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The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization established in 1995in 1995 following the ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and today includes 166 members. It. The WTO succeeded the 1947 General AgreementAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was created as part of the U.S.- and Europe-led post-WorldWorld War II effort to build a stable, open global trading system. The WTO's basic functions include: , and rules-based global trading system. GATT/WTO membership expanded over time, and today the WTO's 166 members, including the United States, collectively account for 98% of global trade. The WTO's basic functions include administering its trade agreements; serving as a negotiating forum for trade liberalization and rules; and providing a dispute settlement (DS) process to resolve disputesprocess. WTO agreements covercover trade in goods, agriculture, and services; remove tariff and nontariff barriers; and establish rules on governmentrules on practices relating to trade (e.g., , such as trade remedies, technicaltechnical barriers to trade (TBT), intellectual property rights (IPR), government procurement). The agreementsand subsidies. The agreements are based on the core principles of nondiscrimination of nondiscrimination—most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment, fair competition, and transparency. (MFN) and national treatment—transparency, and fair competition. WTO rules also include exceptions, WTO rules also allow for exceptions, such as allowing preferential treatment/ for free trade agreement partners and flexibilities for developing countries.
The GATT/WTO system over time has led to a significant reduction ofhas reduced trade barriers, supported global trade expansion and economic growth, and helped manage trade frictions. At the same time, the WTO faces serious challenges. WTO members have struggled to reach consensus and negotiate a comprehensive round of major trade liberalization and new rules since 1994. Concurrently, some members are increasingly using discriminatory measures and industrial policies that may violate both the letter and spirit of core trade rules. Further, members have struggled to respond to trade-related and supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war in Ukraine, and conflict in the Middle East. Several WTO members and observers are concerned that the WTO is losing relevance due to its inability to adapt to the modern global economy. As a result, WTO members are considering various reforms to the institution in attempts to safeguard and improve it.
. One key concern of WTO members and observers is that the WTO is losing relevance due to its inability to adapt to the modern global economy. For decades, members have struggled to negotiate a successful round of major trade liberalization since 1994. In recent years, many have increasingly resorted to measures that may violate core trade rules. Moreover, challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine, have disrupted global trade and supply chains and prompted trade-related responses. WTO members are considering various reforms to the institution in attempts to safeguard and improve it.
In statute, Congress has recognized the WTO as the "foundation of the global trading system" and has a legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. Some Members have expressed support for WTO reforms, new rules, and U.S. leadership (e.g., 118th Cong., S.Res. 202, S. 446). Others have criticized the WTO and oppose U.S. participation (e.g., H.J.Res 93). The Trump Administration has expressed skepticism over the WTO's value, asserting a lack of reciprocity in WTO members' trade concessions. Some WTO members contend that U.S. tariff actions run counter to WTO rules and undermine the trading system. Congress has recognized the WTO as the "foundation of the global trading system" and has a legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. Some Members have expressed support for WTO reforms, new rules, and U.S. leadership in the WTO. Others have criticized the WTO and opposed U.S. participation.
Postexpressed skepticism toward the WTO, criticized the lack of reciprocity in WTO members' trade concessions, and significantly increased U.S. tariffs. The Administration has also withheld U.S. contributions to the WTO's annual budget for the first time, as it conducts a broader review of U.S. participation in international organizations. Amid debate over the WTO's future, key issues facing Congress include the effect of WTO agreements on the U.S. economy, outcomes of reform and negotiation efforts, and the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO.
The Doha Development Agenda, the most recent "round" of multilateral WTO negotiations (Table 1), was launched in 2001, but effectively ended in a stalemate in 2015 with no clear path forward (Table 1)without a package of new agreements. The WTO's diverse membership and the "single undertaking" approach (i.e., nothing is agreed until everything is agreed) made consensus on the broad Doha mandate difficult. These, and these aspects continue to beset WTO talks todaynegotiations. Doha was generally characterized by persistent differences among developed and developing country WTO members across major issues, including market access. Agriculture, where multilateral solutions arguably remain ideal, is among the thorniest issues left on the Doha agenda—see CRS In Focus IF11906, Agriculture in the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12). Doha's legacy may be the successful negotiation of the 2013 Trade Facilitation Agreement, which removes customs obstacles at the border.
|
Year |
Round |
Subjects covered
|
Years
|
Round Subjects Covered |
Members |
|
1947-1961 |
Geneva, Annecy, Torquay, Geneva II, Dillon |
Five rounds of tariff reductions |
23 (1947); |
||
|
1964-1967 |
Kennedy |
Tariffs, antidumping measures |
62 |
||
|
1973-1979 |
Tokyo |
Tariffs, antidumping, subsidies, TBT, government procurement |
102 |
||
|
1986-1994 |
Uruguay |
Tariffs, nontariff measures (NTMs), rules, services, IPR, |
123 |
||
|
2001-2015* |
Doha |
Tariffs, |
142 (2001); |
Source: CRS based on the WTOWorld Trade Organization (WTO) sources.
Note: * In 2015, WTO members The WTO system of agreements also includes plurilateral agreements, which involve a subset of WTO members as participants; various plurilateral talks are ongoing. Plurilateral agreements with U.S. participation include Other plurilaterals include the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement with 131 WTO members, and the Agreement on Electronic Commerce (ECA) with 67 members, both of which concluded in 2024. The United States is not a member of the IFD Agreement but had participated in the e-commerce talks until the Biden Administration withdrew U.S. support in 2023, citing the need for domestic policy space. The United States and many WTO members have generally supported plurilateral deals, particularly where consensus among the broader membership has not been feasible. Some members remain concerned that plurilaterals could marginalize those countries not participating or allow "free riders" to benefit from others' commitments. A few members like India have staunchly opposed plurilateral deals, arguing they should not be incorporated into the WTO legal framework, and acted to prevent the formal adoption of recent agreements like the IFD. USTR Jamieson Greer emphasized the U.S. priority of "exploring a pathway to incorporate plurilaterals into the WTO architecture," assessing without that path, the WTO will no longer be "a viable forum for negotiating." The MC is the WTO's top decisionmaking body; it meets biennially and at times has been an action-forcing event for achieving substantive outcomes. Members held their latest ministerial (MC14) in March 2026. At MC14, members did not announce major outcomes in priority areas or issue a final ministerial declaration. Members sought to clarify a work plan toward WTO reform, bridge differences in agricultural issues, and make progress in the second phase of fisheries talks. For the first time, members were unable to agree to extend the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, which had been periodically renewed since 1998. A proposed deal to extend the moratorium through 2030 was ultimately blocked by Brazil and Turkey; U.S. trade officials expressed disappointment over the outcome. While some saw MC14 as a failure overall, others pointed to "incremental progress" and "key advancements" on issues like the ECA. Key issues facing Congress include the effect of WTO agreements on the U.S. economy, outcomes of negotiations and reform efforts, and the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO. Members have expressed views on WTO negotiating priorities in legislation and urged U.S. engagement and leadership in certain areas. In early 2026, the House Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on advancing U.S. interests at MC14. P.L. 103-465, which implemented the Uruguay Round Agreements, permits periodic congressional review of U.S. participation in the WTO and sets procedures for consideration of a joint resolution to withdraw congressional approval of WTO agreements (§125). In the 119th Congress, such a resolution (H.J.Res. 93) was introduced; no action was taken. Negotiating Agenda. WTO members' ability to negotiate rules is central to WTO legitimacy, but some observers have asserted "hostage-taking" tactics, and consensus requirements have often stymied progress. Some issues, such as agricultural subsidies and public stockholding programs for food security, remain contentious and unresolved from Doha. Some WTO members are concerned about such issues getting deprioritized for newer priorities. For example, with the emergence of new trade barriers, global supply chains, and technology advances since 1995, countries have sought to address "21st century" issues like digital trade, state-owned enterprises, and climate change. At the same time, U.S. officials contend that WTO rules were not designed to effectively handle the challenges of China's statist trade practices and stress the limitations of the WTO's negotiating function to address systemic issues like overcapacity in production and supply chain resilience. WTO Reform. WTO members have agreed to advance reforms and have committed "to improve all [WTO] functions" through a "Member-driven, open, transparent, inclusive" process, but they continue to debate a structured work plan. Long-standing U.S. priorities include improving transparency and WTO members' compliance with existing notification requirements (e.g., for subsidies), and putting conditions on the use of special and differential treatment by developing countries, especially significant commercial players. The Trump Administration circulated papers in the WTO in 2025 and 2026 with its stance on needed reforms. While many WTO members share certain U.S. concerns, approaches to solutions differ and remain contentious, particularly for DS reform. The first Trump Administration and successive Administrations blocked appointments to the WTO's Appellate Body (AB), arguing the AB exceeded its authority and engaged in "judicial overreach" in panel decisions. This led the body to fall below its quorum and cease to function in 2019. Some WTO members, including Canada, China, and the EU, agreed to the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement to hear appeals in their disputes. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about WTO DS. Many observers question the DS system's sustainability given WTO members' inability to agree to reforms and negotiate new agreements. failed to reaffirmdid not reaffirm Doha's mandates.
Plurilateral Initiatives
Ministerial Conference (MC) Outcomes
Ongoing Challenges
Doha's mandates.
The MC is the WTO's top decisionmaking body, and the MC biennial meeting is generally seen as an action-forcing event. WTO members held their latest ministerial (MC13) in February 2024, with the next scheduled for March 2026. Members did not announce major outcomes, but sought to take stock of progress and build on achievements reached in 2022 at MC12, which many observers had viewed as boosting the WTO's credibility. MC12 outcomes included a limited multilateral agreement on fisheries subsidies, which commits members to curb certain harmful subsidies. The deal, which was subject to prolonged talks since 2001, was notable as the only current multilateral negotiation within the WTO and first to cover sustainability issues. Members have continued talks on issues left out of the deal—see CRS In Focus IF11929, World Trade Organization Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations. Other MC12 decisions involved WTO responses to emergencies, food insecurity, and pandemics.
In 2024 at MC13, after overcoming opposition of India and some others, WTO members agreed to extend a moratorium on e-commerce duties until 2026. Members also sought to clarify roadmaps toward WTO reform, including on DS, and bridge persistent differences in agriculture and in the second phase of fisheries talks, which ultimately had failed to conclude. Members formally approved the accessions of Comoros and Timor-Leste as the newest WTO members.
While multilateral efforts have generally progressed slowly, various plurilateral talks among subsets of WTO members are underway. The United States and others support plurilateral deals as a key means to address priority issues on the global trade agenda. Some members are concerned that plurilaterals could marginalize non-participating countries, or allow "free riders" to benefit from others' commitments. Agreements with U.S. membership include
Other plurilateral talks include the Joint Initiative on E-commerce with the United States and over 90 members. In 2023, the Biden Administration withdrew U.S. support for certain provisions under negotiation, citing need for policy space to reconsider domestic regulations and issues like data flows. The United States is also part of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, which focus on trade-related climate measures and environmental goods and services. It remains to be seen what positions the Trump Administration may take on these talks.
Since the Doha Round, WTO members continue to debate a path forward. While MC12 appeared to reenergize efforts and optimism for some, others criticized key issues left aside and slow progress made during 2024. Many WTO members concur that the WTO must reform its negotiating, monitoring, and DS functions to remain effective. The impact of WTO agreements and prospects for ongoing talks remain oversight issues for Congress. In 2024, House Ways and Means held a hearing on advancing U.S. interests at MC13. Members of Congress have expressed views on WTO negotiating priorities in legislation and urged U.S. engagement and leadership in specific areas. P.L. 103-465, which approved and implemented the Uruguay Round Agreements, established procedures by which every five years, Members may consider a joint resolution to withdraw congressional approval of WTO agreements and end U.S. participation (§125). Such a resolution (H.J.Res 93) was introduced on April 10, 2025—see CRS In Focus IF12997, Congressional Review of U.S. Membership in the WTO.
Negotiating Agenda. WTO members' ability to negotiate rules is central to WTO legitimacy, but "hostage-taking" tactics and elusive consensus often stymie progress. Some issues, such as agricultural subsidies and public stock-holding programs, remain contentious and unresolved from the Doha agenda. Further, with the emergence since 1995 of new trade barriers, global supply chains, and technology advances, countries have sought to address "21st century" issues like digital trade, state-owned enterprises, and climate change that pose challenges to the trading system. U.S. officials contend that WTO rules were not designed to effectively handle the challenges of China's statist trade practices. Past U.S. talks with the EU and Japan explored strengthening rules on such issues, e.g., industrial subsidies. Whether Trump officials will prioritize such issues within the WTO or plurilateral efforts is an open question.
COVID-19. Since 2020, WTO members have focused on COVID-19 related global trade and economic disruptions, which tested coordination in trade policies, upset supply chains, and spurred trade protectionism. Many viewed the WTO as playing an important role in tackling the trade challenges and vulnerabilities revealed by the pandemic. WTO members agreed at MC12 to a five-year waiver and clarifications of certain WTO provisions concerning patents and compulsory licenses for COVID-19 vaccines. In 2024, members affirmed "consensus could not be reached" on extending the waiver to diagnostics and therapeutics.
WTO Reform. WTO members have agreed to advance reforms, but have yet to achieve concrete outcomes. WTO members committed "to improve all [WTO] functions" through a process that is "Member-driven, open, transparent, inclusive." U.S. top priorities have included improving WTO transparency and members' compliance with notification requirements, and reforming use of special and differential treatment for developing countries. Many U.S. frustrations are shared by other WTO members, but approaches to solutions differ and remain contentious, particularly for DS reform. Many question the sustainability of the DS system given members' inability to agree to reforms and negotiate new agreements, thus preventing key trade issues from being adjudicated. Successive U.S. Administrations and some Members of Congress have long expressed concerns about DS, alleging "judicial overreach" in panel decisions. The U.S. blocking of Appellate Body appointments led to the body ceasing to function in 2019. In 2020, the EU, China, and other members put into effect an appeal arbitration arrangement to hear their own cases. At MC13, members had reaffirmed the commitment to achieve "a fully and well-functioning" DS system accessible to all WTO members by 2024; this deadline was not met.
Tariffs and Trade Enforcement. Some WTO members and observers are concerned that tariffs imposed since the first Trump Administration and counter-tariffs by U.S. trading partners have strained the WTO and DS system. In this view, unilateral measures, some pursued in the name of national or economic security, could undermine the WTO's credibility and lead to new restrictions. Pandemic-related trade restrictions since 2020 amplified such concerns, though WTO rules permit flexibility for governments to impose temporary measures justified by national security or health crises. U.S. trade officials maintain that a country's "essential security interests" is self-judging and not reviewable by DS panels, despite adverse panel decisions against the United States over its tariffs. Across-the-board tariffs imposed in 2025 by President Trump, could heighten trade frictions and complicate cooperation in the WTO.