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The United States and Canada have had one of the largest bilateral trade relationships in the world, including highly integrated energy and automotive markets. Since 1989, U.S.-Canada trade has been governed by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, then by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and now by the 2020 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
InSince 2025, U.S.-Canada trade tensions have increased following the imposition of U.S. tariffs on key Canadian exports. The United States and Canada have engaged in bilateral trade talks related to tariffs. In October 2025, President Trump stated that trade talks with Canada were "terminated." The two countries, along with Mexico, also are scheduled to engage in a review of USMCA in July 2026two countries, along with Mexico, also are scheduled to engage in a review of USMCA in July 2026, which could lead to significant changes in the agreement. Congress implemented USMCA through legislation (P.L. 116-113) and may need to approve revisions. Congress may consider whether to exercise its legislative prerogatives related to the U.S.-Canada economic relationship, including oversight of U.S. tariffs and the USMCA joint review process.
According to U.S. Census BureauBureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data, Canada was the thirdsecond-largest source of U.S. goods imports in 2024 ($412 billion) and the top destination for U.S. goods exports ($350 billion). When taking into account both goods and services trade, Canada was the second-largest U.S. trade partner in 2024 (see Figure 1).
Source: CRS, with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, June 2025.
March 2026.
According to Statistics Canada data for 20242025, Canada exported 7673% of its goods to, and imported half46% of its goods from, the United States. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic AnalysisPer BEA and Statistics Canada, as of 2024 (latest data available), the United States was the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) by stock in Canada ($459.6 billion), and Canada was the second-largest source of U.S. FDI ($732.9 billion). Canada has becomeis the largest supplier of U.S. energy imports—including crude oil, natural gas, and electricity. Canada's share of U.S. crude oil imports by quantity increased from 3841% (1.021 billion barrels) in 2014 to 63% (1.482015 to 64% (1.4 billion barrels) in 20242025.
In 2025, President Trump imposed tariffs on Canadian goods under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ((19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). ). In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not give the President authority to impose tariffs. Subsequently, the Administration ended the IEEPA tariff actions and imposed a 10%, 150-day "temporary import surcharge" on most U.S. imports, including from Canada, under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Under USMCA, Canadian goods that are certified as having met product-specific rules can enter the United States largely duty-free; such goods also are largely, but not wholly, exempt from U.S. tariff actions (see Table 1). In August 2025, the United States imposed additional duties on about 1113% of U.S. imports from Canada (worth about $350.5 billion total). Most of the remainderCanadian goods entered duty -free, likely because goods were certified as USMCA-compliant.
|
Authority |
Canadian Goods Affected (Tariff Rates) |
Exemption for USMCA-compliant goods |
|
IEEPA |
Most goods ( |
Yes |
|
Sec. 232 |
Steel, aluminum, and copper (50%) |
No |
|
Sec. 232 |
Passenger vehicles and auto parts (25%); trucks (25%), buses (10%), and related parts (25%) |
Yes (full exemption for parts, partial for vehicles) |
|
Sec. 232 |
Timber and lumber (10%), certain wooden products (25%) , certain semiconductors (25%) |
No |
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. government documents, as of December 3, 2025.
IEEPA. March 30, 2026.
In March 2025, President Trump imposed 25% tariffs on most Canadian imports (10% on energy and potash imports) under IEEPA, citing a purportednational emergency at the border with Canada related to illicit fentanyl. In August 2025, President Trump later increased tariffs on Canadian goods to 35%. U.S. imports of USMCA-qualifying goods from Canada remain exempt from IEEPA tariffs. Also under IEEPA, from August 29, President Trump has removedUSMCA-compliant goods were exempt. These tariffs were ended following the February 2026 Supreme Court ruling.
USMCA-compliant goods are exempt from the Section 122 10% global tariffs, as are energy products and fertilizers. President Trump stated, invoking IEEPA, that he would continue to suspend duty-free treatment for all goods shipments valued at less than $800, including from Canada (19 U.S.C. §1321(a)(2)(C), referred to as de minimis).
In March 2026, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launched an investigation into 60 partners, including Canada, regarding their "failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor" under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§2411–2420); depending on the outcome, this could lead to tariffs on Canadian goods.Sectoral Tariffs. In March 2025, President Trump eliminated all country, referred to as de minimis). This action is facing legal challenges.
. In June 2025, he increased the rate to 50% (currently 50%). President Trump also hashas also imposed tariffs on key Canadian sectors, including certain copper products, certain lumber and timber products, and vehicles and auto parts, and medium and heavy-duty vehicles and buses. There are some exemptions for USMCA-compliant imports (see Table 1).
Canadian Retaliation. Canada initially responded to U.S. IEEPA tariffs with 25% tariffs on C$30 billion (about $21.68 billion) worth of U.S. imports. Separately, Canadian provinces and territories announced retaliatoryretaliatory measures related to the sale of U.S. alcohol and government procurement. In response to U.S. steel and aluminumsectoral tariffs, the Canadian government imposed 25% retaliatory tariffs on C$29.8 billion (about $21.57 billion) worth of U.S. imports. In response to U.S. auto tariffs, Canada imposed tariffs and on non-USMCA-compliant vehicles from the United States, and the non-Canadian, non-Mexican content of vehicles traded under USMCA. Canada has challenged the Section 232 tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In April 2025, Canada exempted certain sectors and companies from its retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods. From September 12025, Canada has terminated the retaliatory tariffs it imposed in response to IEEPA and some retaliatory tariffs it imposed in response to U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs. Canadian tariffs remain on U.S. vehicles and C$15.6 billion ($11.3 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum imports. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has announced policies to support the Canadian steel and lumber industries, including prioritizing the use of Canadian materials in government contracts ("Buy Canadian").
Congress's Role. Congress has a constitutional role in U.S. trade policy and may consider whether to bolster or curb presidential authorities related to tariffs and trade talks, including the scheduled 2026 USMCA joint review. For example, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 37 and S.J.Res. 77, which would terminate the national emergency underlying the IEEPA tariffs on Canada. Some Members have proposed exempting small businesses' imports from IEEPA tariffs on Canada (S. 2383/H.R. 4899). Members seeking greater oversight may direct the Trump Administration and/or agencies such as the U.S. International Trade Commission, Congressional Budget Office, or the Government Accountability Office to assess the economic impacts of U.S. tariffs and Canadian retaliatory measures.
Digital Services Tax Act. In June 2024, the Canadian government enacted a 3% digital services tax (DST) on certain revenue of large digital services providers, retroactive to January 2022. Canada was to begin collecting the DST onin June 30, 2025, but the Canadian government announced it would not collect the tax and would take steps to rescind the legislation after President Trump stated that he would terminate trade talks with Canada over the DST. U.S.-Canada trade talks subsequently resumed. The Canadian government included a repeal of the DST in proposed budget legislation introduced in November 2025.enacted in March 2026.
Online Streaming Act. The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) requires television and radio companies operating in Canada to fund and broadcast a certain percentage of Canadian content. Canada's Online Streaming Act enables CRTC to regulate entities that broadcast through social media (e.g., Meta) or online streaming services (e.g., Meta, Netflix, YouTube). In June 2024, the CRTC announced that it would require online streaming services with annual revenues of C$25 million ($18 million) or more to contribute toward or directly fund Canadian content. The first substantive payment was due onin August 31, 2025. Some Members of Congress have criticized the measure as discriminatory toward U.S. firms. Some Canadian observers counter that funding requirements apply to companies in Canada regardless of nationalityproposed legislation directing USTR to investigate whether the act is unfair to U.S. firms (H.R. 8025). Congress may examine the act's potential impacts on U.S. companies and whether it raises concernsviolates Canada's commitments under USMCA. USMCA currently permits Canada to adopt or maintain measures related to a "cultural industry" that would be otherwise inconsistent under the agreement. The other Parties are allowed to take "a measure of equivalent commercial effect" in response.
Automotive and Critical Minerals. USMCA tightened content requirements for duty-free automotive trade in North America. Mexico and Canada challenged the U.S. interpretation of the requirement—the United States argued for a stricter approach to calculating North American content, while Mexico and Canada advanced a more flexible interpretation of the content requirements. In 2022, a USMCA panel decided in favor of Mexico and Canada but did not determine how the issue was to be resolved. The parties have not reached a resolution.
Canada has beenCritical Minerals Canada is a top U.S. source of key critical minerals. Title III of theThe Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.) grants Canadian firms eligibility to receive U.S. federal funding, including for critical minerals projects in Canada. At President Trump's direction USTR sought public comments on a potential plurilateral agreement on critical minerals trade. Canadian officials have expressed a preference for discussing critical minerals as part of overall USMCA talks rather than in a separate sectoral agreement for critical minerals projects in Canada. In addition to the sectoral tariffs mentioned above, the Commerce Department has initiated a Section 232 investigation into imports of processed critical minerals, which could affect U.S.-Canada cooperation on automotive and critical minerals supply chains.
Congress may consider whether and how to oversee the implementation of USMCA automotive rules of origin and U.S.-Canada cooperation on key supply chains, including through the USMCA joint review process.
Dairy and Supply Management. Canada supports its dairy, poultry, and egg sectors by limiting production, setting prices, and restricting imports ("supply management"). Under USMCA, Canada committed to provide greater access for U.S. dairy exports through 14 U.S.-specific tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which allow specified quantities to be imported into Canada at preferential duty rates. USTR has challenged Canada's dairy TRQs twice under USMCA with mixed results. President Trump has criticized Canada's dairy market policies and suggested imposing tariffs on Canadian dairy products. Some Members have urged USTR to continue to pursue improved U.S. access to Canada's dairy market. In June 2025, Canada enacted legislation preventing the government from increasing TRQs or reducing over-quota tariffs for dairy, poultry, or eggs in future negotiations.
Softwood Lumber. The United States and Canada have had a decades-long dispute over tradetrade in softwood lumber—primarily used in residential construction. The last agreement governing U.S.-Canada softwood lumber trade expired in October 2015. Since the agreement's expiration, the United States has imposed antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) on imports of Canadian softwood lumber. Canada has challenged the duties through NAFTA, USMCA, the WTO, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. AD/CVDs apply on top of Section 232 tariffs on timber and lumber imports. Congress may consider whether to bolster, restrict, or exercise greater oversight of the executive branch's power to impose and maintain tariffs on Canadian lumber.
Congress has a constitutional role in U.S. trade policy and may consider whether to bolster or curb presidential authorities related to tariffs and trade talks. For example, the Senate-passed S.J.Res. 37 and S.J.Res. 77 and the House- passed H.J.Res. 72 would terminate the national emergency underlying the previously-imposed IEEPA tariffs on Canada. Members seeking greater oversight may direct the Administration and/or agencies such as the U.S. International Trade Commission to assess the economic impacts of U.S. tariffs and Canadian retaliatory measures. Members of Congress could consider whether and how to engage with the USMCA joint review, including seeking changes or preserving existing provisions. Congress also could codify specific U.S. tariff rates on Canada. Such action could prompt consideration about consistency with U.S. trade obligations under USMCA.