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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

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North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Updated September 26, 2025April 29, 2026 (IF10472)

Overview

Over the past decade, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has advanced its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, raisingwhich has raised the threat Pyongyang poses to the United StatesU.S. homeland, U.S. allies in East Asia, and U.S. interests. Congress could examine current U.S. policy responses, including the implementation of sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and the impact on U.S. and allied forces.

U.S. policies and multiple United NationsIn April 2026, a U.S. defense official testified that "North Korea's nuclear forces are increasingly capable of targeting the U.S. Homeland, and its missile forces can strike South Korea and Japan with nuclear or conventional warheads." The 2026 National Defense Strategy stated that these forces are "growing in size and sophistication, and they present a clear and present danger of nuclear attack on the American Homeland." U.S. policies and multiple UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions have imposed sanctions and called on North Korea to abandoneliminate its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and eliminate them in a "complete, verifiable and irreversible manner." in a "complete, verifiable and irreversible manner." Since 2022, Russian and Chinese policies toward North Korea have shifted. The U.S. Forces Korea commander said in April 2025 that in return for North Korea's assistance in its war against Ukraine, "Russia is expanding sharing of space, nuclear, and missile-applicable technology, expertise, and materials to the DPRK." A trilateral statement of the United States, South Korea, and Japan reiterates their "steadfast commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea." North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has repeatedly rejected denuclearization negotiations since the most recent talks in 2019 between President Donald J. Trump and Kim broke down. According to the U.S. intelligence community's 2025 annual threat assessmentIntelligence Community's 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA), Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as a "guarantor of regime security" and has "no intention" to renounce them.

Nuclear Doctrine and Plans

North Korean laws and doctrine governing the purpose and employment of nuclear weapons appear to affirm this 2025 ATA assessment. Congress could examine U.S. policies toward North Korea, including the implementation of sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and changes to U.S. and allied force posture.

Nuclear Doctrine and Plans

The 2026 ATA stated that North Korea is "committed to expanding its strategic weapons programs, including missiles and nuclear warheads, to solidify its deterrent capability." North Korean laws and doctrine governing the purpose and employment of nuclear weapons appear to affirm this assessment. A North Korean government report on the 2026 Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party stated that the "DPRK's position as a nuclear weapons state has been consolidated to be irreversible and permanent," according to a copy posted by an independent aggregator.

In May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to describe the country as a "nuclear-armed state." The following year, the DPRK People's Assembly adopted a law stipulating that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons "serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows." According to a 2013 law, North Korea's nuclear weapons "can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army [a position held by Kim] to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes." A September 2022 law further codified these policies and outlined the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons, which some analysts say lower the threshold for nuclear use.

The 2013 law also stated the "DPRK shall take practical steps to bolster up the nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory strike power both in quality and quantity." In January 2021, the DPRK announced a Five-Year Defense Plan to field a new nuclear-capable submarinenew submarines, develop tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a single missile, and improve the accuracy of Intercontinental Ballistic Missilesintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), among other goals. The plan also includesincluded the development of an ICBM with a range of 15,000 kmkilometers (9,320 miles) for "preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike," as well as ground-based and sea-based solid-fueled ICBMs. Some analysts predict that North Korea will test missiles at a higher rate later this year in order to meet these goals by 2026. In September 2023, Kim announced that Pyongyang would boost nuclear weapons production "exponentially" and diversify nuclear strike options. In August 2025, Kim said the country was pursuing a "rapid expansion of nuclearization."

Nuclear Material Production

North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons. Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build. After it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, North Korea restarted plutonium production activities at its Yongbyon site. North Korea also operates gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. In June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported continued operations at the Yongbyon uranium centrifuge enrichment plant and "undeclared enrichment facilities" at both Kangson and Yongbyon.

Nuclear Testing

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times, beginning in 2006, at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The underground tests, which were apparently conducted to improve nuclear warhead designs, produced increasing estimated yields. North Korea last conducted a nuclear test on September 3, 2017. North Korea characterized its most recently tested nuclear explosive device as a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) for deployment on an ICBM. In 2018, North Korea announced it had achieved its goals and would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and it dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels. IAEA hasThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022. A 2025 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report stated, "North Korea has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing."

Nuclear Warheads

According to DPRK government statements and U.S. government assessments, North Korea aims to increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads and improve their design for multiple delivery systems. Some nongovernmental experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads but may have assembled approximately 50. Producing a nuclear warhead suitable for deployment on missiles is a key step in a nuclear weapons program. According to then-Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth's response to the Senate Armed Services Committee, North Korea is "improving miniaturization of warheads." Kim Jong-un in January 2021 said the country was able to "miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones."

In a January 1, 2023, speech, Kim said the country would expand its nuclear arsenal, including the mass production tactical nuclear weapons. In March 2023, according to the 2024 ATA, Kim ordered "an increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile and the expansion of weapon[s]-grade nuclear material productionMaterial Production

North Korea is expanding its capacity to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons. North Korea produces plutonium at its Yongbyon site. North Korea also operates gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. In March 2026, the IAEA reported "ongoing operation of enrichment facilities" at Kangson and Yongbyon and a new building at Yongbyon that is similar to the Kangson facility. In an April 2026 statement to the House Armed Services Committee, the DIA director said that "Pyongyang is also building a probable additional uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to increase stockpile production." Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build.

Nuclear Warheads

According to a 2025 statement by the then DIA director, North Korea aims to continue increasing its stockpile of nuclear warheads and improving their design for multiple delivery systems. Some nongovernmental experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads but may have assembled approximately 50. In January 2021, Kim said the country was able to "miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones." The 2024 ATA stated, "North Korea also unveiled a purported tactical nuclear warhead and claimed it could be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including an unmanned underwater vehicle and cruise missiles."

Ballistic Missile Testing

Missiles

Under Kim Jong-un, North Korea has accelerated the pace of its ballistic missile test launches. A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the peak (or apogee) of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth using earth's gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear and conventional payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range (i.e., intermediate range and intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site to the target. North Korea's inventory comprises both solid-fueled missiles, which offer advantages in maintenance and mobility, and liquid-fueled missiles, which have greater thrust and power than solid propellants.

In developing its ballistic missile forces, North Korea has prioritized capabilities "designed to evade U.S. and regional missile defenses, improve the North's precision strike capabilities, and put U.S. and allied forces at risk," according to the 2025 ATA. A U.S. intelligence official stated in May 2025 congressional testimonyThe DIA director's April 2026 testimony stated that North Korea's ballistic missile tests "signal continued progress toward North Korea's stated missile tests "align with Pyongyang's defense modernization goal of improving its deterrence threat against the United States."

North Korea continues to test its ballistic missiles to improve their reliability, effectiveness, and survivability. An increase in military cooperation with Russia may accelerate these efforts. In 2025 testimony, the U.S. Forces Korea Commander said that in return for North Korea's assistance in its war against Ukraine, "Russia is expanding sharing of space, nuclear, and missile-applicable technology, expertise, and materials to the DPRK," and that "Russia's expanded cooperation will enable advancements of DPRK's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program across the next three to five years."

Intercontinental and Intermediate Range Missiles

North Korea has advanced its ability to strike the U.S. homeland with an ICBM through a series of tests, first in 2017, then in 2022, four times in 2023, and most recently in October 2024. The DPRK first successfully testedgoals of improving deterrence against Washington through the development of a modern solid propellant missile force." North Korea has tested ballistic missiles in January, March, and April 2026.

Intercontinental and Intermediate Range Missiles

North Korea has tested ICBMs "capable of reaching the entire [U.S.] Homeland," according to the 2026 ATA. Between 2022 and 2024, North Korea conducted "more than a dozen ICBM flight tests," one U.S. official stated in congressional testimony in 2026. In 2025, DIA assessed that the DPRK had "10 or fewer" ICBMs and that it could possess 50 ICBMs by 2035.

The DPRK successfully tested two liquid-fueled, road-mobile ICBMs in 2017: the Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated KN-20) and Hwasong-15 (KN-22). North Korea began test launching the larger Hwasong-17 (KN-28) ICBM in 2022. In April, July, and December 2023, North Korea tested its solid-fueled ICBM, the Hwasong-18. In October 2024, North Korea tested the solid-fueled Hwasong-19North Korea tested the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19 solid-fueled ICBMs in 2023 and 2024, respectively. In October 2025, North Korea unveiled the solid-fueled Hwasong-20, which the DPRK does not appear to have yet flight tested. North Korea's intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) may have the range to target Guam and other U.S. forces in the region. North Korea's IRBMs include the liquid-fueled Hwasong-12, which North Korea last tested in 2022, and the solid-fueled Hwasong-16, last tested in 2025, which one U.S. official said in congressional testimony in April 2025 could "deliver a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America." In 2025, DIA assessed that the DPRK had "10 or fewer" ICBMs and that it could possess 50 ICBMs by 2035.

North Korea's intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) include the liquid-fueled Hwasong-12, which North Korea last tested in 2022, and the solid-fueled Hwasong-16. In 2025, North Korea said it conducted a test of a Hwasong-16B IRBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload. Such technology could offer greater maneuverability than conventionally armed ballistic missiles, though some analysts have said that North Korea's HGV technology is in an early stage of development.

Short- and Medium-Range Missiles

North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) pose the most acute near-term threats to, which may be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, could target South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in the region. North Korea's solid-fueled SRBMs have "exhibited aerodynamic flight at lower altitudes and in-flight manoeuvres while entering serial production," according to a 2024 UN Panel of Experts report. Some missile systems may be armed with a conventional or a nuclear warhead; the UN Panel of Experts report stated that North Korea "relies on warhead ambiguity to increase its deterrence." In 2025, North Korea has conducted at least three SRBM tests to date, in January, March, and May.

In the MRBM category, the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) is a solid-fueled missile capable of carrying a nuclear or conventional payload. North Korea fires the missile from a tracked vehicle, which gives the system mobility and thereby complicates prelaunch targeting of the system.

North Korea has committed to expanding the power of its precision-guided tactical weapons. The KN-23 SRBM has the potential to strike locations throughout the Korean Peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear payload and uses a solid propellant. The KN-24 SRBM is a tactical system with a mobile launcher, solid propellant, and relatively large payload. The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile in that while its design resembles that of a guided artillery rocket, it is also reportedly capable of matching the range and destructive effects of an SRBM.

North Korea's progress with developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an effort to diversify its ballistic missile forces. The Pukgugsong-3 (KN-26) SLBM was successfully tested beginning in 2019 and is designed to carry a nuclear warhead, according to a 2021 DIA report. North Korea has since revealed the Pukguksong-4, -5, and -6. SomeAccording to the 2026 ATA, North Korea is "investing in nuclear-capable systems to deter the U.S., challenge regional missile defenses, and hold targets in South Korea at risk."

The Hwasong-11A (KN-23) SRBM has the potential to strike locations throughout the Korean Peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear payload and uses a solid propellant. The KN-25 SRBM blurs the line between rocket and missile in that while its design resembles that of a guided artillery rocket, it is reportedly capable of matching the range and destructive effects of an SRBM. In the MRBM category, the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) is a solid-fueled missile launched from a tracked vehicle, which provides the system mobility and survivability.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)

North Korea's efforts to develop SLBMs suggest an effort to diversify its ballistic missile forces. The DPRK tested the Pukgugsong-3 (KN-26), an SLBM reportedly designed to carry a nuclear warhead, in 2019. North Korea has since revealed the Pukguksong-4, -5, and -6. Some analysts have questioned whether North Korea's development of submarines has kept pace with that of its SLBMs.

Missile Technology Development

In its report on the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026, North Korea committed to "upgrading the conventional weapons possessed by our army" and to "accelerate the deployment of already-developed new-type weapons for action." The report highlighted weapons technology programs it said were underway, including the development of attack drones, anti-satellite weapons, and SLBMs.

North Korea has tested ballistic missile payloads and warheads that could complicate missile defenses. In 2025, North Korea said it tested a Hwasong-16B IRBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload and reportedly unveiled a variant of the KN-23 SRBM, the Hwasong-11E, that may be armed with an HGV payload. Such technology could offer greater maneuverability than conventionally armed missiles, though some analysts have said that analysts have questioned whether North Korea's development of submarines has kept pace with that of its SLBMs.

CRS Products

CRS Report R45056, CRS Products and Experts on North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin

CRS In Focus IF12760, Russia-North Korea Relations, by Andrew S. Bowen, Mark E. Manyin, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin

CRS In Focus IF10246, U.S.-North Korea Relations, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin

CRS Report R45033, Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin

CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack

North Korea's development of HGVs is at an early stage. Additionally, in April 2026, North Korea tested ballistic missiles armed with cluster munition warheads.

North Korea has prioritized development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payloads that would allow a single ballistic missile to carry multiple warheads. North Korea reportedly conducted an unsuccessful test of an MIRV-armed ballistic missile in June 2024. Some observers have stated that North Korea's tests of what it has called a "newly upgraded" solid rocket motor in 2025 and 2026, one that may be used on the Hwasong-20, could support North Korea's development of ballistic missiles armed with multiple warheads.