Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Diplomatic Talks and U.S. Policy

Updated May 22August 7, 2026 (IN12534)

The Russian Federation (Russia) launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. More than four years later, Russia and Ukraine remain engaged in Europe's largest war in scope and scale since World War II. With estimates ranging fromof up to 2 million or more up to 1.3 million to 1.8 million killed or wounded to date, and with Russia in control ofcontrolling about 20% of Ukraine's territory, neither side appears poisedpoised to achieve a decisivedecisive military victory. In 2026, Ukrainian forces have limited—and in some cases reversed—Russian gains and markedly expanded a campaign of long-range attacks against Russian oil facilities and logistics infrastructure.

The second Trump Administration has engaged in efforts to facilitate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. Formal negotiations were last held in February 2026; whether negotiations will resume—and, if so, when—is uncertain. Members of Congress may evaluate the prospects for, and potential costs and benefits of, continued U.S. mediation between Russia and Ukraine, including implications for U.S. strategic interests.

Aspects of Negotiations

Building on discussions in 2025, Russian, Ukrainian, and U.S. officials met for the first time in a trilateral format in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in January 2026. Two rounds of U.S.-mediated talks followed, but formal peace talks have not resumed since U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran began in late February 2026.

In an August 2025 meeting with President Trump in Anchorage, AK military victory.

The second Trump Administration has engaged in efforts to facilitate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. Building on prior discussions in 2025, Russian, Ukrainian, and U.S. officials met for the first time in a trilateral format in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in January 2026. Subsequent U.S.-mediated talks followed in February 2026 in Abu Dhabi and Geneva, Switzerland. The United States, European states, Ukraine, and Russia have continued talks in a variety of formats, but formal talks between Russia and Ukraine have not resumed since the start of U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026. Members of Congress may evaluate the prospects for, and potential costs and benefits of, continued U.S. mediation between Russia and Ukraine, including implications for U.S. strategic interests.

Aspects of Negotiations

Talks have addressed or may address various issues, including the following.

Contours of a Potential Peace Settlement. U.S. talks with Russia and Ukraine in 2025 centered in part on whether negotiations should seek to secure a sustained ceasefire prior to a comprehensive peace settlement. Ukrainian officials have long expressed support for a sustained ceasefire. Russian officials have expressed preference for a comprehensive settlement, which for Russia would optimally include neutrality for Ukraine, constraints on Ukrainian military power, and occupation of additional Ukrainian territory that Russia claims to have annexed but does not control.

In an August 2025 meeting with President Trump in Alaska, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly proposed a ceasefire along the line of contact in two of Ukraine's southern regions, if Ukraine transferred to Russia populated areas of theits eastern Donetsk region. to Russia. This proposal appeared to be included as an element of subsequent talks, but Ukrainian authorities rejected this proposalit, maintaining (among other reasons) that the transfer of this heavily fortified "fortress belt" would greatly diminish Ukraine's ability to defend itself from further Russian aggression.

Security Guarantees for Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have sought guarantees against further Russian aggression, including through the deployment of Western peacekeeping forces and closer integration with NATO and the European Union. President Trump and other Administration officials have expressed the view that NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic while indicating support for the provision of European-led security guarantees, potentially with U.S. involvement. Ukraine's leadership has asked the United States to pledge support for such guarantees in the event of a postwar agreement; U.S. authorities reportedly have indicated that Ukraine and Russia should first reach an agreement. The precise nature and form of potential guarantees remains uncertain.

Security Cooperation. The Trump Administration has not publicly In May 2026 remarks to the press, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Russia-Ukraine talks had not been "fruitful" and the Trump Administration was "not interested in getting involved in an endless cycle of meetings that lead to nothing." In July 2026, Secretary Rubio referred to the "failed" efforts that began in Anchorage but said "if the opportunity presents itself and the conditions are right," the United States was "prepared to offer some [new ideas] in the right setting and forum." In June 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed meeting with President Putin in a neutral country to kickstart negotiations and called for "a full ceasefire for the duration of the negotiations." President Putin reportedly rejected the proposal and suggested Russia would continue fighting until it achieved its stated goals. Security Cooperation. The Trump Administration has announced new security assistance to Ukraine, although it has continued to provide for Ukraine, at levels lower than from FY2022 to FY2024, while continuing to provide certain previously committed assistance. In 2025, the United States and NATO allies launched the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, whereby NATO allies fund procurement of U.S. defense articles for Ukraine. As of July (PURL) initiative with NATO allies, whereby the latter are funding the transfer of U.S.-sourced defense articles to Ukraine. As of March 2026, NATO allies and partners had contributed more than $4.16 billion in PURL-related assistance.

In April 2026, a U.S. defense official said the United States is "prepared to continue helping through initiatives like PURL, but this support must not rely on significant U.S. contributions." Some NATO and European officials reportedly have expressed concern that U.S. military operations against Iran could lead to procurement shortages and delays that may affect assistance to Ukraine.

Ukraine has pursued new defense agreements seeking to leverage its defense expertise, particularly in drone and anti-drone warfare. These include cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, among others.

Sanctions Against Russia. Previously established U.S. sanctions on Russia generally have remained in place during the Trump Administration. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has listed some new entities for sanctions, most notably (in October 2025) Russia's two Some NATO and European officials reportedly have expressed concern that U.S. military operations against Iran could lead to procurement shortages and delays that may affect assistance to Ukraine. Ukrainian officials state they are running low on air defense munitions to intercept Russian ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

Ukraine has concluded some, and is seeking more, joint production and defense agreements and has removed barriers to exporting surplus defense production. Some reports indicate U.S. and Ukrainian officials are exploring ways to improve defense industry cooperation. In July 2026, President Trump indicated the United States was considering options to allow Ukraine to coproduce Patriot missiles but subsequently noted this would be a "big step" and "we have to be very careful."

Ukrainian officials have sought guarantees against further Russian aggression, including through the deployment of Western peacekeeping forces and closer integration with NATO and the European Union. President Trump and other Administration officials have expressed the view that NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic while indicating support for the provision of some kind of European-led security guarantees, potentially with U.S. involvement.

U.S. Sanctions Against Russia. The Trump Administration generally has maintained previously established U.S. sanctions on Russia. The U.S. Department of the Treasury listed some new entities for sanctions, most notably two of Russia's largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, and several subsidiaries. After the start of U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran, the Treasury Department, to help stabilize oil markets, issued a series of general licenses temporarily relaxing sanctions on certain Russian oil exports. The last of these licenses expired on June 17, 2026, and was not renewedlargest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, and several subsidiaries.

After the start of U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran, to help stabilize oil markets, the Treasury Department issued two General Licenses (GLs) authorizing for 30 days transactions "ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products" of Russian origin "loaded on any vessel" on or before the date the GLs were issued (initially to Indian ports and then worldwide, excluding transactions involving Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Russia-occupied areas of Ukraine). The second of these licenses has been extended twice; GL134C currently authorizes such transactions for products loaded on or before April 17, 2026, through June 17, 2026.

Prisoners, Detainees, and Forcibly Transferred Populations. Talks have addressed the exchange of prisoners of war, the remains of deceased persons, and the release of Ukrainian civilian detainees and forcibly transferred populations, including children.

Potential Considerations for Congress

Members of Congress may assess the costs and benefits of potential outcomes of U.S.-mediated negotiations and the likelihood of a sustainable ceasefire or peace agreement. Members may evaluate the potential impact of negotiations on other U.S. policy interests, including relations with NATO allies.

The Trump Administration and Congress may assess whether and on what terms to provide continued support to Ukraine alongside U.S. allies. For FY2026 and FY2027, Congress authorized $400 million annually in security assistance to Ukraine, increasing appropriations by an identical amount for "European capacity building" security cooperation programs. Congress may authorize, appropriate, restrict, or conduct oversight over further assistance to Ukraine (e.g., H.R. 2913; S. 2592). Members of Congress may conduct oversight of U.S. sanctions on Russia or consider the use of legislation (e.g., S. 1241/H.R. 2548; S. 2904; S. 3513; H.R. 6856) to maintain, strengthen, or lift sanctionsfor Ukraine (P.L. 119-60, §1243); for FY2026, Congress appropriated $400 million in European capacity building, to include Ukraine (P.L. 119-75, Division A). On June 4, 2026, the House of Representatives passed the Ukraine Support Act (H.R. 2913), by a vote of 226-195, following a discharge process on a special rule that provided for the bill's consideration. On August 7, 2026, the Senate passed (by a vote of 86-11) a revised version of a sanctions bill first introduced in 2025, now titled the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (S.Amdt. 6711 to H.R. 5334). This bill would reinforce existing sanctions authorities, authorize tariffs against Russia and third countries that import certain Russian products, and expand congressional oversight of most Russia sanctions imposed since 2022.

Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: CRS, using data from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats Project, Global Administrative Areas, and Esri.