North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

Updated May 23September 26, 2025 (IF10472)

Overview

Over the past decade, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has advanced its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, raising the threat Pyongyang poses to the United States homeland, U.S. allies in East Asia, and U.S. interests. Congress could examine current U.S. policy responses, including the implementation of sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and the impact on U.S. and allied forces.

U.S. policies and multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions have imposed sanctions and called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and eliminate them in a "complete, verifiable and irreversible manner." North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has repeatedly rejected denuclearization negotiations since the most recent talks in 2019 between President Donald Trump and Kim broke down, 2025 (IF10472)

Overview

North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. The country's ballistic missile testing, military parades, and policy statements suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may wish to examine U.S. policy toward North Korea.

U.S. policy as well as UN resolutions call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs. In recent years, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has repeatedly rejected "denuclearization" talks. According to the U.S. intelligence community's 2025 annual threat assessment (ATA), Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as a "guarantor of regime security."

In response, the United States and South Korea have conducted joint military drills and exercises, and established bilateral consultative mechanisms focused on strengthening extended deterrence such as the Nuclear Consultative Group to "discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat the DPRK poses to the global nonproliferation regime." The Biden Administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review said, "Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime." It maintains that U.S. nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in deterring "rapid strategic attacks" by North Korea in East Asia.

Nuclear Doctrine and Plans

Kim Jong Un said at the 2016 Workers' Party Congress that "nuclear weapons of the DPRK " and has "no intention" to renounce them.

Nuclear Doctrine and Plans

North Korean laws and doctrine governing the purpose and employment of nuclear weapons appear to affirm this 2025 ATA assessment. In May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to describe the country as a "nuclear-armed state." The following year, the DPRK People's Assembly adopted a law stipulating that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons "serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows." According to a 2013 law, North Korea's nuclear weapons "can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army [Kim Jong Una position held by Kim] to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes."

At the 8^th North Korean Workers Party Congress in January 2021, Kim announced a Five-Year Defense Plan that said the country would field a new nuclear-capable submarine, develop its A September 2022 law further codified these policies and outlined the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons, which some analysts say lower the threshold for nuclear use. The 2013 law also stated the "DPRK shall take practical steps to bolster up the nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory strike power both in quality and quantity." In January 2021, the DPRK announced a Five-Year Defense Plan to field a new nuclear-capable submarine, develop tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a single missile, and improve its ICBMs' accuracythe accuracy of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), among other goals. The plan also includes development of an ICBM with a range of 15,000 km for "preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike," andas well as ground-based and sea-based solid-fueled ICBMs. Some analysts predict an increase in missile testing this year in order to meet these goals by 2026.

The Korea People's Assembly adopted a new law in September 2022 that reportedly expands the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to include possible first use in situations that threaten the regime's survival. In September 2023, Kim promised to boost nuclear weapons production "exponentially" and diversify nuclear strike options.

Nuclear Testing

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield. North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3, 2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile. In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022. A recent U.S. Department of Defense report said that "North Korea has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing."

Nuclear Material Production

North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons. Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build.

North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is also operating centrifuge uranium enrichment plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at Kangson. In March 2025, the IAEA reported construction and operations at the Yongbyon uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, "undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and Yongbyon," and activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory plant and Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor site. Spent fuel from that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory to extract plutonium for weapons. The IAEA also reported ongoing uranium mining, milling, and concentration activities at Pyongsan.

Nuclear Warheads

North Korean government statements show that the country is aiming to increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads and improve their design for a variety of delivery systems. Some nongovernmental experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads but may have assembled approximately 50. Another goal of a nuclear weapon program is to lower the size and weight of a nuclear warhead for deployment on missiles, called "miniaturization." A July 2017 DIA assessment asserted North Korea had achieved the level of miniaturization required to fit a nuclear device on weapons ranging from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).that North Korea will test missiles at a higher rate later this year in order to meet these goals by 2026. In September 2023, Kim announced that Pyongyang would boost nuclear weapons production "exponentially" and diversify nuclear strike options. In August 2025, Kim said the country was pursuing a "rapid expansion of nuclearization."

Nuclear Material Production

North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons. Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build. After it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, North Korea restarted plutonium production activities at its Yongbyon site. North Korea also operates gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. In June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported continued operations at the Yongbyon uranium centrifuge enrichment plant and "undeclared enrichment facilities" at both Kangson and Yongbyon.

Nuclear Testing

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times, beginning in 2006 at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The underground tests, which were apparently conducted to improve nuclear warhead designs, produced increasing estimated yields. North Korea last conducted a nuclear test on September 3, 2017. North Korea characterized its most recently tested nuclear explosive device as a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) for deployment on an ICBM. In 2018, North Korea announced it had achieved its goals and would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels. IAEA has reported that North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022. A 2025 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report stated, "North Korea has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing."

Nuclear Warheads

According to DPRK government statements and U.S. government assessments, North Korea aims to increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads and improve their design for multiple delivery systems. Some nongovernmental experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads but may have assembled approximately 50. Producing a nuclear warhead suitable for deployment on missiles is a key step in a nuclear weapons program. According to then-Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth's response to the Senate Armed Services Committee, North Korea is "improving miniaturization of warheads." Kim Jong-un in January 2021 said that the country was able to "miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones."

In hisa January 1, 2023, speechspeech, Kim said the country would expand its nuclear arsenal and "mass produce" tactical nuclear weapons. The 2024 ATA said that Kim ordered a , including the mass production tactical nuclear weapons. In March 2023, according to the 2024 ATA, Kim ordered "an increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile and the expansion of weapon[s]-grade nuclear material production" in March 2023. The ATA said that." The 2024 ATA stated, "North Korea also unveiled a purported tactical nuclear warhead and claimed it could be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including an unmanned underwater vehicle and cruise missiles."

Ballistic Missile Testing

Under Kim Jong-un, North Korea has acceleratedaccelerated the pace of its ballistic missile test launches since 2022. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit North Korea's development of the means of delivering conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to the nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions specifically ban "all ballistic missile tests" by North Korea. A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the apogeepeak (or apogee) of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth using earth's gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range (i.e., intermediate range and intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site to the target.

North Korea will likely continue testing and developing a variety of missiles to increase the reliability, effectiveness, and survivability of its ballistic missile force. According to the 2025 ATA, North Korea may be receiving technical expertise from Moscow in exchange for weapons sales, which "could accelerate North Korea's testing and deployment efforts." In his May 2025 congressional testimony, U.S. Forces Korea Commander said, North Korea's inventory comprises both solid-fueled missiles, which offer advantages in maintenance and mobility, and liquid-fueled missiles, which have greater thrust and power than solid propellants.

In developing its ballistic missile forces, North Korea has prioritized capabilities "designed to evade U.S. and regional missile defenses, improve the North's precision strike capabilities, and put U.S. and allied forces at risk," according to the 2025 ATA. A U.S. intelligence official stated in May 2025 congressional testimony that North Korea's ballistic missile tests "signal continued progress toward North Korea's stated defense modernization goal of improving its deterrence threat against the United States."

North Korea continues to test its ballistic missiles to improve their reliability, effectiveness, and survivability. An increase in military cooperation with Russia may accelerate these efforts. In 2025 testimony, the U.S. Forces Korea Commander said that in return for North Korea's assistance in its war against Ukraine, "Russia is expanding sharing of space, nuclear, and missile-applicable technology, expertise, and materials to the DPRK," and that "Russia's expanded cooperation will enable advancements of DPRK's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program across the next three to five years."

Intercontinental Ballisticand Intermediate Range Missiles

North Korea has been improvingadvanced its ability to strike the continental United StatesU.S. homeland with an ICBM through a series of tests, first in 2017, then in 2022, four times in 2023, and most recently in October 2024. The DPRK first successfully test-launchedtested two liquid-propellantfueled, road-mobile ICBMs in 2017: the Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated KN-20) and Hwasong-15 ( (U.S. designated KN-22). North Korea displayed abegan test launching the larger Hwasong-17 (KN-28) ICBM in 2022. In April, July, and December 2023, North Korea tested its solid-fueled ICBM, the Hwasong-18. In October 2024, North Korea tested the solid-fueled Hwasong-19, which one U.S. official said in congressional testimony in April 2025 could "deliver a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America." In 2025, DIA assessed that the DPRK had "10 or fewer" ICBMs and that it could possess 50 ICBMs by 2035. North Korea's intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) include the liquid-fueled Hwasong-12, which North Korea last tested in 2022, and the solid-fueled Hwasong-16. In 2025, North Korea said it conducted a test of a Hwasong-16B IRBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload. Such technology could offer greater maneuverability than conventionally armed ballistic missiles, though some analysts have said that North Korea's HGV technology is in an early stage of development.

Short- and Medium-Range Missiles

North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) pose the most acute near-term threats to South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in the region. North Korea's solid-fueled SRBMs have "exhibited aerodynamic flight at lower altitudes and in-flight manoeuvres while entering serial production," according to a 2024 UN Panel of Experts report. Some missile systems may be armed with a conventional or a nuclear warhead; the UN Panel of Experts report stated that North Korea "relies on warhead ambiguity to increase its deterrence." In 2025, North Korea has conducted at least three SRBM tests to date, in January, March, and May.

Hwasong-17 ICBM at an October 2020 military parade and began test launching it in 2022. In December 2022, North Korea static (or ground) tested an ICBM solid-propellant rocket motor, potentially for a land-based or submarine-based ICBM. On April 13, July 12, and December 17, 2023, North Korea flight tested its solid-fuel ICBM, the Hwasong-18. The October 31, 2024, test was assessed as a Hwasong-19 solid-propellant ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability. These systems may require further testing to improve reliability.

Short- and Medium-Range Missiles

North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), precision-guided multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and artillery pose the most acute near-term threats to other nations. Advances in these systems demonstrate a shift toward solid propellants and satellite guidance systems; advances that could carry over to larger, more potent systems like the Hwasong series ICBMs. These developments provide the projectiles greater mobility and survivability prior to launch and greater precision on target. Selected systems are described here.

In the MRBM category, the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) is a solid-propellantfueled missile capable of carrying a nuclear or conventional payload—known as dual capable. The North Koreans fire. North Korea fires the missile from a tracked vehicle, which gives the system mobility and makesthereby complicates prelaunch targeting of the system. North Korea has committed to expanding the power of its precision-guided tactical weapons. The KN-23 SRBM has the potential to strike locations throughout the Korean Peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear payload and uses a solid propellant. The KN-24 SRBM prelaunch targeting of the system difficult. The KN-23 SRBM can strike any location on the Korean peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear payload and uses a solid-propellant.

North Korea has committed to expanding the performance of its precision guided tactical weapons, which can pose significant threats to South Korea and U.S. assets on the peninsula. The KN-24 is a tactical system with a mobile launcher, solid propellant, and relatively large payload. The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile in that while its design resembles that of a guided artillery rocket, it is also reportedly capable of matching the range and destructive effects of an SRBM.

North Korea's progress with developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an effort to diversify its ballistic missile forces. The Pukgugsong-3 (KN-26) SLBM was successfully tested beginning in 2019 and is designed to carry a nuclear warhead, according to a 2021 DIA report. North Korea has since revealed the Pukguksong-4, -5, and -6. Some analysts have questioned whether North Korea's development of submarines has kept pace with that of its SLBMs.

blurs the line between rocket and missile; however, it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at significant range. The North Koreans may seek to fire these rockets in salvos to overwhelm missile defense systems.

The recent advances in North Korea's ballistic missile program appear to be directed at developing capabilities to defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses in the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). The United States and South Korea are developing Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD).

North Korea's progress with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an effort to counter land-based THAAD missile defenses by launching attacks from positions at sea outside the THAAD's radar field of view, although local Aegis BMD systems could likely still track these projectiles. The Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was successfully tested beginning in late 2019. According to a 2021 DIA report, North Korea has said this SLBM, to be launched from a ballistic missile submarine, will be cold-launched, solid-fueled and "will carry a nuclear warhead." North Korea has since then revealed development of longer-range SLBMs, the Pukguksong-4, -5, and -6. Unveiled in 2022, the Pukguksong-6 is a longer-range SLBN that some analysts assess is solid-fueled, MIRVed, and under development with a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

North Korean missile tests have demonstrated growing success and, coupled with increased operational training exercises, suggest a pattern designed to strengthen the credibility of North Korea's regional nuclear deterrent strategy.