n i a l e l e c t i o n s i n c e 1972, ranked i n terms of t h e i r d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s . The measurement of PACs a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n l e v e l s i s a l e s s r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y and i n f l u e n c e today t h a n i t was e a r l i e r i n t h i s twelve-year period. A s l a t e r t a b l e s w i l l r e v e a l , PACs have become i n c r e a s i n g l y w i l l i n g t o spend money i n o t h e r , perhaps more i m a g i n a t i v e , ways than l i m i t i n g themselves t o d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s . Nonetheless, i t can be argued t h a t i f one i s seeking t o d e t e r m i n e which PACs have t h e g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l f o r a c c e s s t o e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s , t h e l e v e l of c o n t r i b u t i o n s s t i l l may be t h e most u s e f u l s i n g l e measure. T h i s d i s c u s s i o n h i g h l i g h t s some of t h e most s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s of each y e a r ' s l i s t , c o n c l u d i n g w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n s of t r e n d s i n t h e t o p 20 grouping over t h e s i x - e l e c t i o n The 1972 group period. able 10) c o v e r s a range of $137,500 t o $824,301 i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s , with t h e AFL-CIO's COPE--the f a t h e r of modern PACs--in first p l a c e and t h e UAW's V-CAP i n second p l a c e . Labor PACs c o n s t i t u t e t e n of t h e t o p twenty, not s u r p r i s i n g i n view of l a b o r ' s undisputed predominance i n t h e PAC a r e n a a s t h e 1970s began. Four t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s - - t h o s e connected with t h e r e a l t o r s , t h e A s s o c i a t e d General C o n t r a c t o r s , t h e AMA, and t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Manufacturers (B1PAC)--were i n t h e t o p 20. a l l t h r e e of t h e major d a i r y co-ops--Committee The l i s t i n c l u d e s f o r Thorough A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i t i c a l Education (c-TAPE), A g r i c u l t u r a l and D a i r y E d u c a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l T r u s t (ADEPT), and T r u s t f o r S p e c i a l P o l i t i c a l A g r i c u l t u r a l Community Education (SPACE); i n view of t h e l a t e r r e v e l a t i o n s about t h e i r i l l e g a l contributions in 1972, the total of their contributions listed in Table 10 actually understates the level of their financial giving that year. 1221 Finally, three unaffiliated PACs are included, one of which is Democratic in orientation--the DSG Campaign Fund--and the others are liberal--National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC) and the Committee for Twelve. In 1974 able 111, the range of contributions was $134,100 (lower than in 1972) to $1,090,696 (the first PAC to top the million dollar mark in contributions during this period). COPE was again in first place, but the AMA's PAC supplanted the UAW in second place. Labor PACs increased their representation from 10 to 12 of the top 20, while none of three dairy co-ops were included at all, undoubtedly a result of the negative publicity they received in the wake of the disclosures of their illegal contributions in the previous election. The trade associations increased their ranks from 4 to 6, with the American Medical PAC (AMPAC), Business-Industry PAC (BIPAC), and the Realtors PAC remaining, and the PACs of the American Dental Association, the Trucking Association, and the California chapter of the AMA added. Two unaffiliated PACs were included, with the conservative Comittee for the Survival of a Free Congress joining (and surpassing) one of the liberal groups from 1972 (NCEC). In 1976 (Table 12), the cut-off level for inclusion more than doubled, in conjunction with the overall jump in PAC spending that year; the range in contributions was $290,125 to $1,167,365. Labor PACs remained at about the same level, with 11 included. The trade associations dropped to five--with AMPAC, Realtors PAC, BIPAC, and American Dental PAC (ADPAC) remaining, and the National Automobile Dealers Association's PAC added. 1221 - Two of the dairy Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election, p. 495. co-ops--C-TAPE t o t h e l i s t , and t h e number o f u n a f f i l i a t e d and ADEPT--returned PACs remained a t two--NCEC, a g a i n , and N a t i o n a l C o n s e r v a t i v e PAC (NCPAC), r e p l a c i n g t h e C o r n i t t e e f o r t h e S u r v i v a l o f a F r e e Congress (CSFC) a s t h e largest conservative ideological contributor. I n 1978 ( T a b l e 1 3 ) , t h e c u t - o f f level increased slightly--to w h i l e t h e maximum c o n t r i b u t e d i n c r e a s e d by a l m o s t 50 p e r c e n t - - t o $307,902, $1,639,795. AMPAC was a g a i n i n f i r s t p l a c e , and f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , n e i t h e r of t h e t o p two were l a b o r PACs. F u r t h e r m o r e , UAW V-CAP, i n t h i r d place, for the f i r s t time s u p p l a n t e d COPE a s t h e l e a d i n g l a b o r c o n t r i b u t o r . i n c r e a s e d i n number t o six--with The t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s AMPAC, ADPAC, R e a l t o r s PAC, and t h e Automobile and Truck D e a l e r s EAC r e m a i n i n g (BIPAC l e f t t h e t o p 20 f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e ) and t h e L i f e U n d e r w r i t e r s PAC and t h e T r i a l Lawyers A s s o c i a t i o n PAC added. a d d i t i o n , one membership o r g a n i z a t i o n - - t h e In N a t i o n a l R i f l e A s s o c i a t i o n (NRA)--had i t s V i c t o r y Fund added t o t h e l i s t , t h u s b r i n g i n g t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h t o t a l t o s e v e n , and adding a c o n s e r v a t i v e s i n g l e - i s s u e PAC (NRA) t o t h e t o p 20--the f i r s t s i n g l e - i s s u e PAC t o make t h e l i s t s a t a l l s i n c e 1972. The u n a f f i l i a t e d PACs were down t o o n l y o n e , t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e C i t i z e n s f o r t h e R e p u b l i c , which was o r g a n i z e d t o promote t h e p h i l o s o p h y and p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s of Ronald Reagan. C i t i z e n s f o r t h e R e p u b l i c was t h e f o r e r u n n e r of t h e c a n d i d a t e - o r i e n t e d PACs, which many c a n d i d a t e s , o f t e n P r e s i d e n t i a l , o r g a n i z e d t o conduct t h e e a r l y , pre-formal o p e r a t i o n s of t h e i r campaigns. F i n a l l y , t h e 1978 t o p 20 l i s t i n c l u d e d one d a i r y co-op--C-TAPE. The 1980 l i s t able 1 4 ) i n c l u d e s PACs whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s ranged between $424,008 ( a 40 p e r c e n t r i s e from t h e 1978 c u t - o f f ) d r o p from t h e h i g h p o i n t i n 1 9 7 8 ) . followed by t h e UAW V-CAP, and $1,536,573 ( a s l i g h t The R e a l t o r s PAC was i n f i r s t p l a c e , and t h e n AMPAC. The AFL-CIO's s i x t h p l a c e , no l o n g e r even among t h e t o p f i v e . COPE dropped t o Labor PACs a g a i n c o n s t i t u t e d 11 o f t h e t o p 20. The t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h g r o u p was a g a i n r e p r e s e n t e d by s e v e n o f i t s members--with AMPAC, R e a l t o r s PAC, Automobile and Truck D e a l e r s EAC, ADPAC, L i f e U n d e r w r i t e r s PAC, and t h e NRA V i c t o r y Fund i n c l u d e d a g a i n , and t h e American Banking A s s o c i a t i o n BANKPAC on t h e l i s t f o r t h e f i r s t time--in 13th place. C-TAPE was a g a i n t h e s o l e d a i r y co-op i n c l u d e d , and o n l y one u n a f f i l i a t e d PAC--NCEC--ranked among t h e t o p 20. Thus, t h e o n l y non-connected PAC was a l i b e r a l o n e , i n a y e a r i n which c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs r e c e i v e d s o much a t t e n t i o n i n t h e media ( u n l e s s , of c o u r s e , t h e NRA V i c t o r y Fund i s i n c l u d e d a s a c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l PAC). This apparent i n c o n g r u i t y w i l l be resolved when t h e t o p 20 PACs a r e ranked by o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s . The 1982 l i s t ( T a b l e 1 5 ) i n c l u d e s PACs whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s ranged between $621,601 (47 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e 1980 c u t - o f f ) more t h a n t h e b i g g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r of 1980). and $ 2 , 1 1 5 , 1 3 5 ( 3 8 p e r c e n t The t o p t h r e e PACs were t h e same a s i n 1980, w i t h t h e R e a l t o r s PAC a g a i n f i r s t , and AMPAC s w i t c h i n g p l a c e s w i t h UAW V-CAP t o become, r e s p e c t i v e l y , second and t h i r d . L a b o r ' s r a n k s grew from 11 t o 1 2 , i n c l u d i n g t h r e e o f t h e t o p f i v e ; t h e AFL-CIO COPE f e l l t o t e n t h p l a c e i n 1982. The t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h g r o u p was a g a i n r e p r e s e n t e d by s e v e n PACs, a l t h o u g h two from 1980--American L i f e U n d e r w r i t e r s PAC--were D e n t a l PAC and t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f m i s s i n g from t h e l i s t . They were r e p l a c e d by two PACs which had not p r e v i o u s l y made t h e t o p 20 r a n k i n g s : t h e A s s o c i a t e d G e n e r a l C o n t r a c t o r s PAC was s e v e n t e e n t h l a r g e s t , and B u i l d PAC ( o f t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Home B u i l d e r s ) was t h e s i x t h l a r g e s t . A s i n 1980, t h e NRA P o l i t i c a l V i c t o r y Fund was t h e o n l y membership o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h i s c a t e g o r y . T h e r e were no non-connected o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e 1982 l i s t i n g , a n d , a s i n 1978 and 1980, t h e o n l y co-op was C-TAPE. TABLE 10. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1972 Rank -. Committee (and ~£filiation*) Contributions ,- -- AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers) American Medical Political Act ion Committee (American Medical ~ssociation) Business-Industry Political Action Committee (National Association of ~anufacturers) National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) Agricultural & Dairy Educational Political Trust (Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.) Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America) Trust for Special Political Agricultural Community Education (Dairymen, Inc.) CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America) Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association) Machinists Non-Partisan League (International Association of Machinists) ILGWU Campaign Committee (International Ladies Garment Workers Union) Democratic Study Group Campaign Fund (non-connected) Committee for Twelve (non-connected) Laborers' Political League (Laborers U ~ ~ O ~ / A F L - C I O ) AMCOPE (Meatcutters Union/A~~-C10) Connnittee for Action (Associated General Contractors) Real Estate PEC (National Association of Real Estate Boards) * Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status. Source: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances : Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974, v. 1-111. TABLE 11. Rank Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1974 Committee (and Affiliation*) Contributions AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers) Machinists Non-Partisan League (International Association of ~achinists) MEBA Political Action Fund (~arineEngineers Beneficial Association) United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association) Business-Industry Political Action Committee (National Association of ~anufacturers) Real Estate Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors) Laborers' Political League (Laborer s U ~ ~ O ~ / A F L - C I O ) Transportation Political Education League (united Transportation union) NEA-PAC (National Education Association) Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America) Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected) Railway Clerks Political League ( ~ a i l w a ~Airline , and Steamship Clerks) National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected) CAL-PAC (American Medical Association-~alifornia) Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (Carpenters union) Truck Operators Non-Partisan Committee (Trucking Association,Inc.) American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association) * Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status. Source: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. TABLE 12. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1976 -Rank Committee (and ~£filiation*) Contributions -$1,167,365 American Medical Political Action Cornittee (American Medical ~ssociation) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Commit tee (AFL-CIO ) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers) Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of ~ealtors) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) NEA Political Action Committee (National Education Association) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (~nternationalAssociation of ~achinists) Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust (Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.) United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation union) National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Automobile Dealers Association) National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected) CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America) Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America) American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association) Business-Industry Political Action Committee (National Association of Manufacturers) Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association) MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association) Laborers Political League (Laborers Union/ AFL-CIO) * Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status. Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (from reports on file). TABLE 13. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1978 Rank -- ---- Committee (and Affiliation) ---- P Contributions ------ - American Medical Political Action Committee $1,639,795 ( h e r ican Medical Association) Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of ~ealtors) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers) Automobile & Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Automobile Dealers Association) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (~nternationalAssociation of Machinists) American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association) CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) Citizens for the Republic (non-connected) MEBA Political Action Fund (~arineEngineers Beneficial Association) Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America) Life Underwriters Political Action Committee (~ationalAssociation of Life underwriters) NRA Political Victory Fund (~ationalRifle Association of America) Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust (Association of Trial Lawyers of America) NEA Political Action Committee (National Education Association) Railway Clerks Political League ( ~ a i l w a ~Airline , and Steamship clerks) Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America) Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Report on 1977-78 Financial Activity of Non-Party and Party Political Committees, press release: April 24, 1980. TABLE 14. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1980 - -Rank Committee (and ~ffiliation) - Contributions - Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of ~ealtors) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto workers) American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical ~ssociation) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (~ationalAssociation of Automobile ~ealers) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of ~achinists) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America) United Steelworkers Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) National Association of Life Underwriters PAC (National Association of Life underwriters) American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental ~ssociation) MEBA Political Action Fund (~arineEngineers Beneficial Association) American Bankers Association BANKPAC (American Bankers Association) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation union) Active Ballot Club (Food & Commercial Workers International Union) Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (united Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America) ILGWU Campaign Committee (International Ladies Garment Workers Union) CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Comunicat ion Workers of America) NRA Political Victory Fund (National Rifle Association) National Commi,ree for an Effective Congress (non-connected) Source: U. S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report for 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982. --- TABLE 15: Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1982 Rank Committee (and Affiliation) Contributions Realtors Political Action Committee $2,115,135 (National Association of Realtors) American Medical Association Political Action Committee 1,737,090 (American Medical Association) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 1,628,347 (United Auto Workers) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 1,445,459 (International Association of Machinists) National Education Association PAC 1,183,215 (~ationalEducation Association) Build Political Action Committee 1,006,628 (National Association of Home Builders) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 962 ,450 (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) American Bankers Association BANKPAC 947,460 (American Bankers Association) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 917,295 (National Association of Automobile Dealers) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 906,425 ( AFL-c 10) Seafarers Political Activity Donation 850,514 (Seafarers International Union of North America) Active Ballot Club 729,213 (United Food and Commercial Workers International Union) United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 715,757 (United Steelworkers of America) Engineers Political Education Committee 711,535 (International Union of Operating Engineers) NRA Political Victory Fund 710,902 (National Rifle Association) MEBA Political Action Fund 701,153 (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association) Associated General Contractors Political Action Committee 683,766 (Associated General Contractors of America) CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 643,428 (Communication Workers of America) Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee 637,479 (United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America) ILGWU Campaign Committee 621,601 (International Ladies Garment Workers Union) Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 PAC Study (press release): Nov. 29, 1983; and U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1981-1982. Final Report. Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 3--Non-Party Detailed Tables (Corporate and Labor). Washington, 1983. Looking a t t h e s i x t a b l e s a s a s e t , one c a n v e n t u r e s e v e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s o f t h e m a j o r PAC g r o u p i n g s : ( 1 ) Labor PACs h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e d 10-12 of t h e t o p 20 PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s i n each of t h e s i x e l e c t i o n s . They h a v e , i n f a c t , made up around h a l f o f t h e t o p 1 0 , a l t h o u g h some d e c l i n e h a s b e e n e v i d e n c e d s i n c e 1974 when s e v e n o f t h e t o p 10 were l a b o r PACs; t h e number f e l l t o s i x i n 1976 and 1978, f i v e i n 1980, and f o u r i n 1982. Although l a b o r PACs have remained r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t i n number s i n c e 1972 and have been s u r p a s s e d i n a g g r e g a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s by b o t h c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c o m m i t t e e s , t h e i r s t r e n g t h h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y been c o n c e n t r a t e d i n a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l number of l a r g e , well-organized, p o l i t i c a l l y - m i n d e d unions. ( 2 ) The r e v e r s e o f t h e above d e s c r i p t i o n of l a b o r PACs can b e a p p l i e d t o c o r p o r a t e PACs. No s i n g l e c o r p o r a t e committee a c h i e v e d any predominance among c o r p o r a t e PACs, w i t h none a p p e a r i n g on a n y o f t h e t o p 20 l i s t s . Rather, c o r p o r a t e PAC s t r e n g t h h a s b e e n emanating from t h e i r e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g p r o l i f e r a t i o n , which, i n t u r n , h a s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r high r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n a g g r e g a t e l e v e l of e x p e n d i t u r e s - - t r i p l i n g t h a n d o u b l i n g i t a g a i n i n 1980. i t from 1976 t o 1978 and more The s l o w i n g of t h i s growth r a t e t o 37 p e r c e n t i n 1982 may s i g n a l a l e v e l i n g o f f i n t h i s a r e a , b u t t h e c o r p o r a t e PACs' p o s i t i o n remains s t r o n g r e l a t i v e t o t h e o t h e r groupings. (3) The t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c o m m i t t e e s have m o d e s t l y i n c r e a s e d t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n among t h e t o p 20 c o n t r i b u t o r s , from f o u r i n 1972 t o s e v e n i n 1982. T h e s e c o m m i t t e e s ranked second i n t e r m s of t h e i r i n c l u s i o n on t h e s e l i s t s , a s t h e y ranked second i n t e r m s o f t h e i r a g g r e g a t e l e v e l of c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1982. (4) The non-connected PACs, d e s p i t e t h e i r a s t o n i s h i n g growth i n b o t h numbers and f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y i n r e c e n t y e a r s , r e c e i v e j u s t t o k e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n among t h e b i g PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s . And t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p s , which have l e d t h e growth i n t h e non-connected c a t e g o r y , were no b e t t e r r e p r e s e n t e d - i f a t all--than t h e l i b e r a l groups. ( 5 ) Only one s i n g l e - i s s u e PAC--the NRA P o l i t i c a l V i c t o r y Fund--ranked among t h e 20 l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s i n any y e a r . with t h e media-fostered (6) T h i s , too, appeared t o c o n f l i c t i m p r e s s i o n o f t h e growth of s i n g l e - i s s u e The d a i r y co-ops, politics. once a c o r n e r s t o n e i n t h e PAC movement, have dwindled among t h e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s from t h r e e i n 1972 t o one i n 1978-1982. (7) Seven PACs were i n c l u d e d among t h e t w e n t y l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s i n i n a l l s i x e l e c t i o n s , t h o s e a f f i l i a t e d w i t h t h e AFL-CIO, t h e AMA, t h e S e a f a r e r s , t h e S t e e l w o r k e r s , t h e UAW, t h e R e a l t o r s , and t h e M a c h i n i s t s . Among t h e f o u r l a r g e s t PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s o v e r t h e s i x - e l e c t i o n p e r i o d , t h e r e have been some n o t e w o r t h y developments. The R e a l t o r s PAC h a s e x p e r i e n c e d a m e t e o r i c r i s e from number twenty i n 1972 t o number one i n 1980 and 1982. AMPAC, t h e o l d e s t major non-labor election. PAC, h a s remained i n t h e t o p t h r e e i n e v e r y COPE, t h e modern p r e c e d e n t - s e t t e r among PACs, d e c l i n e d s t e a d i l y from f i r s t p l a c e i n 1972 and 1974 t o t e n t h i n 1982. s i n c e 1978 a s t h e foremost l a b o r PAC--in candidates--by UAW V-CAP. COPE h a s been s u p p l a n t e d terms of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l The l a t t e r committee h a s remained i n t h e t o p t h r e e i n e v e r y e l e c t i o n s i n c e 1972. F i n a l l y , w h i l e t h e t o p t h r e e PACs from 1972-1976 i n c l u d e d two l a b o r and one t r a d e PAC, t h e s i t u a t i o n s i n c e 1978 h a s r e v e r s e d . b. Top 20 PAC s p e n d e r s from 1976-1982 T h i s s u b s e c t i o n f o c u s e s on T a b l e s 16-19, which l i s t t h e t o p 20 PACs ranked by t h e i r a d j u s t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s i n each of t h e l a s t f o u r e l e c t i o n s . Highlights of e a c h t a b l e w i l l b e d e s c r i b e d , a l o n g w i t h key d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s and t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s i n t h a t y e a r . The c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s s u b s e c t i o n w i l l review t h e t r e n d s over t h e four e l e c t i o n s covered. The t w e n t y l a r g e s t PACs i n 1976 ( T a b l e 1 6 ) s p e n t between $512,844 and $2,878,490, w i t h t h e former 75 p e r c e n t h i g h e r and t h e l a t t e r 150 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e t w e n t i e t h and t h e f i r s t l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s i n 1976 ( T a b l e 12). F i f t e e n o f t h e committees i n T a b l e 16 a l s o were l i s t e d among t h e twenty l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s t h a t y e a r ; t h e f i v e not r a n k i n g among t h e l a r g e c o n t r i b u t o r s i n c l u d e d one union (ILGWU), one co-op (SPACE), two c o n s e r v a t i v e membership g r o u p s (Gun Owners and ACU PAC), and one c o n s e r v a t i v e u n a f f i l i a t e d group (CSFC). Among t h e c a t e g o r i e s of PACs r e p r e s e n t e d were n i n e l a b o r u n i o n s (compared w i t h e l e v e n on t h e t o p c o n t r i b u t o r s l i s t ) , t h r e e non-connected groups ( t h e same number a s i n T a b l e 1 2 ) , t h r e e t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s ( w i t h f i v e i n T a b l e 1 2 1 , two membership c o m m i t t e e s , b o t h c o n s e r v a t i v e (compared w i t h none i n T a b l e 1 2 ) , and t h r e e co-ops ( o n e more t h a n i n T a b l e 1 2 ) . I n t h e top f i v e spenders were, i n o r d e r , two c o n s e r v a t i v e u n a f f i l i a t e d PACs, one c o n s e r v a t i v e membership o r g a n i z a t i o n , one l i b e r a l u n a f f i l i a t e d committee, and one a s s o c i a t i o n . most prominent l a b o r PACs, COPE and UAW V-CAP, The two ranked s e v e n t h and e i g h t h , compared w i t h r a n k i n g second and t h i r d among t h e PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s t h a t y e a r . The twenty l a r g e s t 1978 PACs ( T a b l e 1 7 ) s p e n t between $658,236 and $4,509,074, r e s p e c t i v e l y 30 and 60 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e 1976 r a n g e and 114 p e r c e n t more t h a n t h e t w e n t i e t h l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r and 175 p e r c e n t more t h a n t h e t o p c o n t r i b u t o r i n 1978. Twelve PACs ranked among b o t h t h e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s and t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s , t h r e e l e s s t h a n i n 1976, w i t h t h e o t h e r e i g h t i n c l u d i n g f o u r c o n s e r v a t i v e non-connected PACs ( C i t i z e n s f o r t h e R e p u b l i c , NCPAC, CSFC, and C o n s e r v a t i v e V i c t o r y F u n d ) , one c o n s e r v a t i v e 5 membership g r o u p (Gun Owners), one l i b e r a l u n a f f i l i a t e d group ( N C E C ) , and two a s s o c i a t i o n s ( t h e C a l i f o r n i a and Texas c h a p t e r s of t h e AMA). Among t h e key t y p e s of PACs, l a b o r PACs dropped t o o n l y s i x (down from n i n e i n 1976 and compared w i t h e l e v e n among t h e l a r g e s t 1978 c o n t r i b u t o r s ) , non-connected jumped t o s i x ( f r o m t h r e e i n 1976 and compared w i t h one among t h e t o p c o n t r i b u t o r s ) , a s s o c i a t i o n s r o s e t o s i x ( f r o m t h r e e i n 1976 and t h e same number a s i n t h e t o p c o n t r i b u t o r s l i s t i n 1 9 7 8 ) , membership g r o u p s dropped t o one ( f r o m two i n 1976, and t h e same number a s i n t h e 1978 l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s l i s t ) , and co-ops dropped t o one ( f r o m t h r e e i n 1976, and t h e same number a s i n T a b l e 1 3 ) . non-connected It s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t two of t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs ( C i t i z e n s f o r t h e R e p u b l i c and t h e J o h n C o n n a l l y C i t i z e n s ~ o r u m )w e r e , i n f a c t , o r i e n t e d h e a v i l y t o f u r t h e r i n g t h e c a n d i d a c i e s o f two P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s (Reagan and C o n n a l l y , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . Also, t h e r i s e among a s s o c i a t i o n s was l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t o f two o f AMA's S t a t e PACs j o i n i n g i t among t h e t o p 20 s p e n d e r s . The two b i g l a b o r PACs ranked e i g h t h (COPE) and n i n t h (UAW) among s p e n d e r s , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r a n k i n g s of f i f t h and t h i r d among c o n t r i b u t o r s . c o n s e r v a t i v e non-connected The t o p f i v e PAC s p e n d e r s w e r e , i n o r d e r , t h r e e g r o u p s and two a s s o c i a t i o n s . The r a n g e o f t h e t o p twenty PAC s p e n d e r s i n 1980 ( T a b l e 1 8 ) r o s e by r e s p e c t i v e l y 50 and 67 p e r c e n t o v e r t h e 1978 l e v e l t o a r a n g e o f $995,501 t o $7,530,060, 134 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e t w e n t i e t h l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r and n e a r l y 400 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r i n 1980. Again i n 1980, t w e l v e committees were on b o t h t h e t o p s p e n d e r and t o p c o n t r i b u t o r l i s t s , b u t , i n 1980, a l l e i g h t o f t h e t o p s p e n d e r s t h a t d i d not r a n k among t h e t o p c o n t r i b u t o r s were c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs: seven non-connected (NCPAC, C o n g r e s s i o n a l C l u b , Fund f o r a c o n s e r v a t i v e M a j o r i t y , C i t i z e n s f o r t h e R e p u b l i c , Americans f o r a n E f f e c t i v e P r e s i d e n c y , CSFC, and Americans f o r Change) and one membership group (Gun Owners). The non-connected PACs c o n s t i t u t e d t h e l a r g e s t c a t e g o r y of t h e t o p s p e n d e r s w i t h e i g h t i n number ( t h e seven above p l u s t h e l i b e r a l NCEC), a g a i n o f two o v e r 1978, b u t i n c o n t r a s t w i t h o n l y o n e among t h e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s i n 1980--NCEC. Membership g r o u p s added one o v e r 1978, giving them two top spenders (the Gun Owners and the NRA PAC), one more than on the top contributors list for 1980. Labor PACs declined in number to five (eleven on 1980's contributor list). Labor's big two PACs (UAW and COPE) ranked sixth and seventeenth among spenders, but second and sixth among contributors. Associations declined to four (six among the top contributors) , and co-ops remained constant with one (the same as in the contributors listing). The top five PAC spenders in 1980 included four conservative non-connected groups and one association. The 20 biggest PACs in 1982 able 19) spent between $1,202,475 and $10,404,521, 20 and 38 percent higher, respectively, than the 1980 range and twice and four times the respective amounts given by the twentieth largest and the largest PAC contributors that year. The number of PACs ranked in both the top contributors and spenders lists for 1982 fell to eight. Nine of the twelve top spenders not ranked among the largest contributors were non-connected, including four conservative groups (Congressional Club, NCPAC, FCM, and CSFC), one liberal group (NCEC), and four partisan/ideological groups (Citizens for the Republic, Fund for a Democratic Majority, Committee for the Future of America, and Republican Majority Fund) known for their close ties to prominent pol it ical figures (Ronald Reagan, Edward Kennedy, Walter Mondale, and Howard Baker, respectively). With nine PACs listed in Table 19, the non-connected PACs were the largest group, in contrast with none listed among the 20 largest contributors. Trade groups and co-ops remained constant in number in 1982 at four and one, respectively (six and one among top contributors). Membership groups rose to two, with the addition of the League of Conservation Voters; only the NRA was ranked in Table 15. Labor PACs declined from five to four in 1982, with the notable absence of the AFL-CIO COPE; this was in contrast with the twelve labor PACs among the top contributors. The top five spenders included three conservative and one liberal non-connected committees and one trade association. TABLE 16. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1976 1/ National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected) Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress ( non-connec ted) Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee (Gun Owners of America) National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected) American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association) Committee for Thorough Political Agricultural Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers) American Conservative Union Political Action Committee (American Conservative Union) Realtors Political Action Committee (~ationalAssociation of Realtors) NEA Political Action Committee (National Education Association) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists) Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust (Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.) United Steelworkers Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) ILGWU Campaign Committee (International Ladies Garment Workers Union) Trust for Special Political Agricultural Community Education (Dairymen, Inc.) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers) Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association) MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association) * Affiliation does not necessarily correspond to legal status. 1/ Adjusted expenditures represents the gross disbursements of the comiTtee minus monies transferred to af filiated committees. Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (unpublished data). CRS- 107 TABLE 17. Rank 1/ Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1978 - Committee (and ~ffiliation) Expenditures -Citizens for the Republic (non-connected) National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected) Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected) American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association) Realtors Political Action Committee (~ationalAssociation of ~ealtors) Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee ( ~ u nOwners of ~rnerica) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto workers) National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers,Inc.) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union) United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) Texas Medical Political Action Committee (Texas Medical Association) The John Connally Citizens Forum (non-connected) Conservative Victory Fund (non-connected) California Medical Political Action Committee ( ~ a l fornia i Medical Association) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists) Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust (Association of Trial Lawyers of America) CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Connnunication Workers of America) 11 Adjusted expenditures represents the gross disbursements of the =&it tee minus monies transferred to af fi liated committees. Source: U.S. Federal Election Cornmission (press release): April 24, 1980. - CRS- 108 TABLE 18. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1980 1/ National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected) Congressional Club (non-connected) Fund for a Conservative Majority (non-connected) Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors) Citizens for the Republic (non-connected) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto workers) Americans for an Effective Presidency (non-connected) American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association) Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected) National Committee for an Effective Congress ( non-connec ted) Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee (Gun Owners of America) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc .) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation union) NRA Political Victory Fund (National Rifle Association) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists) AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee ( AFL-CIO) Americans for Change (non-connected) Life Underwriters Political Action Committee (National Association of Life Underwriters) United Steelworkers Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America) 1/ Adjusted expenditures represents gross disbursements of the committee minus monies transferred to affiliated committees. Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report For 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982. CRS- 109 TABLE 19: ---_---Rank -- Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1982 1/ I _ y l _ - ------ - Committee (and Affiliation) _ I _ - I - Expenditures ----- National Congressional Club $10,404,521 (non-connected) National Conservative Political Action Committee 10,118,891 (non-connected) Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors) Fund for a Conservative Majority (non-connected) National Committee for an Effective Congress ( non-connec ted) American Medical Association Political Action Committee (American Medical ~ssociation) Citizens for the Republic (non-connected) Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected) Fund for a Democratic Majority (non-connected) UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers) Committee for the Future of America (non-connected) Republican Major ity Fund (non-connected) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists) Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) National Education Association Political Action Committee (National Education Association) California Medical Political Action Committee (California Medical Association) NRA Political Victory Fund (National Rifle Association) Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation union) League of Conservation Voters (League of Conservation voters) Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile ~ealers) 1/ Adjusted expenditures represents gross disbursements of the committee minus-monies transferred to affiliated committees. Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. PAC Study (press release): Nov. 29, 1983. FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 I n r e v i e w i n g t h e l i s t s o f t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s among PACs from 1976- 1 9 8 2 , a p a r t from any c o m p a r i s o n s w i t h t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t l i s t s of l a r g e c o n t r i b u t o r s , s e v e r a l s i g n i f i c a n t t r e n d s can be d i s c e r n e d . The f i r s t i s t h e enormous i n c r e a s e i n j u s t e i g h t y e a r s i n t h e amount o f money s p e n t b y t h e PACs. cut-off Whereas t h e l e v e l f o r i n c l u s i o n among t h e t o p 20 was a r o u n d h a l f a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n 1976, i t more t h a n d o u b l e d t o $1.2 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n 1982. And w h i l e t h e t o p PAC i n 1976 s p e n t a n i m p r e s s i v e $ 2 . 9 m i l l i o n , t h e 1982 h i g h was more t h a n t h r e e t i m e s a s much--$10.4 million. The s e c o n d n o t a b l e t r e n d h a s b e e n t h e d e c l i n e i n l a b o r PACs among t h e b i g s p e n d e r s b y more t h a n h a l f , from n i n e i n 1976 t o f o u r i n 1982. This decline h a s b e e n accompanied by a t h i r d t r e n d , t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e non-connected PACs; t h r e e were i n c l u d e d i n 1976, a n d , b y 1982, t h e i r number had r e a c h e d n i n e . C o n c o m i t a n t l y , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs ( c o n s i s t i n g of some from t h e membership and some from t h e non-connected c a t e g o r i e s ) h a v e d o u b l e d i n number s i n c e 1 9 7 6 , a n d , i n 1 9 8 2 , more t h a n h a l f o f t h e l a r g e s t PACs w e r e i d e o l o g i c a l o r i s s u e o r i e n t e d i n n a t u r e ( a s opposed t o t h e economic o r i e n t a t i o n o f b u s i n e s s and labor groups). W h i l e c o n s e r v a t i v e g r o u p s were p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o m i n e n t i n 1982, t h e y d i d n o t d o m i n a t e t h e f i e l d t o t h e e x t e n t t h e y had i n 1980 when n i n e o u t o f t h e t e n s u c h PACs were c o n s e r v a t i v e i n n a t u r e . Apparently, t h e i r perceived s u c c e s s e s i n 1980 had prompted s t r o n g e r e f f o r t s b y l i b e r a l and D e m o c r a t i c o r i e n t e d g r o u p s i n 1982. The f i n a l m a j o r t r e n d h a s b e e n t h e t e n d e n c y o f a few l a r g e c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs t o skew t h e o v e r a l l s p e n d i n g f i g u r e s . The t o p two PAC s p e n d e r s i n e a c h o f t h e f o u r e l e c t i o n s were c o n s e r v a t i v e g r o u p s whose d o l l a r t o t a l s were d i s t i n c t l y h i g h e r ( a n d more d r a m a t i c a l l y s o w i t h e a c h s u c c e e d i n g e l e c t i o n ) t h a n t h e n e x t o t h e r s on t h e l i s t . I n 1976, t h e t o p two PACs s p e n t $ 2 . 9 and $ 2 . 2 m i l l i o n , w i t h o n l y $150,000 s e p a r a t i n g t h e second and t h i r d h i g h e s t groups. I n 1 9 7 8 , t h e t o p two s p e n t $4.5 and $3.0 m i l l i o n , w i t h t h e second l a r g e s t exceeding t h e t h i r d by 50 percent--a g a p of $ 1 m i l l i o n . I n 1980, t h e t o p two groups s p e n t $7.5 and $7.2 m i l l i o n , exceeding t h e t h i r d l a r g e s t PAC by 129 p e r c e n t , o r $4 m i l l i o n . The two b i g s p e n d e r s o f 1982 ( t h e same two a s i n 1980, i n f a c t ) s p e n t $10.4 and $10.1 m i l l i o n , w i t h t h e t h i r d ranked g r o u p spending n e a r l y $7 million--or 222 p e r c e n t - - l e s s t h a n t h e second. For t h e f i r s t time i n 1982, t h e t h i r d h i g h e s t spender was n o t a l s o a c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l o r i s s u e o r g a n i z a t i o n ; t h e R e a l t o r s PAC s p e n t a n i m p r e s s i v e $3.1 m i l l i o n , r e p o r t e d l y i n p a r t r e f l e c t i n g stepped-up o p e r a t i o n s by t h e g r o u p and p a r t l y because o f a n independent e x p e n d i t u r e e f f o r t by t h i s major t r a d e organization. The n e x t s u b s e c t i o n w i l l d i s c u s s t h e skewing o f t h e e x p e n d i t u r e s t a t i s t i c s by t h e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs by e x p l o r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f where t h e enormous sums o f money have been g o i n g , a s i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e y have n o t been s p e n t i n l a r g e measure on c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s . c. Comparison of t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s among PACs The a t t e n t i o n g i v e n t o t h e b i g PAC s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s r e f l e c t s a n i n t e r e s t i n d e t e r m i n i n g which groups have a c q u i r e d t h e g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l f o r influencing t h e p o l i t i c a l process. This s e c t i o n h a s e x p l o r e d t h i s t o p i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e context of t h e aggregate d a t a presented f o r c a t e g o r i e s o f PACs i n T a b l e s 8 and 9. Before a r r i v i n g a t some c o n c l u s i o n s about t h e l a r g e s t PACs and t h e s t a n d a r d s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e two d i f f e r e n t schemes f o r a r r a n g i n g them, one a d d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n f o r gauging a n i n t e r e s t g r o u p ' s p o t e n t i a l f o r p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e should be noted. A s mentioned e a r l i e r , some unions and c o r p o r a t i o n s sponsor more t h a n one PAC, d e s p i t e t h e a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of t h e 1976 FECA Amendments, which s u b j e c t e d a l l t h e PACs e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e same p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n t o a s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t per c a n d i d a t e ( $ 5 0 0 0 ) . It was i n t e n d e d t o r e d u c e t h e i n c e n t i v e s f o r p r o l i f e r a t i n g PACs w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n . It a p p e a r s , however, t h a t t h e r e may b e o t h e r i n c e n t i v e s working i n f a v o r of e s t a b l i s h i n g m u l t i p l e s e g r e g a t e d funds--for example, g r e a t e r e a s e i n a v o i d i n g d e t e c t i o n of t h e p a r e n t g r o u p ' s accumulated power. P r o l i f e r a t i o n may a l s o a f f o r d g r e a t e r e a s e i n f u n d r a i s i n g , by h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t PACs i n t h e v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s of a union o r c o r p o r a t i o n . Although t h e s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t p e r c a n d i d a t e i s i n e f f e c t , t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n o r union c o u l d r e t a i n t h e power t o d e t e r m i n e how t h e f u n d s r a i s e d by a l l of i t s a f f i l i a t e d PACs w i l l be s p e n t . I n 1980, f o r example, American Telephone & T e l e g r a p h s p o n s o r e d 23 PACs whose g r o s s e x p e n d i t u r e s were $893,637 and whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s t o t a l e d $654,250. While t h e former amount would n o t have p l a c e d AT&T among t h e t o p 20 s p e n d e r s even had t h e y been a r r a n g e d by s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e l a t t e r f i g u r e would l i k e l y have l e d t o t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ' s inclusion a s the tenth l a r g e s t contributor t o Federal candidates. On a s m a l l e r s c e l e b u t i l l u s t r a t i v e n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e LTV C o r p o r a t i o n s p o n s o r e d s i x PACs which s p e n t $446,819 i n 1980, $229,430 of which went t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s , and Dow C h e m i c a l ' s e i g h t PACs s p e n t $350,338, o f which $270,700 - went t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s . 1231 These d a t a r e v e a l t h a t by s p o n s o r i n g s e v e r a l PACs, t h e e x t e n t t o which an o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a y s a f i n a n c i a l r o l e i n F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s may b e o b s c u r e d . I t i s e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l t o b e a r t h i s phenomenon i n mind when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c a s e of t h e c o r p o r a t e PACs, which, d e s p i t e t h e i r l a r g e numbers and l a r g e aggregate contributions, - f a i l e d t o r a n k among t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s o r 1231 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1979-1980. F i n a l R e p o r t : P a r t y and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l Committees. Vol. 3 - Non-Party D e t a i l e d T a b l e s ( C o r p o r a t e and L a b o r ) . Washington, J a n . 1982. c o n t r i b u t o r s i n a n y y e a r examined h e r e i n . limited t o corporations. from i t s pre-eminent The AFL-CIO, But, p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs i s n o t f o r example, sponsored 1 7 PACs a p a r t COPE P o l i t i c a l C o n t r i b u t i o n s Committee. Undoubtedly, t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s would improve t h e o v e r a l l r a n k i n g o f t h e AFL-CIO v i s - a - v i s o t h e r PAC s p o n s o r s . Because t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t a d o p t s t h e method o f r a n k i n g PAC spending by committee, r a t h e r t h a n s p o n s o r , i t i s b e t t e r a b l e t o r e v e a l which PACs may be c o n s i d e r e d t h e most i m p o r t a n t r a t h e r t h a n which i n t e r e s t groups may be c o n s i d e r e d t h e most i m p o r t a n t politically. Because few groups sponsor more t h a n one PAC, t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n is not of overriding significance. The two most noteworthy t r e n d s evidencea from t h e comparison between T a b l e s 10-15 and Tables 16-19 a r e v e r y much i n t e r r e l a t e d : t h e i n c r e a s i n g g a p evidenced s i n c e 1976 i n t h e r a t i o o f s p e n d e r s t o c o n t r i b u t o r s and t h e i n c r e a s i n g predominance among t o p PAC s p e n d e r s o f t h e i d e o l o g i c a l ( m o s t l y conservative) groups. A s demonstrated by t h e a g g r e g a t e d a t a i n Table 3 , t h e p e r c e n t a g e of PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n a d j u s t e d PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s h a s ranged s i n c e 1976 between t h e 4 2 and 4 6 p e r c e n t l e v e l o r , i n o t h e r words, somewhat less t h a n one PAC d o l l a r i n two h a s been c o n t r i b u t e d d i r e c t l y t o F e d e r a l candidates. The comparison between T a b l e s 8 and 9 had shown t h a t t h e 1 t o 2 r a t i o was r o u g h l y a p p l i c a b l e between 1978 and 1982 t o e v e r y c a t e g o r y of PAC, e x c e p t f o r t h e non-connected grouping. I n 1982, between 52 and 63 p e r c e n t of e x p e n d i t u r e s by t h e t h r e e o t h e r major t y p e s o f PACs went i n t o c o n t r i b u t i o n s , b u t o n l y 17 p e r c e n t o f t h e non-connected PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s t o o k t h a t form; o n l y one d o l l a r i n s i x was s p e n t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s ( i n 1980, t h e r a t i o was o n l y 1 : 8 ) . For t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s , r a t h e r t h a n approximating t h e 1 t o 2 r a t i o a p p l i c a b l e t o most PAC g r o u p s , t h e g a p h a s grown s i g n i f i c a n t l y wider s i n c e 1976. I n 1976, t h e 2 0 t h l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r gay? 5 6 p e r c e n t a s much in contributions as the 20th largest spender spent; this proportion dropped to 47 percent in 1978, and to 43 percent in 1980; this trend was reversed in 1982 with a 52 percent figure. At the other end of the range, of more interest here, the largest contributor in 1976 gave 40 percent as much to candidates as was spent by the largest spending PAC; the proportion dropped to 36 percent in 1978 and to only 20 percent in 1980 and 1982. The increasingly high levels of expenditures by the ideological, nonconnected PACs, in conjunction with their relatively low levels of direct support for candidates, have been responsible for this trend. While the nonconnected group increased their representation among top spenders from three to nine from 1976-1982, their numbers among top contributors fell from two to zero in that same period. !Jhile contributions to Federal candidates constituted at least half, and often well over half, of adjusted expenditures by virtually every other PAC on the top spenders lists, this was far from true for the nonconnected PACs. A look at financial activity of the large conservative PACs in 1980 and 1982 will highlight the major contributing factors. Of the $7.5 million spent by NCPAC in 1980, only $237,806 was given as contributions to Federal candidates, while $3.3 million was spent independently for and against candidates. 124/ A Varch 1981 estimate placed NCPAC's operating 1251 In expenses at $2.1 million and its direct-mail costs at $1.8 million. 1982, NCPAC reported expenditures of $10.1 million, of which $264,357 (2.6 - Non-Party Detailed Tables (No Connected Organization, p. CgO; U.S. Federal Xlection Commission. FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top $16 Million (press release): Mov. 29, 1981. 124/ Ibid. Vol. 4 ~ r a d e / M e m b e r s h i ~ / ~ e a l t Cooperative, h, Corporation Without Stock). 125/ - Shaw, New Right Gave Candidates Little, p. 20A. p e r c e n t ) was c o n t r i b u t e d t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s and $3.2 m i l l i o n ( 3 1 . 4 p e r c e n t ) was f o r i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . 1261 The C o n g r e s s i o n a l Club s p e n t $7.2 m i l l i o n i n 1980, o f which $72,3&3 went t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s and $4,601,069 was s p e n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y . 1271 According t o one a c c o u n t , t h e $4.6 m i l l i o n f i g u r e f o r i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s g r e a t l y o v e r s t a t e d t h e l e v e l of c a n d i d a t e - o r i e n t e d activity; in fact, i t asserted, as much a s $ 3 . 9 m i l l i o n o f t h e $4.6 m i l l i o n went f o r d i r e c t - m a i l fundraising. 1281 I n 1982, o f t h e $10.4 m i l l i o n i n e x p e n d i t u r e s r e p o r t e d by t h e C o n g r e s s i o ~ a l I C l u b , o n l y $135,263 ( 1 . 3 p e r c e n t ) was c o n t r i b u t e d t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s ; no i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s were r e p o r t e d . 1291 Such g r o u p s a s Americans f o r Change and Americans f o r an E f f e c t i v e P r e s i d e n c y were o r g a n i z e d i n 1980 e x p r e s s l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c o n d u c t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e campaigns on b e h a l f o f Ronald Reagan. Those two g r o u p s s p e n t n e a r l y $2 m i l l i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y and o n l y $30,250 i n d i r e c t contributions. 1301 Thus, t h e gap between s p e n d i n g and c o n t r i b u t i n g can s t i l l be s e e n l a r g e l y i n terms of f u n d r a i s i n g c o s t s and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . The a f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o imply t h a t o n l y c o n s e r v a t i v e g r o u p s e x p e r i e n c e t h e l a r g e gap between o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s and d i r e c t contributions. I n 1982, s e v e r a l l i b e r a l o r D e m o c r a t i c - o r i e n t e d groups spent - 1 2 6 / U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1981-1982. F i n a l Report. P a r t y and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l C o m n i t t e e s . F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC I s s u e s Vol. I V . Washington, 1983; U.S. F i n a l R e p o r t on 1981-82 I n d e p e n d e n t E x p e n d i t u r e s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : O c t . 14; 1983. - 1271 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. A c t i v i t i t y , 1979-1980. Vol. 4. p. C42. FEC 1281 1291 Issues - FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l Shaw, New R i g h t Gave C a n d i d a t e s L i t t l e . U.S. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1981-1982. Vol. I V ; and F i n a l R e p o r t on 1981-82 I n d e p e n d e n t E x p e n d i t u r e s . 1 3 0 / U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. A c t i v i t y , 1979-1980. Vol. 4 . p. C12. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l CRS- 116 l a r g e sums of money, w i t h o n l y a f r a c t i o n t h e r e o f f o r d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s : I n d e p e n d e n t A c t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d o n l y 9 p e r c e n t of i t s $1.2 m i l l i o n ( w i t h a n o t h e r 11 p e r c e n t on i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s ) , w h i l e t h e two major c a n d i d a t e o r i e n t e d PACs--Fund America--contributed f o r a Democratic M a j o r i t y and Committee f o r t h e F u t u r e o f - o n l y 8 and 10.5 p e r c e n t of t h e i r o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s . 1311 However, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t i v e t o f o c u s on t h e l a r g e c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t j u s t two groups--NCPAC and t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l Club-- were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r more t h a n t e n p e r c e n t of t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s by a l l 3 , 3 7 1 PACs i n 1982, w i t h l e s s t h a n one-half and t h a t one o f them--NCPAC--was percent going f o r d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r more t h a n h a l f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t expenditures t h a t year. With l a r g e o r u n l i m i t e d p o o l s of p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t o r s , t h e non-connected PACs have i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r n e d t o d i r e c t - m a i l a s t h e most e f f e c t i v e way t o r e a c h l a r g e numbers o f p e o p l e s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e i r p h i l o s o p h y . For c o n s e r v a t i v e groups, t h i s trend has coincided with t h e pioneering e f f o r t s i n t h e d i r e c t - m a i l f i e l d by c o n s e r v a t i v e s - - m o s t n o t a b l y Richard Viguerie--anxious to assist c a n d i d a t e s of s i m i l a r i d e o l o g y t h r o u g h s o p h i s t i c a t e d d i r e c t - m a i l and in-house l i s t s o f m i l l i o n s of l i k e l y c o n t r i b u t o r s . techniques Only r e c e n t l y have l i b e r a l g r o u p s begun t o improve t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e d i r e c t - m a i l Thus, t h e d i r e c t - m a i l field. avenue i s one t h a t i s c o n d u c i v e t o t h e m i s s i o n of i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p s , and i t s g r e a t e r development t o d a t e by c o n s e r v a t i v e s h a s made i t an e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y method f o r c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs t o a d o p t . The o t h e r major f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e h i g h e x p e n s e s of c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs h a s been t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o o p e r a t e o u t s i d e o f more t r a d i t i o n a l , e s t a b l i s h e d channels f o r i n t e r e s t group i n f l u e n c e i n t h e e l e c t o r a l 1311 - U.S. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1981-1982. Vol. I V . process. While o f f i c i a l s of b o t h major p a r t i e s have e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n o v e r t h e t r e n d toward more i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , c o n s e r v a t i v e g r o u p s have t e n d e d t o d e f e n d them a s a l o g i c a l r e s p o n s e t o what t h e y s e e a s t h e FECA's undue r e s t r i c t i o n s on d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s . Furthermore, independent e x p e n d i t u r e campaigns, a s a h i g h l y v i s i b l e endeavor ( i n c o n t r a s t w i t h d i r e c t c a n d i d a t e g i v i n g ) , have p r o b a b l y had some impact on t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e g r o u p s t o r a i s e money. =/ F i n a l l y , with regard t o the spender-contributor g a p and t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s p e n d i n g by c o n s e r v a t i v e , non-connected PACs, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o o b s e r v e t h a t by e x c l u d i n g t h e t o p two PAC s p e n d e r s from 1976-1982, t h e gap between s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s more n e a r l y a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e 1 t o 2 r a t i o discussed e a r l i e r . Not o n l y have t h e non-connected PACs skewed t h e s p e n d i n g / c o n t r i b u t i n g d a t a , b u t t h i s h a s been e s p e c i a l l y t r u e o f a few m a j o r , h i g h l y v i s i b l e , l a r g e s p e n d i n g PACs i n e a c h e l e c t i o n . Having e x p l o r e d t h e growing gap between t h e t o p s p e n d e r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s and t h e dominance o f t h e former by t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e , non-connected PACs, t h e o t h e r c o m p a r a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s a p p e a r l a r g e l y t o be s i m p l y b y - p r o d u c t s other trends. of the Labor PACs dominated t h e f i e l d i n t e r m s o f t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s i n a l l s i x e l e c t i o n s , b u t t h e y i n c r e a s i n g l y were u n a b l e t o compete w i t h t h e o v e r a l l f u n d r a i s i n g a b i l i t y of t h e non-connected t h e i r r a n k s d e c r e a s e d among t h e l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s . g r o u p s . Thus, T r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s grew among t h e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s , b u t t h e i r numbers remained c o n s t a n t among t h e large spenders. They, a l s o , d e s p i t e t h e i r g e n e r a l l y i m p r e s s i v e f u n d r a i s i n g r e c o r d , were u n a b l e t o match t h e f u n d i n g l e v e l s of t h e l a r g e , i d e o l o g i c a l PACs. - 1321 I n d e p e n d e n t E x p e n d i t u r e s : T a c t i c s and S t r a t e g y . P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n R e p o r t , v. 3 , August 1 6 , 1980: 9-10. PAC Spending S i n c e 1972: Where t h e Money Has Gone The p r i m a r y f o c u s o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s on t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f PAC g i v i n g d u r i n g t h e past s i x elections--how PAC money h a s been d i s t r i b u t e d t o c a n d i d a t e s i n t e r m s o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p a r t y and e l e c t o r a l s t a t u s ( w h e t h e r incumbent, c h a l l e n g e r , o r open-seat contestant). T h i s s e c t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o promote a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f some of t h e key p o i n t s o f c o n t e n t i o n i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g d e b a t e on t h e s u b j e c t o f PACs, s p e c i f i c a l l y whether t h e r e i s a p a r t i s a n s l a n t i n PAC g i v i n g (and whether i t h a s undergone a s h i f t ) and whether an incumbency b i a s d o e s e x i s t among PACs. P a r t 1 examines t h e s e q u e s t i o n s from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e PACs (and a l s o s h e d s some l i g h t on how t h e s p e c i f i c t y p e s o f PACs have been d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e i r money w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p a r t y and status variables). perspective--how P a r t 2 l o o k s a t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s from t h e c a n d i d a t e much have PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s p l a y e d a r o l e i n t h e f i n a n c i n g o f campaigns, a c c o r d i n g t o p a r t y and c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s . 1. C a n d i d a t e P r e f e r e n c e s From t h e PAC P e r s p e c t i v e T a b l e s 20 and 21 p r e s e n t t h e d a t a on how PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s have been d i s t r i b u t e d t o c a n d i d a t e s s i n c e 1972, a c c o r d i n g t o p a r t y and e l e c t o r a l s t a t u s . They i n c l u d e s t a t i s t i c s f o r b o t h House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s (primary l o s e r s a r e excluded). While T a b l e 20 p r e s e n t s a g g r e g a t e d a t a f o r a l l PACs, T a b l e 21 b r e a k s t h e d a t a down by c a t e g o r i e s of PACs. As e v i d e n c e d i n T a b l e 20, t h e d i v i s i o n o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s h a s s h i f t e d s i n c e 1972 from an overwhelming Democratic b i a s t o a more c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n between t h e two p a r t i e s ' c a n d i d a t e s . I n 1972 and 1974, Democratic c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e d o v e r t w i c e a s much i n PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s a s d i d R e p u b l i c a n c a n d i d a t e s ; t h e Democratic a d v a n t a g e d e c l i n e d s l i g h t l y i n 1976, b u t i t remained i n t h e TABLE 20. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s by P a r t y and S t a t u s o f C a n d i d a t e s : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s and p e r c e n t a g e s ) 11--Continued For 1976: Common Cause. 1976 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . I n t e r e s t Group and P o l i t i c a l P a r t y C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s . Washington, 1978. v . 1. p. v i i i . For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. I n t e r i m Report no. 5--U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J u n e 1979. p . 3 2 , 34. For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l S t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Races ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : March 7 , 1982. F o r 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l R e p o r t on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2 , 1983. I n t e r m s o f c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s , T a b l e 20 r e v e a l s t h a t t h e incumbency b i a s among PACs i s indeed p r e s e n t and t h a t i t h a s grown s i n c e 1972. r o u g h l y one-half In that year, o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s went t o incumbent Members of C o n g r e s s ; t h i s p r o p o r t i o n climbed i n 1974 and a g a i n i n 1976, dropped i n 1978, and r o s e a g a i n i n 1980, t o n e a r l y t w o - t h i r d s . By 1982, more t h a n t w o - t h i r d s o f PAC money ( 6 8 p e r c e n t ) was g i v e n t o incumbents. Contributions t o candidates c h a l l e n g i n g incumbents h a s f l u c t u a t e d between t h e o n e - q u a r t e r and o n e - f i f t h l e v e l , w i t h a f o u r p e r c e n t r i s e i n 1980 followed by a seven p e r c e n t d e c l i n e i n 1982. Most o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o incumbents h a s come a t t h e expense of open-seat contenders. While such c o n t r i b u t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d o n e - f o u r t h o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1972, t h i s p e r c e n t a g e f e l l i n 1974 and a g a i n i n 1976, r o s e i n 1978 (when incumbents' s h a r e d e c l i n e d ) , and f e l l s h a r p l y i n 1980 t o o n l y 12 p e r c e n t ; t h e r e was a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e of one p e r c e n t i n 1982. A t i s s u e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o v e r c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s a s i t r e l a t e s t o PAC s p e n d i n g i s t h e n a t u r e of t h e p r i m a r y g o a l s o u g h t by p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s through t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s . I s money g i v e n p r i m a r i l y t o f u r t h e r t h e p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s a n d / o r economic i n t e r e s t s o f t h e g r o u p , o r i s i t g i v e n p r i m a r i l y a s a means o f g a i n i n g t h e g o o d w i l l of and t h e r e b y a c c e s s t o e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s ? I n t h e former c a s e , i t would seem t o f o l l o w t h a t t h e r e would b e a h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s o f t h e PAC and t h e c a n d i d a t e s it supports. I n t h e l a t t e r c a s e , i t would a p p e a r more l o g i c a l t o s u p p o r t c a n d i d a t e s w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t l i k e l i h o o d of b e i n g e l e c t e d , w i t h t h e i r c o m p a t a b i l i t y w i t h o n e ' s own p h i l o s o p h y de-emphasized a s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Although incumbent S e n a t o r s have n o t f a r e d p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l i n r e c e n t y e a r s , between 86 and 96 p e r c e n t of incumbent House Members h a v e been re-elected i n e v e r y y e a r s i n c e 1950. E/ G e n e r a l l y , incumbents a r e n o t a s c o m p e t i t i v e a s open-seat races involving c o n t e s t s ; t h e open s e a t c o n t e n d e r s t y p i c a l l y spend much l a r g e r sums o f money, a s w e l l . Given t h e d e c i s i v e b i a s o f PACs i n f a v o r of i n c u m b e n t s , who g e n e r a l l y do n o t need t h e same d e g r e e o f f u n d i n g a s do o p e n - s e a t T a b l e 20 l e n d s s u p p o r t t o t h e " a c c e s s " contenders, the data in t h e o r y b e h i n d PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s . How t h i s t h e o r y h o l d s up i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e g r e a t e r f l o w of money t o R e p u b l i c a n s , who, even a f t e r 1980, c o n s t i t u t e a s m a l l e r s h a r e of incumbents t h a n do Democrats, w i l l be e x p l o r e d i n T a b l e 23, which merges t h e p a r t y and candidate s t a t u s variables. The f i n d i n g s i n T a b l e 20 a r e a m p l i f i e d i n T a b l e 21 by t h e breakdown of t h e d a t a i n t o t h e f o u r p r i n c i p a l c a t e g o r i e s i n t o which PACs t o d a y a r e grouped b y t h e FEC. One can t h u s examine t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n p a t t e r n s o f t h e major s e c t o r s o f t h e PAC community, t h u s g a i n i n g i n s i g h t i n t o t h e o v e r a l l t r e n d s r e f l e c t e d i n T a b l e 20. (As i n d i c a t e d i n t h e n o t e s t o T a b l e 21, t h e b a s i s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c a t e g o r i e s f o r c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s d i f f e r s from t h a t used i n T a b l e s 8 and 9 ; t h e p r i m a r y v a l u e o f - 1331 R e - e l e c t i o n S u c c e s s of Incumbents. Weekly R e p o r t s , v. 3 8 , A p r i l 5 , 1980: 908. Congressional Q u a r t e r l y CRS- 122 those categories i n those years l i e s i n the percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n s , rather t h a n t h e d o l l a r amounts.) I n terms of p a r t y b i a s e s , t h e c l e a r e s t p a t t e r n i s seen i n t h e c o n s i s t e n t and overwhelming s u p p o r t which t h e l a b o r PACs have provided t o Democratic c a n d i d a t e s , who r e c e i v e d between 93-97 p e r c e n t o f l a b o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n every e l e c t i o n . C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Democrats from o r g a n i z e d l a b o r a p p a r e n t l y have e n a b l e d them t o a t t r a c t a g r e a t e r s h a r e o f PAC money o v e r a l l t h a n R e p u b l i c a n s h a v e , i n s p i t e o f t h e enormous s t r i d e s made by c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e PACs i n c h a n n e l i n g money t o R e p u b l i c a n c a n d i d a t e s i n r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s . No d e f i n i t i v e p a t t e r n emerges r e g a r d i n g l a b o r PACs' c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s orientation. Whereas t h e y were t h e most d i s t i n c t l y i n c u m b e n t - o r i e n t e d i n 1980 (when t h r e e - f o u r t h s group of t h e i r money went t o i n c u m b e n t s ) , t h i s was h a r d l y t h e c a s e i n 1982 when 58 p e r c e n t of l a b o r money was g i v e n t o incumbents. The l a t t e r d e c l i n e , accompanied by a huge i n c r e a s e i n t h e l e v e l o f s u p p o r t f o r c h a l l e n g e r s ( 2 9 p e r c e n t ) , r e f l e c t e d t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r i n t h e wake o f i t s d e f e a t s i n 1980. Although l a b o r PACs have s h i f t e d t h e i r f u n d s from incumbents t o c h a l l e n g e r s , d e p e n d i n g upon t h e p o l i t i c a l s e a s o n , t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r t h e open-seat c o n t e n d e r s h a s t r e n d e d d i s t i n c t l y downward. The c o r p o r a t e ( b u s i n e s s ) PACs have c o n t r i b u t e d most of t h e i r money t o R e p u b l i c a n c a n d i d a t e s i n a l l o f t h e e l e c t i o n s examined, b u t t h e r e h a s o c c u r r e d a significant s h i f t i n their contribution pattern. From 1972 t o 1976, t h e s h a r e of b u s i n e s s PAC money c o n t r i b u t e d t o Democratic c a n d i d a t e s i n c r e a s e d e a c h y e a r , from 29 p e r c e n t t o 43 p e r c e n t , w h i l e t h e R e p u b l i c a n s h a r e d e c l i n e d from 71 t o 57 p e r c e n t . Although Democratic c a n d i d a t e s a r e t y p i c a l l y t h o u g h t t o be l e s s p r o - b u s i n e s s than Republicans, t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n d e c i s i o n s appeared t o b e b a s e d on t h e d e s i r e of b u s i n e s s t o s u p p o r t incumbents; t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e n e t growth i n s u p p o r t o f incumbents by c o r p o r a t e PACs between 1972-1976. T h i s t e n d e n c y on t h e p a r t o f b u s i n e s s PACs was r e p o r t e d l y a s o u r c e o f annoyance t o GOP l e a d e r s , who f e l t t h a t t h e R e p u b l i c a n c a n d i d a t e s g e n e r a l l y - had a b e t t e r c l a i m t o t h e b u s i n e s s community's s u p p o r t t h a n d i d Democrats. 1341 T h i s s e n t i m e n t i s r e f l e c t e d i n remarks made by Ronald Reagan t o p o l i t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d b u s i n e s s l e a d e r s i n 1978: I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y h a s r e c e i v e d t h e k i n d of f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t from c o r p o r a t e PACs t h a t i t s r e c o r d d e s e r v e s . Why d o e s h a l f o f t h e b u s i n e s s PAC money go t o c a n d i d a t e s who may n o t b e f r i e n d s o f b u s i n e s s ? The b e s t t h i n g you c a n hope f o r by f o l l o w i n g an a n t i - b u s i n e s s , incumbent c o n t r i b u t i o n poli c y i s t h a t t h e a l l i g a t o r w i l l e a t you l a s t . 1351 - Although c o r p o r a t e PACs c o n t i n u e d t h e i r p r a c t i c e of f a v o r i n g incumbents a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , o n l y b a r e l y f a v o r i n g R e p u b l i c a n s t h r o u g h much o f 1978, t h i s p a t t e r n changed d r a m a t i c a l l y i n t h e c l o s i n g weeks o f t h a t e l e c t i o n . Prior t o O c t o b e r 1, 1978, 53 p e r c e n t of c o r p o r a t e PAC money was g i v e n t o R e p u b l i c a n s and 47 p e r c e n t t o Democrats; incumbents r e c e i v e d 72 p e r c e n t o f c o r p o r a t e PAC money i n t h a t same p e r i o d . Between O c t o b e r 1 and O c t o b e r 2 3 , t h e p a r t y s p l i t s h i f t e d t o 71-29 i n t h e R e p u b l i c a n s ' - t o o n l y 49 p e r c e n t . 136/ f a v o r , and t h e i n c u m b e n t s ' s h a r e dropped C o n s e q u e n t l y , T a b l e 21 r e f l e c t s t h e s h a r p r i s e from 1976 t o 1978 i n t h e R e p u b l i c a n s h a r e of c o r p o r a t e money and t h e s h a r p d r o p i n incumbents' s h a r e ( w i t h c h a l l e n g e r s and, e s p e c i a l l y , open-seat contenders t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s ) . The R e p u b l i c a n s h a r e remained a t a c o n s t a n t t w o - t h i r d s level i n 1980 and 1982, w h i l e t h e s u p p o r t f o r incumbents and c h a l l e n g e r s f l u c t u a t e d . The huge s h i f t toward c h a l l e n g e r s i n 1980 ( 3 1 p e r c e n t ) r e f l e c t e d a g r e a t e r r i s k s t r a t e g y by c o r p o r a t e PACs; t h i s was f o l l o w e d i n 1982 w i t h a major s h i f t - 1341 G l e n , Maxwell. A t The Wire, C o r p o r a t e PACs Come Through f o r t h e GOP. N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , v . 11, F e b r u a r y 3 , 1979: 174. 1351 - Ibid. Ibid., p. back to incumbents (75 percent), reflecting a more protective strategy on behalf of a larger number of Republican Members of Congress. TABLE 21. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1982 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/ Party Type Year Labor 1972 1974 Cor1972 porate 21 Amount Given Status Dem Rep Inc 4 Chall. Open TABLE 21. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1982 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 11--Continued - Party Type Year Amo unt Given Dem Status Re P Inc. Chall. Open Trade/ ~emb.1 1972 Health 3/ Non- 4/ connect. 1972 1974 11 Contributions to candidates in millions of dollars, rounded off to nearest tenth. Percentages of overall group contributions given to a type of candidate are based on the rounded off dollars and are themselves rounded off to the nearest whole percentage. The exception to this is the party TABLE 21. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s by Type o f PAC and by P a r t y and S t a t u s o f C a n d i d a t e : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s and p e r c e n t a g e s ) 11--Continued p e r c e n t a g e s ( f r o m 1974-1978) i n t h e non-connected c a t e g o r y , which a r e based on t o t a l d o l l a r s , i n o r d e r t o b e t t e r r e f l e c t t h e s p l i t s and t r e n d s t h a n would p e r c e n t a g e s based on rounded d o l l a r amounts. 2/ F o r 1972-1976, t h e FEC's " c o r p o r a t e " c a t e g o r y c o r r e l a t e s t o t h e " b u s i ~ e s s " c a t e g o r y of Common Cause. Thus, t h e d a t a f o r 1972-1976 a r e n o t e x a c t l y comparable t o t h o s e f o r 1978-1982, a s d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s governed t h e i n c l u s i o n o f PACs i n t h e " b u s i n e s s " v s . " c o r p o r a t e " g r o u p s . 3 / F o r 1972-1976, t h e "trade/membership/health" c a t e g o r y , a s d e f i n e d by t h e FE, c o r r e l a t e s t o t h e " h e a l t h " and "lawyers" g r o u p i n g s used by Common Cause f o r e a c h o r some o f t h o s e t h r e e y e a r s . Thus, t h e d a t a f o r 1972-1976 a r e not e x a c t l y comparable f o r t h o s e i n 1978-1982 b e c a u s e o f t h e d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s used t o d e t e r m i n e PACs i n t h e v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s . T h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y h a s a b e a r i n g on t h e enormous r i s e i n t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s from 1976 t o 1978, which, i n p a r t , c a n b e e x p l a i n e d by t h e a d d i t i o n o f n o n - h e a l t h and non-lawyers PACs t o t h e c a t e g o r y . 41 For 1974-1976, t h e "non-connected" c a t e g o r y used by t h e FEC c o r r e l a t e s t o t h g " i d e o l o g i c a l " g r o u p i n g of Common Cause. Most o f t o d a y ' s i d e o l o g i c a l PACs a r e l i s t e d i n t h e non-connected c a t e g o r y , a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r a l s o i n c l u d e s some which a r e n o t i d e o l o g i c a l i n n a t u r e . Thus, t h e d a t a f o r 1974-1976 a r e n o t e x a c t l y comparable t o t h o s e f o r 1978-1982, i n view o f d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s a p p l i e d t o i n c l u d i n g PACs i n e i t h e r g r o u p . ( I d e o l o g i c a l PACs i n 1972 were lumped i n t o Common C a u s e ' s " m i s c e l l a n e o u s " g r o u p , and a r e t h u s not r e f l e c t e d in this chart.) * Based on whole d o l l a r amounts; s e e n o t e 1, i n f r a . NOTES: T h i s t a b l e d o e s n o t i n c l u d e d a t a f o r t h e FEC's 1978-1982 c a t e g o r i e s o f " c o o p e r a t i v e s " and " c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t s t o c k " o r t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g d a t a from Common C a u s e ' s 1972-1976 c a t e g o r i e s of " m i s c e l l a n e o u s , " " d a i r y , " and " a g r i c u l t u r e " b e c a u s e o f t h e r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l s o f f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y of s u c h g r o u p s t o d a y ( w i t h some n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n s ) . The d a t a i n t h e c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h g r o u p i n g s f o r 19721976 a r e b a s e d on d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s from t h e same g r o u p i n g s i n T a b l e s 8-9. Thus, t h e y a r e n o t c o m p a r a b l e , even a p a r t from t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n p e r i o d o f t i m e c o v e r e d by e a c h . Those s t a t i s t i c s i n t a b l e 20 s h o u l d be used p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e p e r c e n t a g e breakdowns, r a t h e r t h a n t h e d o l l a r amounts. S o u r c e : F o r 1972: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1972 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s : I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1974. v . 1. p. v i . ( p a r t y breakdowns t a k e n from summary pages f o r each c a t e g o r y i n volumes 1-31 For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1974 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t Groups and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . Washington, 1976. p. i x . TABLE 21. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s by Type o f PAC and by P a r t y and S t a t u s o f C a n d i d a t e : 1972-1982 ( i n m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s and p e r c e n t a g e s ) 11--Continued - For 1976: Common Cause. 1976 F e d e r a l Campaign F i n a n c e s . I n t e r e s t Group and P o l i t i c a l P a r t y C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a n d i d a t e s . Washington, 1978. v . 1. p. v i i i . F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l For 1978: U.S. A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. I n t e r i m R e p o r t No. 5--U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. w a s h i n g t o n , J u n e 1979. p. 3 2 , 34. For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l S t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Races ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : March 7 , 1982. F o r 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l R e p o r t on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2 , 1983. Among t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs, a once-overwhelming was weakened c o n s i d e r a b l y from 1972 t o 1978. Republican b i a s For t h e l a s t t h r e e e l e c t i o n s , t h e b a l a n c e between t h e two p a r t i e s h a s remained a t a c o n s t a n t l e v e l of n e a r l y 3-2 i n t h e Republicans' favor. I n t e r m s o f s u p p o r t f o r c a n d i d a t e s by s t a t u s , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e s e PACs c o n s t i t u t e t h e second most i n c u m b e n t - o r i e n t e d grouping. The p a t t e r n h e r e i s n o t e a s i l y d i s c e r n e d , w i t h a v e r y s h a r p i n c r e a s e i n t h e s h a r e r e c e i v e d by incumbents i n 1974, a l a r g e d r o p i n 1976 and i n 1978, and l a r g e i n c r e a s e s i n 1980 and 1982, when f u l l y t h r e e - f o u r t h s went t o incumbents--more o f t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PAC money t h a n f o r any o t h e r g r o u p i n g . The p r o p o r t i o n o f money g i v e n t o c h a l l e n g e r s h a s f l u c t u a t e d i n t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n from t h a t t o i n c u m b e n t s , w i t h t h e huge d e c r e a s e i n 1982 b e n e f i t i n g t h e incumbents. Open-seat c a n d i d a t e s s u f f e r e d a s u b s t a n t i a l n e t d r o p i n s u p p o r t between 1972 and 1982, a l t h o u g h t h e y r e c e i v e d a c o n s t a n t 11 p e r c e n t o f t h e s e PACs' f u n d s i n t h e p a s t two e l e c t i o n s . The non-connected PACs h a v e been t h e o n l y one o f t h e f o u r major g r o u p i n g s t h a t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y g i v e n most o f t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o non-incumbents. U n t i l 1982, i t was t h e c h a l l e n g e r s who were most h e a v i l y f a v o r e d , w i t h a s much a s 51 p e r c e n t o f non-connected c o n t r i b u t i o n s g o i n g t o c h a l l e n g e r s i n 1980. Open-seat c o n t e n d e r s met w i t h d e c l i n i n g f o r t u n e s d u r i n g t h e p a s t d e c a d e , a l t h o u g h t h e y f a r e d b e t t e r h e r e t h a n t h e y d i d i n any o t h e r c a t e g o r y . Incumbents r e c e i v e d o n l y o n e - t h i r d of non-connected PAC money between 1976 and 1980, b u t t h e i r s h a r e jumped d r a m a t i c a l l y t o n e a r l y one-half in 1982; t h i s i n c r e a s e o c c u r r e d a t t h e e x p e n s e of t h e c h a l l e n g e r s . I n view o f t h e predominance o f i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p s i n t h i s c a t e g o r y , i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e i r money would f a v o r non-incumbents. It i s l o g i c a l t h a t PACs which a r e not a f f i l i a t e d w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d l o b b y i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s would be more l i k e l y t o r i s k a l i e n a t i n g incumbent Members o f Congress t h a n would t h o s e t h a t a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h l o b b y i n g arms. Their p r i m a r y commitment t o i d e o l o g y , i n comparison w i t h p e r h a p s t h e more p r a g m a t i c p h i l o s o p h i e s of t h e o t h e r t y p e s o f PACs, a p p e a r s t o make t h e i r c h o i c e s of whom t o s u p p o r t t h a t much e a s i e r . For t h i s r e a s o n , among o t h e r s , t h e non-connected PACs a r e o f t e n viewed a s " l o o s e cannons" w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . I n t e r m s o f p a r t y s u p p o r t , t h e non-connected PACs were u n t i l 1980 t h e most R e p u b l i c a n - o r i e n t e d among t h e f o u r major g r o u p i n g s . From 1974 and 1978, t h e i r s i p p o r t o f R e p u b l i c a g c a n d i d a t e s o v e r Democratic o n e s i n c r e a s e d from a slight plurality to a 3 to 1 ratio. T h e r e was a marked r i s e i n t h e i r s u p p o r t o f Democrats i n 1980, a n d , i n 1982, t h e r e was a s h i f t toward Democrats which was s u b s t a n t i a l enough t o g i v e them a s l i g h t edge. One may v e n t u r e a g u e s s t h a t t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t , accompanied a s i t was by a major s h i f t toward i n c u m b e n t s , was a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e overwhelming a t t e n t i o n g i v e n by c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs t o e x p e n d i t u r e s o t h e r t h a n c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , l e a v i n g l i b e r a l groups--which s t e p p e d up t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s a f t e r 1980--to constitute a greater p r o p o r t i o n o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a n t h e y o t h e r w i s e would h a v e . I n any c a s e , i t i s u s e f u l t o remember t h a t t h e t r e n d s i n c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s by t h e non-connected PACs a r e l e s s i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e o t h e r forms o f p o l i t i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e s i n which t h e y h a v e been engaged. Summing up t h e c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s t o t h e t r e n d s e v i d e n c e d i n T a b l e 2 0 , o n l y one of t h e f o u r p r i n c i p a l PAC groupings--labor--has c o n s i s t e n t l y favcred Democratic c a n d i d a t e s ; t h i s s u p p o r t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y l o p s i d e d t o e n a b l e Democrats t o r e t a i n an o v e r a l l edge o v e r R e p u b l i c a n s i n a t t r a c t i n g PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s . The non-connected PACs were t h e most pro-Republican in t h e i r giving, u n t i l 1982, when t h e y became t h e second most pro-Democratic. In the l a s t three e l e c t i o n s , c o r p o r a t e PACs h a v e been most pro-Republican ( b y a 2-1 r a t i o ) , w i t h t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs second ( a n e a r l y 3-2 r a t i o ) . The major r e d u c t i o n i n t h e Democrats' s h a r e of PAC money i n 1978 was l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t o f a s h i f t among c o r p o r a t e PACs, w h i l e t h e renewed s h i f t t o Democrats i n 1982 may b e t r a c e d t o t h e sudden change among non-connected PACs t h a t y e a r . I n t e r m s o f PAC money f a v o r i n g i n c u m b e n t s , t h i s h a s been an i n c r e a s i n g phenomenon o v e r t h e s i x - e l e c t i o n p e r i o d . The o v e r a l l PAC t i l t t o incumbents i s evidenced i n t h e g i v i n g p a t t e r n s of e v e r y grouping, d e s p i t e a d e c l i n e i n c o r p o r a t e PAC g i v i n g t o incumbents between 1974 and 1980 and t h e s e c o n d a r y r o l e o f incumbents i n t h e g i v i n g p a t t e r n s of t h e non-connected 1982. The d r o p - o f f i n s u p p o r t f o r open-seat group u n t i l c o n t e n d e r s s i n c e 1972 h a s b e e n e v i d e n c e d i n t h e p a t t e r n s o f e v e r y one o f t h e f o u r PAC g r o u p i n g s . In c o n t r a s t , t h e r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y i n t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l o f PAC g i v i n g t o c h a l l e n g e r s u n t i l 1982 masked s h a r p i n c r e a s e s i n c o r p o r a t e and non-connected challengers. PAC g i v i n g t o Sharp divergences i n t h e g i v i n g p a t t e r n s of s e v e r a l groups i n 1982 make o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s more d i f f i c u l t , a s i t i s t o o soon t o t e l l whether t h e y may s i g n a l s i g n i f i c a n t , new t r e n d s . F i n a l l y , i t i s w o r t h remembering t h a t d e a l i n g i n t r e n d s i n a g g r e g a t e t o t a l s may mask t r e n d s o c c u r r i n g i n many i n d i v i d u a l PACs w i t h i n a g i v e n c a t e g o r y . CRS- 130 PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s from t h e C a n d i d a t e s ' P e r s p e c t i v e T a b l e s 22-23 p l a c e t h e q u e s t i o n o f PAC s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e c a n d i d a t e s ' o v e r a l l campaign r e c e i p t s . Whereas T a b l e 20 showed how PAC money was d i s t r i b u t e d t o c a n d i d a t e s a c c o r d i n g t o p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n and e l e c t o r a l s t a t u s , T a b l e s 22-23 show how i m p o r t a n t a r o l e t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s played f o r t h e same c a n d i d a t e breakdowns. The l a t t e r t a b l e s may y i e l d d i f f e r e n t conclusions than t h e former, a s they take i n t o account such a d d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a a s t h e number of c a n d i d a t e s PAC money was d i s t r i b u t e d among and t h e o t h e r s o u r c e s of c a n d i d a t e f u n d i n g . Although PACs may have f a v o r e d a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e of c a n d i d a t e , t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s may have been l e s s r e l i a n t on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a n o t h e r t y p e s of c a n d i d a t e s . The o t h e r key d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e t a b l e s i n t h i s subsection i s t h a t they confine t h e i r focus t o House c a n d i d a t e s , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e combined House and S e n a t e d a t a i n T a b l e s 20-21. T a b l e 22 p r e s e n t s t h e p a r t y breakdowns s e p a r a t e from t h e s t a t u s breakdowns, w h i l e T a b l e 23 combines b o t h v a r i a b l e s f o r more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s . As T a b l e 22 i n d i c a t e s , Democratic House c a n d i d a t e s have r e c e i v e d c o n s i s t e n t l y more PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r f u n d i n g s o u r c e s t h a n have t h e i r R e p u b l i c a n c o u n t e r p a r t s . I n 1982, j u s t o v e r o n e - t h i r d o f Democrats' campaign f u n d i n g emanated from p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , whereas PACs c o n t r i b u t e d more t h a n o n e - f o u r t h of R e p u b l i c a n campaign f u n d s . The gap between t h e l e v e l s of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Democrats and R e p u b l i c a n s o f PAC money d e c r e a s e d i n 1978, p r i o r t o which PAC f u n d s c o n s t i t u t e d about n i n e p e r c e n t more of Democrats' t h a n R e p u b l i c a n s ' r e c e i p t s . I n 1978, i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e i n PAC g i v i n g t o R e p u b l i c a n s , t h e gap was narrowed t o l e s s t h a n f i v e percent. The gap widened t o 5.6 p e r c e n t i n 1980 and t o 6 p e r c e n t i n 1982. TABLE 22. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a P e r c e n t a g e o f House C a n d i d a t e R e c e i p t s by P a r t y o r S t a t u s of C a n d i d a t e : 1972-1982 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s 1/ - Party Total for House 2/ - Year Status -----Dem ----Rep Inc . Chall . Open 1/ Based on f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y o n l y f o r c a n d i d a t e s who r a n i n t h e g e n e r z l e l e c t i o n ; primary l o s e r s excluded. 2/ - T o t a l s correspond with those i n Table 6, i n f r a . S o u r c e : For 1972 and 1974: J a c o b s o n , Gary C. The P a t t e r n of Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e U.S. House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 1972-1978. I n U.S. C o n g r e s s . House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An A n a l y s i s o f t h e Impact o f t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t , 1972-1978. From t h e I n s t i t u t e o f P o l i t i c s , John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y . Committee P r i n t , 9 6 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 25-26. ( s t a t i s t i c s f o r t h i s c h a r t were e x t r a p o l a t e d from t h e d a t a i n J a c o b s o n ' s t a b l e s 6-7.) For 1976: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e S e r i e s . No. 9: 1976 House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Campaigns. R e c e i p t s and E x p e n d i t u r e s . Washington, September 1977. p. 4 , 6 ( f o r p a r t y breakdown); p. 7-8 ( f o r s t a t u s breakdowns). For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1977-1978. I n t e r i m R e p o r t No. 5. U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J u n e 1979. p. 31-32 ( f o r p a r t y breakdowns); p. 3 6 , 51-52 ( f o r s t a t u s breakdowns). F o r 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1979-1980. F i n a l R e p o r t . U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J a n . 1982. p. 49-50 ( f o r p a r t y breakdowns); p. 52-53 ( f o r s t a t u s breakdowns). For 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1981-1982. F i n a l R e p o r t . U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, O c t . 1983. pp. 33-36. With r e g a r d t o t h e l e v e l o f r e c e i p t o f PAC money a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e l e c t o r a l s t a t u s o f c a n d i d a t e s , incumbents have c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c e i v e d more o f t h i s s o u r c e o f f u n d i n g r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r s o u r c e s t h a n have t h e i r c h a l l e n g e r s o r t h o s e competing i n d i s t r i c t s w i t h no incumbent r u n n i n g . Furthermore, t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o incumbents among a l l r e c e i p t s h a s i , . r e a s e d a t a s i g n i f i c a n t l y f a s t e r r a t e t h a n f o r t h e o t h e r two c a t e g o r i e s , b o t h o f which e x p e r i e n c e d an i n c r e a s e d u r i n g t h e 1972-1982 p e r i o d . P e r h a p s t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s d a t a i s t h e h i g h e r d e g r e e o f PAC money i n t h e campaign t r e a s u r i e s o f open s e a t c o n t e n d e r s t h a n o f c h a l l e n g e r s t o incumbents. This i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h e r amount o f PAC d o l l a r s which have been c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c h a l l e n g e r s o v e r t h e open-seat c o n t e n d e r s , a s r e f l e c t e d i n T a b l e 20. This a p p a r e n t i n c o n g r u i t y may r e s u l t from t h e h i g h e r number of c h a l l e n g e r s t h a n o p e n - s e a t c o n t e s t s ; h e n c e t h e l e s s e r s h a r e of PAC money i s d i s t r i b u t e d among a f a r l e s s e r number o f c a n d i d a t e s i n t h e l a t t e r c a t e g o r y . o f t h e House open-seat contenders' By 1982, o n e - f o u r t h funds came from PACs, whereas l e s s t h a n o n e - f o u r t h o f t h e c h a l l e n g e r s ' r e c e i p t s were from PACs ( c h a l l e n g e r s ' s h a r e of PAC money r o s e n o t a b l y i n 1 9 8 2 ) ; i n t h e c a s e of House i n c u m b e n t s , PAC money c o n s t i t u t e d more t h a n o n e - t h i r d o f o v e r a l l g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n r e c e i p t s . The t r e n d s i n PAC g i v i n g by p a r t y and c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s a r e e x p l o r e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n T a b l e 23, which combines t h e two v a r i a b l e s f o r t h e 1972-1982 elections. It i s r e a d i l y o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e r e a r e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e l e v e l o f PAC s u p p o r t between t h e p a r t i e s w i t h i n e a c h c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s category. While T a b l e 22 p o i n t e d o u t t h a t PAC money p l a y s t h e l a r g e s t r o l e i n f i n a n c i n g incumbent campaigns, T a b l e 23 d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e f o r Democratic incumbents. The l e v e l s of PAC money among o v e r a l l r e c e i p t s CRS- 133 i n c r e a s e d a t r o u g h l y t h e same r a t e f o r b o t h Democratic and R e p u b l i c a n incumbents between 1972 and 1 9 7 8 , w i t h b o t h e x p e r i e n c i n g a s h a r p r i s e i n 1976 ( a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e t h a t y e a r i n t h e PAC component). R e p u b l i c a n p e r c e n t a g e r o s e s h a r p l y a g a i n i n 1980 and a l s o i n 1982. The The Democratic f i g u r e r o s e much more m o d e s t l y i n e a c h o f t h e l a t t e r e l e c t i o n s , t h u s a c c o u n t i n g f o r o n l y a t h r e e p e r c e n t g a p between t h e two p a r t i e s i n 1982, w i t h t h e R e p u b l i c a n incumbents a t 3 5 . 1 p e r c e n t and t h e Democratic incumbents a t 38.2 p e r c e n t . The g r e a t e r p e r c e n t a g e o f PAC money i n Democratic t h a n i n R e p u b l i c a n i n c u m b e n t s ' campaigns i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r s h a r e o f t h e l a t t e r s ' r e c e i p t s c o n s t i t u t e d by p a r t y c o n t r i b u t i o n s . While Democrats h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c e i v e d p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more PAC money t h a n R e p u b l i c a n s among incumbent c a n d i d a t e s , t h i s h a s n o t always been t h e c a s e among c h a l l e n g e r s and o p e n - s e a t c o n t e n d e r s . Between 1978 and 1980, R e p u b l i c a n c h a l l e n g e r s and o p e n - s e a t c a n d i d a t e s were d i s t i n c t l y more r e l i a n t on PAC money t h a n t h e i r Democratic c o u n t e r p a r t s ; t h i s t u r n e d around i n 1982, when R e p u b l i c a n c a n d i d a t e s became l e s s and Democratic c a n d i d a t e s much more r e l i a n t on PAC f u n d s . Among Democratic c h a l l e n g e r s , PAC money p l a y e d a r a t h e r s t a b l e r o l e from 1972-1976, b e f o r e d e c l i n i n g s h a r p l y i n i m p o r t a n c e i n 1978, o n l y t o r i s e a g a i n i n 1980 and even more s h a r p l y i n 1982. I n t e r m s o f PAC d i s t r i b u t i o n o f f u n d s , T a b l e 20 i n d i c a t e d t h a t c h a l l e n g e r s o v e r a l l r e c e i v e d a g r e a t e r s h a r e o f PAC money i n 1978 t h a n t h e y d i d i n 1976, b u t t h a t Democrats o v e r a l l r e c e i v e d a much lower p e r c e n t a g e t h a t y e a r . I n 1982, t h e s i t u a t i o n was r e v e r s e d , a s c h a l l e n g e r s r e c e i v e d a much l e s s e r s h a r e of PAC f u n d s b u t Democrats r e c e i v e d a g r e a t e r s h a r e . R e p u b l i c a n c h a l l e n g e r s ' r e c e i p t o f PAC money s h a r p l y i n c r e a s e d i n 1976 and 1978 and s l i g h t l y i n 1980, and d e c l i n e d i n 1982. I n view o f t h e i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t 1978 marked a t u r n toward i n c r e a s e d PAC s u p p o r t of R e p u b l i c a n c h a l l e n g e r s o f Democratic i n c u m b e n t s , i t a p p e a r s l o g i c a l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s were a l a r g e r f a c t o r f o r R e p u b l i c a n c h a l l e n g e r s t h a t y e a r t h a n f o r Democratic c h a l l e n g e r s t o Republican incumbents. The d e c l i n e i n 1982 a p p e a r s l i k e l y t o have stemmed ? from a l e s s e r s h a r e of PAC money g o i n g t o b o t h c h a l l e n g e r s and R e p u b l i c a n s , . . a s b u s i n e s s PAC s t r a a t e g i e s emphasized d e f e n d i n g t h e GOP incumbents. TABLE 23. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a P e r c e n t a g e of House C a n d i d a t e R e c e i p t s by P a r t y and S t a t u s o f C a n d i d a t e : 1972-1982 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s 11 - Incumbents Total House Year -1/ Re P Dem Open S e a t s -- ----- .---Dem Challengers . Rep Dem Re P C a n d i d a t e s competing i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n o n l y ; p r i m a r y l o s e r s e x c l u d e d 21 The 1980 f i g u r e s a r e based on g r o s s House r e c e i p t s , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e n e t r e c e i p t b a s i s f o r o t h e r d a t a i n t h i s t a b l e , because only such i n f o r m a t i o n was a v a i l a b l e w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e breakdowns. The 28.7% h e r e compares w i t h t h e 28.9% f i g u r e used i n T a b l e s 6 and 22; hence t h e p e r c e n t a g e s f o r each c a t e g o r y a r e l i k e l y t o b e u n d e r s t a t e d by around 115 of a p e r c e n t . * Based on c a n d i d a t e s w i t h major p a r t y o p p o s i t i o n o n l y The P a t t e r n o f Campaign S o u r c e : For 1972-1978: J a c o b s o n , Gary C . C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o C a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 1972-1978. I n U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact o f t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t , 1972-1978. From t h e I n s t i t u t e o f P o l i t i c s , John F. Kennedy School o f Government, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y . Committee P r i n t , 9 6 t h C o n g . , l s t S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 25-28. For 1980:. U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e p o r t s on F i n a n c i a l A c t i v i t y , 1979?1980. F i n a l R e p o r t . U.S. S e n a t e and House Campaigns. Washington, J a n . 1982. p . 5 6 , 65-66. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l R e p o r t F o r 1982: u;'s. on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2 , 1983. CRS- 135 Open-seat c o n t e n d e r s t y p i c a l l y engage i n t h e most h e a t e d e l e c t i o n s and spend a f a r g r e a t e r amount o f money t h a n do incumbents o r ( e s p e c i a l l y ) challengers. They r e c e i v e l e s s money a s a g r o u p from PACs t h a q do c h a l l e n g e r s o f i n c u m b e n t s , b u t , b e c a u s e o f t h e i r fewer numbers, t h e y b e n e f i t .from PAC d o l l a r s t o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n do c h a l l e n g e r s . T a b l e 23 i n d i c a t e s t h a t R e p u b l i c a n c a n d i d a t e s f o r open House s e a t s r e c e i v e d i n c r e a s i n g l y h i g h e r l e v e l s o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s - - r e l a t i v e f u n d i n g sources--between t o other 1972 and 1980, w i t h a s h a r p d e c r e a s e i n 1982, and t h a t Democratic c a n d i d a t e s i n open d i s t r i c t s r e c e i v e d lower l e v e l s between 1974 and 1978 and i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s i n 1980 and 1982. D. Summary O b s e r v a t i o n s on PAC Growth F o l l o w i n g a l e n g t h y , d e t a i l e d p r e s e n t a t i o n and a n a l y s i s o f d a t a , i t i s u s e f u l t o summarize t h e key f i n d i n g s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n and growth o f PACs. These o b s e r v a t i o n s s h o u l d b e viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t of an o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e i n PAC s p e n d i n g from $19.2 m i l l i o n t o $190.2 m i l l i o n and i n PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s from $ 8 . 5 m i l l i o n t o $83.6 m i l l i o n between 1972 and 1982. The two key e l e c t i o n s i n t e r m s o f PAC growth were 1976 and 1980. The y e a r 1976 marked t h e l a r g e s t p e r c e n t a g e growth i n t h e number o f PACs, w h i l e 1980 saw t h e l a r g e s t n u m e r i c a l i n c r e a s e . The l a r g e s t p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e i n b o t h PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s o c c u r r e d i n 1976, w i t h t h e second l a r g e s t p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e i n 1980. he l a r g e s t d o l l a r i n c r e a s e i n e x p e n d i t u r e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s o c c u r r e d i n 1982.) The s h a r p e s t i n c r e a s e i n t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f PAC money among o v e r a l l r e c e i p t s of c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s o c c u r r e d i n 1980, f o l l o w e d by t h e r i s e i n 1976. lni&estingly, the i n c r e a s e i n 1980 r e f l e c t e d t h e s t e e p e s t r i s e f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s , w h i l e t h e 1976 i n c r e a s e r e f l e c t e d t h e s t e e p e s t r i s e f o r House c a n d i d a t e s . Some 70 p e r c e n t o f a g g r e g a t e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t y p i c a l l y i s g i v e n t o House c a n d i d a t e s , w h i l e 30 p e r c e n t i s g i v e n t o S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . T h i s , of c o u r s e , d o e s not mean t h a t House c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e l a r g e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s on a v e r a g e t h a n do t h e i r S e n a t e c o u n t e r p a r t s ; t h e r e v e r s e i s p r o b a b l y t r u e . PAC money d o e s p l a y a l a r g e r r o l e i n t h e campaigns o f Hquse c a n d i d a t e s t h a n o f S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s , however. On an a g g r e g a t e l e v e l , Democrats have been a b l e t o a t t r a c t more PAC money t h a n have R e p u b l i c a n s , b u t t h i s a d v a n t a g e h a s been narrowed i n r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s from t h e 2 : l r a t i o p r i o r t o 1978 t o t h e 54-46 s p l i t i n 1982. i n 1980 might have presaged an even s p l i t - - i f The 52-48 s p l i t n o t a GOP advantage--by 1982, b u t t h i s d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e . PAC money c o n t i n u e s t o f a v o r incumbents h e a v i l y , and t h i s t r e n d h a s become more pronounced s i n c e 1972. Today, t w o - t h i r d s o f PAC money goes t o i n c u m b e n t s . I n comparison w i t h t h e o t h e r t h r e e major s o u r c e s o f campaign f u n d s , Democrats o v e r a l l have r e c e i v e d more PAC money t h a n R e p u b l i c a n s . PAC money h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y played a l a r g e r r o l e f o r Democratic t h a n R e p u b l i c a n incumbents a n d , i n 1982, Democratic c h a l l e n g e r s and open-seat d i d t h e i r Republican c o u n t e r p a r t s . c o n t e n d e r s r e l i e d more on PAC money t h a n R e g a r d l e s s of p a r t y o r c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s , however, PAC money h a s g e n e r a l l y become more i m p o r t a n t f o r a l l c a n d i d a t e s ( t h e d e c r e a s e i n r e l i a n c e on PAC money by GOP c h a l l e n g e r s and open-seat contenders i n 1982 may s i g n a l a new t r e n d , b u t i t i s t o o soon t o d e t e r m i n e t h i s ) . Looking a t t h e f o u r major PAC g r o u p i n g s , s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t o b s e r v a t i o n s c a n b e made w i t h r e g a r d t o e a c h . Labor PACs h a v e , a s a g r o u p , d e c l i n e d i n importance i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r s . While t h e y a c c o u n t e d f o r o n e - t h i r d a l l PACs i n 1972, t h e y a c c o u n t f o r l e s s t h a n o n e - n i n t h t o d a y ; whereas t h e y of s p e n t and c o n t r i b u t e d o n e - h a l f o f a l l PAC money i n 1972, t h e y s p e n t l e s s t h a n o n e - f i f t h and c o n t r i b u t e d o n e - f o u r t h o f a l l PAC money i n 1982. They were s u r p a s s e d a s t h e b i g g e s t s p e n d i n g c a t e g o r y i n 1976 and a s t h e b i g g e s t c o n t r i b u t i n g g r o u p i n 1978. Labor PACs a r e t h e most Democratic i n t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n , among a l l t h e t y p e s o f PACs. F i n a l l y , d e s p i t e t h e overshadowing o f l a b o r PACs i n t h e a g g r e g a t e , t h e y remain a p o t e n t f i n a n c i a l f o r c e t h r o u g h t h e a c t i v i t i e s of a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l number of l a r g e PACs; l a b o r PACs a c c o u n t e d f o r more t h a n h a l f o f t h e t o p 20 c o n t r i b u t o r s i n e v e r y e l e c t i o n s i n c e 1972. The non-connected number s i n c e 1976. PACs have e x h i b i t e d t h e l a r g e s t p e r c e n t a g e growth i n They doubled t h e i r l e v e l of e x p e n d i t u r e s from 1978 t o 1980, making them t h e b i g g e s t s p e n d i n g c a t e g o r y of PAC i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n , and t h e y i n c r e a s e d t h e i r e x p e n d i t u r e s by a n o t h e r 68 p e r c e n t i n 1982, f a r s u r p a s s i n g t h e e x p e n d i t u r e s o f any o t h e r c a t e g o r y i n t h a t e l e c t i o n . Their success i n f u n d r a i s i n g h a s been h i g h l i g h t e d by s e v e r a l e s p e c i a l l y l a r g e i d e o l o g i c a l PACs within t h e i r ranks. The two l a r g e s t s p e n d e r s among PACs have been u n a f f i l i a t e d i n t h e 1976, 1978, 1980 and 1982 e l e c t i o n s ( t h e t o p t h r e e i n t h e f i r s t t h r e e e l e c t i o n s ) ; t h e i r s p e n d i n g l e v e l s h a v e been d r a m a t i c a l l y h i g h e r t h a n t h o s e o f most o t h e r PACs. While t h e y have a c h i e v e d prominence f o r t h e i r s p e n d i n g l e v e l s , t h e non-connected g r o u p h a s a c h i e v e d l i t t l e d i s t i n c t i o n among c o n t r i b u t o r s t o Federal candidates. T h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n l e v e l s have been low i n t h e a g g r e g a t e , and few o f t h e g i a n t s p e n d e r s have r e c o r d e d v e r y h i g h l e v e l s o f d i r e c t contributions t o candidates. F i n a l l y , t h i s g r o u p was u n t i l 1982 t h e most R e p u b l i c a n i n i t s o r i e n t a t i o n and h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y been t h e l e a s t incumbento r i e n t e d among t h e c a t e g o r i e s ; i t i s , i n f a c t , t h e o n l y g r o u p i n g t h a t g i v e s l e s s t h a n h a l f o f i t s money t o incumbents. T h i s l a t t e r f a c t was o n l y b a r e l y s o f o r 1982, and i t was o n l y o n e f a c t o r among s e v e r a l t h a t may p o r t e n d changes i n t h e way non-connected PACs behave i n t h e a g g r e g a t e ( e . g . , more money i n d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s , more l i b e r a l g r o u p s p l a y i n g an a c t i v e r o l e , e t c . ) . C o r p o r a t e PACs t o d a y c o n s t i t u t e 44 p e r c e n t of a l l PACs and have e x h i b i t e d t h e l a r g e s t n u m e r i c a l growth s i n c e 1976. They s p e n t 23 p e r c e n t of a l l PAC money i n 1982, up from j u s t o n e - t e n t h i n 1976, and t h e y c o n t r i b u t e d o n e - t h i r d o f a l l PAC money i n 1982, n e a r l y t h r e e t i m e s what t h e y c o n t r i b u t e d i n 1978. As of 1982, t h e y were t h e most h e a v i l y R e p u b l i c a n i n t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n , a f a c t which i n f l u e n c e d t h e i r s t r o n g e r s u p p o r t of incumbents t h a n i n p r e v i o u s elections. T h e i r s t r e n g t h l i e s i n a l a r g e number o f r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l PACs, t h e r e v e r s e of l a b o r ' s s i t u a t i o n . I n t e r m s of i t s growth and i t s s p e n d i n g p a t t e r n s , t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c a t e g o r y h a s e x h i b i t e d l e s s pronounced t r e n d s t h a n have t h e o t h e r t h r e e groupings. It was t h e t h i r d h i g h e s t s p e n d i n g group and t h e second h i g h e s t c o n t r i b u t i n g g r o u p i n 1982, i t h a s a s t r o n g e r b i a s toward incumbents t h a n any non-labor g r o u p ( i n 1982, i t was even s t r o n g e r t h a n l a b o r ' s ) , and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s Republican-oriented t h a n t h e c o r p o r a t e group. I t s growth i n numbers and s p e n d i n g h a s been s t e a d y , y e t i m p r e s s i v e . The f i n a l o b s e r v a t i o n c o n c e r n s t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n - t o - e x p e n d i t u r e among PACs. ratio A s n o t e d e a r l i e r , some 42-50 p e r c e n t o f PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s have t a k e n t h e form of d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s s i n c e 1972--a somewhat l e s s t h a n 1 t o 2 r a t i o . The r a t i o more n e a r l y a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e 1 : 2 l e v e l among l a b o r PACs, c o r p o r a t e PACs, and t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs. The c o n t r i b u t i o n - t o - e x p e n d i t u r e r a t i o f o r t h e non-connected g r o u p i n g was o n l y 1 t o 6 i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n ( a l t h o u g h t h i s compares w i t h a 1 t o 8 r a t i o i n 1 9 8 0 ) , w i t h l a r g e amounts of money s p e n t on such t h i n g s a s f u n d r a i s i n g and independent e x p e n d i t u r e s . The s p e n d i n g p a t t e r n s of t h e non-connected PACs h a v e t h u s p u l l e d t h e a g g r e g a t e PAC community away from t h e 1 t o 2 r a t i o and h a v e , i n f a c t , skewed t h e s p e n d i n g d a t a f o r a l l PACs. 111: REASONS FOR PAC GROWTH SINCE THE 1970s Having examined a t l e n g t h t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs and t h e i r i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s o f f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , one i s i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o comprehend t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e s e developments. The numbers and t h e d o l l a r s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r r e p r e s e n t n o t o n l y t h e e f f e c t s o f PAC growth, b u t a c a u s e thereof, a s w e l l . The p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs and t h e widespread a t t e n t i o n accorded i t by t h e media have undoubtedly provided impetus f o r t h e i r f u r t h e r growth and p r o l i f e r a t i o n . With e a c h i n t e r e s t g r o u p ' s s u c c e s s f u l experience i n establishing a separate segregated fund, within t h e context o f t h e FECA, t h e road h a s been paved f o r o t h e r PACs t o f o l l o w . The f a c t t h a t s o few g r o u p s t o o k advantage o f t h e PAC o p t i o n i n t h e e a r l y 1970s was probably i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e t o t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y of v a r i o u s PACr e l a t e d p r a c t i c e s . Those groups t h a t d i d form PACs s e t p r e c e d e n t s i n t h e f i e l d a n d , i n t u r n , a c t e d a s c a t a l y s t s f o r c o n g r e s s i o n a l amendments t o t h e FECA which e l i m i n a t e d e x i s t i n g a m b i g u i t i e s and r e s t r a i n t s . Thus, t h e c o n t i n u i n g i n c r e a s e i n PAC numbers and d o l l a r s i s a t t r i b u t a b l e , i n p a r t , t o t h e r i p p l e e f f e c t of t h e increase i t s e l f . T h i s s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g e f f e c t a c c o u n t s f o r o n l y p a r t o f PAC growth, and i t d o e s n o t b e g i n t o e x p l a i n t h e i n i t i a l , l a r g e waves o f new PACs i n 1975 and 1976. R a t h e r , two d i f f e r e n t a r e a s might be e x p l o r e d t o approach a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e r i s e of PACs: t h e l e g i s l a t i v e and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter Two and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a f f e c t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s i n g e n e r a l . Chapter Two d i s c u s s e d t h e b a r r i e r s t o PAC f o r m a t i o n which were e l i m i n a t e d w i t h t h e passage o r i s s u a n c e o f e a c h s u c c e s s i v e l e g i s l a t i v e , j u d i c i a l , o r administrative action. These i n c l u d e d t h e o r i g i n a l s a n c t i o n f o r PACs provided i n t h e 1971 FECA, t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e presumed ban on PAC e s t a b l i s h m e n t by government c o n t r a c t o r s i n t h e 1974 Amendments, t h e permission g r a n t e d c o r p o r a t i o n s t o s o l i c i t employees f o r PAC d o n a t i o n s i n t h e FEC's 1975 SUN PAC Advisory Opinion, t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y accorded s e p a r a t e segregated f u n d s i n t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s 1976 Buckley v . Valeo d e c i s i o n , and t h e 1976 FECA Amendment's g u i d e l i n e s f o r s o l i c i t a t i o n by c o r p o r a t e and l a b o r PACs and i t s e x p r e s s a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n of PACs by t r a d e and o t h e r organizations. Each of t h e s e c o n t r i b u t e d t o an environment more h o s p i t a b l e t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. S e v e r a l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws m e r i t s p e c i a l m e n t i o n f o r t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e o v e r a l l PAC s p i r a l . F i r s t , the introduction o f p u b l i c f u n d i n g of P r e s i d e n t i a l campaigns i n t h e 1976 e l e c t i o n s deemphasized t h e r o l e of p r i v a t e ( i n c l u d i n g g r o u p ) money i n such r a c e s , l e a v i n g PACs t o c h a n n e l even more money t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l r a c e s . While p r i v a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e s o u g h t d u r i n g P r e s i d e n t i a l p r i m a r i e s f o r matching fund p u r p o s e s , PACs h a v e e x h i b i t e d a r e l u c t a n c e t o become d e e p l y i n v o l v e d i n e l e c t i o n s d u r i n g these early stages. Whatever PAC money h a s been f o r t h c o m i n g t o P r e s i d e n t i a l c o n t e n d e r s ( o n l y t h r e e p e r c e n t of a l l PAC d o n a t i o n s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s i n 1980) h a s been g i v e n i n t h e p r i m a r i e s s i n c e 1976; c a n d i d a t e s a c c e p t i n g F e d e r a l f u n d s i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ( a s d i d a l l major c a n d i d a t e s i n 1976 and 1980) a r e b a r r e d from t a k i n g any p r i v a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s . This p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y has u n d o u b t e d l y had an impact on t h e growth of PAC money e n t e r i n g t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l a r e n a , a l t h o u g h i t may do l i t t l e t o e x p l a i n t h e o v e r a l l growth i n PAC numbers or dollars. Another major f e a t u r e o f t h e FECA which h a s , b y a l l a c c o u n t s , a f f e c t e d PAC growth h a s been t h e $1000 l i m i t a t i o n on c o n t r i b u t i o n s by i n d i v i d u a l s t o Federal candidates. Coupled w i t h t h e s t r i c t d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e 1971 A c t , t h e l i m i t a t i o n a p p a r e n t l y s p u r r e d w e a l t h y d o n o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e a f f i l i a t e d w i t h t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r , t o s e e k o t h e r avenues f o r p o l i t i c a l g i v i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h c o a l i t i o n s w i t h like-minded individuals. This theory i s e s p e c i a l l y h e l p f u l i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e s u r g e i n b u s i n e s s PACs, t h e l e a d e r s among a l l PACs i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s . The t r a n s f e r e n c e of b u s i n e s s money from i n d i v i d u a l g i v e r s t o PACs i s d e s c r i b e d by P r o f e s s o r Edwin E p s t e i n : ... u n t i l t h e campaign f i n a n c i n g laws were reformed i n t h e 1970s t o impose s t r i c t l i m i t a t i o n s on i n d i v i d u a l d o n a t i o n s and t o p r o v i d e f o r e f f e c t i v e p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of t h e s o u r c e s o f f u n d s , t h e r e was l i t t l e need f o r b u s i n e s s PACs; money from business-related sources could l e g a l l y e n t e r t h e e l e c t o r a l a r e n a , a l m o s t u n d e t e c t e d , i n a l m o s t u n l i m i t e d amounts i n t h e form of i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by w e a l t h y p e r s o n s a f f i l i a t e d 1371 w i t h c o r p o r a t i o n s and o t h e r b u s i n e s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The view t h a t PAC growth c o n s t i t u t e s t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of one form of l a r g e c o n t r i b u t o r f o r a n o t h e r i s echoed i n t h e work of a n o t h e r PAC o b s e r v e r , Michael M a l b i n , who w r o t e : The growth i n PACs s i n c e 1974 h a s been matched by a d e c l i n e i n t h e i m p o r t a n c e of l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l s . Bec a u s e c o r p o r a t e PACs a r e i n c r e a s i n g f a s t e r t h a n any o t h e r PACs, and b e c a u s e l a r g e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t h e p a s t t e n d e d t o come d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y from b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s , t h e r i s e of one and d e c l i n e of t h e o t h e r seem r o u g h l y t o c a n c e l e a c h o t h e r out. I n s t e a d of s a y i n g t h e law h a s f a i l e d t o a c h i e v e i t s purpose of c u r b i n g t h e power of t h e " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , ' ' we s h o u l d say--at l e a s t w i t h r e s p e c t t o b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s - - t h a t t h e law h a s a c h i e v e d t h e g o a l of t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r of b u s i n e s s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s from t h e u n d i s c l o s e d and sometimes s e e d y form i t t o o k b e f o r e 1974 t o t h e more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d and a c c o u n t a b l e form we s e e t o d a y . 1381 - T h i s t h e o r y , o f c o u r s e , i s based on t h e o v e r a l l t r e n d s i n p o l i t i c a l g i v i n g , and an o b j e c t i v e judgment a s t o i t s v a l i d i t y i s h a n d i c a p p e d by t h e l a c k of a d e q u a t e , a c c u r a t e d i s c l o s u r e r e c o r d s p r i o r t o 1974. It i s known t h a t l a r g e d o n a t i o n s were s h a r p l y curbed by t h e 1974 FECA Amendments and t h a t b u s i n e s s 1371 E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971, p. 111. - 1381 M a l b i n , Michael J . Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s : PACs, Campaigns, and P u b l i c P o l i c y . I n h i s P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 152. PAC growth s i n c e 1976 h a s been one o f , i f not t h e , most s t r i k i n g a s p e c t s of t h e PAC s t a t i s t i c s p r e s e n t e d i n Chapter T h r e e . T h e r e i s g e n e r a l l y assumed t o b e a c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e s e two d e v e l o p m e n t s . Although t h i s t h e o r y i s d i f f i c u l t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e when viewed from t h e i n d i v i d u a l g i v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , i t i s b o l s t e r e d n o n e t h e l e s s by t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l i n t h e maximum c o n t r i b u t i o n one may make t o a c a n d i d a t e ($1000) v e r s u s t o a m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committee ( $ 5 0 0 0 ) . While t h e i n t e n t i n a l l o w i n g t h e h i g h e r l i m i t f o r d o n a t i o n s t o PACs was l i k e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y f o r g a i n i n g undue i n f l u e n c e by c o n t r i b u t i n g t o an i n t e r m e d i a r y , t h e law a l l o w s w e a l t h y i n d i v i d u a l s t o maximize t h e i r p o l i t i c a l g i v i n g by c o n t r i b u t i n g t o a m u l t i c a n d i d a t e PAC o f l i k e p h i l o s o p h y r a t h e r t h a n a p a r t i c u l a r candidate. The donor u n d e r s t a n d s , o f c o u r s e , t h a t o n l y p a r t , i f a n y , o f t h a t d o n a t i o n may r e a c h t h e f a v o r e d c a n d i d a t e by g i v i n g t o t h e PAC. The w e a l t h y g i v e r ' s s p e n d i n g d e c i s i o n s must a l s o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e o v e r a l l $25,000 l i m i t on a l l p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by an i n d i v i d u a l , p r o v i d i n g p e r h a p s a f u r t h e r i n c e n t i v e t o maximize h i s p o t e n t i a l f o r i n f l u e n c e w i t h each contribution. The t h i r d major f e a t u r e of t h e FECA which h a s a f f e c t e d PAC growth i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e second. The same p r o v i s i o n of t h e FECA which imposes t h e $1000 l i m i t on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s p l a c e s a $5000 l i m i t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s by m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committees [ 2 U.S.C. 441al. Furthermore, t h e r e i s no a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on t h e amount a PAC c a n g i v e i n a c a l e n d a r y e a r , such a s t h e $25,000 l i m i t a f f e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s . By a c c o r d i n g a g r e a t e r l a t i t u d e t o t h e m u l t i c a n d i d a t e PAC t h a n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h e FECA h a s t h u s provided s t r o n g e r i n c e n t i v e s f o r c a n d i d a t e s t o s e e k f u n d s from t h e former t h a n from t h e l a t t e r . T h i s view p a r a l l e l s t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Harvard U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e of P o l i t i c s i n i t s a n a l y s i s of t h e FECA's i m p a c t : I n e f f e c t , t h e c u r r e n t law f o r c e s c a n d i d a t e s t o t u r n t o c o r p o r a t e and l a b o r PACs a s w e l l a s t o t h e i r p e r s o n a l bank a c c o u n t s f o r t h e needed f u n d s no l o n g e r a v a i l a b l e through t h e p a r t i e s and from i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t o r s . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e l i m i t s on amounts i n d i v i d u a l s can c o n t r i b u t e d i r e c t l y t o c a n d i d a t e s have s e r v e d p r i m a r i l y t o d i v e r t money i n t o c h a n n e l s o f o r g a n i z e d g i v i n g . 1391 P a r t i c u l a r l y g i v e n t h e time-consuming n a t u r e of f u n d r a i s i n g , i t i s e a s i e r t o r a i s e l a r g e amounts o f money by d i r e c t i n g appeals, t o PACs. This i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e f o r House c a n d i d a t e s , whose r a c e s a r e g e n e r a l l y n o t a s w e l l s u i t e d t o d i r e c t - m a i l e f f o r t s a s a r e Senate r a c e s , t h u s , p e r h a p s , a f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e of House c a n d i d a t e s on PAC money t h a n t h e i r Senate c o u n t e r p a r t s . By making PACs more a t t r a c t i v e t o c a n d i d a t e s a s a s o u r c e o f f u n d i n g , t h e FECA h a s added y e t a n o t h e r i n c e n t i v e t o their proliferation. The h i g h e r l i m i t on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i s among t h e more i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s i n t h e growth of PACs i n r e c e n t y e a r s . The second a r e a which o f f e r s e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r PAC growth i s t h e p o l i t i c a l landscape i n general. One f i n d s t h a t PACs have s t e p p e d i n t o f i l l a void c r e a t e d by t h e d e c l i n i n g f o r t u n e s of t h e two major p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s . One a l s o f i n d s t h a t p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs h a s m i r r o r e d a g e n e r a l t r e n d toward f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l system. One must a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e i n c r e a s i n g r o l e government h a s played i n t h e l i v e s o f i t s c i t i z e n s and t h e c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e N a t i o n ' s economic r e s o u r c e s , t h u s p r o v i d i n g f u r t h e r i n c e n t i v e s f o r p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z i n g t o a f f e c t governmental d e c i s i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y s e r v e d a s a r b i t e r s of competing i n t e r e s t s i n t h e p r o c e s s of welding c o a l i t i o n s u n i t e d by c e r t a i n u n d e r l y i n g principles. The p a r t i e s provided c a n d i d a t e s w i t h a g e n e r a l p l a t f o r m on which t o run and w i t h t h e f i n a n c i a l and o t h e r r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y f o r a campaign; 1391 U.S. Administration. Congress. House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Committee on House An A n a l y s i s o f t h e Impact o f t h e FECA, p. 6 . t h e p a r t i e s i n t u r n exercised strong c o n t r o l over t h e recruitment of candidates and commanded a h i g h d e g r e e of l o y a l t y t o t h e p a r t y i s s u e p o s i t i o n s among t h e i r off iceholders . Most o b s e r v e r s contend t h a t t h e p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s have d e c l i n e d s i n c e t h e 1950s and a r e no l o n g e r a b l e t o i n f l u e n c e t o t h e same d e g r e e a s i n the p a s t t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s who become e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s . Some, l i k e David Broder, i n s i s t t h a t t h i s i s l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t of c a n d i d a t e s bypassing t h e p a r t y s t r u c t u r e t o wage more independent campaigns; t h e s u c c e s s f u l e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h such campaigns r e s u l t e d i n t h e a t r o p h y i n g of t h e p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d , c o n c o m i t a n t l y , a l e s s e n e d a b i l i t y t o provide n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s f o r f u t u r e 1401 campaigns. - The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c l i n e p a r a l l e l e d a weakening o f p a r t y l o y a l t i e s among v o t e r s , a s evidenced by s u r v e y r e s e a r c h d a t a on p a r t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t r e n d s and t h e i n c r e a s e d i n c i d e n c e o f v o t e r s c r o s s i n g p a r t y 1411 l i n e s i n selecting t h e i r preferred candidates. The weakening o f t h e power of p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e p a r t y l o y a l t i e s anong v o t e r s c r e a t e d a vaccuum which, i n a s e n s e , g e n e r a t e d t h e need f o r new o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o provide f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o c a n d i d a t e s and i s s u e s around which c a n d i d a t e s could r a l l y v o t e r s . The evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t t o some e x t e n t PACs have proved t o be such s u b s t i t u t e s f o r t h e s e p a r t y functions. R e g a r d l e s s o f hnw one i n t e r p r e t s t h e d a t a i n T a b l e s 6 and 7 , i t i s c l e a r t h a t PACs do play a g r e a t e r r o l e i n campaign funding today t h a n do t h e parties. The e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e Republican P a r t y i n t h e 1980 and 1982 e l e c t i o n s 1401 Broder, David. Let 100 S i n g l e - I s s u e Groups Bloom--The P a i n s They Cause May Push P o l i t i c i a n s Back t o t h e P a r t i e s . The Washington P o s t , J a n . 7, 1979: C1-2. 1 4 1 / Samuelson, Robert J. Fragmentation and U n c e r t a i n t y L i t t e r t h e P o l i t i c a l Landscape. N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , v . 11, Oct. 2 0 , 1979: 1731. have r a i s e d q u e s t i o n s a s t o t h e c o n t i n u e d v a l i d i t y o f t h e p a r t y d e t e r i o r a t i o n theory. The i m p r e s s i v e f u n d r a i s i n g r e c o r d of t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p a l n a t i o n a l committees o f t h e Republican P a r t y i n 1980 (when n e t r e c e i p t s t o t a l e d $111 m i l l i o n ) and 1982 (when t h e t h r e e GOP committees r a i s e d a n e t of $190.5 m i l l i o n , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h $28.4 m i l l i o n by t h e Democratic c o u n t e r p a r t s ) was a t a n g i b l e i n d i c a t i o n t h a t a t l e a s t one o f t h e two major p a r t i e s had gone some d i s t a n c e i n improving i t s a b i l i t y t o a s s i s t i t s c a n d i d a t e s f i n a n c i a l l y ; t h i s f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e included d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s , coordinated party e x p e n d i t u r e s , and campaign a s s i s t a n c e i n s u c h t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s a s p o l l i n g and 1421 The high d e g r e e o f c o h e s i o n among Republican Members media a d v e r t i s i n g . o f Congress on t h e Reagan budget and t a x prosrams d u r i n g 1981 may be f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n o f a r e n a i s s a n c e i n t h e GOP's p r e s t i g e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h . (The i s s u e s a f f e c t i n g perceived p a r t y d e c l i n e and t h e c a u s e s t h e r e o f w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n Chapter Four.) The growth o f PACs c a n a l s o be viewed a s y e t a n o t h e r r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l f r a g m e n t a t i o n of American s o c i e t y and i t s p o l i t i c a l system which h a s been p e r c e i v e d s i n c e t h e 1950s. Kevin P h i l l i p s w r o t e i n 1978 o f t h e " B a l k a n i z a t i o n " of American s o c i e t y , i n which: Small l o y a l t i e s a r e r e p l a c i n g l a r g e r o n e s . a r e a l s o r e p l a c i n g l a r g e r o n e s . 1431 - Small o u t l o o k s P h i l l i p s saw t h e " p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l decomposition" of America a g g r a v a t e d by s u c h e v e n t s a s t h e Vietnam War and t h e end o f Pax Americana, t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Great S o c i e t y , t h e end of energy abundance, and Watergate and t h e p u b l i c ' s l o s s of confidence i n i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 1421 Cohen, Richard E. Democrats Take a Leaf from t h e GOP Book With E a r l y Campaign Financing S t a r t . N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , v. 1 3 , May 23, 1981: 923. 1431 1978: 38. P h i l l i p s , Kevin. The B a l k a n i z a t i o n of America. FIarper ' s , May ... t h e breakdown o f t h e s e u n i t i e s , h o p e s , and g l o r i e s h a s scrambling a f t e r a v a r i e t y been enough t o send Americans o f l e s s e r combinations and s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s : e t h n i c i t i e s , r e g i o n s , s e l f i s h economic i n t e r e s t s , s e c t s , and neighborhoods. 1441 ... - Other o b s e r v e r s d i f f e r a s t o t h e c a u s e s o f f r a g m e n t a t i o n and whether o r n o t i t r e p r e s e n t s t h e ' harmful phenomenon which P h i l l i p s b e l i e v e d i t d i d . One must a l s o be c a u t i o u s n o t t o m i s t a k e c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l t r e n d s f o r t h e merely contemporary m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y t r a d i t i o n a l l y a p a r t o f t h e United S t a t e s . The e v i d e n c e o f s p l i n t e r i n g and f r a g m e n t a t i o n i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system i s r e a d i l y observable. For example, Congress h a s e x p e r i e n c e d a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y growth s i n c e 1970 of i n f o r m a l groups s e e k i n g t o i n f l u e n c e t h e policy-making process within t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n . Such g r o u p s , commonly known a s c a u c u s e s , are n o t recognized i n , f h e House o r Senate Rules and a r e n o t l i n e - i t e m a p p r o p r i a t i o n s . They a r e formed;by like-minded Members who d e s i r e t h e developnent o f common p o l i c y approaches t o s h a r e d p o l i c y c o n c e r n s . 1451 Only t h r e e i n f o r m a l groups e x i s t e d i n 1970: t h e Democratic Study Group, t h e House Wednesday Group, and t h e b i c a m e r a l Members o f Congress f o r Peace Through Law. By 1984, more t h a n n i n e t y i n f o r m a l groups were i n e x i s t e n c e , i n c l u d i n g such groups a s t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l Rural Caucus, J e w e l r y Manufacturing C o a l i t i o n , S o l a r C o a l i t i o n , Senate S t e e l Caucus, T e x t i l e Caucus, Mushroom 1461 Caucus, Pro-Life Caucus, and Automobile Task Force. - These c a u c u s e s c a n 1441 - Ibid. 1451 U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress. Congressional Research S e r v i c e . Formal and I n f o r m a l C o n g r e s s i o n a l Groups [by Paul R u n d q u i s t ] . Report 78-172, October 30, 1978. p. 16-17. 1461 U.S. L i b r a r y of Congress. Congressional Research S e r v i c e . Caucuses and L e g i s l a t i v e S e r v i c e O r g a n i z a t i o n s : An I n f o r m a t i o n a l D i r e c t o r y [by S u l a P. R i c h a r d s o n ] . I s s u e B r i e f No. I B 83193, J a n . 6, 1984. be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e i r narrowly-focused agendas o r b a s e s o f s u p p o r t , a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y among t h e new i n f o r m a l g r o u p s , " t h e major emphasis ... h a s been a s i n g l e i s s u e o r i e n t a t i o n which u n d e r s c o r e s economic and r e g i o n a l shared i n t e r e s t s over p a r t i s a n considerations." 1471 J u s t a s t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f narrowly-focused c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a u c u s e s r e p r e s e n t s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e m u l t i t u d e o f l o y a l t i e s and i n t e r e s t s which e x i s t i n t h e United S t a t e s t o d a y , s o do PACs c o n s t i t u t e one more form o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r America's d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s . Their growth i n number and i n f l u e n c e c a n t h u s be viewed a s a r e f l e c t i o n o f what a p p e a r s t o be t h e h i g h e r d e g r e e o f s o c i a l , p ~ l i t i c a l ,and economic h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e American people today. When viewed i n s u c h a n o v e r a l l c o n t e x t , t h e PAC phenomenon o f t h e 1970s and 1980s seems h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g . F i n a l l y , t h e i s s u e of i n c r e a s e d government r e g u l a t i o n 'fs o f t e n s u g g e s t e d a s a c a t a l y s t f o r PAC growth. The t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t t h e more governmental d e c i s i o n s a r e p e r c e i v e d a s having a n impact on p e o p l e s ' l i v e s , t h e more p o l i t i c i z e d people become, i n o r d e r t o h e l p shape t h e outcome o f p o l i c y decisions. T h i s v i e w , a s i t r e l a t e s t o government r e g u l a t i o n o f b u s i n e s s , was w e l l e x p r e s s e d by a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e B u s i n e s s - I n d u s t r y P o l i t i c a l Action Committee (BIPAC): It was n o t t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t and t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission t h a t promoted t h e PAC movement; i t was e v e r y o t h e r law and e v e r y o t h e r r e g u l a t o r y body t h a t began i n t r u d i n g i n t o t h e b u s i n e s s of b u s i n e s s . A c l e a r p a t t e r n emerges when reviewing who d o e s and who does n o t have a PAC--the more r e g u l a t e d a n i n d u s t r y and t h e more obvious a n i n d u s t r y i s a s a c o n g r e s s i o n a l t a r g e t , t h e more l i k e l y i t i s t o have a p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee w i t h i n t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s o r w i t h i n t h e c m p a n i e s t h a t make u p t h a t i n d u s t r y . A s t h e government moves c l o s e r and c l o s e r t o p a r t n e r s h i p 1471 - U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress, Formal and Informal Groups, p. 2 . w i t h a n i n d u s t r y , t h e r e s u l t o f t h a t l i a i s o n i s a PAC, mothered by i n d u s t r y b u t unmistakably s i r e d by government. 148/ Apart from t h e v a l u e judgment a s s o c i a t e d w i t h government r e g u l a t i o n , t h e e s s e n t i a l argument i s b o t h widely-accepted and l o g i c a l . The b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d examples c i t e d by t h e BIPAC spokesperson c o u l d be expanded c o n s i d e r a b l y by l o o k i n g a t t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs o r g a n i z e d around such s o c i a l i s s u e s a s a b o r t i o n and gun c o n t r o l . Some may s e e t h e p r i n c i p a l f l a w i n t h e above q u o t a t i o n a s t h e d i s c o u n t i n g o f t h e impact of t h e FECA i t s e l f on t h e growth o f PACs. Government r e g u l a t i o n o f and involvement i n p e o p l e s ' l i v e s and b u s i n e s s e s i s n o t j u s t a phenomenon o f t h e 1970s; c e r t a i n l y t h e a c t i v e involvement of government h a s been a growing t r e n d s i n c e a t l e a s t t h e New Deal e r a o f t h e 1930s. While government r e g u l a t i o n i s n o t s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t o d a y ' s growth of PACs, i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s a n i m p o r t a n t c a u s e t h a t cannot be d i v o r c e d from t h e i s s u e of PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 148/ Budde, B e r n a d e t t e A. Business P o l i t i c a l Action Committees. I n Malbin, P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws, p. 11. CHAPTER FOUR: ISSUES SURROUNDING THE; PAC ROLE I N THE POLITICAL SYSTEM T h i s c h a p t e r f o c u s e s on t h e impact which PACs h a v e had and a r e c o n t i n u i n g t o h a v e on t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . We l e a r n e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t h a t , s i n c e 1972, PACs h a v e s t e a d i l y and enormously i n c r e a s e d b o t h t h e i r numbers and t h e amounts of money a v a i l a b l e f o r p o l i t i c a l s p e n d i n g and t h a t t h e y a r e p l a y i n g a n i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e f i n a n c i n g of c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . How t h e PAC phenomenon w i t h i t s i n f u s i o n of many m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s i n t o o u r e l e c t i o n campaigns h a s a f f e c t e d t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m o v e r a l l and t h e v a r i o u s segments and v a l u e s t h e r e o f h a s been a m a t t e r of s h a r p c o n t r o v e r s y i n r e c e n t years . The d e b a t e o v e r PACs h a s r e v o l v e d around t h e i s s u e of whether o r n o t i n t e r e s t g r o u p s h a v e d e v e l o p e d t o o much power o v e r t h e policy-making process, t o t h - d e t r i m e n t of o t h e r s e c t o r s o f s o c i e t y and t o t h e N a t i o n a s a whole. While t h a t i s t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n , o t h e r i s s u e s have i n e v i t a b l y become e n t a n g l e d i n t h e ongoing d e b a t e . Such f a c t o r s a s who h a s b e n e f i t t e d o r who i s l i k e l y t o b e n e f i t from t h e growth of PACs have t e n d e d t o c o l o r t h e p e r c e p t i o n s o f p r o p o n e n t s and o p p o n e n t s of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s . T h i s c h a p t e r o f f e r s a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e major component i s s u e s i n t h e d e b a t e o v e r PACs: t h e r o l e of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i n s o c i e t y and whether o r not t h e y e x e r t t o o much power t o d a y , how PACs have a f f e c t e d t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , how PACs have a f f e c t e d t h e r o l e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , t h e e f f e c t of PACs on C o n g r e s s , t h e l e v e l o f f u n d i n g f o r modern e l e c t i o n campaigns, t h e e f f e c t o f PACs on t h e b a l a n c e o f power between t h e b u s i n e s s and l a b o r s e c t o r s , and t h e r e l a t i o n o f PACs t o t h e n o t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l accountabity. For e a c h component i s s u e , t h e views of PAC p r o p o n e n t s and opponents w i l l be d i s c u s s e d and a n a l y z e d . I. THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS The d e b a t e o v e r PACs e s s e n t i a l l y c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e view one t a k e s of t h e r o l e of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , whether o r not t h e power e x e r t e d by i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t o d a y i s d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e n a t i o n a l good. Opponents o f PACs a s s e r t t h a t t h e sum t o t a l o f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s do not always add up t o t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , w h i l e d e f e n d e r s i n s i s t t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n e v i t a b l y emerges o u t of t h e c o n f l i c t between t h e special interests. PAC o p p o n e n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s have become t o o powerful i n r e c e n t y e a r s ( t h e PAC b e i n g a v e h i c l e f o r w i e l d i n g t h a t power) and t h a t t h i s i s making i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o f o r g e c o h e s i v e n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . They s e e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s a s h a v i n g become i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r i d e n t and u n y i e l d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e advancing s i n g l e , " l i t m u s " i s s u e s . The end r e s u l t of t h e i r i n p u t i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , opponents s a y , h a s been t o undermine t h e s p i r i t o f compromise and f l e x i b i l i t y which i s e s s e n t i a l i n a democracy and t o p a r a l y z e t h e Congress. I n t h e words o f Common C a u s e ' s Fred Wertheimer: The PACs s t a n d o u t a s one o f t h e major c a u s e s o f t h e growing f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f o u r p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m and a l s o of t h e i n c r e a s i n g d i f f i c u l t y we e x p e r i e n c e i n o u r a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . They a r e a key f a c t o r i n t h e growth i n America of t h e s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t s t a t e . 1481 - Although PAC c r i t i c s acknowledge t h e l e g i t i m a t e r o l e i n t e r e s t groups and PACs , a s t h e i r a g e n t s , have t o p l a y i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , t h e y a r g u e t h a t t h e y 1481 Wertheimer, F r e d . Commentary. and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p . 199. In Malbin, P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, must b e k e p t i n c h e c k , l e s t t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e s y s t e m b e t h r e a t e n e d . It i s t h e i r c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e l a r g e amounts o f money which PACs have i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e p r o c e s s o v e r t h e p a s t d e c a d e and t h e i n c r e a s e d c a n d i d a t e r e l i a n c e on PAC money h a v e s i g n a l e d t h e u p s e t t i n g of t h e b a l a n c e between o r g a n i z e d i n t e r e s t g r o u p s and t h e r e s t of s o c i e t y . The d e f e n d e r s o f PACs i n s i s t t h a t t h e y a r e n o t a m o n o l i t h i c f o r c e and t h a t t h e y r e p r e s e n t a wide s p e c t r u m of p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s . Rather than e x p r e s s i n g a l a r m a t t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of PACs, t h e y s e e it a s a h e a l t h y development which c o n t r i b u t e s t o a v i g o r o u s democracy. P r o p o n e n t s adopt t h e Madisonian view, a s e x p r e s s e d i n F e d e r a l i s t No. 1 0 , t h a t t h e way t o p r e v e n t a t y r a n n y o f f a c t i o n s i s t o a l l o w them t o f l o u r i s h and m u l t i p l y so t h a t no one f a c t i o n c o u l d s o dominate o t h e r s a s t o e l i m i n a t e i n c e n t i v e s f o r compromise w i t h o t h e r s e c t o r s o f t h e s o c i e t y ; t h e y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e d i v e r s e economic i n t e r e s t s p r e s e n t i n America - t o d a y m a n i f e s t such a s y s t e m . 1491 PAC s u p p o r t e r s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e s h a r p i n c r e a s e s i n PAC s p e n d i n g l a r g e l y r e f l e c t a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e methods which c o r p o r a t i o n s f o r m e r l y used t o i n f l u e n c e e l e c t i o n outcomes. They n o t e t h a t c o r p o r a t e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s h a v e r e p l a c e d t h e " l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s from c o r p o r a t e ' f a t c a t s , ' 'double-envelope' i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s c o l l e c t e d and bound t o g e t h e r i n an o u t s i d e e n v e l o p e w i t h a c o r p o r a t i o n ' s r e t u r n a d d r e s s , and i l l e g a l in-kind corporate contributions." 1501 The g o a l of t h e FECA, Michael Malbin o b s e r v e s , was not t o end t h e r o l e o f b u s i n e s s in p o l i t i c s , but t o transform it. And, a s f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e of t h e t r a n s f o r m e d n a t u r e o f campaign f i n a n c i n g , h e c i t e s t h e d e c r e a s e d s h a r e o f l a r g e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s among House c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s between 1972 and 1978. 149/ 150/ - M a l b i n , Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s , p . 215-216. I b i d . , p. 156. Because most of t h e l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y have come from b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s , t h i s d r o p seems more t h a n a d e q u a t e t o account f o r t h e p r o p o r t i o n a t e growth of PACs. 1511 - Thus, PAC d e f e n d e r s downplay t h e s t a t i s t i c s (which c r i t i c s u n d e r s c o r e ) on PAC s p e n d i n g . They b e l i e v e t h a t s o l o n g a s t h e money comes from v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , s u b j e c t t o d i s c l o s u r e laws and l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e reason f o r concern. F i n a l l y , PAC s u p p o r t e r s o b j e c t t o t h e f r e q u e n t p e j o r a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n o f t h e t e r m " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t " and t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of i t w i t h a n o t h e r v a l u e - l a d e n term, "public i n t e r e s t . " They h o l d t h e view t h a t a l l f a c t i o n s which a d v o c a t e s p e c i f i c government p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s a r e , i n f a c t , s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , and t h a t no one group h a s any more c l a i m t o t h e r o l e o f d e f e n d e r o f t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t t h a n any o t h e r group. Both t h e c r i t i c s and t h e d e f e n d e r s of PACs make some v a l i d p o i n t s and some which r a i s e l e g i t i m a t e q u e s t i o n s . Both s i d e s c l a i m t o s u p p o r t t h e r o l e 3f i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i n s o c i e t y w h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g t h e need f o r some b a l a n c e , l e s t t h e y become o v e r l y powerful. The c r i t i c s b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s b a l a n c e h a s a l r e a d y been u p s e t by PACs, w h i l e d e f e n d e r s c l a i m t h a t PACs do n o t e x e r t a disproportionate influence. The q u e s t i o n may b e a d d r e s s e d t o s u p p o r t e r s a s t o what l e v e l of PAC f u n d i n g might c a u s e them c o n c e r n : i f n o t t h e 20 p e r c e n t of House and S e n a t e r e c e i p t s i n 1978 o r t h e n e a r l y 27 p e r c e n t i n 1982, what l e v e l of PAC s p e n d i n g a s a p r o p o r t i o n of c a n d i d a t e s p e n d i n g would s i g n a l t o o g r e a t a r o l e by i n t e r e s t g r o u p s ? PAC d e f e n d e r s a r e c o r r e c t i n t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t , t o some e x t e n t , what i s o c c u r i n g i s a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e way i n which b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d money i s contributed. Because o f t h e a b s e n c e o f c o m p l e t e , t h o r o u g h d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s p r i o r t o 1972, i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h i s a c c o u n t s f o r most of t h e PAC growth o r i s m e r e l y one f a c t o r among many. It i s a l s o t r u e t h a t PACs a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of modern-day p l u r a l i s m , i n which a wide-range policies. of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s compete t o win f r i e n d s and i n f l u e n c e They a r e n o t a m o n o l i t h i c f o r c e . However, t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e v e h i c l e s o f o r g a n i z e d i n t e r e s t s , t h o s e p e r s o n s and g r o u p s who a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y e d u c a t e d and i n v o l v e d i n t h e s y s t e m s o a s t o have an impact on p o l i c i e s . The c o n c e r n e x p r e s s e d by c r i t i c s may b e b a s e d , i n p a r t , on t h e comparison of t h e organized i n t e r e s t groups with t h o s e s e c t o r s of s o c i e t y unable o r i n s u f f i c i e n t l y aware o r m o t i v a t e d t o b e p o l i t i c a l l y i n v o l v e d . A t t h e r o o t of t h i s concern i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether e q u a l a c c e s s t o government i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h o s e s e c t o r s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n which a r e u n a b l e t o r a i s e l a r g e amounts of money; t h u s , PACs a r e s e e n a s f u r t h e r i n g an imbalance i n a c c e s s t o t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A f u r t h e r m i s g i v i n g of c r i t i c s , a s w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , i s t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f t o o much power by p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s o r s e c t o r s o f s o c i e t y , which PACs may p l a y an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n h e l p i n g them a c q u i r e . PAC d e f e n d e r s make a v a l i d p r o t e s t t o t h e p e j o r a t i v e u s e o f t h e t e r m " s p e c i a l interest.'' What a c t u a l l y s e p a r a t e s a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t g r o u p from t h e s o - c a l l e d p u b l i c i n t e r e s t g r o u p , t h e y a s s e r t , i s t h e p r i m a r i l y economic agenda o r f o c u s which c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e former ( c o r p o r a t i o n s , u n i o n s , t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s ) and t h e more i d e o l o g i c a l n a t u r e of t h e l a t t e r ' s agenda o r f o c u s . What may e x p l a i n t h e p e j o r a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n given t h e term " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s " i s t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e i r motivation i s e s s e n t i a l l y g r e e d , i n c o n t r a s t with t h e "nobler" motivation of commitment t o an i d e o l o g y o r s e t of non-economic p r i n c i p l e s . F i n a l l y , w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l t h r e a t which c r i t i c s f e e l PACs c o n s t i t u t e , t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f f r a g m e n t e d and p a r a l y z e d government may b e b o t h f l e e t i n g and i n t h e e y e s o f t h e b e h o l d e r . I n t e r e s t groups were w i d e l y c r i t i c i z e d f o r t h e o b s t a c l e s t h e y placed i n t h e path of a n a t i o n a l energy p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; PAC money was s e e n b y some a s a r o o t cause of t h e a b i l i t y of omnipotent i n t e r e s t groups t o thwart t h e n a t i o n a l interest. T h i s c a n b e c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e s u c c e s s e n c o u n t e r e d b y t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n winning passage of i t s f a r - r e a c h i n g t a x and b u d g e t p r o g r a m s i n t h e 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , t h i s d e s p i t e t h e p r e s s u r e s from i n t e r e s t g r o u p s which had a s t r o n g s t a k e i n t h e outcome and whose PACs h a d , by 1 9 8 1 , become a n e v e n more i m p o r t a n t component i n t h e f u n d i n g o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a m p a i g n s t h a n t h e y were i n t h e l a t e 1970s. T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t i f o t h e r s e g m e n t s o f t h e power s t r u c t u r e a r e performing t h e i r f u n c t i o n s w e l l , t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t e r e s t groups w i l l be k e p t i n check. T h u s , what some p e r c e i v e d a s g o v e r n m e n t a l p a r a l y s i s j u s t a few y e a r s a g o may h a v e had l e s s t o d o w i t h i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t r e n g t h t h a n w i t h i n s u f f i c i e n t power w i e l d e d by o t h e r f o r c e s . Rather than t h e stand-off some p e r c e i v e d e a r l i e r , t h e 1981 e x p e r i e n c e may h a v e r a i s e d an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t spectre--the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e which some saw a s b e i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y w i e l d e d b y i n t e r e s t g r o u p s which s t o o d t o g a i n from t h e o u t c o m e . 11. PAC IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL PARTIES One i s s u e o f t e n r a i s e d b y c r i t i c s i s t h a t PACs h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e d e c l i n i n g power o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t by o f f e r i n g new s o u r c e s o f f i n a n c i a l and l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t t o c a n d i d a t e s , w h i l e t h e p a r t i e s ' a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e s u c h s u p p o r t h a s l e s s e n e d , t h e PACs h a v e r e n d e r e d t h e p a r t i e s i n c r e a s i n g l y impotent i n performing t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e a s agents o f compromise and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . P a r t y t i e s h a v e become l e s s i m p o r t a n t t o e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s , who owe t h e i r v i c t o r i e s l e s s t o p a r t i e s t h a n t o i n t e r e s t groups. The p a r t i e s a r e t h u s l e s s a b l e t o a c t a s i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between i n t e r e s t g r o u p demands and p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s , c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e o v e r l o a d i n g of t h e policy-making p r o c e s s and r e s u l t i n g i n t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n d i s c u s s e d above. T h e r e i s a r e c i p r o c a l n a t u r e t o t h i s t h e o r y , i n t h a t PACs a r e s e e n a s owing t h e i r g r o w t h , i n p a r t , t o weakened p a r t i e s and t h a t t h a t g r o w t h , i n t u r n , h a s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e f u r t h e r e r o s i o n of p a r t y s t r e n g t h . Most s c h o l a r s , however, a p p e a r t o adopt t h e v i e w t h a t w h i l e "PACs a r e g e t t i n g s t r o n g e r and t h e p a r t i e s a r e g e t t i n g weaker c o i n c i d e n t a l f o r t h e most p a r t . " 1521 ... the directions are P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t David Adamany a s s e r t s : The f o r c e s r a v a g i n g American p a r t i e s were s e t i n motion l o n g b e f o r e t h e r e c e n t emergence o f PACs. 1531 - Adamany a t t r i b u t e s p a r t y d e c l i n e e s s e n t i a l l y t o a " m e d i a - o r i e n t e d m i d d l e - c l a s s e l e c t o r a t e " h a v i n g become more i n t e r e s t e d i n i s s u e s and c a n d i d a t e s and l e s s - i n t e r e s t e d i n p a r t i e s . 1541 As h i s f e l l o w p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t , A u s t i n Ranney, n o t e d , " a n y t h i n g t h a t i n c r e a s e s t h e r o l e o f TV i n n a t i o n a l campaigns d i m i n i s h e s t h e r o l e of t h e p a r t i e s . " 1551 - While t e l e v i s i o n i s w i d e l y viewed a s one c o n t r i b u t o r t o weakening of p a r t y t i e s a n d , h e n c e , power, s u c h o t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s a s i n t e r n a l p a r t y r e f o r m s , a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of p r i m a r i e s , and p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g - 1521 Kayden, Xandra. Campaign F i n a n c e : The Impact on P a r t i e s and PACs. I n An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact of t h e FECA, p. 9 7 . - 1531 Adamany, David. PACs and t h e Democratic F i n a n c i n g of P o l i t i c s . I n P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees and Campaign F i n a n c e : Symposium, p. 593. 1541 - - Ibid. 1551 Ranney, A u s t i n . The P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s : Reform and D e c l i n e . I n Anthony King ( e d . ) . The New American P o l i t i c a l System. Washington, American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y R e s e a r c h , 1978. p. 244. o f P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n campaigns a r e o f t e n mentioned a s o t h e r i m p o r t a n t - f a c t o r s . 1561 It can b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s have had a d i r e c t r o l e i n t h e growth o f PACs, a s w e l l . Frank S o r a u f i s a n o t h e r p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t who t e n d s t o downplay t h e r o l e o f PACs i n t h e d e c l i n i n g f o r t u n e s of t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . h e s a y s , "PACs h a v e o n l y nudged t h e p a r t i e s ' downward s l i d e . " " A t most," 1571 He views PACs a s a major p a r t n e r i n a new c o a l i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s i n America, one i n which t h e p a r t i e s a r e l a r g e l y e x c l u d e d . He n o n e t h e l e s s s u g g e s t s one way i n which PACs h a v e l i k e l y worked t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i e s . The a b i l i t y o f PACs t o r a i s e i n c r e a s i n g amounts o f campaign money s u p p o r t s l e g i s l a t i v e c a n d i d a t e s i n t h e i r r e l i a n c e on new campaign t e c h n o l o g y and e x p e r t i s e . Very s i m p l y , PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s h e l p c a n d i d a t e s r e t a i n t h e c o s t l y s e r v i c e s of o p i n i o n p o l l e r s , campaign c o n s u l t a n t s , and t h e media i t s e l f . It i s , i n e f f e c t , p o s s i b l e t o " r e n t " a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y s u r r o g a t e , b u t t h e p r i c e i s d e a r . PAC money f o s t e r s t h e e x t e n s i o n of p e r s o n a l i s m i n campaign p o l i t i c s and s u p p o r t s t h e freedom of c a n d i d a t e s from r e l i a n c e on p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , r e s o u r c e s , and, even a t t i m e s , t h e p a r t y l a b e l . 1581 - The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e l a r g e amounts of money n e c e s s a r y t o wage modern, mediao r i e n t e d campaigns i s w i d e l y viewed a s t h e p r i n c i p a l s t r e n g t h o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t modern campaigns promote a c a n d i d a t e o r i e n t e d s y s t e m , t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s may w e l l s u f f e r . In t h i s c r u c i a l r e s p e c t , PACs c a n b e s e e n a s i n d i r e c t l y c o n t r i b u t i n g t o p a r t y a t r o p h y . A f i n a l c h a r g e by PAC c r i t i c s which p e r t a i n s t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s t h a t 1561 Kayden, Campaign F i n a n c e : The Impact on P a r t i e s and PACs, p. 97- - 1571 S o r a u f , Frank J . P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Comrnittes: Two L i f e C y c l e s . I n P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees and Campaign F i n a n c e : Symposium. p. 454. I b i d . p. 455. PACs a r e drawing money away from t h e p a r t i e s . T h e r e i s s u p p o r t f o r t h i s view from former R e p u b l i c a n N a t i o n a l Committee Chairman B i l l Brock who s a i d t h a t PACs have t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r drawing s u p p o r t from t h e p a r t y b e c a u s e o f t h e t e n d e n c y o f R e p u b l i c a n businessmen who might n o r m a l l y be e x p e c t e d t o c o n t r i b u t e - t o t h e p a r t y t o s a y t h a t t h e y h a v e " a l r e a d y g i v e n a t t h e o f f i c e . " 1591 Although PACs and p a r t i e s may i n d e e d be competing f o r money, we a r e reminded t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l a p p e a l of t h e p a r t i e s t o c a n d i d a t e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a s been t h e i r p r o v i s i o n o f n o n f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s . 1601 Adamany o b s e r v e s t h a t p a r t i e s were n o t good p r o v i d e r s o f campaign money l o n g b e f o r e PACs became a growing f o r c e . P a r t i e s h a v e p r o v i d e d f u n d s o n l y i n a d e q u a t e l y , f i t f u l l y , and unevenly i n t h e whole o f t h e post-war p e r i o d . The c o n t i n u i n g d e c l i n e of p a r t y f i n a n c i n g i s s u r e l y not due t o t h e r i s e of PACs, a l t h o u g h t h e c o n v e r s e may b e t r u e . 1611 Thus, even i f o n e s e e s PACs a s a t t r a c t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s which might o t h e r w i s e go t o t h e p a r t i e s , i t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t p r o v i d i n g money t o c a n d i d a t e s i s t h e p r i n c i p a l means by which p a r t i e s i n d u c e l o y a l t y among t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s and elected officials. *It s h o u l d a l s o b e n o t e d t h a t t h e FECA, d e s p i t e c r i t i c i s m t h a t i t h a s played a r o l e i n p a r t y d e c l i n e , i n f a c t e n c o u r a g e s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s b y imposing a $20,000 l i m i t on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e n a t i o n a l committees o f t h e p a r t i e s , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e $1,000 l i m i t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s and t h e $5,000 l i m i t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committees. One a d d i t i o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n may b e a p p r o p r i a t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e o f 1591 - Kayden, Campaign F i n a n c e : The Impact on P a r t i e s and PACs, p. 86. - 1 6 0 1 S o r a u f , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n C o m n i t t e e s : Two L i f e C y c l e s . p. 451. 1611 - Adamany, PACs and t h e Democratic F i n a n c i n g o f P o l i t i c s , p. 593-594. p o l i t i c a l party decline. I n l i n e w i t h o t h e r comments made i n t h i s r e p o r t , al.1 s u c h t h e o r i e s may b e proven i n v a l i d i f t h e R e p u b l i c a n s u c c e s s e s i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s , combined w i t h t h e s i g n s of p a r t y c o h e s i o n i n t h e 9 7 t h Congress and t h e phenomenal GOP f u n d r a i s i n g r e c o r d i n r e c e n t y e a r s , c o n t i n u e u n a b a t e d . P a r t y d e c l i n e may s u d d e n l y be s e e n a s b e i n g r e v e r s e d . 111. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS I N THE POLITICAL - PROCESS S u p p o r t e r s o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees c l a i m t h a t t h e y perform a b e n e f i c i a l f u n c t i o n by promoting g r e a t e r c i t i z e n involvement i n t h e e l e c t o r a l process. interests It i s s a i d t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n c o n s t i t u t i n g amorphous " s p e c i a l ,'I PACs a r e made up of m i l l i o n s o f p e o p l e and t h a t t h e y a r e t h e one v e h i c l e f o r i n f l u e n c i n g t h e making of p u b l i c p o l i c y open t o t h o s e who do n o t have l a r g e amounts o f money t o c o n t r i b u t e . The o p p o n e n t s o f PACs i n s i s t t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a r e b e i n g crowded o u t of t h e campaign f i n a n c e p r o c e s s by t h e o r g a n i z e d i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , o p e r a t i n g t h r o u g h t h e i r PACs. They s e e t h e a v e r a g e c i t i z e n l e s s l i k e l y t o c o n t r i b u t e money b o t h o u t of f r u s t r a t i o n o v e r h i s i n a b i l i t y t o compete w i t h l a r g e sums of money which PACs c a n spend and o u t o f c y n i c i s m o v e r t h e p e r c e i v e d dominance of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s over t h e p o l i c y making p r o c e s s . I n t h e a b s e n c e o f c o m p r e h e n s i v e , r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s o f PACs, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o draw c o n c l u s i o n s about t h e a c c u r a c y o f t h e above a s s e r t i o n s on t h e e x t e n t t o which PACs promote g r e a t e r involvement i n t h e p o l i t i c a l process. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t l e n d s support to that proposition. A 1980 p o s t - e l e c t i o n s u r v e y by t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n ' s Survey R e s e a r c h C e n t e r found t h a t a h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e o f i n d i v i d u a l s p o l l e d c l a i m e d t h a t t h e y had c o n t r i b u t e d t o a PAC t h a n had c o n t r i b u t e d t o e i t h e r a candidate or a p o l i t i c a l party. The q u e s t i o n was a s k e d : E12. Now what about p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n g r o u p s s u c h a s g r o u p s s p o n s o r e d by a union o r a b u s i n e s s , o r i s s u e g r o u p s l i k e t h e National R i f l e A s s o c i a t i o n or t h e National O r g a n i z a t i o n of Women. Did you g i v e money t h i s e l e c t i o n y e a r t o a p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n g r o u p o r any o t h e r g r o u p t h a t s u p p o r t e d o r opposed particular candidates i n the election? The r e s p o n s e was 6.7 p e r c e n t a f f i r m a t i v e and 92.5 p e r c e n t n e g a t i v e . This compared w i t h 5 . 9 p e r c e n t who r e p o r t e d c o n t r i b u t i n g t o a c a n d i d a t e ( a t any - l e v e l ) and 3.6 p e r c e n t who s a i d t h e y had c o n t r i b u t e d t o a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . 1621 One c a v e a t t h a t s h o u l d be added t o t h i s d a t a r e l a t e s t o t h e p h r a s i n g of t h e q u e s t i o n on PACs. The N a t i o n a l R i f l e A s s o c i a t i o n and t h e N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Women a r e n o t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , a l t h o u g h t h e y b o t h s p o n s o r PACs. P e o p l e who gave money t o i s s u e g r o u p s l i k e NOW may have t h o u g h t t h e y were g i v i n g t o a PAC; c l e a r l y t h e r e was a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g about t h e n a t u r e of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n even on t h e p a r t of t h o s e who w r o t e t h e s u r v e y . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e a r e p e o p l e who g i v e money t o t h e s p o n s o r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n who do n o t a l s o g i v e t o t h e i r PAC. T h i s may have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e f o r PACs t h a n f o r c a n d i d a t e s o r p a r t i e s . A second c a v e a t r e g a r d i n g t h e Michigan d a t a i s t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e t o what e x t e n t t h o s e who gave t o PACs and t o c a n d i d a t e s were l a r g e l y t h e same g r o u p o f p e o p l e . T h i s d a t a n o n e t h e l e s s p r o v i d e s an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t PACs a r e a t t r a c t i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l of c o n t r i b u t o r s . T h e r e i s a l s o some e v i d e n c e , a l t h o u g h h e r e a g a i n d a t a i s l i m i t e d , t h a t PACs g e t most of t h e i r money i n s m a l l d o n a t i o n s , t h u s i m p l y i n g a b r o a d , democratic base of s u p p o r t . One s t u d y shows t h a t o f a l l PACs i n 1976 w i t h r e c e i p t s of more t h a n $100,000, 87 p e r c e n t of t h e i r r e c e i p t s were from 1621 Center f o r Center f o r P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s . I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i a l Research. P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s . American N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n S t u d y , 1980. T r a d i t i o n a l Time S e r i e s . Codebook. c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f $100 o r l e s s . A s might be e x p e c t e d , t h i s r e s u l t was skewed by l a b o r PACs, which g o t 96 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r money i n d o n a t i o n s of $100 o r l e s s ; t h e p e r c e n t a g e f o r c o r p o r a t e PACs was 66 p e r c e n t and f o r a l l o t h e r - PACs, 8 2 . 5 p e r c e n t . 1631 The a v e r a g e s i z e o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o PACs i s a much-disputed m a t t e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y r e g a r d i n g t h o s e t o c o r p o r a t e PACs. One l a b o r union s t u d y found t h e a v e r a g e d o n a t i o n t o a c o r p o r a t e PAC was $200; a n o t h e r s t u d y , t h i s by t h e business-oriented P u b l i c A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , found t h e f i g u r e f o r c o r p o r a t e - PACs t o be under $125. 1641 C l e a r l y , t h e r e e x i s t s a tendency f o r proponents o f ( b u s i n e s s ) PACs t o maximize t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f s m a l l g i v i n g , whereas c r i t i c s o f PACs may downplay any s u c h e v i d e n c e . R e g a r d l e s s o f t h e e v i d e n c e showing l a r g e numbers o f r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o PACs, c r i t i c s c o n t e n d t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n many c a s e s i s b r o u g h t a b o u t a s a r e s u l t o f ~ e r c e i v e dp r e s s u r e by c o r p o r a t e managers. Despite t h e p r o h i b i t i o n on c o e r c i o n under t h e FECA, r e p o r t s p e r s i s t t h a t a s u b t l e , u n s t a t e d p r e s s u r e does e x i s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y within c o r p o r a t i o n s . ' - As t h e Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l w r o t e i n a 1980 a r t i c l e : Some m i d d l e and s e n i o r managers a t t h e 900 o r more are increasingly companies w i t h t h e s o - c a l l e d PACs f e e l i n g p r e s s u r e d t o cough up p a r t o f t h e i r paychecks t o s u p p o r t "our way of l i f e , " a s one s o l i c i t a t i o n l e t t e r p u t s i t . 11 I know i t i s n ' t mandatory t o g i v e , " s a y s an employee o f a L i t t o n I n d u s t r i e s u n i t . "But t h e word around t h e w a t e r c o o l e r i s t h a t i f you d o n ' t g i v e o r i f you g i v e l e s s t h a n t h e amount e x p e c t e d based on your s a l a r y , y o u ' r e l i a b l e t o b e c a l l e d i n f o r a pep t a l k from t h e d i v i s i o n a l p r e s i d e n t . " 1651 ... ------1631 - Adamany, PACs and t h e Democratic F i n a n c i n g of P o l i t i c s , p. 590. - 1641 Discussion. I n M a l b i n , P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 226-227. - 1651 S a n s w e e t , Stephen J . P o l i t i c a l - A c t i o n U n i t s A t Firms Are A s s a i l e d by Some Over T a c t i c s . Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l , J u l y 2 4 , 1980: 1, 1 2 . C r i t i c s p o i n t t o comments l i k e t h e one by J u s t i n D a r t , chairman o f D a r t I n d u s t r i e s , who s a i d i n 1978, r e g a r d i n g h i s p r a c t i c e o f w r i t i n g l e t t e r s t o h i s e x e c u t i v e s s o l i c i t i n g d o n a t i o n s t o t h e company's PAC, " I f t h e y d o n ' t g i v e , - t h e y g e t a s e l l . " 1661 C o r p o r a t e PAC spokesmen i n s i s t t h a t c o e r c i o n i s a r a r e o c c u r r e n c e , a t m o s t , and t h a t s u c h c h a r g e s r e a l l y a r e i n d i c a t i v e o f a t t e m p t s by b u s i n e s s a d v e r s a r i e s t o d i s c r e d i t them. For t h e most p a r t , t h e y c o n t e n d t h a t t h e y a r e "100% s e r i o u s a b o u t a v o i d i n g p r e s s u r e . " 1671 The f o l l o w i n g s o l i c i t a t i o n l e t t e r from a c o r p o r a t i o n c h a i r m a n i s s e e n by b u s i n e s s e x e c u t i v e C l a r k MacGregor a s i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e g r e a t l e n g t h s c o r p o r a t i o n s go t o a v o i d any s i g n o f c o e r c i o n : I hope you w i l l d e c i d e t o t a k e p a r t i n t h i s program, b u t t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y no p r e s s u r e on you t o do s o . Whether o r not you t a k e p a r t i s up t o you and w i l l have no b e a r i n g on your p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n o r f u t u r e w i t h o u r company. T h e r e w i l l be n e i t h e r r e w a r d s n o r r e p r i s a l s whatever your d e c i s i o n . Should anyone even imply a n y t h i n g t o t h e c o n t r a r y , I a s k t h a t you i m m e d i a t e l y b r i n g t h i s t o my p e r s o n a l a t t e n t i o n . 1681 - C r i t i c s r e s p o n d , w i t h some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t employees may f e e l p r e s s u r e , r e g a r d l e s s o f what i s a c t u a l l y s a i d t o them. A s d e s c r i b e d by Common Cause s e n i o r v i c e p r e s i d e n t F r e d Wertheimer : T h e r e ' s i m p l i c i t p r e s s u r e i n t h e system t o begin with. When you have p e o p l e working t h e i r way up t h e l a d d e r and t h e i r b o s s a s k s f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e PAC, many w i l l c o n c l u d e t h a t t h i s an e x p e c t e d a c t i v i t y . 1691 - C o n v e r s e l y , unspoken, s u b t l e p r e s s u r e i s t h e most d i f f i c u l t t o p r o v e . - 1661 Ulman, N e i l . Companies O r g a n i z e Employees and H o l d e r s I n t o a P o l i t i c a l F o r c e . Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l , August 1 5 , 1978: 1, 18. 1671 - S a n s w e e t , P o l i t i c a l - A c t i o n U n i t s A t F i r m s Are A s s a i l e d . - 1681 MacGregor, C l a r k . Commentary. I n Malbin, P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 207. 1691 - S a n s w e e t , P o l i t i c a l - A c t i o n U n i t s A t Firms Are A s s a i l e d . Although t h e i s s u e of perceived c o e r c i o n may be t o o nebulous t o e n a b l e a n o b j e c t i v e f i n d i n g on i t s e x i s t e n c e , PAC d e f e n d e r s c l a i m t h a t such p r a c t i c e s a r e n o t unique t o b u s i n e s s , a s such c r i t i c i s m h a s extended t o l a b o r u n i o n s , a s w e l l . I n r e s p o n s e t o a 1979 s u i t by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f M a c h i n i s t s a l l e g i n g c o e r c i o n among c o r p o r a t e PACs i n t h e i r f u n d r a i s i n g , t h e c o r p o r a t i o n s a s s e r t e d t h a t t h a t u n i o n ' s own p r a c t i c e s e x h i b i t e d t h e same p a t t e r n s which t h e y saw a s i n d i c a t i v e o f c o e r c i o n by t h e c o r p o r a t i o n s . 170/ A more n e u t r a l o b s e r v e r , Edwin E p s t e i n , m a i n t a i n s t h a t , " u p p e r - l e v e l b u s i n e s s and l a b o r o f f i c i a l s s t i l l f a c e s u b t l e peer p r e s s u r e s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l armtwisting." 1711 A f i n a l i s s u e with implications f o r t h e r o l e of t h e individual i n t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s i s t h e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f campaign f i n a n c i n g , which i s s e e n a s being f o s t e r e d by PACs. "Because money i s r e a d i l y t r a n s f e r a b l e , " w r i t e s David Adamany, "PACs n a t i o n a l i z e funding s o u r c e s . They c o l l e c t ample t r e a s u r i e s i n s m a l l i n d i v i d u a l g i f t s from many l o c a l e s , c e n t r a l i z e t h o s e funds i n t h e hands o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l o f f i c e r s , and t h e n make l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n s t r a t e g i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t r a c e s anywhere i n t h e c o u n t r y . " 1721 This t r e n d toward n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s c e r n e d by o b s e r v e r s a s a major e f f e c t of t h e PAC phenomenon, and i t i s a c a u s e of some c o n s t e r n a t i o n among l o c a l politicians. Consider t h e f r u s t r a t i o n voiced by one S t a t e p a r t y chairman over t h e " o u t s i d e money" coming i n t o h i s S t a t e : S i x t y p e r c e n t of t h e money i n t h e S t a t e i s from o u t s i d e t h e State--on b o t h s i d e s . T h e r e ' s no e l i m i n a t i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . Out-of-state s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups 1701 - Ibid. 1711 Ibid. 172/ - Adamany, PACs and t h e Democratic Financing of P o l i t i c s , p. 596. a r e working a s a c o a l i t i o n - - n o t a c o n s p i r a c y - - j u s t a o n e n e s s of p u r p o s e and t h e y ' r e l o o k i n g f o r like-minded c a n d i d a t e s . These c o n s e r v a t i v e o r l i b e r a l PACs c a n g e t t o g e t h e r and i n a s m a l l S t a t e t h e y c a n r e a l l y make a d e n t i n a campaign. Yet t h e guy i n t h e S t a t e who l i v e s t h e r e can o n l y c o n t r i b u t e $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 173/ - As c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e g r e a t e r s h a r e s of t h e i r f u n d i n g from o u t s i d e of t h e i r jurisdictions, one l i n k between t h e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l and t h o s e h e r e p r e s e n t s may t e n d t o d i s i n t e g r a t e . A g a i n , t o q u o t e Adamany: These n a t i o n a l l y c e n t r a l i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n s t h u s compete w i t h l o c a l c o n s t i t u e n t s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e who s u p p l y p o l i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s , f o r t h e a t t e n t i o n of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . In t h i s competition, nationally centralized i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e i n c r e a s i n g l y a t an a d v a n t a g e b e c a u s e t h e money t h e y p r o f f e r i s r e a d i l y c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o t e c h n o l o g i e s t h a t a r e e v e r more e f f e c t i v e i n modern campaigns. 174/ - With i n c r e a s i n g n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , t h e r o l e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i l l t e n d t o become overshadowed i n t h e p r o c e s s . I n summary, t h e r e i s r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t PACs b o t h promote and h i n d e r t h e r o l e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n i n t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . By o f f e r i n g a new, i s s u e - o r i e n t e d v e h i c l e t h r o u g h which t o become i n v o l v e d , PACs a p p e a r t o b e b r i n g i n g more p e o p l e i n t o t h e p r o c e s s . S u b t l e p r e s s u r e may p l a y a r o l e i n some o f t h e PAC g i v i n g , b u t i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h i s a c c o u n t s f o r o n l y a s m a l l p o r t i o n of t h e money d o n a t e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , PAC s u p p o r t e r s c o r r e c t l y n o t e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s s t i l l c o n s t i t u t e t h e s i n g l e l a r g e s t component of campaign r e c e i p t s f o r c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g arguments about i n d i v i d u a l s b e i n g crowded o u t o f t h e p r o c e s s . 1731 p. 9 7 7 1741 - Kayden, Campaign F i n a n c e : The Impact on P a r t i e s and PACs, Adamany, PACs and t h e Democratic F i n a n c i n g of P o l i t i c s , p. 596. Based on i n t e r v i e w s conducted w i t h PAC managers, t h e Harvard s t u d y on t h e FECAts impact c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e encouragement of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by i t s membership i s a major and s i n c e r e l y - h e l d g o a l of t h o s e who e s t a b l i s h PACs. T h e r e a r e two o b v i o u s o b j e c t i v e s o f t e n c i t e d by PACs: To s e e ; c a n d i d a t e s e l e c t e d t o o f f i c e who r e p r e s e n t t h e i r views and t o e n c o u r a g e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e i r membership a s p a r t o f their civic responsibility. The l a t t e r o b j e c t i v e s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r r a t e d a s a f a c t o r b e c a u s e i t a p p e a r s t o be v e r y much i n t h e mind of many of t h o s e i n t e r v i e w e d . E d u c a t i o n always h a s been a major emphasis of l a b o r ' s , and many b u s i n e s s PACs a r e n o t r u n by p e o p l e w i t h e i t h e r s t r o n g i d e o l o g i c a l views o r much p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . 1751 .. . * - * * As one b u s i n e s s e x e c u t i v e put i t , "Giving i s a way of g e t t i n g c i t i z e n s t o p a r t i c i p a t e , t h e PAC i s a c o n d u i t . Our p h i l o s o p h i c a l premise i s t h a t f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t i s a s i m p o r t a n t as v o t i n g . " Labor l e a d e r s would s a y t h e same t h i n g . 1761 - Two s e r i o u s c o n c e r n s a r e r a i s e d by PAC c r i t i c s a s t h e y a f f e c t t h e individual's role. One, a s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , i s t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f PACs w i t h t h e t r e n d toward n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of campaign f u n d i n g s o u r c e s . This could s e r v e t o diminish t h e importance of t h e average c i t i z e n as c o n s t i t u t e n t , i n t h e e l e c t o r a l system. face vis-a-vis The o t h e r i s t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t o r s PACs i n t h a t w h i l e " p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s may outcomes i n mind when t h e y make c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o an o r g a n i z e d l o b b y i n g e f f o r t . " 1771 .. . . . . have policy these a r e r a r e l y linked I f one views t h e p r o c e s s of i n f l u e n c i n g p u b l i c p o l i c y a s a two-step p r o c e s s i n v o l v i n g campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s b e f o r e t h e e l e c t i o n and o r g a n i z e d l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s a f t e r w a r d s , t h e t e n d e n c y of PACs t o b e l i n k e d w i t h l o b b y i n g arms of p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s i m p l i e s p o t e n t i a l l y g r e a t e r c l o u t f o r a PAC t h a n f o r an i n d i v i d u a l i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e . - 1751 Kayden, The Impact o f t h e FECA on t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n of P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 111. 1761 1771 - Ibid., p. 103. U.S. C o n g r e s s , An A n a l y s i s o f t h e Impact of t h e FECA, p. 5. IMPACT OF PACs ON THE CONGRESS IV. P e r h a p s t h e most fundamental i s s u e s a t s t a k e i n t h e d e b a t e o v e r PACs c o n c e r n t h e e f f e c t PAC s p e n d i n g h a s had on t h e C o n g r e s s , g i v e n t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l r o l e a s c h i e f policy-making body i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f PAC r e s o u r c e s i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . Those alarmed by PAC growth s e e t h e a b i l i t y o f Congress t o a c t d e c i s i v e l y impeded by t h e p r e s s u r e s o f t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , which t h e y f e e l a r e emboldened by t h e i r f i n a n c i a l l a r g e s s e . And t h e y e x p r e s s c o n c e r n t h a t PAC money h a s c r e a t e d a c l i m a t e w h e r e i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e PAC r e c e i v e s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , o r a r e p e r c e i v e d by t h e p u b l i c a s s u c h , when t h e l e g i s l a t o r d e c i d e s h i s p o s i t i o n on a r e l e v a n t v o t e . They a r e answered by o t h e r s who i n s i s t t h a t PAC money f o l l o w s i s s u e p o s i t i o n s , and not t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d , and t h a t t h e competing p r e s s u r e s on Congress a r e an i n h e r e n t p a r t o f o u r g o v e r n m e n t a l p r o c e s s . In a d d i t i o n , a t h i r d i s s u e a f f e c t i n g Congress i s t h e e x t e n t t o which PAC money h e l p s t o l o c k incumbents i n t o o f f i c e ; t h i s i s s u e c a u s e s c o n c e r n among b o t h d e f e n d e r s and c r i t i c s of PACs. A. Each o f t h e s e t h r e e i s s u e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n . P a r a l y s i s o f t h e Policy-Making P r o c e s s One o f t h e f e a r s most o f t e n v o i c e d by PAC c r i t i c s i s t h a t PACs a i d t h e i n t e r e s t s t h e y r e p r e s e n t i n g a i n i n g a s t r a n g l e h o l d on t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s , l e a v i n g e a c h Member b e h o l d e n t o c o n f l i c t i n g and u n y i e l d i n g p r e s s u r e s and making compromise more d i f f i c u l t . T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e was b e s t c h a r a c t e r i z e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e David Obey i n 1979, d u r i n g h i s d e f e n s e o f t h e Obey-Railsback amendment t o l i m i t PACs ( t o b e d i s c u s s e d i n t h e f i n a l c h a p t e r ) . A f t e r commenting on t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a s m e d i a t i n g s t r u c t u r e s f o r competing i n t e r e s t s , Obey proceeded t o m e n t i o n t h e f o l l o w i n g o t h e r c a u s e s of t h e perceived l e g i s l a t i v e p a r a l y s i s : When we add t o t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e of s i n g l e - i s s u e g r o u p s who want t o judge t h i s p l a c e and judge us i n d i v i d u a l l y o n l y on t h e b a s i s o f how we perform on t h e i r own s i n g l e i s s u e , and t o b l a z e s w i t h what we do on a n y t h i n g e l s e , we have a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e House t o perform i s a t b e s t m a r g i n a l . When you add t o t h a t t h e a b i l i t y of a l l t h e s e groups t o now b e g i n t o i n j e c t l a r g e and e v e r i n c r e a s i n g amounts of d o l l a r s i n t o e a c h o f o u r campaigns and i n t o t h e campaigns of our o p p o n e n t s , you have a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r making t h e F e d e r a l Government one g i a n t i s o m e t r i c e x e r c i s e , b e c a u s e you g r a d u a l l y f r e e z e t h e wheels i n t h i s p l a c e b e c a u s e you have such tremendous p r e s s u r e b e i n g put on t h i s p l a c e , i t i s p u l l i n g t h i s p l a c e a p a r t on e v e r y s i n g l e i s s u e you c a n name. We almost l o s e our a b i l i t y t o 1781 put t o g e t h e r a m a j o r i t y . . . .- As d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n I o f t h i s c h a p t e r , t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f governmental p a r a l y s i s may b e j u s t t h a t - - a p e r c e p t i o n ; even t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t i s r e a l , i t may b e o n l y a temporary c o n d i t i o n . The d e f e n d e r s o f PACs t e n d t o s e e them a s m e r e l y t h e modern-day v e h i c l e s of A m e r i c a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l p l u r a l i s t i c p o l i t i c s . The d i s c o m f o r t t h e y c a u s e l e g i s l a t o r s i s n o t o n l y i n h e r e n t i n t h e s y s t e m b u t may produce d e s i r a b l e r e s u l t s , a s w e l l . By "keeping t h e h e a t " on l e g i s l a t o r s , t h e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s s e r v e t o remind them of t h e i r r o l e a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who may i g n o r e t h e w i s h e s o f t h e v o t e r s o n l y a t t h e i r own u l t i m a t e p e r i l . The c o m p l a i n t s by some Members of undue p r e s s u r e from PACs may be viewed by PAC s u p p o r t e r s a s i n d i c a t i v e of discomfort over being forced t o confront c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s which t h e y would r a t h e r i g n o r e . Thus, t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f p a r a l y s i s i n t h e Congress and t h e v a l u e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t a r e not e a s i l y reconciled. - 1781 Obey, David. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971 Amendments. Remarks i n t h e House. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, v . 125, O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1979: 2864428645. B. L i n k a g e Between PAC Money and L e g i s l a t i v e V o t e s The d e b a t e o v e r whether PAC money i n f l u e n c e s l e g i s l a t o r s ' v o t e s o r whether i t m e r e l y r e w a r d s v o t e s of s y m p a t h e t i c Members i s t h e s i n g l e most c o n t r o v e r s i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e e n t i r e PAC phenomenon. It i s a l s o t h e one which i s most d i f f i c u l t t o e v a l u a t e o b j e c t i v e l y ; n e i t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e i s r i g h t and n e i t h e r i s wrong. At m o s t , we can hope t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e b a s i c p e r s p e c t i v e s o f t h e c r i t i c s and t h e d e f e n d e r s on t h i s i m p o r t a n t i s s u e . The Harvard s t u d y on t h e impact of t h e FECA d e c l a r e d : ... PAC money i s i n t e r e s t e d money. While t h o s e who r u n p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s may n o t b e s u c c e s s f u l i n accomplishing t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e designs, it is c l e a r t h a t t h e y do have s p e c i f i c agendas f o r p u b l i c l a w s . 1791 - Concerning t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n , t h e r e a p p e a r s t o b e no d i s p u t e . The p o i n t o f d i v e r g e n c e l i e s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n by some b u t n o t o t h e r s t h a t , t h r o u g h PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s , i n t e r e s t groups g a i n s u f f i c i e n t l e v e r a g e t o i n f l u e n c e l e g i s l a t i v e v o t e s t h a t t h e y might n o t o t h e r w i s e have had and which g i v e s them an u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h o s e w i t h l e s s o r no money t o s p e n d . T h e r e can b e d i s c e r n e d i n t h e a t t i t u d e s o f PAC o p p o n e n t s a h i e r a r c h y o r spectrum of perceived o b l i g a t i o n a s i t p e r t a i n s t o t h i s i s s u e . t h e s e v i e w s a r e l i k e l y t o b e h e l d by PAC c r i t i c s . Any o r a l l o f A t one l e v e l , t h e y may p o i n t t o examples i n which s p e c i f i c c o n g r e s s i o n a l v o t e s a p p e a r e d t o have been o v e r l y i n f l u e n c e d by campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s from PACs. (Common Cause i s p e r h a p s t h e most prominent a d v o c a t e o f t h i s v i e w p o i n t , which i t promotes t h r o u g h i t s many s t u d i e s a t t e m p t i n g t o c o r r e l a t e key v o t e s o r committee a s s i g n m e n t s w i t h PAC giving.) A t t h e n e x t l e v e l , t h e argument i s advanced t h a t a f e e l i n g of o b l i g a t i o n t e n d s t o b e c r e a t e d by PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s a n d , whether o r n o t a 179/ - U.S. C o n g r e s s , An A n a l y s i s o f t h e Impact of t h e FECA, p. 4-5. l e g i s l a t o r a l t e r s h i s o r h e r v o t e on a g i v e n m a t t e r a s a r e s u l t , he h a s been p l a c e d i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . The n e x t l e v e l of argument i s t h a t even i f no q u i d pro quo r e l a t i o n s h i p i s e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f a l l t h e PAC money i s t o make i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r Members t o p l a c e t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t above some s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . F i n a l l y , even i f t h e c o r r e l a t i o n between money and v o t e s i s ambiguous o r n o n e x i s t e n t , t h e p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n of s u c h a connection j e o p a r d i z e s t h e appearance of t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' o b j e c t i v i t y and t h u s damages t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e e n t i r e C o n g r e s s . In t h i s case, the a p p e a r a n c e of i m p r o p r i e t y may be a s damaging a s t h e r e a l i t y . What most c o n c e r n s t h o s e who a r e s k e p t i c a l of PAC power i s t h e a b i l i t y of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t o j o i n f o r c e s on p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s , t h u s overwhelming t h e opposition. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Obey d e s c r i b e d t h i s t e n d e n c y a s f o l l o w s : ... t h e i n t e r e s t s o f PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s f r e q u e n t l y c o i n c i d e , such a s when an i s s u e a f f e c t s b u s i n e s s a s a whole o r an e n t i r e i n d u s t r y and a l l of t h e companies and l a b o r u n i o n s i n that industry. When t h a t o c c u r s , when a l a r g e number of groups which have made s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Members a r e a l l l o b b y i n g on t h e same s i d e o f an i s s u e , t h e p r e s s u r e g e n e r a t e d from t h o s e a g g r e g a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i s enormous and warps t h e p r o c e s s . It i s i f t h e y had made a s i n g l e , e x t r e m e l y l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n . 1801 - Thus, w h i l e t h e a g g r e g a t e s p e n d i n g o f PACs i s o f c o n c e r n l a r g e l y b e c a u s e o f t h e g e n e r a l a p p e a r a n c e o f i m p r o p r i e t y o r i n f l u e n c e p e d d l i n g , t h e a b i l i t y of PACs t o c o n c e n t r a t e and t a r g e t t h e i r r e s o u r c e s c a u s e s c o n c e r n o v e r t h e a c t u a l i t y of such p r a c t i c e s . Defenders o f PACs adopt t h e view t h a t b e c a u s e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s a r e not inherently e v i l or corrupt, neither are t h e i r contributions t o candidates inherently corrupting or s i n i s t e r tools - . With t h e c o n c e p t o f a c c e s s b e i n g a -1801 - Obey, F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campa i g n Act of 1971 Amendments, p. 28632. f u n d a m e n t a l e l e m e n t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g a l a r m i n g a b o u t t h e i r s e e k i n g t o maximize t h e i r a c c e s s t o t h e i r e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . While PAC s u p p o r t e r s acknowledge t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p t o g a i n undue i n f l u e n c e o v e r Members, i t i s a r a r e o c c u r r e n c e , g i v e n t h e d i v e r s i t y o f i n t e r e s t s competing w i t h o n e a n o t h e r and t h e d i s c l o s u r e laws which s e r v e a s a r e s t r a i n t a g a i n s t unseemly p r a c t i c e s . These two f a c t o r s a r e s e e n a s s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o t e c t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f t o o much power by any o n e g r o u p o r s e c t o r . PAC p r o p o n e n t s a s s e r t t h a t PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y g i v e n t o c a n d i d a t e s who a r e b a s i c a l l y s y m p a t h e t i c w i t h t h a t g r o u p ' s p h i l o s o p h y ; t h e r e f o r e , i t i s l o g i c a l f o r a h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n t o e x i s t between PAC g i v i n g and Members' v o t e s . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Mendel Davis e x p l a i n e d t h i s p a t t e r n i n h i s f l o o r s t a t e m e n t o p p o s i n g t h e Obey-Railsback Amendment: I t h i n k maybe we g e t c o n t r i b u t i o n s b e c a u s e o f t h e way we v o t e , maybe f o r f r e e e n t e r p r i s e , maybe b e c a u s e we a r e p r o - l a b o r , o r maybe b e c a u s e we a d d r e s s s p e c i f i c i s s u e s . But t o s a y t h a t j u s t b e c a u s e we have t a k e n money, we a r e c a s t i n g v o t e s i n t h e i n t e r e s t of t h a t money, I t h i n k , i s unsound. 1811 - Thus, t h e money i s s e e n p r i m a r i l y a s an e f f e c t o f Members' issue positions r a t h e r t h a n a s a c a u s e o f them. PAC d e f e n d e r s v i e w campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s a s o n l y one o f many t o o l s used by i n t e r e s t g r o u p s i n t h e i r e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c p o l i c y . A s Michael Malbin o b s e r v e s : - 1811 D a v i s , Mendel. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971 Amendments. I n Remarks t o t h e House. C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d , v . 125, O c t . 1 7 , 1979: 28656. J u s t a s members do not depend on any one s e t of g r o u p s f o r s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e i r campaign f u n d s , n e i t h e r do t h e most s u c c e s s f u l g r o u p s r e l y on c o n t r i b u t i o n s a s t h e b a s i s o f a n y t h i n g more t h a n a s m a l l p a r t of t h e i r o v e r a l l lobbying s t r a t e g i e s . 1821 The f a c t o r s which d e t e r m i n e a ember' s v o t e on a g i v e n i s s u e a r e t o o complex t o b e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y p r i o r i t i z e d by o b s e r v e r s . Hence, t h o s e who a r e s u p p o r t i v e o f PACs c l a i m t h a t campaign d o n a t i o n s p l a y no g r e a t e r r o l e i n a Member's v o t e t h a n do newspaper e d i t o r i a l s , o r g a n i z e d l o b b y i n g , c o n s t i t u e n t m a i l , o r a h o s t of o t h e r f a c t o r s . C r i t i c s o f t e n c h a r g e t h a t PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e i n v e s t m e n t s i n p r o s p e c t i v e Members of Congress. T h i s a p p e a r s t o be an a c c u r a t e o b s e r v a t i o n , l e a v i n g a s i d e t h e q u e s t i o n of whether o r not t h e i n v e s t m e n t s h o u l d be viewed i n a c y n i c a l manner. A t t h e v e r y l e a s t , PACs hope t o g a i n a c c e s s t o Members, t o h e l p e n s u r e a f a i r h e a r i n g of t h e i r c o n c e r n s . Beyond t h a t , t h e s t r a t e g i e s of t h e v a r i o u s PACs d i v e r g e , w i t h some emphasizing t h e need t o reward proven f r i e n d s and t o keep them i n o f f i c e and o t h e r s embarking on a s o - c a l l e d "risk-taking" C. p o l i c y i n o r d e r t o e l e c t new f r i e n d s t o C o n g r e s s . PACs a s P r o t e c t o r s o f Incumbents As was d e m o n s t r a t e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e , PACs have a s t r o n g b i a s toward c o n g r e s s i o n a l i n c u m b e n t s , and t h i s b i a s h a s i n c r e a s e d s i n c e 1972. I n 1982, more t h a n t w o - t h i r d s o f PAC money was c o n t r i b u t e d t o incumbent House and S e n a t e Members. Among t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f PACs i n 1982, l a b o r PACs gave 58 p e r c e n t of t h e i r money t o i n c u m b e n t s , t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h groups ----1821 - M a l b i n , Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s , p. 1 7 7 . 76 p e r c e n t , and c o r p o r a t e PACs 75 p e r c e n t ; even t h e non-connected PACs gave more of t h e i r money t o incumbents t h a n t o any o t h e r t y p e of c a n d i d a t e (48 percent). F u r t h e r m o r e , incumbents have r e c e i v e d an i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e r s h a r e of t h e i r f u n d s from PACs, r i s i n g from 17 p e r c e n t of House r e c e i p t s i n 1972 t o n e a r l y 37 p e r c e n t i n 1982; t h i s l e v e l f a r exceeded t h a t f o r c h a l l e n g e r s and o p e n - s e a t c o n t e n d e r s . Many o b s e r v e r s , c r i t i c s and d e f e n d e r s of PACs a l i k e , f i n d t h e incumbency b i a s d i s t u r b i n g , a l t h o u g h t h e i r r e a s o n s v a r y . PAC c r i t i c s t e n d t o s e e t h e s u p p o r t f o r incumbents a s c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e i r t h e o r y t h a t PACs s e e k t o buy i n f l u e n c e a n d , by g i v i n g t o incumbents--who g e n e r a l l y do n o t need a s much money a s t h e i r o p p o n e n t s t o wage a c r e d i b l e campaign--they a r e maximizing t h e i r c h a n c e s t o win t h a t a c c e s s . Many PAC s u p p o r t e r s f a v o r a more a g g r e s s i v e s t r a t e g y f o r PACs, u r g i n g them t o back c a n d i d a t e s more on t h e b a s i s of i s s u e c o m p a t a b i l i t y t h a n on t h e s a f e r c o u r s e o f c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h o s e most l i k e l y t o win--the incumbents, a t l e a s t i n t h e c a s e o f House c a n d i d a t e s ; by g i v i n g up t h e c a u t i o u s , p a s s i v e a p p r o a c h , PACs would r i s k a l i e n a t i n g incumbents i n f a v o r of winning p o t e n t i a l l y s t r o n g e r f r i e n d s among t h e i r c h a l l e n g e r s . T h i s a d v i c e , r e f l e c t e d i n t h e words of Ronald Reagan i n 1978 ( s e e page 1 2 3 ) , i s p a r t i c u l a r l y d i r e c t e d a t c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e PACs which a r e s e e n a s t o o w i l l i n g t o s u p p o r t Democratic incumbents t h a n t o s u p p o r t t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t s by b a c k i n g t h e i r R e p u b l i c a n c h a l l e n g e r s ( a l t h o u g h t h i s h a s changed somewhat i n r e c e n t y e a r s ) . R e g a r d l e s s o f o n e ' s g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e s about PACs, t h e r e i s t h e c o n c e r n t h a t t h e c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s o f our e l e c t i o n s i s d i m i n i s h e d by t h e p e r c e i v e d enormous a d v a n t a g e s incumbents have o v e r t h e i r o p p o n e n t s . When PAC f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t i s added t o an i n c u m b e n t ' s p e r q u i s i t e s of o f f i c e and h i g h e r v i s i b i l i t y ( a s compared w i t h non-incumbents), t h e c h a l l e n g e r , g e n e r a l l y underfinanced t o b e g i n w i t h , may be overwhelmed by h i s incumbent opponent a n d , t h u s , be u n a b l e t o compete e f f e c t i v e l y . Two f a c t o r s may m i t i g a t e t h e p e r c e i v e d PAC b i a s toward incumbents. i n s o f a r a s c o r p o r a t e PACs--the l a r g e s t s i n g l e c a t e g o r y of PACs--are First, concerned, t h e y have shown a g r e a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s i n r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s t o s u p p o r t c a n d i d a t e s on t h e b a s i s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m p a t a b i l i t y , r e g a r d l e s s of incumbency s t a t u s . Second, Malbin a s s e r t s t h a t , i f one f a c t o r s i n t h e v a r i a b l e s of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s of a c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n and number of c a n d i d a t e s i n a g i v e n c a t e g o r y , t h e a p p a r e n t d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e of PAC money d i s t r i b u t e d t o incumbents i s diminished. He e x p l a i n s : ... s i n c e most c h a l l e n g e r s have l i t t l e r e a l i s t i c chance o f winning a g a i n s t most House incumbents i n any g i v e n y e a r , and s i n c e most p e o p l e a r e r e l u c t a n t t o "wastett money on a c a n d i d a t e who h a s no chance of w i n n i n g , i t d i s t o r t s t h e p i c t u r e t o t a l k about t h e r e c e i p t s o f a l l incumbents v e r s u s a l l c h a l l e n g e r s . A much c l e a r e r p i c t u r e can be o b t a i n e d by Second, c o n t r o l l i n g f o r b o t h p a r t y and c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s p e r c e n t a g e of c a n d i d a t e s i n a g i v e n c a t e g o r y : i t s h o u l d be o b v i o u s t h a t i f s a f e incumbents r e p r e s e n t about 40 p e r c e n t o f a l l House g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n c a n d i d a t e s ( a s t h e y d o ) and i f t h e y r e c e i v e about 40 p e r c e n t of a l l n o n p a r t y PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o general e l e c t i o n candidates ( a s they do), one c a n n o t use t h e 40 p e r c e n t c o n t r i b u t i o n f i g u r e t o c l a i m t h a t PACs f a v o r s a f e incumbents d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y . 1831 . - Although M a l b i n ' s f i g u r e s do l e s s e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e of incumbency b i a s , one f i n d s i n o t h e r o f h i s d a t a t h a t c o m p e t i t i v e incumbents r e c e i v e d 23 p e r c e n t of PAC money compared w i t h o n l y 1 3 p e r c e n t t o c o m p e t i t i v e c h a l l e n g e r s . 1841 Once a g a i n , t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e of t h e PAC b i a s i n f a v o r of incumbents. ---1831 - Ibid., p. 157. 184/ - Ibid., p. 160-161. V. THE BUSINESS-LABOR BALANCE OF POWER The i s s u e of how t h e PAC phenomenon h a s a f f e c t e d t h e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s i n s o c i e t y of t h e b u s i n e s s and l a b o r s e c t o r s i s one t h a t i s r a i s e d r e p e a t e d l y . The p e r c e p t i o n o f how e a c h h a s e i t h e r b e n e f i t t e d o r s u f f e r e d h a s a b e a r i n g on how many p e o p l e g e n e r a l l y f e e l about PACs; i t might b e argued t h a t , whether spoken o r n o t , i t i s a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e e n t i r e PAC d e b a t e . A t t h e o u t s e t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h e c o n c e r n o v e r t h e b a l a n c e o f power between b u s i n e s s and l a b o r p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h a t s p l i t r e f l e c t s t h e p i v o t a l f o c u s of power r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s i n such i s s u e s a s d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g , t r a d e p o l i c y , environmental r e g u l a t i o n , maritime l e g i s l a t i o n , trucking l e g i s l a t i o n , and n u c l e a r power, t h e c o n v e r g e n c e o f b u s i n e s s and l a b o r p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s may c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h a t dichotomy t o t o d a y ' s p o l i t i c s . 1851 Because s o much o f t h e PAC d e b a t e h a s been i n f l u e n c e d by t h e b u s i n e s s v e r s u s l a b o r c o n t e s t , however, i t d o e s w a r r a n t e x p l o r a t i o n h e r e , b e a r i n g i n mind t h a t o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e s may u l t i m a t e l y prove t o be o f g r e a t e r u t i l i t y . While l a b o r PACs once dominated t h e f i e l d , s i n c e 1974 t h e y have been g r e a t l y and i n c r e a s i n g l y overshadowed by c o r p o r a t e , t r a d e , and o t h e r PACs; o n e - t h i r d of a l l PACs i n 1974 were s p o n s o r e d by l a b o r u n i o n s , b u t , by 1984, l a b o r c o n s t i t u t e d fewer t h a n o n e - n i n t h o f a l l PACs. In c o n t r a s t , corporate PACs grew i n number from o n l y 89 i n 1974 t o 1 , 5 3 6 i n 1984 and t o d a y make up 44 p e r c e n t o f a l l PACs i n e x i s t e n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , l a b o r PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s a c c o u n t e d f o r one-half 1974 b u t o n l y o n e - f o u r t h i n 1982. - o f a l l such c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n C o r p o r a t e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s , which n e a r l y 1851 Wertheimer, F r e d . Commentary. In Malbin, P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 199-200. e q u a l e d l a b o r g i v i n g i n 1978, s u r p a s s e d l a b o r ' s a g g r e g a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s by 35 p e r c e n t i n 1982. O n e - t h i r d of a l l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1982 came from the corporate sector. While t h e s e d a t a d e p i c t a r a t h e r b l e a k p i c t u r e f o r l a b o r v i s - a - v i s t r a d i t i o n a l c o r p o r a t e r i v a l (and not w i t h o u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) , f a c t o r s which work t o l a b o r ' s a d v a n t a g e . its there are other Their a d v e r s a r i e s i n the corporate community a r e q u i c k t o p o i n t o u t t h e l a r g e sums of money expended by l a b o r on i n t e r n a l communications and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s ; t h e s e e x p e n d i t u r e s a r e s e e n a s k e e p i n g l a b o r i n a more c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e a g g r e g a t e d a t a reflects. The e s t i m a t i o n by spokesmen f o r t h e b u s i n e s s and l a b o r s e c t o r s of e a c h o t h e r ' s s t r e n g t h s can be s e e n a s p a r t of t h e propaganda b a t t l e which e n s u e s between them. As o b s e r v e d b y t h e Harvard s t u d y on t h e FECA's impact: Each s i d e assumes t h e o t h e r h a s more power, more i n f l u e n c e , and each s i d e s e e s i t s e l f a s a p p e a l i n g t o p o s i t i v e v a l u e s such a s t h e c i v i c p r i d e t h a t comes from p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 1861 - It i s p o s s i b l e and d e s i r a b l e t o a s s e s s some of t h e s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of b u s i n e s s and l a b o r a s i t a f f e c t s t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s t o i n f l u e n c e electoral politics. C l e a r l y , t h e most i m p r e s s i v e a d v a n t a g e p o s s e s s e d by t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e numbers of i t s PACs and t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r even g r e a t e r proliferation in the future. As o b s e r v e d by Edwin E p s t e i n : The f i g u r e s s u g g e s t t h a t whereas growth o p p o r t u n i t i e s a r e l i m i t e d on t h e l a b o r s i d e , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c o r p o r a t e and 1861 Kayden, The Impact of t h e FECA on t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n of P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 103. o t h e r b u s i n e s s PAC f o r m a t i o n and e x p a n s i o n i s v i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d . 187/ - One l a b o r o f f i c i a l e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e r e were more t h a n 4 m i l l i o n b u s i n e s s e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ( w i t h 186,547 employing more t h a n 50 p e o p l e ) , a s compared - F u r t h e r m o r e , o n l y 20 p e r c e n t of t h e 3,700 w i t h 60,000 l o c a l u n i o n s . 188/ c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h a s s e t s o v e r $100 m i l l i o n had s e t up PACs by 1978, and o n l y 3 . 4 p e r c e n t o f t h e 23,800 w i t h a s s e t s between $10 and $100 m i l l i o n had PACs 189/ t h a t y e a r ; t h e s e d a t a p o i n t t o ample room f o r f u r t h e r p r o l i f e r a t i o n . Because o f t h e growth i n numbers, c o r p o r a t e PAC g i v i n g i n t h e a g g r e g a t e h a s i n c r e a s e d a t an i m p r e s s i v e r a t e , t r i p l i n g i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i n 1982 o v e r i t s 1978 l e v e l , r a n k i n g f i r s t ( f o r t h e second y e a r i n a row) among a l l PAC c a t e g o r i e s . A s c o r p o r a t e PACs grow i n number, t h e i r a b i l i t y t o spend w i l l i n c r e a s e a c c o r d i n g l y . The b u s i n e s s a d v a n t a g e i n o v e r a l l s p e n d i n g c a p a b i l i t y i s g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d i f one views t h e t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h PACs l a r g e l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e business sector. T h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e agreement t h a t most o f t h e s e g r o u p s d o , i n f a c t , e x h i b i t an e s s e n t i a l l y p r o - b u s i n e s s orientation. As noted i n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n of C h a p t e r T h r e e , E p s t e i n makes t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t i m a t e t h a t one-half o f t h e PACs i n t h e FEC's t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h c a t e g o r y c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e b u s i n e s s community. Thus, a d d i n g t h e d o l l a r f i g u r e s f o r t h i s c a t e g o r y t o t h o s e i n t h e c o r p o r a t e g r o u p i n g shows o r g a n i z e d - 187/ E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971, p. 138. - 188/ J e s s u p , David. Can P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e Be Democratized? A Labor Perspective. I n M a l b i n , P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 3 2 . - 189/ Tumin, J o n a t h a n . May 24, 1980: 14. How t o Bury L i b e r a l s . The New R e p u b l i c , v. 1 8 2 , l a b o r i n c r e a s i n g l y overwhelmed by t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r i n i t s a b i l i t y t o g i v e t o candidates. Along t h e s e l i n e s , t h e Harvard s t u d y o b s e r v e d : I f one e x c l u d e s , f o r t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , membership a s s o c i a t i o n s , and c o n s i d e r s o n l y t h o s e t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h c o r p o r a t e members, i t seems c l e a r t h a t b u s i n e s s h a s i n c r e a s e d i t s a r s e n a l by d o u b l i n g t h e number of avenues t h r o u g h which i t can p a r t i c i p a t e . It i s not u n l i k e l y , f o r i n s t a n c e , f o r a t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n PAC t o s u p p o r t a c a n d i d a t e , f o r t h e c o r p o r a t i o n s which b e l o n g t o t h e a s s o c i a t i o n t o c o n t r i b u t e , and f o r t h e e x e c u t i v e s who work i n t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t o make d o n a t i o n s on t h e i r own b e h a l f . 1901 - The same s t u d y , however, r e p o r t e d t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n e x e c u t i v e s t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between r e p r e s e n t i n g an i n d u s t r y and r e p r e s e n t i n g a c o r p o r a t i o n ; they note t h a t t r a d e groups o f t e n a l l y themselves with l a b o r - on p o l i c y m a t t e r s . 1911 How one views t h e g e n e r a l p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e t r a d e PACs i s a d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r i n o n e ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e magnitude o f b u s i n e s s ' spending advantage over l a b o r . Labor PACs, a l t h o u g h fewer i n number t h a n t h e i r c o r p o r a t e c o u n t e r p a r t s , a r e g e n e r a l l y l a r g e r i n s i z e and tend t o make l a r g e r i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . The l i s t s o f t h e l a r g e s t PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e r e v e a l e d t h a t between 10 and 12 of t h e t o p 20 were l a b o r PACs i n e v e r y e l e c t i o n s i n c e 1972. ( T h i s , o f c o u r s e , c o n t r a s t e d w i t h l a b o r ' s d w i n d l i n g p o s i t i o n among t h e l a r g e s t PAC s p e n d e r s i n t h o s e e l e c t i o n s . ) And, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t c o r p o r a t e PACs outnumbered l a b o r PACs by 4 t o 1 i n 1982, t h e i r a g g r e g a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s were o n l y 35 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n l a b o r ' s . That l a b o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s comprised a s much a s o n e - f o u r t h o f a l l PAC g i v i n g i n 1982, i n t h e f a c e of o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n s of waning s t r e n g t h , b o r e t e s t i m o n y t o o r g a n i z e d l a b o r ' s s t i l l c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l s k i l l s . - 1901 Kayden, The Impact of t h e FECA on t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 104. 1911 - Ibid. If corporations have the numbers in terms of their PACs, labor has the numbers in terms its membership base--one-fourth of the Nation's work force. It is this base to which the unions direct their ostensibly non-partisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, which, in accordance with the FECA [2 U.S.C. 441b(2)(~)], may be conducted with general treasury funds (corporations have the same rights in this area). By targeting these appeals to individuals whose presumed political philosophies are in concert with those of organized labor, the unions have a potentially important vehicle for political impact. Beyond the non-partisan drives are the internal communications which, under the FECA [2 U.S.C. 441b(2)(A)], are allowed between unions and their members and families and between corporations and their stockholders and executives and families. These comunications may be political and partisan in nature, and their costs are paid out of the general treasuries of the unions and corporations. For the unions, with their enormous membership, these partisan communications represent an invaluable tool, comprising such tactics as mailings, phone banks, door-to-door canvassing, leaflets at factories, and In the words of AFL-CIO COPE'S David Jessup: rallies. Labor leaders are justifiably proud of this effort and do not rdemur when columnists or conservative journalists exaggerate its cost. Labor's strength does indeed rest with its membership 1921 communications. The combined value of the registration and get-out-the-vote drives, the partisan communications to the membership, and other goods and services provided to campaigns by unions is potentially enormous. 1921 - (None of these expenditures Jessup, Can Political Influence Be Democratized?, p. 32. i s s u b j e c t t o c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s , a l t h o u g h i n t e r n a l cormnunication c o s t s above $ 2 , 0 0 0 must b e r e p o r t e d t o t h e FEC.) Malbin e s t i m a t e d t h a t o r g a n i z e d l a b o r s p e n t $11 m i l l i o n on such a c t i v i t i e s on b e h a l f of t h e Carter-Mondale i n 1976, one-half ticket of t h e amount C a r t e r was g i v e n i n F e d e r a l f u n d s w i t h which - t o run h i s e n t i r e campaign. 1931 The c o s t of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s by l a b o r i n 1978 - was e s t i m a t e d by E p s t e i n a t n e a r l y $20 m i l l i o n , 1941 - a t $15 m i l l i o n . 1951 and i n 1980 by Alexander While l a b o r may j u s t i f i a b l y p o i n t t o t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l network and i t s numerous j o u r n a l s and in-house publications w i t h which i t c a n d i s s e m i n a t e p a r t i s a n , p o l i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e r e i s l i t t l e r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s community i s n e a r l y a s a d e p t o r s u c c e s s f u l - a s l a b o r i n u s i n g s u c h methods. 1961 I n t e r n a l communications a r e p e r h a p s t h e most - i m p o r t a n t s i n g l e d e v i c e l a b o r h a s t o keep i t s e l f c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h b u s i n e s s . Although l a b o r h a s t h e membership b a s e , i t c l e a r l y needs i t even more a s l a b o r ' s p o l i t i c a l s p e n d i n g i s i n c r e a s i n g l y overshadowed by t h a t of t h e b u s i n e s s sector. And w h i l e union members a r e s e e n a s o p e r a t i n g i n an environment t h a t h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y been c o n d u c i v e t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( b y t h e m s e l v e s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s ) , c o r p o r a t i o n s have a p o t e n t i a l e l i t e pool of b e t t e r e d u c a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s who might b r i n g t o b e a r even g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s i f t h e y - chose t o become i n v o l v e d . 1971 - 1931 Analysis. I f one s e e s money a s b u s i n e s s ' L a b o r , B u s i n e s s and Money--A M a l b i n , Michael J . N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , v. 9 , March 1 9 , 1977: 412. principal Post-Election - 1941 E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971, p. 125. - 1951 A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E. Heath & Co., 1983. p. 114. F i n a n c i n g t h e 1980 E l e c t i o n . L e x i n g t o n , D.C. 1961 J e s s u p , Can P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e Be D e m o c r a t i z e d ? , p. 32. 1 9 7 1 Kayden, The Impact of t h e FECA on t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 1 0 3 , 109. of p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l and t h e membership b a s e a s l a b o r ' s , t h e g r e a t e r momentum now may l i e w i t h b u s i n e s s ; t h e t r e n d toward more c o r p o r a t e g i v i n g i s c l e a r e r a t t h i s p o i n t t h a n toward i n c r e a s i n g c o h e s i o n i n l a b o r ' s membership b a s e . VI. PACs AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY I n d i c a t i o n s t h a t PACs a r e i n c r e a s i n g l y e n g a g i n g i n campaign a c t i v i t i e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f e i t h e r c a n d i d a t e s o r p a r t i e s have r e s u l t e d i n c h a r g e s t h a t PACs a r e s e r v i n g t o weaken t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y deemed n e c e s s a r y i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system. As used h e r e i n , " a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " r e l a t e s t o t h e p r o c e s s under which c a n d i d a t e s assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e campaigns waged i n t h e i r b e h a l f and by which t h e c a n d i d a t e s must answer t o t h e v o t e r s on e l e c t i o n d a y f o r t h o s e campaigns and t a c t i c s . Although i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s may be made by i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s , a s w e l l a s p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s and PACs, i t i s t h e PACs t h a t h a v e used them most h e a v i l y and i n a h i g h l y v i s i b l e manner. As s u c h , t h e terms " p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee" and " i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e " have become l i n k e d i n t h e e y e s o f many. The FECA [ 2 U.S.C. 431 ( 1 7 ) ] d e f i n e s " i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e " a s : .... an e x p e n d i t u r e by a p e r s o n e x p r e s s l y a d v o c a t i n g t h e e l e c t i o n o r d e f e a t of a c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d c a n d i d a t e which i s made w i t h o u t c o o p e r a t i o n o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h any c a n d i d a t e , o r any a u t h o r i z e d committee o r agency of such c a n d i d a t e , and which i s n o t made i n c o n c e r t w i t h , o r a t t h e r e q u e s t o r s u g g e s t i o n o f , any c a n d i d a t e , o r any a u t h o r i z e d committee o r a g e n t of s u c h c a n d i d a t e . I n c o n t r a s t w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l s o r g r o u p s d i r e c t l y t o c a n d i d a t e s , i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s may not be l i m i t e d by law; t h i s was a major component o f t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n Buckley v . V a l e o , 424 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . Not b e i n g s u b j e c t t o l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a major l o o p h o l e f o r t h o s e w i s h i n g t o i n f l u e n c e e l e c t i o n s beyond t h e s c o p e a l l o w e d them under t h e FECA. Some $2 m i l l i o n was s p e n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y i n 1976 and $317,455 i n 1978. 1981 I n 1980, t h e l e v e l o f i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s jumped d r a m a t i c a l l y - - $ 1 6 . 1 199/ million. - Of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e h e r e i s t h a t some $14 m i l l i o n was s p e n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y by PACs, r e p r e s e n t i n g 1 2 p e r c e n t o f a l l PAC s p e n d i n g i n 1980 and e q u a l i n g a b o u t o n e - f o u r t h o f t h e amount PACs c o n t r i b u t e d t o a l l F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s . 2001 The v a s t m a j o r i t y o f t h e s e i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s were made by s o - c a l l e d "New R i g h t , " non-connected PACs, a l t h o u g h 1980 a l s o saw some prominent t r a d e PACs, s u c h as t h e AMAs' PAC and t h e R e a l t o r s PAC, e n t e r t h e field. I n 1 9 8 2 , i n d e p e n d e n t s p e n d i n g i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s amounted t o $5.75 m i l l i o n , more t h a n d o u b l e t h e $2.3 m i l l i o n s p e n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y i n t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l r a c e s o f 1980. Once a g a i n , PACs dominated t h e i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e a c t i v i t i e s ( o v e r 90 p e r c e n t of t h e money was s p e n t by PACs), w i t h o n e group--NCPAC--spending more t h a n h a l f t h e t o t a l ($3.2 m i l l i o n ) . And w h i l e c o n s e r v a t i v e g r o u p s a g a i n a c c o u n t e d f o r t h e b u l k o f t h e s p e n d i n g , some l i b e r a l - g r o u p s and t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s were a l s o among t h e t o p i n d e p e n d e n t s p e n d e r s . 2011 The c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s was b r o u g h t t o f o c u s i n 1980 around a d v e r t i s e m e n t s which NCPAC r a n a g a i n s t s e v e r a l incumbent Democratic Senators. These a d s were c o n s i d e r e d by many o b s e r v e r s t o b e i n f l a m a t o r y and t h e i r a c c u r a c y was c h a l l e n g e d i n some c a s e s . Although t h e y were i n t e n d e d t o b e n e f i t t h e campaigns o f t h e incumbent S e n a t o r s ' o p p o n e n t s , t h e r e was F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s I n f o r m a t i o n 1981 U.S. on I n d e p e n d e n t E x p e n d i t u r e s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : October 9 , 1980. 1991 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. E x p e n d i t u r e s Top $16 M i l l i o n ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : FEC S t u d y Shows I n d e p e n d e n t Nov. 29, 1981. 2001 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s F i n a l Summary Data on PAC G i v i n g ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : August 4 , 1981. 2011 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC I s s u e s F i n a l Report on 1981-82 I n d e p e n d e n t E x p e n d i t u r e s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Oct. 14, 1983. d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n t h e campaign o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h o s e o p p o n e n t s whether o r n o t such a d s would prove b e n e f i c i a l ; some c a n d i d a t e s r e q u e s t e d t h a t NCPAC d i s c o n t i n u e i t s a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , f e a r i n g a b a c k l a s h e f f e c t among v o t e r s . In f a c t , t h e r e remains d o u b t o v e r t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s ; NCPAC, p o i n t i n g t o t h e v i c t o r i e s of many o f t h e i n c u m b e n t s ' o p p o n e n t s , i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e i r u s e had been v i n d i c a t e d . The NCPAC a d s and t h o s e o f some o t h e r g r o u p s r e s u l t e d i n e d i t o r i a l s a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , comments from l e a d e r s of b o t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s d e c r y i n g t h e t r e n d toward i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , m a i n l y on t h e ground t h a t t h e y i n v o l v e s p e n d i n g by i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s which a r e not a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e e l e c t o r a t e and which may n o t a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t c a n d i d a t e s ' v i e w s . Even former R e p u b l i c a n N a t i o n a l Chairman R i c h a r d R i c h a r d s , whose p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e s were t h e i n t e n d e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f most o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s i n 1980, d e c l a r e d about i n d e p e n d e n t s p e n d i n g PACs: "They c r e a t e a l l k i n d s of m i s c h i e f . T h e y ' r e n o t - r e s p o n s i b l e t o anyone .I' 2021 By 1982, i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s had been p u b l i c i z e d enough t h a t t h e y became a n i s s u e i n t h e campaigns of many i n t e n d e d t a r g e t s and b e n e f i c i a r i e s , w i t h many o f t h e former s e e k i n g t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h e n e g a t i v e p u b l i c i t y t h e i r d e t r a c t o r s had r e c e i v e d and w i t h many o f t h e l a t t e r p r o m i n e n t l y d i s a v o w i n g these a c t i v i t i e s . I n any c a s e , t h e e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s a p p e a r e d t o v i n d i c a t e most o f t h e prominent t a r g e t s o f t h e n e g a t i v e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , u n l i k e i n 1980. A s d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Three, independent e x p e n d i t u r e s r e p r e s e n t a l o g i c a l p o l i t i c a l t o o l f o r non-connec t e d PACs , which, u s u a l l y n o t b e i n g l i n k e d t o o r g a n i z e d l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s , may be l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n g a i n i n g a c c e s s on C a p i t o l H i l l (and l e s s concerned about a l i e n a t i n g Members) t h a n i n c h a n g i n g - 2021 Cannon, Lou. GOP C h i e f D e c r i e s t h e I n d e p e n d e n t E f f o r t s To T a r g e t Democrats on ' S i n g l e I s s u e s . ' Washington P o s t , A p r i l 2 8 , 1981: A3. t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l make-up of t h e Congress a s a whole. Some a r g u e t h a t non- connected PACs and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s u n d e r c u t t h e n o t i o n o f a r e s p o n s i b l e , a c c o u n t a b l e p o l i t i c a l system. Both r e p r e s e n t l e g i t i m a t e and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i t i e s , and i t c a n be a r g u e d t h a t t h e y promote e x p r e s s i o n o f d i v e r s e and h i t h e r t o i g n o r e d v i e w p o i n t s i n Washington; some would s u g g e s t t h a t , i f t h e y s e r v e t o d i s r u p t t h e e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s and power s t r u c t u r e , t h e y a r e performing a b e n e f i c i a l f u n c t i o n . The f u t u r e o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e method i s u n c e r t a i n . Although t h e y were p e r c e i v e d a s s u c c e s s f u l i n 1 9 8 0 , t h e y were s e e n a s e i t h e r i n e f f e c t i v e o r , w o r s e , h a v i n g b a c k f i r e d , i n 1982. 2031 N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e non-connected g r o u p s have a g a i n announced p l a n s f o r s u c h a c t i v i t i e s i n 1984. What may be more i n t e r e s t i n g from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f p o l i t i c a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e AMA and t h e R e a l t o r s i n 1 9 8 2 , which s p e n t a combined t o t a l o f more t h a n $400,000 i n i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s - - a l l t h a n n e g a t i v e , campaigns. 2041 of i t i n p o s i t i v e , r a t h e r By emphasizing t h i s a p p r o a c h , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e two l a r g e s t t r a d e PACs w i l l h e l p p o p u l a r i z e t h i s d e v i c e among t h o s e PACs which a r e s p o n s o r e d by o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( i - e . , o n e s which l o b b y Congress a n d , h e n c e , have a r e p u t a t i o n t o uphold i n t h e p o l i t i c a l community). T h i s w i l l p r o v i d e f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e a s t o whether i n d e p e n d e n t expenditures a r e inherently destructive of p o l i t i c a l accountability. 2051 2031 A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E. F i n a n c i n g P o l i t i c s : Money, E l e c t i o n s , and P o l i t i c a l Reform ( 3 r d e d . ) . Washington, C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y . 1984. p. 147. 2041 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC I s s u e s F i n a l Report on 1981-82 I n d e p e n d e n t Spending ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Oct. 14, 1983. 2051 For a more t h o r o u g h d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e i s s u e , s e e : U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e . The E v o l u t i o n o f and I s s u e s S u r r o u n d i n g Independent E x p e n d i t u r e s i n E l e c t i o n Campaigns [ b y J o s e p h E. C a n t o r ] . Report 82-87, May 5 , 1982. 78 p. VII. THE LEVEL OF MONEY I N POLITICS A f i n a l i s s u e i s one t h a t p e r h a p s u n d e r l i e s t h e e n t i r e PAC c o n t r o v e r s y . E l e c t i o n s h a v e become i n c r e a s i n g l y e x p e n s i v e , w i t h an e s t i m a t e d $1 b i l l i o n s p e n t on e l e c t i o n s a t a l l l e v e l s combined i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1980, d o u b l e - t h e amount s p e n t f o u r y e a r s e a r l i e r . 2061 The c o s t s o f e l e c t i o n s h a v e , i n f a c t , r i s e n f a s t e r t h a n t h e r a t e of i n f l a t i o n , w i t h t h e c o s t s of such campaignr e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s a s media a d v e r t i s i n g , d i r e c t - m a i l f u n d r a i s i n g , and a i r t r a v e l c o n t r i b u t i n g h e a v i l y t o t h e s h a r p i n c r e a s e s . =/ The c o s t o f r u n n i n g f o r e l e c t i v e o f f i c e h a s t h u s become i n c r e a s i n g l y e x p e n s i v e . The l a r g e amounts of money b e i n g s p e n t on campaigns h a v e c a u s e d c o n c e r n e s s e n t i a l l y o v e r t h e f e a r t h a t i t i s d i s t o r t i n g o u r d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m by making t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a n d / o r a c c e s s t o l a r g e sums of money a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r running f o r public o f f i c e . As stated e a r l i e r , t h i s fear is tied t o the larger c o n c e r n t h a t t h e e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g sums of money needed f o r e l e c t i o n campaigns may b e , i n e f f e c t , c u r t a i l i n g t h e a c c e s s t o t h e p r o c e s s by l a r g e s e c t o r s o f t h e electorate. By r a i s i n g l a r g e amounts o f p o l i t i c a l money, PACs a r e viewed a s t h e new l e a d e r i n t h e t r e n d toward more e x p e n s i v e e l e c t i o n s . The s k e p t i c i s m which many p e r c e i v e among t h e e l e c t o r a t e o v e r t h e l a r g e amounts o f money s p e n t i n e l e c t i o n s i s s e e n a s p r o o f , i n and of i t s e l f , o f money's c o r r o s i v e e f f e c t on p o l i t i c s . The c y n i c a l v i e w o f money i n p o l i t i c s and t h e h i g h c o s t s o f campaigning were d i s p u t e d by t h e Harvard s t u d y , which c o n c l u d e d t h a t : - 2061 E l e c t i o n Tab: A B i l l i o n D o l l a r s , and R i s i n g . R e p o r t , v . 8 9 , December 1 5 , 1980: 32. - U.S. News & World 2071 Clymer, Adam. I n f l a t i o n and a L i m i t on C o n t r i b u t i o n s S t r a i n P r e s i d e n t i a l H o p e f u l s ' Budget. New York Times, F e b r u a r y 4 , 1980: A14. there is nothing intrinsically wrong with campaign contributions and expenditures. Adequate campaign funds are essential to competitive congressional elections. The essence of an election campaign is to provide voters with a choice among alternative candidates. This process requires the communication to voters of some minimum quantity of information about the contestants. In contemporary America, providing that information to the voters costs substantial amounts of money. Every study based on the information available since 1972 has shown that most campaigns have too little, not too much money. 2081 Placing the amount spent on elections in the context of the total expenditures by government at all levels, Dr. Herbert Alexander has written: In fiscal year 1980, government at all levels--national, state, county, and municipal--spent a total of $958,757,000,000 in taxpayer money. The $1,203,000,000 spent on election campaigns, whose outcomes determined who will make decisions on, among other things, how such enormous sums of tax money are spent, amounts to only about one-tenth of 1 percent of that total. 2091 Furthermore, Alexander noted that the Nation's leading advertiser, Procter and Gamble Company, spent $649 million in advertising its products in 1980, far more than the $514 million he estimated in costs of electing the national government 2101 Alexander's view appears to prevail today among political that year. scientists, that the high cost of campaigns, while perhaps unfortunate, is not disproportionate to the costs of other goods and services available today. D.C. 2081 U.S. Congress, An 2091 Alexander, Herbert Heath and Company, 1983. 2101 - Ibid. Analysis of the Impact of the FECA, p. 1. E. Financing the 1980 Election. p. 1. Lexington, CHAPTER FIVE: CONGRESS' RESPONSE TO PACs AND THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE I n v i e w o f t h e r a p i d growth and p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs i n r e c e n t y e a r s , a number of s u g g e s t i o n s f o r c u r b i n g PACs have been made, b o t h i n and o u t of Congress. This chapter w i l l discuss recent l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e s i n the a r e a and w i l l a n a l y z e some o f t h e c u r r e n t p r o p o s a l s f o r c u r t a i l i n g t h e r o l e o f PACs. P a r t I d e s c r i b e s b i l l s i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e 9 5 t h Congress t h r o u g h t h e F i r s t S e s s i o n of t h e 9 8 t h C o n g r e s s , w i t h a f o c u s on t h e 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s ' ObeyR a i l s b a c k amendment. P a r t I1 o f f e r s an e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e major PAC-related p r o p o s a l s c u r r e n t l y under d i s c u s s i o n i n C o n g r e s s , t h e m e d i a , and t h e p o l i t i c a l and academic communities. F i n a l l y , P a r t 111 w i l l c o n c l u d e w i t h a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n and some o b s e r v a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s c e n a r i o s f o r t h e f u t u r e o f PACs. I. LEGISLATION TO LIMIT PACs I N THE 95TH THROUGH 98TH CONGRESSES 9 5 t h Congress L e g i s l a t i o n S i x b i l l s i n t h e 9 5 t h Congress proposed v a r i o u s forms of PAC l i m i t a t i o n measures. An o u t r i g h t ban on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s was proposed i n H.R. 6132, i n t r o d u c e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e John E r l e n b o r n on A p r i l 6 , 1977; i d e n t i c a l b i l l s were l a t e r i n t r o d u c e d : H.R. M. 7005 on May 9 , 1977, by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s E r l e n b o r n , C a l d w e l l B u t l e r , James C o l l i n s , J o h n Duncan, M i l l i c e n t Fenwick, Tom Hagedorn, W i l l i a m Ketchum, A l b e r t Q u i e , and C.W. B i l l Young; and H.R. 1977, by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e R i c h a r d S c h u l z e . 7585 on J u n e 2 , These b i l l s banned c o n t r i b u t i o n s by n o n p a r t y p o l i t i c a l committees t o any F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e o r any o t h e r p o l i t i c a l committee, except to official party committees; they also imposed a $5,000 limit on what a national, State, or local party committee could give to a Federal candidate. A ban on PAC contributions was also proposed in two bills introduced by Representative James A.S. Leach: on June 29, 1977. H.R. 7966 on June 22, 1977, and H.R. 8092 In addition to proposing public funding of congressional elections, Leach's bills prohibited all contributions by nonparty political committees and limited congressional candidates to accepting only contributions from party committees and from individuals residing in a candidate's own district (State), the latter in amounts of $500 or less. In restricting contributions to within a candidate's State or district, Leach was apparently influenced by the argument (discussed in Chapter Four) that campaign funding sources have become increasingly nationalized, with potential damage to the ties between a Member and his constituents. Whereas none of the above measures received any action in the 95th Congress, a proposal to reduce the limit on PAC contributions was the subject of a floor vote in the Senate in the first session, and a similar proposal made it through a House committee in the second session, while failing on a floor vote. The Senate vote occurred during debate on S. 926, a bill to extend public financing to Senate election campaigns. On August 3, 1977, an amendment was offered by Senator Adlai Stevenson to reduce the contribution limit for multicandidate committees--both party and non-party committees--from $5,000 to $3,000 (the initial version of the amendment lowered it to $1,000, before it was modified). 2111 Stevenson's expressed rationale was to bring the 2111 Public Financing of Senate Elections. Debate and Vote in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 123, Aug. 3, 1977: 26304. l i m i t o n PACs and p a r t i e s more i n t o l i n e w i t h t h a t on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h u s g i v i n g t h e former a l e s s f a v o r e d s t a t u s o v e r t h e l a t t e r . Senator Charles M a t h i a s o f f e r e d an amendment t o S t e v e n s o n ' s amendment t o lower t h e l i m i t f o r a f f i l i a t e d PACs b u t t o l e a v e i n t a c t t h e $5,000 l i m i t f o r non-connected PACs, on t h e ground t h a t t h e l a t t e r were f i n a n c i a l l y handicapped a l r e a d y by h a v i n g - t o b e a r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and f u n d r a i s i n g c o s t s of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . 2121 The M a t h i a s amendment was t a b l e d by v o i c e v o t e , a f t e r which t h e S t e v e n s o n amendment was t a b l e d by a v o t e o f 63-33. 2131 I n t h e second h a l f o f t h e 9 5 t h C o n g r e s s , H.R. 11315, i n t r o d u c e d b y R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Frank Thompson on March 6 , 1978, was r e p o r t e d from t h e . House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Committee on March 1 6 , 1978, by a v o t e o f 16-9. 2141 Although i t l a r g e l y c o n s i s t e d o f n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l amendments t o t h e FECA, t h e b i l l became e m b r o i l e d i n a h i g h l y p a r t i s a n c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r t h e i n c l u s i o n o f p r o v i s i o n s r e d u c i n g t h e amounts which p a r t y and n o n p a r t y c o m m i t t e e s c o u l d - c o n t r i b u t e . 2151 With r e g a r d t o t h e l a t t e r , t h e b i l l , a s r e p o r t e d , reduced from $ 5 , 0 0 0 t o $2,500 t h e amount which n o n p a r t y m u l t i c a n d i d a t e c o m m i t t e e s could g i v e t o e i t h e r F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s o r t o o t h e r p o l i t i c a l committees. F u r t h e r m o r e , i t r e d u c e d from $15,000 t o $10,000 t h e amount such c o m m i t t e e s 2131 I b i d . , p. 26308. 2141 U.S. Congress. House Administration. Federal Election o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Committee on House Campaign Act Amendments o f 1978; r e p o r t t o g e t h e r w i t h m i n o r i t y , s u p p l e m e n t a l , and a d d i t i o n a l v i e w s t o accompany H.R. 13315, 9 5 t h Cong., 2nd S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1978. 123 p. ( 9 5 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd S e s s i o n . House. R e p o r t no. 95-982) - Congressional Q u a r t e r l y 2151 P u b l i c F i n a n c i n g , Campaign Spending B i l l s . Almanac, 1978. Washington, C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y , I n c . , 1979. v . 3 4 , p. 769773. could give to the national committees of political parties. An attempt to delete these provisions failed by a 9-13 vote within the Committee. 2161 The bill also included a provision to tighten the prerequisites for multicandidate status by a political committee, adding the additional requirement that contributions in amounts of at least $500 be given to five Federal candidates (the introduction of the dollar amounts intended to "curb the creation of bogus PACs designed to aid only one candidate"). 2171 By the time the Committee's bill reached the House floor, the controversy surrounding it had been heightened by the announced intentions of supporters to offer an amendment to institute public funding of congressional elections. Thus, the focus of debate was on the open rule for consideration of H.R. 11315, which had been reported by the Rules Committee. In a brief but heated debate on March 21, 1978, the House rejected the open rule--H. Res. 1093--by a vote of 198-209. 2181 This killed not only the prospects for public financing but the bill itself, with its PAC and party limitation provisions. B. 96th Coneress Leeislation Five bills were introduced in the 96th Congress which sought to limit the opportunities for influence by political action committees. Two proposed a flat prohibition on PAC contributions to Federal candidates. S. 714, introduced by Senator Adlai Stevenson on March 21, 1979, banned contributions to Federal candidates by any political committee which received donations from at least 2161 - Ibid., p. 771. 2171 - Ibid. - 2181 Providing for Consideration of H.R. 11315, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1978. Debate and Vote in the House. Congressional Record, v. 124, Mar. 21, 1978: 7880. 50 i n d i v i d u a l s and which was n o t a c a n d i d a t e ' s a u t h o r i z e d committee; t h i s would h a v e a p p l i e d t o a l l m u l t i c a n d i d a t e PACs and t h o s e PACs which had a s many as 50 c o n t r i b u t o r s b u t d i d n o t meet t h e o t h e r c r i t e r i a f o r m u l t i c a n d i d a t e s t a t u s . An i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of t h i s b i l l was i t s e x p l i c i t d e c l a r a t i o n o f p u r p o s e , one which c a n b e b e viewed a s t h e m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e b e h i n d most o f t h e PAC limitation bills: S e c . 2 . The Congress f i n d s and d e c l a r e s t h a t - ( a ) t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of m u l t i c a n d i d a t e p o l i t i c a l c o m i t t e e s h a s r e s u l t e d i n a m a s s i v e i n c r e a s e i n t h e amount and p r o p o r t i o n o f f u n d s c o n t r i b u t e d by s u c h e n t i t i e s t o c a n d i d a t e s f o r e l e c t i o n t o Federal o f f i c e s ; ( b ) such c o n t r i b u t i o n s c r e a t e a t l e a s t t h e appearance of d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e stemming from t h e dependence o f c a n d i d a t e s upon l a r g e campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s from e n t i t i e s w i t h special interests; ( c ) i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r such a r t i f i c i a l l e g a l e n t i t i e s , which a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d t o v o t e f o r c a n d i d a t e s f o r F e d e r a l o f f i c e , t o make p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o , o r f o r t h e u s e o f , s u c h c a n d i d a t e s ; and ( d l i t i s an a p p r o p r i a t e e x e r c i s e o f t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e Congress t o e l i m i n a t e t h e r e a l i t y o r a p p e a r a n c e o f improper i n f l u e n c e upon i t s d e c i s i o n s by l i m i t i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e o f making contributions t o candidates for election t o Federal o f f i c e t o individuals generally. H.R. 5081, i n t r o d u c e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s E r l e n b o r n and Thomas R a i l s b a c k on August 2 , 1979, was i d e n t i c a l t o t h e E r l e n b o r n b i l l s i n t h e 9 5 t h Congress ( p r o h i b i t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s by n o n p a r t y p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s , w h i l e a l l o w i n g them t o c o n t r i b u t e t o o f f i c i a l p a r t y committees). T h r e e b i l l s i n t h e 9 6 t h Congress s o u g h t t o c u r t a i l PACs by l o w e r i n g t h e l i m i t on how much t h e y c o u l d c o n t r i b u t e t o F e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s , r a t h e r t h a n prohibiting the contributions entirely. H.R. 4768, i n t r o d u c e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e J o s e p h M i n i s h on J u l y 1 2 , 1979, proposed s l o w e r i n g o f t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t same l e v e l a s o t h e r p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s ( s u c h a s n o n - m u l t i c a n d i d a t e PACs) and individuals. (Of c o u r s e , i n d i v i d u a l s would have t h e a d d i t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t of t h e o v e r a l l $25,000 l i m i t on a l l p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . ) On August 3 , 1979, S e n a t o r s Edward Kennedy, R o b e r t S t a f f o r d , and P a u l Tsongas i n t r o d u c e d S. 1700, which lowered t h e l i m i t on m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committee c o n t r i b u t i o n s o n l y t o S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s ( l e a v i n g a d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g House c a n d i d a t e s t o t h a t body). The b i l l p l a c e d a $5,000 a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a c a n d i d a t e i n b o t h a g e n e r a l and p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n ( o r s p e c i a l and p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n ) , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g $5,000 l i m i t a t i o n per It a l l o w e d a h i g h e r limit--$7,500--for election. c a n d i d a t e s involved i n a r u n o f f e l e c t i o n , a s w e l l , w h i l e s p e c i f y i n g t h a t no more t h a n $5,500 c o u l d b e c o n t r i b u t e d i n one p h a s e of t h e e l e c t i o n c y c l e . The o n l y PAC-related H.R. b i l l t o b e a c t e d upon d u r i n g t h e 9 6 t h Congress was 4970, t h e Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n Reform Act o f 1979, which passed t h e House i n amendment-form b u t was n o t a c t e d upon by t h e S e n a t e . The Obey-Railsback b i l l , a s i t came t o b e known, was t h e p r i n c i p a l f o c u s i n t h e 9 6 t h Congress o f t h o s e s e e k i n g t o c u r t a i l t h e i n f l u e n c e of PACs. It h a s remained t h e h a l l m a r k o f s u c h e f f o r t s t o d a t e , and i t h a s s e t t h e t o n e f o r t h e d e b a t e o v e r PACs which h a s ensued. H.R. 4970 was i n t r o d u c e d on J u l y 26, 1979, by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s R a i l s b a c k and David Obey and co-sponsored b y more t h a n 120 o t h e r House Members. In its i n i t i a l form, i t proposed l o w e r i n g t h e l i m i t on n o n p a r t y , m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committee c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o any c a n d i d a t e from $5,000 p e r e l e c t i o n t o $5,000 o v e r a l l ; t h e $5,000 would a p p l y t o p r i m a r y and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s , b u t would be r a i s e d t o $7,500 i f a c a n d i d a t e w a s i n v o l v e d i n a r u n o f f , as w e l l ($5,000 was t h e most t h a t c o u l d be g i v e n i n any one e l e c t i o n , however). The second major f e a t u r e was a n a g g r e g a t e l i m i t of $50,000 on t h e amount a House c a n d i d a t e c o u l d a c c e p t from a l l PACs i n an e l e c t i o n c y c l e . F i n a l l y , t h e b i l l imposed a 30-day l i m i t on t h e e x t e n s i o n of c r e d i t ( o f more t h a n $ 1 , 0 0 0 ) t o House c a n d i d a t e s by campaign c o n s u l t a n t s and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l v e n d o r s ; t h i s was aimed a t c u r t a i l i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e of media and d i r e c t - m a i l specialists. On O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e b i l l was o f f e r e d a s a n amendment t o S . 832, t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission ( a l r e a d y passed by t h e senate). 2191 An amendment was o f f e r e d t o t h i s amendment which was d e s i g n e d t o improve i t s c h a n c e s f o r p a s s a g e by t h e House. I t r a i s e d t h e proposed l i m i t from $ 5 , 0 0 0 t o $6,000 ( r e t a i n i n g t h e $5,000 p e r e l e c t i o n l i m i t ) and r a i s e d t h e l i m i t on e l e c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g a r u n o f f from $7,500 t o $9,000. It a l s o r a i s e d t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on a l l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s from $50,000 t o $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 , and t o $85,000 when t h e c a n d i d a t e f a c e s a r u n o f f e l e c t i o n . F i n a l l y , it declared t h a t a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n s d e l i v e r e d by a PAC t o a c a n d i d a t e , i n c l u d i n g earmarked d o n a t i o n s , would b e c o u n t e d a g a i n s t t h e PAC's c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t ; t h i s was intended t o prevent evasion of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t . T h i s amendment t o t h e amendment had t h e s u p p o r t of t h e s p o n s o r s o f Obey-Railsback, and i t was adopted - by v o i c e v o t e . 2201 B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g t o t h e f i n a l p a s s a g e of t h e Obey-Railsback s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l amendments were a t t a c h e d t o i t , i n c l u d i n g : e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t t o c a n d i d a t e s by d i r e c t - m a i l amendment, a ban on t h e f i r m s , r a i s i n g from 30 t o 60 d a y s t h e proposed l i m i t on c r e d i t e x t e n s i o n by campaign c o n s u l t a n t s , and a $35,000 l i m i t on t h e amount of campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s a House c a n d i d a t e c o u l d u s e t o r e p a y h i s own l o a n s t o h i s campaign. I n i t s f i n a l form, t h e Obey- R a i l s b a c k Amendment i n c l u d e d t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s , p l u s t h e $ 6 , 0 0 0 l i m i t on PAC - 2191 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971 Amendments. Debate and Vote i n t h e House. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, v . 1 2 5 , O c t . 1 7 , 1979: 28644. 2201 - I b i d . , p. 28651. contributions ($9,000 with runoff) and the $70,000 aggregate limit on PAC contributions ($85,000 in cases of runoff elections). The debate over Obey-Railsback essentially involved the issues discussed in Chapter Four, although there was a qualitative difference in the thrust of arguments among supporters than among opponents of the amendment. Opponents largely centered their arguments on what they saw as the harmful consequences of specific features of the bill and appeared less inclined to address the overriding contention of the amendment's supporters that the relation between interest group money and politics was having a corrosive effect on the political system. In contrast, supporters based their positions primarily on that underlying issue and spent less of their time rebutting the specific flaws raised by amendment opponents. This difference in tone is exemplified in the excerpted floor statements of Representative Leach (in support) and Representative Bill Frenzel (in opposition). Leach focused on the damage to the system which he saw resulting from too much PAC money: The most effective way for a candidate to achieve support in a bid for legislative office is to isolate every identifiable group--especially moneyed groups--and announce support for the group's vested interest. Unfortunately, going along with the most powerful interest groups inevitably leads either to the proliferation of Federal programs or to the weakening of the tax structure. Fiscal balance and equitability are impossible to maintain after lawmakers, that is, the successful candidates, have committed themselves in advance to support specific tax advantages or Government programs favoring those having made generous campaign contributions. America may be a society of individuals, but power groupings--not individuals--are represented in legislative bodies where money is a key determinant of election outcomes. A government of the people, by the people, and for the people cannot be a government where influence is purchasable through large, private campaign contributions. The subordination of individual rights to indiscriminate moneyed influence is the subordination of representative democracy to institutional oligarchy. 2211 - Ibid., Opponents t o o k i s s u e w i t h t h e premise t h a t s u p p o r t f o r p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n s f o l l o w e d f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t h a t we have a r r i v e d a t a p o i n t where i n t e r e s t g r o u p money i s i n d e e d d o m i n a t i n g t h e p r o c e s s . Frenzel addressed h i s r e m a r k s t o t h e harm he saw r e s u l t i n g from t h e p a s s a g e of t h e amendment, w i t h t h e u n d e r l y i n g a s s e r t i o n t h a t s u p p o r t e r s were m o t i v a t e d by a d e s i r e t o k e e p t h e p o l i t i c a l b a l a n c e t i l t e d toward t h e i r own p h i l o s o p h i e s and i n t e r e s t s . Here i s what t h e s p o n s o r s a r e t r y i n g t o h i d e : F i r s t . T h i s i s a n incumbent p r o t e c t i o n b i l l . A l l t h e s o p h i s t r y i n t h e world c a n n o t h i d e t h a t f a c t . S u r e , incumbents r e c e i v e more b u t t h e y do n o t need i t . They a l r e a d y h a v e t h e r e c o g n i t i o n c h a l l e n g e r s c a n n o t l i v e w i t h o u t . With l i m i t s on c o n t r i b u t i o n s s e t a t a t i m e when campaigns c o s t o n e - t h i r d a s much a s t o d a y , c h a l l e n g e r s c a n n o t make a v i a b l e campaign w i t h o u t PACs. The r e a s o n incumbents h a v e w a i t e d t h i s l o n g t o smash PACs down i s b e c a u s e o n l y now a r e t h e y b e g i n n i n g t o f a v o r c h a l l e n g e r s . T h i s incumbents' ~ r o t e c t i o nb i l l i s a s u r e s i g n o f t h a t . The r i c h , Second. It i s a r i c h p e r s o n ' s p r o t e c t i o n b i l l . p r o t e c t e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , c a n spend u n l i m i t e d p e r s o n a l f u n d s d e s p i t e a clumsy, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a t t e m p t i n Obey-Railsback. Because i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e l i m i t e d t o $ 1 , 0 0 0 , PACs a r e t h e o n l y d e f e n s e a g a i n s t r i c h c a n d i d a t e s . Those who c o n t r i b u t e a l a r g e s h a r e t o t h e i r own campaigns w i l l s u r e l y want t o v o t e f o r i t . T h i r d . It i s a b i g l a b o r p r o t e c t i o n b i l l . It r e s t r i c t s a l l PACs e q u a l l y , and l e a v e s l a b o r ' s enormous s p e c i a l l o o p h o l e s t o communicate and t o r u n r e g i s t r a t i o n and g e t - o u t - t h e - v o t e drives, a l l of which c a n b e done w i t h d u e s money c o l l e c t e d i n v o l u n t a r i l y . F o u r t h . It i s a b i l l t o p r o t e c t t h e p e o p l e from knowing v e r y much a b o u t c a n d i d a t e s o r i s s u e s . B u t , n o t t o worry, i t w i l l o n l y s t i f l e t h o s e campaigns t h a t a r e c l o s e , o r have c o n t e s t e d p r i m a r i e s . O n l y where t h e r e i s r e a l c o m p e t i t i o n , which we used t o t h i n k was t h e l i f e ' s blood o f o u r p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , w i l l t h i s b i l l have e f f e c t . The s p o n s o r s a r e incumbents. Incumbents do n o t l i k e c o m p e t i t i o n . F i f t h . But w o r s t o f a l l , i t s an a n t i p a r t i c i p a t i o n b i l l . Hundreds o f t h o u s a n d s o f t h o u g h t f u l Americans, n o t s a t i s f i e d w i t h p a r t i e s , t u r n e d o f f on p o l i t i c i a n s , f i n d p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n by It may b e a u n i o n , a c o n t r i b u t i n g through a r e f e r e n c e group. c o r p o r a t i o n , a p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n , o r an i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p . Whatever i t i s , t h e y have some c o n f i d e n c e i n i t . Yes, PACs a r e growing b e c a u s e p e o p l e l i k e them. They f i n d PACs a c o n v e n i e n t way t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s o f t h i s Nation. They g i v e t o PACs f o r some r e a s o n s i n t h e same way a s p e o p l e g i v e t o campaigns d i r e c t l y . So l e t us t h r o w them o u t , s a y t h e Obey-Railsback s p o n s o r s . L e t u s s t i f l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . L e t us k e e p p o l i t i c s f o r t h e e l i t e - - j u s t f o r us i n s i d e r s . 2 2 2 1 - 222/ - Ibid., p. 2 8 6 2 8 . S u p p o r t e r s responded t o t h e s e p o i n t s by n o t i n g t h a t PAC money g o e s overwhelmingly t o incumbents, t h e r e b y s t i f l i n g c o m p e t i t i o n , t h a t l a b o r PACs g i v e l a r g e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a n do c o r p o r a t e PACs, and would t h e r e f o r e b e h u r t by t h e reduced PAC l i m i t , and t h a t r a t h e r t h a n e n h a n c i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s r o l e i n t h e p r o c e s s , PACs a r e overshadowing him. F o l l o w i n g d e b a t e , t h e House passed t h e amended v e r s i o n o f t h e ObeyR a i l s b a c k amendment by a v o t e of 217-198. 2231 - Democrats s p l i t 188-74 i n f a v o r o f t h e amendment, w h i l e R e p u b l i c a n s s p l i t 29 i n f a v o r and 124 a g a i n s t it. A f t e r a n u n s u c c e s s f u l v o t e t o recommit t h e amendment t o t h e House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Committee, t h e House approved S . 832 by a v o i c e v o t e , - r e q u e s t i n g a c o n f e r e n c e w i t h t h e S e n a t e . 224/ No f u r t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n was t a k e n on t h e S. 832 o r t h e ObeyR a i l s b a c k Amendment. A t h r e a t e n e d f i l i b u s t e r k e p t t h e measure from b e i n g - c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e S e n a t e d u r i n g t h e 9 6 t h Congress. 2251 C. 9 7 t h Congress L e g i s l a t i o n Seven PAC l i m i t a t i o n b i l l s were proposed i n t h e 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s . On J a n u a r y 5 , 1981, S e n a t o r Robert Byrd i n t r o d u c e d S. 9 , which was i d e n t i c a l t o t h e ObeyR a i l s b a c k amendment, a s passed by t h e House i n 1979. House e l e c t i o n s . ) ( I t applied only t o On J u l y 8 , 1981, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Dan Glickman, James Leach, and Mike Synar i n t r o d u c e d H.R. 4070, which combined some f e a t u r e s o f t h e Obey- R a i l s b a c k b i l l w i t h o t h e r s n o t p r e v i o u s l y proposed i n Congress. 2231 2241 - - Designed t o I b i d . , p. 28659-28660. Ibid., p. 28661. 2251 Buchanan, C h r i s t o p h e r . Obey-Railsback P l a n S t a l l e d i n t h e S e n a t e By Threat of F i l i b u s t e r . C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y Weekly R e p o r t , v . 3 8 , J a n . 5 , 1980: 33. r e d u c e t h e i n f l u e n c e o f PACs w h i l e e n h a n c i n g t h e r o l e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l and o f the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , it included the following features : --an o v e r a l l l i m i t on how much House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s c a n a c c e p t from from m u l t i c a n d i d a t e PACs--$75,000 f o r House c a n d i d a t e s ( a n d an a d d i t i o n a l $25,000 i n c a s e o f a r u n o f f ) and between $75,000 and $500,000, d e p e n d i n g on t h e s i z e o f t h e S t a t e , f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s ( w i t h an a d d i t i o n a l $25,000 o r $12,500 t i m e s t h e number of c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t s , t h e h i g h e r f i g u r e , i n t h e c a s e of a r u n o f f ) ; $500,000 would remain t h e o u t s i d e l i m i t f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s , i n any c a s e ; --an i n c r e a s e i n t h e l i m i t on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s from $1,000 t o $2,500; --an i n c r e a s e i n t h e maximum a l l o w a b l e t a x c r e d i t f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s from $50 t o $100 f o r s i n g l e r e t u r n s and from $100 t o $200 f o r j o i n t r e t u r n s ; and --the establishment of a separate t a x c r e d i t f o r contributions t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t y committees--50 p e r c e n t of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n amount, w i t h a maximum of $100 f o r s i n g l e r e t u r n s and $200 f o r j o i n t r e t u r n s . H.R. 4070 d i f f e r e d from a l l p r e v i o u s PAC l i m i t a t i o n b i l l s i n t h a t i t n e i t h e r p r o h i b i t e d such c o n t r i b u t i o n s n o r reduced t h e l i m i t on PAC contributions. It d i d r e t a i n t h e o v e r a l l l i m i t on a g g r e g a t e PAC g i v i n g c o n t a i n e d i n Obey-Railsback, well. and i t e x t e n d e d t h i s l i m i t t o S e n a t e r a c e s , a s R a t h e r t h a n r e d u c e t h e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t , H.R. 4070 s o u g h t t o e n h a n c e t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o s i t i o n by r a i s i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t and by r a i s i n g t h e maximum a l l o w a b l e t a x c r e d i t . F i n a l l y , it sought t o encourage g i v i n g t o t h e p a r t i e s d i r e c t l y through t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s e p a r a t e t a x c r e d i t s o l e l y f o r such c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Introduced by Rep. James Howard on March 10, 1982, H.R. 5793 included all the features of the Glickman-Leach-Synar bill (H.R. 4070) except for the increase in the contribution limit. H.R. 5450, proposed by Rep. Joseph Minish on Feb. 3, 1982, would lower the limit on multicandidate committee contributions from $5,000 to $1,000. On April 1, 1982, Rep. Andrew Jacobs introduced H.R. 6047, a House public funding bill that included a provision prohibiting candidates who accept public funds from receiving PAC donations. On August 12, 1982, Representative Philip Sharp introduced H.R. 6988, which lowered the contribution limit for multicandidate committees from $5,000 to $2,500 and placed a ceiling on PAC receipts by general election candidates of $75,000 for the House and the greater of $75,000 or $37,500 times the number of districts in the State, up to $500,000, for the Senate. Finally, Representative Obey introduced H.R. 7277, a public funding bill for House general elections, on October 1, 1982; it included a limit on PAC receipts of $90,000 per election cycle (with an additional $90,000 allowed if there were a special election, as well). The subject of political action committees received some attention at hearings held by the Senate Rules and Administration Committee in the first session of the 97th Congress. Although the focus of the hearings was the administration of the Federal Election Campaign Act, several witnesses devoted 2261 their comments to the role of PACs, both pro and con. - Two days of hearings were also held by the House Administration Committee Task Force on 2261 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Application and Administration of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, As Amended. Hearings on S. 1550, S. 1766, and S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 20 and 24, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 369 p. E l e c t i o n s i n t h e second s e s s i o n of t h e 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s . 2271 While t h e second d a y was l a r g e l y d e v o t e d t o t h e s u b j e c t o f i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , t h e r o l e o f PACs was a main f o c a l p o i n t on t h e f i r s t d a y , a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f PACs and o f " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " g r o u p s j o i n e d Members o f Congress i n t e s t i f y i n g on b o t h s i d e s o f t h e PAC d e b a t e . D. No l e g i s l a t i o n r e s u l t e d from t h e s e h e a r i n g s . 9 8 t h Congress L e g i s l a t i o n The f i r s t s e s s i o n o f t h e 9 8 t h Congress p r o b a b l y saw more l e g i s l a t i v e activity--in t e r m s o f t h e number o f proposed b i l l s and d a y s of committee hearings--on b e h a l f of campaign f i n a n c e r e f o r m t h a n i n any Congress s i n c e t h e post-Watergate p e r i o d of t h e mid-1970s. I n t h e wake of s h a r p l y r i s i n g campaign c o s t s and PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s and w i d e s p r e a d a t t e n t i o n t h e r e t o i n t h e media, c a l l s f o r r e f o r m of t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws became more pronounced by t h e s t a r t o f 1983--both w i t h i n t h e Congress and w i t h o u t . As a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h i s , n e a r l y 50 b i l l s were i n t r o d u c e d i n 1983 and 12 d a y s of S e n a t e and House h e a r i n g s o c c u r r e d on t h e s u b j e c t o f amending t h e campaign f i n a n c e l a w s . S e v e n t e e n o f t h e campaign f i n a n c e b i l l s f o c u s e d w h o l l y o r i n p a r t on r e s t r i c t i n g t h e r o l e of PACs i n t h e f i n a n c i n g of campaigns. S. 911 ( S e n a t o r Lawton C h i l e s ; March 2 3 , 1983) and H.R. P a u l Simon; May 3 , 1 9 8 3 ) - - c a l l e d Two o f these-- 2876 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of a s t u d y commission t o make recommendations f o r c h a n g e s i n t h e r o l e of PACs i n f i n a n c i n g campaigns. I n t h e i r statement of f i n d i n g s , t h e s e i d e n t i c a l b i l l s d e c l a r e d t h e sense of t h e Congress t h a t - 227/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Task F o r c e o n E l e c t i o n s . C o n t r i b u t i o n L i m i t a t i o n s and I n d e p e n d e n t E x p e n d i t u r e s . H e a r i n g s ; 9 7 t h Cong., 2nd S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1982. 437 p. ... t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d growth i n t h e amount of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaigns by n o n p a r t y m u l t i c a n d i d a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , and i n t h e r a t i o which such c o n t r i b u t i o n s b e a r t o t o t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o such campaigns-(A) r e p r e s e n t s a t h r e a t t o t h e i n t e g r i t y and p u r i t y o f t h e e l e c t o r a l process; (B) undermines t h e c o n c e p t of e q u a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n which i s t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f American democracy; (C) e r o d e s t h e a b i l i t y o f e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t o r e p r e s e n t t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r a t h e r t h a n s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s ; and (D) e x e r c i s e s a c o e r c i v e i n f l u e n c e on t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s . Although t h e s e b i l l s d e f e r r e d a d e c i s i o n on t h e n a t u r e of t h e c h a n g e s , t h e y d i d not d i s g u i s e t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s t o l i m i t t h e r o l e o f PACs. T h r e e b i l l s proposed l o w e r i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t f o r n o n p a r t y m u l t i c a n d i d a t e committees from $ 5 , 0 0 0 t o $ 1 , 0 0 0 . These i n c l u d e d H.R. ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Joseph Minish; January 6 , 1983), H.R. James McNulty; March 2 , 1 9 8 3 ) , and H.R. October 19, 1983). One bill--H.R. 640 1799 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 4157 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e James Howard; 1893--prohibited PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s o u t r i g h t , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a p l a n f o r p u b l i c s u b s i d i e s f o r media a d v e r t i s i n g ( ~ e p r e s e n t a t i v eAndrew J a c o b s ; March 3 , 1 9 8 3 ) ; t h i s was t h e same p r o p o s a l J a c o b s had i n t r o d u c e d i n each of t h e p r e v i o u s C o n g r e s s e s . One of t h e major i n n o v a t i o n s i n campaign f i n a n c e r e f o r m was H . R . 3737 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Matthew McHugh; August 2 , 1 9 8 3 ) ) which proposed e l i m i n a t i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c u r r e n t t a x c r e d i t t o c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o PACs. T h i s was done i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a p r o p o s a l f o r a 100 p e r c e n t c r e d i t f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s i n o n e ' s own S t a t e and a s e p a r a t e 50 p e r c e n t c r e d i t f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ; t h u s , c o n t r i b u t i o n s by i n d i v i d u a l s t o t h e i r S e n a t o r s and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were e n c o u r a g e d , w h i l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o PACs would not be encouraged t h r o u g h i n d i r e c t public subsidy. E i g h t o f t h e PAC l i m i t a t i o n b i l l s s o u g h t t o a c h i e v e t h a t o b j e c t i v e t h r o u g h c a p s on PAC r e c e i p t s ( o n an e l e c t i o n c y c l e b a s i s - - p r i m a r y and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n combined, with p r o v i s i o n f o r a d d i t i o n a l r e c e i p t s i n t h e c a s e o f a s p e c i a l election). I n v a r i a b l y t h e s e were p a r t of reform packages, which might i n c l u d e p u b l i c f u n d i n g , i n c r e a s e d i n c e n t i v e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l and p o l i t i c a l p a r t y g i v i n g , a n d / o r spending l i m i t s . They a r e l i s t e d h e r e i n o r d e r of t h e i r i n t r o d u c t i o n , with b r i e f comments about each: 1 ) S. 151 ( S e n a t o r William Proxmire; J a n u a r y 26, 1983)--includes a PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s of 30 p e r c e n t of t h e b i l l ' s spending l i m i t f o r t h a t S t a t e ; it p r o v i d e s f o r F e d e r a l matching funds i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s along w i t h an e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i t of $600,000 p l u s f i v e c e n t s per e l i g i b l e voter ; 2 ) H.R. 2005 ( ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i vGeorge e Brown; March 9 , 1983)--includes a $90,000 PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t f o r House c a n d i d a t e s , along w i t h F e d e r a l s u b s i d i e s f o r p o s t a l c o s t s i n c o n j u n c t i o n with a g r e e i n g t o a b i d e by e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i t s ; 3 ) H.R. 2490 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e David Obey e t a l . ; A p r i l 1 2 , 1983)--includes a $90,000 PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t f o r House c a n d i d a t e s , a l o n g w i t h a matching fund system and e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i t s i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ; t h i s was t h e major PAC reform b i l l f o r most of t h e f i r s t s e s s i o n ; 4 ) H.R. 2959 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Lee Hamilton; May 1 0 , 1983)--includes a PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t of $90,000 f o r House c a n d i d a t e s and t h e g r e a t e r of $200,000 o r $40,000 per c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t ( w i t h a maximum of $600,000) f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s , along with i n c r e a s e s i n i n d i v i d u a l and p a r t y c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s and p a r t y c o o r d i n a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i t s ; 5 ) H.R. 3262 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Mike Synar; June 8 , 1983)--includes a PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t of $75,000 f o r House c a n d i d a t e s ($100,000 i f t h e y a r e c h a l l e n g e d i n b o t h t h e primary and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ) and t h e g r e a t e r of $75,000 o r $25,000 per c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t ( w i t h a maximum of $500,000) f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s , a l o n g w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t ; 6 ) S. 1433 ( S e n a t o r David Boren; J u n e 8 , 1 9 8 3 ) - - i d e n t i c a l 7 ) H.R. t o H.R. 3262; 3610 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Tom L a n t o s ; J u l y 20, 1 9 8 3 ) - - i n c l u d e s a PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t of $75,000 f o r House c a n d i d a t e s and t h e g r e a t e r o f $75,000 o r $37,500 p e r c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t ( w i t h a maximum of $500.,000) f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s , a l o n g w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t and a d o u b l i n g o f t h e maximum t a x c r e d i t f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; and 8 ) H.R. 4428 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e David Obey e t a l . ; November 21, 1983)--the r e v i s e d f o c u s f o r t h e PAC r e f o r m movement i n t h e 9 8 t h C o n g r e s s ; i t i n c l u d e s a $90,000 PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t f o r House c a n d i d a t e s ( i n d e x e d f o r i n f l a t i o n ) , a l o n g w i t h a new 100 p e r c e n t t a x c r e d i t f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House c a n d i d a t e s who a g r e e t o a b i d e by s p e c i f i e d campaign and p e r s o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i t s . S e n a t o r Warren Rudman i n t r o d u c e d a n o t h e r b i l l - - S . 1185 (May 2, 1983)-- which c o n t a i n e d a p r o v i s i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t engendered i n t h e e i g h t b i l l s d i s c u s s e d above. R a t h e r t h a n l i m i t i n g PAC r e c e i p t s , t h e b i l l p l a c e s a l i m i t on t h e amount of PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s which may be s p e n t , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e g r e a t e r o f 25 c e n t s per e l i g i b l e v o t e r o r 20 p e r c e n t o f o v e r a l l e x p e n d i t u r e s . The b i l l a l s o p r o v i d e s f o r a s i m i l a r l i m i t ( b u t w i t h a h i g h e r maximum amount) f o r p a r t y c o m m i t t e e s and i n c r e a s e d i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s . F i n a l l y , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e James C o u r t e r i n t r o d u c e d one o f t h e more u n u s u a l PAC l i m i t a t i o n b i l l s . H i s H.R. 1379 ( F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 1983) would e s t a b l i s h a b l i n d t r u s t t h r o u g h which PACs may c o n t r i b u t e t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s . The money would be f u n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission, which would, i n t u r n , d i s t r i b u t e i t t o c a n d i d a t e s d e s i g n a t e d by t h e PACs. No one would be p e r m i t t e d t o d i s c l o s e t h e amounts of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , b u t t h e a g g r e g a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f s p e c i f i c PACs, t h e names of t h e PACs g i v i n g t o e a c h c a n d i d a t e , and t h e a g g r e g a t e PAC r e c e i p t s by each c a n d i d a t e would be disclosed publicly. By p r e v e n t i n g d i s c l o s u r e of t h e s p e c i f i c amounts g i v e n by a PAC t o a c a n d i d a t e , t h e b i l l s e e k s t o c o r r e c t t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t PAC money buys v o t e s o f Members of C o n g r e s s . A p a r t from t h e s e v e n t e e n b i l l s d i s c u s s e d above were many o t h e r s which s o u g h t t o make a d j u s t m e n t s i n t h e campaign f i n a n c e l a w s , t h r o u g h c h a n g i n g contribution l i m i t s or tax c r e d i t s , boosting the potential role for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and o t h e r methods w i t h o t h e r g o a l s . Most of t h e s e n e a r l y 50 b i l l s came under d i s c u s s i o n d u r i n g two s e t s o f h e a r i n g s d u r i n g 1983. The S e n a t e R u l e s and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Committee h e l d h e a r i n g s on J a n u a r y 26-27 and May 1 7 on a b r o a d r a n g e o f campaign f i n a n c e i s s u e s and on September 29 - o n t h e s u b j e c t o f media i s s u e s i n t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s . 2281 The House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Committee Task F o r c e on E l e c t i o n s h e l d h e a r i n g s on J u n e 9 , 1 6 , 21, and 23, J u l y 8 , August 22 and 23, and O c t o b e r 12 on such campaign f i n a n c e t o p i c s a s PACs, t h e r o l e of p a r t i e s , t h e c o s t o f campaigns, and t h e r o l e o f - media a d v e r t i s i n g . 2291 By t h e end of 1983, a f t e r t w e l v e days of committee h e a r i n g s , Congress a p p e a r e d no c l o s e r t o c o n s e n s u s about t h e n a t u r e of t h e problems, much l e s s a b o u t t h e i r s o l u t i o n , t h a n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e y e a r . - S e n a t e . Committee on R u l e s and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Campaign 2281 U.S. F i n a n c e Reform P r o p o s a l s of 1983. H e a r i n g s , 9 8 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1984. 783 p. House. C o r n i t t e e on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Task F o r c e on 2291 U.S. 7 Electrons. Campaign F i n a n c e Reform. H e a r i n g s , 9 8 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1984. 837 p. 11. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO LIMIT PAC INFLUENCE The major c u r r e n t p r o p o s a l s i n t e n d e d t o r e d u c e t h e i n f l u e n c e of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees c a n b e o r g a n i z e d around f o u r b a s i c themes: t h o s e which d i r e c t l y r e d u c e t h e i n f l u e n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l PACs, t h o s e which r e d u c e t h e l e v e l of c a n d i d a t e dependence on a l l PACs, t h o s e which i n d i r e c t l y a t t e m p t t o r e d u c e PAC i n f l u e n c e by e n h a n c i n g t h e f i n a n c i a l power of o t h e r f u n d r a i s i n g components, and t h o s e which s e e k t o e l i m i n a t e most forms of p r i v a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h r o u g h p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g of e l e c t i o n s . T h i s s e c t i o n o f f e r s a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of t h e key p r o p o s a l s w i t h i n t h e s e f o u r c l u s t e r s . A. Reduce PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n L i m i t s As was s e e n i n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r , i t h a s been proposed t h a t t h e l i m i t on m u l t i c a n d i d a t e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s b e lowered from $5,000 t o e i t h e r $3,000 o r $ 1 , 0 0 0 , o r t h a t such c o n t r i b u t i o n s be banned e n t i r e l y . The common t h r e a d i n a l l of t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s i s t h e a t t e m p t t o r e d u c e t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r undue i n f l u e n c e by any one PAC; i n a d d i t i o n , t h e p r o p o s a l s t o lower t h e l i m i t a p p e a r t o b e m o t i v a t e d by a d e s i r e t o make PAC d o n a t i o n s more i n l i n e w i t h t h e l i m i t s on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t o r s ( c e r t a i n l y t h e p r o p o s a l f o r a $1,000 l i m i t would do p r e c i s e l y t h a t ) and t h u s make PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s l e s s v a l u a b l e vis-a-vis those of i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s . The c o n c e p t o f a l i m i t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s f i n d s s u p p o r t i n t h e Buckley v . Valeo r u l i n g . This passage c o n f i n e s i t s e l f t o t h e $1,000 i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t b u t may b e a p p l i e d a s w e l l a s t o l i m t s on group c o n t r i b u t i o n s : It i s u n n e c e s s a r y t o l o o k beyond t h e A c t ' s p r i m a r y purpose-t o l i m i t t h e a c t u a l i t y and a p p e a r a n c e o f c o r r u p t i o n r e s u l t i n g from l a r g e i n d i v i d u a l f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s - - i n o r d e r t o f i n d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e $1000 To t h e e x t e n t t h a t l a r g e contribution limitation c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e g i v e n t o s e c u r e p o l i t i c a l q u i d pro quos from c u r r e n t and p o t e n t i a l o f f i c e h o l d e r s , t h e i n t e g r i t y of . . .. .... o u r s y s t e m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy i s undermined O f a l m o s t e q u a l c o n c e r n a s t h e d a n g e r of a c t u a l q u i d pro quo a r r a n g e m e n t s i s t h e impact of t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f c o r r u p t i o n stemming from p u b l i c a w a r e n e s s of t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a b u s e i n h e r e n t i n a regime of l a r g e i n d i v i d u a l f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 2301 - Thus, t h e a p p e a r a n c e o r a c t u a l i t y of q u i d pro quo r e l a t i o n s h i p s between donor and r e c i p i e n t a r e s e e n a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s . Clearly, the s e t t i n g o f more r e s t r i c t i v e l i m i t s on what a PAC c a n g i v e would c r e a t e o b s t a c l e s t o i t s g a i n i n g what may b e p e r c e i v e d a s a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l e v e l of i n f l u e n c e through i t s f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . T h r e e problems might h e r a i s e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e d u c t i o n of t h e PAC l i m i t o r t h e o u t r i g h t ban on PAC g i v i n g . F i r s t , i n f l a t i o n h a s made t h e $5,000 l i m i t imposed i n 1974 a l e s s m e a n i n g f u l boundary between p r o p e r and improper l e v e l s o f p o l i t i c a l influence. It might be s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e i n f l a t i o n f a c t o r a l o n e h a s o b v i a t e d any p e r c e i v e d need t o r e d u c e t h e l i m i t a s a means of r e d u c i n g t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f t o o much power by any g r o u p . (Using t h e i m p l i c i t p r i c e d e f l . a t o r s f o r g r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i n t h e 1984 Economic R e p o r t o f t h e P r e s i d e n t , one f i n d s t h a t $5,000 i n 1974 would b e t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f o n l y $ 2 , 6 6 8 i n 1983 d o l l a r s . ) A second p o t e n t i a l problem w i t h t h e i m p o s i t i o n of f u r t h e r l i m i t s on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s might b e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b j e c t i o n s . I n t h e Buckley c a s e , t h e Supreme C o u r t s u g g e s t e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s were t h e o r e t i c a l l y a j u s t i f i a b l e i n s t r u m e n t of p u b l i c p o l i c y , t h e y c o u l d pose problems d e p e n d i n g upon t h e e x a c t l e v e l s o f c o n t r i b u t i n g a l l o w e d : Given t h e i m p o r t a n t r o l e o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n f i n a n c i n g p o l i t i c a l campaigns, c o n t r i b u t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s c o u l d have a s e v e r e impact on p o l i t i c a l d i a l o g u e i f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p r e v e n t e d c a n d i d a t e s and p o l i t i c a l committees from amassing t h e r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y f o r e f f e c t i v e advocacy. 2311 231/ - Ibid., a t 21. - With regard to imposing a lower limit on PAC contributions (e.g., $3,000 or $1,000), a CRS legal analysis in 1979 stated: While the proposal would render the limit which is applicable to separate segregated funds more restrictive of pertinent First Amendment freedoms than the limits upheld in Buckley which formerly applied to separate segregated funds, the newer limit might still not be too restrictive. That is, it might yet be justified by the relevant counterbalancing governmental interest (i.e., the prevention of both actual and apparent quid pro quo arrangements between donors and recipients of campaign contributions). Unfortunately, the Buckley decision provides 2321 little guidance in this connection. If the reduced PAC limit might raise constitutional questions, the proposed ban on PAC contributions would likely raise even more such objections. The same CRS study declared: Demonstrably restrictive of both political expression and political association, the proposed ban could survive First Amendment scrutiny only if justified by a sufficiently strong and directly served governmental interest. Inasmuch as a total ban is necessarily more restrictive than a mere limit on amount, it seems clear that the requisite governmental interest would have to be one which would not be satisfied by the imposition of a limit. That is so since in the case of so-called "fundamental" rights generally (and First Amendment rights in particular) a pertinent governmental interest justifies only the least restrictive option. Consequently, the governmental interest isolated in the Buckley case as sufficient to justify amount limits on contributions (i.e., an interest in preventing actual and apparent quid pro quo arrangements between donors and recipients of campaign contributions) would not suffice to justify the proposed ban. No suitable governmental interest seems 2331 immediately apparent. Potential constitutional questions aside, there is a third problem inherent in lowering the PAC limits, one which may have become sufficient to squelch further consideration of such proposals. The perceived likelihood 2321 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Restricting "PAC" Involvement in Federal-Office Political Campaigns: Some Constitutional Consideration [by Robert B. ~urdette]. May 25, 1979. p. 3. 2331 - Ibid., p. 6-7. t h a t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f f u r t h e r r e s t r a i n t s on PACs would l e a d t o o t h e r , l e s s c o n t r o l l a b l e , forms o f PAC a c t i v i t y h a s been i n c r e a s i n g l y r e c o g n i z e d a s v a l i d even by t h o s e s e e k i n g t o l i m i t PAC i n f l u e n c e ; i n d e e d , i t h a s g i v e n pause t o many PAC o p p o n e n t s who have a d v o c a t e d t h i s a p p r o a c h . Opponents of Obey-Railsback had c h a r g e d t h a t a lower PAC l i m i t would r e s u l t i n PACs s e e k i n g o t h e r avenues f o r s p e n d i n g , s p e c i f i c a l l y a p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs w i t h i n a n i n d u s t r y and t h e i n c r e a s e d use o f i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . T h i s c h a r g e was s u p p o r t e d by t h e Harvard s t u d y , which s t a t e d : .... t h e s t u d y g r o u p c o n s i d e r e d t h e most p r o b a b l e r e s u l t s of r e d u c i n g l e g i s l a t i v e l y t h e amount of money which PACs c a n c o n t r i b u t e t o p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e s . That change w i l l m e r e l y d i v e r t , b u t n o t stem, t h e f l o w of money. P r o l i f e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , p e r f e c t l y l e g a l c o o p e r a t i o n among PACs, and a r a p i d e x p a n s i o n i n i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s by PACs a r e t h e c l e a r l y p r e d i c t a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s . 234/ - Whereas t h e r e e x i s t c e r t a i n r e s t r a i n t s on p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f PACs w i t h i n a company o r union ( l i m i t i n g a l l a f f i l i a t e d PACs t o a s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t ) , independent e x p e n d i t u r e s a p p a r e n t l y cannot be capped, i n accordance with t h e Buckley d e c i s i o n . The i n c i d e n c e o f PACs e n g a g i n g i n i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e campaigns i n c r e a s e d d r a m a t i c a l l y d u r i n g r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s , and many of t h e i r o r g a n i z e r s f l a t l y a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e y were d r i v e n t o such forms of s p e n d i n g by what t h e y saw a s t h e unduly r e s t r i c t i v e l i m i t s on d i r e c t PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s for ($5,000). Many went s o f a r a s t o p l e d g e c o n t i n u e d and expanded u s e of t h e - i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e r o u t e , i n view of t h a t l i m i t a t i o n . 235/ Thus, t h e t h r e a t of g r e a t e r l e v e l s o f i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of l i m i t a t i o n s on d i r e c t c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s by PACs a p p e a r s t o have a l r e a d y been r e a l i z e d , t o some e x t e n t . 234/ - - U.S. C o n g r e s s , An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact of t h e FECA, p. 5 . 235/ Dionne, E . J . , Aug. 8 , 1980. p. A15. Jr. Campaign Spending B a t t l e . New York Times, The p o s s i b i l i t y o f l o w e r i n g t h e l i m i t even f u r t h e r i s i n c r e a s i n g l y s e e n b y opponents of PACs a s l i k e l y t o b e c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e t o t h e i r u l t i m a t e g o a l o f r e d u c i n g PAC i n f l u e n c e . The f a c t t h a t such a p r o p o s a l was n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e major PAC r e f o r m b i l l s of t h e most r e c e n t C o n g r e s s e s (H.R. and H.R. 2490 and H.R. realization. 4070 i n t h e 9 7 t h 4428 i n t h e 9 8 t h ) may b e s e e n a s i n d i c a t i v e o f such a I f , however, one e q u a t e s p o t e n t i a l f o r i n f l u e n c e o n l y w i t h d i r e c t c a n d i d a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s ( a s opposed t o i n d e p e n d e n t e f f o r t s ) , one may b e more l i k e l y t o a c c e p t such a r i s k i n imposing t i g h t e r l i m i t s on PAC g i v i n g . b i l l s i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress (H.R. t h e PAC l i m i t - - t o B. 640, H.R. 1799, and H.R. Three 4157) would lower $1,000. Reducing C a n d i d a t e Dependence on PACs The g o a l o f r e d u c i n g t h e l e v e l of c a n d i d a t e dependence on PAC money i s behind t h e p r o p o s a l t o impose an a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on t h e amount o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s a c a n d i d a t e may a c c e p t . p r o p o s a l s f o r such a l i m i t v a r y . No such l i m i t e x i s t s t o d a y , and The Obey-Railsback b i l l s u g g e s t e d a $70,000 l i m i t on House c a n d i d a t e s ( $ 8 5 , 0 0 0 i f t h e y f a c e d a r u n o f f ) and d i d n o t make a recommendation f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . e i t h e r $75,000 (K.R. 2490, H.R. The b i l l s i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress p r o p o s e 3262, S. 1433, H . R . 4428, H . R . 3610) o r $90,000 ( H . R . 2959) f o r House c a n d i d a t e s , w i t h H . R . 2005, H.R. 3262/S. 1433 a l l o w i n g an a d d i t i o n a l $25,000 i f t h e r e i s o p p o s i t i o n i n t h e p r i m a r y and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n and w i t h H . R . 4428 i n d e x i n g t h e f i g u r e f o r i n f l a t i o n . Those b i l l s a f f e c t i n g S e n a t e PAC r e c e i p t s p l a c e a c a p i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s i z e of t h e S t a t e . One b i l l - - S . 151-- p l a c e s a f l a t l i m i t of 30 p e r c e n t o f t h e c o n c o m i t a n t s p e n d i n g l i m i t , b u t t h i s l i m i t i s based on t h e v o t i n g a g e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e ; t h e o t h e r s a l l o w e d a c h o i c e o f t h e g r e a t e r o f some minimum amount ($75,000 i n H . R . 3262, S. 1433, and H . R . 3610 and $200,000 i n H.R. 2959) o r a c e r t a i n amount per c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t i n t h e S t a t e 3262 and S. 1433, $37,500 i n H . R . ( $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 i n H.R. 3610, and $40,000 i n H.R. 2 9 5 9 ) , w i t h a maximum l e v e l o f $500,000 i n a l l b u t H.R. t o $600,000. 2959, which a l l o w e d up I n a d d i t i o n t o l i m i t i n g t h e d e g r e e t o which c a n d i d a t e s c o u l d fund t h e i r campaigns w i t h PAC money, t h e s e p r o p o s a l s would have t h e a d d i t i o n a l g o a l of " r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e by many PACs a c t i n g i n c o n c e r t .I1 2361 Two p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n s a r e r a i s e d t o t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on PAC d o n a t i o n s , one p o l i t i c a l , t h e o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Of a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e i s t h e c h a r g e , a s a r t i c u l a t e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e F r e n z e l d u r i n g t h e d e b a t e o v e r Obey-Railsback, t h a t t h i s p r o p o s a l would pose an undue burden t o c h a l l e n g e r s o f incumbent Members, t h u s i m p a i r i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s o f t h e c o n t e s t : .... l i m i t i n g t h e amount o f moneys c a n d i d a t e s c a n r e c e i v e and t h e r e f o r e spend d r a s t i c a l l y h u r t s t h e c h a n c e s o f c h a l l e n g e r s o f b o t h p a r t i e s w i t h o u t h a v i n g much of an impact on incumbents. 2371 - S u p p o r t e r s o f t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t might respond t h a t c h a l l e n g e r s would s t i l l b e f r e e t o s e e k o u t f u n d i n g from o t h e r s o u r c e s . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t may p r e s e n t more o f a n o b s t a c l e t o i t s e n a c t m e n t . These were a d d r e s s e d i n an a n a l y s i s by U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s law p r o f e s s o r J o h n Nowak ( h i s r e f e r e n c e s t o a $50,000 l i m i t were based on t h e i n i t i a l l i m i t proposed i n Obey-Railsback) : T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n i s of d u b i o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s , a t b e s t . The $50,000 l i m i t a t i o n may be s e e n a s e f f e c t i v e l y imposing a c e i l i n g on t o t a l campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s and c a n d i d a t e expenditures. I n Buckley v. Valeo t h e Supreme C o u r t found t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s might b e r e a s o n a b l y l i m i t e d i n o r d e r t o f i g h t b o t h t h e r e a l i t y and a p p e a r a n c e o f improper i n f l u e n c e .---------- 2361 - Adamany, P A C s and t h e Democratic F i n a n c i n g o f P o l i t i c s , p. 599. 2371 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971 Amendments. Vote i n t h e House. 28631. Debate and by l a r g e c o n t r i b u t o r s , b u t t h a t a c e i l i n g on c a n d i d a t e s p e n d i n g was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n v a l i d a t t e m p t t o r e s t r i c t s p e e c h a c t i v i t i e s i n p o l i t i c a l campaigns The proposed law may r e d u c e t h e r o l e t h a t some p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees may p l a y i n a g i v e n e l e c t i o n , b u t i t w i l l n o t f u r t h e r a government i n t e r e s t r e l a t i n g t o t h e " r e a l i t y o r a p p e a r a n c e o f improper i n f l u e n c e stemming from t h e dependence o f c a n d i d a t e s on l a r g e campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s , " which was t h e o n l y b a s i s a c c e p t e d by t h e Supreme Court i n B u c k l e y f o r restraining political contributions. T h i s b i l l may be s e e n a s imposing an e f f e c t i v e c e i l i n g on campaign s p e n d i n g b e c a u s e , a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , it w i l l l i m i t t h e amount of money t h a t c a n come i n t o a c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaign. 2381 .... - S u p p o r t e r s o f t h e l i m i t , l i k e Fred Wertheimer o f Common Cause, i n s i s t t h a t it w i l l not l i m i t t h e f r e e speech r i g h t s of c a n d i d a t e s , noting t h e Buckley d e c i s i o n ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s was "merely t o require candidates . . . to r a i s e f u n d s from a g r e a t e r number o f persons" - r a t h e r t h a n r e d u c e t h e amount o f p o l i t i c a l s p e n d i n g . 239/ Beyond t h e i s s u e of whether t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t would c o n s t i t u t e a c e i l i n g on c a n d i d a t e s p e n d i n g i s t h e d e b a t e o v e r whether i t would i n f r i n g e on, t h e r i g h t s o f a s s o c i a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s . The Nowak s t u d y o b s e r v e d : .... t h e b i l l goes beyond t h e mere l i m i t a t i o n o f campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s and d i r e c t l y r e s t r a i n s a s s o c i a t i o n a l freedom. To examine t h a t problem one n e e d s o n l y t o h y p o t h e s i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n where a c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e h a s r e c e i v e d $50,000 from p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees when a n o t h e r committee comes on t h e s c e n e t h a t w i s h e s t o d o n a t e money t o t h e c a n d i d a t e . Under H.R. 4970 t h a t " e x t r a " p o l i t i c a l committee would be p r o h i b i t e d from g i v i n g even $1.00 t o t h e c a n d i d a t e and a l l o f t h e p e r s o n s w h o ~ ei n t e r e s t s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by t h a t a s s o c i a t i o n a l e n t i t y a r e denied t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c a n d i d a t e . 2401 - Bill. 125, 2381 In Nowak, J o h n . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l R a m i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e Obey-Railsback E x t e n s i o n o f remarks o f Guy Vander J a g t . Congressional Record, v. September 25, 1979: 26229. 2391 Wertheimer , F r e d . The PAC Phenomenon i n American P o l i t i c s . P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees and Campaign F i n a n c e : Symposium , p. 625. 2401 Nowak, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l R a m i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e Obey-Railsback B i l l , p. 26229. In T h i s argument would no d o u b t b e answered by s u p p o r t e r s o f t h e l i m i t by n o t i n g t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h PACs h a v e o t h e r o u t l e t s f o r p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n , such a s through f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s d i r e c t l y t o c a n d i d a t e s . A s David Adamany o b s e r v e d , PACs a l s o have o t h e r o u t l e t s a v a i l a b l e t o them: The c a s e f o r s u s t a i n i n g s u c h a l i m i t i s s t r e n g t h e n e d b e c a u s e PAC s p e e c h i s n o t c u t o f f by such a c e i l i n g : a PAC which c o u l d n o t c o n t r i b u t e w i t h i n t h e l i m i t c o u l d s t i l l make i t s v i e w s known t h r o u g h d i r e c t i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . 2411 - C e r t a i n l y , t h e r e i s room f o r d i s c u s s i o n o v e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t on PACs. Such q u e s t i o n s may o r may n o t s e r v e t o p r e v e n t f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s p r o p o s a l ; t h e Obey-Railsback t h e House i n t h e f a c e o f such o b j e c t i o n . amendment passed F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e PAC r e c e i p t s l i m i t h a s emerged a s t h e most p o p u l a r remedy s u g g e s t e d by PAC c r i t i c s i n t h e C o n g r e s s . C. Enhancing t h e R o l e o f O t h e r P a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e P o l i t i c a l P r o c e s s The t h i r d g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h t o c u r b i n g PAC i n f l u e n c e r e v o l v e s around a d d i t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e s f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n by i n d i v i d u a l s and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a s a means o f c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g t h e r o l e p l a y e d by PACs i n t h e f u n d i n g o f p o l i t i c a l campaigns. A s r e f l e c t e d i n a number of s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s , i t i s based on an a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c o n t i n u e d growth and s t r e n g t h o f PACs and t h e b e l i e f t h a t f u r t h e r d i r e c t l i m i t a t i o n s on PAC f i n a n c i a l g i v i n g w i l l i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o f u r t h e r a t t e m p t s by PACs t o evade t h e l i m i t s t h r o u g h v a r i o u s l o o p h o l e s i n t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws. By s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s and p a r t i e s t o b o a r t h e f u n d i n g c o s t s o f e l e c t i o n campaigns, t h e s e p r o p o s a l s s e e k t o c u r b PACs i n an i n d i r e c t , r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t , manner; i n t h i s way, t h e y a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e p r o p o s a l s o u t l i n e d above. -------2411 - Adamany, PACs and t h e Democratic F i n a n c i n g of P o l i t i c s , p. 600. One of t h e most w i d e l y s u g g e s t e d p r o p o s a l s i s t o r a i s e t h e l i m i t on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s from $ 1 , 0 0 0 t o some h i g h e r amount. In the 98th C o n g r e s s , t h e d o u b l i n g of t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t was proposed i n S e n a t o r G o r t o n ' s S. 732 and S e n a t o r Humphrey's S. 810 ( t h e l a t t e r indexed a l l l i m i t s t o a c c o u n t for inflation). A $2,500 l i m i t was s u g g e s t e d i n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S y n a r ' s H.R. 3262 and S e n a t o r B o r e n ' s S. 1433 ( f o r House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s ) , i n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e L a n t o s ' H.R. 3610 ( f o r House c a n d i d a t e s ) , and i n S e n a t o r Rudman's S. 1185 ( f o r a l l candidates). R e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o r c o r a n proposed a $3,000 f i g u r e i n H.R. and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H a m i l t o n ' s H.R. 2959 s e t t h e f i g u r e a t $3,500. 2976, The Harvard s t u d y n o t e d ' t h a t t h e $1,000 c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t was s e t i n 1974 and had been r e n d e r e d a l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t f i g u r e by i n f l a t i o n . It d e c l a r e d : I n f l a t i o n a l o n e d i c t a t e s r a i s i n g t h e l i m i t t o $1,500 f o r t h e 1980 campaign. 2421 - I n announcing i t s s u p p o r t f o r r a i s i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t , a b i p a r t i s a n g r o u p o f former P r e s i d e n t i a l campaign f i n a n c e o f f i c e r s convened under t h e a u s p i c e s o f t h e C i t i z e n s ' R e s e a r c h F o u n d a t i o n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e l i m i t might b e indexed f o r i n f l a t i o n and rounded t o t h e n e a r e s t $500 ( t h i s t o a v o i d some c o n f u s i o n - r e s u l t i n g from a s i m p l e i n d e x i n g f o r m u l a ) . 2431 Beyond t h e i n f l a t i o n f a c t o r , i t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t a s t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t i s r a i s e d t o more c l o s e l y a p p r o x i m a t e t h e c u r r e n t $5,000 PAC l i m i t , i t would e s t a b l i s h i n d i v i d u a l s and PACs on a more e q u a l f o o t i n g . The presumption i s , f i r s t , t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s would be more l i k e l y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a c a n d i d a t e --2421 - - U.S. Congress, An A n a l y s i s of t h e Impact o f t h e FECA, p. 3 . 2431 C i t i z e n s ' R e s e a r c h F o u n d a t i o n . Amending t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act: A S t a t e m e n t o f Recommendations by Former P r e s i d e n t i a l Campaign F i n a n c e O f f i c e r s , J u n e 1, 1981. p. 2. than a PAC if they had more leeway to do so (they can currently give as much as $5,000 to a multicandidate PAC) and, second, that candidates would be more inclined to give priority to raising money from individuals than from PACs if they could raise as much money with as few a number of solicitations. Little other than supposition has been offered to support the former suggestion. The vast majority of individual contributions to both candidates and PACs fall well below the current limits, thus detracting from the theory that large numbers of individuals are being stifled by those limits and that they would give directly to candidates if given a more flexible upper limit. The principal incentive to give to a PAC--the added weight attached to a specific policy goal through the collective resources of like-minded individuals--would appear to remain unaffected by raising the individual limit. When viewed from the candidate's perspective, however, it does appear that such an increase would further the goal of lessening candidate dependence on PAC money. Therein lies the principal merit to this argument and the likely reason behind the increasing popularity of the proposal. Another proposal advanced to encourage individuals to play a greater role is to remove the aggregate $25,000 a year limitation on all political contributions. This was endorsed by the conference of former Presidential campaign officers, which included persons across both partisan and ideological lines, thus adding to the weight carried by its recommendations. 2441 In addition to the fact that abolishing the limit would accord the individual citizen more opportunity to contribute money, it may be further argued that the average citizen is placed at a disadvantage by the aggregate limit, in view of there being no such limitation on political giving by PACs and other 2441 - Ibid. f u n d i n g s o u r c e s . Thus f a r i n t h e 9 8 t h C o n g r e s s , t h e r e have been no p r o p o s a l s t o abolish the aggregate l i m i t , but proposals t o r a i s e it include Senator Rudman's S. 1185 ( t o $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 ) , S e n a t o r Humphrey's S. 810 ( t o $48,900, a s indexed f o r i n f l a t i o n s i n c e 1 9 7 4 ) , S e n a t o r G o r t o n ' s S. 732, and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o r c o r a n ' s H.R. 2976 ( t o $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ) . The drawback t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n s o f r a i s i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t and abolishing the aggregate l i m i t l i e s i n the potential for upsetting the d e s i r a b l e b a l a n c e w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m between a l l o w i n g and e n c o u r a g i n g a c c e s s and impeding t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n of a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e d e g r e e of i n f l u e n c e by any one i n d i v i d u a l o r i n t e r e s t . It i s u n d o u b t e d l y an u n d e r s t a t e m e n t t o suggest t h a t t h i s balance i s d i f f i c u l t t o gauge, given i t s s u b j e c t i v e n a t u r e which l e n d s i t s e l f t o d i f f e r i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s . It i s a l s o q u i t e p o s s i b l e , a s many have c h a r g e d , t h a t i n t h e i r a t t e m p t t o e l i m i n a t e t h e l a r g e c o n t r i b u t o r s of t h e p a s t , t h e s p o n s o r s o f t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act and i t s amendments have h e l p e d t o p r o v i d e t h e impetus f o r t h e PACs o f t o d a y , t h u s r e p l a c i n g one t y p e of " f a t c a t s " w i t h a n o t h e r , a l l e g e d l y more p e r n i c i o u s t y p e . One may view t h e laws g o v e r n i n g t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s a s an amorphous mechanism i n which a l l i t s p a r t s a r e r e l a t e d , p e r h a p s i m p e r c e p t i b l y , and under which e v e r y b i t o f t i n k e r i n g i n one s e c t o r may have profound r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r o t h e r s e c t o r s . I n e s t a b l i s h i n g a p o l i c y g o a l , t h e p o s s i b l e consequences f o r o t h e r g o a l s must b e c o n s i d e r e d . I f t h e g o a l i s t h e r e d u c t i o n of t h e l e v e l o f i n f l u e n c e which may a c c r u e t o l a r g e campaign c o n t r i b u t o r s , one must c o n s i d e r how s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s may a f f e c t such o t h e r c h e r i s h e d p o l i c y g o a l s a s e n c o u r a g i n g c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n , promoting t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e p o l i t i c a l process, etc. Conversely, i f t h e goal i s t o allow g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r c i t i z e n s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p r o c e s s t h r o u g h f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , one may have t o c o n s i d e r how t h i s can b e accomplished w i t h o u t t i l t i n g t h e b a l a n c e s o f a r i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n t h a t i t impedes t h e o r i g i n a l g o a l s which m o t i v a t e d t h e p o l i c y m a k e r s i n imposing l i m i t s . The q u e s t i o n h e r e would be: c a n t h e l i m i t s b e r a i s e d o r a b o l i s h e d w i t h o u t o p e n i n g t h e door t o l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of a s u f f i c i e n t number s o a s t o l e a d t o t h e p u b l i c c y n i c i s m which l e d t o t h e r e s t r a i n t s i n the f i r s t place? T h i s d e l i c a t e b a l a n c i n g a c t i s a fundamental p a r t of such p o l i c y changes. S t i l l o t h e r p r o p o s a l s d e s i g n e d t o e n c o u r a g e i n d i v i d u a l g i v i n g f o c u s on t h e t a x laws. C u r r e n t l y , i n d i v i d u a l s may r e c e i v e a 50 p e r c e n t t a x c r e d i t f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , up t o a maximum c r e d i t of $50 ( o r $100 on j o i n t returns). 2451 i n c l u d e H.R. P r o p o s a l s t o i n c r e a s e t h e maximum c r e d i t i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress 3610 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ~ a n t o s ) ,which d o u b l e s i t t o $100 ($200 on j o i n t r e t u r n s ) ; H.R. $200 ( $ 4 0 0 ) ; and H.R. t o $500 ( $ 1 0 0 0 ) . 2976 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o r c o r a n ) , which q u a d r u p l e s i t t o 3172 ( ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i vMcCollum), e which i n c r e a s e s i t t e n f o l d S e v e r a l o t h e r b i l l s i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress o f f e r a 100 p e r c e n t c r e d i t f o r i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House (and S e n a t e ) c a n d i d a t e s , i n t h e hope t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t o f a f u l l r e t u r n of t h e d o n a t i o n w i l l b e a major i n c e n t i v e t o wider p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e funding process. proposed i n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e P e a s e ' s H.R. Such a c r e d i t i s 2833, which a l l o w s a maximum c r e d i t o f $10 ( $ 2 0 ) f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s i n t h e d o n o r ' s home S t a t e ; t h e e x i s t i n g c r e d i t would remain u n a f f e c t e d . Only c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o home s t a t e c a n d i d a t e s a r e e l i g i b l e f o r t h e 100 p e r c e n t i n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e McHughls H.R. 3737, a s w e l l ; t h e maximum c r e d i t , however, i s $50 ( $ l o o ) , and the existing c r e d i t i s eliminated for contributions t o out-of-state, S t a t e and l o c a l , and P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s and t o PACs and n e w s l e t t e r f u n d s ( a s e p a r a t e A d i f f e r e n t approach i s c r e d i t i s s e t up f o r d o n a t i o n s t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ) . t a k e n i n H.R. 4428 ( ~ e p r e s e n t a t i v eObey), which p r o v i d e s t h e c r e d i t o n l y f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House c a n d i d a t e s who a g r e e t o a b i d e by a $240,000 s p e n d i n g l i m i t ( w i t h a maximum of $20,000 i n p e r s o n a l f u n d s ) . The maximum c r e d i t would b e $100 ( $ 2 0 0 ) p e r c a n d i d a t e and $200 ( $ 4 0 0 ) f o r a l l q u a l i f i e d House c a n d i d a t e s . The l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e s e p r o p o s a l s might l i e , f i r s t , i n t h e a d d i t i o n a l r e v e n u e l o s s e s f o r t h e F e d e r a l Government a n d , s e c o n d , i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g c r e d i t s a r e used by o n l y around f o u r p e r c e n t of t a x p a y e r s , n o t i n d i c a t i v e of an overwhelming d e g r e e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Of c o u r s e , a broadened c r e d i t ( s u c h a s t h e 100 p e r c e n t a p p r o a c h ) would presumably i n c r e a s e t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n l e v e l . The t a x laws a r e a l s o t h e f o c u s of some s u g g e s t i o n s i n t e n d e d t o s t r e n g t h e n the p o l i t i c a l parties. The p r o p o s a l f o r a s e p a r a t e t a x c r e d i t f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y committees i n c l u d e d i n H.R. 3737 ( 9 8 t h C o n g r e s s ) i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of o t h e r p r o p o s a l s advanced i n r e c e n t y e a r s . By c r e a t i n g a s e p a r a t e c r e d i t , w i t h such g e n e r o u s terms a s proposed i n H.R. 3737 (50 p e r c e n t of t h e v a l u e o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s , up t o $50 f o r s i n g l e r e t u r n s and $100 on j o i n t r e t u r n s ) , i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t more p e o p l e would choose t o make d i r e c t donations t o the p a r t i e s . As w i t h i n c r e a s i n g t h e c u r r e n t c r e d i t , t h e q u e s t i o n might b e r a i s e d a s t o whether t h e s e c r e d i t s would be used l a r g e l y by r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e , a f f l u e n t i n d i v i d u a l s who have s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c s t o c o n t r i b u t e even w i t h o u t t h e i n c e n t i v e o f a t a x s a v i n g . With r e g a r d t o t h e v a r i o u s p r o p o s a l s d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s s u b s e c t i o n , i t might b e noted t h a t many of them a r e made i n c r e a s i n g l y p o p u l a r by t h e c o n v e r g e n c e of o t h e r , perhaps d i f f e r i n g , p o l i c y g o a l s . Whereas, f o r example, t h e r a i s i n g of t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t on c o n t r i b u t i o n s i s r e c e n t l y b e i n g advanced by t h o s e who s e e i t a s a means t o r e d u c e PAC i n f l u e n c e , t h e same p r o p o s a l h a s been espoused f o r a number of y e a r s by t h o s e who a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y opposed t o g o v e r n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n of t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . When t h e i n f l a t i o n argument advanced i n academic c i r c l e s i s f a c t o r e d i n , one s e e s a c o n s e n s u s b u i l d i n g o u t o f a v a r i e t y of p o l i c y g o a l s . S i m i l a r c o n s e n s u s may w e l l b e b u i l d i n g toward s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' f u n d r a i s i n g a b i l i t i e s , although such c o n s e n s u s i s n o t a t a l l p r e s e n t i n s u c h o t h e r s u g g e s t i o n s a s a b o l i s h i n g o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y r a i s i n g t h e a g g r e g a t e $25,000 l i m i t . D. P u b l i c Funding o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s P r o b a b l y t h e most s e v e r e measure d e s i g n e d t o l i m i t PAC i n f l u e n c e i s t h e proposal f o r p u b l i c funding of c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . I n 1956, when t h e f i r s t b i l l p r o p o s i n g p u b l i c f u n d i n g of F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s was i n t r o d u c e d i n Congress ( S . 3242, 8 4 t h Cong.), it declared: F r e e and untrammeled r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c i s p o s s i b l e o n l y when men and women i n h i g h o f f i c e a r e n o t i n d e b t e d t o s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s f o r f i n a n c i a l d o n a t i o n s . 246/ - P u b l i c f u n d i n g l e g i s l a t i o n h a s been proposed i n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y Congress s i n c e t h a t t i m e , and t h e d e s i r e t o e l i m i n a t e t h e p e r c e i v e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e o f " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s " h a s been one of t h e o v e r r i d i n g g o a l s e x p r e s s e d by t h e sponsors i n almost e v e r y c a s e . One r e c e n t p r o p o s a l f o r p u b l i c f u n d i n g was H.R. 3436, i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Matthew McHugh and 23 c o s p o n s o r s . In h i s s t a t e m e n t on t h e b i l l , which would e s t a b l i s h a m a t c h i n g fund s y s t e m f o r t h e f i n a n c i n g o f House and S e n a t e p r i m a r y and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n campaigns, McHugh stated: - 246/ N e u b e r g e r , R i c h a r d . F e d e r a l Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o R e l i e v e Officeholders of Private Obligations. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, v. 102, F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1956: 2855. F i r s t , p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g works, and i t works f o r b o t h p r i m a r y and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s a s h a s been d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e 1976 and 1980 P r e s i d e n t i a l campaigns; Second, one o f t h e u n i n t e n d e d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f i t s s u c c e s s h a s been t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e t h e f l o w of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t o House and S e n a t e e l e c t i o n campaigns ; and T h i r d , a s t h e expenses a s s o c i a t e d with running f o r Congress i n c r e a s e , t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h o s e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s w i l l a l s o grow, and t h e c o n f i d e n c e o f t h e American p e o p l e i n our e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e r o d e . 247/ - P u b l i c f u n d i n g s u p p o r t e r s b e l i e v e t h a t o n l y by e n d i n g t h e s y s t e m o f p r i v a t e f i n a n c i n g o f e l e c t i o n s w i l l t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r g a i n i n g undue power b y p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s t h r o u g h t h e i r campaign d o n a t i o n s b e s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d . As a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , some may s u p p o r t o t h e r p l a n s t o l i m i t PACs d i r e c t l y (such a s Obey-Railsback), w h i l e u l t i m a t e l y r e t a i n i n g hope f o r t h e enactment of p u b l i c f u n d i n g a s a more fundamental s o l u t i o n t o what t h e y s e e a s money's c o r r o s i v e i n £ l u e n c e on p o l i t i c s . O p p p o s i t i o n t o p u b l i c f u n d i n g of e l e c t i o n s i s j u s t a s deep-rooted i s support f o r i t . as Opponents p o i n t t o such f a c t o r s a s t h e h i g h c o s t t o t h e t a x p a y e r s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a time o f b u d g e t a r y c u t b a c k s ) , t h e p e r c e i v e d d a n g e r s i n h e r e n t i n incumbent Members of Congress d r a f t i n g t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e campaign f u n d i n g of t h e i r o p p o n e n t s , and t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d r a f t i n g an e q u i t a b l e s y s t e m a s drawbacks t o t h e p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g i d e a . P e r h a p s more b a s i c i s t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t such a s y s t e m would hamper t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t i s d e s i r e d i n a democracy. A s noted by t h e S e n a t e S e l e c t Committee on P r e s i d e n t i a l Campaign A c t i v i t i e s ( t h e W a t e r g a t e Committee) i n i t s final report: - ~ o n g r e s s i o n a lCampaign F i n a n c i n g Act of 1981. 2471 McHugh, Matthew F. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record [ d a i l y e d . ] v . 127, May 5 , 1981: E 2124. The committee's opposition is based like Jefferson's upon the fundamental need to protect the voluntary right of citizens to express themselves politically as guaranteed by the first amendment. 248/ Some public financing foes have gone beyond their opposition to extending the system to congressional candidates and have called for the repeal of the existing Presidential funding system, as exemplified in former Representative McDonald's and Senator Goldwater's proposals in the 98th Congress (H.R. 3234 and S. 1684). It is interesting that supporters of public financing for congressional elections see the increase in PAC contributions to congressional candidates as one outgrowth of the current Presidential system, which they presumably favor. They insist that inequities are bound to result from having different policies on private contributions for Presidential and for congressional elections. Rather than abolish the former, they support extending a similar system to the latter. Even supporters of public funding for congressional elections acknowledge the unfavorable climate for passage of such legislation in the immediate future. Previous Congresses, particularly in the post-Watergate period of the mid19709, had devoted considerable attention to public funding of congressional elections; the Senate passed such proposals twice in the 93rd Congress, and the House appeared close to passage of similar ones on several occasions. By the 96th Congress, supporters were unable to get a bill (H.R. 1) reported from the House Administration Committee, despite some 155 co-sponsors of it. Only two bills (H.R. 3436, H.R. 6047) were introduced in the 97th Congress which proposed a public funding system for congressional elections, with only 2481 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. Final Report pursuant to S. Res. 60, February 7, 1973. washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. (93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Senate. Report no. 93-981) p. 573. 23 c o - s p o n s o r s of t h e major one--H.R. 3436. While t h i s had r e p r e s e n t e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e c l i n e i n t h e number of b i l l s and co-sponsors i n previous C o n g r e s s e s , t h e number of such p r o p o s a l s r o s e t o s i x i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress w i t h a s many a s 130 c o s p o n s o r s on one of them (H.R. (H.R. 2490). One p r o p o s a l 2005; R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Brown) p r o v i d e s f o r reduced m a i l i n g c o s t s f o r House c a n d i d a t e s who a b i d e by c e r t a i n s p e n d i n g l i m i t s ; a n o t h e r (H.R. 1893; R e p r e s e n t a t i v e J a c o b s ) p r o v i d e s f o r F e d e r a l s u b s i d i e s of media c o s t s f o r House c a n d i d a t e s ; and t h e o t h e r f o u r p r o v i d e matching funds t o g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n candidates--two f o r House c a n d i d a t e s ( ~ e p r e s e n t a t i v eObey's H . R . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e G r e e n ' s H.R. 2490 and 3812) and two f o r S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s ( S e n a t o r D i x o n ' s S. 85 and S e n a t o r P r o x m i r e ' s S . 1 5 1 ) . Although d i r e c t p u b l i c f u n d i n g a p p e a r e d t o b e a l i v e l y p r o s p e c t a t t h e s t a r t of t h e 9 8 t h C o n g r e s s , s u p p o r t e r s of t h e key proposal--H.R. 2490--shifted p e r c e n t t a x c r e d i t t h r o u g h H.R. t o t h e i n d i r e c t a p p r o a c h of t h e 100 4428 a t t h e c l o s e of t h e f i r s t s e s s i o n ; t h i s r e f l e c t e d a t a c t i c a l c h a n g e , i n view of t h e c o n t i n u e d s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n t o d i r e c t public subsidies. It i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e a p p a r e n t d e c l i n e i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l i n t e r e s t r e f l e c t s a s i m i l a r d e c l i n e i n public support f o r t h e concept. P o l l found t h a t t h e p u b l i c f a v o r e d by a 51-37 A 1975 H a r r i s p e r c e n t p l u r a l i t y ''having a l l f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s f i n a n c e d o u t of p u b l i c f u n d s w i t h s t r i c t l y e n f o r c e d l i m i t s " ; - by 1982, 4 3 p e r c e n t e x p r e s s e d a p p r o v a l , w h i l e 53 p e r c e n t opposed t h e i d e a . 2491 While t h i s o p p o s i t i o n i s r e a f f i r m e d i n a March 1982 C i v i c S e r v i c e , I n c . , survey, 2501 an August 1982 G a l l u p P o l l found 55 p e r c e n t a g r e e i n g t h a t i t i s 2491 P u b l i c F i n a n c i n g of F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s Opposed by Most Americans. The H a r r i s S u r v e y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : J a n . 1 0 , 1983. 2501 A t t i t u d e s Toward P u b l i c F i n a n c i n g : A Nationwide P u b l i c Opinion Survey. C i v i c S e r v i c e , I n c . March 1982. a good i d e a f o r " t h e F e d e r a l government t o p r o v i d e a f i x e d amount o f money f o r t h e e l e c t i o n campaigns o f c a n d i d a t e s f o r Congress and t h a t a l l p r i v a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s from o t h e r s o u r c e s be p r o h i b i t e d " ; - i d e a . 2511 31 p e r c e n t s a i d i t i s a poor While t h e p o l l r e s u l t s a p p e a r t o be i n c o n f l i c t , t h e r e d o e s seem t o b e a p e r c e p t i o n among s u p p o r t e r s a s w e l l a s o p p o n e n t s t h a t t h e r e d o e s n o t e x i s t a public groundswell i n favor of t h e i d e a a t t h i s time. I f an i n c r e a s e i n s u p p o r t f o r p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g i s viewed a s a r e a c t i o n t o r e v e l a t i o n s o f r e a l o r apparent impropriety (e.g., watergate), it is possible t h a t it w i l l take some f u t u r e p u b l i c s c a n d a l t o r e v e r s e what a p p e a r s t o b e a g e n e r a l l e v e l i n g o f f ( i f n o t d e c l i n e ) i n p u b l i c and c o n g r e s s i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r such a p r o p o s a l . - 251/ Americans Vote "Yes" No. 209. F e b r u a r y 1983. f o r E l e c t o r a l Reform. The G a l l u p R e p o r t . 111. P r o e n o s i s f o r t h e F u t u r e o f PACs I n v i e w o f t h e many v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t i n g PAC g r o w t h , most o b s e r v e r s a r e r e l u c t a n t t o make p r e d i c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g f u t u r e i n c r e a s e s i n t h e i r a g g r e g a t e l e v e l o f a c t i v i t y , f i n a n c i a l and o t h e r w i s e . The q u e s t i o n o f t e n asked c o n c e r n s whether we have s e e n most of t h e PAC growth a l r e a d y o r whether t h e r e i s l i k e l y t o b e an even more a c c e l e r a t e d growth i n t h e f u t u r e . This f i n a l section w i l l e x p l o r e some of t h e s c e n a r i o s which have been s u g g e s t e d r e l e v a n t t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , w i t h an e y e toward r e t r o a c t i v e l y v a l i d a t i n g o r i n v a l i d a t i n g c e r t a i n forecasts. T h e r e i s no e x p e c t a t i o n , however, t h a t d e f i n i t i v e answers c a n emerge from t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . A c o n f e r e n c e sponsored by t h e American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y R e s e a r c h i n t h e f a l l of 1979 s e t t h e s t a g e f o r much of t h e d i a l o g u e which h a s ensued on t h e s u b j e c t of PACs and t h e i r p r e s e n t and f u t u r e r o l e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system. O f p a r t i c u l a r relevance a r e the papers d e l i v e r e d by Michael Malbin and Edwin E p s t e i n , which, i n t h e i r d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s on how s i g n i f i c a n t PAC growth had b e e n , a p p e a r e d t o frame t h e d i s p u t e on how l a r g e a r o l e t h e y might be e x p e c t e d t o p l a y i n t h e f u t u r e . With t h e e l e c t i o n s of 1980 and 1982 h a v i n g t r a n s p i r e d s i n c e t h a t c o n f e r e n c e , we now have some a d d i t i o n a l measure o f t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e s c e n a r i o s s u g g e s t e d i n t h o s e two p a p e r s . Malbin viewed t h e PAC phenomenon a s n e i t h e r "a mountain nor a m o l e h i l l , " a s s e r t i n g t h a t w h i l e PACs had grown s i n c e 1974, t h e y were n o t "on a growth c u r v e w i l d l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e growth of campaign c o s t s a s a whole." - 2521 M a l b i n , P o l i c y , p. 153. Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s : PACs, Campaigns and P u b l i c 2521 Taken a s a whole, PACs i n c r e a s e d i n number and became more i m p o r t a n t t o t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s between 1974 and 1976, but-d e s p i t e t h e p i c t u r e g i v e n by most a n a l y s t s - - t h e y were no more i m p o r t a n t p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y i n 1978 t h a n t h e y were i n 1976. 253/ - E s s e n t i a l l y , Malbin saw much of t h e i n c r e a s e i n PAC s p e n d i n g a s a r e f l e c t i o n o f a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e way b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s g a v e money t o p o l i t i c a l campaigns, r a t h e r t h a n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of l a r g e new, p r e v i o u s l y untapped sources of funding; t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , explored e a r l i e r i n t h i s r e p o r t , h a s been l a b e l e d t h e "old wine i n new b o t t l e s " t h e o r y . Malbin's arguments, examined c u m u l a t i v e l y , seemed t o s u g g e s t t h a t PAC growth would l e v e l o f f , i f i t had not a l r e a d y a t t h a t p o i n t , once campaign c o n t r i b u t o r s f u l l y a d j u s t e d t o t h e new modus o p e r a n d i f o r p o l i t i c a l g i v i n g . E p s t e i n ' s c o n c l u s i o n s c o u l d b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by h i s comment t h a t : PAC o p e r a t i o n s i n 1976 and 1978 r e v e a l o n l y t h e t i p o f a p o s s i b l e i c e b e r g - - c l e a r l y f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s and o t h e r b u s i n e s s r e l a t e d g r o u p s , b u t t o some e x t e n t even i n t h e c a s e o f l a b o r . 254/ - On one l e v e l , t h e campaign f i n a n c e d a t a f o r t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s g i v e s a n i m p o r t a n t b o o s t t o E p s t e i n ' s views v i s - a - v i s Malbin's. More t h a n one y e a r b e f o r e November 1980, E p s t e i n s u g g e s t e d : I n t h e campaign of 1980, t h e r e c o u l d b e o v e r a thousand c o r p o r a t e PACs o p e r a t i n g w i t h a g g r e g a t e r e c e i p t s of $2530 m i l l i o n and c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f $15-18 m i l l i o n . 255/ - As C h a p t e r T h r e e r e v e a l e d , t h e r e were 1204 c o r p o r a t e PACs i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e end o f 1980, such PACs s p e n t $31.4 m i l l i o n and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s a l o n e amounted t o $19.2 m i l l i o n . In every respect, E p s t e i n ' s p r e d i c t i o n was exceeded i n 1980 (and s i n c e ) , and it i s n o t e d t h a t Ibid., - 2541 E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971, p. 143. 2551 - I b i d . , p. 1 4 4 . E p s t e i n ' s views were a t t h e t i m e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e " a l a r m i s t " camp r e g a r d i n g t h e whole PAC q u e s t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h i l e Malbin c o r r e c t l y noted t h a t PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s were no h i g h e r i n 1978 t h a n i n 1976 p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o o t h e r s o u r c e s o f campaign f u n d i n g , t h e same c o u l d h a r d l y b e s a i d of t h e i n c r e a s e from 1978 t o 1980; t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s among t h e o v e r a l l r e c e i p t s of c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n c a n d i d a t e s who competed i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s jumped from 20 p e r c e n t t o more t h a n 25 p e r c e n t i n t h o s e two y e a r s , t h e s h a r p e s t such jump i n t h e s i x - e l e c t i o n p e r i o d covered i n t h i s r e p o r t . Most o b s e r v e r s have f o c u s e d on t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r a s t h e key t o f u t u r e a g g r e g a t e PAC growth. The Harvard s t u d y commented: Whatever t h e m o t i v a t i o n o f c o r p o r a t e PACs w i t h i n t h e i r c o r p o r a t i o n s may b e , however, i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s t r u e t h a t t h e i r numbers w i l l c o n t i n u e t o i n c r e a s e . 256/ - I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p r o s p e c t f o r new PACs b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d , E p s t e i n n o t e d t h a t "most c o r p o r a t e PACs t h a t a r e a l r e a d y f u n c t i o n i n g have ample o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n c r e a s e t h e s i z e and scope of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . " 2571 These e x p e c t a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g c o r p o r a t e PACs a p p e a r t o c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e e x p r e s s e d views of some of t h e key s p o k e s p e r s o n s f o r t h e c o r p o r a t e PAC community. C l a r k MacGregor i s one such spokesman who commented: I t h i n k t h a t 50 p e r c e n t of t h e c o r p o r a t e i c e b e r g i s a l r e a d y above w a t e r i n PACs. I s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n whether t h e f u t u r e w i l l w i t n e s s a n y t h i n g l i k e t h e r a p i d growth i n c o r p o r a t e PACs o f t h e l a s t t h r e e o r f o u r y e a r s From now on a d d i t i o n a l c o r p o r a t e PACs w i l l be few and f a r between i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e i r r a p i d p r o l i f e r a t i o n s i n c e I would b e t t h a t t h e n e x t f i v e y e a r s w i l l 1976 .... .... - 256/ Kayden, The Impact o f t h e FECA on t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees, p. 208. - 2571 E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1971, p. 144. n o t s e e - - i n f l a t i o n d i s c o u n t e d - - a d o u b l i n g of t h e a g g r e g a t e amount c o n t r i b u t e d v o l u n t a r i l y by i n d i v i d u a l s t o t h e i r c o r p o r a t i o n s ' PACs. 2581 - Don K e n d a l l , a c o n s u l t a n t f o r BIPAC, a l s o t o o k i s s u e w i t h t h e p r o j e c t i o n s o f c o n t i n u e d enormous growth f o r c o r p o r a t e PACs: T h e r e i s p o t e n t i a l f o r g r o w t h , b u t many o f t h o s e working i n c o r p o r a t e p u b l i c a f f a i r s b e l i e v e t h e p e r i o d o f r a p i d growth i s o v e r . They p r e d i c t a more m o d e r a t e growth f o r c o r p o r a t e PACs i n t h e n e x t few y e a r s . 2591 - K e n d a l l n o t e d t h a t PACs i n g e n e r a l were l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e t o p r o l i f e r a t e i n t h e coming d e c a d e , i n t h e a b s e n c e of t h e enactment o f s h a r p l y r e s t r i c t i v e - l e g i s l a t i o n . 2601 One a d d i t i o n a l comment from t h e b u s i n e s s p e r s p e c t i v e i s worthy o f m e n t i o n h e r e b e c a u s e i t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between t h e f i n a n c i a l a s p e c t of c o r p o r a t e PACs and o t h e r f a c e t s o f t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . Lee Ann E l l i o t t ( c u r r e n t l y s e r v i n g on t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission) s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l f o c u s t h u s f a r i n t h e " e a r l y s t a g e s of development" of c o r p o r a t e PACs h a s been on " g e n e r a t i n g - and i n c r e a s i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e PAC." 2611 She a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e c o n t i n u e d s u c c e s s e s o f c o r p o r a t e PACs would depend upon how s e r i o u s l y t h e y d e v o t e d a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r o t h e r s t a t e d goal--the e d u c a t i o n and involvement o f t h e i r c o n t r i b u t o r s i n PAC o p e r a t i o n s and t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . - 2581 MacGregor, C l a r k . Commentary. Groups, and Campaign F i n a n c e Laws, p. 208. A l l of t h e s e I n Malbin, P a r t i e s , I n t e r e s t - 2591 K e n d a l l , Don R . C o r p o r a t e PACs: S t e p - b y - s t e p Formation and T r o u b l e f r e e O p e r a t i o n . Campaigns and E l e c t i o n s , v . 1, S p r i n g 1980: 1 6 . 2601 - - Ibid., p. 1 9 . 2611 E l l i o t t , Lee Ann. P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n C o m m i t t e e s - - P r e c i n c t s o f t h e '80's. I n P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committees and Campaign F i n a n c e : Symposium, p. 552-553. s p o k e s p e r s o n s saw c o n t i n u e d growth of c o r p o r a t e PACs, a l t h o u g h n o t a t t h e same r a t e o f growth a s h i t h e r t o e x p e r i e n c e d and p e r h a p s f o c u s i n g on forms of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n o t h e r t h a n f i n a n c i a l o n e s . The d a t a p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e s u p p o r t s t h e v i e w t h a t c o r p o r a t e PACs would p r o l i f e r a t e a t a slower r a t e s i n c e 1980 t h a n b e f o r e , a l t h o u g h b o t h t h e i r i n c r e a s e i n numbers and money r a i s e d , s p e n t and c o n t r i b u t e d h a s been q u i t e i m p r e s s i v e . While most o b s e r v e r s have f o c u s e d on t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r i n t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t s o f f u t u r e PAC g r o w t h , t h e o v e r a l l p i c t u r e may b e g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by t h e nonconnected g r o u p i n g , a s w e l l . Not o n l y have t h e non-connected PACs exceeded even t h e c o r p o r a t e PACs i n r a t e o f p r o l i f e r a t i o n s i n c e 1977 (when t h e former was b r o k e n o u t i n t o a s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y by t h e FEC), b u t t h e y registered the l a r g e s t , recent aggregate d o l l a r increases i n overall e x p e n d i t u r e s of any o t h e r g r o u p i n g . T h e i r enormous growth i n 1980 and 1982 ( t o f i r s t p l a c e i n e x p e n d i t u r e s ) may w e l l be i n d i c a t i v e of l a r g e f u t u r e growth among t h e u n a f f i l i a t e d PACs, a l t h o u g h once a g a i n t h e "wild c a r d " n a t u r e o f t h i s c a t e g o r y of PAC a d d s t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y of f u t u r e prognoses. E p s t e i n h a s i s o l a t e d two f a c t o r s which h a v e r e s u l t e d from t h e PAC growth of r e c e n t y e a r s which a r e l i k e l y t o p l a y a major r o l e i n f u t u r e PAC growth: t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e l e c t o r a l a c t i v i t y ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e b u s i n e s s community) and t h e l e g i t i m a c y which PACs have a t t a i n e d a s v e h i c l e s f o r p o l i t i c a l - a c t i v i t y . 2621 These f a c t o r s p r o v i d e a v a l u a b l e framework t h r o u g h which one c a n a s s e s s t h e l i k e l i h o o d of f u t u r e PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n and growth. I n terms of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n f a c t o r , E p s t e i n w r i t e s : While i n t h e p a s t t h e r a i s i n g and s p e n d i n g of f u n d s were l a r g e l y ad hoc , i n f o r m a l , and u n s y s t e m a t i c a c t i v i t i e s , - 2621 E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971, p. 146. t o d a y s u c h e f f o r t s h a v e become i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d w i t h i n companies and a r e i n t h e h a n d s o f s t a f f p r o f e s s i o n a l s ( u s u a l l y i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s p o s i t i o n s ) who s e r v e on an ongoing b a s i s a s t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f o c a l p o i n t f o r e l e c t o r a l a c t i v i t i e s . PACs a r e t h e r e f o r e v i s i b l e t o o f f i c e h o l d e r s , p r o s p e c t i v e c a n d i d a t e s , and p a r t y o f f i c i a l s - - a s w e l l a s t o e a c h other--and have become p o r t s o f c a l l f o r o f f i c e s e e k e r s and fund r a i s e r s , a s w e l l a s mechanisms f o r more e f f e c t i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f b u s i n e s s g r o u p s . I n summary, PACs a l l o w c o r p o r a t i o n s and b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d a s s o c i a t i o n s t o o r g a n i z e and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e t h e i r electoral a c t i v i t i e s i n a highly e f f i c i e n t way. 2631 E p s t e i n s e e s such i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o r p o r a t i o n s o c c u r r i n g through such d e v i c e s a s t h e automatic p a y r o l l deduction t o encourage c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e PAC, n o n p a r t i s a n r e g i s t r a t i o n and g e t - o u t - t h e - v o t e drives, and g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on i n t e r n a l communications among management and s t o c k h o l d e r s ; i n such ways, c o r p o r a t i o n s w i l l b e m i r r o r i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s which have i n t h e p a s t r e a l i z e d i m p r e s s i v e g a i n s f o r o r g a n i z e d l a b o r . 2641 E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , a c c o r d i n g t o E p s t e i n , h a s been t h e l e g i t i m i z a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y "both w i t h i n f i r m s and i n t h e g r e a t e r community": E l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s , s o t o s p e a k , h a s come o u t of t h e c o r p o r a t e c l o s e t and i s now r e c o g n i z e d a s a l e g a l and a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i v i t y for business. Such enhanced s t a t u s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a d e f i n e d l e g a l mechanism f o r such a c t i v i t y - - t h e PAC--makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r companies ( 1 ) t o e n c o u r a g e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n among c o r p o r a t e p e r s o n n e l (who might o t h e r w i s e b e r e l u c t a n t ) ; ( 2 ) t o encourage o t h e r f i r m s t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r e l e c t o r a l involvement by e s t a b l i s h i n g PACs, t h e r e b y " k e e p i n g up w i t h t h e J o n e s e s " ; and ( 3 ) i n g e n e r a l , t o u n d e r t a k e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y w i t h a h e i g h t e n e d s e n s e o f r e c t i t u d e and p u r p o s e . 2651 - While E p s t e i n views t h e new l e g i t i m a c y a s a r e s u l t o f t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws o f t h e 1970s, one f i n d s mixed s i g n s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l environment a s t o 2631 2641 2651 - Ibid., p. 146. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 146. t h e i r continued legitimacy with t h e e l e c t o r a t e . When asked whether b u s i n e s s and l a b o r PACs c o n s t i t u t e d a good o r a bad i n f l u e n c e on p o l i t i c s and government, a 64-27 p e r c e n t p l u r a l i t y of Americans t o l d a 1982 H a r r i s Survey t h a t l a b o r PACs were a bad i n f l u e n c e and a 71-20 p e r c e n t p l u r a l i t y s a i d b i g company PACs - were a bad i n f l u e n c e 2661; two y e a r s e a r l i e r , t h e same q u e s t i o n had e l i c i t e d a - r e s p o n s e o f 49-35 p e r c e n t "good i n f l u e n c e " f o r b o t h l a b o r and b u s i n e s s PACs. 2 6 7 / T h i s s h i f t i n p u b l i c o p i n i o n a g a i n s t PACs ( a t l e a s t t h o s e of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r and t h e b u s i n e s s community) may w e l l be t h e r e s u l t o f t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n i n t h e media i n t h e p a s t c o u p l e of y e a r s on t h e r o l e of PAC money i n t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , which PAC s u p p o r t e r s have a s s e r t e d h a s been l a r g e l y s l a n t e d a g a i n s t them. Examining t h i s i s s u e from a d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e , a n o t h e r r e c e n t o p i n i o n p o l l o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of Americans i n t o narrowly-focused g r o u p s and c a u s e s , a s was d i s c u s s e d i n t h e s e c t i o n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e r e a s o n s f o r PAC growth. T h i s 1981 G a l l u p P o l l found w i d e s c a l e p u b l i c membership i n and s u p p o r t of t h e k i n d s of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s which a r e forming PACs t o d a y : S p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t p o l i t i c s i s commonly t h o u g h t t o c o m p r i s e s m a l l , w e l l - o r g a n i z e d g r o u p s which w i e l d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on t h e Congress and hence on t h e p o l i c i e s of t h e f e d e r a l government. C o n t r a r y t o t h i s b e l i e f , t h e G a l l u p P o l l r e c e n t l y found t h a t a s many a s 20 m i l l i o n Americans a r e members of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and a n o t h e r 20 m i l l i o n have g i v e n money t o t h e s e g r o u p s d u r i n g t h e p a s t y e a r . These p r o j e c t i o n s may u n d e r s t a t e p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n g r o u p s formed t o d e f e n d o r promote s i n g l e - i s s u e i n t e r e s t s , s i n c e t h e s u r v e y c o v e r e d o n l y a s e l e c t e d l i s t of 16 t y p e s of groups. - 266/ Americans C a l l Heavy Campaign Spending a " S e r i o u s Problem." H a r r i s S u r v e y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : J a n . 3 , 1983. - The 267/ L i m i t on P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committee Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s Favored. ABC News-Harris S u r v e y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Apr. 3 , 1980. For t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s a whole, t h e s u r v e y found t h a t 1 3 p e r c e n t o f t h e a d u l t p o p u l a t i o n c l a i m e d membership i n one o r more o f t h e s e g r o u p s w h i l e 23 p e r c e n t s a i d t h e y had g i v e n money. About o n e - f o u r t h of t h e p u b l i c (26 p e r c e n t ) r e p o r t e d d o n a t i o n s o r membership o r b o t h . I n a d d i t i o n , 39 p e r c e n t s a i d t h e y would l i k e t o become members o f one o r more of t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . */ To t h e e x t e n t t h a t PACs a r e a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e same t r e n d s which a r e l e a d i n g s o many Americans t o j o i n and c o n t r i b u t e t o i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , one f i n d s s u p p o r t i n t h e p o l i t i c a l environment f o r t h e growth o f PACs. As E p s t e i n n o t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o c o r p o r a t e PACs: P o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y coupled with i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c s w i t h i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework no doubt w i l l l e a d t o i n c r e a s e d and more e f f e c t i v e c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . 269/ - The same i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s and t h e l e g i t i m a c y now a c c o r d e d PACs no d o u b t e x t e n d s beyond j u s t c o r p o r a t e PACs and i n d i c a t e s a h o s p i t a b l e c l i m a t e f o r t h e f u t u r e growth o f PACs i n g e n e r a l . T h i s p r o g n o s i s , however, i s n o t w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Several f a c t o r s can b e d i s c e r n e d which w i l l l i k e l y h a v e a b e a r i n g on t h e f u t u r e of PACs, w i t h t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c u r b i n g t h e k i n d of growth now f o r e s e e n . Each of t h e s e b e a r s b r i e f mention h e r e . F i r s t , t h e d e c l i n e i n t h e p e r c e n t a g e r a t e o f PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n s i n c e 1980 h a s been n o t a b l e , from 21 p e r c e n t a y e a r b e f o r e 1980 t o 16 p e r c e n t i n 1982 and j u s t 4 112 p e r c e n t i n 1983. A s was s a i d i n t h e accompanying a n a l y s i s , i t may w e l l b e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a l e v e l i n g o f f of new PAC growth. Second, a s t h e Harvard s t u d y o b s e r v e d : - 2681 Broad P u b l i c P a r t i c i p a t i o n Found i n ' S p e c i a l - I n t e r e s t ' The G a l l u p P o l l [ p r e s s r e l e a s e ] : August 1 6 , 1981. - Politics. 269/ E p s t e i n , B u s i n e s s and Labor Under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971, p. 146. To a l a r g e e x t e n t , a l l PACs a r e dependent on t h e i s s u e s o f t h e d a y f o r t h e i r growth and a c t i v i t y . The more a d v e r s e t h e circumstances f o r a c o r p o r a t i o n , union, i n d u s t r y , i n t e r e s t o r segment o f s o c i e t y , t h e more l i k e l y i t w i l l s e e k r e d r e s s t h r o u g h a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s . 2701 - Governmental p o l i c i e s which l e a d t o l e s s r e g u l a t i o n c o u l d r e d u c e t h e i n c e n t i v e s o f h i t h e r t o r e g u l a t e d s e c t o r s t o form PACs. By t h e same t o k e n , such p o l i c i e s c o u l d w e l l l e a d t o an i n c r e a s e i n PACs by g r o u p s which f a v o r g r e a t e r government regulation. T h i r d , t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e w i l l i n v a r i a b l y a f f e c t t h e growth o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. As e v i d e n c e above p o i n t e d t o t h e l e g i t i m a c y a c c o r d e d PACs t o d a y , such a h o s p i t a b l e environment c o u l d be a l t e r e d i n t h e future. O p i n i o n p o l l r e s u l t s a l r e a d y show a d e c l i n e i n s u p p o r t f o r b u s i n e s s and l a b o r PACs, a s mentioned above. Such o c c u r r e n c e s a s t h e r e v e l a t i o n o f major i m p r o p r i e t i e s r e s u l t i n g from PAC campaign d o n a t i o n s c o u l d work t o s o u r t h e p u b l i c t o l e r a n c e o f i n t e r e s t g r o u p s and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on policy-making. Such d e v e l o p m e n t s , of c o u r s e , c a n n o t be f o r e s e e n a t any g i v e n t i m e . F o u r t h , t h e r o l e PACs w i l l p l a y i s hinged on t h e r o l e s played by o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l process. I f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were t o p l a y a s t r o n g e r r o l e i n t h e f u n d i n g of campaigns, f o r example, t h e need f o r PAC money w i l l l i k e l y b e l e s s e n e d a n d , i n t u r n , t h e i r r a i s o n d ' e t r e w i l l b e undercut. The s t r e n g t h o f t h e R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y ' s f u n d r a i s i n g e f f o r t i n r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s i s one t a n g i b l e i n d i c a t i o n of such a development a t t h i s t i m e . F i f t h , and f i n a l l y , t h e f u t u r e o f PACs i s i n v a r i a b l y l i n k e d t o f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s by t h e Congress which a f f e c t t h e " r u l e s of t h e game." Some d e c i s i o n s c o u l d have a b e a r i n g on o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e p r o c e s s , a s was mentioned - 270/ Kayden, The Impact of t h e FECA on t h e Growth and E v o l u t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n C o m i t t e e s , p. 107 above o r a s would b e t h e c a s e i f t h e l i m i t s on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s were sharply raised. Congress c o u l d a l s o a c t t o r e d u c e i n c e n t i v e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t o g i v e t o PACs, by d i s a l l o w i n g t a x c r e d i t s f o r s u c h d o n a t i o n s . Congress h a s t h e power t o w r i t e t h e r u l e s f o r s o l i c i t a t i o n o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s by PACs. The Harvard s t u d y n o t e d : Should t h e t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s win t h e r i g h t t o s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s w i t h g r e a t e r e a s e , n o t o n l y w i l l t h e i r numbers increase, but so too, potentially, w i l l t h e i r capacity t o 2711 participate in electoral politics . . . .- These and o t h e r a c t i o n s would o b v i o u s l y have a g r e a t i m p a c t . Whether o r n o t PAC growth t o d a t e i s m e r e l y a " t i p o f t h e i c e b e r g " w i l l t a k e c o n s i d e r a b l e time t o determine. The s h o r t t e r m o u t l o o k , however, i n - t h e words o f one o b s e r v e r , i s f o r "more o f t h e same." 2721 The 2711 I b i d . , p. 108. 2721 P h i l l i p s , Kevin. I n t r o d u c t i o n . P o l i t i c a l Action f o r PAC Handbook. Washington, F r a s e r A s s o c i a t e s , 1981. p. 4. Business: FEC FORM 1 APPENDIX A: STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION (ma revarw side for instructions) 1. (a) Name of Committee (in Full) 0 Check if name or address is changed. 2. Date I 1 3. b)Addrrrc (Number and Strwt 1 FEC Identification Number 4. Is this an amended Statement? (c) City. State and ZIP Code 0 YES 0 NO I 5. TYPE OF COMMllTEE (check one): 0 la) This somminw is a principal campaign committee. (Complete the candidate information below.) 0 (b) This committee is an authorized committw, and is NOT a principal campaign committea. (Complete the candidate information below.) C Name of Candidate Candidate Party Affiliation I Office Sought StatelDistrict end is NOT an authorized committee. 0 Ic) This committee S U ~ O ~ S ~ O P P O Monly S one candidate ~nemeof candidate) 0 (dl This committw is a committee of the Party. (Democratic, Republican, etc.) (National, Stm or subordinatel 0 (el This committw is a wprate ugng.ted fund. 0 (1) This committw suppom/oppowa more than one Federal candidate and is NOT a separate segregated fund nor a party committee. 6. Relationship Mailing Addrom and ZIP Cod. Nama d Any b n n ~ a d Organiution or Affilhtrd Committa If the rW&terinQ Political committee has identified a ''connected organization" above, please indicate type of organization: oCorp0ration OCorporation wlo Capital Stock 0 Labor Orgsnization 7. Cu*odian of RUOrds: Identify by Mme. Mdress (phone number Membership Organization 0 Trade Association Cooperative - optional) and posttion, the person in possesston of committee books and ncords. Full &ma Mailing A d d m and ZIP Coda Title or Position 8. T r r u n r : List the name and address (phone number - optional) of the treasurer of the committee; and the name and address of any designated agent (e.g., assistant trwsurer). Full &nw Mailing A d d m and ZIP Cod. Titla or Position 9. h o k s or 0 t h Depositorb: ~ List ell banks or other depositories in which the committee deposits funds, holds accounts, rents safety deposit boxes or maintains funds. Name of h n k . Dopoaitow, me. Mail* Addrom and ZIP Cod. Icenitv that Ihave ermined this Statement and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. Type or Print Name of Treasurer NOTE: SIGNATURE OF TREASURER Date Submission of false. erroneous, or incomplete information may subject the person signing th~sStatement to the Peoaltres of 2 U.S.C. $4379. For further informetion contact: Federal Election Commission. Toll Free 800424-9530, Local 202-5234068 FEC FORM 1 13/80) w - APPENDIX B: FEC FORM 3X REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS For a Political Commitme Other Than an Authorized Commitme (Summary Page) 1 4. TYPE OF REPORT (check appropriate boxas) 1. Name of Committee (in Full) April 15 Quarterly Report (a) July 15 Quarterly Report / Address (Number and Street) October 15 Quarterly Report / January 31 Year End Report July 31 Mid Year Report (Non-election Year Only) City, hate end ZIP Code Monthly Report for Twelfth day report preceding (Tvw of Elmion) in the State of -. election on Thirtieth day report following the General Election on 3. 0 This committee qualified as a multicandidate com- in the State of Termination Report minee during this Reporting Period on (b) (date) I s this Report an Amendment? 0 YES 0 NO I SUMMARY 5. Covering Period 6. Cdumn A I Column B Through ....................... Cash on Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total Receipts (from Line 18). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ . $ (d) Subtotal (add lines 6(b) and 6(c) for Column A and lines 6(a) and 6(c) for Column B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ $ b) (b) (c) 1 CashonHandJanuary 1,19-. 7. Total Disbursements (from Line 28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... 1 Icertify that Ihem exclmined this R w r t md to the best of my knowl.dg. end belief For funh.r infomution, eonmet: k h true, c o n m end complne. Fedorel Elmion Commission Toll Free 800424-9530 Local2026234088 Typo or Rint W e of Tr-urer NGNATURE OF TREASURER NOTE: Date Submirion of feln. erroneous, or incomplete information m w subject the w n o n signing this Rooon to the wnaltms of 2 U.S.C. w7g. All pmiour rr*orn d FEC FORM I rd FEC FORM 3.ua okDCn end dsould m b w k u r d . FEC FORM 3X (3180) DETAILED SUMMARY PAGE of Receipts and Disbursements (Page 2, FEC FORM 3x1 Repon Cowring the Poriod: Nrmof bmninw (in Full) I. RECEIPTS 1l.CONTRIBUT IONS (other than loans) FROM: b)Individwls/PlnonsOtherThmPoliticelCMmi .................................... m................ (Memo Entry Unitomimd (b)PoliticelPInvCommitcm ................................ .................................. .................................................................... (C~OthorPoliticeIbmmin ra (dl TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS (other then Ions) bdd 1lo, 11b end 1l c ) 12.TRANSFERS FROM AFFILIATEDIOTHER PARTY COMMITTEES ...... ........ ,, I .................................. 14.LOAN REPAYMENTS RECEIVED . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.OFFSETS TO OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Refunds. R.bmr; nc.) . . . . . . . 13.ALL LOANS RECEIVED 16.REFUNDSW CONTRIBUTIONS MADE TO FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND OTHER POLITICAL COMMIREES ........................ 17.OTHER RECEIPTS (Divi&nds. Intomt, OW.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B.T0TALRECElPTS(Add11d'12'13' 14'15' 16md 17)' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. DISBURSEMENTS .............................. 2O.TRANSFERS TO AFFILIATEDIOTHER PARTY COMMITTEES. . . . . . . . . . . 19.OPERATING EXPENDITURES 2l.CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND OTHER POLITICAL COMMITTEES. ........................... 22.1NDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES (Uw Schdulo E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.COORDlNATED EXPENDITURES MADE BY PARTY COMMITTEES (2 U.S.C. $441o(d)) (Uw Schodulo F) ............................ . . . . ........................... 24.LOAN REPAYMENTS MADE SLOANSMADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26. REFUNDS OF CONTRIBUTICNS TO: (a) IndividuelslP.rrons Othor Then Politiul Committees ............................... ..................................... W T O T A L CONTRIBUTION REFUNDS ledd 26e. 28bmd 26cl. . . . . . . . . . . 1 lc) Other Politicel C m m i n m 27.0THER DISBURSEMENTS. ................................ ............. 3O.TOTAL CONTRIBUTION REFUNDS from Lino ZBd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.NET CONTRIBUTIONS (other than loans) (subtnn Line 30 from Uno 29). . . . . . 29.TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS (other than loens) from Line 1I d ................... 33.OFFSETS TO OPERATING EXPENDITURES from Line 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.NET OPERATING EXPENDITURES (wbtnct Line 33 from Lim 32) . . . . . . . . 1 1 I 32.TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDlTURESfrom Line 19 I I SCHEDULE A - R g l Of LINE NUMBER ITEMIZED RECEIPTS fw Any information copied from such Repons or Statements rruv not be sold or used bV any m r w n for the purpose of wlicitinp contributions or for commercial purposes, other then using the name and address of m y Political committw t o wlicit contributions from such c o n i t t w . Noma of C o m m i n r (in Full) L A. Full Nama. Mailing A d d r u m d ZIP Coda Name of Employer Date (month. Amount of E u h day, yeor) Receipt this Period Dam (month, &Y, year) R n e ~This ~ t Pmod Occupation Rceipt For: 0 Primary General Other (specify): Ag~regeteYear-to-Data-$ 0 . Full Nama, Mailing M d r r d ZIP Cod. I Name of Employer I Occupation 0 Pr~rnary Raaipt For: 0 Other (specify): Amount of Each 0 General &grogate Year-to-Date-$ C. Full Name, Mailing M d m a and ZIP Cod. Name of Employer Date (month. Amount of E r h &v, year) Receipt This Period Occupation R m i m For: 0 Primarv 0 Other (specify): 0 General Aggregate Year-to-Date-$ 0. Full Name, Mailing M d n r and ZIP Cod. Name of Employer Data (month, Amount of E r h day, year) Rceipt This Period Occupation 0 Primary Receipt For: 0 Other (specify): 0 General Aggregate Year-to-hte-$ E. Full k m o , Mailing M d r u ud ZIP Cod. Name of Employer Date (month. Amount of E u h day, year) Receipt This Period I Occupation 0 Primary Receipt For: 0 Other (spscify): 0 General Aggregate Year-to-Date-$ Name of Employer F. Full Name, Moiling M d m and ZIP Code Occupation Receipt For: 0 Primary 0 General Aggregate Year-to-Me-$ Other (specify): a. Full Hma, Mailing A d d r u ud ZIP Code I Amount of E u h day, year) Receipt This Period 1 Name of Employer Dam (month, Amount of Each day. veer) Receipt This Pwiod Occupation 0 Primary R c a i p t For: 0 Other (specify): I 0 Gmual i I SUBTOTAL Date (month, of ~ . a i p am i s Pago (optional). I Aggropte Year-to-Dote-$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .I ---- TOTAL This Period (lost p.ge t h h line number only) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . - Page of for LINE NUMBER (Use soparate :ch&ule(s) for each catngory of the Detailud Summary Page) ITEMIZED DISBURSEMENTS SCHEDULE 8 Anv information copied from such Repons and Statements may not be sold or used by any penon for the purpow of soliciting contributions or for commercial PuIP-s. other than using the name m d addrau of any polit~calcommittee to solicit contributions from such committee. ------ Nune of Committee (in Fulll P A. Full Nama. h i l i n g Add- and ZIP Cod. Purpose of Disbursement Dirbunament for: 0 Primary 0 Other (specify): B. Full Nam, Mailing M d r r end Z P Coda Date (month. Amount of Ench day, year) Dirbummmt This Pericr Date (month, Amount of Fach day, year) Disburcsrncnt This b r i m General Purpow of Disbunsment I D Primary D General D t s b u ~ m e nfor: t fJ C. Full Namr, Mailing Addma md ZIP Cod. Other (specify): Purpose of Disbursement I I Date (month, Amount of Each day, year) Disbursement This Psrim Date (month, day, year) 1 I Amount of Each / Oirbursernent Thi, Peria Disbursement for: 0 Primary 0 General 0 Other (specify): 1 Purpose of Disbursement D. Full Name. Mailing M d r r and ZIP Code - [ I I Disbursement for: 0 Primary 0 General 0 Other (specify): E. Full k n w , Mailing Addno and ZIP Cod. Purpose of Disbursement Disbursement for: 0 Primary Date (month, Amount of Each day, year) Disbursement This Perim General Other (specify). F. Full Name, Mailing M d r r and ZIP Cod. Purpose of Disbursement k b w s e m e n t for: 0 Primary 0 General 0 Other (specify): G. Full Name, Mailing Add- ( and ZIP Code I I I Purpose of Dtsbursement I I Date (month. day, year) Disbursement for: 0 Primary 0 General 0 Other (specify): H. Full Name. Mailing M d n r md ZIP Coda Purpose of Disbursement I Disbursement for: 0 Primary 0 Other (specify): I. Full Nam. Mailing A d d r r and ZIP Cod. Amount of Each Disbursement This Perio, I 1 I kI Date (month, day, year) Amount of Eech I General Purpose of Disbursement Date (month. day, year) IDisburrment Thir Psria I Disbursement for: 0 Primary 0 General 0 Other (specify1: ( SUBTOTAL 1 of 0iBunamanu This Rga (optlonall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .I TOTAL This Period h a t p . ~ this s line number only) Dirbursarnent This Psriot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I P.ge - of for LINE NUMBER (Up. separate rhedulu for 6sch numbed line1 LOANS Nmr of Cmmitta (In Full) A. Full Mme. tMllng A d d m m md ZIP Cod#of LM Sour- I I O ~ C W*mourn d Lan 7 I I ~ u r mTOhan iw ~ a v m I tb l m a ~ u t m n d k #m I . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . I S This Pniod Phh PIO. (omiwl) - CI- of ~ h ~bm b d - - SCHEDULE D (Revised 3/80) 11 SUBTOTALS This Period This Pago (optional) DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS Excluding Loans Page of tor LINE NUMBER (Use separate scheduler for each numbered line) ............................................... ................................................ TOTAL OUTSTANDING LOANS from Schedule C (last paqe only ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2) TOTAL This Period (last page this line only) 3) 4) ADD 2) and 3 ) and carry forward to appropriate line o f Summary P.ge (last Page only) .I ....................... - ITEMIZED INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES Ur I- WI kr Innucn*rrl Amount h of Fl&rrl C.nd~Oltr su~morr.dor woomd bv the N O T A R Y PUBLIC SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY GENERAL . Alexander, H e r b e r t E The c a s e f o r PACs. Washington, P u b l i c A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , 1983. 32 p. (A P u b l i c A f f a i r s Council Monograph) Author u s e s s t a t i s t i c s and o u r e x p e r i e n c e t h u s f a r w i t h PACs t o s u p p o r t h i s argument t h a t PACs perform a b e n e f i c i a l r o l e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system. ----- and Brian A. Haggerty, e d . The F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t : a f t e r a decade of p o l i t i a l reform: r e p o r t o f a c o n f e r e n c e sponsored by C i t i z e n s ' Research Foundation, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a . Washington, D. C . , A p r i l 2-3, 1981. Los Angeles, The Foundation, 1981. 135 p. Chapter 4 d i s c u s s e s pros and cons of s u g g e s t i o n s t o a l t e r t h e r o l e played by PACs i n t h e campaign f i n a n c e p r o c e s s . ----- Financing p o l i t i c s : money, e l e c t i o n s , and p o l i t i c a l reform. 3rd ed. Washington, C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y P r e s s , 1984. 232 p. (Politics and p u b l i c p o l i c y s e r i e s ) JK1991.A6797 1984 A comprehensive l o o k a t campaign f i n a n c i n g and i t s r e g u l a t i o n today. Chapter 4 d e a l s w i t h t h e r o l e of i n t e r e s t groups and PACs i n t h e f i n a n c i n g of e l e c t i o n s . ----- PACs: what t h e y a r e , how t h e y a r e changing p o l i t i c a l campaign f i n a n c i n g p a t t e r n s . Washington, Conn., Center f o r I n f o r m a t i o n on America, 1979. 1 4 p. (Grass r o o t s g u i d e s on democracy and p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s ; b o o k l e t J K 1991.A713 no. 62) A s u c c i n c t r e v i e w o f PACs and t h e r o l e t h e y have been p l a y i n g i n American p o l i t i c s . ----- P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees and t h e i r c o r p o r a t e s p o n s o r s . P u b l i c a f f a i r s r e v i e w , v. 2, 1981: 27-38. Looks a t t h e f u t u r e of b u s i n e s s PACs and p r e d i c t s c o n t i n u e d corporate p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , a s well a s continued controversy over PACs i n g e n e r a l . B a l i t z e r , Alfred. A n a t i o n o f a s s o c i a t i o n s : t h e o r i g i n , development and t h e o r y o f t h e p o i t i c a l a c t i o n committee. Washington, American S o c i e t y of A s s o c i a t i o n E x e c u t i v e s , 1981. 104 p. "Present-day p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees play a r o l e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system t h a t d a t e s t o c o l o n i a l America. P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n a s s o c i a t i o n s a r e i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y o f t h e United States--a form of v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n whose members a s s o c i a t e o f t h e i r own w i l l t o advance s h a r e d i n t e r e s t and p r i n c i p l e . A s s u c h , t h e y a r e wholly c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s p i r i t and l e t t e r o f democracy." Brenner, Steven N. Business and politics--an update. Harvard Business Review, v. 57, Nov.-Dec. 1979: 149-163. HF5001.H3, v. 57 "A survey of HBR subscribers shows that executives think that for the 1980s greater involvement in politics is proper; the public is less sure." Compares 1978 poll with 1968 poll. Campaign finance reform. Commonsense, v. 6, Dec. 1983: 1-82. Partial contents--Campaign finance reform: expanding government's role or the parties' role? by J. Bibby--The real crisis in campaign financing, by P. Laxalt--PAC limitations and public financing: solutions in search of a problem? by B. Frenzel--Looking back at the future of campaign finance reform, by M. Malbin--Homogenizing Congress, by 3 . Thomas--Major camapign finance reform legislation. Conference on Congressional Campaigns and Federal Law, Washington, D.C. 1979. The political campaign and election law committee of the Federal Bar Association presents a conference on congressional campaigns and Federal law, Four Seasons Rotel, Vashington, D.C. November 27-28, 1979. Washington, Federal Bar Association, 1979. 223p. KF4886 .A5C66 1979 Conference addresses such issues as the effects of the Federal election campaign act on campaign strategy; permissible party activity on behalf of candidates for Federal office; corporate and union political activities; the Federal Election Commission; and congressional ethics guidelines. Conway, M. Margaret. PACs, the new politics, and congressional campaigns. In interest group politics. Allan J. Cigler and Rurdett A. Loomis, ed. Washington, CQ Press, 1983. Politics and Public Policy Series. p. 126-144. "Discusses the rise of PACs as potent political forces and assesses their impact upon the electoral and legislative processes. Conway examines various proposals directed at curbing the excesses--real and potential--of PAC influence, particularly those designed to strengthen political parties and increase the role of individuals in financing campaigns. " Dollar politics. 3rd ed. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982. 163 p. Chapter 3--"PACs: A vital force in politicsw-provides a brief overview of the role of PACs and the debate regarding them. Drew, Elizabeth. Politics and money: the new road to corruption. New York, Macmillan, 1983. 166 p. Argues that despite the limitations on contribution and spending under the Federal Election Campaign Act, private money is continuing to play so large a role in our electoral system-through PACs and loopholes in the law--that the system itself is in danger of being seriously eroded. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Laws: symposium. Emory law j o u r n a l , v . 29, s p r i n g 1980: 313-436. K10.0885, V . 29 P a r t i a l c o n t e n t s - - P o l i t i c s , money, c o e r c i o n , and t h e problem w i t h c o r p o r a t e PACs, by W. Mayton--Federal r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e campaign f i n a n c i n g a c t i v i t y o f t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s : a n overview, by D. S w i l l i n g e r . Gray, Robert T. Involved b u s i n e s s people: powerful new f o r c e f o r change. N a t i o n ' s b u s i n e s s , v. 6 6 , May 1978: 23-26, 28, 30. HFl.N4, v. 66 Examines "what i s perhaps t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t development i n c u r r e n t p o l i t i a l l i f e . That d e v e l o p e n t Is t h e growth o f a movement among b u s i n e s s men and women--from t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f s m a l l shops t o t o p executives of g i a n t corporations--to o b t a i n a voice i n t h e p r o c e s s by which government makes t h e d e c i s i o n s t h a t a f f e c t them." Money i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . New Haven, Yale J a c o b s o n , Gary C. U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980. 251 p. JK1991.J32 Documents t h e incumbency advantage i n t h e f i n a n c i n g of c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . Provides d a t a on s o u r c e s of f u n d i n g , i n c l u d i n g PACs. ----- The p o l i t i c s o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1983. 216 p. JK1067.53 1983 C h a p t e r s 4 and 5 c o n t a i n u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e f i n a n c i n g o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaigns. A s campaign c o s t s s k y r o c k e t , l o b b y i s t s K e l l e r , B i l l , and I r w i n B. A r i e f f . Congressional q u a r t e r l y t a k e growing r o l e i n Washington f u n d - r a i s e r s . weekly r e p o r t , v. 38, May 17, 1980: 1333-1346. JKl.Cl5, v . 38 D i s c u s s e s t h e i n c r e a s i n g amount o f 1l;oney provided t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaigns by i a t e r e s t groups and l o b b y i s t s . Campaign f i n a n c i n g and t h e " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . " P u b l i c Malbin, Michael J. i n t e r e s t , no. 56, summer 1979: 21-42. A s s e r t s t h a t campaign f i n a n c i n g laws need r e v i s i o n , b u t r a t h e r t h a n changing f i n a n c i n g laws because o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee t h e more b a s i c f u n d i n g , Congress "should be c o n s i d e r i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s b e s e t t i n g o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s . PACs a r e o n l y a s m a l l p a r t o f t h e s e , and i f Congress p e r s i s t s i n r e a c t i n g o n l y t o PAC growth i t may u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y s t r e n g t h e n o t h e r f o r c e s i n ways t h a t w i l l haunt u s i n t h e f u t u r e . There may w e l l be an argument t o be made on b e h a l f o f some form of p u b l i c campaign f i n a n c i n g , b u t t h e arguments now being made, and t h e b i l l s p r e s e n t l y being c o n s i d e r e d , r e a c t t o a minor phenomenon w h i l e i g n o r i n g major t h r e a t s Congress u n w i t t i n g l y h a s been h e l p i n g . " ... ed. P a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , and campaign f i n a n c e laws. Washington, American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y Research, 1979. 384 p. (American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y Research. AEI symposia 791) JK1118.P37 P a p e r s p r e s e n t e d a t a c o n f e r e n c e sponsored by t h e American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e and h e l d i n Washington, D.C. S e p t . 4-5, 1979. Contents.--Interest groups and t h e law: some p e r s p e c t i v e s from inside.--Interest groups and t h e law: two overviews.--Campaign f i n a n c e and campaign s t r a t e g y . - - P a r t i e s and campaign f : ~ a n c e laws. Campaign f i n a n c e r e g u l a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . ,, Malbin, Michael. The problem of PAC-journalism. P u b l i c Opinion, v. 5, Dec./Jan. 1983. p. 15-17. "Whatever e l s e we may t h i n k about t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws o f t h e 1970s, t h e y d i d n o t spawn something f o r e i g n t o American p o l i t i c s when t h e y encouraged i n t e r e s t ,),roups t o form p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees." P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. New York, WNET/Thirteen, 1982. 8 p. The MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Nov. 9, 1982. Sen. William Proxmire, Rep. P h i l Gramm, Richard Thaxton o f t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of R e a l t o r s , and Ann McBride o f Common Cause d i s c u s s t h e impact o f PAC money i n t h e 1980 congressional elections. P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees and campaign f i n a n c e : symposium. Arizona law r e v i e w , v. 22, no. 2, 1980: whole i s s u e . LAW P a r t i a l contents.--Constitutional l i m i t a t i o n on r e s t r i c t i n g c o r p o r a t e and union p o l i t i c a l s p e e c h , by J . Bolton.--PACing t h e Burger Court: t h e c o r p o r a t e r i g h t t o s p e a k and t h e p u b l i c r i g h t t o h e a r a f t e r F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank v . B e l l o t t i , by T. Kiley-P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees: two l i f e c y c l e s , by C. Sprou1.--The F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission: a g u i d e f o r c o r p o r a t e c o u n s e l , by J. Baran.--The Obey-Railsback B i l l : i t s g e n e s i s and e a r l y h i s t o r y , by H. Alexander.--Congressional r e s p o n s e s t o Obey-Railsback. Reaves, Lynne. Campaign f i n a n c i n g reform: i s Congress r e a d y ? American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n j o u r n a l , v. 69, June 1983: 715-717. "The chances f o r passage o f any campaign reform l e g i s l a t i o n t h i s y e a r a r e s l i m , but e v e n t u a l l y i t w i l l happen, s a y a number of long-term Congress watchers." Rees, John. The p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees a r e throwing r i n g e r s . American o p i n i o n , v . 23, June 1980: 27-29, 31-46, 85-86. AP2.04732, V . 23 "The r i s e o f t h e independent and b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees i s s e e n a s a b e n e f i c i a l c o u n t e r - t r e n d t o p u b l i c a p a t h y and l a c k o f involvement i n t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . R e s t r i c t i o n s on campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s , l i m i t s on i n d i v i d u a l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s and on t o t a l PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s have been i n t e n d e d t o choke o f f money flowing t o t h e new C o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e s coming from o u t s i d e t h e e s t a b l i s h e d 'Liberal' party hierarchies." E s q u i r e , v . 93, Mar. 1980: 7 , 11. AP2SE845, V. 93 A s s e r t s t h a t campaign f i n a n c e laws have "had r e s u l t s d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e r e f o r m e r s a n t i c i p a t e d . " Notes t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e number of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees, t h e i n c r e a s e i n c o r p o r a t e campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t h e i n c r e a s e i n s i n g l e i n t e r e s t p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s which have r e s u l t e d from campaign f i n a n c e reform l e g i s l a t i o n . Reeves, Richard. When reform b a c k f i r e s . PACs arnericana: a d i r e c t o r y o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees Roeder, Edward. (PACs) and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Washington, Sunshine S e r v i c e s Corp., 1982. 859 p. JK1991.R63 1982 D e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about e v e r y PAC r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e FEC, i n c l u d i n g a g g r e g a t e d a t a on t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1980, and f e a t u r i n g a breakdown o f PACs by i n d u s t r y o r a r e a o f i n t e r e s t . Rothenberg, S t u a r t . Campaign r e g u l a t i o n and p u b l i c p o l i c y : PACs, i d e o l o g y , and t h e FEC. Washington, Free Congress Research and E d u c a t i o n Foundation, 1981. 82 p. Recommends " t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s , b o t h on p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees and on i n d i v i d u a l s , be e l i m i n a t e d . The system o f d i s c l o s i n g campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s should be m a i n t a i n e d , and p e n a l t i e s f o r f a i l i n g t o r e p o r t c o n t r i b u t i o n s should be i n c r e a s e d . Removing c o n t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s would, i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , l e a d t o fewer independent e x p e n d i t u r e campaigns, s i n c e PACs and wealthy i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d t h e n help candidates directly." The campaign reform f a i l u r e . New r e p u b l i c , S e p t . 5, Samuelson, Robert J. 1983: 28-36. A r e f u t a t i o n of t h e arguments advanced by E l i z a b e t h Drew and PAC r e f o r m e r s " t h a t money has a t t a i n e d unprecedented and t h a t t h e r e a r e l e v e r a g e over government behavior p o s s i b l e reforms t h a t would r e p r e s e n t s u b s t a n t i a l improvements without a g g r a v a t i n g c u r r e n t d e f i c i e n c i e s o r c r e a t i n g new ones." .. . S c h n e i d e r , William. Campaign f i n a n c i n g : c u r b s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t g i v i n g but d o n ' t go p u b l i c . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 5 , Feb. 26, 1983: 472-473. Reviews r e c e n t p u b l i c o p i n i o n s u r v e y s on e l e c t i o n f i n a n c i n g , f i n d i n g t h a t n o t a l l p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees were o b j e c t e d t o a s bad i n f l u e n c e s . "What people o b j e c t t o i s n o t PACs b u t s e l f The c o n v e n t i o n a l s o l u t i o n proposed by serving i n t e r e s t s . t h o s e who oppose s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t money i n p o l i t i c s i s p u b l i c financing. But t h e p u b l i c does n o t approve o f p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g a s a remedy." ... Twentieth Century Fund. Task f o r c e on p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. What p r i c e PACs? Report of t h e Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on P o l i t i c a l Action Committees w i t h background paper by Frank J. Sorauf. New Pork, The Fund, 1984. 122 p. I n c l u d e s a background paper " P o l i t i c a l Action Committees i n American P o l i t i c s : An Overview", by Frank J . S o r a u f . p. 27-122. Shabecoff, P h i l i p . Big b u s i n e s s on t h e o f f e n s i v e . New York times magazine, AP2.N6575, 1979 Dec. 9 , 1979: 134, 136, 138, 1 4 1 , 143, 145-146. " A f t e r decades of r e t i c e n c e , t h e b u s i n e s s community h a s q u i e t l y become t h e most i n f l u e n t i a l lobby i n Washington." D i s c u s s e s lobbying t e c h n i q u e s and i s s u e s g a i n i n g s u p p o r t o f t h e b u s i n e s s lobby. S i l b e r m a n , J o n a t h a n , and G i l b e r t Yochum. The m a r k e t f o r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t f u n d s : a n e x p l o r a t o r y a p p r o a c h . P u b l i c c h o i c e , v . 35, 1980: 75-83. JAl.P77, v. 35 " E x i s t i n g t h e o r y and e c o n o m e t r i c work on t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f r e p o r t e d campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s h a s f o c u s e d a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y on s u p p l y a s p e c t s . " T h i s s t u d y e v a l u a t e s " t h e s u p p l y and demand o f special i n t e r e s t contributions." U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An a n a l y s i s o f t h e impact o f t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t , 1972-78. From t h e I n s t i t u t e of P o l i t i c s , John F. Kennedy School of P o l i t i c s , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. 1 4 1 p. 9 6 t h Congress, 1st s e s s i o n . House. Committee p r i n t . "The s t u d y r e v i e w s t h e impact o f t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t o n campaigns f o r t h e U.S. House o f q e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , a s w e l l as t h e impact o f t h e Act on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and t h e r e s u l t a n t growth o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n cormnittees. An a d d i t i o n a l a s p e c t o f t h e s t u d y i s a n a n a l y s i s o f t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Act by t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n commission." Study c o n c l u d e s t h a t post-Watergate ' r e f o r m s ' i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n laws have g i v e n t h e c o u n t r y f i v e y e a r s o f o v e r r e g u l a t e d , underfunded p o l i t i c a l campaigns even more d e p e n d e n t on s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t money t h a n t h e y were b e f o r e . " U.S. L i b r a r y o f Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e . Options t o l i m i t f i n a n c i n g and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s r e g a r d l e s s o f s o u r c e i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l elections--some l e g a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , ( R e p o r t No. 83-52s) E l i z a b e t h Yadlosky. Washington, 1983. 33 p. Reviews c u r r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e and o t h e r p r o p o s a l s t o c u r b PACs and i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . Watson, Tom. S o a r i n g campaign s p e n d i n g g e n e r a t e s renewed i n t e r e s t i n e l e c t i o n f i n a n c e c h a n g e s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v. 41, J u l y 1 6 , 1983: 1451-1453. "The l a r g e sums pumped i n t o some 1982 campaigns have r e k i n d l e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l d e b a t e on f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n f i n a n c i n g l a w s . But i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t members w i l l d o a n y t h i n g i m m e d i a t e l y t o c u r b b i g spending. The PAC d i r e c t o r y : a Weinberger, Marvin I . , and David U. Greevy, comp. c o m p l e t e g u i d e t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. Cambridge, Mass., B a l l i n g e r , 1982. 1552 p. ( i n v a r i o u s p a g i n g s ) JK1991.W44 1982 L i s t s d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on e a c h PAC r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e FEC, i n c l u d i n g a g g r e g a t e f i n a n c i a l d a t a f o r t h e 1978 and 1980 e l e c t i o n s , a l i s t o f r e c i p i e n t s o f e a c h PAC's c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1978 and 1980, a l i s t o f PACs g i v i n g t o s e l e c t e d c a n d i d a t e s i n 1978 and 1980, and a breakdown o f c o r p o r a t e PACs by i n d u s t r y . HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS ( C i t a t i o n s o f books and a r t i c l e s t h a t t r a c e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s p e n d i n g and PAC g r o w t h and t h e l a w s a f f e c t i n g them) P o l i t i c a l money: a s t r a t e g y f o r Adamany, David W., and George E. Agree. campaign f i n a n c i n g i n America. B a l t i m o r e , J o h n s Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975. 242 p. JK1991.A64 An a n a l y s i s o f t h e r e f o r m e f f o r t s i n t h e 1970s r e g a r d i n g campaign f u n d i n g , and a d i s c u s s i o n o f many r e f o r m p r o p o s a l s . Money i n p o l i t i c s . Washington, P u b l i c A f f a i r s P r e s s , A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E. 1972. 353 p. JK1991 .A694 A s t u d y o f campaign f i n a n c i n g i n American e l e c t i o n s and t h e e f f o r t s t o r e f o r m and r e g u l a t e i t . C h a p t e r s 9-10 f o c u s o n i n t e r e s t g r o u p , b u s i n e s s and l a b o r a c t i v i t i e s i n campaign f i n a n c i n g . Corporate p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees : e f f e c t o f t h e Federal Brown, Diane V. e l e c t i o n campaign a c t amendments of 1976. C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y l a w r e v i e w , v . 26, summer 1977: 756-793. K3.A79, v . 26 Comment c o n c l u d e s t h a t w h i l e t h e 1376 amendments a r e on t h e whole s o u n d , t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e r i g h t t o s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s - - d i s t i n c t from t h e r i g h t t o c o n t r i b u t e - - a r e t o o l i m i t i n g o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ' s r i g h t t o communicate. 2 v. Washington, 1971-74. JK199l.C66 1971 P r o v i d e s background o n campaign f i n a n c i n g i s s u e s t h r o u g h 1974 and Includes spending d a t a attempts t o r e g u l a t e i t through t h a t period. f o r c a n d i d a t e s and g r o u p s between 1970 and 1974. Dollar P o l i t i c s . Congressional Q u a r t e r l y , Inc. Egan, J o h n . A f f i l i a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s under t h e a n t i p r o l i f e r a t i o n amendments t o t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act o f 1971. C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y l a w r e v i e w , v . 29, s p r i n g 1980: 713-731. K3.A79, v. 29 Comment examines t h e u n r e s o l v e d s t a t u s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e AFL-CIO's committee on p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n and i t s member u n i o n s ' p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees and between t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s ' PACs v i s - a - v i s t h e 1976 amendments t o t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act p r o h i b i t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a c a n d i d a t e by m u l t i p l e PACs o f a s i n g l e e n t i t y . C o r p o r a t i o n s and l a b o r u n i o n s i n e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s . E p s t e i n , Edwin M. I n P o l i t i c a l f i n a n c e : r e f o r m and r e a l i t y . P h i l a d e l p h i a , American Academy o f P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l S c i e n c e , 1976. ( A n n a l s , v . 425, May 1976) p. 33-58. Hl.A4, v. 425 Reviews t h e c o u r t d e c i s i o n s , l e g i s l a t i o n , and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n s which c r e a t e d t h e f a v o r a b l e c l i m a t e f o r PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n a s o f 1976. E p s t e i n , Edwin M. C o r p o r a t i o n s , c o n t r i b u t i o n s , and p o l i t i c a l campaigns: F e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n i n p e r s p e c t i v e . Rer k e l e y , I n s t i t u t e o f Governmental S t u d i e s , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , 1968. 222p. KF4920.ZgE6 T r a c e s i n d e t a i l t h e v a r i o u s l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s which r e g u l a t e d c o r p o r a t e (and l a b o r ) p o l i t i c a l s p e n d i n g d u r i n g most o f t h e 2 0 t h C e n t u r y , p r i o r t o t h e campaign f i n a n c e l a w s o f t h e 1 9 7 0 s . ----- The emergence o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s . I n A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E. P o l i t i c a l f i n a n c e . B e v e r l y H i l l s , C a l i f . , Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1979. p . 159-198 (Sage e l e c t o r a l s t u d i e s y e a r b o o k , v . 5 ) JK1991.P58 T r a c e s t h e v a r i o u s i n c e n t i v e s t o PAC g r o w t h p r o v i d e d by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e , j u d i c i a l , and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n s o f t h e 1970s. ----- The B u s i n e s s PAC Phenomenon: An i r o n y o f e l e c t o r a l r e f o r m . R e g u l a t i o n , v . 3 , May-June 1979: 35-41. K18.E6, v . 3 Examines t h e i m p e t u s f o r PAC growth p r o v i d e d by t h e campaign f i n a n c e l e g i s l a t i o n o f t h e 1970s and a r g u e s t h a t , i n e a c h c a s e , o r g a n i z e d l a b o r was t h e major f o r c e b e h i n d t h e l e g i s l a t i v e c h a n g e s which rebounded ultimately t o the benefit of the business s e c t o r . ----- Labor and F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s : t h e new l e g a l framework. Industrial r e l a t i o n s , v . 1 5 , O c t . 1976: 257-274. HD6951.152, v . 15 C o n s i d e r s p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s o f t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t and i t s 1974 and 1976 amendments on campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s by l a b o r and c o r p o r a t i o n s . S i n c e t h e 1976 amendments and F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission r e g u l a t i o n s a r e s o new, t h e 1976 e l e c t i o n r e f l e c t e d t h e u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Heard, A l e x a n d e r . The c o s t s o f democracy. Chapel H i l l , U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1960. 493p. JK1991.H39 An e a r l y o v e r v i e w o f t h e r o l e o f money i n e l e c t i o n s , w i t h s e v e r a l c h a p t e r s on t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f b u s i n e s s , l a b o r and o t h e r i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . A discussion of corporate contributions t o p o l i t i c a l McKeown, M a r g a r e t T. campaigns. Delaware j o u r n a l o f c o r p o r a t e l a w , v . 2 , no. 1, 1977: 138-145. K4.E38, v . 2 Comment d i s c u s s e s t h e l a w a f f e c t i n g " t h e r o l e t h a t c o r p o r a t i o n s may p l a y i n t h e f e d e r a l e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , n o t o n l y f i n a n c i a l l y , b u t a l s o t h r o u g h o t h e r l i t t l e known a v e n u e s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a l l w i t h i n t h e framework o f t h e law." Mager, T. R i c h a r d . P a s t and p r e s e n t a t t e m p t e by Congress and t h e c o u r t s t o r e g u l a t e c o r p o r a t e and u n i o n campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s i n t h e e l e c t i o n of Federal o f f i c i a l s . Southern I l l i n o i s University l a w j o u r n a l , v . 1976, Dec. 1976: 338-399. K23.078, v . 1976 " T h i s a r t i c l e summarizes and d i s c u s s e s t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s and r e g u l a t i o n by Congress o f c o r p o r a t e and u n i o n campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s . The l a n g u a g e and l o g i c (is) employed by t h e c o u r t s i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e s e a c t s c a r e f u l l y a n a l y z e d . The a u t h o r a l s o s u g g e s t s some s o l u t i o n s t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n problems which w i l l c o n t i n u e t o a r i s e o u t o f t h e a n o m a l i e s c r e a t e d by t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e l a w i n t h i s f i e l d and t h e p r e s e n t F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t and i t s amendments." ... Mayton, William T. Nixon's PACs Americana. Washington monthly, v. 11, J a n . 1980: 54-57. E838.W37, v . 11 M a i n t a i n s t h a t c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees a r e i n e s s e n c e t h e l e g a l i z a t i o n of t h e c o r p o r a t e group s o l i c i t a t i o n program d e s i g n e d by t h e 1972 Nixon r e e l e c t i o n committee f o r a l l e g e d l y c o e r c i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s from employees. Mazo, Mark E l l i o t t . Impact on c o r p o r a t i o n s o f t h e 1976 amendments t o t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t . Business l a w y e r , v. 32, J a n . 1977: 427-450. LAW "The 1976 Amendments c o n t i n u e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s ' made by any c o r p o r a t i o n . However, t h e new s t a t u t e does make s e v e r a l s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n t h e scope of p e r m i s s i b l e c o r p o r a t e political activities." Overacker, L o u i s e . L a b o r ' s p o l i t i c a l contributions. P o l i t i a l s c i e n c e Hl.P8, v. 54 q u a r t e r l y , v. 54, Mar. 1939: 56-68. Examines t h e e a r l y movement toward s e p a r a t e s e g r e g a t e d funds by o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , i n c l u d i n g spending d a t a s i n c e 1900. ----- P r e s i d e n t i a l campaign f u n d s . New York, AMS P r e s s , 1978. 76 p. (Gaspar G. Bacon l e c t u r e s on t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e United S t a t e s , 1945) JK1991.072 1978 T h i s work i s a " R e p r i n t of t h e 1946 e d . p u b l i s h e d by Boston U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Boston, which was i s s u e d a s t h e Gaspar G. Bacon L e c t u r e s h i p on t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s , Boston U n i v e r s i t y l e c t u r e s , 1946." Chapter 3 t r a c e s t h e e a r l y p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s o f o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , f o c u s i n g on t h e e a r l y f o r e r u n n e r s o f t o d a y ' s PACs. Tanenhaus, J o s e p h . Organized p o l i t i c a l spending: t h e law and i t s consequences. J A l . J 6 , v. 16 J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c s , v. 1 6 , Aug. 1954: 441-471. An account of l e g i s l a t i v e e f f o r t s t o c u r b u n i o n s ' p o l i t i c a l power and a r e v i e w o f l a b o r s ' p o l i t i c a l spending s i n c e World War 11. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS ( C i t a t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l h e a r i n g s and r e p o r t s on t h e campaign f i n a n c e laws o f t h e 1970s and o t h e r documents t h a t r e l a t e t o t o p i c s d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s report) 1971 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Camaainn Act (FECA) U.S. Congress. Conference Committees, 1971. F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t o f 1971, c o n f e r e n c e r e p o r t t o accompany S. 382. Washington, 1J.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1971. 37 p. (92d Congress, 1st s e s s i o n . S e n a t e . Report no. 92-580) T h i s r e p o r t was a l s o i s s u e d a s 92d Congress, 1st s e s s i o n . House. Report no. 92-752. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Federal e l e c t i o n reform; r e p o r t , t o g e t h e r with s e p a r a t e , a d d i t i o n a l , s u p p l e m e n t a l , and d i s s e n t i n g v i e w s ( t o accompany H.R. 11060). Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1971. 36 p. (92d C o n g r e s s , 1st s e s s i o n . House. Report no. 92-564) KF32.H6 1971 U. S. Congress. House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Subcommittee on E l e c t i o n s . To l i m i t campaign e x p e n d i t u r e s . H e a r i n g s , 92d C o n g r e s s , 1st s e s s i o n , on H.R. 5284. June 22, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1971. 226 p. KF27.H645 1971 U.S. Congress. S e n a t e . Committee on R u l e s and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Federal E l e c t i o n s Campaign Act of 1971; r e p o r t , on S. 832. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1971. 128 p. (92d C o n g r e s s , 1st s e s s i o n . S e n a t e . Report no. 92-229) U.S. Subcommittee Congress. S e n a t e . Comrnittee on R u l e s and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . on P r i v i l e g e s and E l e c t i o n s . F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t of 1971. H e a r i n g s , 92d C o n g r e s s , 1st s e s s i o n , on S. 382. May 24 and 25, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1971. 204 p. KF26.R867 1971 1974 FECA Amendments U.S. Congress. Conference Committees, 1974. F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t amendments of 1974; c o n f e r e n c e r e p o r t t o accompany S. 3044. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1974. 128 p. (93d C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n . House. Report no. 93-1438) T h i s r e p o r t was a l s o i s s u e d a s 93d Congress. 2d s e s s i o n . S e n a t e . Report no. 93-1237. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Federal e l e c t i o n campaign a c t amendments of 1974; r e p o r t t o accompany H.R. 16090, 93d C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1974. 160 p. (93d Congress, 2d s e s s i o n . House. Report no. 93-1239) U. S . Congress. House. Commit t e e on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Subcommittee on e l e c t i o n s . F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n reform. H e a r i n g s , 93d Congress, 1st s e s s i o n , on H.R. 7612, S. 372, and r e l a t e d e l e c t i o n r e f o r m b i l l s . Oct. 2-Nov. 29, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1973. KF27.H645 1973a 493 p. U.S. Congress. S e n a t e . Committee on R u l e s and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Federal e l e c t i o n campaign a c t amendments o f 1974; r e p o r t t o accompany S. 3044, 93d Congress, 2d s e s s i o n . Washington, Y.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1974. 90 p. (93d C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n . S e n a t e . Report no. 93-689) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Subcornittee on Privileges and Elections. Federal Election Reform, 1973. Hearings, 93d Congress, 1st session, on S. 23, S. 343, S. 372, S. 1094, S. 1189, S. 1303, S. 1355, and S.J. Res. 110. Apr. 11-June 7, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 406 p. KF26 .R867 1973 ----- Public financing of Federal elections. Hearings, 93d Congress, 1st session, on S. 1103, S. 1954, S. 2417. Sept. 18-21, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 634 p. KF26.R867 1973b 1976 FECA Amendments U.S. Congress. amendments U.S. Govt. Report no. Conference Committees, 1976. Federal election campaign act of 1976; conference report to accompany S. 3065. Washington, Print. Off., 1976. 77 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. House. 94-1057) U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Federal election campaign act amendments of 1976; report to accompany H.R. 12406. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 96 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 94-917) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee cn Rules and Administration. Federal election campaign act amendments of 1976; report to accompany S. 3065 together with minority views. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 62 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-677) "To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for its administration by a Federal Election Commission appointed in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, and for other purposes ." ----- Subcommittee on privileges and elections. Federal election campaign act amendments, 1976. Hearings, 94th Congress, 2d session, on S. 2911, S. 2911-Amdt. no. 1396, S. 2912, S. 2918, S. 2953, S. 2980, and S. 2987. Feb. 18, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 207 p. KF26.R867 1976 "Bills to amend the Federal election campaign act of 1971, as amended, to reconstitute a Federal Election Commission, and for other purposes ." Miscellaneous U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Public financing of congressional elections. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, on H.R. 1 and related legislation. Mar. 15-27, 1979. Washington, U.S. KF27.H6 1979 Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 535 p. ----- Task force on elections. Campaign finance reform. Hearings, 98th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984. 837 p. Hearings held June 9-23, 1983, Washington, D.C.; July 8, 1983, Boston, Mass.; Aug. 22, 1983, Sacramento, Calif.; Aug. 23, 1983, Seattle, Wash.; Oct. 12, 1983, Atlanta, Ga. ----- Contribution limitations and independent expenditures. Hearings, 97th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 437 p. Hearings held June 10, and July 28, 1982. Washington, D.C. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Application and administration of the federal election campaign act of 1971, as amended. Hearings, on S. 1550, S. 1766, and S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 369 p. Hearings held Nov. 20 and 24, 1981, Washington, D.C. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. The final report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, pursuant to S. Res. 60, Feb. 7, 1973: a resolution to establish a select committee of the Senate to investigate and study illegal or improper campaign activities in the Presidential election of 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 1250 p. (93d Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 93-981) KF31.5.P7 1974 TRENDS AND STATISTICS ON PAC ACTIVITY BY ELECTION CYCLE (Includes citations for books, articles, and monographs which provide data and assessments of PAC activity and spending as they applied to particular points in specific election cycles. Some assessments were based on provisional data, but all accounts provide a glimpse of overall trends during this period). Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1560 election. Princeton, Citizens' Research Foundation, 1964. 108 p. (Citizens' Research Foundation. Study no. 5 ) Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1960 national election, including details on interest group activity. Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1964 election. Princeton, Citizens' Research Foundation, 1966. 137 p. (Citizens' Research Foundation. Study no. 9) Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1964 national elections, including details on interest group activity. ----- Financing the 1968 election. Lexington, Mass. Heath Books, 1971. 355 p . Statistical data and narrative on the financing of national elections, including details on interest group Lexington JK1991eA683 1971 the 1968 activity. Financing the 1972 election. Lexington, Mass., Alexander, Herbert E. D.C. Heath, 1976. 771 p. JK1991.A684 Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1972 national elections, including details on interest group activity. Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal campaign finances, interest groups, and political parties. Washington, 1974. 3 V. JK1991eC655 1974 Statistics on interest group contributions to congressional candidates in 1972. Common Cause. Campaign finance monitoring project. 1974 congressional campaign finances. Volume 5: interest groups and political parties. ( various paging ) Statistics on interest group contributions to congressional candidates in 1974. Financing the 1976 election. Washington, Alexander, Herbert E. Congressional Quarterly, 1979. 871p. JK199l.A6798 Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1976 national elections, including details on interest group activity. There's a special interest in the congressional campaigns Cohen, Richard E. this year. National journal, v. 8, Oct. 23, 1976: 1514-1520. JKeN28, v.8 Reports on the increasing role of special interest groups in the 1976 congressional elections due to the growth in the number of politial action committees of business and trade associations, expanded activities of conservative PACs, wider dissemination of rating of Members' voting records. Common Cause. Campaign F i n a n c e M o n i t o r i n g P r o j e c t . 1976 F e d e r a l campaign finances. Washington,'l977. 3v. JK1991 .C655 1977 S t a t i s t i c s on i n t e r e s t g r o u p c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s i n 1976. F r e e d , Bruce F. Companies moving t o s e t up p o l i t i c a l u n i t s . Congressional q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 34. J a n . 1 0 , 1976: 46-49. J K l . C l 5 , v . 34 D e s c r i b e s how, under a p r o v i s i o n of t h e 1974 F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign a c t , c o r p o r a t i o n s a r e e s t a b l i s h i n g p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s t o s o l i c i t money from s t o c k h o l d e r s and employees f o r campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s . C o r p o r a t e PAC-backers c h a r t a t r a i l t h r o u g h C o n g r e s s . M a l b i n , Michael J . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v. 8 , Apr. 1 0 , 1976: 470-475. JKl.N28, v. 8 R e p o r t s on t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act. ----- U.S. L a b o r , b u s i n e s s and money--a p o s t - e l e c t i o n a n a l y s i s . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 9 , Mar. 1 9 , 1977: 412-417. JKl.N28, v . 9 . "Organized l a b o r c l e a r l y knew what i t was d o i n g when i t s u p p o r t e d e f f o r t s i n 1974 and 1976 t o r e v i s e t h e campaign f i n a n c e law. The one s u r e r e s u l t o f t h e changes was t o i n c r e a s e l a b o r ' s r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e on t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n p r e s i d e n t i a l r a c e s . " F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. Corporate-related p o l i t i c a l committees; r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s , 1976 campaign. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1977. 82 p. (U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. D i s c l o s u r e s e r i e s , no. 8) Data on c o r p o r a t e PAC s p e n d i n g and r e c e i p t s d u r i n g t h e 1976 e l e c t ion. ----- L a b o r - r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s ; r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s , 1976 campaign. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1976. 65 p . (U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. D i s c l o s u r e s e r i e s , no. 1 0 ) Data on l a b o r PAC s p e n d i n g and r e c e i p t s d u r i n g t h e 1976 election. ----- 1976 House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s campaigns; r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s . Washington, 1977. 113 p. (U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. D i s c l o s u r e s e r i e s , no. 9 ) Data on House c a n d i d a t e s s p e n d i n g and r e c e i p t s d u r i n g t h e 1976 e l e c t i o n . ---a- 1976 S e n a t o r i a l campaigns; r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s . Washington, 1977. 17 p. (U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. Disclosure series,no. 6) Data on S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s p e n d i n g s and r e c e i p t s i n the 1976 e l e c t i o n . Cook, Rhodes. P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee s p e n d i n g s o a r e d i n 1978. C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 3 7 , J u n e 2 , 1979: 1043-1045. J K l . C l 5 , v. 37 D i s c u s s e s t h e e x t e n t o f f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s made t o p o l i t i c a l campaigns by p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s . "According t o a r e c e n t l y completed r e p o r t by t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission (FEC) , PACs c o n t r i b u t e d $35.1 m i l l i o n t o f e d e r a l c a n d i d a t e s d u r i n g t h e 1978 e l e c t i o n c y c l e - - t h e p e r i o d between J a n . 1 , 1977, and Dec. 31, 1978. That was n e a r l y t r i p l e t h e $12.5 m i l l i o n i n PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1974 and more t h a n 50 p e r c e n t above t h e 1976 l e v e l o f $22.6 m i l l i o n . " B u s i n e s s g r o u p s gave GOP a l a t e w i n d f a l l . F e l t o n , J o h n , and C h a r l e s E . Hucker. C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 3 6 , Nov. 11, 1978: 3260-3262. J K l . C l 5 , v. 36 A s s e r t s t h a t " l a s t - m i n u t e i n j e c t i o n s of c a s h by c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s (PACs) b o o s t e d t h e campaigns o f R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s t h i s f a l l . The b u s i n e s s PACs--some p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e i r f i r s t campaign--apparently s e t a s i d e a t l e a s t a t h i r d of t h e i r b u d g e t s f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o many R e p u b l i c a n s and some m o d e r a t e Democrats i n t h e f i n a l weeks b e f o r e t h e Nov. 7 e l e c t i o n s . Labor u n i o n s , which have run PAC-type c o m m i t t e e s f o r y e a r s , f o l l o w e d t r a d i t i o n i n g i v i n g a l m o s t a l l t h e i r money t o Democrats." A t t h e w i r e , c o r p o r a t e PACs come t h r o u g h f o r t h e GOP. G l e n , Maxwell. JKl.N28, v . 11 N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 11, Feb. 3 , 1979: 174-177. "With a month t o go i n l a s t y e a r ' s c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n , t h e growing number of c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees were g i v i n g p r a c t i c a l l y a s much money t o Democrats a s R e p u b l i c a n s . But i n O c t o b e r , c o r p o r a t e PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s went overwhelmingly t o R e p u b l i c a n s , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t GOP c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e d 6 1 p e r c e n t o f a l l c o r p o r a t e PAC f u n d s t h r o u g h O c t . 23. That t r e n d i s l i k e l y t o f u e l e f f o r t s i n t h e Democratic Congress t o e n a c t p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g of c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n campaigns." Corporate p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees a r e l e s s o r i e n t e d Hucker, C h a r l e s W. t o R e p u b l i c a n s t h a n e x p e c t e d . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , J K l . C l 5 , v . 36 v. 3 6 , Apr. 8, 1978: 849-854. Reviews t h e l e g a l f o u n d a t i o n , g r o w t h , f u n d r a i s i n g methods, and g i v i n g p a t t e r n s o f c o r p o r a t e PACs. ----- O r g a n i z e d l a b o r t a k e s a h a r d l o o k a t whom i t w i l l s u p p o r t t h i s f a l l . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 3 6 , J a n . 28, 1978: 193-198. J K l . C l 5 , v . 36 Examines t h e s t a t u s o f o r g a n i z e d l a b o r a s a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n t h e 1978 e l e c t i o n s . K i r s c h t e n , Dick. C o r p o r a t e PACs--the GOP1s a c e i n t h e h o l e ? N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 0 , Nov. 2 5 , 1978: 1899-1902. JKl.N28, v . 1 0 "This f u l l p i c t u r e w o n ' t b e known u n t i l t h e f i n a l r e p o r t s on 1978 campaign g i v i n g a r e i n l a t e r t h i s y e a r , b u t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y f i g u r e s show c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , formed f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f making s e l e c t i v e campaign g i f t s , a r e h a v i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l impact on c o n g r e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c s . T h e r e a r e now 776 such c o r p o r a t e PACs--up from 450 o n l y two y e a r s ago--and t h e y d o n a t e d $14.2 m i l l i o n t h r o u g h S e p t . 3 0 , compared w i t h $6.8 m i l l i o n f o r a l l o f 1976." Big y e a r f o r company p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . Dunn's Review, v . 111, Perham, J o h n C . Mar. 1978: 100-102, 105. HFl.D8, v . 111 II C o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s a r e growing i n numbers and know how a s t h e y g e a r up f o r t h e 1978 r a c e s . " Ulman, N e i l . Companies o r g a n i z e employees and h o l d e r s i n t o a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . HG1 .W26 Wall S t r e e t j o u r n a l , Aug. 1 5 , 1978: 1, 18. D i s c u s s e s t h e then-burgeoning development o f c o r p o r a t e PACs a s a p o l i t i c a l force. U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC r e p o r t s on f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , 1977-1978; f i n a l r e p o r t : p a r t y and non-party p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e s . Washington, 1980. 4 v . F i n a l d a t a on PAC (and p a r t y ) c o n t r i b u t i o n s , s p e n d i n g , and r e c e i p t s d u r i n g t h e 1977-78 e l e c t i o n c y c l e . A l e x a n d e r , H e r b e r t E. F i n a n c i n g t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n . L e x i n g t o n , Mass., L e x i n g t o n Books, 1983. 524 p. C h a p t e r 8--"Sources o f f u n d s : g r o u p s and i n d i v i d u a l s u - - r e v i e w s PAC a c t i v i t y and i s s u e s i n 1980. Cohen, R i c h a r d E. C o n g r e s s i o n a l d e m o c r a t s beware--here come t h e c o r p o r a t e PACs. N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 2 , Aug. 9 , 1980: 1304-1308. JKl.N28, v . 12 II C o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees have r a i s e d more money t h a n l a b o r PACs and a r e gunning f o r Democratic incumbents who f a c e s t r o n g GOP c h a l l e n g e r s . " C o r p o r a t e PACs: a major b r e a k w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y . Dunn's r e v i e w , HFl.D8, v . 115 v . 115, Feb. 1980: 23, 26. "While c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees (PACs) a r e e x p e c t e d t o e x e r t c o n s i d e r a b l e c l o u t i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c a n d i d a t e s , it i s o n l y v e r y r e c e n t l y t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n laws have allowed U.S. companies A new t o g i v e money t o p o l i t i c a l campaigns a t a l l . e r a began i n 1974 when Congress f i n a l l y d e c i d e d t o a l l o w c o r p o r a t i o n s , a s w e l l a s u n i o n s , t o c r e a t e PACs and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission t o o v e r s e e t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a l l PACs. The s t a t u s o f t h e PACs was f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e d by changes i n t h e e l e c t i o n laws i n 1976." .. G l e n , Maxwell. elections. The PACs a r e b a c k , r i c h e r and w i s e r , t o f i n a n c e t h e 1980 N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 11, Nov. 2 , 1979: 1982-1984 J K 1 .N28, v . "A y e a r b e f o r e t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s , p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees (PACs) a r e a l r e a d y busy s e l e c t i n g t h e c a n d i d a t e s who w i l l r e c e i v e t h e i r f i n a n c i a l contributions--and t h e candidates a r e looking f o r f r i e n d l y PACs. Rut t h e PACs a r e choosy: t h e y l i k e t o c o n t r i b u t e o n l y t o c a n d i d a t e s who a g r e e w i t h them and f a c e c l e a r l y l e s s d e s i r a b l e o p p o n e n t s . They a l s o t r y t o s u p p o r t w i n n e r s . " Landauer, J e r r y . Hedging p o l i t i c a l b e t s , f i r m s g i v e t o l i b e r a l s i n p o s i t i o n s HG1. W26 o f power. Wall S t r e e t j o u r n a l , O c t . 13, 1980: 1 , 12. D i s c u s s e s t h e t e n d e n c y of c o r p o r a t e PACs t o c o n t r i b u t e t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s more on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r incumbency s t a t u s t h a n on t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s . PAC g i f t s t o P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s i n c l u d e some Lanouette, William J . p o l i t i c a l s u r p r i s e s . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 2 , Aug. 9 , 1980: 1309-1311. JKl.N28, v . 12 Examines t h e impact of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s on t h e outcome of t h e 1980 P r e s i d e n t i a l p r i m a r i e s . Light, Larry. Democrats may l o s e edge i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s from PACs. C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 3 8 , Nov. 2 2 , 1980: 3405-3409. J K l . C l 5 , v . 38 "Democratic c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y have r e c e i v e d t h e l i o n ' s s h a r e o f t h e campaign f u n d s d o l e d o u t by p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s (PACs). But t h i s y e a r may be d i f f e r e n t . A C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y s t u d y o f t h e f i n a n c i a l r e p o r t s of 10 l a r g e PACs shows t h a t c o m m i t t e e s r e p r e s e n t i n g b u s i n e s s e s h a v e s t e p p e d up t h e i r g i v i n g t o Republican c a n d i d a t e s ." Perham, J o h n C . PACs: t h e new z e s t o f t h e c o r p o r a t e . Dun's Review, v . 1 1 5 , Feb. 1980: 50-52. HFl.D8, v . 115 A s s e r t s t h a t "business-sponsored p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees s h o u l d r a c k up t h e i r g r e a t e s t impact t o d a t e i n t h i s y e a r ' s p r i m a r i e s and g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s " b e c a u s e o f t h e i r i n c r e a s e d w e a l t h and numbers. N e g a t i v e campaigns and n e g a t i v e v o t e s : t h e 1980 T a r r a n c e , V . Lance, J r . e l e c t i o n s . Washington, F r e e Congress R e s e a r c h and E d u c a t i o n F o u n d a t i o n , 1982. 36 p. " U t i l i z e d only i n t h e s m a l l e s t of s c a l e s previous t o 1980, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t f u t u r e e l e c t i o n s a t t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l and U.S. S e n a t e l e v e l s w i l l w i t n e s s a g r e a t e r usage o f n e g a t i v e theme campaigns a s a r e s u l t of a s t r o n g i n c r e a s e i n t h e numbers and a b i l i t i e s of s i n g l e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s and t h e i r a c c e s s t o c a m p a i g n - r e l a t e d t e c h n o l o g y . The emergence o f t h i s form of campaigning on a l a r g e s c a l e r e p r e s e n t s a new c h a p t e r i n p o l i t i c a l campaigns . I 1 U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC r e l e a s e s f i n a l PAC r e p o r t f o r 1979-80 e l e c t i o n c y c l e ( ~ r e s sr e l e a s e ) : Feb. 21, 1982. 10 p. P r e s s r e l e a s e g i v e s f i n a l summary d a t a on PAC r e c e i p t s , e x p e n d i t u r e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s . ----- FEC r e l e a s e s f i n a l s t a t i s t i c s on 1979-80 c o n g r e s s i o n a l r a c e s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Mar. 7 , 1982. 7 p. P r e s s r e l e a s e g i v e s f i n a l summary d a t a on House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s p e n d i n g and s o u r c e s of f u n d i n g i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n s . ----- FEC r e p o r t s on f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , 1979-80; f i n a l r e p o r t : p a r t y and non-party p o l i t i c a l committees. Washington, 1982, 4 v. F i n a l d a t a on PAC and p a r t y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , s p e n d i n g , and r e c e i p t s i n t h e 1979-80 e l e c t i o n c y c l e . ----- FEC r e p o r t s on f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , 1979-80; f i n a l r e p o r t : U.S. S e n a t e and House campaigns. Washington, 1982. 472 p. F i n a l d a t a on House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s d u r i n g t h e 1979-80 e l e c t i o n c y c l e . Bonafede, Dom. Some t h i n g s d o n ' t change--cost o f 1982 c o n g r e s s i o n a l r a c e s h i g h e r t h a n e v e r . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 4 , O c t . 3 0 , 1982: 1832-1836. ~ e v i e w st h e campaign f i n a n c e a s p e c t of t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s , f o c u s i n g on o v e r a l l campaign c o s t s and PAC a c t i v i t y . Clymer, Adam. Labor i n t e n s i f i e s 1982 campaigning. New York t i m e s , S e p t . 7 , 1982: A l , 17. M o n i t o r s i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s by l a r g e l a b o r u n i o n s i n 1982, a s measured by t h e i r f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y . Cohen, R i c h a r d E. G i v i n g t i l l i t h u r t s : 1982 campaign prompts new l o o k a t f i n a n c i n g r a c e s . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 4 , Dec. 1 8 , 1982: 2144-2153. I I As c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaign s p e n d i n g mounts, s o does debate o v e r r e f o r m s t o c u t back t h e i n f l u e n c e of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . Our a n a l y s i s i s supplemented by t h e l a t e s t d a t a on c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n a l l 1982 S e n a t e r a c e s and 39 h i g h - c o s t House r a c e s ." ----- B u s i n e s s , c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs--bigger y e t , b u t t h e i r i n f l u e n c e may b e waning. N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 4 , Aug. 7, 1982: 1368-1373. "With GOP-leaning PACs l e a d i n g t h e way, p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees w i l l p r o v i d e p e r h a p s a f o u r t h of a l l funds s p e n t by c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a n d i d a t e s t h i s year." G l e n , Maxwell. Labor t r y i n g t o b r i n g i t s r e b e l l i o u s members back t o t h e Democratic f o l d . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 4 , O c t . 3 0 , 1982: 1837-1840. Organized l a b o r ' s major e f f o r t i n t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s i s i d e n t i f y i n g and b r i n g i n g o u t what i t i s c o n f i d e n t w i l l be a s t r o n g Democratic v o t e on Nov. 2." Glen, Maxwell and James K . Popkin. L i b e r a l PACs l e a r n i n g i t won't be e a s y t o stem t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e t i d e . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v. 1 4 , Mar. 20, 1982: 500-501. "By most p r e d i c t i o n s , t h e l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees w i l l b e o u t s p e n t t o a l a r g e d e g r e e i n 1982 by t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e PACs. By 1984, t h e y may do b e t t e r . " Keller, B i l l . Organized l a b o r ' s v i t a l s i g n s show waning p o l i t i c a l c l o u t ; b u t numbers d o n ' t t e l l a l l . Congressional q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , V . 40, A u ~ . 28, 1982: 2111-2118. A r e v i e w o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses o f o r g a n i z e d l a b o r i n 1982. Business PACs and i d e o l o g y : Rothenberg, S t u a r t , and Richard R. Roldan. a s t u d y o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s . Washington, F r e e Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1983. 49 p . "Our d a t a i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s a m i s t a k e t o assume a u t o m a t i c a l l y t h a t c o n s e r v a t i v e c a n d i d a t e s b e n e f i t from c o n t r i b u t i o n s by b u s i n e s s (and) t h a t t h e r e a r e r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n p a t t e r n s among c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n PACs, even among t h o s e PACs i n t h e same industrial sector." ... Sabato, Larry. P a r t i e s , PACs, and independent g r o u p s . I n Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J . O r n s t e i n . The American e l e c t i o n s of 1982. Washington, American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1983. p. 72-110. A r e v i e w o f t h e r o l e played by PACs and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s , w i t h emphasis on i d e o l o g i c a l PACs and t h e s t r a t e g i e s of t h e various groups. Taylor, Paul. For b u s i n e s s PACs t h i s y e a r , s u i t a b l e t a r g e t s a r e i n s h o r t s u p p l y . Washington p o s t , J u l y 27, 1982: A6. A r e v i e w o f b u s i n e s s PAC a c t i v i t y i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s , i n t h e a g g r e g a t e and by s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i e s . U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. FEC p u b l i s h e s f i n a l 1981-82 PAC s t u d y ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Nov. 29, 1983. 10 p. F i n a l summary d a t a on PAC f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s . ----- FEC r e l e a s e s f i n a l r e p o r t on 1981-82 c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s ( p r e s s r e l e a s e ) : Dec. 2, 1983. 6 p. F i n a l summary on House and Senate c a n d i d a t e s ' f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s . ----- FEC r e p o r t s on f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , 1981-82; f i n a l r e p o r t : p a r t y and non-party p o l i t i c a l committees. Washington, 1983. 4 v. F i n a l d a t a on PAC and p a r t y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , spending and r e c e i p t s d u r i n g t h e 1981-82 e l e c t i o n c y c l e . ----- FEC r e p o r t s on f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y , 1981-82; f i n a l r e p o r t : U.S. S e n a t e and House campaigns. Washington, 1983. 348 p . F i n a l FEC d a t a on House and Senate c a n d i d a t e r e c e i p t s and e x p e n d i t u r e s d u r i n g t h e 1981-82 e l e c t i o n c y c l e . PROFILES ON SPECIFIC PACs OR GROUPINGS OF PACs (These c i t a t i o n s a r e f o r a c c o u n t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s PACs o r c a t e g o r i e s t h e r e o f , a t a given point i n time) AGC PAC's p o l i t i c a l v o i c e f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . C o n s t r u c t o r , v . 62, J u l y 1980: 42-53. D e s c r i b e s t h e b i p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee a f f i l i a t e d w i t h A s s o c i a t e d G e n e r a l C o n t r a c t o r s of America whose g o a l s a r e " t o e l e c t a Congress t h a t w i l l b e r e s p o n s i v e t o t h e n e e d s o f t h e construction industry." I n c l u d e s a s e c t i o n on "The Role of PACs i n E l e c t i o n s Today," by Robbi K i m b a l l , a message from AGC PAC chairman Ben Hogan, and a l i s t o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s made t o House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s from J u n e 1 4 , 1978-June 1 3 , 1980. Anson, Robert Sam. The American P e t r o l e u m I n s t i t u t e : i t ' s b o t h s t r o n g e r and weaker t h a n i t seems. Common c a u s e , v . 6 , O c t . 1980: 24-29. Examines t h e manner i n which t h e p e t r o l e u m i n d u s t r y ' s lobby h a s o p e r a t e d s i n c e t h e o n s e t o f t h e e n e r g y c r i s i s . "It i s a f a r c r y from t h e days when t h e i n d u s t r y c o u l d d i s m i s s i t s c r i t i c s w i t h t h e wave of a h a n d , o r t h e s i g n i n g of a campaign check." B a n k e r s ' p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee: one h o n e s t and e f f e c t i v e way t o p a r t i c i p a t e . ABA b a n k i n g j o u r n a l , v . 72, Apr. 1980: 76-79. HG1501.B6, v . 72 D i s c u s s e s t h e Bank PAC and i t s 1980 f u n d - r a i s i n g d r i v e . The p u r p o s e of t h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee "under t h e f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n l a w s , i s t o e n a b l e b a n k e r s a t t h e g r a s s - r o o t s l e v e l t o make f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s a t t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l , l e g a l l y , e f f e c t i v e l y , and c o n v e n i e n t l y , t o t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s who a r e most l i k e l y t o a f f e c t t h e banking community." Bannon, Brad. NCPAC i n t h e 8 0 s : a c t i o n v . r e a c t i o n . Campaigns & e l e c t i o n s , v . 3 , w i n t e r 1983: 36-43. F i n d s t h a t f o r t h e 1982 c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s , t h e N a t i o n a l C o n s e r v a t i v e P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committee "employed t h e same h i g h p r o f i l e and long-term t a c t i c s t h a t i t used i n most s t a t e s i n 1980 a n d , by g o i n g t h i s r o u t e , i n c u r r e d t h e same kind of b a c k l a s h . High v i s i b i l i t y n e g a t i v e campaigns may h e l p NCPAC r a i s e money, b u t t h e y do n o t c o n s t i t u t e e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y . " ----- NCPAC's r o l e i n t h e 1980 S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s . Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s , v . 3 , s p r i n g 1982: 43-46. M a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e i n i t i a l n e g a t i v e media campaigns a g a i n s t incumbent S e n a t e Democrats by t h e N a t i o n a l C o n s e r v a t i v e P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committee made a s t r o n g impact b e c a u s e of t h e a d s ' t i m e l i n e s s , b u t t h a t "as NCPAC c o n t i n u e d i t s a t t a c k s i n t o 1980, t h e ongoing A l o o k a t NCPAC's 1981 assaults n u l l i f i e d e a r l i e r gains. a c t i v i t i e s s u g g e s t s t h a t i t may b e r u n n i n g i n t o t h e same d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t i t e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e 1980 campaign." ... Berlow, Alan, and Laura B. Weiss. Energy PACs: p o t e n t i a l power i n e l e c t i o n s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 37, Nov. 3 , 1979: 2455-2461. JKl.Cl5, V . 37 Examines t h e d i v e r s i t y and r a p i d growth of 133 p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees t h a t a r e a f f i l i a t e d w i t h c o r p o r a t i o n s , t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s o r p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s having s u b s t a n t i a l o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s and e v a l u a t e s t h e i r r o l e i n f u t u r e e l e c t i o n s . I n c l u d e s a c h a r t on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n 1978 S e n a t e c o n t e s t s and a l i s t i n g o f t h e s e PACs w i t h t h e i r c o r p o r a t e a f f i l i t a t i o n , d a t e o r g a n i z e d , energy i n t e r e s t , and t o t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Senate and House campaigns from 1977 through September 1979. Clymer, Adam. C o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c a l committee evokes b o t h f e a r and Newsp. a d o r a t i o n . New York t i m e s , May 31, 1981: 1, 26. A p r o f i l e on t h e most c o n t r o v e r s i a l i d e o l o g i c a l PAC d u r i n g t h e 1980 elections--NCPAC--one which c o n t i n u e s t o s e r v e a s a precedents e t t e r f o r o t h e r such groups. New York t i m e s , Aug. 1 7 , Conservative evangelical C h r i s t i a n s i n p o l i t i c s . 1980, p. 1, 5 2 ; Aug. 1 8 , p . B7; Aug. 1 9 , p. D17; A u ~ . 2 0 , p. B22. News p. D e s c r i b e s t h e growing network of c o n s e r v a t i v e e v a n g e l i c a l C h r i s t i a n l e a d e r s who a r e " o r g a n i z i n g t o a r o u s e a p a r t i c u l a r e l e c t o r a t e , t o shape t h e ways i t views i s s u e s , t o r e g i s t e r i t s members t o v o t e , t o g i v e i t a common language and means o f communication, t o u s e i t t o i n f l u e n c e law and p o l i c y a t s t a t e and n a t i o n a l l e v e l s , t o r a i s e funds t o s u p p o r t c e r t a i n c a n d i d a t e s and t o s e l e c t and t r a i n o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s f o r p u b l i c off i c e . " Cook, Rhodes. P r e s i d e n t i a l hopefuls funnel c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o s a f e r a c e s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v. 40, Aug. 21, 1982: 2074-2075. A p r o f i l e of two p r o s p e c t i v e P r e s i l e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s ' PACs (Kennedy's and Mondale's). C o t t i n , Jonathan. Washington p r e s s u r e s : BIPAC s e e k s t o e l e c t pro-business members t o Congress. N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v. 2 , J u l y 18, 1970: 15251531. JKleN28, V. 2 An in-depth l o o k a t one of t h e e a r l i e s t b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d PACs, d e s c r i b i n g i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t s methods and i t s g o a l s . P r o v i d e s a u s e f u l background on a major f o r e r u n n e r o f t o d a y ' s PACs. D a l t o n , James G. P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees: r e s h a p i n g t h e U.S. e l e c t o r a l / l e g i s l a t i v e scene. P r o f e s s i o n a l e n g i n e e r , v . 50, S e p t . 1980: 10-13. Reviews t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e N a t i o n a l S o c i e t y o f P r o f e s s i o n a l E n g i n e e r s ' PAC i n t h e 1980 c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . Davis, L. J. C o n s e r v a t i s m i n America. H a r p e r ' s m a g a z i n e , v . 231, O c t . 1980: 21-26. AP2.H3, v . 231 Examines t h e b e l i e f s and a c t i v i t i e s of c o n s e r v a t i v e a c t i v i s t s P a u l Weyrich, Howard P h i l l i p s , T e r r y Dolan, and R i c h a r d V i g u e r i e and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h e y l e a d . "Like t h e Old R i g h t , t h e New R i g h t c o n s i s t s o f a s m a l l , t i g h t - k n i t g r o u p of t r u e b e l i e v e r s . " Demkovich, L i n d a E . AMA--reports of i t s d e a t h have been g r e a t l y e x a g g e r a t e d . JK1. N28, v . 11 N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v . 1 1 , Dec. 1 , 1979: 2017-2022. " D e s p i t e some e v i d e n c e t h a t i t s i n f l u e n c e h a s d i m i n i s h e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e American Medical A s s o c i a t i o n r e m a i n s a power on It played a key r o l e i n t h e d e f e a t of t h e Washington s c e n e . P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s h o s p i t a l c o s t c o n t a i n m e n t b i l l and--in p a r t b e c a u s e o f t h e campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s by i t s p o l i t i c a l arm, t h e American Medical P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n Committee (AMPACI--is r e s p e c t e d on C a p i t o l H i l l . I t s i n f l u e n c e may be p r i m a r i l y n e g a t i v e , b u t t h a t ' s f i n e with t h e M A . " Energy PACs--a quiet explosion. I n common, v . 1 0 , summer 1979: 22-26. JK1.163, v . 10 I I L a r g e campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s from o i l and g a s i n d u s t r y e x e c u t i v e s have been a l o n g - s t a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n i n t h e U.S. p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . Now t h e s e e n e r g y i n t e r e s t s a r e moving i n t o a new i n f l u e n c e game, t h a t of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees (PACs). The e x p l o s i o n i n t h e number of e n e r g y PACs h a s been a q u i e t o n e , u n n o t i c e d by most o b s e r v e r s . But i t s p o t e n t i a l impact on U.S. e n e r g y p o l i c y i s enormous ." E p s t e i n , Edwin M. PACs and t h e modern p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . P r e p a r e d f o r d e l i v e r y a t a c o n f e r e n c e on t h e impact of t h e modern c o r p o r a t i o n , s p o n s o r e d by t h e c e n t e r f o r law and economic s t u d i e s , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y School of Law, The Henry Chauncey Conference C e n t e r , P r i n c e t o n , Nov. 12-13, 1982. 131 p. 1' an e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r o l e and impact of c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees on e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a t the federal level." ... Erickson, Jack. The Democrats: r e b u i l d i n g w i t h s u p p o r t g r o u p s . Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s , v . 3 , s p r i n g 1982: 4-14. "Reviews t h e Big Ten o f t h e new PACs, t h i n k - t a n k s and p u b l i c i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t h a t Democrats have formed t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h o s e o f t h e R e p u b l i c a n s and The New R i g h t . They s u p p o r t and h e l p l i b e r a l c a n d i d a t e s r i g h t down t o t h e mayoral l e v e l . " F e l d s t e i n , P a u l J . , and Glenn A. Melnick. P o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by h e a l t h PACs t o t h e 9 6 t h Congress. I n q u i r y ( C h i c a g o ) , v . 1 9 , w i n t e r 1982: 283294. Concludes " t h a t h e a l t h PACs, r e g a r d l e s s of s i z e , s u p p o r t c a n d i d a t e s h a v i n g i d e o l o g i e s s i m i l a r t o t h e h e a l t h PAC members' i n t e r e s t s . Another f i n d i n g i s t h a t a congressman on a House committee o r subcommittee w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r h e a l t h i s s u e s i s more l i k e l y t o b e s u p p o r t e d . Support f o r incumbents i n t h e House i s a l s o r e l a t e d t o t h e i n c u m b e n t s ' s i d e o l o g y . I d e o l o g y a l s o a p p e a r s t o be a good p r e d i c t o r o f a c o n g r e s s m a n ' s v o t e s on h e a l t h i s s u e s . ' ' F i a l k a , John J. Jewish groups i n c r e a s e campaign d o n a t i o n s , t a r g e t them p r e c i s e l y . Wall S t r e e t j o u r n a l , Aug. 3, 1983: 1, 13. "During t h e l a s t c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n , Jews used o v e r 30 s e p a r a t e p o l i t i c a l - a c t i o n committees t o g i v e favored c a n d i d a t e s $1.67 m i l l i o n , more than i n any p r i o r e l e c t i o n . " ----- and Tim C a r r i n g t o n . Walls S t r e e t ' s f i r m s broaden g i f t l i s t s f o r Congress members. Wall S t r e e t j o u r n a l , Oct. 17, 1983: 1, 27. Reviews p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n a c t i v i t i e s by Wall S t r e e t e x e c u t i v e s and t h e i r f i r m s ' PACs i n t h e 1982 e l e c t i o n s . Glen, Maxwell. L i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees borrow a page from t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s . N a t i o n a l j o u r n a l , v. 1 3 , J u l y 4 , 1981: 1197-1200. JKl.N28, V . 13 "Last y e a r , c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees (PACs) helped swing t h e White House and t h e S e n a t e i n t o t h e Republican column. Now l i b e r a l s a r e a d o p t i n g some o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s ' own t a c t i c s . " Graves, F l o r e n c e . The power b r o k e r s . Common Cause, v. 7, Feb. 1981: 13-20. D i s c u s s e s t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of R e a l t o r s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee and examines t h a t a s s o c i a t i o n ' s p o l i t i c a l goals i n California. Handler, Edward, and John R. Mulkern. Business i n p o l i t i c s : campaign s t r a t e g i e s of c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 128 p. Hogan, B i l l , and Diane K i e s e l . Southern PACs: " I n t e r e s t e d " money. A t l a n t a magazine, v . 22, Feb. 1983: 46-49, 63-67. "The l i s t of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees i n t h e S o u t h e a s t r e a d s l i k e a c o r p o r a t e 'who's whoq. More t h a n t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of t h e r e g i o n ' s Fortune 500 companies have d e a l t themselves i n t o t h e game." Holley, J o e , and Geoffrey Rips. Tracking t h e chemical lobby. Texas o b s e r v e r , V. 75, May 6, 1983: 1, 4-9. D e s c r i b e s t h e Texas Chemical Council a s a "rough b e a s t plodding through t h e C a p i t o l , l e a v i n g i n i t s wake a n g r y e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s and l a b o r a d v o c a t e s , thwarted lawmakers and p u b l i c i n t e r e s t groups." Holloway, Harry. I n t e r e s t groups i n t h e p o s t p a r t i s a n e r a : t h e p o l i t i c a l machine o f t h e AFL-CIO. P o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e q u a r t e r l y , v . 94, s p r i n g 1979: 117-133. HlBP8, V . 94 D e s c r i b e s t h e t o o l s used by COPE i n i t s e l e c t o r a l a c t i v i t i e s and examines t h e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e s e and t h e AFL-CIO's lobbying arm. Hunter, William A. The new r i g h t : a growing f o r c e i n s t a t e p o l i t i c s . Washington, Conference on A l t e r n a t i v e s t a t e and l o c a l p o l i c i e s , 1980. 106 p. P a r t i a l contents--The New R i g h t ' s a c t i o n strategy--The i s s u e s o f t h e New Right--A l o o k a t t h e New Right o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n s t a t e p o l i t i c s : N a t i o n a l Conservative P o l i t i c a l Action Committee (NCPAC); N a t i o n a l Right t o Work Committee (RTWC); American L e g i s l a t i v e Exchange Council (ALEC)--New Right i n s t a t e p o l i t i c s : t e n c a s e s t u d i e s . Stumping f o r t h e environment: t h e " g r e e n v o t e " h a s c l o u t t h i s Jubak, J i m . y e a r a s never b e f o r e . Environmental a c t i o n , v . 1 4 , Oct./Nov. 1982: 9-1 3 D e s c r i b e s a "wave of environmental a c t i v i s m up a g a i n s t tremendous odds i n a n e l e c t i o n awash i n s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t money." Gives s p e c i f i c examples o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s u p p o r t o f p o l i t i c a l candidates. ... The r i g h t of i d e o l o g i c a l n o n a s s o c i a t i o n . C a l i f o r n i a law K a l i n , Alan B. r e v i e w , v. 66, J u l y 1978: 767-808. LAW Comment reviews c a s e law d e a l i n g w i t h compelled s u p p o r t of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and sets f o r t h t h e c o n t r a s t i n g approaches of two r e c e n t Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s . Argues f o r broad c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a r i g h t o f i d e o l o g i c a l n o n a s s o c i a t i o n . Considers government i n t e r e s t s which might j u s t i f y i n f r i n g e m e n t o f such a r i g h t and o u t l i n e s a p p l i c a t i o n of such a r i g h t t o government f i n a n c i n g o f elections. Kamber, V i c t o r S. PAC c o u n s e l . Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s , v. 2 , f a l l 1981: 46-48. "Discusses t h e importance o f o r g a n i z e d l a b o r ' s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees, and s u g g e s t s ways f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e t o approach them. " Katskee, Melvin R. P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees: should n a t i o n a l banks s t a y away? Banking law j o u r n a l , v. 96, S e p t . 1979. 738-745. LAW " F e d e r a l law p r o h i b i t s n a t i o n a l bank c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s and s t a t e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s . But t o what e x t e n t a r e n a t i o n a l banks p r o h i b i t e d from s e t t i n g up p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees, funded by i n d i v i d u a l v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t o s u p p o r t c a n d i d a t e s f o r f e d e r a l and s t a t e o f f i c e s ? Does t h e law permit bank l o a n s t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , committees, o r c a n d i d a t e s ? May bank PACs s o l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s from bank employees? The a u t h o r answers t h e s e and many o t h e r q u e s t i o n s by p l a c i n g t h e 1976 Amendments t o t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act a g a i n s t wide v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y t h a t n a t i o n a l banks may be p r e s e n t l y engaged i n o r contemplating." Keller, B i l l . I n a b u l l market f o r arms, weapons i n d u s t r y l o b b y i s t s push p r o d u c t s , n o t p o l i c y . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 38, Oct. 25, 1980: 3201-3206. JKl.Cl5, v. 38 Examines t h e lobbying a c t i v i t i e s and i n f l u e n c e of d e f e n s e c o n t r a c t o r s . "The consensus among t h o s e who h a n d l e d e f e n s e l e g i s l a t i o n i s t h a t t h e i n d u s t r y ' s i n f l u e n c e i s probably m a r g i n a l compared t o o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t shape d e f e n s e spending.'' I n c l u d e s a s e p a r a t e d i s c u s s i o n ( p . 3204) of t h e spending p r a c t i c e s of d e f e n s e company p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. ----- "New Right" wants c r e d i t f o r Democrats' Nov. 4 l o s s e s b u t GOP, o t h e r s d o n ' t a g r e e . C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v. 38, JKl.Cl5, v . 38 Nov. 1 5 , 1980: 3372-3373. A p o s t - e l e c t i o n a n a l y s i s of t h e r o l e of t h e New Right PACs i n t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n outcomes. La Mere, Joanne. PACs: channel f o r c o r p o r a t e a c t i o n . I n d u s t r i a l development, v . 148, July-Aug. 1979: 22-26. HC107.Al3132, v . 148 I n t h e f i r s t of two a r t i c l e s , a c o r p o r a t e government a f f a i r s manager a s s e r t s t h a t "companies can employ t h e same product m a r k e t i n g and r e s e a r c h t e c h n i q u e s t o e l e c t a r e a s o n a b l e and i n t e l l i g e n t Congress." D e s c r i b e s t h e growth and o p e r a t i o n of c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees (PACs) and d i s c u s s e s some employee and c o r p o r a t e s k e p t i c i s m about PACs. I n t h e second a r t i c l e , e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r of t h e b u s i n e s s round t a b l e s t a t e s t h a t " g r a s s r o o t s and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n programs p l a y an i n t e g r a l p a r t i n d e t e r m i n i n g l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n w h i l e encouraging a c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s .I' L a r s o n , Reed. Right t o work b a t t l e s b i g l a b o r ' s $ 3 - b i l l i o n k i t t y . Human e v e n t s , v . 40, S e p t . 1 3 , 1980: 14-15, 1 7 , 19, 21, 23-25. D45.H8, v. 40 I n t e r v i e w with "Reed Larson, head of t h e N a t i o n a l Right t o Work Committee and arch-foe of forced unionism and compulsory union dues used f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes, who looks back on R-T-W's p a s t a c t i v i t i e s and f o r e s e e s a major blow t o Big L a b o r ' s c l o u t i f t h e Helms-Dickinson b i l l c u r b i n g t h e use of union funds f o r p o l i t i c a l campaigns i s passed by Congress .I1 Light, Larry. New l i b e r a l money groups compete f o r campaign funds. C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v. 39, Oct. 3 , 1981: 1905-1908 Reports on t h e f i v e newly e s t a b l i s h e d l i b e r a l o r democratic p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees--the P r o g r e s s i v e P o l i t i c a l Action Committee, Independent A c t i o n , Democrats f o r t h e '809, Fund f o r a Democratic M a j o r i t y , and Committee f o r t h e F u t u r e of America-which a r e "hoping t o r a i s e money by f r i g h t e n i n g l i b e r a l g i v e r s with t h e s p e c t e r of New Right domination." Timberg, Robert. The PAC business. Baltimore Sun, July 11, 1982: A6-A7; July 12: 1, A6; July 13: 1, A4; July 14: 1, All, July 15: 1, A12; July 16 16: 1, A8-A9; July 17, 1, A4-A5; July 25: 1, A5. Series contains profiles on the inner workings of several ideological, nonconnected PACs. Titles include: "The Political Money Machines: Fat, Fancy, Free of Curbs" "NCPAC Means Business for Friends on the Right" "Insiders in NCPAC Operate Group Like a Family Business" -- "1,iberal PROPAC Set Up to Counteract Groups on Right" "Anti-Abortion PAC Sticks to Fund-Raising" "PACs, Principles and Profits: This Activist is a One-Man Band" -- "Anti-Abortion PAC Gives Aid Where it Isn't Wanted" "New Liberal PAC Follows Old Financial Game Rules" ----- --- Trost, Cathy. Occidental Petroleum flexes its political muscles. and society review, no. 43, fall 1982: 46-49. "The combination of Occidental's PAC donations with corporate contributions on a private level only serve to strengthen Occidental's already-strong power base in Washington, where the company's influential lobbyists complement the social and business diplomacy of eightythree-year-old Chairman of the Board Armand Hammer." Business ... Tumin, Jonathan. How to bury liberals. New republic, v. 182, May 24, 1980: 13-15. AP2 .W624, v. 182 "The enormous increase in the number of corporate and trade PACs represents two major threats to liberal policies and politicians: first, through sheer numbers, conservative PACs are now greatly outspending labor union PACs, often endangering liberal Democrats in Congress; and second, these donations are jeopardizing pro-consumer legislation across a whole range of issues. " Wagner, Susan. The political action committee: a new way for publishers to make their voices heard. Publishers weekly, v. 209, Mar. 8, 1976: 36-38. 21219.P28, v. 209 Outlines concerns facing publishers, such as copyright, postal rates and freedom of information and describes the lohbying activities of the Committee set up for publishers to support candidates and to make their feelings known on the Hill. , HOW PACs WORK (Primarily, these citations are to guides on setting up a PAC or which offer some description of how PACs operate; some are articles which explore the inner workings of PAC operations) American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Federal election campaign guide task force. Compliance with Federal election campaign requirements: a guide for candidates. New York, 1980. 192 p. KF4920.A95 1980 Appendix 5 summarizes laws on PACs and chapter 5 describes tax considerations for PACs and others. Anderson, Gary. P o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees: a t t a i n i n g t e c h n i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s , v . 4 , summer 1983: 28-34. E x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r of t h e Texas Medical P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n C o r n i t t e e (TEXPAC) d e s c r i b e s t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a s a model f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n PAC development. Chamber of Commerce o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of America. Public A f f a i r s Dept. C o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee g u i d e l i n e s . Washington, 1982. 1 v . (various pagings) KF4886. G84 " T h i s document i s d e s i g n e d t o p r o v i d e c o r p o r a t i o n s , t r a d e and p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , and chambers of commerce w i t h a r e f e r e n c e s o u r c e f o r o r g a n i z i n g , o p e r a t i n g , and c o n d u c t i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s of a p o l i t i a l a c t i o n committee i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h b o t h t h e F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n laws and r e g u l a t i o n s and t h e F e d e r a l t a x l a w s , r e g u l a t i o n s , and r u l i n g s . " Hamburger, Tom. How t o f l e e c e t h e PACs. w a s h i n g t o n Monthly, v . 1 5 , July-Aug. 1983: 27-31. F i n d s t h a t most p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees "were paying l e s s a t t e n t i o n t o philosophy. Some r e g u l a r l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o members of c e r t a i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l c o m m i t t e e s . Some f o c u s e d on c a n d i d a t e s i n c l o s e r a c e s . But t h e most common c r i t e r i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r c o r p o r a t e and i n d u s t r y PACs, was what avid) S t r a u s s c a l l s ' w i n n a b i l i t y . "' I n f a c t , " t h e most i n f a l l i b l e t r i c k i s t o w a i t t o f o r k o v e r t h e money u n t i l t h e workings of chance have f i n i s h e d , and one c a n d i d a t e o r a n o t h e r h a s a c t u a l l y won." H a n d l e r , Edward, and John Mulkern. The governance of c o r p o r a t e PACs. P r e p a r e d f o r d e l i v e r y a t t h e 1982 a n n u a l m e e t i n g of t h e American p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e a s s o c i a t i o n , Denver, S e p t . 2-5, 1982. T h i s p a p e r r e p r e s e n t s an e f f o r t t o b r i n g e m p i r i c a l knowledge t o b e a r on t h e c o n t r o v e r s y about t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of c o r p o r a t e PACs and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o c o r p o r a t e l e a d e r s h i p . It examines t h e c o m p o s i t i o n and s t r u c t u r e of t h e committees t h a t run t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and t h e i r decision-making. It t h e n e x p l o r e s t h e e x t e n t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n f l u e n c e of CEOs and of c o n t r i b u t o r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n t h e a f f a i r s of PACs. Access, r e c o r d , and c o m p e t i t i o n a s i n f l u e n c e s on i n t e r e s t Herndon, James F. g r o u p c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l campaigns. J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c s , v . 4 4 , Nov. 1982: 996-1019. Concludes from i n t e r v i e w s w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f f o u r b u s i n e s s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees and f o u r l a b o r PACs t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s g r o u p s emphasize s u p p o r t f o r incumbents (which s u g g e s t s a s t r a t e g y o f s e e k i n g a c c e s s ) , w h i l e t h e l a b o r g r o u p s emphasize p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n ( a s t r a t e g y of r e c o r d - s t r e s s i n g ) . "Business groups, s a t i s f i e d ( a t l e a s t n o t t e r r i b l y d i s s a t i f i e d ) w i t h t h e makeup of C o n g r e s s , c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t o emphasize l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y , whereas l a b o r , somewhat unhappy w i t h t h e membership of C o n g r e s s , c o u l d b e e x p e c t e d t o p l a c e more emphasis on e l e c t o r a l a c t i v i t y ." $22,000 d i v i d e d by f o u r dozen r a c e s e q u a l s a Hershey, R o b e r t D . , J r . b u s y d a y f o r one c o m m i t t e e . New York t i m e s , O c t . 1 3 , 1982: B5. An i n s i d e l o o k a t t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on c a n d i d a t e s e l e c t i o n i n one c o r p o r a t e PAC. Hunt, A l b e r t R. An i n s i d e look a t p o l i t i c i a n s h u s t l i n g PACs. Wall S t r e e t j o u r n a l , O c t . 1 , 1982: 33, 37. I I What emerges a r e some s h a m e l e s s campaign s o l i c i t a t i o n s , u n d e r s c o r i n g t h e need of p o l i t i c i a n s of b o t h p a r t i e s t o r e l y more and more on s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t money.'' C o r p o r a t e PACs: s t e p - b y - s t e p f o r m a t i o n and t r o u b l e f r e e Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s , v . 1, s p r i n g 1980: 14-20. JK1976.C33, v . 1 An o v e r v i e w of what PACs a r e and how t h e y a r e formed, f o c u s i n g on t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r . K e n d a l l , Don R. operation. Light, Larry. The game of PAC t a r g e t i n g : f r i e n d s , f o e s and guesswork. C o n g r e s s i o n a l q u a r t e r l y weekly r e p o r t , v . 39, Nov. 21, 1981: 2267-2270. Examines how p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n cormnittees t a r g e t t h e i r f u n d s f o r Congressional candidates. The PAC handbook: p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n f o r b u s i n e s s . Washington, F r a s e r A s s o c i a t e s , 1981. 363 p. JK467.P33 1981 A "how-to" Guide f o r t h o s e i n t e r e s t e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a PAC, i n c l u d i n g c a s e s t u d i e s , l e g a l g u i d e l i n e s , and s t r a t e g i e s f o r t h e It e m p h a s i z e s c o r p o r a t e and t r a d e PACs. future. PACs: how t o b a c k t h e ' r i g h t ' c a n d i d a t e s . E n g i n e e r i n g news-record, v. 201, Nov. 2 , 1978: 24-25, 27. TAl.E6, v . 201 "Whether i t was s i t u s p i c k e t i n g o r l a b o r law r e f o r m o r h i g h e r t a x e s on f o r e i g n - e a r n e d income--or maybe j u s t c l o s e r l o o k a t r e c e n t changes i n t h e f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n law--the r e s u l t is t h i s : construction, l i k e business i n general, i s getting into p o l i t i c s . A growing number o f c o n s t r u c t i o n companies and t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s a r e following l a b o r ' s lead--they've stopped t a l k i n g about p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n and s t a r t e d t a k i n g i t t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees (PACs)." I n c l u d e s a l i s t of c o n s l l r u c t i o n c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees. Sansweet, Stephen J . P o l i t i c a l - a c t i o n u n i t s a t f i r m s a r e a s s a i l e d by some o v e r t a c t i c s . Wall S t r e e t j o u r n a l , J u l y 2 4 , 1980: 1 , 12. HG1. W26 D i s c u s s e s t h e i s s u e o f a l l e g e d c o e r c i o n of c o r p o r a t e employees f o r PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s , b a s e d on i n t e r v i e w s w i t h managers, employees, and o u t s i d e o b s e r v e r s . S c h w a r t z , Thomas J . , and Vigo G. N i e l s e n , J r . The c o r p o r a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s 1982: PACs, l o b b y i n g l a w s , and p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . New York, P r a c t i s i n g Law I n s t i t u t e , 1982. 529 p. ( c o r p o r a t e l a w and p r a c t i c e c o u r s e handbook s e r i e s no. 385) P a r t i a l c o n t e n t s - - C o n t r i b u t i o n and e x p e n d i t u r e l i m i i a t i o n s u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign Act of 1 9 8 1 , a s amended, by V. N i e l s e n , J r . - - C o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s by n a t i o n a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y c o m m i t t e e s , by C. D a r r - - R e s t r i c t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s by b u s i n e s s c o r p o r a t i o n s , by B. Vandegrift--House and S e n a t e r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o g i f t s and h o n o r a r i a , by G . Frampton, J r . - - P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by n a t i o n a l banks and F e d e r a l c o n t r a c t o r s , by T. Schwarz and A. S t r a u s . - - C o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s and t r u s t e e p l a n s , by J. Baran--Active c o r p o r a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e l e c t i o n s , by C . D a r r - - R e g i s t r a t i o n and r e p o r t i n g f o r a p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee and o t h e r n o n - c a n d i d a t e c o m m i t t e e s , by V. N i e l s e n , J r . - - P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s under t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Campaign A c t , by T. Schwarz and A. S t r a u s - - S o l i c i t a t i o n o f v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s by membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s , c o o p e r a t i v e s , and c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h o u t c a p i t a l s t o c k , by T. Schwarz and A. S t r a u s - - F e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n o f l o b b y i n g and taxation of e t h i c s i n government a c t s , by K. Guido, J r . - - F e d e r a l c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ; by L. A t o r , Jr.--FEC c o m p l i a n c e and e n f o r c e m e n t , by C . S t e e l e and N. L i t c h f i e l d . S o r a u f , Frank J . A c c o u n t a b i l i t y i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s : who's i n c h a r g e ? P r e p a r e d f o r d e l i v e r y a t t h e 1982 a n n u a l m e e t i n g o f t h e American P o l i t i a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , Denver, S e p t . 2-5, 1982. 38 p. E x p l o r e s t h e q u e s t i o n s : "Who r u n s t h e PACs, t o whom do t h e y a n s w e r , and what u l t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a c c o u n t i n g must t h e y make? I f n o t by l e g i s l t i o n , t h e n by what o t h e r mechanisms o f c o n t r o l a r e t h e y h e l d t o o u r s t a n d a r d s o f p o l i t i c a l e t h i c s and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . " Timberg, R o b e r t , and G r a n t W i l l i a m s . PACs c o u l d a l l o w f o r e i g n r o l e i n e l e c t i o n s . B a l t i m o r e s u n , Aug. 29, 1982: 1 , A 1 4 . " F o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g some i n which f o r e i g n governments c o n t r o l l a r g e p o r t i o n s o f s t o c k , have d i r e c t l i n k s t o numerous p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s i n t h e United S t a t e s t h r o u g h American s u b s i d i a r i e s t h e y own w h o l l y o r i n part. These PACs e x i s t d e s p i t e a f e d e r a l l a w t h a t p r o h i b i t s f o r e i g n i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e American p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s a t a l l levels--local, s t a t e o r federal." U.S. F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission. Campaign g u i d e f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s and l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1982. 56 p. A l a y m a n ' s g u i d e t o t h e FECA1s r u l e s f o r s e t t i n g u p and o p e r a t i n g a c o r p o r a t e o r l a b o r ( o r o t h e r a f f i l i a t e d ) PAC, i n f u l l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e l a w ' s r e p o r t i n g and d i s c l s o u r e requirements. U.S. Federal Election Comuiission. Campaign guide for nonconnected committees. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 52 p. A layman's guide to the FECA's rules for setting up and operating an unaffiliated PAC, in full compliance with the law's reporting and disclosure requirements. ----- Regulations. Washington, 1983. 278 p. KF4885 .A33 1983 Regulations for compliance with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended. THE IMPACT OF PAC CONTRIEUTIONS (These citations offer various perspectives on the connection between PAC contributions and outcome of policy decisions; these mostly focus on particular PACs or issues) Are Congressmen for sale to business? Business and society review, summer HD60.5.U5B855 1980: 10-14. "It is widely estimated that business and trade associations, through lawful political action committees (PACs), will give approximately $30 million to congressional and presidential candidates this year. And this figure does not include donations by wealthy individuals, nor the huge sums given to state and local candidates." Ripon forum, v. 13, Aug. 15, 1977: 1-18. JK2351.955, v. 13 Cargogate. Charges that the Carter administration's proposed cargo preference legislation is a return favor for iuerchant marine support and that this link is being kept from public scrutiny. Includes copies of memos to the President on options concerning cargo preference legislation. Cash politics. Wall Street journal, July 26, 1982: 1, 13; July 29: 1, 10; Aug. 2: 1, 13. Three part series examines the influence of political action committee funds on congressional decisions. Titles include: -- "Special Interest Money Increasingly Influences What Congress Enacts," -- "How Realtors PAC Rewards Office Seekers Uel.pful to the Industry," and -- "A Liberal Congressman Turns Conservative; Did PAC Gifts Do It?" Chappell, Henry W., Jr. Campaign contrihutions and voting on the cargo preference bill: a comparison of simultaneous models. Puhlic choice, JAl.P77, v. 36 v. 36, 1981: 301-312. Correlates congressional voting on the Energy Transportation Security Act, a 1977 House bill which would have required that 9.5% of America's oil imports be carried on U.S. built and operated ships, with campaign contrihutions frora three maritime union political action committees--the National Pfaritine Union, the Marine Engineers, and the Seafarers. The author finds "unavoidably ambiguous" results for his hypothesis that interest group contributions influence legislative voting. Common Cause. A Common Cause guide to money, power, and politics in the 97th Congress. Washington, 1981. 239 p. "Lists all campaign contributions from PACs to some of the most important and powerful government decisionmakers in Washington--the Democratic and Republican leadership in Congress and House and Senate Committee Chairmen." ----- House Agriculture Committee members facing key vote to limit dairy price supports received more than $350,000 from dairy industry PACs in last two elections. Washington, 1981. 5, 1 p. Presents statistics on canpaign contributions received by House Agriculture Committee members from the three major dairy political action committees. The committee is considering a measure to freeze automatic dairy price support increases. ----- How money talks in Congress: a Common Cause study of the impact of money on congressional decision-making. Washington, 1978. 111 p. JKl99l .C655 1978 This study is "intended to demonstrate the various ways in which political contributions, financial holdings, honoraria, outsiee earnjngs and lobbying expenditures affect congressional decisions that have an impact on the lives of all Americans." ----- More than $1 million in political contributions pays off in key legislative victory. Washington, 1979. 5, 10 p. Argues that the $1.1 million contributed to 1978 congressional candidates by the National Association of Realtors' political action committee was a factor in the June 7 House vote eliminating from the 1979 Housing and Community Development Act the power of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to issue cease-and-desist orders where there was reasonable cause to believe that fraudulent sales techniques had been used, in violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. Green, Mark. Political Pac-Man. New republic, v. 187, Dec. 13, 1982: 18-21, 24-25. Expresses alarm at the link between political action committee contributions to candidates and PAC lobbying of Members of Congress. "According to studies by Public Citizen's Congress Watch and Common Cause, PAC contributions invariably correlate with legislative results. When specific economic interests invest substantial amounts in many members before key votes, the dividends roll in." Green, Mark, and J a c k Newfield. Who owns Congress. Washington p o s t magazine, J u n e 8 , 1980: 10-19, 21. Newsp From e x a m i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committee c o n t r i b u t i o n s , a l l e g e s t h a t many Members of Congress a r e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of p a r t i c u l a r b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s - - t h e o i l , b a n k i n g , d e f e n s e , n u c l e a r power, t o b a c c o , i n s u r a n c e , s h i p p i n g , t r u c k i n g , a i r l i n e , and a u t o m o b i l e i n d u s t r i e s , and t h e m e d i c a l , gun, and anti-FTC l o b b i e s . I n c l u d e s a d i s c u s s i o n ( p . 1 6 ) of s p e n d i n g by u n i o n PACs, by S p e n c e r R i c h . . Handel, Ted. What PACs do. P u b l i c power, v . 41, Mar.-Apr. 1983: 40-42, 44, 46. Defends p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees from t h e c h a r g e t h a t t h e y e x e r t a n u n h e a l t h y i n f l u e n c e on t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s . "The f a c t t h a t c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e PAC money and when e l e c t e d s u p p o r t t h e s e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r e s t s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h e y a r e t a i n t e d . They a l s o may be v o t i n g f o r t h e i r own b e l i e f and c o n s t i t u e n t s ' i n t e r e s t s . I f PACs do n o t have t h e s i n i s t e r i n f l u e n c e a s c r i b e d t o them, what does a group g a i n by h a v i n g o n e ? Access." Buying Congress. American o p i n i o n , v. 21, July-Aug. 1978: Huck, Susan L. M. 7 , 9-16, 1 2 9 , 131-132. AP2.04732, v. 21 Charges t h a t l a b o r u n i o n s and " v a r i o u s L e f t i s t p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s " i n e f f e c t "buy" s y m p a t h e t i c Members of Congress w i t h huge campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s . A t t h e mercy of t h e h i g h e s t b i d d e r . Common Cause, v. 8 , Kosterlitz, Julie. Aug. 1982: 8-20. Warns of t h e growing i n f l u e n c e i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s and d e l i b e r a t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n committees, which "have g o t t e n t o be b i g b u s i n e s s i n t h e n a t i o n ' s C a p i t a l . And, s i n c e t h e bulk of PAC d o l l a r s go t o incumbents, PACs have a p o w e r f u l b u i l t - i n c o n s t i t u e n c y a g a i n s t reform--Members of Congress themselves. PACs' growth and a p p a r e n t s u c c e s s i s s e n d i n g a message t o t h e n a t i o n t h a t , i n c r e a s i n g l y , o u r s i s a government o f , by and f o r t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . " McMenamin, M i c h a e l , and W a l t e r McNamara. M i l k i n g t h e p u b l i c ; how t h e d a i r y lobby buys f r i e n d s and f a v o r s i n C a r t e r ' s Washington. Inquiry 2839.5.15, v. 1 (San F r a n c i s c o ) , v. 1, Nov. 1 3 , 1978: 9-13. A u t h o r s d i s c u s s t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e d a i r y lobby i n Washington a s s e r t i n g t h a t "you d o n ' t f i n d t h e d a i r y l o b b y d r i v i n g t r a c t o r s o r h e r d i n g a n i m a l s through t h e s t r e e t s of Washington When d a i r y f a r m e r s want a n o t h e r s u b s i d y from t h e f e d e r a l government, t h e y go t o C a p i t o l H i l l q u i e t l y and smoothly, w i t h w e l l - p a i d l o b b y i s t s and l a w y e r s c a r r y i n g b r i e f c a s e s f u l l of money. Next t o t h e American M e d i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , t h e d a i r y l o b b y gave more campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o House and S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s i n 1976 t h a n any o t h e r i n t e r e s t group-over 1.3 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . " . Public Citizen, inc. Congress watch. Nader study links oil contributions to pro-oil House vote. Washington, 1979. 2, 10, 2 p. "95% of 1T.S. Representatives who received more than $2500 from oil industry 'political action committees' voted on June 28, 1979, for an industry-favored version of the windfall profits tax, according to a study done by Public Citizen's Congress Watch, a consuiner advocacy group affiliated with Ralph Kader ." - The power of the PACs: campaign contributions from car dealers to congressional co-sponsors of resolutions to veto the FTC's used car rule. Washington, 1981. 6, 6 p. Presents statistics on campaign contributions given by the National Automobile Dealers Association's PAC to senators and members of Congress cosponsoring the congressional veto resolution to disapprove the proposed Federal Trade Commission rule requiring used car dealers to list all warranties and known defects. Robinson, Gail. Many happy returns. Environmental action, v. 12, Dec. 1980: 28-32. HCllO.B5E496, v. 12 Expresses skepticism that the Reagan administration will promote environmental protection and analyzes the impact of the 1980 congressional elections on environmental causes in the 97th Congress. Includes separate discussions on the outcome of antinuclear referenda in western states (p. 29) and on the effort to have congressional candidates reject contributions from the political action committees of the "Filthy Fivem--corporations which are allegedly major polluters (p. 31). Roeder, Edward. Catalyzing favorable reactions: a look at chemical industry PACs. Sierra, v. 66, Mar.-Apr. 1981: 23-26. F868.S5S476, v. 66 Discusses the impact of chemical industry political action committee funds on legislation and elections. ----- Lubricating Congress. Sierra, v. 65, Var.-Apr. 1980: 6-8, 10-11. F868.S5S476, v. 65 "A shocking analysis of how Big Oil buys votes--and influence. How can we have independent legislators when so many are on the payroll?" Running with the PACs: how political action committees win friends and influence elections. Time, Oct. 25, 1982: 20-26. "Today the power of PACs threatens to undermine America's system of representative democracy." ... Sedacca, Sandra. Dirty money dirty air? A Common Cause study of political action committee contributions to House and Senate Committees reviewing the clean air act. Washington, 1981. 14 p. Finds that members of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment, with jurisdiction over the reauthorization of the expiring Clean Air Act, received almost $1.15 million in 1980 campaign contributions from the political action committees of seven industries-automobiles, chemicals, forest products, metals and mining, oil and gas, steel, and electric utilities--affected by provisions of the law. Take $2,000 and call me in the morning: A Common Cause Study of American Medical Association political action committee contributions. Washington, Common Cause, 1983. 1 v. (various pagings). "Examines AMA PAC giving for the past three congressional election cycles--from January 1, 1977 through November 22, 1982--in order to provide a picture of the cumulative impact PAC contributions can have in creating obligations for Members of Congress." INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURZS (Citations to some of the discussions of this form of campaign spending and how it overlaps with PAC activity) Glen, Maxwell. Free spenders--the 'other' campaign for Reagan chooses its targets. National journal, v. 12, Sept. 13, 1980: 1512-1515. JKl.N28, v. 12 Describes the independent expenditure plans and activities of conservative groups seeking to advance Ronald Reagan's candidacy for President in 1980. ----- How to get around the campaign spending limits. National journal, JKl.N28, v. 11 Anticipates the increasing incidence of independent spending, particularly by PACs, as a means of influencing elections. v. 11, June 23, 1979: 1044-1046. ----- Independent spenders are gearing up, and Reagan and GOP stand to benefit. Congressional quarterly weekly report, v. 15, nec. 17, 1983: 2627-2631. "More money than ever is expected to be spent independently of candidates in 1984, and Democratic and liberal groups lag well behind Republicans in their plans." Independent political committees and the Federal election laws. University of Pennsylvania law review, v. 129. Apr. 1981: 955-4393. "Comment examines, in the context of presidential general election campaigns, the issues arising from" the Supreme Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo, that limits imposed on independent campaign expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act were illegal, while upholding "the limitations on contributions." Considers implications of this revised treatment of independent expenditures. Kayden, Xandra. Campaign under siege: reflections on one senator's defeat. New York University review of law and social change, v. 10, no. 1, 1980-1981: 67-79. Political scientist reviews the response to the advertising of the independent National Conservative Political Action Committee presented by a losing incumbent in the 1980 election, as an illustration of "the counter-strategies candidates are forced to develop in response to the negative spending tactics of special interest groups." Light, Larry. Independent Reagan groups have shaved spending plans. Congressional quarterly weekly report, v. 38, Oct. 18, 1980: 3152-3153. JKl.Cl5, v. 38 "Last summer, five groups announced media efforts totaling up to $70 million to aid the GOP presidential nominee. Now the organizations project overall spending of slightly less than 515 million." ----- Surge in independent campaign spending. Congressional quarterly weekly report, v. 38, June 14, 1980: 1635-1639. JKl.Cl5, v. 38 Provides background on the independent spending phenomenon and its increasing popularity among PACs, particularly ideological ones. Public Citizen. New Right exploits campaign loophole (press release): May 1981. Reports on independent expenditures by individuals and groups (e.g., PACs) in 1980, arriving at a total of $16.1 million. US. Federal Ylection Commission. FEC issues final report on 1981-82 independent spending (press release): Oct. 14, 1983. 6 p. Final summary data on independent expenditures in the 1982 elections. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Independent expenditures in political campaigns--A discussion of constitutional constraints. Elizabeth Yadlosky. Washington, 1982. 23 p. (Report no. 82-83s) Examines legal and constitutional aspects of independent expenditures. ----- The evolution of and issues surrounding independent expenditures in election campaigns. Joseph F. Cantor. Washington, 1982. 78 p. (Report 82-87 GOV) Reviews the history and legal bases of independent expenditures, and examines their use through the 1980 elections and the debate surrounding them. *US. GOVERNMENT PRlNTlNQ OFFICE: 1 9 8 4 4 4 4 7 1 7 0