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According to the Pentagon's 2026 National Defense Strategy, Russia "possesses the world's largest nuclear arsenal, which it continues to modernize and diversify, as well as undersea, space, and cyber capabilities that it could employ against the U.S. Homeland."
Since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has invoked Russia's nuclear weapons in an apparent attempt to deter Western military intervention against Russia in Ukraine and stated that Russia has deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons to its ally Belarus. The 2010 New START Treaty that limited U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces expired in February 2026, though Russian officials then stated that Russia would continue to abide by the treaty's central limits—1,550 warheads on 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—as long as the United States did so. Congress may choose to examine U.S. deterrence and risk reduction policy toward Russia, including whether or not to support future arms control.Russia presents an "acute threat" to the United States and its allies, according to the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, a Biden Administration review of U.S. nuclear policy, states,
Russia remains the U.S. rival with the most capable and diverse nuclear forces. Today it is unique in the combination of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces it fields that enables nuclear employment ranging from large-scale attacks on the [U.S.] homeland to limited strikes in support of a regional military campaign [in the Euro-Atlantic region].
Since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued nuclear weapons threats, stated that Russia has deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons to its ally Belarus, and declared the suspension of certain Russian obligations under the 2010 New START Treaty that limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Congress may choose to examine U.S. deterrence and risk reduction policy toward Russia.
According to one 2025 nongovernmental estimate, Russia has around 1,718 deployed nuclear warheads based on a triad of strategic delivery vehicles roughly consisting of 330 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) with 192 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 58 strategic bombers. Russia has not exchanged official data with the United States about the structure of its strategic nuclear forces since 2023. Russian officials have stated, however, that Russia continues to abide by New START limits, thus maintaining rough parity with U.S. strategic nuclear forces. According to one 2025 nongovernmental estimate, the United States has around 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads.
Russia is concluding a modernization of its strategic nuclear forces that focuses in particular on the development of the SS-X-29 (Sarmat) heavy ICBM, the SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars) ICBM, and the Dolgorukiy (Borei) class SSBN, according to a 2024 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) statement to Congress.According to a 2026 FAS estimate, the United States has around 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads.
The U.S. intelligence community's 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) states that Russia "is modernizing its nuclear weapons capabilities in the face of multiple failed tests of new systems." Russia deploys the majority of its strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs. A separate Russian military service, the Strategic Rocket Forces, commands these silo-based and mobile ICBMs. Russia can field most of its ICBMs and all of its SLBMs with multiple warheads on each missile.
Russia also has a variety of dual-capable systems (which are able to use conventional or nuclear warheads), including precision strike missiles, of various ranges and modes of launch, that are not limited by any arms control agreements. The Russian military could deploy these systems with nuclear warheads, enabling their use as nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). Russia has rejected U.S. efforts to negotiate limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weaponsNSNW, describing these weapons as an offset to U.S. and NATO conventional superiority. The State Department stated in 2025 that the Russian military has between 1,000 to 2,000 nuclear warheads for nonstrategic weapons; nongovernmental organizations attribute Admiral Correll stated in March 2026 that Russia had "up to 2,000 warheads" intended for NSNW; a FAS estimate attributes 1,477 warheads to these systems. According to a 2026 Department of State report, "there are as- yet no indications of a large-scale increase in the overall numbers of warheads assigned these roles." 1,477 warheads to these systems.
Russian officials have expressed concerns about the survivability of Russian strategic nuclear forces, given advances in U.S. long-range conventional strike and missile defenses. In 2018, President Putin announcedstated that Russia was developing new delivery vehiclescapabilities, including an ICBM-mounted hypersonic glide vehicle, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, and a nuclear-capable autonomous underwater system. Some of these capabilities have been undergoing testingThe latter two systems were tested in 2025, according to a 2026 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) statement. According to 2025 testimony of NORTHCOMU.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander General Gregory Guillot, "if fielded," these novel Russian capabilities "will severely challenge [the U.S.] ability to detect and characterize an inbound attack and determine an appropriate response during a conflict."
In 2024, U.S. officials positedexpressed concerns about Russia's plans to launch a nuclear-armed satellite into space. A 2025 DIA statement indicated that Russia believes that a "satellite capable of carrying a nuclear device," among other counterspace capabilities, "will deter Western adversaries reliant on space and enable [Russia] to disrupt or destroy Western satellites should deterrence fail."
According to a November 2024 revisionrevision of Russia's nuclear declaratory policy document, Russian nuclear deterrence policy seeks to maintain nuclear forces at a "sufficient" level, that "guarantees the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity," deters aggression, and enables escalation management, as well as the "termination" of adversary "military actions" on conditions "cessation" of hostilities on "terms acceptable" to Russia. The document adds that the Russian Presidentpresident could authorize nuclear weapons employment in the following scenarios: (1) "the receipt of reliable data" about a ballistic missile attack against Russian or allied territory, (2) the use by an adversary of "nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction" against Russia or an ally, (3) "adversary actions" on "government or military" targets that could affect Russia's ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, (4) a conventional "aggression against" Russia and (or) Belarus that "poses "a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity," and (5) "the receipt of reliable data" about a "mass start of aerospacemassive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means" and "their crossing of [Russia's] state border." The document also states that Russia considers "an aggression" by "any nonnuclear state, but with non-nuclear state with the participation or with support fromof a nuclear state," a "joint attack" against Russia. While this declaratory policy revision broadens the range of Russia's potential nuclear employment scenarios, it is unknown how the Russian military will translate it into changes in Russia's nuclear employment planning.
Russian political and military leaders have articulated a "strategic deterrence" concept that combines nonmilitary means, nonnuclear capabilities, and nuclear weapons into a spectrum of continuous actions aimed at deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. The U.S. intelligence community's 2024 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA)2024 ATA said that "Russia is expanding and modernizing" its dual-capable systems "because Moscow believes [they] offer options to deter adversaries, control the escalation of potential hostilities, and counter U.S. and Allied conventional forces." Western studies of authoritative Russian military writings depict several differentpotential variants of "ladders" involving steps with dual-capable systems the Russian military could take to deter or manage escalation.
The Russian military plans for the use of military force through a system of "strategic operations." According to some nongovernmental sources, some of these operations may foresee large-scale as well as limited use of nuclear weapons. Other strategic operations may provide Russia with flexible coercive options below the nuclear threshold. According to General Guillot's 20242026 testimony, Russia could employ nonnuclearconventional precision strike missiles and other nonnuclear capabilities on U.S. critical infrastructure "missiles and cyber capabilities "to strike Western economic and military infrastructure in an attempt to degrade our political will and compel negotiations to terminate an escalating conflictpolitical will, disrupt force flows, and terminate a conflict on terms acceptable to Russia."
Since February 2022, President Putin has invoked Russia's nuclear weapons in an apparent attempt to deter Western military intervention against Russia in Ukraine. Russian signaling has included announcements ofmade public references to Russia's nuclear weapons, including signaling through announcements about Russia's increased nuclear readiness, exercises, missile tests, capability demonstrationscapability demonstrations, missile tests, and changes in nuclear declaratory policy. (See CRS Insight IN12464, Russia's Nuclear and Coercive Signaling During the War in Ukraine.) In February 2023, President Putin also noted the possibility of Russian nuclear tests, if the United States engaged in such testing. Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in November 2023. Russia maintains a nuclear testing capability at a test site in the Arcticwere to engage in such testing. Russia, which maintains a nuclear testing capability at a test site in the Arctic, withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in November 2023.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko positedstated in April 2024 that Russia deployed "several dozen" nuclear weapons to Belarus. The DIA stated in 2025 that Russia is "expanding its nuclear posture to Belarus by establishing missile and nuclear-capable aircraft capabilities, renovating a nuclear weapons storage site, and training Belarusian crews to handle tactical nuclear weapons."
Some experts in Russia have called for limited nuclear strikes and changes to declaratory policy, arguing that Russian threats have not deterred Western military aid to Ukraine. Western analysts have debated the credibility of Putin's nuclear threats and signaling. According to a 2025 DIA statement, "Russia almost certainly seeks to avoid direct conflict with NATO because it assesses it cannot win a conventional military confrontation with the alliance."
Throughout the war in Ukraine, U.S. officials have voiced concerns that Russia may employ a nuclear weapon. More recently, a 2025 DIA statement posited that "Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the conflict unless Russian leadership judged it faced an existential threat to the regime." At the same time, the 2026 ATA stated, "The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges."
Since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and Russia have periodically engaged in efforts to reduce the risks of nuclear war and negotiated agreements to limit and reduce their nuclear weapons. (See CRS In Focus IF12964, U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress, and CRS Insight IN12568, Golden Dome: Potential Strategic Stability Considerations for Congress.)
The United States and Russia have not met in a Strategic Stability Dialogue aimed at discussing future arms control since January 2022. Biden Administration officials have said since 2023 that the United States is willing to return to talks with Russia "without preconditions." However, President Putin has.) The United States and Russia have not met to discuss future arms control since January 2022. President Putin had said that Russia would not discuss arms control while the United States seeks to inflict "strategic defeat" on Russia by providing military aid to Ukraine. A 2022 National Intelligence Council assessment stated that Russia "probably still sees value in strategic nuclear arms control as a means to constrain the United States."
In February 2023, President Putin announced that Russia would suspend its participation in the New START Treaty, an agreement that limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 800 and warheads actively deployed on these delivery vehicles to 1,550 each. Russian officials have . Russian officials said Russia would maintain treaty central limits but discontinue on-site inspections and data exchanges. In a January 2025 report2026 annual report to Congress, the State Department stated that "Russia may have exceeded the [treaty's] deployed warhead limit by a small number,stated that "Russia was probably close to the deployed warhead limit during much of the year and likely exceeded [it] toward the end of 2025" but "assesses with high confidence" that Russia did not carry out "any large-scale activity above the Treaty limits in 20242025." The report stated." The report further stated that while the United States "cannot could not "certify" that Russia iswas compliant with New START, the department "doesdid not "determine" at present that "Russia's noncompliance" threatensthreatened U.S. "national security interests." A 2025 DIA assessment stated that Russia has "a stockpile of about 1,550 deployed strategic warheads."
In September 2025, President Putin stated that Russia would continue to abide by New START central limits after the treaty's February 5, 2026, expiration date if the United States did so. It is unknown if Putin may choose to build up Russian strategic nuclear forces after New START expires.
The Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture proposed in its 2023 report that the United States prepare for the emerging "two-nuclear-peer" threat from Russia and China. Congress may consider some of the commission's recommendations for U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities, cooperation with allies, and risk reduction with adversaries.
Some Members of Congress have debated the issue of nuclear arms control with Russia. Through intelligence community briefings and other oversight activities, Congress may continue to track Russia's nuclear modernization and any increases in its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear capabilities. Congress also may continue to authorize and appropriate funds for, as well as conduct oversight of, the executive branch's efforts to deter threats from Russia. Congress may further examine the executive branch's approaches to nuclear risk reduction, including whether or not to support future arms control.