Iraq
Changes from September 29, 2025 to June 8, 2026
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The Republic of Iraq (Figure 1) sits at an intersection withina crossroad in the Middle East region, with ties to Iran, Turkey, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula shaping itsthat shape Iraqi interests, create constraints, and opportunities. Iraq is emerging from decades of strife and conflict, and U.S.-Iraq security cooperation continues amid strains imposed by regional tensions. U.S. troops remain in Iraq at the Iraqi government's invitation to support shared counterterrorism objectives. A period of relative stability and prosperity has prevailed in Iraq since political leaders settled a tumultuous dispute over government formation after the 2021 national election. Iraq's leading Shia and Sunni Arab and ethnic Kurdish parties are competing within and across communal lines in advance of the next national election, set for November 2025.
Ongoing competition for influence in Iraq between outside powers, especially neighboring Iran and the United States, complicates Iraqi decision making. Related pressures have increased since October 2023; Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups launched a campaign of attacks through 2024 against Israel and on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria in the context of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. Since 2024, Israel-Iran conflict and U.S. strikes on Iran have resulted in greater international attention to Iraq's orientation and sovereignty. The collapse of the Iran-backed Asad government in Syria rekindled Iraqi concerns about Syria-based terrorism threats and altered the context for ongoing changes to U.S. and coalition military operations in Iraq.
U.S. military forces remain deployed in Iraq to provide advice and aid to Iraqi security forces, including the peshmerga forces of the federally recognized Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). U.S. plans jointly developed with Iraqi security officials are providing for the relocation and consolidation of U.S. forces in Iraq as counter-Islamic State coalition operations come to an end. Iraqi and U.S. officials have stated their intent to continue security cooperation and training on an enduring bilateral basis.
Some U.S. diplomatic personnel temporarily departed from Iraq in June 2025, as tensions involving Iran increased. Following U.S. strikes against nuclear targets in Iran in June 2025, several unclaimed drone attacks in Iraq targeted locations in the Kurdistan region and some sites hosting U.S. troops. The 119th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq's relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Trump Administration's FY2026 requests for U.S. security assistance and foreign aid for Iraq and ongoing changes to the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Members also may consider steps to shape U.S.-Iraq security cooperation and economic ties, influence relations between Iraq's national government and the KRG, and monitor the rights of Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities.
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Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data. |
and opportunities, and attract intervention. In May 2026, Shia Arab businessman Ali Al Zaydi was sworn in as Prime Minister after Iraq's parliament approved his government program and 14 of 23 cabinet nominees. A newcomer to government, Al Zaydi was the nominee of the Coordination Framework, a Shia coalition whose members won the most seats in Iraq's November 2025 election.
After a post-election government formation process complicated by regional tensions and the spillover of the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict, Al Zaydi's government faces questions about its strategic orientation, commitment to asserting state control over armed groups, and plans for averting conflict-amplified fiscal and energy crises. Under U.S.-Iraqi agreements, U.S. military forces have mostly withdrawn from central Iraq and consolidated in Iraq's Kurdistan region. U.S.-Iraq security cooperation continues, including on efforts to secure more than 5,700 Islamic State (IS/ISIS) prisoners transferred to Iraq from Syria in 2026.
Since February 2026, Iran-backed Shia Iraqi armed groups have carried out hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and on civilian targets in the Kurdistan region and neighboring countries, drawing counterstrikes and intensifying pressure on Iraq to rein in Iran-backed militias. Al Zaydi's ability to do so may be limited and contingent; the CF coalition that nominated him includes parties with ties to Iran-backed armed groups. Like his predecessors, Al Zaydi may be challenged in asserting Iraqi sovereignty while maintaining Iraq's internal cohesion and balanced relations with competing neighbors and the United States.
Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $8.4 billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. The 119th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq's relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Trump Administration's FY2027 requests for security assistance, as well as proposals related to foreign aid, security, and Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities.
Background
Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the invasion ended the decades-long
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data. Compared to earlier decades marred by conflict, relative stability and prosperity prevailed in Iraq from 2022 through 2025 under then-prime minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani. Joint U.S.-Iraqi operations targeted IS remnants in remote areas, and IS threats diminished. As conflict inside Iraq receded, new economic opportunities emerged, but regional conflict and unresolved domestic issues threatened to undermine Iraq's gains. The Sudani government rested on an uneasy partnership between most Shia Arab parties and major Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that enacted expansive public spending laws. Political rivalry and national officials' disputes with Kurdish leaders over security, energy, and revenue sharing limited government effectiveness. Intra-Kurdish divides have enabled national government efforts to re-centralize decisions and processes. Sudani's challenges now fall to Ali Al Zaydi. Unilateral foreign military operations in Iraq and Iraqi airspace by Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United States have prompted nationalist demands to assert Iraq's sovereignty. Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups' attacks contravene Iraqi law, invite retaliation, and jeopardize Iraq's stated desire to cooperate with foreign partners. Iraq's young, growing population creates economic promise and employment pressure. Fiscal dependence on oil export revenue persists and public sector hiring has grown, while regional conflict and domestic disputes have limited trade and energy output. Conflicts involving Iran since 2023 have shaken Iraq's security and have placed a spotlight on the future of Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq. Some of these groups have been integrated into the PMF, whose origins lie in the 2014-2018 war against the Islamic State. Others have remained outside the PMF, working alongside some PMF-integrated forces to oppose the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. and coalition forces and to occasionally or repeatedly attack U.S. forces in Iraq, national and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces, and Iraq's neighbors. Following armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes during the 2023-2024 Israel-Hamas war, U.S. officials and the Sudani government agreed to end the presence in Iraq of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS during 2026, while U.S. forces relocated within and outside Iraq and refocused toward a bilateral security cooperation mission. While these plans were underway, the onset of Operation Epic Fury against Iran in February 2026 and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria prompted an "accelerated transition and force realignment" by U.S. forces in Iraq and a sharp uptick in armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes, including some U.S. strikes that killed Iraqi security personnel. Clandestine military operations in Iraq's deserts attributed to Israel and Iranian attacks on Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish groups both contribute to Iraqi sovereignty concerns. The United States has demanded that Iraq take action to dismantle Iraqi armed groups that have attacked U.S. targets and civilian targets and infrastructure in Iraq and neighboring countries. Iraqi officials and legislators may consider proposals to alter the status of the PMF and its personnel or address PMF ties to specific armed groups. Prime Minister Al Zaydi may face political and diplomatic dilemmas, as the coalition that nominated him includes parties that have been tied to the PMF and armed groups and as Iraq's security sector has sought continued U.S. support. Al Zaydi has welcomed decisions by some groups to disengage from the PMF and/or accede to state control of all arms. According to U.S. defense officials, U.S. plans for long term security cooperation with Iraq envision "counterterrorism-focused training, intelligence sharing, and episodic presence without permanent basing." U.S. forces in Iraq now operate at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and from the Kurdistan region. Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq's constitution recognizes KRG federal authority in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG referendum favoring independence, national forces reasserted control of some disputed territories. The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in Iraq's parliament. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged, delaying formation of a new KRG cabinet since the 2024 regional election. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his nephew, Nechirvan, is KRG president, and his son, Masrour, is KRG prime minister. The KDP and PUK retain separate aligned militia and security units, despite U.S. efforts to help unify and depoliticize the KRG security sector. The United States has cooperated with the KRG and has supported the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over oil production, the budget, territory, and security. In September 2025, a KRG-Baghdad agreement conditionally resolved disputes that had delayed transfers of funds and contributed to serious KRG fiscal strains. Since 2022, Iraqi court rulings have reduced KRG autonomy, including rulings that have found the KRG oil and gas sector law unconstitutional, invalidated KRG electoral arrangements, and required the transfer of KRG revenue to national authorities for payment of KRG employees. Iraq opposes Turkey's unilateral military presence and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish forces have targeted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK's 2025 decision to disarm and steps taken to implement this decision could prompt future changes in Turkey's posture. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil have been attacked in 2026, but remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra closed in 2018. The position of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is vacant, and Joshua Harris has served as chargé d'affaires A.I. since September 2025. On May 31, 2026, President Donald Trump named U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack as Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq. Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 2026, and has appropriated related funds available through September 2027. The request for 2027 seeks nearly $119 million for Iraq's military and Counter Terrorism Service, but does not seek funds for the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA). The Trump Administration's 2025 foreign aid review ended some U.S. aid programs in Iraq and preserved others. The Trump Administration has not requested a specific amount of Foreign Military Financing foreign assistance for Iraq in FY2027, but seeks $900,000 to continue International Military Education and Training. rule, dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party but ushered in a long period of chaos, violence, and political transition from which the country struggled to emerge. U.S. forces withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled IS insurgents to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq from 2014 to 2018. Iraqis leveraged new U.S. and coalition military support to defeat the Islamic State, butU.S. military forces and coalition partners returned to Iraq in 2014 at the government of Iraq's invitation to help defeat the Islamic State group. Iran's influence in Iraq also grew during this period as several Iran-backed Shia militia groups mobilized and later were. Some of these militias were later legally consolidated into the nationalIraq's security apparatussector under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state force with an estimated 238,000 personnel and a 2024 budget of about $3.4 billion.
U.S.-Iran Conflict and U.S.-Iraq Ties
Views from the Kurdistan Region
U.S. Partnership and the 119th Congress
under the Popular Mobilization Forces.
As of 2025, IS threats in Iraq have diminished, but some remnants of the group remain active in remote areas, including disputed territories between the Kurdistan region and areas to the south secured by national government forces. Joint Iraqi-U.S. operations have targeted IS leaders in Iraq since 2024, with several senior figures eliminated. IS fighters also are active in eastern Syria, where U.S.-backed partner forces are negotiating with Syria's interim authorities while detaining thousands of IS fighters and IS-associated persons, including Iraqis awaiting repatriation.
As conflict inside Iraq has receded, opportunity has emerged for many Iraqis, but unresolved domestic issues, regional tension, rising temperatures, and water shortages may cloud Iraq's future. Since 2022, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani has led a power-sharing government that is the first since 2003 not to include all of Iraq's leading political factions. An uneasy partnership between several Shia Arab parties and Iraq's major Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties has enabled the ruling State Administration Coalition to enact expansive public spending legislation and advance U.S.-supported banking reforms. Political rivalry and national government differences with Kurdish leaders over security and federalism, including energy policy and revenue sharing, have limited the government's effectiveness. Sudani has adopted a nationalist posture toward unilateral foreign military operations in Iraq and Iraqi airspace, criticizing actions by Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United States. His government has described Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups' attacks as illegal and inconsistent with Iraq's desire to continue cooperation with foreign partners.
Election Looms and Pressures Mount
Transitions in U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation arrangements are being implemented as Iraqis navigate a period of renewed political campaigning in 2025. National elections are planned for November 11, and candidate, coalition, and party registration had closed as of June. Prime Minister Sudani is seeking a second term and intends to lead a new electoral list (the "Reconstruction and Development Alliance") to compete against some of his current partners in the Shia-led Coordination Framework (CF) coalition. Iraq's electoral law has been revised to return it to a framework expected to benefit party-backed candidates over independents.
Victors in the election will faces challenges posed by strains between the national government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Iraq's fiscal dependence on oil export revenue, Iraq's assertive and troubled neighbors, and the activities of Iraqi armed non-state actors, including militia groups associated with some CF members.
Views from the Kurdistan Region
Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between Iraqi Kurdistan's two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq's constitution recognizes KRG authority in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG independence referendum, national forces reasserted control of some disputed territories.
The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in parliament. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged and have delayed the formation of a new KRG cabinet since the 2024 regional election. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his son, Masrour Barzani is KRG prime minister. Nechirvan Barzani is KRG president and is the prime minister's cousin. The KDP and PUK retain separate politically aligned militia and security force units, despite U.S. efforts to encourage the unification and depoliticization of the KRG security sector.
The United States cooperates with the KRG and supports the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over oil production, the budget, territory, and security. Baghdad has placed conditions on the transfer of funds to the KRG, contributing to the KRG's fiscal strains. Since 2022, Iraqi court rulings have reduced the KRG's autonomy, including rulings that have found the KRG oil and gas sector law unconstitutional, invalidated long-standing KRG electoral arrangements, and required the transfer of KRG revenue to national authorities for payment of KRG employees.
Iraq has opposed Turkey's unilateral military presence and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish forces have targeted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK's 2025 decision to disarm and initial steps taken to implement this decision may prompt changes in Turkey's posture.
U.S. Partnership and the 119th Congress
In 2024, Iraqi and U.S. officials outlined plans to end the counter-IS coalition mission in Iraq in 2025, with Iraq hosting Syria-focused U.S. forces into 2026. Those plans are now being implemented. Post-2026 security cooperation may include a residual U.S. force presence.
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra closed in 2018. The position of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is vacant, and Joshua Harris has served as chargé d'affaires A.I. in Baghdad since September 2, 2025.
Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $8.2 billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 2025, and has appropriated related funds available through September 2026, including aid to the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) subject to Baghdad's approval and pursuant to a nonbinding U.S.-KRG 2022 memorandum of understanding.
Through 2024, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development funded security, economic, stabilization, and democracy programs in parallel to Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Defense Department Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) and Global Train and Equip (10 U.S.C. 333) security assistance. The Trump Administration's 2025 foreign aid review ended some U.S. aid programs and preserved others. The Trump Administration has not requested specific aid for Iraq in FY2026 except for FMF funding and $212.5 million in FY2026 CTEF funds. Pending appropriations bills (H.R. 4016/S. 2572) would provide the requested CTEF amount. The House-passed version of a 2026 national defense authorization act (H.R. 3838) would repeal the 1991 and 2002 authorizations for use of military force for Iraq. Other bills would make Iraqi gas imports from Iran sanctionable (H.R. 2574), or require the terrorist designation of some Iraqi entities and place conditions on U.S. aid (H.R. 2658).