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The second Trump Administration has shifted the framing of U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) away from that of the first Trump and Biden Administrations. Rather than portraying the United States and China as engaged in strategic competition,The United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) lead the world in the size of their economies, defense budgets, and research and technology investments. Both are among the five nuclear-armed, veto-wielding permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. While the first Trump Administration and the Biden Administration described the U.S.-China relationship as one of "strategic competition," the second Trump Administration has stated that it seeks the second Trump Administration has stated its desire for a "balance of power" and a "stable peace" with the PRC. At the same time, it has pursued actions in the trade and defense arenas to counter China that appear to align more with a conception of China as a competitorChina. At a May 2026 summit, President Donald J. Trump and Communist Party General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping committed to "build a constructive relationship of strategic stability." (A White House fact sheet added the phrase "on the basis of fairness and reciprocity," which is absent from PRC readouts.)
Some U.S. and PRC policies appear intended to foster stability in relations, particularly ahead of Xi's planned September 24, 2026, state visit to Washington, DC. (The PRC has not confirmed the date for Xi's visit.) Other actions and statements from the Administration and the PRC government appear to align with a relationship of strategic competition. In its oversight and legislative activities, the 119th Congress has focused on the competitive dimension of U.S.-China relations, including by re-authorizing achallenges and risks that China poses to U.S. interests, including by reauthorizing the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition betweenBetween the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (H.Res. 5) first established in the 118th Congress (H.Res. 11).
The second Trump Administration has outlined aspects of its approach to China in two major public documents, the December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2025, and the and the January 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in January 2026. Language about China in those documents is in some places conciliatory and in other places combative, which could reflect strategic framing, policy differences within the Administration, or both. The NSS pledges that the Administration will "[w]in the economic future" in Asia, in part through "a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing." The NSS also states that the Administration seeks to "rebalance America's economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence." Nowhere does the NSSThe NSS does not explicitly identify China as a competitor.
The NDS states that, "President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China." The NDS adds that the goal of the Department of Defense (which is "using a secondary Department of War designation" under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025) "is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them," but rather, "[t]o prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies," and to achieve "a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace." The NDS explicitly states that U.S. defense strategy with regard to Chinatoward the PRC "does not require regime change." At the same time, the NDS states that the United States will "prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China." The NDS makes no explicit The NDS makes no mention of Taiwan, the self-governing democracy of 23.3 million people over which the PRC claims sovereignty. It does, however, stateThe NDS states the Department's intention to "erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain," a reference to the string of islands in Asia that includeincludes Japan, Taiwan, and parts of the Philippines and Indonesia. (See CRS In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.)
In its reshaping of the executive branch, the second Trump Administration has reduced or ended the role of many entities previously involved in implementing China policy, and stood up some new entities. The Administration eliminated the White House National Security Council's Technology and National Security Directorate, for example, and established a new Bureau of Emerging Threats in the Department of State focused on threats at the nexus of technology and national security, many involving China. The Administration ended the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) former role in administering foreign assistance and transferred some of its former functions to the Department of State. That Department is now the sole administrator of the Countering PRC Influence Fund, which USAID previously co-administered. The Administration has sought to reduce other China-related entities, such as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), to "the minimum presence and function required by law." Global broadcasters that USAGM funds include Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, both of which broadcast into China. Additionally, the Department of State eliminated the position of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and shrank the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, as part of a larger reorganization.
In his second term, President Trump has largely adopted a conciliatory tone in his public statements about China. On May 4, 2026, the President stated, "We're adversaries, but we have a very good relationship.... And I think it's better to get along with China than it is to fight with China, and they feel the same thing." The President has stated that he has respect for China's leader, Communist Party of China General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping.
At an October 2025 summit with President Trump in Busan, South Korea, Xi called for the United States and China to be "partners and friends." According to a PRC readout, he stated that China has "no intention to challenge or supplant anyone," and he called for the business relationship to "to serve as the anchor and driving force for China-U.S. relations." In a February 4, 2026, call with President Trump, Xi called for "mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation." Xi scheduled a video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the same day as his phone call with Trump, appearing to signal, at a minimum, an equivalency between China's relationship with the United States and with Russia.
Both the Second Trump Administration and the PRC government have appeared to prioritize leader-level diplomacy, with the PRC portraying such diplomacy as playing "an irreplaceable role in providing strategic guidance" for the relationship. President Trump and General Secretary Xi's October 2025 summit in Busan was their first meeting of the second Trump term. They are scheduled to meet again in Beijing on May 13-15, 2026. This would be the first American presidential visit to China since President Trump's last visit in late 2017. Sixteen U.S. executives are to accompany the President to Beijing.
The Beijing summit could be the first of as many as four meetings between the two leaders in 2026. President Trump has stated that he and the First Lady intend to host Xi and his wife for a visit to Washington, DC, "in November or so." The two leaders also might meet at this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, China (November 18-19), and at the G-20 Summit in Miami (December 14-15).
Since 2017, the U.S. government has stepped up its use of tariffs, export controls, and other tools to address PRC practices of concern, to promote and protect U.S. competitiveness vis-a-vis China, and to reduce U.S. trade reliance on China. Since spring 2025, U.S. and PRC officials have engaged in talks over tariffs that President Trump imposed on China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.). After the Supreme Court ruled in early 2026 that President Trump cannot use IEEPA to impose tariffs, he lifted such tariffs and imposed a 10% global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132). In May 2026, a panel on the U.S. International Court of Trade found that President Trump could not legally impose the Section 122 tariff on most imports. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) also initiated an investigation of 16 trading partners, including the PRC, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411) related to structural excess manufacturing capacity. The second Trump Administration separately has imposed sectoral tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended), which apply to certain U.S. imports from China. U.S. non-IEEPA tariffs remain in effect. Since 2018, the U.S. government has strengthened export controls on exports to China, particularly for semiconductors. In 2025, the Trump Administration appeared to reverse this trend, at least in part, in approving the export to China of California-based Nvidia Corp.'s advanced chips. Some former U.S. officials have said the decision appears to have traded U.S. national security decisions for trade concessions, which would be a shift from past practice.
The PRC has responded to U.S. actions by imposing tariffs, export controls, and market restrictions, and by canceling orders of U.S. goods. It also has expanded the scope of its export controls to cover more trade and require disclosure about the end-use of PRC inputs. Such actions appear to have fostered a dynamic in trade talks in which U.S. officials have sought to delay PRC measures in exchange for delays in U.S. trade actions on China. This could shift the focus of talks away from addressing systemic issues in the PRC economy that the United States had previously prioritized. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer says he is seeking a "managed trade" arrangement with China, an approach that typically sets import and export quotas. PRC offers to make purchases the PRC typically makes but has withheld during talks (e.g., aircraft, beef, and soybeans) raise questions about the extent to which PRC commitments will boost U.S. exports to China above normal levels. (See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations.)
In the February 2026 Trump-Xi call, Xi identified Taiwan as "the most important issue in U.S.-China relations" and urged the President to "handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with prudence." The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.) stipulates that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." PRC scholars have suggested that Xi may use the May 2026 summit to renew his call for the United States to limit Taiwan arms sales, and to request that the President state his opposition to Taiwan independence and his support for China's quest for "peaceful unification" with Taiwan. Such statements would be a departure from longstanding U.S. policy. (See CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations.)
China maintains partnerships with Iran and the Arab Gulf states and is the largest importer of Iranian crude oil. On May 4, 2026, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent called on China to "step up with some diplomacy and get the Iranians to open the strait," a reference to the Strait of Hormuz. On April 24, 2026, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated five China-based oil refineries for sanctions, arguing that such refineries "play a vital role in sustaining Iran's oil economy." On May 2, China's Ministry of Commerce publicly ordered PRC companies not to comply with the U.S. sanctions, the first time the PRC has taken such an action. Earlier in April, the Financial Times reported that Iran has used a satellite purchased from a China-based company in 2024 to target U.S. military assets in the Middle East during the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran.
Date Location Details Oct. 30, 2025 Busan, South Korea First Trump-Xi in-person meeting since 2019 in Osaka, Japan May 14-15, 2026 Beijing, PRC First presidential visit to PRC since Trump's 2017 trip *Sept. 24, 2026 Washington, DC Would be Xi's first U.S. visit since 2023 and second U.S. state visit (the first was in 2015) *Nov. 18-19, 2026 Shenzhen, PRC Possible meeting on APEC sidelines *Dec. 14-15, 2026 Miami, FL Possible meeting on G-20 sidelines Source: White House. Note: * Planned or proposed meetings. At the Busan summit in October 2025, Trump and Xi agreed to establish two tracks for ongoing cabinet-level engagement. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng lead an economic track. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio and China's top diplomat, Wang Yi, lead a political track. Areas of focus at the September 2026 summit may include the following. Since 2017, the U.S. government has stepped up its use of tariffs, export controls, investment review, and other tools to address PRC practices of concern, to promote and protect U.S. national security and competitiveness vis-à-vis China, and to reduce U.S. trade reliance on China. Since 2025, the Trump Administration has increased tariffs on China and other countries. The PRC has responded to U.S. tariffs by imposing tariffs, market restrictions, and export controls on key production inputs (e.g. rare earths) and by canceling orders of U.S. goods. Since 2025, most PRC retaliation has involved nontariff actions as the PRC ran out of items to effectively tariff given the trade imbalance. The PRC has also expanded the scope of its export controls to cover more trade and require disclosure about the end use of PRC inputs, likely raising PRC visibility into and leverage over U.S. supply chains. See CRS In Focus IF12990, U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview. Since 2025, senior-level U.S.-PRC trade talks have focused on tariffs and PRC nontariff retaliatory actions. The talks have not resolved U.S. concerns and have widened into other areas, such as export controls. PRC actions appear to have fostered a dynamic in which U.S. officials have sought to delay PRC measures in exchange for concurrent delays in U.S. actions, potentially distracting from U.S. efforts to address systemic issues. In 2025, both sides paused some tariff and export control actions for a year, until November 2026; some say PRC follow-through has been uneven. The Administration's decisions to allow U.S. technology firm Nvidia to export the H200 chip to the PRC (and to set terms by which the U.S. government collects 25% of the proceeds) prompted congressional legislation seeking to limit the sale of advanced chips and semiconductor equipment to China. Former U.S. officials criticized the Nvidia licensing decision and what they saw as a negotiating of national security decisions in exchange for trade concessions, saying that such actions contradict past U.S. practice. The Administration's rescission of the 2025 Artificial Intelligence (AI) Diffusion Rule ended proposed efforts to curtail PRC firms' use of advanced computing and data centers in third countries. PRC firms are competing using third-country data centers, open-source AI models, and reported unauthorized training of models on U.S. models. The summit may include a discussion of AI safety and risk management, an area where U.S. and PRC approaches differ widely. See CRS Report R48642, U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer has said the President seeks stability and is not looking for a "massive confrontation" or "full-on conflict" with China, suggesting limits to U.S. willingness to pressure China given deep economic ties and the PRC's tendency to retaliate. For example, USTR has pressed the PRC to ease rare earth exports with limited result. Greer has also said he is seeking a "managed trade" arrangement with China, an approach that typically sets import/export quotas. PRC offers to make purchases of U.S. goods in exchange for trade concessions have involved purchases the PRC typically makes but has withheld during talks (e.g., aircraft, beef, and soybeans), raising questions about whether PRC commitments will boost U.S. exports to China above normal levels. In May 2026, the two sides agreed to create trade and investment boards to identify goods on which tariffs could be lifted and areas for PRC investment in the U.S. market. Other issues for discussion include PRC industrial policies, overcapacity, and exports and global investment in sectors such as electric vehicles, as well as PRC guidance directing firms not to abide by U.S. sanctions and European trade investigations. (See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations.) The Department of State announced on August 20, 2026, that Secretary Rubio had designated Burma-born American scholar Min Zin as "wrongfully detained in China," following Zin's June 3, 2026, detention. The Department confirmed the same designation for PRC-born U.S. seismologist Dr. Youlin Chen, whom the PRC detained in November 2024 and charged with espionage in May 2025. Some Members of Congress have called for release of both. During his visit to Beijing in May 2026, the President stated in a Fox News interview that he was holding "in abeyance" a $14 billion arms sales package for Taiwan—a follow-on to an $11 billion package announced in December 2025. The President stated that the second arms package was "a very good negotiating chip for us" with the PRC. Some Members of Congress have pressed the Administration to approve the package. (See CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations.) Separately this year, the PRC has carried out a "special maritime traffic law enforcement" operation in waters east of Taiwan and has increased its presence in the area of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, inflaming tensions with the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, and the United States. China is the largest importer from Iran of crude oil and other exports. The United States has expanded sanctions on Iran and imposed secondary sanctions on some PRC firms doing business with Iran but has not sanctioned major PRC firms and banks to date. With the United States and Israel engaged in a conflict with Iran, the President stated after the Beijing summit that Xi had "promised me that he's not sending any weapons to Iran" and "I take him at his word." Reuters reported in July 2026 that Iran expected to take delivery of 300-400 PRC-manufactured man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) "within weeks."The 119th Congress is considering legislation to strengthen export controls and protect the U.S. market vis-a-vis China. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60) includes provisions on U.S. outbound investment to China. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75) appropriates not less than $400 million for the Countering PRC Influence Fund. It also appropriates funds for entities related to competition with China that the second Trump Administration has sought to defund, including the USAGM. Congressional Member travel to China has resumed at a low level in the 119th Congress. This Congress accounts for three of the fourTo manage the bilateral relationship and address key issues, the Administration has prioritized leader-level engagement and regular meetings of senior foreign policy, trade, and economic officials. President Trump and Xi have held two summits since 2025, with up to three more possible this year, including Xi's U.S. state visit in September. (See Table 1.) China has invited President Trump to travel to Shenzhen, PRC, in November 2026 for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Meeting it is hosting this year. If the President attends APEC, some analysts expect Xi to reciprocate and attend the 2026 G-20 summit in Miami, FL. (PRC Premier Li Qiang represented China at the 2025 G-20 summit in South Africa).
Table 1. Trump-Xi Summits, 2025-2026
PRC Leader Xi's Planned State Visit
Trade and Investment
American Detainees
Taiwan and the South China Sea
Iran
The 119th Congress and China
The 119th Congress is considering legislation to strengthen export controls and address concerns about data security, technology competition, and the PRC government's ties to PRC firms. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60) has provisions on outbound investment to China. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75) appropriates not less than $400 million for the Countering PRC Influence Fund, administered by the Department of State. It also appropriates funds for the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which the Trump Administration had sought to reduce. USAGM funds the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, which broadcast into China. Some congressional travel to China has resumed; the 119th Congress accounts for four of the five Member delegations to visit China since 2019.