Assessing the Options for Preserving ICBM Survivability

The decision on how to redress the perceived vulnerability of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) is the most controversial strategic nuclear weapon decision now facing the 97th Congress. A full-scale debate on this issue, especially as regards MX missile basing, seems certain. To assist Members of Congress in the debate, this paper discusses nine proposals for treating ICBM survivability: Recognize that ICBMs are invulnerable, rely only on bombers and submarines for deterrence, deploy a large or scaled-down shell-game multiple shelter system, defend MX with anti ballistic missiles, launch ICBMs on warning of attack, deploy MX on aircraft or small submarines, and diversify strategic forces, perhaps using small ICBMs.

R e p o r t No. 81-222 F ASSESSING WE OPTIONS FOR PRESERVING ICBM SURVIVABILITY bY J o n a t h a n E. Medalia Analyst i n N a t i o n a l Defense F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e D i v i s i o n S e p t e m b e r 2 8 , 1981 UC 500 GOVERNMENT GOCUMCOLLECTION U.S. B T h e Congressional Research Service works exclusivelv for the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legslation, and providing information at the request of committees, Members, and their staffs. T h e Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compilations, digests, and background briefings. Upon request, CRS assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals and issues, and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals and their alternatives. T h e Service's senior specialists and subject analysts are also available for personal consultations in their respective fields of expertise. ABSTRACT The decision on how to redress the perceived vulnerability of U.S. inter- continental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) is the most controversial strategic nuclear weapon decision now facing the 97th Congress. A full-scale debate on this issue, especially as regards MX missile basing, seems certain. T o assist Members of Congress in the debate, this paper discusses nine proposals for treating ICBM survivability: Recognize that ICBMs are invulnerable, rely only on bombers and submarines for deterrence, deploy a large or scaled-down shellgame multiple shelter system, defend MX with antiballistic missiles, launch ICBMs on warning of attack, deploy MX on aircraft or small submarines, and diversify strategic forces, perhaps using small ICBMs. ABM Antiballistic missile AMMX Airmobile MX ASW Antisubmarine warfare C3 Command, control, and communication CBO Congressional Budget Off ice CEP Circular error probable DOD Department of Defense FOC Full operational capability FY Fiscal year GBS Ground beacon systern ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile IOC Initial operational capability L oAD Low Altitude Defense (ABM) LOW Launch on warning LUA Launch under attack MIRV Multiple independently-targetable reenty vehicle MPS Multiple protective structure nmi Xautical mile(s) OTA Office of Technology Assessment PLU Preservation of location uncertainty psi Pounds per square inch RCD Research and development RV Reentry vehicle SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SICBM Small intercontinental ballistic missile SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile SSKP Single-shot kill probability SUM Smallsub undersea mobile CONTENTS ..................................................................iii ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................ v INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 1 ARE I C B M s VULNERABLE? ..................................................... 5 ABSTRACT CAN WE ABANDON LAND-BASED I C B M s ? e......................................... 9 MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES : THE B A S E L I N E SYSTEM FOR B A S I N G MX ON LAND ............................... 1 4 T h e C a s e F o r MPS .................................................. 1 7 T h e C a s e A g a i n s t MPS ................................................ 2 1 ALTERNATIVE MEANS O F BASING MX ON LAND .................................... 24 S c a l e d - D o w n MPS ..................................................... 2 4 A n t i b a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e D e f e n s e o f MX .................................. 2 7 L o w A l t i t u d e D e f e n s e (LOAD) ..................................... 2 7 L a y e r e d D e f e n s e ................................................. 30 S i m p l e S y s t e m s .................................................. 3 2 L a u n c h on W a r n i n g ....................................................34 VON-LAND BASING FOR MX .................................................... 3 9 A i r m o b i l e ............................................................ 3 9 S m a l l S u b m a r i n e B a s i n g ............................................... 4 5 A BROADER SOLUTION: STRATEGIC FORCE D I V E R S I F I C A T I O N AND SMALL I C B M s BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................... 5 3 .............................................................. 59 ASSESSING THE OPTIONS FOR PRESERVING ICBM SURVIVABILITY INTRODUCTION The d e c i s i o n on how t o r e d r e s s t h e p e r c e i v e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f U.S. inter- c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s (ICBMs) i s t h e most c o n t r o v e r s i a l s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapon d e c i s i o n f a c i n g t h e 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s . A t i s s u e a r e U.S. policy on I C B M s , a n t i b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s (ABMs), and o t h e r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s ; t h e f u t u r e of SALT; t h e b u d g e t ; i m p a c t s on l a r g e a r e a s o f t h e n a t i o n ; and p e r h a p s U.S. a b i l i t y t o preserve deterrence. The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s d e v e l o p i n g a new I C B M , t h e MX. I t i s t o be c o n s i d e r - a b l y l a r g e r and more a c c u r a t e t h a n Minuteman 111, t h e o n l y c u r r e n t l y d e p l o y e d multiple-warhead U.S. U.S. ICBM. T h e r e a r e , however, f e a r s a b o u t t h e a b i l i t y o f I C B M s t o s u r v i v e a t h r e a t by a c c u r a t e S o v i e t I C B M s . survivable s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i s undisputed. S i n c e 1J.S. The need t o r e t a i n policy i s t o structure f o r c e s t h a t can a b s o r b a n a t t a c k and s t i l l e f f e c t i v e l y r e t a l i a t e , I C B M s must be s u r v i v a b l e i f t h e y a r e t o b e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p o l i c y . Since missiles a r e q u i t e v u l n e r a b l e t o n u c l e a r weapon e f f e c t s , t h e i r s u r v i v a b i l i t y depends on how t h e y a r e b a s e d , u s e d , o r d e f e n d e d . Members o f Congress h a v e e x p r e s s e d i n t e r e s t i n a w i d e v a r i e t y o f p r o p o s a l s t o e n s u r e ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y . While announcement of an A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e c i s i o n on MX b a s i n g d e c i s i o n a p p e a r s imminent, C o n g r e s s i s n o t p o w e r l e s s i n t h e m a t t e r and many Members w i l l c o n t i n u e t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h e r a n g e of a l t e r n a t i v e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s r e p o r t d e s c r i b e s t h e more prominent o n e s and t h e m a j o r arguments f o r and a g a i n s t each. ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y depends c r i t i c a l l y on t h e a c c u r a c y of t h e a t t a c k i n g force. The S o v i e t s h a v e been improving I C B M a c c u r a c y d r a m a t i c a l l y i n t h e l a s t few y e a r s and d e p l o y i n g many a c c u r a t e ICBMs. A s a r e s u l t , many i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b e l i e v e t h e S o v i e t s c a n now, o r i n a few y e a r s , d e s t r o y p e r h a p s 90% of U.S. I C B M s i n a p r e e m p t i v e o r f i r s t s t r i k e . 1_/ Another p o s i t i o n d i s a g r e e s . I t c o n t e n d s t h a t many f a c t o r s d e g r a d e a c c u r a c y and o t h e r w i s e impede a f i r s t s t r i k e , making I C B M v u l n e r a b i l i t y a c r e a t u r e of t h e o r y t h a t f o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e can be ignored i n t h e r e a l world. Few h a v e f e l t , however, t h a t we c o u l d j u s t d i s m i s s t h e problem. After a l l , d e t e r r e n c e h i n g e s on whether S o v i e t l e a d e r s b e l i e v e t h e y c o u l d d e s t r o y o u r I C B M s , n o t w h e t h e r t h e y would i n f a c t s u c c e e d . Moreover, f e w want t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o be p e r c e i v e d a s h a v i n g one of i t s s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s v u l n e r a b l e . These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s weighed, C o n g r e s s s t a t e d i n 1976 t h a t MX must b e s u r v i v a b l y based on l a n d . 21 - For t h e s e r e a s o n s , and o t h e r s d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r recommended b a s i n g MX i n t h e shell-game m u l t i p l e p r o t e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e (MPS) system. He f e l t i t would k e e p MX on l a n d s u r v i v a b l y , v e r i f i a b l y , a f f o r d a b l y , c o m p a t i b l y w i t h SALT, and w i t h minimal e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact. P r e s i d e n t Reagan c h a l l e n g e d MPS i n h i s campaign, a p p a r e n t l y b e c a u s e o f i t s s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l consequences, c o s t , and complexity. o f f i c e , h i s Administration has been looking f o r a l t e r n a t i v e s . Since taking A t one p o i n t o r o t h e r , t h e p r e s s has r e p o r t e d t h a t i t h a s c o n s i d e r e d b a s i n g MX on s u r f a c e s h i p s 11 S e e , f o r example, IT. S. Department of Defense. Annual R e p o r t , F i s c a l Year 1 9 8 2 . (Harold Brown, S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e ) Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f , 1981. p. 111. 2 1 U.S. Congress. Committee o f Conference. Authorizing Appropriations f o r ~ i s c a Year l 1977 f o r M i l i t a r y Procurement and f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s . S. Rept. 94-1004. To accompany H.R. 12438. 9 4 t h C o n g r e s s , 2d S e s s i o n . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1977. p. 40. ... and a i r c r a f t , i n 3000-ft deep s i l o s and a scaled-down KPS, and d e f e n d i n g MX w i t h ABMs. 21 The problems a r e s o complex, w i t h s o many r e q u i r e m e n t s imposed s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n has d e l a y e d t h e d e c i s i o n s e v e r a l t i m e s . A s o f e a r l y S e p t e m b e r , t h e s t a t u s of v a r i o u s o p t i o n s was a s f o l l o w s . A i r F o r c e and t h e Armed S e r v i c e s Committees s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d The MXIMPS; some o t h e r Members of Congress opposed i t ; t h e P r e s i d e n t a p p e a r e d u n w i l l i n g t o d e p l o y t h e f u l l 200-MX/4600-shelter s y s t e m C a r t e r proposed. B a s i n g 100 MX i n 1000 s h e l t e r s now seems t h e l e a d i n g c o n t e n d e r , e v e n t h o u g h t h a t s y s t e m by i t s e l f h a s v e r y poor s u r v i v a l p r o s p e c t s i n a d e t e r m i n e d a t t a c k . ( S e e p. 2 5 . ) A i r m o b i l e MX (AMMX) was r e p o r t e d t o b e t h e l e a d i n g c h a l l e n g e r t o MPS. I n e a r l y August, on C-5 t h e p r e s s r e p o r t e d t h a t S e c r e t a r y Weinberger wanted t o b a s e MX a i r c r a f t i n t h e mid-1980s, t h e n d e p l o y i n t h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 s a new a i r c r a f t , "Big B i r d , " d e s i g n e d t o k e e p MX a l o f t f o r days. S e n a t o r Tower, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s P r i c e and D i c k i n s o n , and some A i r F o r c e g e n e r a l s r e p o r t e d l y c r i t i c i z e d AMMX sharply. 4/ A t t h i s w r i t i n g , AMMX no l o n g e r seems a n o p t i o n f o r e a r l y deploy- ment, b u t r e s e a r c h on i t may c o n t i n u e . Small submarine b a s i n g h a s r e c e i v e d modest c o n g r e s s i o n a l s u p p o r t , b u t t h e A i r F o r c e opposes i t . The Navy i s u n i n t e r e s t e d i n i t b e c a u s e , some b e l i e v e , i t c o u l d t h r e a t e n t h e T r i d e n t program, o f f e r s no a d v a n t a g e s c v e r T r i d e n t , a n d c o u l d l e a d t o d i s p u t e s between t h e Navy and A i r F o r c e o v e r r o l e s and m i s s i o n s . 3 / See: Wilson, George. Weinberger S u g g e s t s U.S. More W i l l i n g To s t a t i o n G I s i n T r o u b l e S p o t s Abroad. Washington P o s t , Feb. 4 , 1981: A l , A4 ( s u r f a c e s h i p s ) ; Robinson, C l a r e n c e , J r . Weinberger P u s h e s S t r a t e g i c A i r m o b i l e MX Concept. A v i a t i o n Week and Space Technology, Aug. 3 , 1981: 16-19 ( a i r m o b i l e and d e e p underground b a s i n g ) ; A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Weighing O p t i o n s i n MX B a s i n g P l a n . A v i a t i o n Week and Space Technology, S e p t . 7 , 1981: 22-25 ( s m a l l MPS and ABM), 4 1 Tower, John. P r e s s C o n f e r e n c e , Aug. 1 , 1981. 5 p.; W i l s o n , George. ~ o u s e - ~ e a d e r sTry To Down A i r b o r n e MX. Washington P o s t , Aug. 1 3 , 1981 : A l ; Evans, Rowland, and R o b e r t Novak. W e i n g e r g e r ' s F l y i n g T r a p . Washington P o s t , Aug. 1 0 , 1981: A17. The n e a r - t e r m f u t u r e of ABM d e f e n s e of MX w i l l b e c r i t i c a l l y a f f e c t e d by t h e MX b a s i n g d e c i s i o n . S i l o b a s i n g would need a n ABM d e f e n s e t o s u r v i v e u n l e s s MX were l a u n c h e d u n d e r a t t a c k . The 200-MX/4600-IQS a Low A l t i t u d e D e f e n s e ABM i f t h e S o v i e t s were a d d i n g R V s . system could require The 1 0 0 - ~ ~ / 1 0 0 0 - ~ ~ ~ ~ would o f f e r n e g l i g i b l e s u r v i v a b i l i t y w i t h o u t a much more e l a b o r a t e ABM d e f e n s e . S m a l l s u b m a r i n e s o r AMMX would n o t depend on ABMs f o r s u r v i v a l . S i m p l e ABM systems have r e c e i v e d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i n Congress. L a u n c h i n g ICBYs on warning of a t t a c k h a s r e c e i v e d some c o n g r e s s i o n a l support. Some S e n a t o r s h a v e u r g e d t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h b e r e a s s e s s e d . 51 The House Committee on I n t e r i o r and I n s u l a r A f f a i r s recommended i m p r o v i n g command and i n t e l l i g e n c e s y s t e m s t h a t would e n h a n c e U.S. 5/ a b i l i t y t o do s o . The S e n a t e p a s s e d a n amendment on May 1 4 , 1981, a d d i n g $31.2 m i l l i o n f o r a S u r v i v a b l e O p t i c a l Forward A c q u i s i t i o n System w h i c h , i t s a d v o c a t e s c l a i m e d , would enhance U.S. a b i l i t y t o l a u n c h on warning. T h i s o p t i o n and " d u s t d e f e n s e " ( s e e page 3 3 ) a r e t h e o n l y t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e ways t o k e e p I C B M s s u r v i v a b l e i n t h e n e a r term. The c a s e t h a t s i l o - b a s e d I C B M s a r e i n v u l n e r a b l e h a s n o t s t u c k . spokesmen have r e c e n t l y c h a l l e n g e d some of t h e s e arguments. A i r Force Yet t h e r e i s l i t t l e s u p p o r t i n Congress f o r abandoning I C B M s . Some a r e a r g u i n g t h a t MX b a s i n g must be d e c i d e d n o t a s a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t of a b r o a d e r v i e w of 1J.S. security interests. Several S e n a t o r s and t h e TJouse Committee on I n t e r i o r and I n s u l a r A f f a i r s t a k e t h i s 5 / Garn, J a k e , and P a u l L a x a l t . MX B a s i n g and a N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o s t u r e f o r t x e U n i t e d S t a t e s . R e p o r t accompanying p r e s s r e l e a s e by S e n a t o r Garn of J u n e 2 5 , 1981. 1 4 p . 6 / U.S. C o n g r e s s . House. Committee on I n t e r i o r a n d I n s u l a r A f f a i r s . B a s i n g t h e MX M i s s i l e . 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1st S e s s i o n . Committee P r i n t No. 2 . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1981. 2 8 p. p o s i t i o n ; S e c r e t a r y Weinberger h a s r e p o r t e d l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a comprehensive p l a n t o u p g r a d e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . This position further recommends d e v e l o p i n g v a r i o u s weapons a s hedges a g a i n s t S o v i e t weapons advances. ARE I C B M s VULNERABLE? The b a s i n g mode d e b a t e assumes t h a t U.S. I C B M s a r e becoming v u l n e r a b l e . Some d i s p u t e t h i s , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y problem i s a c r e a t u r e 7/ of t h e o r e t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s and c a n be i g n o r e d i n t h e r e a l w o r l d . Many u n c e r t a i n t i e s r e d u c e a n a t t a c k e r ' s c o n f i d e n c e t h a t i t c a n s u c c e s s fully strike first. The a b i l i t y o f a n I C B M f o r c e t o d e s t r o y a n o p p o s i n g ICBM f o r c e depends on a c c u r a c y , e x p l o s i v e y i e l d , numbers, and r e l i a b i l i t y of r e e n t r y v e h i c l e s (RVS), and r e l i a b i l i t y o f I C B M s . Accuracy i s o f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e . A s f i g u r e 1 shows, d e g r a d a t i o n s of a c c u r a c y beyond a c e r t a i n p o i n t ( d e p e n d i n g on RV y i e l d and s i l o h a r d n e s s ) d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a n RV c a n d e s t r o y an ICBM s i l o . P e t every b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e t r a j e c t o r y i s a f f e c t e d by a n o m a l i e s i n t h e e a r t h ' s g r a v i t a t i o n a l and m a g n e t i c f i e l d s . While a n I C B M ' s t r a j e c t o r y can be a d j u s t e d f o r known a n o m a l i e s , n e i t h e r s i d e h a s f l o w n ICBMs over t h e n o r t h p o l e f o r obvious reasons. I t i s argued t h a t t h e anomalies of t h i s t r a j e c t o r y , b e i n g unknown, would d e g r a d e b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a c c u r a c y by some unknown amount. Weather c o n d i t i o n s o v e r t h e t a r g e t would a l s o a f f e c t accuracy. 7 1 S e e , f o r example, Anderson, J . Edward. Are We V u l n e r a b l e t o a F i r s t s t r i k e ? P r e p u b l i c a t i o n d r a f t . M i n n e a p o l i s , Dept. of Mechanical E n g i n e e r i n g , U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a , May 1981. 3 4 p. FIGURE 1. S i n g l e - S h o t K i l l P r o b a b i l i t y (SSKP) v s . C i r c u l a r E r r o r P r o b a b l e (CEP) ns: T h i s graph p r e s e n t s d a t a f o r a 500-kiloton weapon used a g a i n s t a s i l o hardened t o w i t h s t a n d o v e r p r e s s u r e s of 2000 pounds p e r s q u a r e i n c h . , t h e r a d i u s of a c i r c l e w i t h i n which h a l f of t h e R V s of a t y p e of ICBM can be expected t o f a l l . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , a n SSKP of 1.00 i s n e v e r a c h i e v a b l e . However, f o r CEPs approachi n g z e r o , SSKP approaches 1.00 D a t a c a l c u l a t e d u s i n g G e n e r a l E l e c t r i c CEP C a l c u l a t o r , c o p y r i g h t 1978 by P e r r y g r a f D i v i s i o n of Nashua Gorp. Circular Error Probable ( n a u t i c a l miles) L- ---- 5 - The b l a s t , d u s t , h e a t , wind c u r r e n t s , e t c . , o f a n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n would d i s a b l e o r knock o f f c o u r s e any R V s f l y i n g n e a r i t f o r some m i n u t e s , a n e f f e c t known a s f r a t r i c i d e . To a v o i d f r a t r i c i d e , R V s must a t t a c k o n e s i d e o f a m i s s i l e f i e l d , t h e n sweep toward t h e o t h e r s i d e on a p r e c i s e s c h e d u l e . A more d i f f i c u l t a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o have a l l R V s i n e a c h m i s s i l e f i e l d e x p l o d e a t a b o u t t h e same instant. Each method r e q u i r e s g r e a t c o o r d i n a t i o n . While e a c h RV t h a t r e a c h e s i t s t a r g e t h a s a v e r y good c h a n c e o f d e s t r o y i n g t h e t a r g e t , ICBM r e l i a b i l i t y i s n o t n e a r l y s o good. An a t t a c k e r would t h e r e f o r e p r e f e r t o u s e two R V s p e r t a r g e t , d o u b l i n g t h e number o f R V s needed. These R V s s h o u l d come from d i f f e r e n t m i s s i l e s s o t h a t one m i s s i l e ' s f a i l u r e would n o t l e a v e one o r more s i l o s u n t a r g e t e d . T h i s " c r o s s - t a r g e t i n g " a d d s t o t h e com- p l e x i t y of c o o r d i n a t i n g a n a t t a c k . The r e l i a b i l i t y of equipment and p e r s o n n e l i n l a u n c h i n g a p r e c i s e l y c o o r d i n a t e d a t t a c k w i t h t h o u s a n d s of R V s i s u n c e r t a i n . A f t e r a l l , s u p p o r t e r s of t h i s p o s i t i o n n o t e , t h e e n t i r e s y s t e m c a n n o t b e t e s t e d , b u t must work n e a r l y p e r f e c t l y the f i r s t time. F i n a l l y , a n a t t a c k e r would f e a r t h a t t h e o p p o s i n g s i d e would l a u n c h i t s I C B M s on w a r n i n g of a t t a c k . I n d e e d , on v i e w i n g p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a n a t t a c k , such a s moving many b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n e s o u t t o s e a , t h e o t h e r s i d e might p r e p a r e t o l a u n c h on warning. D e t a i l e d and s p e c i f i c r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e p o i n t s would be h i g h l y c l a s s i f i e d . I n g e n e r a l , r e s p o n s e s a r e of two t y p e s . F i r s t , t h e i m p a c t of t h e e r r o r f a c t o r s have been d e t e r m i n e d v e r y w e l l by i n t e g r a t i n g measurements o b t a i n e d o v e r t h e l a s t 20 y e a r s , u s i n g s a t e l l i t e s and o n - s i t e s u r v e y d a t a t o measure g r a v i t a - t i o n a l a n o m a l i e s a l o n g f l i g h t p a t h s , examining c h a n g e s i n t h e e a r t h ' s m a g n e t i c f i e l d under d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o n d u c t i n g m i s s i l e f l i g h t t e s t s a l o n g many different trajectories, and so on. 81 Atmospheric conditions have minor effects on accuracy, it is argued, and a missile's trajectory can be adjusted for weather at the target prior to launch. For these and other reasons, the U.S. intelli- gence community believes that uncertainties would not degrade projected ICBM accuracies beyond the point where they have a high probability of destroying ICBM silos. 91 The rebuttal to arguments based on difficulties of coordinating an attack is that the United States should not rest the survivability of its ICBMs on problems that Soviet planners may encounter in calculating the times for launching ICBMs and the trajectories their RVs are to follow. So doing, it is argued, would undermine for friends and foes alike the perception that the United States is committed to preserving the value of its strategic forces, especially ICBMs, which comprise a substantial part of our deterrent capability and almost all of our existing prompt counterforce capability. It is Soviet perceptions of the vulnerability of our ICBMs, not our calculations of their vulnerability, that affect Soviet war plans. 81 Mann, Paul. Panel Examines ICBM Vulnerability. Aviation Week and ~ ~ a c e - ~ e c h n o l July o ~ ~ ,13, 1981: 141+; Administration Weighing Options in MX Basing Plan. Aviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 7, 1981: 22-25. 91 U.S. Air Force. Office of the Special Assistant for MX Matters. ~ e l e ~ h o nconversation, e Sept. 16, 1981. CAN WE ABANDON LAND-BASED ICBMs? One g r o u p o f t h o s e who assume t h a t I C B M s a r e v u l n e r a b l e , o r t h a t we c a n n o t r e l y f o r d e t e r r e n c e on I C B M s t h a t a p p e a r v u l n e r a b l e , b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d move t o a dyad of s u b m a r i n e s and bombers, s u i t a b l y upgraded. p o s i t i o n opposes d e p l o y i n g new I C B M s f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : -- D e t e r r e n c e d o e s n ' t r e q u i r e much i n t h e way o f s u r v i v i n g f o r c e s . A few hundred R V s t h a t c a n s u r v i v e a t t a c k and p e n e t r a t e t o t h e i r t a r g e t s c o u l d d e v a s t a t e t h e S o v i e t Union and d e t e r a n y r a t i o n a l S o v i e t l e a d e r ; no amount of f o r c e c o u l d d e t e r a n i r r a t i o n a l l e a d e r . -- T h e r e i s no p o l i t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e way of b a s i n g I C B M s s u r v i v a b l y on l a n d . MPS- o r s i l o - b a s e d ICBMs c a n be t a r g e t e d and d e s t r o y e d . Land-mobile I C B M s c a n be b a r r a g e d . g e n e r a t e huge amounts of f a l l o u t . a t t a c k e n t a i l s huge r i s k s . A t t a c k s on e i t h e r would Launching I C B M s on w a r n i n g of ABM d e f e n s e would b e c o s t l y , would r e q u i r e r e n e g o t i a t i n g o r w i t h d r a w i n g from t h e A . BM T r e a t y , and may be i n e f f e c t i v e . I t i s p o i n t l e s s t o p o u r money i n t o r e t a i n i n g a n i r r e m e d i a b l y v u l n e r a b l e system. -- D e p l o y i n g new I C B M s p l a y s t o S o v i e t s t r e n g t h by p r o v i d i n g t a r g e t s f o r t h e many a c c u r a t e S o v i e t ICBM R V s . I n s t e a d , by e n h a n c i n g o u r bomber and s u b m a r i n e f o r c e s and f o r e g o i n g new I C B M s , we c o u l d d e f e a t t h e m a s s i v e S o v i e t i n v e s t m e n t i n c o u n t e r f o r c e I C B M s and t h e s t r a t e g y on which i t i s b a s e d . -- The T r i d e n t I1 (D-5) m i s s i l e c o u l d become o p e r a t i o n a l i n 1989, and c o u l d improve t h e T r i d e n t I m i s s i l e ' s r a n g e , a c c u r a c y , a n d This payload. 101 The U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d d e s i g n a T r i d e n t s u b m a r i n e 1 T r i d e n t I1 s y s t e m t o e x e c u t e prompt c o u n t e r f o r c e attacks. (i.e., 111 I t would be h i g h l y s u r v i v a b l e , and c o u l d e n d u r e o p e r a t e i f i t s u r v i v e s t h e i n i t i a l a t t a c k ) f o r months. S i n c e t h e f l e e t would o p e r a t e o v e r v a s t ocean a r e a s , i t would be i n s e n s i t i v e t o numbers of S o v i e t R V s . S o v i e t RVs t o l a n d . I t would a t t r a c t few Very few submarines would be needed t o p r o v i d e t h e 1000 o r s o R V s t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h o p e s would s u r v i v e from a n MX system. T r i d e n t I1 would presumably c a r r y between 8 R V s (which T r i d e n t I c a r r i e s ) and 14 R V s ( t h e maximum p e r m i t t e d by SALT 1 1 ) . F i v e submarines armed w i t h 8-RV T r i d e n t 11s would c a r r y 960 R V s ; 3 armed w i t h 14-RV T r i d e n t 11s would c a r r y 1008 RVs. I f t h e T r i d e n t submarine has a 66% a t - s e a a v a i l a b i l i t y over i t s l i f e t i m e , a s planned, 121 5 would p e r m i t 3 t o 5 t o be on s t a t i o n a t a l l t i m e s . t o 8 submarines We c o u l d guard a g a i n s t S o v i e t a d v a n c e s i n a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) by p u r s u i n g 1 0 1 Z e i b e r g , Seymour (Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e f o r R e s e a r c h and Testimony f o r t h e Sea Based ~ n ~ i n z r (i Snt r~a t e g i c and Space S y s t e m s ) ) . N u c l e a r D e t e r r e n t F o r c e H e a r i n g o f t h e S t r a t e g i c Programs Subcommittee, S e n a t e Armed S e r v i c e s Committee. Feb. 27, 1981. p. 1-3. 11/ R e g a r d i n g t h e D-5's c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y , s e e C a r t e r , P o w e l l , J r . ( ~ e a r A d m i r a 1 , USN, D i r e c t o r , S t r a t e g i c and T h e a t e r N u c l e a r Warfare D i v i s i o n , O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f o f Naval O p e r a t i o n s ) . S t a t e m e n t b e f o r e t h e Subcommittee on S t r a t e g i c and T h e a t e r N u c l e a r f o r c e s of t h e S e n a t e Armed S e r v i c e s Committee on S e a Based D e t e r r e n t , Feb. 2 7 , 1981. p. 4-6. The r e q u i r e d r e s p o n s i v e n e s s would need c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e s and t e c h n o l o g y , b u t t h e y c o u l d be o b t a i n e d i f a d e c i s i o n were made t o d o s o . Based on d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h D O D , Navy, and Congress i o n a l p e r s o n n e l , S e p t . 1981. 1 2 1 W i l l i a m s , J o h n , J r . ( V i c e A d m i r a l , USN, Deputy C h i e f o f Naval OperaS taternent b e f o r e t h e Subcommit t e e on Seapower tions?or Submarine Warfare). of t h e House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee on t h e FY82 Budget R e q u e s t f o r S t r a t e g i c and T a c t i c a l Submarine F o r c e s . [No d a t e ; c. Feb. 19811. p. 7 (VG-9). counter-ASW t e c h n i q u e s and by c o n d u c t i n g r e s e a r c h and develop- ment (R&D) on s e v e r a l hedge programs, s u c h a s ABM, s m a l l I C B M s , a i r m o b i l e I C B M s , and s n a l l s u b m a r i n e s , any of which we c o u l d deploy i n response t o a s p e c i f i c f u t u r e S o v i e t t h r e a t . U.S. As the ABM program i n t h e l a s t d e c a d e shows, R&D-only programs can advance t e c h n o l o g y d r a m a t i c a l l y a t modest c o s t e v e n w i t h o u t deploying o p e r a t i o n a l systems. -- The U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d a l s o a c c e l e r a t e t h e a i r - l a u n c h e d c r u i s e m i s s i l e program and p r o c e e d w i t h a B-1, a n advanced t e c h n o l o g y ( " s t e a l t h " ) bomber, o r b o t h . Advocates of r e t a i n i n g a t r i a d composed o f land-based I C B M s , bombers, and submarines respond a s follows: -- I t i s h a r d e r t o a t t a c k s e v e r a l independent f o r c e s simultaneously. F o r example, i f ICBMs a r e l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t bombers and I C B M s , bombers c a n be l a u n c h e d on w a r n i n g o f a t t a c k . But i f submarine- l a u n c h e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s (SLBMs) a r e l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t bombers, and I C B M s a r e l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t I C B M s , t h e bombers would be d e s t r o y e d b e f o r e t h e I C B M s a r r i v e , c o n f i r m i n g w a r n i n g of a t t a c k s o t h a t I C B M s c o u l d be l a u n c h e d . -- I t i s harder t o defend a g a i n s t s e v e r a l independent s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s ; f o r example, I C B M s would a t t a c k t h e U.S.S.R. from t h e n o r t h , and SLBMs c o u l d a p p r o a c h from v a r i o u s d i r e c t i o n s . Unlike m i s s i l e s , bombers c a n f l y low and u s e e v a s i v e o r s e l f - d e f e n s e tactics. -- D i f f e r e n t f o r c e s a r e s u i t e d t o d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s . SLBMs, f o r example, a r e a n i d e a l r e s e r v e f o r c e b e c a u s e of t h e i r n e a r invulnerability. -- Even i f t h e S o v i e t s b e l i e v e one of o u r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i s v u l n e r a b l e and t h u s i n e f f e c t i v e a s a d e t e r r e n t , t h e o t h e r s could s t i l l d e t e r . -- Bombers a r e of q u e s t i o n a b l e s u r v i v a b i l i t y given t h e prospect t h a t a n a t t a c k c o u l d d e s t r o y many bombers a t t h e i r b a s e s and S o v i e t a i r d e f e n s e s c o u l d d e s t r o y bombers n e a r t h e i r t a r g e t s . A dyad would t h u s i n e f f e c t r e s t s o l e l y on s u b m a r i n e s , making o u r d e t e r r e n t v u l n e r a b l e t o a S o v i e t ASW b r e a k t h r o u g h . Some oppose a bomber-submarine dyad on t h e b a s i s of t h e need f o r land-based ICBMs. -- They n o t e : I C B M s h a v e a u n i q u e c o m b i n a t i o n of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i n c l u d i n g : Rapid r e s p o n s e t i m e , s h o r t t i m e t o t a r g e t , a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o y h a r d t a r g e t s , h i g h a l e r t r a t e , a b i l i t y t o be r e t a r g e t e d r a p i d l y , and v e r y good command and c o n t r o l . g! I n some b a s i n g modes, I C B M s c a n h a v e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d v e r i f i c a t i o n f o r SALT. 1 3 1 A l l e n , Lew, J r . ( G e n e r a l , C h i e f o f S t a f f , USAF). L e t t e r t o Repres e n t a z v e Melvin P r i c e , Chairman, House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, Dec. 2 9 , 1978. I n U.S. C o n g r e s s . S e n a t e . Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s . F i s c a l Y e a r 1979 Supplemental M i l i t a r y Authorization. H e a r i n g s on S. 429, a B i l l t o A u t h o r i z e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r F i s c a l Year 1979, i n A d d i t i o n t o Amounts P r e v i o u s l y Authori z e d f o r Procurement of A i r c r a f t , M i s s i l e s , Naval V e s s e l s , and f o r O t h e r Purposes. 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t S e s s i o n . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 166-167. ... -- 2 liminating ICBMs would free resources that the Soviets could devote to making our bombers and submarines vulnerable. -- Just as our bomber and submarine forces give us time to remedy ICBM vulnerability, so maintaining a survivable ICBM force would provide time in which to remedy a future weakness in the bomber or submarine force. -- The U.S. would convey an image of weakness by letting the Soviets drive U.S. ICBMs from land. MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES: THE BASELINE SYSTEM FOR BASING MX ON LAND A m a j o r g r o u p o f t h o s e who b e l i e v e I C B M s a r e v u l n e r a b l e i n s i s t t h a t we r e t a i n s u r v i v a b l e land-based ICBMs. Many of , t h i s g r o u p want t o d e p l o y MX; some want t o d e p l o y i t i n a m u l t i p l e p r o t e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e (MPS) s y s t e m . S i n c e MPS i s t h e A i r F o r c e ' s p r e f e r r e d s o l u t i o n , t h e one p r e f e r r e d by t h e Ford admini1 4 1 a n d t h e o n e s e l e c t e d by P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r i n September 1979, i t i s stration t h e b a s e l i n e s y s t e m and t h e one t h a t h a s r e c e i v e d t h e most a t t e n t i o n . G e n e r i c a l l y , a n MPS i s a g i a n t s h e l l game, i n which few m i s s i l e s a r e moved among many s h e l t e r s . The s h e l t e r s may be h o r i z o n t a l o r v e r t i c a l and may be c o n n e c t e d by r o a d s , r a i l r o a d s , t u n n e l s , e t c . The t h e o r y u n d e r l y i n g MPS i s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would n o t know which s h e l t e r s c o n t a i n m i s s i l e s , s o t h e y would have t o attack a l l the shelters i n a f i r s t strike. Yet t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would b u i l d s o many s h e l t e r s t h a t t h e y c o u l d n ' t a t t a c k them a l l . and m i s s i l e s would s u r v i v e . A s a r e s u l t , some s h e l t e r s The S o v i e t s , knowing t h i s , would b e d e t e r r e d . MPS e n t a i l s two key c o n d i t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s must p r e v e n t t h e S o v i e t s from knowing which s h e l t e r s c o n t a i n m i s s i l e s . T h i s t a s k , known a s p r e s e r v a t i o n of l o c a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y , o r PLU, i s d i f f i c u l t ; t h e O f f i c e of Technology Assessment (OTA) s e e s i t a s " t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f a new t e c h n o l o g y . " 151 A m i s s i l e , even i n a s h e l t e r , g i v e s o f f many s i g n a l s t h a t c a n be u s e d t o d e t e c t i t , i n c l u d i n g a c o u s t i c , communications, c h e m i c a l , m a g n e t i c , n u c l e a r , s e i s m i c , and t h e r m a l . 141 L o c a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y must be p r e s e r v e d a g a i n s t ground s e n s o r s , Department of D e f e n s e . Annual D e f e n s e Department R e p o r t , ( S e c r e t a r y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) Washington, 1J.S. Govt. P r i n t . 1977. p. 1 3 0 . U.S. FY 19%. Off., 1 5 / V.S. Congress. O f f i c e of T e c h n o l o g y Assessment. MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : Summary. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , J u n e 1981. (Hereafter c i t e d a s "OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : Summary.") p. 1 6 . s a t e l l i t e s , and s e c u r i t y b r e a c h e s w h i l e t h e m i s s i l e s a r e i n s h e l t e r s and b e i n g transported. I f t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d d i f f e r e n t i a t e on even one o b s e r v a b l e , t h e l e v e r a g e s o u g h t by p r o l i f e r a t i n g s h e l t e r s would d i s a p p e a r b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d a t t a c k 200 s h e l t e r s i n s t e a d o f 4600 and overwhelm t h e s y s t e m . Second, MPS must r e s p o n d t o t h e t h r e a t . MPS s u r v i v a b i l i t y d o e s n o t r i s e i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e number of s h e l t e r s d e p l o y e d , b u t r i s e s v e r y s l o w l y u n t i l s h e l t e r s outnumber a t t a c k i n g R V s , t h e n r i s e s r a p i d l y . CBO n o t e s , "Thus, a n MPS b a s i n g s y s t e m i s ' i n d i v i s i b l e ' i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e C o n g r e s s c o u l d n o t r e d u c e t h e s i z e of t h e proposed s h e l t e r c o n s t r u c t i o n program w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e primary purpose of t h e system." FIGURE 2 . 100 - 80 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. d 3 3 & 2 i l l u s t r a t e s these points. MX M i s s i l e s S u r v i v i n g v s . MPS S h e l t e r s Deployed ASSUMPTIONS bD C d E/F i g u r e 60 Soviets have 2700 warheads to attack MPS. Soviets use 2 warheadslshelter when they can. Reliability of Soviet warheads 0.85. Kill probability/reliable warhead 1.0. One MX deployed per 23 shelters. - 1 cn V) al 4 .r( m 40 . m d C 20 0 -1350 2700 S h e l t e r s Deployed 1 6 / U.S. Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Budget O f f i c e . The MX M i s s i l e and ~ u l t i z eP r o t e c t i v e S t r u c t u r e B a s i n g : Long-Term B u d g e t a r y I m p l i c a t i o n s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 3 0 . I f t h e S o v i e t s add ICBM w a r h e a d s , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c h o o s e s t o r e t a i n s u r v i v a b l e l a n d - b a s e d I C B M s , i t must a d d s h e l t e r s , m i s s i l e s , o r w a r h e a d s p e r m i s s i l e ; d e f e n d MPS w i t h ABMs; o r some c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s . C a r t e r a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e s y s t e m met t h e f o l l o w i n g f i v e c r i t e r i a . promotes ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y . 171 It I t i s a d e q u a t e l y v e r i f i a b l e . I t "minimizes t h e impact o n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , " s i n c e i t r e q u i r e s c l o s i n g o f f o n l y 3 3 s q u a r e s t a t u t e m i l e s from p u b l i c use. I t i s a f f o r d a b l e , c o s t i n g no more i n c o n s t a n t d o l l a r s t h a n t h e Minuteman, P o l a r i s , o r B-52 programs. I t i s "compatible w i t h e x i s t i n g SALT a g r e e m e n t s and w i t h o u r o b j e c t i v e s f o r SALT 111." MPS k e p t I C B M s on l a n d , a sixth criterion t h a t Carter did not state. F i n a l l y , i t was d e s i g n e d a r o u n d t h e MX r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r m i s s i l e . C a r t e r ' s p l a n c a l l e d f o r e a c h o f 200 MX m i s s i l e s t o b e b a s e d i n i t s own c l u s t e r of 23 h o r i z o n t a l s h e l t e r s , o r 4600 s h e l t e r s i n a l l . was t h e G r e a t B a s i n a r e a of Nevada and U t a h . by c l o s e d - l o o p The s h e l t e r s w e r e t o b e c o n n e c t e d r o a d s , hence t h e name " r a c e t r a c k . " p l a n was m o d i f i e d i n s e v e r a l ways. 181 The p r e f e r r e d s i t e I n A p r i l 1980, t h e " r a c e t r a c k " The new p l a n would h a v e t h e same number of s h e l t e r s and m i s s i l e s , b u t t h e s h e l t e r s would be a r r a y e d a l o n g l i n e a r r o a d s . A s m a l l e r t r a n s p o r t e r v e h i c l e would i n s e r t t h e m i s s i l e a n d l a u n c h e r i n t o t h e shelter. T r a n s p o r t e r , l a u n c h e r , and m i s s i l e would weigh 1.6 m i l l i o n pounds. The s y s t e m would h a v e o n l y a l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y t o move m i s s i l e s i n t o s h e l t e r s during attack. To a i d PLU, t h e s y s t e m would u s e mass s i m u l a t o r s , 500,000-lb a r c h e s of s t e e l and c o n c r e t e t h a t would mimic t h e mass and o t h e r s i g n a t u r e s of 1 7 1 U.S. White House. O f f i c e of t h e W h i t e House P r e s s S e c r e t a r y . ~ r e s s % m o u n c e m e n t by t h e P r e s i d e n t on MX b a s i n g , S e p t . 7 , 1979. 4 p. A i r Force. 1 8 1 T h i s s y s t e m i s d e s c r i b e d i n i n t r i c a t e d e t a i l i n U.S. A i r F z c e Systems Command. H e a d q u a r t e r s B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e O f f i c e . M-X H o r i z o n t a l S h e l t e r Weapon System: B a s e l i n e C o n f i g u r a t i o n (Dec. 1 9 8 0 ) . S e v e r a l hundred pages. the missile/launcher. Mass s i m u l a t o r s would be i n e a c h s h e l t e r and t h e t r a n s - p o r t e r v e h i c l e whenever t h e y d i d n o t c o n t a i n a m i s s i l e . Like t h e "racetrack," t h e new p l a n had s e v e r a l f e a t u r e s t o f a c i l i t a t e SALT m o n i t o r i n g . Missiles would b e assembled a t a d e s i g n a t e d a r e a n e a r t h e s h e l t e r s , and moved s l o w l y a l o n g a s p e c i a l road network t o t h e s h e l t e r s . A l a r g e e a r t h mound, r e q u i r i n g a t l e a s t a day t o move, would be p l a c e d a c r o s s t h e e n t r a n c e t o e a c h c l u s t e r o f s h e l t e r s ; s i n c e the t r a n s p o r t e r v e h i c l e s could not t r a v e l o f f t h e road, t h e mound would enhance S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e t h a t we w e r e n o t moving more m i s s i l e s i n t o s h e l t e r s covertly. S h e l t e r s and t r a n s p o r t e r s would have "SALT p o r t s , " d o o r s t h a t c o u l d be removed o r opened t o p e r m i t S o v i e t s a t e l l i t e s t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t a c l u s t e r c o n t a i n e d a t most one m i s s i l e . I n normal o p e r a t i o n , t h e m i s s i l e s would b e moved p e r h a p s o n c e e a c h s i x months from one s h e l t e r t o a n o t h e r i n a c l u s t e r . When r e q u i r e d , m i s s i l e s would be moved from a s h e l t e r t o t h e c l u s t e r m a i n t e n a n c e f a c i l i t y and back. To a v o i d i n d i c a t i n g t o t h e S o v i e t s which s h e l t e r s c o n t a i n m i s s i l e s , t h e t r a n s p o r t e r would s t o p a t a l l s h e l t e r s i n a c l u s t e r whenever i t s t o p p e d a t a n y . would c o n t a i n e i t h e r a m i s s i l e o r a s i m u l a t o r . Each s h e l t e r A t each s h e l t e r , t h e t r a n s p o r t e r would exchange i t s s i m u l a t o r f o r o n e i n t h e s h e l t e r , i t s s i m u l a t o r f o r t h e missile/launcher i n the s h e l t e r , o r i t s missile/launcher f o r t h e simulator i n t h e s h e l t e r , a s t h e c a s e might be. The Case For MPS MPS a d v o c a t e s a r g u e t h a t we need a t r i a d c o n t a i n i n g land-based of t h e a d v a n t a g e s of t h e t r i a d and I C B M s n o t e d e a r l i e r . ICBMs because MX must be t h e ICBM we d e p l o y b e c a u s e i t s development i s f a r a l o n g and i t s c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y i s essential. A sea- o r a i r - b a s e d MX would have s i m i l a r v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a s t h e s u b m a r i n e o r bomber f l e e t , and MX1s l a r g e s i z e p r e v e n t s i t from b e i n g f r e e l y mobile on l a n d . Thus MX s h o u l d b e b a s e d o n l y i n s i l o s o r MPS. S i l o s , however, a r e v u l n e r a b l e t o S o v i e t a t t a c k , and C o n g r e s s i n s i s t e d t h a t MX be s u r v i v a b l y based. Thus MPS i s t h e o n l y c h o i c e . S u p p o r t e r s a r g u e t h a t no o t h e r s y s t e m b a s e s MX on l a n d s u r v i v a b l y , v e r i f i a b l y , a f f o r d a b l y , i n consonance w i t h SALT, and w i t h manageable s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s . MPS r a i s e s t h e c o s t of a S o v i e t a t t a c k . To d e s t r o y 200 m i s s i l e s d i s p e r s e d among 4600 s h e l t e r s , t h e y would n e e d a t l e a s t 4600 R V s i n s t e a d o f 200. need a t l e a s t 23 R V s t o d e s t r o y 1 MX w i t h i t s 1 0 R V s . They would Without MPS, t h e y c o u l d d e s t r o y most o f o u r 2152 ICBM R V s by u s i n g 1052 R V s ( o n e f o r e a c h o f 1052 s i l o s ) , a b o u t 25% of t h e i r c o u n t e r f o r c e RVs. E/With 4600 MPS, 350 Minuteman 111, 450 Minuteman 11, a n d 52 T i t a n s , t h e y would n e e d 5452 c o u n t e r f o r c e R V s t h e y now have -- -- more than t o a t t a c k o u r 3552 ICBM R V s w i t h one RV p e r s h e l t e r o r s i l o . Using two R V s p e r t a r g e t d o u b l e s t h i s c o s t . r a t i o f o r the Soviets. MPS t h u s c r e a t e s a p o o r exchange S i n c e we have f a r more weapons on bombers and s u b m a r i n e s t h a n t h e y d o , a n a t t a c k on MX/MPS would l a r g e l y d i s a r m t h e a t t a c k e r , moving t h e p o s t a t t a c k b a l a n c e of R V s s h a r p l y i n o u r f a v o r . T h i s consequence h o l d s w i t h o r w i t h o u t SALT e v e n i f t h e y a t t a c k o u r f o r c e s i n a " b o l t o u t o f t h e b l u e . " figure 3.) (See Thus MPS d e t e r s S o v i e t a t t a c k , promoting s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . While t h e y c o u l d add R V s , we c o u l d add s h e l t e r s t o o f f s e t them, a n d t h e r e s u l t would be t h e same ours. -- t h e y would u s e a l l t h e i r ICBMs t o d e s t r o y a l l of I f we were r e l u c t a n t t o b u i l d t h o u s a n d s of a d d i t i o n a l s h e l t e r s , we c o u l d a c h i e v e t h e same l e v e r a g e by d e f e n d i n g MPS w i t h t h e Low A l t i t u d e D e f e n s e ABM, 1 9 / John C o l l i n s e s t i m a t e s t h e S o v i e t s h a d 4 , 2 1 6 R V s o n MIRVed SS-17, SS-18, and ~ F 1 9I C B M s a s of J a n u a r y 1, 1981. U.S. L i b r a r y of Congress. Congressional Research Service. U.S./Soviet M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e : S t a t i s t i c a l T r e n d s , 1970-1980. U n p u b l i s h e d r e p o r t , by J o h n C o l l i n s , J u l y 1981. p. 15. discussed l a t e r . Knowing t h e y c o u l d g a i n no a d v a n t a g e by a d d i n g R V s , t h e y would be l e d away from s o d o i n g and toward m u t u a l s t r a t e g i c a r m s l i m i t a t i o n . FIGURE 3 POST-EXCHANGE DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES WlTH AND WITHOUT MX WITH SALT I1 LIMITS Source: U.S. Department o f D e f e n s e . MX w i l l t h r e a t e n S o v i e t f i x e d - s i t e WITHOUT SALT I1 LIMITS Annual R e p o r t , F i s c a l Y e a r 1982. p. 5 9 . I C B M s , s o i t s h o u l d compel t h e S o v i e t s t o spend l a r g e sums on ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y , a s t h e y h a v e f o r c e d u s t o do w i t h t h e i r I C B M program, f u r t h e r p r e s s i n g them t o s e e k a n e q u i t a b l e arms c o n t r o l ceiling. Of c o u r s e , i f t h e y p l a n t o u s e t h e i r I C B M s f o r a f i r s t s t r i k e , t h e y need n o t r e s p o n d , but a l a c k of r e s p o n s e would i t s e l f be t e l l i n g . The f u n d s t h e S o v i e t s spend on s u r v i v a b i l i t y c o u l d o t h e r w i s e be u s e d f o r o t h e r m i l i t a r y forces. To compel t h i s d i v e r s i o n o f r e s o u r c e s , t h o u g h , MX must b e d e p l o y e d . To p r e s e r v e t h e t r i a d a s we know i t , s u p p o r t e r s a s s e r t , MX must be deployed on land. S e v e r a l MPS c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s promote d e t e r r e n c e . I t w i l l h a v e v e r y good command, c o n t r o l , and communication (C3), u s i n g s e v e r a l modes f o r redundancy. I t w i l l p e r m i t s h e l t e r s t h a t s u r v i v e a t t a c k t o e n d u r e f o r months. Because o f t h e a c c u r a c y , r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o n a t i o n a l command a u t h o r i t y , t i m e on t a r g e t c o n t r o l , and r a p i d r e t a r g e t i n g t h a t MPS p e r m i t s , i t maximizes M X ' s w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y , which many a d v o c a t e s of MPS s e e a s e s s e n t i a l f o r d e t e r r e n c e . Some q u e s t i o n o u r a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n PLU. ways, MPS s u p p o r t e r s b e l i e v e . But t h e problem c u t s b o t h Could t h e S o v i e t s r e a l l y be s o c o n f i d e n t t h e y had found a l l t h e m i s s i l e s t h a t t h e y would r i s k t h e i r s u r v i v a l a s a n a t i o n o n i t ? J u s t a s we would n o t know f o r s u r e i f t h e S o v i e t s had broken PLU, n e i t h e r would t h e y . We w i l l d e v o t e e x t e n s i v e r e s o u r c e s t o PLU. A s we d o f o r o u r m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n e s now, we w i l l have a team of e x p e r t s , w i t h a c c e s s t o more i n f o r m a t i o n t h a n we e x p e c t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d o b t a i n , t r y i n g t o b r e a k PLU, and w i l l a d j u s t t h e MPS system a s needed t o c o r r e c t t h e problems t h e y d i s c o v e r . MPS a d v o c a t e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t MPS w i l l a f f e c t t h e deployment a r e a . They a r g u e , however, t h a t o n l y 33 s q u a r e s t a t u t e m i l e s of l a n d w i l l be removed from p u b l i c u s e , and t h e A i r F o r c e h a s c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d how t o minimize s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s of MPS. The m i s s i l e s h o u l d p o s e a s few h a z a r d s t o t h e p u b l i c a s t h e s o l i d - f u e l e d Minuteman h a s i n two d e c a d e s o f o p e r a t i o n . While a d v o c a t e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t a n a t t a c k on MPS would g e n e r a t e b l a s t and f a l l o u t , t h e y a r g u e t h a t MPS w i l l be v e r y e f f e c t i v e i n d e t e r r i n g a t t a c k . Moreover, t h e S o v i e t s would n o t j u s t a t t a c k MPS i n a f i r s t s t r i k e , b u t would a l s o a t t a c k Minutemen, T i t a n s , bomber and s u b m a r i n e b a s e s , and p r o b a b l y C3 and o t h e r m i l i tary targets. An a t t a c k on MPS would c a u s e r e l a t i v e l y few a d d i t i o n a l d e a t h s , MPS s u p p o r t e r s a r g u e . Some i m p a c t s w i l l be p o s i t i v e . The p r o j e c t w i l l employ t h o u s a n d s d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , b r i n g i n g b i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s i n t o t h e deployment a r e a and h e l p i n g i t s c i t i z e n s r e t a i n t h e i r young p e o p l e r a t h e r t h a n l o s i n g them a s t h e y m i g r a t e e l s e w h e r e f o r j o b s . The p r o j e c t w i l l improve r o a d s and w i l l s u r v e y w a t e r and m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s . The Case A g a i n s t MPS C r i t i c s c h a l l e n g e MPS on many g r o u n d s . They n o t e t h a t enough MPS-based m i s s i l e s c a n s u r v i v e a t t a c k o n l y i f we b u i l d enough s h e l t e r s . know we have b u i l t enough? Yet how c a n we The S o v i e t s w i l l a l w a y s know i f t h e y c a n d e s t r o y MPS b e c a u s e t h e y know how many R V s t h e y have and how many s h e l t e r s we b u i l d . While we have i n d i c a t i o n s of numbers o f S o v i e t R V s , however, we c a n n e v e r know precisely. MPS g i v e s t h e S o v i e t s a n i n c e n t i v e t o deny u s t h a t knowledge. By b u i l d i n g I C B M s c o v e r t l y , a s t h e y c a n d o u n d e r SALT I and IT, and making p r o v i s i o n s t o l a u n c h them w i t h o u t s i l o s , t h e y c o u l d a v e r t a U.S. increase i n the number o f s h e l t e r s , s o c o u l d minimize t h e number o f R V s n e e d e d t o d e s t r o y MPS. C i t i n g r e c e n t U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates regarding the Soviet t h r e a t i n 1990, c r i t i c s n o t e t h a t e v e n w i t h o u t c o v e r t deployment o f I C B M s we may n e e d more t h a n 4600 s h e l t e r s . 20,' OTA h a s e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d ( a s s u m i n g no SALT I1 c e i l i n g s ) d e p l o y 7,000 R V s i n 1990 and 1 2 , 0 0 0 i n 1995 f o r u s e s o l e l y a g a i n s t MPS. To p e r m i t 100 MX t o s u r v i v e , we would need 360 MX and 8,250 s h e l t e r s i n 1990 and 550 MX and 12,500 s h e l t e r s i n 1995. 211 201 Garn and L a x a l t , u n i t e d s t a t e s , p. 3 . 211 - MX B a s i n g and a N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o s t u r e f o r t h e OTA, YX M i s s i l e Basing: Summary, p. 1 8 . Moreover, OTA s t a t e s , we would n e e d t o p r e d i c t t h e s i z e o f t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s e v e r a l y e a r s i n advance. We " c o u l d not f i r s t build a 4,600-shelter t h e n d e c i d e t o expand i t i f i t p r o v e d t o b e t o o smal!., u n l e s s t h e United S t a t e s were p r e p a r e d t o d e f e r s u r v i v a b i l i t y i n t o t h e mid-1990's." more d i f f i c u l t , we a r e s t a r t i n g t h e r a c e from b e h i n d . S o v i e t s c o u l d " f r a c t i o n a t e " t h e p a y l o a d s on t h e i r ICBMs p a y l o a d i n t o l a r g e r numbers o f l o w e r - y i e l d RVs. l a r g e s t ICBM, t h e SS-18, s y s t e m and 221 To make m a t t e r s C r i t i c s contend t h a t t h e -- t h a t is, divide the The S o v i e t s h a v e t e s t e d t h e i r w i t h a maximum of 10 RVs. I f t h e y conducted enough f l i g h t t e s t s s o t h a t we b e l i e v e d t h e y c o u l d d e p l o y a 20-RV SS-18 w i t h a d e q u a t e l e t h a l i t y a g a i n s t h a r d t a r g e t s , we c o u l d r e t a i n c o n f i d e n c e i n MPS o n l y by i n c r e a s i n g t h e number of s h e l t e r s d r a m a t i c a l l y , d e p l o y i n g ABM, o r b o t h . C r i t i c s of MPS q u e s t i o n o u r a b i l i t y t o p r e s e r v e l o c a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y . 231 Guy B a r a s c h , o f Los Alamos N a t i o n a l L a b o r a t o r y , f e e l s t h a t w h i l e we c a n maint a i n PLU i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s , "I have c o n c e r n s a b o u t 20 o r 25 y e a r s from now." %/ A f t e r a l l , PLU w i l l b e c h a l l e n g e d by S o v i e t t e c h n o l o g y o f 1990 and beyond, when MX/MPS would be o p e r a t i o n a l . We would n e v e r know, of c o u r s e , i f we had maint a i n e d PLU. C r i t i c s f e a r t h a t d o u b t s a b o u t PLU and u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e e v e r - expanding amounts of l a n d w i l l compel u s t o d e p l o y a n ABM t o d e f e n d MPS. This c o u l d l e a d u s t o a b r o g a t e t h e ABM T r e a t y , which many s e e a s t h e most u s e f u l arms c o n t r o l agreement n e g o t i a t e d t o d a t e . Even i f t h e S o v i e t s a g r e e t o modify t h e t r e a t y t o p e r m i t MPS-defense ABM, c r i t i c s f e a r , s u c h r e n e g o t i a t i o n would be t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e end of t h e t r e a t y . 22/ - I b i d . , p. 1 9 . I t a l i c s i n original. 231 Garn and L a x a l t , MX Basing and a N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o s t u r e f o r t h e L J n i t e T ~ t a t e s , p. 4 . 2 4 / U.S. L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e . i n g ICBM V u l n e r a b i l i t y : O p t i o n s f o r t h e F u t u r e . Seminar T r a n s c r i p t . Washington, March 2 3 , 1981. p. 30. Yo. 81-157 F. RedressReport MPS o f f e r s t h e S o v i e t s s e v e r a l a d v a n t a g e s , c r i t i c s a r g u e . t o t h e i r s t r a t e g y and i n v e s t m e n t . n u c l e a r weapons a r e on I C B M s , Three-fourths G/many F i r s t , i t plays of S o v i e t d e l i v e r a b l e s t r a t e g i c of which c a n r e a d i l y d e s t r o y t h e f i x e d t a r g e t s t h a t MPS p r o v i d e s by t h e t h o u s a n d s . I n c o n t r a s t , a s y s t e m i n which v e h i c l e s c a r r y m i s s i l e s o v e r l a r g e a r e a s , s u c h a s on t h e U.S. highway s y s t e m , would r e n d e r S o v i e t I C B M s of l i t t l e v a l u e by removing most of t h e i r t a r g e t s . Second, t h e S o v i e t s would h a v e a d v a n t a g e s i n a n MPS v s . MPS c o m p e t i t i o n . They have much more s p a r s e l y p o p u l a t e d l a n d and no comparable r e s t r a i n t s on e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact. They c a n c l o s e o f f v a s t a r e a s t o h e l p PLIJ. s o r t s of t h i n g s i n q u a n t i t y r a p i d l y . a S o v i e t MPS? F o u r t h , a U.S. They c a n b u i l d a l l T h i r d , how c o n f i d e n t l y c o u l d we v e r i f y commitment t o MPS would compel U.S. a t o r s t o s e e k l i m i t s on S o v i e t ICBM R V s t o k e e p MX/MPS s u r v i v a b l e . SALT n e g o t i The S o v i e t s could t h e n e x a c t major concessions from t h e United S t a t e s i n exchange f o r t h e s e limits. C r i t i c s n o t e s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l problems. I n May 1 9 8 1 , t h e Mormon Church, of which more t h a n 70% of Utahns a r e members, e x p r e s s e d g r a v e c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e s h o r t a g e o f w a t e r , t h e s o c i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a n " i n f l u x o f t e n s of t h o u s a n d s of temporary workers and t h e i r f a m i l i e s , " t h e i m p a c t on " t h e f r a g i l e ecology of t h e a r e a . " The s t a t e m e n t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a n a t t a c k on MX/MPS would c a u s e " n e a r a n n i h i l a t i o n of most of what we have s t r i v e n t o b u i l d , " and f a l l o u t r e a c h i n g " a c r o s s much o f t h e n a t i o n . " "viable alternatives." E/ R a n c h e r s , have e x p r e s s e d s i m i l a r c o n c e r n s . Therefore, i t asked t h a t t h e n a t i o n f i n d I n d i a n s , e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s , and o t h e r s Other l a r g e p r o j e c t s a r e a l s o planned f o r 2 5 / U.S. Department o f D e f e n s e . Annual R e p o r t , F i s c a l Y e a r 1981. ( ~ a r o Brown, z S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e ) Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1980. p. 89. 2 6 / Church o f J e s u s C h r i s t o f Latter-Day S a i n t s . F i r s t Presidency s t a t e m e n t on Basing t h e MX M i s s i l e . S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h , May 5 , 1981. 3 p. Nevada and Utah in the 1980s, such as power plants, mines, and perhaps synthetic fuel plants. Their cumulative effects along with MX would be immense. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF BASING MX ON LAND MPS is by far the most controversial basing scheme seriously put forth for a strategic weapon system. Many advocates of MX survivably based on land oppose MPS, so are compelled to offer alternatives. Three leading ones are a scaled- down MPS, ABM defense of MPS- or silo-based MX, and launch on warning. S caled-Dawn MPS The Reagan Administration is reportedly considering a 1 0 0 - M X / 1 0 0 0 - ~ system, ~ which would offset two difficulties of the larger system. The 200-MX/4600-~~~ system has been widely criticized because of its social and environmental impacts. Moreover, it would cost $40.7 billion (FY82 $ ) for acquisition (research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement of missiles and basing mode), requiring expenditures (in then-year $ ) of about $5.9 billion in FY83, $8.3 billion in FY84, 271. $10.4 billion in FY85, and $10.5 billion in FY86 would cost $28.7 billion (FY82 $ ) for acquisition. 281 The small MPS, in contrast, It would have fewer adverse impacts. There is little disagreement that the smaller system by itself would be extraordinarily cost-ineffective. An Air Force planning guide, assuming SALT I1 limits, was that the number of accurate Soviet ICBM RVs available to be targeted 271 U.S. Air Force. Off ice of the Special Assistant for MX Matters. ~ e l e ~ h o nconversation, e Sept. 16, 1981. 281 - Ibid. This is a preliminary estimate. a t HX would n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y exceed 2700 by t h e MX/MPS f u l l o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y o f 1989. OTA assumes t h e damage e x p e c t a n c y of e a c h o f t h e s e R V s i s 0.85; 291 t h a t i s , e a c h RV t a r g e t e d a t a s h e l t e r w i l l have a n 85% c h a n c e of d e s t r o y i n g i t . Using t h e s e f i g u r e s , i f t h e S o v i e t s t a r g e t 2 R V s on e a c h o f t h e 1000 s h e l t e r s , t h e n 15% of 1 5 % , o r 2.25%, of t h e s h e l t e r s (22.5 s h e l t e r s ) would s u r v i v e . Worse, s i n c e t h e S o v i e t s would i n t h i s a t t a c k t a r g e t 2 R V s a t e a c h s h e l t e r c o n t a i n i n g a m i s s i l e , o n l y 2 ( n o m i n a l l y 2.25) MX m i s s i l e s would be e x p e c t e d t o s u r v i v e , a t a c o s t o f $14.5 b i l l i o n a p i e c e . The 900 empty s h e l t e r s would buy z e r o a d d i t i o n a l s u r v i v a b i l i t y ; s i n c e t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d a t t a c k e a c h MX w i t h 2 R V s , what t h e y d i d t o t h e o t h e r 900 s h e l t e r s would n o t a f f e c t numbers o f MXs s u r v i v i n g . When t h e r e a r e enough s h e l t e r s s o t h e S o v i e t s c a n t a r g e t o n l y one RV a t e a c h s h e l t e r , MPS e n h a n c e s s u r v i v a b i l i t y m o d e s t l y . Only when s h e l t e r s g r e a t l y outnumber S o v i e t a c c u r a t e ICBM R V s , s o t h e y c a n n o t a t t a c k most s h e l t e r s and m i s s i l e s , d o e s MPS enhance s u r v i v a b i l i t y s i g n i f i c a n t l y . P r o p o n e n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e s m a l l MPS l e t s u s do s o m e t h i n g now, and p r o v i d e s f u t u r e o p t i o n s , whereas d o i n g n o t h i n g now would k i l l MX and f o r e c l o s e m i t i g a t i n g t h e I C B M v u l n e r a b i l i t y problem d u r i n g t h i s decade. I n p r o v i d i n g a way of d e p l o y i n g MX, i t would compel t h e S o v i e t s t o spend v a s t sums t o make t h e i r I C B M s s u r v i v a b l e , w h i l e k e e p i n g them o f f g u a r d a s t o t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e f u t u r e U.S. ICBM f o r c e . T h i s would p u t p o s i t i v e p r e s s u r e on them a t SALT. Further, i t would s a t i s f y West European governments t h a t would f i n d i t p o l i t i c a l l y impos- s i b l e t o a c c e p t U.S. on l a n d . bility. 29/ - t h e a t e r n u c l e a r f o r c e s on t h e i r s o i l i f we do n o t b a s e MX The s m a l l s y s t e m i s a c o n s e r v a t i v e i n i t i a l s t e p t h a t m a i n t a i n s f l e x i Our e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i t would a s s u a g e c o n c e r n s on MPS o p e r a b i l i t y and OTA, MX M i s s i l e Basing: Summary, p. 17'. PLU. I t hedges a g a i n s t t h e f a i l u r e of s e v e r a l o t h e r o p t i o n s b e c a u s e i t a l l o w s u s t o make i n c r e m e n t a l d e c i s i o n s w h i l e R&D c o n t i n u e s on complementary o p t i o n s . I t would p r o v i d e l e v e r a g e t h a t would i n c r e a s e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s and lower t h e t e c h n i c a l r i s k o f a n ABM. I t c o u l d complement a l a t e r deployment of a d e e p underground b a s i n g s y s t e m t h a t s t r e s s e s t h e S o v i e t s i n a n o p p o s i t e manner from MPS. Deep underground b a s i n g would b e t a r g e t e d w i t h l a r g e weapons, t h e r e b y r e q u i r i n g few RVs p e r ICBM, whereas t h e S o v i e t s must u s e many R V s p e r I C B M t o h o l d MPS a t r i s k . C r i t i c s r e s p o n d t h a t we would d e c e i v e o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h e s m a l l YPS. s m a l l MPS k e e p s us o f f A guard a b o u t t h e f u t u r e c o m p o s i t i o n of o u r ICBM f o r c e . We must e i t h e r commit t o a much l a r g e r s y s t e m , and t o e x p a n d i n g a n d / o r defendi n g i t i f t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t r e q u i r e s , o r n o t d e p l o y a n MPS. In fact, critics b e l i e v e , a s m a l l MPS i n v i t e s t h e S o v i e t s t o engage u s i n a n RV v s . MPS r a c e by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t MPS h a s s o l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s u n w i l l i n g even t o s t a r t t h e r a c e , l e t a l o n e s t a y t h e course. Nor s h o u l d we b u i l d a s m a l l WS i n t h e hopes t h a t a n ABM c o u l d e x p l o i t t h e l e v e r a g e provided by d e f e n d i n g o n l y t h e 100 s h e l t e r s w i t h m i s s i l e s i n them. OTA s t a t e s t h a t w h i l e LOAD would n o t need t o be v e r y e f f i c i e n t t o f o r c e t h e S o v i e t s t o u s e two R V s p e r s h e l t e r , " i t would be e x c e e d i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o e x a c t a p r i c e o f several RVs," and i t i s f a r t o o soon i n t h e development c y c l e t o r e l y on t h e more advanced l a y e r e d d e f e n s e ABM. 301 ( S e e below.) Finally, c r i t i c s c i t e OTA on t h e need f o r a t i m e l y d e c i s i o n on t h e numbers of s h e l t e r s t o be b u i l t ( p a g e 2 2 ) and C o n g r e s s i o n a l Budget O f f i c e on t h e " i n d i v i s i b i l i t y " o f t h e s i z e of a n MPS s y s t e m ( p a g e 1 5 ) . 301 U.S. Congress. Off i c e o f Technology Assessment. MX M i s s i l e Basing. ~ a s h i G t o n ,U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , S e p t . 1981. ( H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s "OTA, MX M i s s i l e Basing. ") p. 1 2 1 , 1 3 2 , 135. A n t i b a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense of MX The U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d d e v e l o p and d e p l o y a n t i b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s (ABMs) t o d e f e n d MPS- o r s i l o - b a s e d MX ( o r o t h e r ICBMs). systems. T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l t y p e s of ABM The c h o i c e depends on when t h e s y s t e m i s t o be d e p l o y e d ( a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d ABM c o u l d be u s e d l a t e r ) and t h e b a s i n g mode i n which MX i s t o be defended. S i n c e t h e SALT I ABM T r e a t y o f 1972 s h a r p l y l i m i t s ABM development and deployment, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would have t o s e e k r e n e g o t i a t i o n of t h e t r e a t y o r , f a i l i n g t h a t , would have t o w i t h d r a w from t h e t r e a t y i n o r d e r t o d e p l o y most m i l i t a r i l y e f f e c t i v e t y p e s o f ABM. Low A l t i t u d e D e f e n s e (LoAD) T h i s i s a n ABM s y s t e m c u r r e n t l y u n d e r development a n d i s t h e most r a p i d l y d e p l o y a b l e U.S. ABM. I t i s d e s i g n e d t o d e f e n d MX/MPS, n o t s i l o - b a s e d m i s s i l e s . I t would i n t e r c e p t R V s a t v e r y low a l t i t u d e s , a few k i l o m e t e r s . u s e a n u c l e a r warhead i n t h e low k i l o t o n range. contain 3 missiles, shelter. 321 %/ I t would A LoAD u n i t would r e p o r t e d l y a r a d a r , and a computer, and c o u l d f i t i n t o a n MX I n a t y p i c a l LoAD engagement, l e s s t h a n 10 s e c o n d s would e l a p s e from t h e t i m e t h e LoAD r a d a r s d e t e c t a n RV u n t i l t h e i n t e r c e p t o r s d e s t r o y t h e RV. 331 Because of t h e s h o r t r a n g e of LoAD m i s s i l e s , t h e LoAD u n i t must be i n a n MPS s h e l t e r n e a r t h e one c o n t a i n i n g t h e MX, s o must b e m o b i l e . 311 U.S. Los Alamos S c i e n t i f i c L a b o r a t o r y . Q u i c k Look Assessment o f ~ a l l i z i cM i s s i l e Defense. J u n e 1980. R e p r i n t e d i n C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record ( D a i l y E d i t i o n ) , J u n e 6 , 1980: S 6434. A n o t h e r a r t i c l e s t a t e s t h a t t h e m i s s i l e would i n t e r c e p t a t a b o u t 7,000 f t a l t i t u d e . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Weighing O p t i o n s i n MX Basing P l a n . A v i a t i o n Week and S p a c e Technology, S e p t . 7 , 1981: 22. 32/ - Ibid. 33/ Los Alamos S c i e n t i f i c L a b o r a t o r y , Quick Look Assessment o f B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record ( D a i l y ~ d i t i o n ) ,J u n e 6 , 1980: S6434. LoAD c o u l d d e f e n d MX/MF'S e f f e c t i v e l y , a d v o c a t e s c l a i m , b e c a u s e i t would need t o i n t e r c e p t o n l y t h o s e R V s headed f o r s h e l t e r s c o n t a i n i n g M X s o r LoAD u n i t s ( p r e f e r e n t i a l defense). To t a k e a h y p o t h e t i c a l example, i f t h e S o v i e t s u s e 2 3 RVs t o a t t a c k a l l 2 3 s h e l t e r s i n a n MX c l u s t e r c o n t a i n i n g o n e MX a n d one LoAD m i s s i l e , t h e d e f e n s e , by u s i n g t h e LoAD m i s s i l e t o i n t e r c e p t t h e RV headed f o r t h e M X , d e f e a t s t h e a t t a c k . S t i l l n o t knowing t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e MX, t h e S o v i e t s would need t o expend a n o t h e r 23 RVs ( o n e p e r s h e l t e r ) t o destroy the shelter with the missile. T h i s l e v e r a g e , a d v o c a t e s a r g u e , enhances d e t e r r e n c e by i n c r e a s i n g t h e c o s t and r i s k t o t h e S o v i e t Union of l a u n c h i n g a f i r s t strike. While a d d i n g MPS s h e l t e r s would p r o v i d e t h e same l e v e r a g e , advo- c a t e s c l a i m LoAD i s l e s s c o s t l y , more r a p i d l y d e p l o y e d , and l e s s d i s r u p t i v e t o t h e environment. They c o n t e n d t h a t "shoot-look-shoot" t a c t i c s , where t h e S o v i e t s a t t a c k MPS, t h e n u s e s a t e l l i t e o r ground s e n s o r d a t a t o d e t e r m i n e which s h e l t e r s survived, then a t t a c k only surviving s h e l t e r s , a r e u n r e a l i s t i c . The S o v i e t s c o u l d n o t depend on t h e i r s a t e l l i t e s o r ground s e n s o r s s u r v i v i n g o r n o t b e i n g jammed, and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d l a u n c h I C B M s between t h e f i r s t a n d second waves. P r o p o n e n t s c l a i m t h a t i t i s q u i t e f e a s i b l e t o b u i l d a n e f f e c t i v e LoAD a s l o n g a s i t u s e s n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s , w i t h i n i t i a l deployment p o s s i b l e i n t h e mid1980s. 341 They a s s e r t t h a t a n expanded S o v i e t t h r e a t t o MX/MPS c o u l d b e o f f s e t f a r more c h e a p l y w i t h LoAD t h a n w i t h many more s h e l t e r s . P r o p o n e n t s b e l i e v e LoAD would e n h a n c e d e t e r r e n c e . Since it could only d e f e n d I C B M s , n o t c i t i e s , i t would lower S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o destroy our ICBMs preemptively while not a f f e c t i n g t h e i r confidence i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o r e t a l i a t e a g a i n s t U.S. 341 Ibid. - c i t i e s i n r e s p o n s e t o a U.S. first s t r i k e . C r i t i c s c h a r g e t h a t LoAD would h a v e e x t r e m e l y s e r i o u s o p e r a t i o n a l problems. They q u e s t i o n i f we c o u l d have c o n f i d e n c e t h a t LoAD c o u l d f o r c e t h e S o v i e t s t o u s e more t h a n 2 R V s p e r s h e l t e r . OTA f i n d s i t would b e d i f f i c u l t t o make LOAD a b l e t o s u r v i v e and o p e r a t e w i t h n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s a m i l e o r s o away. =/ LOAD compounds t h e problem o f p r e s e r v a t i o n of l o c a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y (PLU) f o r MPS. LoAD would r e q u i r e t h e same o b s e r v a b l e f e a t u r e s a s MX and mass s i m u l a t o r s , b u t s i n c e LoAD i s a " f u n c t i o n a l o b j e c t , " OTA n o t e s , "PLU would become c o n s i d e r a b l y more complex i f [LOAD] were added t o MX/MPS." 36/ S i n c e t h e LOAD u n i t would be i n a s h e l t e r n e a r t h e MX, c r i t i c s a r g u e , i f t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d l o c a t e LoAD u n i t s t h e y would narrow t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e m i s s i l e s t o w i t h i n a few s h e l t e r s . They c o u l d t h e n overwhelm t h o s e s h e l t e r s w i t h s e v e r a l R V s a p i e c e , u s i n g f e w e r R V s t h a n would be needed t o d e s t r o y a n undefended MPS. Ben P l y m a l e , a f o r m e r Deputy D i r e c t o r o f D e f e n s e R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g , w r o t e t h a t "LoAD was n o t d e s i g n e d t o engage a r e s p o n s i v e S o v i e t t h r e a t , which might i n c l u d e maneuvering RV1s, anti-radiation homing R V 1 s , jammers, d e c o y s , o r a m y r i a d o f o t h e r poten- t i a l countermeasures." x/ A f u l l LoAD d e f e n s e o f MX/MPS i s c l e a r l y f o r b i d d e n by t h e ABM T r e a t y , a s i t would u s e ABM l a u n c h e r s and r a d a r s n o t o f "permanent f i x e d t y p e s , " and f o r o t h e r reasons. The t r e a t y might p e r m i t deployment of 1 0 0 LoAD m i s s i l e s u s i n g f i x e d u n i t s n e a r Grand F o r k s , N o r t h Dakota, t h e o n l y ABM s i t e p e r m i t t e d t h e U.S. by t h e t r e a t y , b u t t h i s would s u r e l y n o t be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e . 35/ - OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 1 1 3 , 122-123. 36/ - OTA, MX M i s s i l e Basing: 3 7 / Plymale, Ben. S e p t . 1 0 , 1981: E 4151. Summary, p. 27. I s s u e Papers. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record ( D a i l y E d i t i o n ) , Layered D e f e n s e A n o t h e r t y p e of ABM c o u l d b e u s e d t o d e f e n d s i l o - b a s e d I C B M s . c a l l e d l a y e r e d d e f e n s e , would have two t i e r s . T h i s system, An " o v e r l a y " of long-range m i s s i l e s , e a c h w i t h m u l t i p l e n o n n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s , would i n t e r c e p t R V s i n s p a c e , above 300,000 f t . This overlay i s i n e a r l y experimental stages. i s s i m p l y LoAD o r a s i m i l a r s y s t e m . The " u n d e r l a y " Any m i l i t a r i l y u s e f u l l a y e r e d d e f e n s e i s f o r b i d d e n by t h e ABM T r e a t y . E i t h e r l a y e r by i t s e l f would h a v e g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n d e f e n d i n g s i l o - b a s e d ICBMs. S i n c e s i l o s would o f f e r o n l y a f r a c t i o n of t h e a i m p o i n t s of MPS, t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e many R V s a g a i n s t e a c h s i l o . Even i f t h e o v e r l a y c o u l d d e s t r o y most a t t a c k i n g R V s , t h e I J n i t e d S t a t e s would have t o assume t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d u s e s o many R V s t h a t enough would l e a k t h r o u g h a n d d e s t r o y most silos. A t t h e same t i m e , t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d p r o b a b l y d e f e a t a LOAD-only d e f e n s e by u s i n g a p r e c i s e l y c o o r d i n a t e d a t t a c k w i t h many R V s a n d s p e c i a l t a c t i c s . T o g e t h e r , however, t h e o v e r l a y c o u l d b r e a k up t h e a t t a c k i n s p a c e , making t h e S o v i e t s u n a b l e t o r e l y o n R V s r e a c h i n g LoAD i n v a s t numbers w i t h p r e c i s e c o o r d i n a t i o n , w h i l e t h e u n d e r l a y , f a c i n g a ragged and weakene6 a t t a c k , c o u l d i n t e r c e p t many r e m a i n i n g R V s headed f o r s i l o s . I n t h i s way, l a y e r e d d e f e n s e would s e e k t o compensate f o r t h e l e v e r a g e l o s t by u s i n g s i l o s r a t h e r t h a n MPS. Advocates c i t e by way of example t h a t i f e a c h l a y e r c o u l d i n t e r c e p t 80% o f t h e a t t a c k i n g R V s , t h e n o n l y 4 % ( 2 0 % o f 2 0 % ) would l e a k t h r o u g h , s o t h a t two m o d e r a t e l y " l e a k y " l a y e r s c o u l d t o g e t h e r i n t e r c e p t most RVs. 381 Using s e v e r a l n o n n u c l e a r warheads p e r o v e r l a y i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e 3 8 1 Donald Brennan u s e d t h i s example i n BMD P o l i c y I s s u e s f o r t h e 1 9 8 0 s , i n ~ c h n e i d e r ,W i l l i a m , J r . , e t a l . U.S. S t r a t e g i c - N u c l e a r P o l i c y and B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e D e f e n s e : The 1980s and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass., I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a l y s i s , I n c . , 1980; s p o n s o r e d by t h e U.S. Army B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e D e f e n s e Advanced Technology C e n t e r . p. 2 0 . and p e r h a p s c o n c e n t r a t i n g i n t e r c e p t o r s t o d e f e n d c e r t a i n s i l o s w h i l e l e a v i n g o t h e r s i l o s undefended ( p r e f e r e n t i a l d e f e n s e ) c o u l d a l s o i n c r e a s e l e v e r a g e . C r i t i c s a s s e r t t h a t t h i s l e a k a g e example i s m i s l e a d i n g . S i l o b a s i n g lowers o u r c o s t o f b a s i n g MX, b u t a l s o l o w e r s t h e number o f a i m p o i n t s t h e S o v i e t s must target. I f t h e y c o u l d t a r g e t 2700 R V s on MX, t h e y c o u l d i n t h e o r y d e v o t e 13-14 X V s t o e a c h o f 200 s i l o s . U n l e s s b o t h ABM l a y e r s a r e e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y good, con- c e n t r a t e d a t t a c k s u s i n g c l e v e r t a c t i c s would have a v e r y good c h a n c e of d e s t r o y ing a s i l o . OTA c i t e s a n example i n which t h e o v e r l a y c a n d e s t r o y a n y a t t a c k i n g RV it t a r g e t s 85% of t h e time and t h e o f f e n s e s e n d s 8 R V s p e r s i l o . The o v e r l a y would d e s t r o y a l l t h e R V s o n l y 27% o f t h e t i m e (0.85 t o t h e e i g h t h power). If t h e u n d e r l a y c o u l d d e s t r o y t h e f i r s t RV r e a c h i n g i t 70% of t h e t i m e , and t h e second 50% of t h e t i m e , t h e n a d e f e n d e d s i l o h a s a 62% c h a n c e o f s u r v i v i n g . r e s u l t s a r e s e n s i t i v e t o overlay effectiveness. The I f t h e o v e r l a y c a n d e s t r o y 65% of t h e R V s and t h e u n d e r l a y h a s t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s s t a t e d a b o v e , t h e n a d e f e n d e d s i l o has o n l y a 22% chance of s u r v i v i n g . 39/ Opinion i s s h a r p l y d i v i d e d on t h e q u e s t i o n o f o v e r l a y f e a s i b i l i t y . c a t e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e o v e r l a y f a c e s more d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a n d o e s LOAD. AdvoThey a r g u e , however, t h a t t h e t e c h n o l o g y r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o v e r l a y i s , o r s o o n w i l l be, a v a i l a b l e . C r i t i c s a r e extremely p e s s i m i s t i c . They b e l i e v e t h a t t h e needed t e c h n o l o g y i s v e r y d i s t a n t and t h a t t h e o v e r l a y c a n n o t work a g a i n s t a m a s s i v e Soviet attack. OTA'S C r i t i c s and t h o s e i n v o l v e d i n ABM development would a g r e e w i t h a s s e s s m e n t t h a t "For t h e moment, i t would be q u i t e r i s k y t o r e l y on t h e O v e r l a y , o r on l a y e r e d d e f e n s e , a s t h e b a s i s f o r IX b a s i n g . " 401 39/ - OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 132-134. 40/ - OTA, MX M i s s i l e Basing: Summary, p. 32. Some a d v o c a t e s hope t h a t l a y e r e d d e f e n s e o r a more a d v a n c e d ABM c o u l d defend c i t i e s a g a i n s t l i m i t e d a t t a c k s . They b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U.S. p o l i c y o f de- t e r r i n g n u c l e a r war by h a v i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n s of b o t h s i d e s h o s t a g e t o a t t a c k i s immoral, t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d defend i t s c i t i z e n s r a t h e r t h a n k i l l R u s s i a n s , a n d t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y programs a r e r a p i d l y removing t h e m u t u a l i t y of mutual assured d e s t r u c t i o n . They t h u s b e l i e v e t h e U.S. s h o u l d withdraw from t h e ABM T r e a t y and b u i l d l a y e r e d d e f e n s e and more a d v a n c e d ABMs t o l i m i t damage i n t h e e v e n t of war. o n l y one f e a s i b l e : C r i t i c s contend t h e mutual hostage r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t h e With t o d a y ' s huge n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s t h e S o v i e t s know t h e United S t a t e s could r e t a l i a t e w i t h devastating e f f e c t even a f t e r absorbing a f i r s t strike. They t h u s s e e p e r p e t u a t i o n o f t h e ABM T r e a t y a s d e s i r a b l e t o p r e s e r v e d e t e r r e n c e a n d a v o i d a r a c e b e t w e e n ABMs a n d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s i n which b o t h s i d e s would s p e n d l a r g e sums w i t h o u t i m p r o v i n g s e c u r i t y . They view l a y e r e d d e f e n s e a s b r e a c h i n g t h e s p i r i t a s w e l l a s t h e l e t t e r o f t h e ABM T r e a t y . Simple Systems S e v e r a l a n a l y s t s o u t s i d e DOD h a v e p r o p o s e d c h e a p l o w - t e c h n o l o g y d e f e n d MPS- o r s i l o - b a s e d "Bed o f N a i l s " : ICBHs. Examples i n c l u d e : Thousands of '-ft l o n g s t e e l r o d s would b e d r i v e n i n t o t h e g r o u n d j u s t n o r t h of s i l o s o r s h e l t e r s . north-to-south trajectory. systems t o ICBM R V s g e n e r a l l y f o l l o w a S i n c e R V s u s e d t o a t t a c k I C B M s would n e e d e x t r e m e a c c u r a c y , R V s w i t h low a e r o d y n a m i c d r a g would p r o b a b l y be u s e d t o m i n i m i z e a t m o s p h e r i c e f f e c t s on t h e RV. These R V s approach t h e i r t a r g e t s a t s h a l l o w a n g l e s , s o would i m p a l e t h e m s e l v e s o n t h e r o d s . 411 41 / G a m i n , R i c h a r d . E f f e c t i v e M i l i t a r y Technology f o r t h e 1980s. ~ n t e r z t i o n a lS e c u r i t y , F a l l 1976 : 53-54. " P e b b l e - C u r t a i n Defense" o r "Porcupine": P e l l e t s o r d a r t s would be p l a c e d o v e r a bed of c h e m i c a l e x p l o s i v e s j u s t n o r t h of a n ICBM. A r a d a r would d e t e c t a n RV headed f o r t h e s i l o and t r i g g e r a n e x p l o s i v e , l a u n c h i n g t h e p r o j e c t i l e s i n t o the R V ' s path. "Swarmjet": 421 Very s m a l l , c h e a p , f a s t m i s s i l e s would be f i r e d i n s a l v o s f o r low a l t i t u d e d e f e n s e , d e s t r o y i n g RVs by impact. Advocates c o n t e n d t h a t t h e s e s y s t e m s c a n s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d I C B M s , and t h a t t h e i r s i m p l i c i t y , low c o s t , low t e c h n i c a l r i s k , and p o s s i b i l i t y of r a p i d deployment make them a t t r a c t i v e . The B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e D e f e n s e d e p u t y program manager b e l i e v e s t h e y " a r e d i f f i c u l t t o s y n t h e s i z e and s t i l l meet t h e c r i t e r i a of low c o s t , r a p i d d e p l o y a b i l i t y and a d e q u a t e e f f e c t i v e n e s s . " "Dust Defense": 431 C l e a n n u c l e a r d e v i c e s would be d e t o n a t e d o n o r under t h e ground n e a r I C B M s t o s e n d up c l o u d s of d u s t t o d i s a b l e a t t a c k i n g R V s . i s no t e c h n i c a l c h a l l e n g e t o t h e a s s e r t i o n i t would be h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e . There The r a d i o a c t i v i t y of t h e s e d e v i c e s c o u l d be h e l d t o a low l e v e l , 1%of t h a t f o r a 441 n u c l e a r weapon of s t a n d a r d d e s i g n , OTA e s t i m a t e s . deployed r a p i d l y and a t low c o s t . The s y s t e m c o u l d be The " p r e e m p t i v e f r a t r i c i d e " would make S o v i e t p l a n n e r s h i g h l y u n c e r t a i n of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o y I C B M s , a d v o c a t e s a r g u e , enhancing d e t e r r e n c e . The drawback i s t h a t p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e s y s t e m would be v e r y h a r d t o obtain. Two p o t e n t i a l problems a r e of minimum c o n c e r n . The l i k e l i h o o d t h a t 4 3 1 Davis, William, J r . B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense I n t o t h e E i g h t i e s . ~ a t i o GD l e f e n s e , Sept.-Oct. 1979 : 62. 441 - OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 1 2 7 . t h e d e v i c e s would d e t o n a t e w i t h o u t a u t h o r i z a t i o n i s low, a s f o r n u c l e a r weapons i n g e n e r a l , and t h e a d d i t i o n a l f a l l o u t t h e y would g e n e r a t e i n a n u c l e a r war w i t h t h o u s a n d s of l a r g e S o v i e t RVs d e t o n a t i n g i s i m m a t e r i a l . The r e a l c o n c e r n i s t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t m i g h t d e t o n a t e h u n d r e d s o f t h e s e d e v i c e s on f a l s e w a r n i n g , k i l l i n g many Americans. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , c r i t i c s b e l i e v e , no P r e s i d e n t would u s e i t , making i t s d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t low and i t s deployment u s e l e s s . Launch on Warnin& I C B M s c o u l d be l a u n c h e d o n w a r n i n g of a t t a c k , a c o n c e p t termed l a u n c h on w a r n i n g , o r LOW. A v a r i a n t i s l a u n c h under a t t a c k , o r LUA, sometimes d e f i n e d a s l a u n c h upon a t t a i n i n g h i g h c o n f i d e n c e t h a t a m a s s i v e a t t a c k was underway o r a f t e r R V s had exploded on U.S. on a c c u r a t e warning: t i o n of o u r I C B M s . territory. T h i s method p l a c e s g r e a t r e l i a n c e e r r o r would mean n u c l e a r war by a c c i d e n t o r t h e d e s t r u c F o r f e a r of t h e f i r s t e r r o r , t h e U.S. h a s p r e f e r r e d t o have i t s I C B M s a b l e t o r i d e o u t a n a t t a c k b e f o r e being launched. But w i t h I C B M s w i d e l y s e e n a s becoming v u l n e r a b l e , some b e l i e v e t h a t we s h o u l d p r e p a r e t o LOW s o a s t o i n c r e a s e t h e s i z e and c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e r e t a l i a t i o n , t h u s maximizing t h e d e t e r r e n t v a l u e of e a c h d e p l o y e d ICBM. U.S. p o l i c y h a s b e e n n e i t h e r t o c o n f i r m n o r deny t h a t we would LOW. At i s s u e now i s n o t whether we s t a t e LOW t o be o u r p o l i c y , f o r t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d b e l i e v e we would ( o r would n o t ) LOW r e g a r d l e s s of o u r s t a t e m e n t . F o r LOW t o enhance d e t e r r e n c e , what c o u n t s i s t h e e x t e n t t o which we can make t h e S o v i e t s b e l i e v e we would LOW. The c r e d i b i l i t y of a s t a t e d o r u n s t a t e d LOW p o l i c y depends on a c q u i r i n g t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o LOW. T h i s i n c l u d e s hardware, such a s augmenting s e n s o r s and communication equipment; p r o c e d u r e s f o r h a n d l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , t r a n s m i t t i n g d e c i s i o n s , and p a s s i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y t o l a u n c h n u c l e a r weapons from one p e r s o n t o a n o t h e r r a p i d l y a s c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e ; and making key d e c i s i o n s w e l l i n a d v a n c e s o t h e y c a n be implemented r a p i d l y . F o r example: Would we l a u n c h I C B M s i r r e v o c a b l y armed, unarmed b u t a r m a b l e i n f l i g h t , o r armed but disarmable i n f l i g h t ? What p o r t i o n o f t h e f o r c e would we l a u n c h i n r e s p o n s e t o what magnitude of a t t a c k ? A t what t a r g e t s ? %/ Advocates a r g u e t h a t LOW h a s n ' t b e e n l o o k e d a t s e r i o u s l y , b u t d e s e r v e s attention. They c l a i m LOW i s t h e o n l y way t o s a l v a g e s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y v a l u e from t h e c u r r e n t I C B M f o r c e d u r i n g t h e 1980s. states. %/ I t i s " a v a i l a b l e now," DOD Major advances i n e l e c t r o n i c s g i v e u s h i g h c o n f i d e n c e t h a t LOW would work p r o p e r l y , a d v o c a t e s c o n t e n d . dence would i n c r e a s e f u r t h e r . A s improvements w e r e a d d e d , o u r c o n f i - Any r i s k s of LOW must be weighed a g a i n s t t h e (presumed) e r o s i o n of d e t e r r e n c e and i n c r e a s e d r i s k o f w a r by h a v i n g v u l n e r a b l e ICBMs t h r o u g h 1990 o r so. A d e c i s i o n t o u s e LOW would s p u r improvements needed i n C3 anyway. L i k e s p a r e p a r t s and m a i n t e n a n c e , C3 h a s b e e n p a s s e d o v e r i n f a v o r of new weapons, y e t i t i s t h e most c r i t i c a l a s p e c t of o u r s t r a t e g i c forces: It p r e s e n t s a tempting v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a n a t t a c k e r u n l e s s i t c a n perform i n s t a n t l y and f l a w l e s s l y d e s p i t e a t t e m p t s t o d i s r u p t i t . T h i s capa- b i l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l t o LOW a s w e l l a s t o C3 i n g e n e r a l ; i n d e e d , some p r o p o n e n t s of LOW might a r g u e t h a t t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o LOW i s one minimum t e s t of adequacy of C3. 45/ See Garwin, R i c h a r d . Launch Under A t t a c k t o R e s o l v e Minuteman ~ u l n e r a b i l i t ~ I?n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , Winter 1979/80: 117-139; and Graham, William, e t a l . Discussion: V i a b l e U.S. S t r a t e g i c M i s s i l e F o r c e s f o r t h e E a r l y 1980s. I n Van C l e a v e , W i l l i a m , and W. S c o t t Thompson. Strategic O p t i o n s f o r t h e E a r l y E i g h t i e s : What Can Be Done? New Y o r k , N a t i o n a l S t r a t e g y I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r , I n c . , 1979. p. 143-146. 46/ U.S. Department o f D e f e n s e . O f f i c e o f t h e Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y of ~ e x n s ef o r R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g ( S t r a t e g i c and Space S y s t e m s ) . ICBM Basing O p t i o n s : A Summary o f Major S t u d i e s To D e f i n e a S u r v i v a b l e B a s i n g Concept f o r ICBMs. December 1980. p. 16. LOW h a s s e v e r a l b e n e f i c i a l m i l i t a r y consequences. I t would p r o v i d e a d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r t h e S o v i e t s t o b u i l d a n ABH, f o r i t would b e f a r h a r d e r f o r a n ABM t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t a l a r g e , w e l l - c o o r d i n a t e d r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e coming a l l a t once t h a n a g a i n s t a ragged a t t a c k from a s m a l l s u r v i v i n g f o r c e . enhance t h e v a l u e of o u r bomber f o r c e . LOW would I C B M s would be u s e d t o d e s t r o y S o v i e t a i r d e f e n s e s i t e s , c r e a t i n g c o r r i d o r s f o r bombers; LOW would p e r m i t more I C B M s t o be used f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . F i n a l l y , t h e i n c r e a s e d number of S o v i e t t a r g e t s s t r u c k by I C B M s and bombers would p e r m i t h o l d i n g more U.S. i n c r e a s i n g o u r b a r g a i n i n g l e v e r a g e f o r war t e r m i n a t i o n . SLBMs i n r e s e r v e , A l l t h i s i s achieved, a d v o c a t e s s t a t e , by a s y s t e m t h a t i s t o t a l l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e x i s t i n g a n d p r o s p e c t i v e arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t s and means of v e r i f i c a t i o n , s i n c e no new weapon s y s t e m s a r e i n v o l v e d . LOW i s c h e a p e r t h a n o t h e r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e o p t i o n s ; OTA e s t i m a t e s t h a t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l C3 and warning improvements needed f o r LOW would c o s t s e v e r a l billion dollars. 471 LOW would c r e a t e no e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t beyond t h a t a l r e a d y c r e a t e d by I C B M s . Some might a r g u e t h a t LOW would be d e s t a b i l i z i n g b e c a u s e t h e S o v i e t s , s e e i n g a 1J.S. LOW c a p a b i l i t y emerge, might f e a r we would l a u n c h a f i r s t s t r i k e and p r e p a r e t o do s o t h e m s e l v e s . counter. I f t h e S o v i e t s b e l i e v e d t h a t we c o u l d LOW, t h e y would r e a l i z e we had no need t o s t r i k e f i r s t . of no c o n c e r n t o us. situation. Yet t h a t f e a r i s ungrounded, a d v o c a t e s would Moreover, S o v i e t d i s c o m f o r t c a u s e d by LOW s h o u l d b e S o v i e t a c t i o n s have p u t o u r I C B M s i n t o a use-or-lose Why s h o u l d we spend t e n s of b i l l i o n s t o remedy a problem t h e y h a v e c r e a t e d i n a way c o m f o r t a b l e t o them? 471 - OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : I f we b e l i e v e some s t i g m a a t t a c h e s t o Summary, p. 30. a U.S. d e c l a r a t i o n of LOW, we c a n s i m p l y a c q u i r e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o LOW. The S o v i e t s w i l l r e a d t h e same message w h e t h e r o r n o t we d e c l a r e a LOW p o l i c y . C r i t i c s n o t e t h a t , w i t h LOW, ICBMs would have no e n d u r a n c e ( i . e . , the a b i l i t y f o r missiles t h a t survive a t t a c k t o operate f o r long periods). P r o p o n e n t s respond t h a t e n d u r a n c e i s d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n w i t h any f i x e d - s i t e ICBM. MPS p r o v i d e s e n d u r a n c e o n l y i f t h e S o v i e t s do n o t h a v e enough R V s o f s u f f i c i e n t r e l i a b i l i t y and c a p a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o y a l l t h e s h e l t e r s , i n which c a s e t h e y would p r o b a b l y n o t a t t a c k . An ABM d e f e n s e o f s i l o s o r MPS r e l i a b l y i n c r e a s e s e n d u r a n c e by a t most a few m i n u t e s , f o r once t h e ABMs have been e x h a u s t e d o r d e s t r o y e d , t h e n e x t wave o f R V s c o u l d d e s t r o y t h e I C B M s . It is pointless t a c t i c s might p e r m i t e a r l i e r d e s t r u c t i o n of d e f e n d e d I C B M s . t o spend b i l l i o n s on a l t e r n a t i v e b a s i n g modes, ABM, e t c . , Clever t o g a i n a few m i n u t e s of d e c i s i o n t i m e , p r o p o n e n t s b e l i e v e ; we s h o u l d s i m p l y r e c o g n i z e t h a t t e c h n o l o g y h a s made f i x e d - s i t e I C B M s u n a b l e t o e n d u r e , and a d o p t LOW. Opponents of LOW respond t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w i t h a l l i t s r e s o u r c e s , s h o u l d n ' t have t o r e l y on a s y s t e m t h a t p l a c e s a h a i r t r i g g e r on n u c l e a r war. They doubt we c o u l d have c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e e n t i r e s y s t e m c a t i o n s , p r o c e d u r e s , and p e o p l e -- would -- work r i g h t i n s t a n t l y . s e n s o r s , communiThe P r e s i d e n t might l a c k i n f o r m a t i o n needed t o LOW, s u c h a s which t a r g e t s t h e S o v i e t s c h o s e n o t t o a t t a c k , s o might be u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e which t a r g e t s t o s t r i k e i n r e t a l i a t i o n before the attacking RVs a r r i v e . I f we depend on LOW, DOD s t a t e s , " t h e S o v i e t s would s u r e l y d e v i s e ways t o b l i n d o u r w a r n i n g s y s t e m s i n a p r e c u r s o r a t t a c k , t h e r e b y i n h i b i t i n g o u r a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s t o l a u n c h a r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k w i t h only inconclusive evidence." 481 The s y s t e m needed 4 8 1 Department o f D e f e n s e , I C B M B a s i n g O p t i o n s , p. 17. - f o r high-confidence LOW -- t h e o n l y k i n d we s h o u l d c o n t e m p l a t e -- would t a k e t i m e t o d e p l o y ; OTA e s t i m a t e s t h a t a l m o s t a l l t h e needed improvements c o u l d b e deployed by t h e end of t h e decade. 491 D e s p i t e d e p l o y i n g t h i s s y s t e m , OTA n o t e s , we c o u l d n e v e r e l i m i n a t e t h e " l i n g e r i n g f e a r " t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d d e f e a t t h e LOW s y s t e m o r t h a t t h e s y s t e m c o u l d f a i l c a t a s t r o p h i c a l l y . 501 Opponents f e a r t h a t some may s e e LOW a s a p a n a c e a and t h i n k we n e e d d o nothing e l s e . I n r e a l i t y , o p p o n e n t s a s s e r t , we must f a c e up t o t h e need t o spend b i l l i o n s o n s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s t h a t c a n s u r v i v e and e n d u r e . With LOW, o u r I C B M s would be launched o r d e s t r o y e d a t t h e s t a r t of a war, e l i m i n a t i n g o u r most c o n t r o l l a b l e and f a s t e s t - r e a c t i n g weapons, and s e v e r e l y i n h i b i t i n g o u r a b i l i t y t o f i g h t a war o r n e g o t i a t e war t e r m i n a t i o n . By l a u n c h i n g many ICBMs a t t h e s t a r t o f w a r , we would a c c e p t t h e r i s k of e s c a l a t i n g t h e war beyond what we would p r e f e r . A s a r e s u l t , we would weaken o u r a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l e s c a l a t i o n and p r o v i d e " i n t r a w a r d e t e r r e n c e " -- the ability t o deter the S o v i e t s from s t r i k i n g c e r t a i n t a r g e t s d u r i n g a war, i n t h i s c a s e by t h r e a t of p r e c i s e r e t a l i a t i o n . I n sum, c r i t i c s b e l i e v e , t h e P r e s i d e n t s h o u l d n e v e r have t o make t h e most momentous d e c i s i o n p o s s i b l e under t h e extreme p r e s s u r e t h a t LOW e n t a i l s ; we s h o u l d buy s u r v i v a b l e and e n d u r i n g f o r c e s i n s t e a d . P e r h a p s t h e w o r s t problem w i t h LOW, c r i t i c s a r g u e , i s t h a t i t would threaten us. R e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was a t t a i n i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o LOW, and r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t f a l s e warning c o u l d r e s u l t i n a U.S. attack that c o u l d d e s t r o y most S o v i e t I C B M s , t h e S o v i e t s would f e e l compelled t o a d o p t a LOW p o l i c y . With b o t h s i d e s h a v i n g a c c u r a t e I C B M s r e a d y t o l a u n c h on a moment's n o t i c e , t h e r i s k of n u c l e a r war would i n c r e a s e . 4 9 1 OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : 50/ - Ibid., p. 31. Summary, p. 3 0 . NON-LAND BASING FOR MX O t h e r s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s must r e s p o n d t o t h e t h r e a t posed by S o v i e t I C B M s , view LOW a s i n a d e q u a t e , and f i n d t h a t e a c h l a n d b a s i n g mode f o r MX proposed s o f a r h a s f a t a l d e f e c t s . A s a r e s u l t , t h e y c o n t e n d , we h a v e n o c h o i c e b u t t o g i v e up on d e p l o y i n g new land-based ICBMs. To r e t a i n some d e s i r - a b l e f e a t u r e s o f t h e t r i a d , t h e y b e l i e v e , we s h o u l d d e p l o y MX o n a i r c r a f t o r on small submarines. Airmobile P r e s s r e p o r t s of August 1981 i n d i c a t e d t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was c o n s i d e r i n g a i r m o b i l e MX (AMMX). 511 Under t h i s c o n c e p t , I C B M s would be dropped from l a r g e a i r c r a f t by p a r a c h u t e , t h e n f i r e d . The A i r F o r c e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e c o n c e p t ' s f e a s i b i l i t y i n 1974 by l a u n c h i n g a Hinuteman from a C-5 l a r g e t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t and c o m p l e t i n g a 19-second t e s t f i r i n g . 521 The r e p o r t e d p l a n e n v i s i o n e d m o d i f y i n g p e r h a p s 115 C-5s t o c a r r y one MX a p i e c e i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n 100 a i r c r a f t on a l e r t a t a n y t i m e . U n i t e d S t a t e s now h a s 77 C-5s, t o be reopened. t h e p r o d u c t i o n l i n e , c l o s e d i n 1973, would have Lockheed, which b u i l t t h e C-5, p r o p o s a l f o r s o doing. 541 =/ S i n c e t h e h a s r e p o r t e d l y submitted a b r i e f The f i r s t a i r c r a f t might be o p e r a t i o n a l a s e a r l y a s 1986. MX. 5 1 1 S e e , f o r example, Cannon, Lou. - Reagan t o Recommend a n Air-Launched Washington P o s t , Aug. 1 , 1981: A l . 521 Drop of Minuteman by C-5A T e s t s Air-Mobile I C B M Concept. Week a n d Space Technology, Nov. 11, 1974 : 21. 53/ concept. Aviation Robinson, C l a r e n c e , J r . Weinberger P u s h e s S t r a t e g i c A i r m o b i l e MX A v i a t i o n Week and Space Technology, Aug. 3 , 1981 : 1 7 . 541 I b i d . - While d e p l o y i n g MX on C-5s, DOD would a l s o d e v e l o p , and p e r h a p s d e p l o y i n FY88, a f l e e t o f a i r c r a f t d e s i g n e d t o c a r r y MX a s a f ollow-on t o t h e C-5s. The a i r c r a f t , "Big B i r d , " would l o o k l i k e a huge g l i d e r , w i t h a wingspan of 360 f t and a f u s e l a g e 164 f t l o n g . I t would h a v e f o u r 2 4 - f t p r o p e l l e r s . 551 (By c o m p a r i s o n , t h e C-5 i s 247 f t l o n g , h a s a 222-ft wingspan, and h a s f o u r j e t engines.) Big B i r d would c r u i s e a t 5000 f t a t 100 k n o t s ( 1 1 5 mph). It could remain a i r b o r n e f o r n e a r l y 7 d a y s u n r e f u e l e d . SLBMs p o s e t h e g r e a t e s t t h r e a t t o a i r m o b i l e I C B M s . c o u l d be a s s h o r t a s 7 m i n u t e s , suffices t o barrage airbases. 561 SLBM f l i g h t t i m e s and c u r r e n t (modest) S o v i e t SLBM a c c u r a c y T h e r e f o r e t h e a i r m o b i l e s y s t e m would r e q u i r e e n h a n c i n g t h e s e n s o r s , communication s y s t e m s , e t c . , t o warn of SLBM a t t a c k , and h a v i n g t h e a i r c r a f t t a k e o f f i m m e d i a t e l y on w a r n i n g . Hardening t h e a i r c r a f t t o r e s i s t n u c l e a r weapon e f f e c t s would a l s o r e d u c e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e SLBM threat. 571 The a i r c r a f t c o u l d b e b a s e d i n s e v e r a l ways. They c o u l d b e d i s p e r s e d a t a u s t e r e b a s e s i n n o r t h c e n t r a l U n i t e d S t a t e s and m a i n t a i n e d on ground a l e r t , ready t o t a k e o f f on warning. attack. T h i s deployment m i g h t b e v u l n e r a b l e t o SLBM A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e a i r c r a f t c o u l d be moved t o c o a s t a l b a s e s and k e p t on a i r b o r n e a l e r t o v e r t h e o c e a n s d u r i n g c r i s e s . T h i s a p p r o a c h , however, i s e x t r e m e l y c o s t l y i f C-5s a r e used and s t r e s s e s t h e a i r c r a f t . DOD n o t e s t h a t t h e s e two a p p r o a c h e s might be combined, u s i n g ground a l e r t u s u a l l y and a i r 551 - Ibid. 5 6 1 P e r r y , W i l l i a m (Under S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e f o r R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r ing). Testimony. I n U.S. S e n a t e . Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s . F i s c a l Year 1979 S u p p l e m e n t a l M i l i t a r y A u t h o r i z a t i o n . H e a r i n g s . p. 1 0 3 . 571 - OTA, NX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 228. a l e r t i n c r i s i s o r i f S o v i e t SSBNs were massed n e a r t h e c o a s t s . z/Big B i r d i s designed t o be s o f u e l - e f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s could a f f o r d t o keep a s u b s t a n t i a l f r a c t i o n of t h e f o r c e on c o n t i n u o u s a i r b o r n e a l e r t a t a l l t i m e s . The a c c u r a c y o f a n a i r - l a u n c h e d I C B M i s i n h e r e n t l y l e s s t h a n t h a t o f a land-launched ICBM b e c a u s e t h e i n i t i a l l a u n c h p o s i t i o n , v e l o c i t y , and o r i e n t a - t i o n c a n n o t b e known a s p r e c i s e l y . To compensate, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would n e e d t o d e p l o y a network of n a v i g a t i o n a i d s , e i t h e r ground t r a n s m i t t e r s ( g r o u n d beacon s y s t e m , GBS) o r n a v i g a t i o n s a t e l l i t e s ( N a v s t a r ) . OTA e s t i m a t e s t h a t a ground a l e r t a i r m o b i l e b a s i n g f o r c e c o u l d be a c q u i r e d and o p e r a t e d u n t i l 2000 f o r a b o u t t h e same c o s t a s a 2 0 0 - ~ X / 4 6 0 0 - ~system. ~~ OTA e s t i m a t e s t h a t a c o n t i n u o u s l y a i r b o r n e f o r c e , u s i n g a s p e c i a l l a r g e turbop r o p a i r c r a f t ( n o t Big B i r d ) , c o u l d c o s t $ 9 1 b i l l i o n (FY80 $ ) t o a c q u i r e a n d o p e r a t e f o r 10 y e a r s a f t e r f u l l deployment. =/ The A i r F o r c e h a s n o t y e t d e t e r m i n e d f i r m l i f e - c y c l e c o s t e s t i m a t e s f o r B i g B i r d . =/ A d v o c a t e s p o i n t o u t many a d v a n t a g e s o f AMMX. r o n m e n t a l , and p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s o f MPS. I t avoids t h e s o c i a l , envi- It i s not nearly a s sensitive t o i n c r e a s e d numbers of S o v i e t I C B M s a s i s MPS, and i s i n s e n s i t i v e t o f r a c t i o n a t i o n o r increased accuracy of t h o s e m i s s i l e s . I t can endure f o r hours, o r days i n t h e c a s e of Big B i r d , whereas MPS might be overwhelmed i f t h e S o v i e t s b u i l t enough R V s o r l e a r n e d which s h e l t e r s c o n t a i n e d m i s s i l e s . The b a s i n g mode en- t a i l s no r e a l t e c h n i c a l r i s k , s i n c e C-5s have been b u i l t and a i r l a u n c h o f I C B M s h a s been d e m o n s t r a t e d . SLBM w a r n i n g c a p a b i l i t y would h a v e t o b e b u i l t u p , b u t w i t h good warning and immediate t a k e o f f , a b o u t 90% o r more of t h e f o r c e c o u l d 5 8 1 Department o f D e f e n s e , I C B M B a s i n g O p t i o n s , p. 3 5 . 591 - OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 220, 230-231. 5 9 a / U.S. A i r F o r c e . Off i c e o f t h e S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t f o r MX M a t t e r s . T e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n , O c t o b e r 2 , 1981. s u r v i v e e x c e p t i n one c a s e , OTA f i n d s . 60/ f o r arms c o n t r o l , s i n c e a i r - t o - s u r f a c e The s y s t e m p o s e s no d i f f i c u l t i e s b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s a r e p e r m i t t e d by SALT I1 u n d e r t h e same r e l e v a n t r e s t r i c t i o n s a s ICBMs. AMMX would p r o v i d e s u r - v i v i n g R V s f o r e a c h u n i t d e p l o y e d , and c o u l d do s o b e f o r e o t h e r b a s i n g modes. The added e x p e n s e of b u i l d i n g a f l e e t of C-5s b e f o r e Big B i r d t o p r o v i d e t h i s e a r l y c a p a b i l i t y would n o t b e w a s t e d b e c a u s e t h e C-5s c o u l d b e u s e d f o r a i r l i f t when Big B i r d e n t e r s t h e i n v e n t o r y . A d v o c a t e s c o n t e n d t h a t B i g B i r d would o f f s e t two k e y c o n c e r n s of AMMX u s i n g C-5. I t would be 5 t o 10 t i m e s more f u e l - e f f i c i e n t t h a n C-5, %/ so perhaps h a l f t h e a i r c r a f t could remain a l o f t a t a l l t i m e s and s t i l l r e t a i n a moderate l i f e - c y c l e c o s t . C-5/MX A s a r e s u l t , i t would be f a r more s u r v i v a b l e t h a n a f l e e t on s t r i p a l e r t and would n o t r e l y on w a r n i n g f o r s u r v i v a b i l i t y . C r i t i c s l i s t t h e f o l l o w i n g f l a w s w i t h AMMX. I t ends t h e s t r a t e g i c t r i a d b e c a u s e i t h a s a key f a i l u r e mode i n common w i t h bombers. u s e SLBMs t o d e s t r o y b o t h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . The S o v i e t s c o u l d R e s t i n g t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y of two t r i a d e l e m e n t s on a d e q u a t e w a r n i n g i s t o o much of a r i s k . Moreover, t h e warning s y s t e m must be one t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d n o t s p o o f , f o r i f t h e y c o u l d make u s s e n d o u r bombers and APlMX a l o f t , t h e s e a i r c r a f t would b e q u i t e v u l n e r a b l e when t h e y l a n d e d . AMMX would a l s o g i v e t h e S o v i e t s an i n c e n t i v e t o b u i l d many a d d i t i o n a l I C B M s t o b a r r a g e t h e a r e a where bombers a n d AMMX would b e a f t e r takeoff. 6 0 1 OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 225-228. The e x c e p t i o n i s t h a t , i f t h e s o v i e t s a t t a c k e d a i r f i e l d s a t which a i r m o b i l e I C B M s were b a s e d u s i n g submarinel a u n c h e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s l a u n c h e d on f a s t t r a j e c t o r i e s from s u b m a r i n e s a t t h e c o a s t s , t h e y c o u l d u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e s t r o y a b o u t 114 t o 112 of the aircraft. I b i d . , p. 2 2 7 . 611 Pincus, Walter. Aug. 1 3 , 1981: A10. ' 2 L i t t l e Guys' With a B i g I d e a . Washington P o s t , AMMX endurance would be l i m i t e d e v e n i f t h e a i r c r a f t e s c a p e d SLBM a t t a c k and I C B M b a r r a g e . days. C-5 c o u l d s t a y a l o f t f o r 7-8 h o u r s u n r e f u e l e d ; B i g B i r d f o r The S o v i e t s c o u l d f o r c e u s t o u s e o r l o s e o u r AMMX by d e s t r o y i n g t h e few hundred a i r f i e l d s a b l e t o r e c o v e r C-5s. T h i s problem c o u l d n o t be remedied by b u i l d i n g more a u s t e r e a i r f i e l d s t h a n t h e S o v i e t s had ICBM R V s . A s OTA n o t e s , "4,600 a i r f i e l d s s p a c e d 2 5 m i l e s a p a r t would f i l l t h e e n t i r e 3 m i l l i o n s q u a r e m i l e s of t h e c o n t i n e n t a l U n i t e d S t a t e s . " E/ Moreover, i f AMMX would p a t r o l o v e r t h e o c e a n s , might t h e S o v i e t s l o c a t e them w i t h r a d a r o r i n f r a r e d s a t e l l i t e s and d e s t r o y them w i t h a n ICBM b a r r a g e ? w i t h Big B i r d t h a n C-5. T h i s would be more of a problem Big B i r d ' s s l o w e r s p e e d p e r m i t s i t t o c o v e r l e s s d i s t a n c e t h a n a C-5 f o l l o w i n g ICBM l a u n c h , s o t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d a t t a c k i t w i t h fewer m i s s i l e s . AMMX would be somewhat l e s s u s a b l e t h a n l a n d - l a u n c h e d MX i n c o u n t e r f o r c e attacks. I t c o u l d n o t respond a s r a p i d l y t o a l a u n c h command b e c a u s e t h e a i r c r a f t would have t o t a k e o f f b e f o r e t h e m i s s i l e c o u l d be f i r e d . I t would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o c o o r d i n a t e a n a t t a c k p l a c i n g R V s on t a r g e t s t h o u s a n d s of m i l e s away on s c h e d u l e s f o r which t h e m a r g i n of e r r o r i s measured i n s e c o n d s o r l e s s , s i n c e t h e a i r c r a f t would be a t w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d and r a p i d l y s h i f t i n g locations. AMMX would r a i s e s e v e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n c e r n s , c r i t i c s c o n t e n d . might r a i s e t h e r i s k of war. It The S o v i e t s would have t o p r e p a r e i n a d v a n c e t o preempt o r l a u n c h on w a r n i n g b e c a u s e , upon s e e i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s e n d AMMX a l o f t , t h e y would n o t know i f we d i d s o f o r t r a i n i n g , f o r f e a r of a S o v i e t a t t a c k , o r f o r launching a f i r s t s t r i k e . Canada and Mexico m i g h t f e a r t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would d e s t r o y any a i r f i e l d s t h e y had t h a t c o u l d r e c o v e r AMMX, - --- 62/ - OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : Summary, p. 38. though t h e same c o n c e r n would a r i s e r e g a r d i n g bombers and t a n k e r s . West Germany and o t h e r West European n a t i o n s h a v e i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t would be n e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e p o l i t i c a l l y t o p e r m i t U.S. t h e a t e r n u c l e a r weapons ( P e r s h i n g I1 and ground- l a u n c h e d c r u i s e m i s s i l e s ) on t h e i r s o i l i f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d o e s n o t b a s e MX on l a n d , f o r t h e y would t h e n b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was n o t w i l l i n g t o r u n t h e r i s k s of h a v i n g n u c l e a r weapons on i t s t e r r i t o r y t h a t i t was a s k i n g t h e Europeans t o run. 631 T h i s l a s t p o i n t i s i r o n i c , AMMX c r i t i c s p o i n t o u t , b e c a u s e a S o v i e t a t t a c k on AMMX would k i l l many more Americans t h a n a n a t t a c k on MPS, 11.3 m i l l i o n vs. 5.9 m i l l i o n i n a f i r s t exchange and 67 t o 93 m i l l i o n v s . 6.1 m i l l i o n i n a second exchange, a c c o r d i n g t o one Department of Defense (DOD) study. AMMX i s complex and d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n , c r i t i c s n o t e . 641 The r e p e a t e d s h o c k s of a i r t u r b u l e n c e and l a n d i n g s w i l l n e c e s s i t a t e f r e q u e n t maintenance f o r a i r c r a f t and m i s s i l e s . Yet m i s s i l e s i n a i r c r a f t a r e h a r d e r t o a c c e s s and maintain than m i s s i l e s i n s i l o s o r s h e l t e r s . Moreover, a complex l o g i s t i c s s y s t e m i s needed t o p r o v i d e s p a r e p a r t s and m a i n t e n a n c e f o r m i s s i l e s and a i r c r a f t a t many d i s p e r s e d b a s e s . E/ Thus u s i n g two s o p h i s t i c a t e d t e c h n o l o g i e s , a i r c r a f t and m i s s i l e s , i n s t e a d of o n e i n c r e a s e s t h e r i s k o f f a i l u r e . The s y s t e m e n t a i l s many h i d d e n c o s t s . N a v s t a r o r a ground beacon system w i l l be needed f o r a c c u r a c y . SLBM warning w i l l have t o b e upgraded. O p e r a t i n g c o s t s w i l l be h i g h , e s p e c i a l l y f o r a i r b o r n e a l e r t and e s p e c i a l l y i f f u e l p r i c e s Geddes, J o h n . West Germans S e e a T i n y Utah Town a s Barometer o f U.S. P l a n s . Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l , J u n e 1 7 , 198 : 32; and Schmidt Warns Reagan on MX S i t i n g . Washington P o s t , J u n e 21, 1981: A26. 63/ iss six 64 / Cannon, Lou. P o s t , Aug. 1 , 1981: A l . Reagan To Recommend a n Air-Launched 651 Gregory, William. Magic E l i x i r f o r MX. ~ e c h n x o J~u~l y, 2 7 , 1981: 11. MX. Washington A v i a t i o n Week and Space increase. AMMX w i l l r e q u i r e c o s t l y and complex C3 and l o g i s t i c s . The Air Force b e l i e v e s 291 C-5s would b e needed t o k e e p 1 0 0 on s t r i p a l e r t , r a t h e r t h a n t h e 115 t h a t D O D ' s O f f i c e of Program A n a l y s i s and E v a l u a t i o n e s t i m a t e s . f l e e t o f t a n k e r a i r c r a f t would presumably b e needed. a commitment t o C-5, Big B i r d , B-1, 661 A new F i n a l l y , t h e y a s k , would and p e r h a p s a S t e a l t h bomber i n c r e a s e t h e c o s t s o f o t h e r m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n a i r c r a f t ? I n d e e d , d o we h a v e t h e produc- t i o n capacity t o build a l l those a i r c r a f t i n a s h o r t time? Because o f t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s , AMMX h a s a t t r a c t e d p o w e r f u l o p p o n e n t s . A DOD s t u d y of December 1980, "ICBM B a s i n g O p t i o n s , " found no m a j o r p o s i t i v e f e a t u r e s f o r wide-bodied j e t b a s i n g o f MX. e d l y would r e s i g n i f AMMX were chosen. r e p o r t e d l y opposed AMMX. 671 Some members of t h e Townes Committee R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s P r i c e and Dickinson w r o t e t o S e c r e t a r y Weinberger v o i c i n g t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o AMMX. f e r e n c e o f August 1 , s a i d : Three A i r Force g e n e r a l s report- S e n a t o r Tower, i n a p r e s s con- "The a i r m o b i l e p l a n h a s b e e n c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d a n d v i r t u a l l y d i s c a r d e d by t h e House and S e n a t e [Armed S e r v i c e s Committees] a s t o o u n r e l i a b l e , t o o c o s t l y , and of q u e s t i o n a b l e s u r v i v a b i l i t y . " i n d i c a t e d , C o n g r e s s might r e j e c t t h e p r o p o s a l . As a result, he 681 S m a l l Submarine B a s i n g T h i s c o n c e p t e n v i s i o n s u s i n g s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s t o c a r r y two o r f o u r MX ( o r other) missiles horizontally i n canisters outside the pressure hull. Perhaps 6 6 1 USAF A n a l y s i s A t t a c k s A i r m o b i l e MX Concept. A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e ~ e c h n x o ~Aug. ~ , 1 7 , 1981 : 30-31; and Robinson, C l a r e n c e , J r . Weinberger P u s h e s S t r a t e g i c A i r m o b i l e MX Concept. A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , Aug. 3 , 1981: 17. 67/ - Department o f D e f e n s e , I C B M B a s i n g O p t i o n s , p. 3 4 . 6 8 / R e g a r d i n g c r i t i c i s m of a i r m o b i l e MX, s e e f o o t n o t e 4 on p. 3; and ~ o w e r z o h n . S t a t e m e n t on t h e MX M i s s i l e , Aug. 1 , 1981. p. 1. 51-72 b o a t s would be d e p l o y e d , w i t h 28-55 on s t a t i o n a t any time. 691 A fleet o p e r a t i n g from two b a s e s , one e a c h on t h e e a s t and w e s t c o a s t s , w i t h a p a t r o l r a d i u s of 1000 mi and u s i n g a 6500-nmi r a n g e m i s s i l e , would have a p a t r o l a r e a of 2 m i l l i o n s q nmi. 701 The m i s s i l e s c o u l d p r o b a b l y meet t h e a c c u r a c y r e q u i r e - ments of l a n d - l a u n c h e d MX by u s i n g s t e l l a r i n e r t i a l guidance. Alternatively, N a v s t a r s a t e l l i t e s o r a ground ( r a d i o ) beacon s y s t e m (GBS) c o u l d h a v e t h e same result. 711 V a r y i n g d e s i g n s have been s e t f o r t h , i n c l u d i n g o n e s by DOD and OTA, and " s m a l l s u b u n d e r s e a m o b i l e , " o r SUM, by S i d n e y D r e l l and R i c h a r d Garwin. P r e s s u r e h u l l d i s p l a c e m e n t would be 1100-3300 t o n s , v s . 18,700 f o r T r i d e n t ; crew s i z e would b e 15-45, v s . 1 3 3 f o r T r i d e n t ; s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s c o u l d o p e r a t e 500-1500 nmi from t h e U.S. c o a s t vs. thousands f o r T r i d e n t , but t h e r e i s l i t t l e r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h e y c o u l d n o t o p e r a t e 2000 t o 3000 nmi from t h e i r b a s e s i f i t were n e c e s s a r y t o do so. I n i t i a l o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y (IOC), when t h e f i r s t u n i t s would be o p e r a t i o n a l , i s v a r i o u s l y e s t i m a t e d a s 1988-1992, w i t h f u l l o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y (FOC), when a l l u n i t s would be o p e r a t i o n a l , a b o u t f o u r years l a t e r . A small s u b m a r i n e s y s t e m c o u l d h o l d c o s t s down i n s e v e r a l ways. S m a l l sub- m a r i n e s would n o t need n u c l e a r t u r b i n e p r o p u l s i o n , b u t c o u l d u s e d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c propulsion. f o r Poseidon. Communication would r e q u i r e l o w e r power t r a n s m i t t e r s t h a n a r e u s e d The s u b m a r i n e s would u s e e x t e n s i v e a u t o m a t i o n t o minimize crew Testi691 OTA, MX M i s s i l e Basing: Summary, p. 33; and D r e l l , S i d n e y . b a s i n g t h e MX a t s e a on s m a l l submarines: t h e SUM s y s t e m , b e f o r e mony D e f e n s e and M i l i t a r y C o n s t r u c t i o n Subcommittees of t h e S e n a t e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee, J u n e 1 9 , 1981. p. 11, 20. on 701 Telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n , OTA s t a f f , S e p t . 2 3 , 7 1 1 OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g , p. 202-208. See a l s o System P l a n n i n g Corp. An ~ s s e s s n e n to f S m a l l Submarines and E n c a p s u l a t i o n o f B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s P h a s e 1 . U n c l a s s i f i e d V e r s i o n , E x e c u t i v e Summary. May 1980. P r e p a r e d f o r Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e f o r R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g ( S t r a t e g i c and Space S y s t e m s ) . p. 7. -- size. F o r i t s a n a l y s i s , OTA p o s t u l a t e s a f l e e t o f 51 s u b m a r i n e s , w i t h 28 a t s e a a t a l l t i m e s , o p e r a t i n g from t h r e e bases. Each would d i s p l a c e 3 , 3 0 0 t o n s ( p r e s s u r e h u l l o n l y ) and c a r r y f o u r MX m i s s i l e s . T h i s f l e e t , OTA e s t i m a t e s , would c o s t $32 b i l l i o n (FY80 $ ) f o r a c q u i s i t i o n and $7 b i l l i o n f o r o p e r a t i o n u n t i l 2000; s i n c e no d e t a i l e d d e s i g n e x i s t s , t h e s e c o s t s a r e a p p r o x i m a t e . 721 Advocates c l a i m t h a t t h i s f l e e t would b e v e r y s u r v i v a b l e a g a i n s t a n y known o r f o r e s e e a b l e a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) t h r e a t . 731 Its operation relatively n e a r t h e c o a s t s hampers a c o u s t i c ASW, t h e most w i d e l y u s e d f o r m , a n d would f a c i l i t a t e Navy p r o t e c t i o n . The U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d c o m p l i c a t e a c o u s t i c ASW by p l a c i n g d e c o y s and a c o u s t i c g e n e r a t o r s i n deployment z o n e s . D i e s e l - e l e c t r i c propulsion i s q u i e t e r than nuclear. I t would be d i f f i c u l t t o d e s t r o y t h e e n t i r e f l e e t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h s t a n d a r d ASW methods b e c a u s e many s u b m a r i n e s would b e d e p l o y e d , and t h e deployment a r e a would be t o o l a r g e f o r t h e S o v i e t s t o b a r r a g e w i t h n u c l e a r weapons. Radar d e t e c t i o n w h i l e s n o r k e l i n g c o u l d be r e n d e r e d a " v e r y l i m i t e d " problem, a DOD s t u d y f i n d s . 741 I f a radar t h r e a t develops, the United S t a t e s could c o n v e r t submarines t o f u e l c e l l p r o p u l s i o n d u r i n g o v e r h a u l s o r could use n u c l e a r - e l e c t r i c propulsion. The d i f f i c u l t y o f d e s t r o y i n g i n d i v i d u a l s u b m a r i n e s h a s many c o n s e q u e n c e s . Each one d e p l o y e d c o n t r i b u t e s s u r v i v i n g m i s s i l e s w h i l e MPS e n a b l e s few m i s s i l e s t o s u r v i v e u n t i l most s h e l t e r s a r e d e p l o y e d , s o , s u p p o r t e r s a r g u e , i t i s u n f a i r t o compare t h e I O C of t h i s s y s t e m w i t h t h a t of MPS. The number of s u r v i v o r s i s i n s e n s i t i v e t o numbers of S o v i e t R V s , s o t h e s y s t e m g i v e s t h e S o v i e t s n o 721 OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : - Summary, p. 32-36. 7 3 1 S e e D r e l l , Testimony on b a s i n g t h e MX a t s e a on s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s , f o r t h e c a s e f o r t h i s b a s i n g mode. 741 System P l a n n i n g Corp., s u l a t z n of B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s Summary, p. 11. An Assessment of S m a l l S u b m a r i n e s and Encap1, U n c l a s s i f i e d V e r s i o n , E x e c u t i v e -- P h a s e i n c e n t i v e t o add RVs. The program c o u l d be completed w i t h a known number of s u b m a r i n e s , making i t s c o s t a n d s c h e d u l e more p r e d i c t a b l e . W i t h MPS, i n c o n t r a s t , t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d add RVs, f o r c i n g u s t o add s h e l t e r s , d e l a y i n g s u r v i v a b i l i t y , a n d d r i v i n g up c o s t s . T h i s system i s h i g h l y compatible w i t h arms c o n t r o l , proponents a s s e r t . P r o c e d u r e s f o r m o n i t o r i n g numbers of s u b m a r i n e s a r e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . p l a c e s no premium o n launch-on-warning, war. It t h u s reducing t h e r i s k of a c c i d e n t a l I t a v o i d s t h e need f o r a n ARM, t h u s h e l p i n g p r e s e r v e t h e ABM T r e a t y . S m a l l s u b m a r i n e s c o u l d u s e e x i s t i n g t e c h n o l o g y a n d o p e r a t i o n a l pro- c e d u r e s ; OTA f i n d s t h e t e c h n i c a l r i s k s of i t s proposed d e s i g n t o be low. =/ I t would h a v e m i n i m a l s o c i e t a l a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t , s i n c e i t would u s e o n l y a few c o a s t a l b a s e s . By moving s t r a t e g i c weapons from l a n d , s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s r e d u c e t h e f a l l o u t l i k e l y f r o m a n u c l e a r war. A d v o c a t e s r e j e c t c h a r g e s t h a t u s i n g s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s i n s t e a d of landbased MX would move t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o a s t r a t e g i c dyad. The e s s e n c e of t h e t r i a d , they argue, i s t h a t t h r e e independent s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s o b s t r u c t a f i r s t strike: They a r e h a r d e r t o a t t a c k o r d e f e n d a g a i n s t ; t h e weapons a r e s u i t e d t o d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s ; t h e t r i a d p r o v i d e s t i m e i n which t o remedy weakness i n one o r two of i t s e l e m e n t s ; e t c . g o a l s , i t s s u p p o r t e r s contend. This system accomplishes t h e s e S i n c e i t s s i z e , numbers, deployment a r e a , o b s e r v a b l e f e a t u r e s , and o p e r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s would d i f f e r from t h o s e of T r i d e n t , i t p o s e s a d i f f e r e n t ASW problem. between t h e T r i d e n t f l e e t . . . and A s OTA n o t e s : t h e [ s u b m a r i n e ] MX f l e e t "The d i f f e r e n c e s . . . c o u l d make i t more d i f f i c u l t , and p e r h a p s i m p o s s i b l e , f o r t h e S o v i e t s t o d e p l o y a n a n t i - submarine w a r f a r e f o r c e c a p a b l e o f a t t a c k i n g both." 7 5 1 OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : - Summary, p. 3 4 . 761 They would h a v e t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r r e s o u r c e s i n what OTA c a l l s t h e " v e r y u n p r o m i s i n g " a r e a of s t r a t e g i c ASW. 771' I n a d d i t i o n , l a u n c h i n g a m i s s i l e from a T r i d e n t s u b m a r i n e r e v e a l s t h e p o s i t i o n of 23 o t h e r m i s s i l e s , w h i l e l a u n c h from a s m a l l submarine r e v e a l s t h e p o s i t i o n of o n l y 1 o r 3 o t h e r m i s s i l e s . Small submarines t h u s enhance o u r l e a s t v u l n e r a b l e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e by h e d g i n g a g a i n s t S o v i e t a d v a n c e s i n ASW. I n c o n t r a s t , MPS e n h a n c e s o u r most v u l n e r a b l e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e i n a way t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d d e f e a t s i m p l y by a d d i n g R V s . Indeed, s u p p o r t e r s argue, a f o r c e composed o f bombers, Minuteman, T r i d e n t , and s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s would b e a q u a d r a d , n o t a dyad. Advocates b e l i e v e t h e f i r s t u n i t s c o u l d be d e p l o y e d by 1 9 8 8 , w i t h FOC i n 1992, d e s p i t e d i r e c l a i m s a b o u t s h i p b u i l d i n g c a p a c i t y . z/Admiral Thomas Moorer, f o r m e r Chairman o f t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f , n o t e d i n a CRS s e m i n a r on MX b a s i n g t h a t " t h e b o t t l e n e c k i s i n t h e n u c l e a r powered c o n s t r u c t i o n i t wouldn't begin t o t a k e seven y e a r s t o b u i l d one of [ t h e submarines]." ... z/ The c o n g r e s s i o n a l Reform Caucus i s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n n o t a f f o r d enough n u c l e a r a t t a c k s u b m a r i n e s , s o must s u p p l e m e n t them w i t h d i e s e l a t t a c k submarines. E/ Doing s o would s p r e a d t h e c o s t s o f d e v e l o p i n g d i e s e l s u b m a r i n e s among t h o s e s h i p s a s w e l l a s s m a l l s t r a t e g i c s u b m a r i n e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s e x c e s s submarine b u i l d i n g c a p a c i t y ; f o r example, t h e E l e c t r i c Boat 76/ Ibid., p. 35. 77/ - Ibid., p. 48 78/ - D r e l l , Testimony on b a s i n g t h e MX a t s e a on s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s , p. 1 7 . 79/ C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , R e d r e s s i n g I C B M V u l n e r a b i l i t y , Seminar ~ r a n s c r i ~ p. t , 31. 80/ 1 . Caucus U r g e s Review of B o o s t s f o r D e f e n s e t o P r e v e n t Wilson, George. Washington P o s t , Aug. 11, 1981: A10. D i v i s i o n of G e n e r a l Dynamics, which makes n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s , i s l a y i n g o f f w o r k e r s , and i t s f a c i l i t y f o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g submarine h u l l c y l i n d e r s i s u n d e r u t i l i z e d . 811 F o r e i g n s h i p y a r d s c o u l d a l s o b u i l d d i e s e l submarines. For example, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche W e r f t of West Germany, which b u i l d s s m a l l d i e s e l s u b m a r i n e s , h a s d e s i g n e d a 2,182-metric-ton i t f o r t h e United S t a t e s . submarine and would b u i l d 821 Advocates r a i s e o t h e r p o i n t s . Some b e l i e v e MPS would c o s t a t l e a s t $10 b i l l i o n more t h a n s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s w i t h SALT 11, and e v e n more w i t h o u t SALT 11. Because o f t h e n e a r - c o a s t a l deployment, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d o b t a i n h i g h c o n f i d e n c e i n i t s a b i l i t y t o communicate w i t h s m a l l submarines. e n d u r e f o r months d u r i n g a n u c l e a r war. They c o u l d I f SALT 11 c o n s t r a i n t s on numbers o f RVs t a k e e f f e c t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d d e p l o y 14 R V s on a submarine-launched m i s s i l e v s . 1 0 on a l a n d - l a u n c h e d o n e . new t y p e of ICBM. SALT I1 p e r m i t s e a c h s i d e t o d e p l o y one By f o r e g o i n g MX and u s i n g T r i d e n t I1 on s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d a v o i d u s i n g up i t s o n e new t y p e of ICBM. I t could then d e v e l o p MX and a s m a l l ICBM and d e c i d e which, i f any, t o d e p l o y on t h e b a s i s of f u t u r e arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t s and S o v i e t weapon deployments. Opponents a r g u e t h a t a move t o s m a l l submarines would c r e a t e a dyad of s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , with a l l t h e disadvantages t h a t e n t a i l s . t h e same f a i l u r e mode a s T r i d e n t . That system h a s I t would have t o be defended w i t h ASW 8 1 1 V e l i o t i s , P. T a k i s ( E x e c u t i v e V i c e P r e s i d e n t - M a r i n e , G e n e r a l ~ ~ n a m z sG;e n e r a l Manager, E l e c t r i c Boat D i v i s i o n ) . Statement before t h e Subcommittee o n Seapower and S t r a t e g i c and C r i t i c a l M a t e r i a l s o f t h e House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, Mar. 25, 1981. p. 33; and d i s c u s s i o n w i t h G e n e r a l Dynamics Corp. p e r s o n n e l , J u l y 1981. 821 Tagliabue, John. ~ i m e s T s e ~ t22, . 1981: D6. Germans T r y t o S e l l Submarines t o U.S. New York f o r c e s , one S e n a t o r n o t e s , a t a h i d d e n c o s t of a b o u t $12 b i l l i o n . ASW b r e a k t h r o u g h would be " h i g h l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g , " OTA f i n d s . 841 831 A Soviet I t would t h r e a t e n a l a r g e p o r t i o n of o u r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s ; w i t h ICBMs and bombers a l r e a d y v u l n e r a b l e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would h a v e n o e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t . Secure land- based I C B M s a r e t h u s e s s e n t i a l t o hedge a g a i n s t ASW d e v e l o p m e n t s . S m a l l s u b m a r i n e s o f f e r no a d v a n t a g e r e l a t i v e t o T r i d e n t , c r i t i c s c h a r g e . T r i d e n t would p l a c e 1 5 t o 20 s u b m a r i n e s i n a 1 5 t o 20 m i l l i o n s q m i p a t r o l a r e a , v s . 28 t o 5 5 small s u b m a r i n e s i n p e r h a p s 2 o r 3 m i l l i o n s q m i . c o n c e n t r a t i o n would make U.S. f o r c e s , " DOD s t a t e s . 851 This c o a s t s " a f e r t i l e h u n t i n g ground f o r S o v i e t ASW A DOD s t u d y e s t i m a t e s t h e l i f e c y c l e c o s t o f a n a t - s e a T r i d e n t I1 m i s s i l e on a T r i d e n t submarine a t $230 m i l l i o n , vs. m i l l i o n f o r a n MX on a s m a l l s u b m a r i n e . $475 €31 Even though t h e s y s t e m a p p e a r s t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , c r i t i c s n o t e many a r e a s of r i s k . The m i s s i l e s would n e e d r e l i a b l e w a t e r p r o o f c a n i s t e r s . To r e d u c e crew s i z e , t h e s u b m a r i n e s would need much more a u t o m a t i o n t h a n c u r r e n t The amount of m o d i f i c a t i o n t o r e q u a l i f y MX s u b m a r i n e s u s e , t h e Navy f i n d s . f o r u n d e r w a t e r deployment c a n be d e t e r m i n e d o n l y a f t e r m i s s i l e and b o a t have been f i r m l y d e f i n e d . The e f f e c t s o f u n d e r w a t e r s h o c k from a n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n and m i t i g a t i o n of shock t r a n s m i s s i o n between c a p s u l e and submarine a r e uncertain. 8 3 1 Garn, J a k e . SUM: n a t i o n a l , J a n . 1980: 36-37. I t D o e s n ' t Add Up. 8 4 1 OTA, MX M i s s i l e B a s i n g : - Armed F o r c e s J o u r n a l I n t e r - Summary, p. 48. 8 5 1 Department of D e f e n s e , ICBM B a s i n g O p t i o n s , p. 22. 8 6 1 System P l a n n i n g Corp., s u l a t i o n of B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s Summary, p. 1 4 . An Assessment of S m a l l Submarines and EncapPhase 1, U n c l a s s i f i e d Version, Executive -- The I O C would be 1990-1992, w i t h a n FOC of 1993-1995. The b a s e s would be t h e s l o w e s t - d e p l o y e d e l e m e n t b e c a u s e o f t h e need f o r s i t e s e l e c t i o n , e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact s t a t e m e n t p r e p a r a t i o n , and b a s e c o n s t r u c t i o n , s o would 871 pace I O C . - The s u b m a r i n e s would a l s o t a k e t i m e t o b u i l d . Three s h i p y a r d s t h a t do n o t now b u i l d s u b m a r i n e s would have t o do s o , OTA s t a t e s . 881 Timely a c q u i s i t i o n o f needed p a r t s , m a t e r i a l s , and s k i l l e d w o r k e r s c o u l d b e d i f f i c u l t , e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s h i p b u i l d i n g program. s h i p y a r d s might speed c o n s t r u c t i o n . Use of f o r e i g n However, a n amendment t o H.R. 3519 (FY82 DOD a u t h o r i z a t i o n s ) t h a t p a s s e d t h e House on J u l y 8 would, i f i t becomes law, f o r b i d u s e of f o r e i g n s h i p y a r d s f o r b u i l d i n g o r o v e r h a u l i n g Navy s h i p s . 891 S m a l l s u b m a r i n e s would b e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h arms c o n t r o l b e c a u s e encapsul a t e d m i s s i l e s a t t a c h e d t o " t h e l e a s t c a p a b l e submarine i n t h e w o r l d " c o u l d be p l a c e d on o t h e r submarines and would be i m p o s s i b l e t o v e r i f y . It i s a r g u e d t h a t when t h e " h i d d e n c o s t s " a r e i n c l u d e d , t h i s s y s t e m c o u l d c o s t a s much a s $10 b i l l i o n more t h a n MX/MPS. 9J/ R e l i a n c e on e x t e r n a l n a v i g a t i o n a i d s l i k e N a v s t a r o r GBS " i s a r i s k i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o t a k e f o r a c e n t r a l s t r a t e g i c s y s t e m , " DOD f i n d s . 911 The S o v i e t s might d e t o n a t e n u c l e a r weapons j u s t o f f t h e c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f t o d e s t r o y any s m a l l submarines o p e r a t i n g there; t h e r e s u l t i n g t i d a l waves would be d i s a s t r o u s f o r c o a s t a l c i t i e s . 8 7 1 I b i d . , p. 14-15. 881 OTA, M X M i s s i l e B a s i n g : Summary, p. 33-34. 8 9 1 S e e C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record ( D a i l y E d i t i o n ) , J u l y 8 , 1981 : H4089-H4090. 901 Garn, SUM: - I t D o e s n ' t Add Up, p. 36-37. 911 U.S. Department of Defense. O f f i c e of t h e Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y An o f ~ e f e n s ef o r R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g ( S t r a t e g i c and Space S y s t e m s ) . E v a l u a t i o n of t h e S h a l l o w Underwater M i s s i l e (SUM) c o n c e p t . A p r i l 9 , 1980. p. 4. It would be difficult to find the needed personnel, given that the Navy is 1,050 officers short of the 3,550 it needs for nuclear submarines, only 34% of officers choose further submarine duty after their first opportunity to leave it, and the attack submarine fleet is projected to grow from about 80 92/ In light of all these problems, critics to 100 between now and 1990. reject small submarines as fatally flawed. A BROADER SOLUTION: STRATEGIC FORCE DIVERSIFICATION AND SMALL ICBMs Another approach sees problems with any single MX basing mode, and holds that strategic force diversification -- while retaining submarines and bombers using several basing modes for ICBMs -- offers many advantages. Many advo- cates of this approach envision using a small ICBM (SICBM) because they contend it can be based in many survivable ways. Accordingly, this section links diversification and SICBM even though they can be considered independently. The justification for diversification is the same as for the triad itself: Several systems provide more assurance of survivability, are harder to attack or defend against, etc. Similarly, its advocates hold, several basing modes can promote ICBM survivability. They see any single basing mode as putting all one's eggs in one basket. MPS, for example, could be overwhelmed if the Soviets break PLU or build enough RVs to destroy all the shelters. This encourages the Soviets to concentrate their resources on countering it. Years ago, it sufficed to deploy single ICBM, submarine, and bomber systems, for each would be effective despite Soviet counters. As a bonus, R&D costs were spread over many units of a system, lowering unit cost. Now, however, there are great uncertainties about future Soviet strategic forces, SALT policy, and 92/ Wilson, George. Built-up Navy Founders as Submariners Opt Out. washington Post, Aug. 4, 1981: Al, A4. i n t e n t i o n s ; I C B M s a r e becoming v u l n e r a b l e ; and t h e S o v i e t s can i n c r e a s e t h e i r threat. Thus, a n y s i n g l e I C B M b a s i n g o p t i o n i s o f u n c e r t a i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s . We must hedge a g a i n s t t h e s e u n c e r t a i n t i e s , d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n a d v o c a t e s h o l d ; a d d i n g o p t i o n s , w h i l e c o s t l y , i s t h e o n l y way t o do t h i s . P r o p o n e n t s c o n t e n d t h a t d e p l o y i n g s e v e r a l systems i n s t e a d of MX/MPS, each on a s m a l l s c a l e , o f f e r s k e y a d v a n t a g e s . The c h o i c e of a n KX b a s i n g mode m e r i t s p a i n s t a k i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n because i t a f f e c t s d e t e r r e n c e , i s c o s t l y , w i l l forec l o s e a l t e r n a t i v e s , and w i l l be w i t h u s f o r d e c a d e s . With s e v e r a l b a s i n g modes, however, e a c h p r o c u r e d i n modest numbers and l e s s e x p e n s i v e t h a n MPS, t h e r e would be l e s s n e e d f o r d e l a y t o make c e r t a i n t h a t e a c h s y s t e m was t h e a b s o l u t e best. We c o u l d l e a r n t h e p r o s and c o n s of e a c h s y s t e m from o p e r a t i o n a l e x p e r i - ence. I f t h e S o v i e t s i n c r e a s e t h e i r s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t , t h a t e x p e r i e n c e would l e t u s s e l e c t c o n f i d e n t l y one o p t i o n o r more t o d e p l o y r a p i d l y on a l a r g e r s c a l e i n r e s p o n s e . T h i s p r o s p e c t s h o u l d i t s e l f d i s s u a d e t h e S o v i e t s from seeking t o counter our systems. Some b e l i e v e t h e MX b a s i n g d e c i s i o n i s s o d i f f i c u l t b e c a u s e MX i s t h e wrong missile. They n o t e t h a t MX i s a c r e a t u r e of SALT 11: The U n i t e d S t a t e s r e g a r d s SALT I1 a s p e r m i t t i n g a l a u n c h w e i g h t of 90,000 kg (198,414 l b ) and a t h r o w w e i g h t of 3,600 kg (7,937 l b ) f o r MX; M X ' s l a u n c h w e i g h t i s 192,000 l b , and i t s t h r o w w e i g h t i s r e p o r t e d l y 7,900 l b . 931 SALT I1 l i m i t s e a c h s i d e t o 8 2 0 931 "On August 1 6 , 1977, i n a p l e n a r y s t a t e m e n t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s informed t h e S o v i e t Union t h a t ' f o r planning purposes, with r e s p e c t t o ICBMs i t might develop, t e s t o r deploy i n t h e f u t u r e , t h e United S t a t e s c o n s i d e r s t h e launch-weight l i m i t on l i g h t I C B M s t o be 90,000 k i l o g r a m s and t h e throw-weight l i m i t t o b e 3,600 k i l o g r a m s . ' These f i g u r e s a r e b a s e d on o u r e s t i m a t e s f o r t h e [ S o v i e t ] SS-19 [ICBM]. The S o v i e t Union d i d n o t respond t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t . The U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l r e g a r d t h e s e f i g u r e s a s t h e l i m i t s f o r t h e o n e new t y p e o f l i g h t ICBM p e r m i t t e d t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s under P a r a g r a p h 9 of A r t i c l e I V . " U.S. Department o f S t a t e . Bureau of P u b l i c A f f a i r s . SALT I1 Agreement, V i e n n a , J u n e 1 8 , 1979. S e l e c t e d Documents No. 128. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. p. 1 3 ; MX Throw w e i g h t d a t a from A i r F o r c e Wants S p a c e S e n s o r s f o r Warning of A i r c r a f t A t t a c k on U.S. Aerospace D a i l y , Feb. 5 , 1980: 187. ... ICBMs c a r r y i n g m u l t i p l e i n d e p e n d e n t l y t a r g e t a b l e r e e n t r y v e h i c l e s (MIRVs) and one new t y p e o f I C B M t h a t , i f MIRVed, c a n be t e s t e d w i t h a t most 1 0 R V s . We c a n t h u s d e p l o y t h e maximum a l l o w e d number of R V s by making o u r one new ICBM l a r g e enough t o c a r r y 1 0 R V s . MX s u p p o r t e r s c o n t e n d we need I C B M s on l a n d t o p r e s e r v e t h e a d v a n t a g e s of t h e t r i a d . Some f o r c e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n a d v o c a t e s , however, b e l i e v e t h a t m o b i l i t y i s t h e o n l y way t o g a i n s u r v i v a b i l i t y o n l a n d , f o r a n y m i s s i l e i n a f i x e d l o c a t i o n can be d e s t r o y e d . They s e e MX a s t o o l a r g e t o be t r u l y m o b i l e , s o s u p p o r t SICBM a s w e l l a s MX. S a i d o n e , "We n o l o n g e r h a v e t h e l u x u r y of e n d u r i n g s u r v i v a b i l i t y and a prompt r e s p o n s e i n o f f e n s i v e s y s t e m s t h a t we h a v e had i n t h e p a s t w i t h Minuteman. P a r t i t i o n i n g t h e f o r c e w i t h MX and 941 SICBM weapons i s needed t o p r o v i d e b o t h c a p a b i l i t i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . " SICBM, i n o n e p r e l i m i n a r y d e s i g n , i s 3 8 f t l o n g , w e i g h s 22,013 l b , h a s 2 o r 3 s t a g e s , and can c a r r y a s i n g l e 335- o r 5 0 0 - k i l o t o n RV. 5,500 t o 6,500 nmi. 951 high accuracy. - I t s r a n g e would be I t would u s e N a v s t a r s a t e l l i t e s o r s t e l l a r u p d a t e s f o r I t might become o p e r a t i o n a l i n 1986. 961 I t c o u l d be c a r r i e d on l a r g e t r u c k s , medium s i z e d c a r g o a i r c r a f t , b a r g e s , s u r f a c e s h i p s , etc. I t c o u l d be e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e c t ; i n 1979, t h e r e were 1,339,000 combination t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r u n i t s i n s e r v i c e i n t h e United S t a t e s . 971 It c o u l d a l s o be p l a c e d i n s i l o s t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o one r e p o r t , c o u l d be hardened t o 7 , 0 0 0 t o 8 , 0 0 0 p s i , v s . a b o u t 2,000 p s i f o r Minuteman. 981 941 Robinson, C l a r e n c e , J r . lJ.S. Weighs S m a l l I C B M Development. ~ v i a t s nWeek and Space Technology, May 4 , 1981: 50. 951 I b i d . , p. 49-52. - 961 Missic. Pincus, Walter. Boeing O f f e r i n g S m a l l A l t e r n a t i v e t o B i g MX Washington P o s t , J u n e 29, 1981 : A1 . 971 American T r u c k i n g A s s o c i a t i o n s , I n c . American T r u c k i n g T r e n d s , 1979-380. Washington, American T r u c k i n g A s s o c i a t i o n s , I n c . , 1981. p. 17. 981 Robinson, U.S. Weighs S m a l l ICBM Development, p. 49. - S e v e r a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n a l t e r n a t i v e s u s e SICBM. P r o f e s s o r Donald Snow, of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Alabama, p r o p o s e d u s i n g STJM, s i l o - b a a e d MX d e f e n d e d by ABMs, and road-mobile SICBMs based on m i l i t a r y r e s e r v a t i o n s b u t d i s p e r s e d on t h e i n t e r s t a t e highway s y s t e m i n c r i s e s . 991 A n o t h e r a p p r o a c h would accompany MX/MPS w i t h s m a l l I C B M s based i n hardened s i l o s , on t r u c k s , and on aircraft. 1001 One c o u l d , of c o u r s e , i m a g i n e a SICBM-only f o r c e w i t h s e v e r a l b a s i n g modes. A d v o c a t e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t SICBM would f o r c e t h e U.S. l i m i t of 2,250 s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s . t o b r e a c h t h e SALT I1 They c o u n t e r t h a t SALT l e t s t h e S o v i e t s b u i l d a f o r c e a b l e t o d e s t r o y o u r I C B M s w h i l e b a r r i n g u s from making o u r I C B M s s u r v i v a b l e . The ABM T r e a t y p r e c l u d e s d e f e n d i n g f i x e d - s i t e I C B M s , w h i l e SALT 11's r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r v e r i f i a b i l i t y and i t s l i m i t s o n l a u n c h e r s and d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s p r e c l u d e d e p l o y i n g SICBM. T h i s r e s u l t , they a r g u e , i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e s p i r i t of SALT, c o n t r a r y t o s t a b l e d e t e r r e n c e , and c o n t r a r y t o our s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s . We c h o s e t h e e x p e d i e n t c o u r s e i n l i m i t i n g l a u n c h e r s r a t h e r t h a n R V s o r t h r o w w e i g h t , t h e y b e l i e v e ; t h e IIX d e c i s i o n , w i t h i t s c h o i c e between s u r v i v a b l e I C B M s and SALT-compatible I C B M s , h i g h l i g h t s t h e error. To p r o v i d e s u r v i v a b l e I C B M s , t h e y c o n c l u d e , we must r e o r i e n t SALT. If t h e S o v i e t s a r e u n w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e SALT a g r e e m e n t s t h a t p e r m i t b o t h s i d e s t o p r o v i d e f o r s t a b l e d e t e r r e n c e , t h e n we must c h o o s e s s c u r i t y o v e r SALT and p r o c e e d w i t h SICBM, s u r v i v a b l y d e p l o y e d among d i v e r s e b a s i n g modes. D i s c a r d i n g SALT and b u i l d i n g SICBMs would a c t u a l l y promote arms l i m i t a t i o n , they argue. We would move t o a new arms c o n t r o l regime i n which weapons a r e 9 9 1 C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , R e d r e s s i n g I C B M V u l n e r a b i l i t y , Seminar ~ r a n s z i ~ p. t , 17. 100/ - Robinson, 1J.S. Weighs S m a l l I C B M Development, p. 50. limited not by formal agreements but by deploying weapons that give the Soviets no incentive to add to their ICBM force and give us no concern if they do, since those missiles would be of no use in attacking SICBMs they couldn't locate. Critics note military problems with SICBM. A counterforce attack, in which each RV must arrive on a precise schedule, would be difficult to coordinate for thousands of SICBMs based in many areas and several basing modes. They en- vision immense problems for the national command authority in communicating with thousands of SICBMs on trucks, barges, aircraft, and in silos. With MX, only 200 or fewer missile launches need be coordinated. Critics point out the value of SALT. SALT I1 would cap numbers of ICBMs and RVs, foreclose Soviet fractionation of ICBMs, ban light RVs that could be used for fractionation, prevent certain types of concealment, etc. The ABM Treaty has prevented an arms race between one side's offensive forces and the other side's defense, thus permitting deterrence with fewer forces. establishes a U.S.-Soviet dialog that fosters cooperation and future agreements. Yet SICBM would violate SALT 11. nuclear delivery vehicles. The SALT process It would breach the limit of 2,250 strategic Under most concepts, it would violate the SALT I1 prohibition of deliberate concealment. SICBM and MX together would violate the SALT I1 limit of one new type of ICBM. Critics also dispute force diversification. Several basing modes, even in small numbers, would be far more costly than one. They question each basing mode proposed for SICBM. Hard silo basing would require thousands of missiles and silos to provide survivability against the current Soviet threat; if that threat grows, then, like MPS, many more silos would be needed. The costs of silo basing would be high and could skyrocket. Road-mobile basing would create a public outcry over nuclear weapons on public highways. The missiles would have to be guarded against terrorist hijackings. Basing SICBMs on m i l i t a r y r e s e r v a t i o n s d u r i n g p e a c e t i m e t o a v o i d t h e s e problems and d i s p e r s i n g them on highways i n c r i s e s would c r e a t e o t h e r problems. The system would r e q u i r e warning. p r e v e n t t h e t r u c k s from d i s p e r s i n g . T r a f f i c jams i n c r i s e s might Moving t h e t r u c k s o n t o t h e highways c o u l d l e a d t h e S o v i e t s t o preempt, f o r a f t e r s e v e r a l h o u r s t h e t r u c k s would be untargetable. S i n c e SICBM t r u c k s would be v u l n e r a b l e t o low o v e r p r e s s u r e s , t h e S o v i e t s might a t t e m p t t o b a r r a g e l a r g e a r e a s w i t h n u c l e a r weapons, t h u s p o t e n t i a l l y k i l l i n g more p e o p l e t h a n t h e y would by a t t a c k i n g MX/MPS. A i r m o b i l e SICBMs would r e p l i c a t e t h e f l a w s of a i r m o b i l e MX. r e q u i r e w a r n i n g , have s h o r t e n d u r a n c e , and b e c o s t l y . They would B a r g e s on i n l a n d w a t e r - ways would i n t e r f e r e w i t h commercial t r a f f i c and would r e q u i r e e x t e n s i v e secur i t y forces. waterways. ships. With more R V s , t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d b a r r a g e a l l t h e U.S. inland S a t e l l i t e s and s h i p s o r submarines c o u l d d e t e c t and a t t a c k s u r f a c e SICBM, w i t h i t s o n e R V , would n o t be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e f o r u s e on s m a l l submarines. Why, c r i t i c s a s k , d e p l o y SICBM i f t h e m i s s i l e and e a c h b a s i n g mode have s e r i o u s problems? BIBLIOGRAPHY MX STRATEGIC ASPECTS GELB, L e s l i e , e t a l . ' S t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ' -- p a t h s and p r o s p e c t s . New York t i m e s , J u l y 2 6 , 1981: E5. A d i s c u s s i o n w i t h W a l t e r Slocombe, J o h n S t e i n b r u n e r , and Seymour Weiss. Gray, C o l i n . S t r a t e g y and t h e MX. The H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n , 1980. 66 p. Argues t h a t t h e U.S. n e e d s " t h e s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t i e s p r o v i d e d by a s u r v i v a b l e MX ICBM f o r c e . " Scoville, Herbert, Jr. MX: p r e s c r i p t i o n P r e s s , 1981. 231 p. Argues t h a t MPS w i l l n o t e n s u r e c r e a s e s t h e r i s k of a n arms r a c e and submarine b a s i n g and arms c o n t r o l a s for disaster. U.S. A s o l i d c a s e f o r MX. MIT MX s u r v i v a b i l i t y and t h a t MX i n n u c l e a r war. Recommends s m a l l alternatives. Snow, Donald. MX: maginot l i n e of t h e 1980s. s c i e n t i s t s , Nov. 1980: 22-25. Ulsamer, Edgar. Cambridge, Ifass., B u l l e t i n of t h e a t o m i c A i r F o r c e magazine, A p r i l 1980: 28-35. L i b r a r y of Congress. C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e . n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e program [ b y ] J o n a t h a n M e d a l i a . 26 p. ( I s s u e B r i e f IB77080) R e g u l a r l y updated. MX i n t e r c o n t i [ W a s h i n g t o n ] 1981. STUDIES OF MORE THAN ONE BASING MODE I n s t i t u t e f o r Defense A n a l y s e s , R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g S u p p o r t D i v i s i o n . STRAT-X. 20 volumes. Vol. 1 (Aug. 1967, 165 p a g e s ) h a s been s a n i t i z e d . An i n f l u e n t i a l s t u d y of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e b a s i n g s y s t e m s . P l y m a l e , Ben. I s s u e p a p e r s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, S e p t . 1 0 , 1981: E4150E4l52. R e j e c t s l a u n c h on w a r n i n g and a c o n t i n u o u s l y a i r b o r n e MX; f i n d s "LOAD'S a b i l i t y t o improve MX s u r v i v a b i l i t y i s d o u b t f u l . " U.S. Congress. O f f i c e of Technology Assessment. MX m i s s i l e b a s i n g . Washingt o n , 1J.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f , S e p t . 1981. 335 p. By f a r t h e b e s t and most d e t a i l e d u n c l a s s i f i e d s t u d y on i t s t o p i c . D i s c u s s e s MPS, ABM, s m a l l submarine b a s i n g , a i r m o b i l e b a s i n g , and f o u r o t h e r o p t i o n s . A l s o c o n s i d e r s command, c o n t r o l , a n d communication; s t r a t e g i c f o r c e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ; and arms c o n t r o l . U.S. Department of Defense. O f f i c e of t h e Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e f o r R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g ( S t r a t e g i c a n d S p a c e S y s t e m s ) . ICBM b a s i n g o p t i o n s : a summary of major s t u d i e s t o d e f i n e a s u r v i v a b l e b a s i n g c o n c e p t f o r I C B M s . Dec. 1980. 83 p. Examines 30 b a s i n g o p t i o n s , from MPS t o d i r i g i b l e s , comparing them o n 11 c r i t e r i a . F i n d s t h a t o n l y MX/MPS h a s no n e g a t i v e f e a t u r e s . U.S. L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e . Redressing ICBM vulnerability: options for the future. Seminar t r a n s c r i p t . R e p o r t No. 81-157 F. Washington, March 1981. 5 3 p. A p a n e l d i s c u s s i o n of MPS, ABM, Hydra l a u n c h ( l a u n c h i n g I C B M s d i r e c t l y from t h e w a t e r ) , s m a l l s u b m a r i n e a n d s u r f a c e s h i p b a s i n g , s t r a t e g i c f o r c e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , and o t h e r o p t i o n s . I C B M VULNERABILITY Are we v u l n e r a b l e t o a f i r s t s t r i k e ? M i n n e a p o l i s , D e p t . Anderson, J . Edward. of M e c h a n i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g , U n i v e r s i t y of M i n n e s o t a , May 1981. Prep u b l i c a t i o n d r a f t . 34 p. A n a l y z e s t h e problems of a t t a c k i n g U.S. I C B M s , a n d c o n c l u d e s t h a t s u c h a n a t t a c k c a n n o t be e x p e c t e d t o s u c c e e d . Examines f r a t r i c i d e , r e l i a b i l i t y , m i s s i l e g u i d a n c e a c c u r a c y and e r r o r s , u n t e s t a b i l i t y , e t c . - a s t o r y of e v e r g r e a t e r Hoag, David. S t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e guidance accuracy. A s t r o n a u t i c s and a e r o n a u t i c s , May 1978: 28-39. The head of D r a p e r L a b o r a t o r y ' s Advanced Systems Department d i s c u s s e s b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a c c u r a c y and e s t i m a t e s " a n o v e r a l l p r o b a b l e m i s s of 30 m [98.4 f t ] a t i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l r a n g e s a s p o s s i b l e . " K a i s e r , R o b e r t , and W a l t e r P i n c u s . The doomsday d e b a t e : " S h a l l we a t t a c k America?" Washington p o s t , Aug. 1 2 , 1979: B 1 A f i c t i o n a l a c c o u n t of S o v i e t l e a d e r s c o n s i d e r i n g a p r e e m p t i v e a t t a c k on U.S. I C B M s , and t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h e y f i n d . Mann, P a u l . P a n e l r e e x a m i n e s I C B M v u l n e r a b i l i t y . A v i a t i o n week and s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y , J u l y 1 3 , 1981: 141+. R e p o r t s on t h e d e b a t e o v e r I C B M v u l n e r a b i l i t y . M e t c a l f , A. E d i t o r i a l : M i s s i l e a c c u r a c y -- t h e need t o know. Strategic r e v i e w , Summer 1981: 5-8. Q u e s t i o n s i f U.S. o r S o v i e t I C B M s c o u l d b e n e a r l y a s a c c u r a t e a s s u p p o s e d , n o t e s t h a t many d e c i s i o n s h i n g e on a c t u a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y , and c o n c l u d e s " i t i s t i m e we knew t h e f u l l f a c t s . " P o i n t p a p e r on i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e (ICBM) a c c u r a c y . (No a u t h o r o r d a t e l i s t e d ; p r e p a r e d by L t . C o l . W i l l i a m S c a n l o n , USAF, 1981.) 4 P. Concludes t h a t f a c t o r s r e d u c i n g I C B M a c c u r a c y a r e w e l l known and c a n be l a r g e l y c o r r e c t e d f o r ; t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t Union a r e b o t h c a p a b l e of a c h i e v i n g h i g h a c c u r a c y ; and S o v i e t I C B M s , which u s e l a r g e r w a r h e a d s , need n o t be a s a c c u r a t e a s U.S. I C B M s . MX b a s i n g a n d a n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o s t u r e f o r Garn, J a k e , and P a u l L a x a l t . t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . R e p o r t a c c o m p a n y i n g p r e s s r e l e a s e by S e n a t o r G a r n of J u n e 2 5 , 1 9 8 1 . 1 4 p. R e j e c t s MPS b a s i n g a n d s u g g e s t s a n a l t e r n a t i v e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o s t u r e , i n c l u d i n g w e a p o n s , s u p p o r t s y s t e m s , a n d SALT. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Domestic cons i d e r a t i o n s a f f e c t i n g d e p l o y m e n t of a m u l t i p l e p r o t e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e b a s i n g s y s t e m f o r t h e MX m i s s i l e . S p e c i a l R e p o r t , b y J o n a t h a n M e d a l i a , March 11, 1980. W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 8 0 . 56 p. O f f i c i a l r e s p o n s e t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r F o r c e deployment Nevada, S t a t e o f . a r e a s e l e c t i o n and l a n d w i t h d r a w a l / a c q u i s i t i o n d r a f t e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t statement. A p r i l 1981: v o l . 1, 5 4 1 p.; v o l . 2 , 5 9 3 p . U.S. A i r Force. A i r F o r c e S y s t e m s Command. B a l l i s t i c Missile Office. M-X h o r i z o n t a l s h e l t e r weapon s y s t e m : b a s e l i n e c o n f i g u r a t i o n . Dec. 1 9 8 0 . S e v e r a l hundred pages. A d e t a i l e d t e c h n i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e MX m i s s i l e a n d MX/MPS. U.S. C o n g r e s s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l Budget O f f i c e . The MX m i s s i l e a n d m u l t i p l e protective s t r u c t u r e basing: long-term b u d g e t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s . Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , J u n e 1979. 135 p. D e s c r i b e s s t r a t e g i c , t e c h n i c a l , a n d f i s c a l a s p e c t s o f MX/MPS. U.S. C o n g r e s s . House. Committee on I n t e r i o r and I n s u l a r A f f a i r s . Basing t h e MX m i s s i l e : a n a n a l y s i s o f i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o p o t e n t i a l w i t h d r a w a l o f p u b l i c l a n d s f o r t h e m u l t i p l e p r o t e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e (MPS) b a s i n g o f t h e i*IX m i s s i l e , w i t h a recommended a l t e r n a t i v e . S t a f f r e p o r t , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t s e s s i o n . W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , Aug. 1 9 8 1 . 2 8 p. A t head of t i t l e : Committee p r i n t n o . 2 . "Doubts a b o u t t h e p r o p o s e d MX/MPS b a s i n g mode a r e s o w e l l - f o u n d e d and t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s a r e s o fundamental t h a t i t s h o u l d b e r e j e c t e d . " U.S. C o n g r e s s . House. C o m m i t t e e on I n t e r i o r and I n s u l a r A f f a i r s . Subcomm i t t e e on P u b l i c Lands. The MX m i s s i l e s y s t e m . O v e r s i g h t h e a r i n g s , 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1st and 2d s e s s i o n s , O c t . 1 9 7 9 and J a n . , F e b . , J u n e 1980. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r i n t . O f f . , 1 9 8 0 . 906 p. C o n t a i n s t e s t i m o n y by s u p p o r t e r s and o p p o n e n t s o f MPS. U.S. Congress. S e n a t e . Committee o n A p p r o p r i a t i o n s . Subcommittee on Y i l i tary Construction. MX m i s s i l e b a s i n g . S p e c i a l h e a r i n g , 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n , May 1 9 8 0 . W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r i n t . O f f . , 1 9 8 0 . 2 6 9 p. C o n t a i n s t e s t i m o n y by s u p p o r t e r s and o p p o n e n t s o f MPS, a n d d i s c u s s i o n o f o t h e r b a s i n g modes. U.S. Department of t h e A i r Force. Deployment a r e a s e l e c t i o n a n d l a n d w i t h d r a w a l / a c q u i s i t i o n DEIS. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , Dec. 1980. 9vols. The m o s t r e c e n t d r a f t e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s t a t e m e n t o n MX. U.S. Department of Defense. O f f i c e of A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e ( P u b l i c A f f a i r s ) . A d d r e s s p r e p a r e d f o r d e l i v e r y by D r . S.L. Z e i b e r g , Deputy U n d e r s e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e ( S t r a t e g i c & Space Systems) t o a j o i n t d i n n e r m e e t i n g of t h e American I n s t i t u t e of A e r o n a u t i c s a n d A s t r o n a u t i c s [ a n d e i g h t o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s ] a t t h e H i l t o n H o t e l , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah. J u n e 1 2 , 1980. 1 8 p. News r e l e a s e 248-80. D i s c u s s e s t h e need f o r MX, t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s l e a d i n g t o MX/MPS, t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s c o n s i d e r e d , and t h e r e a s o n s f o r s e l e c t i n g MPS. U.S. White House. O f f i c e of t h e White House P r e s s S e c r e t a r y . P r e s s announcement by t h e P r e s i d e n t on MX b a s i n g . S e p t . 7 , 1979. 4 p. P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s announcement of MPS, w i t h s u p p o r t i n g arguments. W i t , J o e l , and M i c h a e l Z a g u r e k , J r . F a l l o u t and t h e l a n d - b a s e d MX. Arms c o n t r o l t o d a y , ~ u l y / A u g u s t 1981: 4-5. Maps t h e f a l l o u t t h a t w o u l d , u s i n g c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s , r e s u l t from a S o v i e t a t t a c k on MX/MPS. ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE OF E?X A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w e i g h i n g o p t i o n s i n MX b a s i n g p l a n . A v i a t i o n week and s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y , S e p t . 7 , 1981: 23-26. D i s c u s s e s u s e of ABM t o p r o t e c t 100 MX i n 1000 MPS. B a r a s c h , Guy, and o t h e r s . Quick l o o k a s s e s s m e n t of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e . Los Alamos S c i e n t i f i c L a b o r a t o r y , J u n e 1980. R e p r i n t e d i n C o n g r e s s i o n a l r e c o r d [ d a i l y ed.] J u n e 6 , 1980: S6429-S6436. A d e t a i l e d a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e s t a t u s of and p r o s p e c t s f o r ARM t e c h n o l o g y , by ABM a d v o c a t e s . B r a d s h e r , Henry. ARMS s t u d i e d a s d e f e n s e f o r MX m i s s i l e s . Apr. 3 0 , 1981: A l . Washington s t a r , Pincus, Walter. U.S. e y e i n g ABM p a c t f o r c h a n g e s t o a l l o w t e s t s of m o b i l e system. Washington p o s t , J u l y 1 8 , 1981: A4. R o b i n s o n , C l a r e n c e . Layered d e f e n s e s y s t e m pushed t o p r o t e c t I C B M s . week and s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y , Feb. 9 , 1981: 83, 85-86. U.S. Aviation L i b r a r y o f Congress. Congressional Research Service. Antiballistic m i s s i l e s [ b y ] J o n a t h a n Medalia. [Washington] 1981. 2 6 p. (Issue brief IB81003) R e g u l a r l y u p d a t e d . LAUNCH ON WARNING Garwin, R i c h a r d . Launch u n d e r a t t a c k t o r e d r e s s Minuteman v u l n e r a b i l i t y ? I n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , W i n t e r 1979/80: 117-139. Advocates a c q u i r i n g t h e c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y t o l a u n c h u n d e r a t t a c k . MX and t h e c o u n t e r f o r c e p r o b l e m : a c a s e f o r s i l o deployment. Stewart, Blair. S t r a t e g i c r e v i e w , Summer 1981: 16-26. "The l o g i c a l c o u r s e i s t o e m p l a c e YXs i n e x i s t i n g Minuteman s i l o s , h a r n e s s i n g them t o a ' l a u n c h - o n - a s s e s s m e n t ' p o l i c y , a n d c o m b i n i n g them w i t h o t h e r n e e d e d c o m p o n e n t s o f a n e f f e c t i v e a n d p r o m p t U.S. c o u n t e r f o r c e capability." Strategic options f o r the early Van C l e a v e , W i l l i a m , and W . S c o t t Thompson. e i g h t i e s : What c a n b e d o n e ? New Y o r k , N a t i o n a l S t r a t e g y I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r , I n c . , 1 9 7 9 . 200 p. P r o b l e m s o f l a u n c h o n w a r n i n g a r e d i s c u s s e d o n p. 143-146. AIRMOBILE EIX Cannon, Lou. Reagan t o recommend a n a i r - l a u n c h e d MX. Aug. 1 , 1981: A l + . Washington p o s t , ----- A i r b o r n e MX r e p o r t e d e y e d by W e i n b e r g e r , b y Lou Cannon a n d M i c h a e l G e t l e r . W a s h i n g t o n p o s t , J u l y 1 6 , 1 9 8 1 : A l , A5. Halloran, Richard. C o n g r e s s h e l d l i k e l y t o r e j e c t a i r b o r n e m i s s i l e s . New York times, Aug. 2 , 1 9 8 1 : 24. R e p o r t s t h a t S e n . Tower b e l i e v e s C o n g r e s s w o u l d p r o b a b l y r e j e c t a i r m o b i l e MX. Pincus, Walter. ' 2 l i t t l e g u y s ' w i t h a b i g i d e a . W a s h i n g t o n p o s t , Aug. 1 3 , 1981: A l , A10. Discusses t h e design and p o l i t i c s of t h e Big Bird a i r c r a f t . Robinson, C l a r e n c e , Jr. W e i n b e r g e r p u s h e s s t r a t e g i c a i r m o b i l e MX c o n c e p t . A v i a t i o n week a n d s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y , Aug. 3 , 1 9 8 1 : 16-19. D e s c r i b e s B i g B i r d and o p e r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t s f o r i t . U.S. Congress. S e n a t e . Committee o n Armed S e r v i c e s . Subcommittee on R e s e a r c h and Development. Department of Defense a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r f i s c a l y e a r 1980. H e a r i n g s , 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t s e s s i o n , A p r i l 1979. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. P a r t 6 , p. 3487-3538. A i r F o r c e t e s t i m o n y o n a i r m o b i l e MX. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of t h e A i r F o r c e . Air e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s t a t e m e n t , MX: P r i n t . O f f . , 1979. S e v e r a l h u n d r e d D e s c r i b e s a i r m o b i l e MX and i t s mobile d r a f t supplement t o f i n a l M i l e s t o n e 11. W a s h i n g t o n , 1J.S. G o v t . pages. environmental impact. Wilson, George. Tlouse l e a d e r s t r y t o down a i r b o r n e MX. Washington p o s t , Aug. 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 : A l , A10. D i s c u s s e s a l e t t e r by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s D i c k i n s o n a n d P r i c e t o S e c r e t a r y W e i n b e r g e r c r i t i c i z i n g a i r m o b i l e MX. SMALL SUBMARINE BASING the D r e l l , Sidney. Testimony on b a s i n g t h e MX a t s e a on s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s : SUM system. Testimony b e f o r e t h e Subcommittees on D e f e n s e and M i l i t a r y C o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e S e n a t e Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, J u n e 1 9 , 1981. 29 p. Argues f o r s m a l l s u b m a r i n e b a s i n g and a g a i n s t MX/MPS. Garn, J a k e . SUM: i t d o e s n ' t add up. Armed f o r c e s j o u r n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l , J a n . 1980: 36-37. Argues a g a i n s t s m a l l s u b m a r i n e b a s i n g . H a t f i e l d , Mark. SUM s t r a t e g y . Armed f o r c e s j o u r n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l , J a n . 35-36. Argues f o r s m a l l s u b m a r i n e b a s i n g . 1980: System P l a n n i n g Corp. An a s s e s s m e n t of s m a l l s u b m a r i n e s and e n c a p s u l a t i o n of ballistic missiles p h a s e I . U n c l a s s i f i e d v e r s i o n , e x e c u t i v e summary. May 1980. 17 p. D i s c u s s e s f e a s i b i l i t y , a c c u r a c y , s u r v i v a b i l i t y , c o s t , and s c h e d u l e of s m a l l s u b m a r i n e b a s i n g . G e n e r a l l y n o t u n f a v o r a b l e t o t h i s b a s i n g mode. -- U.S. Department of D e f e n s e . O f f i c e of t h e Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e f o r R e s e a r c h and E n g i n e e r i n g ( S t r a t e g i c and Space S y s t e m s ) . An e v a l u a t i o n of t h e s h a l l o w u n d e r w a t e r m i s s i l e (SUY) c o n c e p t . A p r i l 9 , 1980. 44 p. C o n s i d e r s v a r i o u s s m a l l submarine d e s i g n s and c o s t s . R e j e c t s t h i s b a s i n g mode a s b e i n g n o c h e a p e r t h a n MX/MPS, u n a v a i l a b l e b e f o r e t h e 1 9 9 0 s , o f f e r i n g no a p p a r e n t a d v a n t a g e o v e r T r i d e n t - t y p e s u b m a r i n e s , and l e a d i n g t o a s t r a t e g i c dyad. STRATEGIC FORCE DIVERSIFICATION AND SMALL I C B M s B r a d s h e r , Henry. S m a l l m i s s i l e weighed a s s u b s t i t u t e f o r MX. s t a r , J u l y 9 , 1981: A4. Washington Lodal, Jan. The MX and SALT. New York t i m e s , J u n e 11, 1981: 23. Argues f o r d e p l o y i n g s m a l l ICBMs i n s i l o s . Pincus, Walter. Boeing o f f e r i n g s m a l l a l t e r n a t i v e t o b i g MX m i s s i l e . Washington p o s t , J u n e 2 9 , 1981: A l . Robinson, Clarence, J r . U.S. w e i g h s s m a l l I C B M development. and s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y , May 4 , 1981: 49-52. A v i a t i o n week Snow, Donald. Colloquy i n 1J.S. L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l options f o r the future. R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e . R e d r e s s i n g ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y : Seminar t r a n s c r i p t . R e p o r t No. 81-157 F . Washington, March 1981. p . 161 8 , 47-48. P r e s e n t s t h e c a s e f o r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n u s i n g roadm o b i l e s m a l l I C B M s , d e p l o y i n g ARMS a t one s i t e , and d e p l o y i n g p e r h a p s 50 s m a l l MX-carrying s u b m a r i n e s .