U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview

Updated August 26, 2025February 26, 2026 (IF12990)

Since 2018, the U.S. government has imposed a series of tariffs on imports from the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) with the stated intention of addressing U.S. concerns about PRC trade practices and foreign policies. Since January 2025, the Trump Administration's trade policy and tariff actions have maintained a focus on China among other countries. Some actions explicitly target China; others involve sectors that affect China. The PRC (Figure 1). China has responded to U.S. tariffs with its own tariffs and market restrictions. Given the trade imbalance (China exports to the United States more than four times what it imports), China has fewer goods on which to raise tariffs. In that context, China has focused its tariffs on top U.S. exports and turned to nontariff measures. It has canceled orders, implemented export controls on some production inputs, and imposed market restrictions on some U.S. firms. Both sides have exempted some products from tariffs. Members of Congress may consider whether to support, modify, or oppose the Administration's approach to tariffs; whether to sustain, expand, or pull back trade authorities Congress delegated to the President; and whether to require approval by Congress for trade deals that result in tariff changes.

Escalating Tariff Rates

By mid-April 2025, U.S. and PRC average tariff rates on the other country's goods were about 164% and 146%, respectively (not accounting for tariff exemptions). Average tariff rates fell to 49% (U.S.) and 31% (PRC) in mid-May 2025 when both sides agreed to reduce "reciprocal tariffs" to 10% for 90 days during tariff negotiations, and, in mid-August extended this interim rate until November 10, 2025. Most U.S. tariff actions on China are cumulative (Table 1).

• U.S. tariffs: In 2017, the average U.S. tariff rate on PRC goods was about 2.7%. The rate rose to about 19% by 2023 with tariffs imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §2411 and §1862 as amended). In 2025, the rate rose to about 73% in early April after U.S. tariffs on China increased by 20% and 34%. The rate then rose to about 164% in mid-April in response to China's counter tariffs (with some exemptions for top imports).
• PRC tariffs: In 2017, China's average tariff rate on U.S. goods was about 8%. The rate rose to about 21% by 2023 and to about 55% on April 2, 2025, and 146% in mid-April as China responded with counter tariffs.

In 2024, China was the fourth-largest U.S. goods trading partner (total trade was $582.5 billion), the fourth-largest U.S. export market ($143.5 billion), and the third-largest source of U.S. imports ($438.9 billion). In 2024, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $295.4 billion. China is a top U.S. export market for aircraft, agriculture, semiconductor chips/equipment, gas turbines, and medical devices, and a top source of U.S. consumer goods and production inputs.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) to impose tariffs, affecting some tariffs the United States imposed on China in 2025 (see "IEEPA (2025-2026)"). U.S. and PRC officials have been in talks since 2025 but have not reached a tariff deal. Members of Congress may consider whether to support, modify, or oppose the Administration's approach to tariffs; sustain, expand, or pull back trade authorities Congress delegated to the President; and require approval by Congress for trade deals that result in tariff changes. See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations; CRS In Focus IF12125, Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal; CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors; and CRS In Focus IF12666, Section 301 and China: Shipping and Shipbuilding Issues.

Escalating Tariff Rates

As of February 20, 2026, U.S. and PRC average tariff rates on the other country's goods were about 34% (U.S.) and 31% (PRC), not accounting for exemptions and Section 232 actions, and rates weighted for trade flows (Table 1). Table 1. U.S.-China Two-Way Average Tariffs (%)

2017

2023

2025

2026

Mar.

April

May

Nov.

Feb.

U.S.

2.7

19

39

73 then 164

49

39

34

PRC

8

21

21

55 then 146

31

31

31

After two-way tariff rates reached a high of 164% (U.S.) and 146% (PRC) in mid-April 2025, average rates fell to 49% (U.S.) and 31% (PRC) in May and August 2025, when both sides reduced "reciprocal tariffs" to 10% for 90 days. In November 2025, U.S. average tariff rates on China fell to 39% when the United States reduced the fentanyl tariff to 10% and both sides extended their tariff truce for one year. In 2023, the average U.S. tariff rate on China rose to about 19% with tariffs imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §2411 and §1862 as amended). China's average tariff rate on U.S. goods was about 21% by 2023 as it responded with counter-tariffs. Most U.S. and PRC tariff actions are cumulative.

U.S. Tariff Actions and PRC Responses

Section 301 (2018, 2024, 2025)

Authority: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411). Addresses unfair trade barriers.

Industrial Policies: In 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) found that the PRCChina engaged in forced technology transfer, cyber-enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property and trade secrets, discriminatory and nonmarket licensing practices, and state-funded strategic acquisitions of U.S. assets. USTR imposed tariffs at rates from 7.5% to 25% on about $370 billion worth of U.S. imports from China. China countered with tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. trade. Most tariffs remain in effect with some exclusions.

In 2020, the United States and the PRCChina signed what both sides referred to ascalled a Phase One trade deal. It addressed some but did not resolve many of the issues USTR had raised. The deal also sought to address the U.S. trade deficit with China with a purchasing deal.As part of the deal, China agreed to purchase during 2020 and 2021 at least $200 billion of goods above a 2017 baseline amount of U.S. agriculture (+$32 billion), energy (+$52.4 billion), manufactured goods (+$77.7 billion), and services (+$37.9 billion). As of 2021, China fell short of its commitments by 60%, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. At his confirmation hearing in January 2025, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said he would push to enforce the PRC's purchase commitments.

In May 2024, USTR extended most 2018 tariffs and raised tariffs by an additional 25% to 100% on some goods (e.g., electric vehicles/batteries, medical products, ship-to-shore cranes, semiconductors, solar cells, steel, and aluminum).

Semiconductors: In December 2024, USTR initiated an investigation on PRC policies in mature-node chips and their effects on critical industries, and silicon carbide substrates/wafers used in chip production.

Shipping/Shipbuilding: In 2025, USTR determined PRC practices to be "actionable" and proposed port equipment tariffs and fees for using PRC-built ships.

Section 201: Solar (2018)

Authority: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2251). Protect U.S. industry against import surges.

In 2018, the United States imposed tariff-rate quotas on imports of crystalline solar photovoltaic cells and modules (including from China) to counter import surges and subsidies. Imports above the first 5 gigawatts of cells each year are subject to a 14% tariff until February 2026.

Section 232 (2018, 2025 In October 2025, USTR initiated an investigation of China's implementation of the 2020 Phase One deal. In November 2025, USTR extended certain tariff exclusions for one year.

Semiconductors: In December 2025, USTR determined PRC policies and practices on mature-node chips and silicon carbide substrates/wafers to be "actionable" and proposed an initial 0% tariff rate until June 2027.

Shipping/Shipbuilding: In 2025, USTR determined PRC practices to be "actionable" and proposed port equipment tariffs and fees for using PRC-built ships. China retaliated with similar measures. In November 2025, both sides halted such actions for one year.

Section 232 (2018, 2025-2026)

Authority: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). . National security effects of U.S. imports. Investigations precede decisions on tariffs decisions on tariffs. The actions are taken on global imports. Some countries negotiated lower rates as part of tariff trade agreements.

Steel and Aluminum: In 2018, then-President Trump imposed tariffs on most steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) imports, including from China, to address PRC trade practices and excess capacitydistorting global markets. China retaliated by raising tariffs on aluminum waste/scrap (49%) and on pork, fruits, and nuts (20%). In March 2025, President Trump raised aluminum tariffs to 25%, expanded the scope of products, and ended country exemptions. In June 2025, he raised steel and aluminum tariffs to 50%. China is the top U.S. source of steel items and the 2^nd-largest source of aluminum.

Automobiles and Parts: In 2^nd-largest U.S. aluminum supplier. Cars, Light Trucks, and Parts: In March 2025, March 2025, President Trump announced 25% tariffs on imports of cars, light trucks, and parts, with some offsets for parts used for U.S. production of finished vehiclesimposed a 25% tariff with some offsets. China is the 3^rd -largest U.S. supplier of auto parts.

Copper: In July 2025, President Trump imposed a 50% tariff on semi-finished copper importssemifinished copper. China is the seventh9^th-largest U.S. source of copper/copper items.

Semiconductors: In April 2025, President Trump initiated an investigation of imports of semiconductors, equipment, and derivative products. China produces, Equipment, and Derivative Products: In January 2026, President Trump imposed a 25% tariff on advanced chips with most imports exempted. China makes about 30% of the world's mature-node semiconductors.

Heavy Trucks and Parts: In November 2025, President Trump imposed a 25% tariff (and a 10% tariff on buses). China is a top U.S. source of industrial trailers and buses.

Critical Minerals: In January 2026, President Trump directed negotiations with other countries in lieu of tariffs. China controls a large share of global processing.

Ongoing Section 232 investigations (initiation date):

Pharmaceuticals and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) (April 2025). An estimated 80% of global drug production depends on API from China.

Aircraft, Jet Engines, Parts (May 2025). China is the 9^th-largest U.S. source for such items.

Drones (July 2025). China is the 2^nd-largest U.S. source for these items.

Polysilicon (July 2025). China is the 6^th-

Pharmaceuticals: In April 2025, President Trump initiated an investigation of all imports of pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients (API). An estimated 80% of global drug production depends on API from China.

Critical Minerals: In April 2025, President Trump opened an investigation of all imports of critical minerals. China controls a large share of global processing (e.g., rare earth elements [90%], nickel [75%], copper [40%]).

Trucks: In April 2025, President Trump opened an investigation of all imports of heavy trucks. China is a top source of trailers and work trucks for factories/warehouses.

Aircraft: In May 2025, President Trump opened an investigation of all imports of aircraft, jet engines, and parts. China is the 10^th largest U.S. source for these items.

Drones: In July 2025, President Trump opened an investigation on all imports of drones. China is the 2^nd largest U.S. source for these items.

Polysilicon: In July 2025, President Trump opened an investigation on all imports of polysilicon. China is the 4^th largest U.S. source for these items.

Wind Turbines: In August 2025, President Trump opened an investigation on wind turbine imports. China is the 10^th (turbines) and 4^th (blades) largest U.S. source of such items.

IEEPA (2025largest U.S. source for these items. Between 2018 and 2025, the United States imposed tariff-rate quotas on crystalline solar photovoltaic cells and modules under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2251). Wind Turbines (August 2025). China is the 3^rd-largest U.S. source of turbine blades.

Medical Supplies, Equipment (Sept. 2025). China is among the top 8 U.S. suppliers for some items.

Robotics and Industrial Machinery: (Sept. 2025) China is in the top 7 U.S. suppliers of industrial robots.

IEEPA (2025-2026)

Authority: International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.). Emergency national security threats). Emergency national security threats. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use the IEEPA to impose tariffs. President Trump lifted such tariffs and imposed a 10% global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132). The de minimis trade action is in effect.

U.S. Border (Immigration, Fentanyl): In February 2025, President Trump announced a 10% tariff (raised to 20% in March 2025 and lowered to 10% in November 2025) on ) on all U.S. imports from China and ended de minimis treatment (an exemption of tariffs, fees, and taxes for goods valued at $800 or less), after declaring the PRCChina had not taken decisive actions to address its role in fentanyl and synthetic opioids trade. The PRCChina retaliated with 10%-15% tariffs on U.S. autos, agricultural machinery, coal, and liquefied natural gas. It launched an antitrust action against U.S.-based Google and imposed market restrictions on U.S.-based Illumina and export controls on some chemicals.

natural gas; targeted U.S. firms in some antitrust actions and market restrictions; and imposed export controls on chemicals.

Trade Deficit: In April 2025, President Trump announced a 34% tariff on U.S. imports from China. The PRCChina met U.S. tariffs, and; a two-way tariff escalation raised tariffs to 125%. U.S. exemptions include electronics and goods subject to Section 232 actions. The PRC exempted some strategic goods while it with some exceptions. China restricted rare earth exports, initiated antidumping and antitrust actions, delayed some purchases of U.S. agriculture and aircraft, and listed some U.S. firms as "unreliable" and subject to export and market restrictionsU.S. aircraft and agricultural purchases, and added some U.S. firms to export control and "unreliable entity" lists. In May 2025, both sides reduced the rate to 10% for 90 days (extended throughin November 10, 20252025 for a year). China agreed to lift some nontariff retaliatory actions against the United States.

Venezuela: In March 2025, President Trump authorized the Secretary of State to designate and subject countries, including China, that import Venezuela's oil to 25% tariffs. China was the second-largest importer of oil from Venezuela in 2024.

Figure 1. U.S.-PRC Tariff Actions Since 2018 *

Source: CRS, based on public reporting. Note: Some PRC tariff and nontariff actions are not included.