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Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Diplomatic Talks and U.S. Policy

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Russia's War Against Ukraine: Diplomatic Talks and U.S. Policy
Updated September 5, 2025May 22, 2026 (IN12534)

Russia The Russian Federation (Russia) launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. More than three-and-a-halffour years later, Russia and Ukraine remain engaged in Europe's largest war in scope and scale since World War II. With estimates ranging from up to 1.3 million to 1.8With estimates of over 1 million killed or wounded to date, and with Russia in control of about 20% of Ukraine's territory, neither side appears poised to achieve a decisive military victory.

Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump has made efforts to facilitate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, which he has characterized as a "horrific and brutal conflict" that "should have never started." In August 2025, President Trump held separate meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as a multilateral meeting with Zelensky and several European leaders. President Trump also has called for Putin and Zelensky to meet. Members of Congress may evaluate the costs and benefits of, and prospects for,The second Trump Administration has engaged in efforts to facilitate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. Building on prior discussions in 2025, Russian, Ukrainian, and U.S. officials met for the first time in a trilateral format in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in January 2026. Subsequent U.S.-mediated talks followed in February 2026 in Abu Dhabi and Geneva, Switzerland. The United States, European states, Ukraine, and Russia have continued talks in a variety of formats, but formal talks between Russia and Ukraine have not resumed since the start of U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026. Members of Congress may evaluate the prospects for, and potential costs and benefits of, continued U.S. mediation between Russia and Ukraine, including implications for U.S. strategic interests.

Aspects of Negotiations

Talks have addressed or may address a number ofvarious issues, including the following:

  • Ceasefire or Comprehensive Settlement. August 2025 talks centered in part on the question of. Contours of a Potential Peace Settlement. U.S. talks with Russia and Ukraine in 2025 centered in part on whether negotiations should seek to achieve an interimsecure a sustained ceasefire prior to a comprehensive peace settlement. Ukrainian officials have long expressed support for an initiala sustained ceasefire. Russian officials have said talks should instead focus on achieving a comprehensive settlement, includingexpressed preference for a comprehensive settlement, which for Russia would optimally include neutrality for Ukraine and, constraints on Ukrainian military power.
    After initial talks in March 2025, the White House announced agreement on a partial ceasefire, but the agreement did not hold. Before his August meeting with Putin, , and occupation of additional Ukrainian territory that Russia claims to have annexed but does not control.

    In an August 2025 meeting with President Trump in Alaska, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly proposed a ceasefire along the line of contact in two of Ukraine's southern regions, if Ukraine transferred to Russia populated areas of the eastern Donetsk region. Ukrainian authorities rejected this proposal, maintaining (among other reasons) that the transfer of this heavily fortified "fortress belt" would greatly diminish Ukraine's ability to defend itself from further Russian aggression.

    President Trump stated he would not "be happy if I walk away without some form of a ceasefire." In his subsequent meeting with Zelensky, President Trump said he likes "the concept of a ceasefire" but "we can work ... on a peace deal while they're fighting."
  • The Status of Russian-Occupied Ukrainian Territory. Ukraine lays claim to all its internationally recognized territory (Figure 1). The Russian government claims to have annexed most of the Ukrainian territory it occupies, as well as some areas not under Russian control. Prior to the August 2025 meetings, President Trump said there would "be some land swapping going on" but that Ukraine would have to "make that decision." In his meeting with President Trump, Putin reportedly proposed a ceasefire along the line of contact in two of Ukraine's southern regions, if Ukraine transferred to Russia areas of the eastern Donetsk region still under Ukrainian control.
  • Security Guarantees Security Guarantees for Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have sought guarantees against further Russian aggression, including, for example, through the deployment of Western peacekeeping forces and closer integration with NATO and the European Union. President Trump and other Administration officials have expressed the view that NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic but alsowhile indicating support for the provision of European-led security guarantees for Ukraine. Some reports indicate the United States may consider providing air defense and intelligence support in furtherance of such guarantees. During the August 2025 multilateral meeting President Trump stated, "I'm optimistic that collectively we can reach [a security] agreement that would deter any future aggression against Ukraine ... the European nations are going to take a lot of the burden, we're going to help them and we're going to make it very secure." Related discussions are ongoing.
  • Security Assistance to Ukraine. Ukrainians view the ability to defend themselves as a critical element of a sustainable ceasefire or peace agreement. In July 2025, the Department of Defense (DOD) reportedly paused previously committed security assistance to Ukraine as part of what DOD referred to as a "capability review to ensure U.S. military aid aligns with our defense priorities" (an earlier assistance pause occurred in March). According to DOD, President Trump soon directed the resumption of weapons shipments to Ukraine. From May to August 2025, DOD announced approval of an estimated $2.32 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine. In July 2025, President Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced an agreement whereby NATO allies are to fund purchases from U.S. defense companies for Ukraine.
  • Sanctions and Related Measures, potentially with U.S. involvement. Ukraine's leadership has asked the United States to pledge support for such guarantees in the event of a postwar agreement; U.S. authorities reportedly have indicated that Ukraine and Russia should first reach an agreement. The precise nature and form of potential guarantees remains uncertain.

    Security Cooperation. The Trump Administration has not publicly announced new security assistance to Ukraine, although it has continued to provide previously committed assistance. In 2025, the United States launched the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative with NATO allies, whereby the latter are funding the transfer of U.S.-sourced defense articles to Ukraine. As of March 2026, NATO allies and partners had contributed more than $4.1 billion in PURL-related assistance.

    In April 2026, a U.S. defense official said the United States is "prepared to continue helping through initiatives like PURL, but this support must not rely on significant U.S. contributions." Some NATO and European officials reportedly have expressed concern that U.S. military operations against Iran could lead to procurement shortages and delays that may affect assistance to Ukraine.

    Ukraine has pursued new defense agreements seeking to leverage its defense expertise, particularly in drone and anti-drone warfare. These include cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, among others.

    Sanctions
    Against Russia.
    As of August 2025, Previously established U.S. sanctions on Russia generally have remained in place during the Trump Administration. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has listed some new entities for sanctions, most notably (in October 2025) Russia's two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, and several subsidiaries.

    After the start of U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran, to help stabilize oil markets, the Treasury Department issued two General Licenses (GLs) authorizing for 30 days transactions "ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products" of Russian origin "loaded on any vessel" on or before the date the GLs were issued (initially to Indian ports and then worldwide, excluding transactions involving Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Russia-occupied areas of Ukraine). The second of these licenses has been extended twice; GL134C currently authorizes such transactions for products loaded on or before April 17, 2026, through June 17, 2026.

    Prisoners, Detainees, and Forcibly Transferred Populations. Talks have addressed the exchange of prisoners of war, the remains of deceased persons,
    U.S. sanctions on Russia established prior to President Trump's inauguration remained in place. President Trump periodically has expressed readiness to impose additional sanctions on Russia if it does not cease attacks against Ukraine or conclude a peace agreement. On July 14, President Trump stated the United States would impose "secondary tariffs" on Russia "if we don't have a deal in 50 days" (he later shortened the deadline).
  • On August 6, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14329, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation." The E.O. establishes a 25% tariff on imports from India for "currently directly or importing Russian Federation oil" (on top of an existing 25% tariff). The White House stated the E.O. also establishes "a process for the potential imposition of similar tariffs on other countries" (e.g., China).
  • Prisoners, detainees, and forcibly transferred populations. Talks between Russia and Ukraine have addressed the exchange of prisoners of war and deceased persons and the release of Ukrainian civilian detainees and forcibly transferred populations, including children.

Potential Considerations for Congress

Members of Congress may assess the costs and benefits of potential outcomes of U.S.-mediated negotiations and the likelihood of a sustainable ceasefire or peace agreement. Members may evaluate the potential impact of negotiations on other U.S. policy interests, including relations with NATO allies and strategic challenges posed by China.

The Trump Administration and Congress may assess whether and on what terms to provide continued support to Ukraine alongside U.S. allies. For FY2026, Congress authorized $400 million in security assistance to Ukraine, increasing appropriations by an identical amount for "European capacity building" security cooperation programs. U.S. allies. Congress may authorize, appropriate, restrict, or conduct oversight onover further assistance to Ukraine, as well as any possible support for a potential peacekeeping mission to Ukraine. Members of Congress also may (e.g., H.R. 2913; S. 2592). Members of Congress may conduct oversight of U.S. sanctions on Russia or consider the use of legislation (e.g., S. 1241/H.R. 2548; S. 2904; S. 3513; H.R. 6856) to maintain, strengthen, or lift sanctions on Russia.

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Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: CRS, using data from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats Project, Global Administrative Areas, and ESRIEsri.