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On May 31, Colombia, a top U.S. security partner in Latin America, is scheduled to convene an election to replace President Gustavo Petro (2022-present), who is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the Petro government's counterdrug and security policies. The 119th Congress has reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on that assistance. Some Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about political violence in Colombia since the June 2025 assassination of a presidential hopeful and threats against other candidates.
The three main candidates are Iván Cepeda of Petro's leftist Historic Pact (PH) and two conservative rivals—Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center (CD) and independent Abelardo De la Espriella. Members of Congress may examine these candidates' platforms and assess their possible implications for relations with the United States. If no candidate captures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election is scheduled for June 21; the winner is to take office on August 7June 4, 2026, Colombian authorities certified the results of a May 31 first-round presidential election in which right-wing political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella exceeded expectations, garnering 44% of the vote to finish ahead of left-wing senator Iván Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact (PH) with 41% (see Figure 1). Despite some violence in the leadup to the contest, election day proved peaceful; international observers deemed the process orderly and transparent, contradicting President Gustavo Petro's claims of fraud. After a delay, Cepeda accepted the results on June 7. A runoff is scheduled for June 21; the winner is to take office on August 7.
Since the late 1990s, Congress generally has sought to foster closer security and economic ties with Colombia. The 119th Congress has reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on that assistance, however, due to concerns about the Petro government's security policies, which Cepeda supports. De la Espriella, a criminal defense lawyer, advocates a military-led security policy. President Trump endorsed de la Espriella, a move that President Petro rejected as election interference. Congress may examine the candidates' platforms to assess their possible implications for Colombia and U.S.-Colombian relations.
The legacy of outgoing President Petro, a polarizing figure whose popularity has risen since November, has influenced the elections. Supporters have praised Petro's focus on reducing inequality through labor reform and historic minimum wage increases despite his government's corruption scandals. The Petro administration's deemphasisde-emphasis of coca eradication has coincidedcoincided with record cocaine production. Also, theThe government's "total peace" negotiations involving ceasefires with illegally armed groups may have bolstered the power of such groups and fueled violence. Increased violence could inhibit voting in some regions as armed groups seek to influence the election results.
The results of such groups' power and fueled violence.
Colombia's March 8 legislative elections illustrated a left-right division among voters regarding how best to address violence, corruption, and economic issues but also the continued relevance of traditional parties, including the Liberal and Conservative partiessecurity and economic issues amid continued fragmentation in the party system. PH captured the most Senate (25 of 103) and House of Representatives (43 of 183) seats, while CDand the conservative Democratic Center (CD) garnered the second-largest number in both chambers (17 and 28, respectively). Four parties that aligned with the PH early in Petro's term despite ideological differences—but later broke with PH—together won 69 House seats and 38 Senate seats. The next president likely will need to form cross-party alliances.
Colombia began its presidential contest with hundreds of candidates. After three interparty primaries were held concurrently with legislative elections, Paloma Valencia, winner of the center-right primary, emerged as a leading candidate, alongside Cepeda and De la Espriella—neither of whom participated in a primary.
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Iván Cepeda is a left-wing PH senator, human rights activist, and "total peace" negotiator. Cepeda has pledged to combat corruption, prioritize peace and armed conflict victims' rights, enact a progressive tax reform, and bolster rural development. Cepeda opposed U.S. Cepeda selected Aida Quilcué, a former senator and Indigenous activist, as his running mate |
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Abelardo His running mate, José Manuel Restrepo, is an economist and former minister of finance. |
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Paloma Valencia, a conservative CD senator, is a lawyer who was backed by former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and proposed policies similar to those of de la Espriella.
Disputes between Valencia and her running mate Juan Carlos Oviedo, a moderate economist, arguably hurt her candidacy. Valencia chose Juan Carlos Oviedo, a moderate economist who directed the national statistics agency, to join her ticket. |
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Since January 2026, Cepeda has led in the polls but remained short of an absolute majority. A weighted average of recent polls suggests that Cepeda could narrowly lose to Valencia and tie De la Espriella in a runoff (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Results of Colombia's First-Round Presidential Election Source: CRS, using results from Colombia's National Electoral Commission and a weighted average of polls as published by Colombia's La Silla Vacia. |
U.S.-Colombian relations have been strained under the second Trump Administration amid the Administration's differences with President Petro. Drug policy changes, U.S. foreign assistance cuts and tariffs, and Colombia's decision to sign a cooperation plan with the People's Republic of China on the(PRC, or China) on China's Belt and Road Initiative have contributed to strained relationstensions. In September 2025, President Trump determined that Colombia had failed to meet its counternarcotics commitments, the State Department revoked Petro's visa, and the Department of the Treasury sanctioned Petro under counternarcotics authorities. Those sanctions remain in place despite a reportedly cordial February 2026 White House meeting.
Colombia's next president may seek a positive relationship with the U.S. government, as the United States remains Colombia's top economic partner and a source of security and humanitarian support. Cepeda is regarded as less polarizing than President Petro and supports human rights programming and initiatives for Afro-Colombians and Indigenous peoples, such as those funded in the FY2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75). Nevertheless, his backingCepeda's support of Petro's security policies and wariness of U.S. intervention in Venezuela could strain relations. Valencia and De la Espriella havehas vowed to join President Trump's Americas Counter Cartel initiative. Valencia has proposed a modernized Plan Colombia bilateral security initiative. De la Espriella has endorsed security policies such as El Salvador's "state of exception" policy, which has raisedCoalition and Shield of the Americas regional security initiatives. He has endorsed El Salvador's approach to security, which includes the use of emergency powers and large-scale prisons (such Salvadoran policies have spurred some human rights concerns in Congress). In terms of economic policies, Cepeda supports targeted welfare programs, agrarian and land reform, and a transition to renewable energies. De la Espriella reportedly favors reducing investment restrictions, limiting regulations, and promoting hydrocarbons development. . Cepeda could maintain Petro's high corporate taxes and frequent regulatory changes, which have created uncertainty among investors, while his opponents reportedly could seek to attract U.S. businesses by rolling back investment restrictions and limiting regulations.