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Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have been increasingly challenged to defend againstdefended and repelled Russian advances, givendespite ongoing disadvantages in personnel and a less developedsmaller defense industry. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict (including conducting a drone attack against Russian strategic bombers at four airbases across Russia in June 2025) as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance. Nevertheless, the UAF continues to face obstacles to sustaining momentum against Russian forces, including personnel and equipment losses.
The Biden Administration supported Ukraine's defense of its territorial integrity against Russia's invasion, and since early 2022From FY2022 to FY2024, Congress has enacted five supplemental appropriations measures to provide assistance to Ukraine. In March 2025, the Trump Administration announced a pause and review of further security assistance and intelligence sharing to Ukraine. After negotiations and consultations with Ukraine, the Trump Administration announced it would resume security assistance. The UAF's evolving condition and performance may be of interest to the 119th Congress as Members weigh the impact of U.S. support for the UAF and potentially consider any potential further assistance.
The UAF's overall performance to date has been bolstered, in part, by high levels of recruitment and motivation. High personnel losses and desertion, however, pose continued challenges to the UAF's ability to sustain effective operations.
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered high levels of casualties (data on Ukrainian casualties are sparse, but one estimate places UAF killed as high as 140,000), lowering force quality. In addition, desertion and draft evasion pose continued challenges to the UAF's ability to sustain operations. In January 2026, Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov estimated that 200,000 soldiers were absent without official leave (AWOL) and 2 million men were avoiding draft notices.
After Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine's eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as "the Donbas"). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and the Reserve forcesReserve without the need for lengthy training. This likelyarguably contributed to UAF effectiveness, since Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force quality. In order to replace these losses, the UAF needs new recruits to regenerate forces. The UAF's need for immediate reinforcements creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training. However, the UAF also needs to train personnel to conduct complex operations and employ advanced weaponry in order to sustain combat operations. UAF officials say they have the capacity and capability to conduct new recruit training inside Ukraine.
Currently, the UAF also is experiencing recruitment challenges. Reportedly, the average Ukrainian soldier is around 40 years old, and some recruits often have health or substance abuse issues. Some reports indicate that recruitment officials also are resorting to more coercive methods. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to address some recruitment issues (including allowing some prisoners to serve in exchange for a reduced sentence) but continues to reject calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18 because of public opposition to lowering the age.
In February 2025, the UAF implemented a new option for volunteers between the ages of 18 and 24 to sign one-year contracts in return for higher wages, a signing bonus, exemption from mobilization for 12 months, and other social benefits. While this option initially drew some interest, the UAF has struggled to recruit and retain younger recruits, and reports indicate recruitment officials have sometimes turned to more coercive methods. In February 2025, the UAF implemented a new option for volunteers between the ages of 18 and 24 to sign one-year contracts in return for higher wages, a signing bonus, exemption from mobilization for 12 months, and other social benefits. UAF officials have reported a high level of initial sign-ups in responseMany initial volunteers have been killed or wounded since 2022. Reportedly, the average Ukrainian soldier is over 40 years old, and some recruits have health or substance abuse issues. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to address some recruitment issues. However, the government continues to reject some calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18, a policy that would likely meet with public opposition.
Training
To replace losses, recruiting and training new personnel remain key tasks. The UAF faces a dilemma in seeking to adequately train new recruits amid demands to provide immediate reinforcements. Ukrainian officials have instituted new training standards, including centralized training centers and an increase in basic training to 1.5 months (up from one month). Despite improvements, most training for new recruits happens in their respective units. This arguably contributes to differing levels of capability across the UAF, as some more elite units prioritize training and provide quality instructors.
Additionally, the UAF reportedly struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet-era or Russian equipment and has sustained significant equipment losses during the course of the war. The UAF has exhibited resilience in the face of such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and concerted UAF maintenance efforts. The diversity of systems, continued losses, and varied supply, however, undermine UAF standardization. Ukrainian officials assert Western security assistance remains critical for supporting UAF operations. Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian equipment (especially artillery and ammunition) and relies on security assistance for a variety of key systems, such as air defense and medium-range strike capabilities. Low supplies of artillery systems and ammunition have forced the UAF to adapt to other systems such as drones. Alongside Western security assistance, Ukraine's domestic defense industry has increased production and continues to innovate. Ukraine currently produces a wide range of systems, including drones (tactical and long-range strike), missiles, artillery systems, radar and electronic warfare, ammunition, and armored vehicles. Ukrainian officials maintain that a robust and capable domestic defense industry is essential to Ukraine's long-term security and for reducing the country's reliance on security assistance. According to one Ukrainian estimate, as much as 76% of the weapons and equipment the UAF needs is now produced domestically. Ukraine's defense industry still faces multiple challenges, including accusations of corruption and fraud, labor shortages, and Russian strikes. Additionally, Ukraine's defense industry has excess capacity but not enough government funding to contract production. In response, Ukraine has sought alternative funding mechanisms—including foreign donors, joint production agreements, foreign investment, and potential exports. TheA lack of trained staff officers has, in some cases, led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to centralized and slower decisionmaking. The UAF has announced organizational changes (such as organizing multiple brigades under the command of a corps) to improvestreamline management and coordination.
Equipment
U.S. and Western Security Assistance
Since the start of Russia's 2022 war, the United States has committed more than $66 management and coordination of its forces.
In February 2025, the UAF suspended the creation of new brigades made up of new recruits to focus on reinforcing existing brigades. The UAF took this decision in response to criticism from Ukrainian officials about the new brigades' poor performance (including desertions and the opening of criminal investigations).
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet-era or Russian equipment. This variety of systems complicates maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has sustained significant equipment losses, apparently leaving some UAF units without mechanized or motorized vehicle support. The UAF has exhibited resilience in the face of such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and concerted UAF maintenance efforts.
Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF almost entirely reliant on Western assistance for artillery systems and ammunition. To date, the UAF has demonstrated an ability to use the qualitative advantages provided by Western security assistance (e.g., long-range precision fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages in artillery.
According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine produces 40% of the equipment and weapons it needs, and the United States supplies 30%. Ukraine's domestic defense industry has increased production but remains unable to meet the country's full wartime demands. International partners are seeking to help Ukraine strengthen its defense industry capacity (including through funding purchase orders and joint production agreements with Western defense companies), thus reducing its reliance on Western security assistance.
Since the start of Russia's 2022 war, the United States has committed almost $67 billion, the EU over $5470 billion, and the UK over $17 billion (among other donors) in security assistance to Ukraine. This support is coordinated by NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (assuming the mission and role of Security Assistance Group—Ukraine) andNSATU), currently led by a U.S. three-star general. Simultaneously, Western officials have repeatedly voiced concerns over potential escalation of the conflict, defense industrial production capacity challenges, and the continued availability of funding to sustain security assistance.
The United States and other allies have provided training and advice to the UAF since before Russia's 2022 invasion. Most training efforts focus on employing Western security assistance, basic infantry skills and unit-level development, and combined arms operations. Currently, the UK (Operation Interflex), the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM), and the United States (the Joint Multinational Training Group—Ukraine) conduct a variety of training programs. Training could grow in importance as the UAF seeks to replace its losses with mobilized personnel.
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision of anti-tank and short-range man-portable air defense systems were critical for Ukraine's resistance to Russia's invasion. As the war has continued, Ukraine's partners have adjusted security assistance to respond to changing conditions and the UAF's evolving needs.
for the UAF.
Equipment
The UAF continues to request a wide range of equipment from the United States and other Western countries, especially advanced weapons such as air defense systems and ammunition, anti-drone capabilities, and fighter support. At the tactical level, the UAF has identified protected mobility (e.g., armored vehicles), tanks, and tactical-levelcounterbattery radars, artillery, and fire support among its needs. Frontline UAF soldiers and commanders have also reportedly have expressed concern about the availability of basic supplies.
The focus of Western security assistance appears to have shifted from donations of existing equipment to financing procurement and investment. In 2024, Ukraine and Denmark reached an agreement (the so-called "Danish Model") to finance equipment purchases from Ukraine's domestic defense industry. Additionally, in 2025, NATO and the United States created the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), through which allies contribute funds to purchase "critical defence equipment" from the United States about the availability of basic supplies. UAF officials express particular concerns about their reliance on Western supplies of artillery ammunition.
Despite improvements in Ukraine's domestic defense industry and growing European production capacity, the UAF remains reliant on the United States for key advanced weapon systems such as air defense, artillery ammunition, and long-range rocket artillery.
The UAF continues to demonstrate high levels of tactical flexibility and capability in the face of Russian quantitative advantages in equipment, air support, and electronic warfarepersonnel, equipment, drones, and air support. The UAF continues to hamper Russian efforts and has thus far stymied any new large-scale Russian breakthrough in Ukraine's Donbas region.
Fighting remains attritional and positional, with the UAF primarily focused on defending the "fortress belt" of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which anchor UAF defenses in the Donbas region. According to U.S. officials, Russia captured 1,865 square miles of Ukrainian territory in 2025, but "nowhere on the front did this equate to more than 60 miles of penetration or any territory of operational significance." The UAF leadershipFighting remains attritional, and Russia's summer offensive appears to be gradually encircling UAF defenses around the cities of Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka in the Donbas region.
The UAF command structure appears more centralized than earlier in the war. While the UAF seeks to adopt NATO-style (mission command) principles of command, it also exhibits traits of Soviet-style (centralized, top-down) command. Some observers and UAF officers have criticized the UAF command for poor communication, micromanagement, and inefficient leadership. The UAF also has been criticized for its strategy of refusing to withdraw from positions, even risking potential encirclement.
The UAF continues to seek Western equipment to replace losses and provide improved capabilities and survivability. Ukrainian officials also note the importance of continued ammunition supplies, especially as fighting remains dominated by artillery. Additionally, the UAF has identified needs in logistics, breaching equipment (e.g., mine clearing), electronic warfare, counter-drone technology, intelligence, and secure communications.
The UAF relies on a core of professional units to conduct operations and respond to Russian advances. However, losses and exhaustion continue to degrade these units' capabilities, as they appear increasingly called to various positions across the front line. Most frontline UAF brigades are understrength and receive ad hoc rotation from the front line. Often, rather than fighting as cohesive formations, sections of units are detached and sent to other units to compensate for losses. Some observers suggest that overreliance on a few units, combined with personnel losses, contributes to Russian advances.
The UAF faces severe infantry shortages and is seeking to recruit more personnel to replace losses and to rotate units from the front line. Training new recruits to replace and expand professional units, as well as officers for staff positions, remains a key objective. The UAF's ability to regenerate and maintain force quality arguably will be critical to its success.
In August 2024, the UAF launched a surprise invasion of Russia's Kursk region, but Russia expelled UAF forces from the region in April 2025. The 2024 Kursk offensive raised questions from some observers about how Ukraine's leadership allocates and prioritizes scarce human and material resources.
These developments may factor into congressional decisions regarding whether and how to support Ukraine's defense. Some observers suggest that sustained Western security assistance is critical for the UAF to avoid a deteriorating situation. Other observers argue that the UAF faces significant hurdles to decisively defeating Russian forces regardless of security assistance.
Ukraine's strategy appears to be centered on limiting Russian territorial advances and imposing more casualties than Russia is able to replace. In January 2026, Ukrainian defense minister Fedorov said a strategic goal was "to kill 50,000 Russians per month." While some reports indicate the UAF has at times succeeded in imposing more casualties than Russia can replace, other observers express skepticism about this strategy given the UAF's own losses. Some observers argue for a greater emphasis on targeting Russian logistics and command centers, but the UAF lacks sufficient medium-range strike capabilities.
Another component of UAF strategy has been to undermine Russia's ability to economically sustain its war by targeting Russian oil production and export facilities.
While the UAF seeks to adopt NATO-style (mission command) principles of command, it also exhibits traits of Soviet-style (centralized, top-down) command. Some observers have criticized the UAF command for poor communication and micromanagement. To improve coordination and maximize resources, the UAF has implemented reforms by establishing corps that control a set number of brigades and are responsible for particular sections of the front line. Some UAF officials report improved coordination, but the process is ongoing; reports indicate some corps are better resourced with personnel and equipment than others.
Recruiting, training, rotating, and retaining troops remain challenges for the UAF. The UAF faces severe infantry shortages and is seeking to recruit more personnel. Most frontline UAF and TDF brigades are understrength and receive ad hoc rotation from the front line. With a porous front line, Russian forces are seeking to identify, bypass, and exploit weak UAF positions.
The UAF relies on a core of professional units to fill gaps in the front line and counter Russian advances. Some observers and UAF officers argue these professional units get priority for personnel and equipment at the expense of other units. Losses and exhaustion also continue to degrade these units' capabilities, as they appear increasingly called to various positions across the front line. Some observers suggest that overreliance on select units, combined with personnel losses, has contributed to Russian advances.