Contents

• Overview
• Politics
• The Economy
• Climate Change and "Green Growth"
• Humanitarian Issues
• Security Concerns
Issues
• Selected Foreign Relations Issues
• Wildlife and Environmental Conservation
• U.S. Relations and Assistance

Figures

• Figure 1. Kenya

Summary

LongstandingSummary

Long-standing U.S. ties with Kenya have deepened over the past decade, despite some tensions. In May 2024, President Joe Biden hosted Kenya's President William Ruto for a State Visit, marking the 60^th anniversary of the U.S.-Kenya diplomatic relationship, established after Kenya's independence from the United Kingdom. Ruto was the first African leader to be invited for a State Visit since 2008, and President Biden subsequently designated Kenya as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Kenya is the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to be granted that status, which conveys defense trade and security cooperation benefits.

Kenya hosts the largest U.S. embassy in sub-Saharan Africa and has regularly ranked among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid globally, a majority of it focused on health programs. The country is a frequent destination for congressional travel and routinely receives senior U.S. officials for visits. Kenya has been a leading beneficiary of tariff benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; P.L. 106-200, as amended). Under the first Trump Administration, the United States and Kenya launched talks aimed at negotiating a free trade agreement, which would have been the first in sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden Administration did not continue the FTA talks, instead launching a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP).

Kenya became an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in the aftermath of Al Qaeda's 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy. In 2011, the country launched military operations in neighboring Somalia against regional Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab and subsequently joined the UN-authorized African Union stabilization mission in Somalia. Al Shabaab attacks against soft targets frequented by foreigners, including U.S. citizens, in Kenya's capital raised U.S. ties with Kenya have deepened over the past decade, as successive U.S. administrations have viewed the country as a strategic partner in Africa. Former President Joe Biden hosted Kenya's President William Ruto for a state visit in 2024, and he designated Kenya as the United States' first Major Non-NATO Ally in Sub-Saharan Africa, a designation that conveys defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Ruto was the first African leader to be invited by a U.S. president for a state visit since 2008. The Trump Administration has similarly appeared to value the bilateral relationship with Kenya, describing the country as one of the United States' strongest partners in the region. Kenya became an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in Africa in the aftermath of Al Qaeda's 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2011, the country launched military operations in neighboring Somalia against the regional Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Shabaab, and subsequently joined the UN-authorized African Union stabilization mission there. Al Shabaab launched attacks against soft targets frequented by foreigners, including U.S. citizens, in Kenya's capital, raising the group's international profile. In 2020, Al Shabaab killed a U.S. servicemember and two U.S. contactors in an attack on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan base used by the U.S. military near the Somali border. Al Shabaab, which U.S. officials now describe as Al Qaeda's largest and wealthiest affiliate, continues to pose a threat in Kenya and the broader region., and Kenya hosts an expanding U.S. military presence at Manda Bay that supports regional counterterrorism efforts. The 2024 state visitU.S. forces supporting regional counterterrorism efforts at Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay.

The 2024 State Visit highlighted Kenya's importance to the United States as a strategic partner, not only as a key diplomatic, economic,not only as a diplomatic and security actorpartner in East Africa, but as an African counterpart on shared global priorities. Kenya, which served on the UN Security Council in 2021-2022, has participated in Operation Prosperity Guardian, a maritime taskforce launched by the United States in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and it has been one of the only African members of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. WithKenya's 2024 deployment, with U.S. support, Kenya is leadingto lead the Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti.

President Ruto, meanwhile, has faced turbulence at home. , further elevated U.S.-Kenya ties, despite outstanding questions about the country's human rights trajectory. Kenya is often characterized as a comparatively stable and democratic anchor state in a troubled region, but a new protest movement, led by young Kenyans, shook the country in 2024, sparking a political crisis that Ruto, elected in 2022, has struggled to overcome. Political unrest has threatened its stability several times, however, most recently in 2024, when a protest movement led by young Kenyans and a violent state response spurred a political crisis. Facing a heavy debt burden and the threat of default, President Ruto tried to raise taxes that year, which fueledfanned public anger amidst widespread frustration with rising costs of living. Tens of thousands went to the streets in June 2024 to protest proposed tax hikes, and when legislators passed the tax bill over public oppositionamid rising costs of living. When legislators passed the tax bill while tens of thousands were in the streets protesting, some demonstrators stormed the parliament. Dozens were killed in the police response to the protests, and over a thousand people were arrested. The nationwide protests highlighted frustrationpublic frustration not only with economic hardships, but with public sector corruption, and a perceived lack of government accountability. The public display of public discontent was an unprecedented challenge for the government. Ruto, and Ruto ultimately reversed the tax bill and, reshuffled his cabinet, and he brought several opposition politicians into his government. Human rights groups have since raised growing concern with a spate of abductions and killings of Kenyan government critics, and with to defuse tensions. Scores of government critics were abducted or killed in the aftermath of the protests, and a series of forcible extraditions of foreign dissidents from Kenya. Ruto continues to face prompted accusations that the government was enabling transnational repression. Ruto has faced calls for his ouster and allegations, including from former allies, of corruption, as his government tries to navigate public opposition to new taxes, manage Kenya's debt, and position Ruto for re-election in 2027.

The Trump Administration has yet to articulate what changes it may pursue with respect to the bilateral relationship, but its initial engagement suggests continuity with past administrations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has spoken more often with President Ruto than any other African leader in his first months in office. In public statements, the Secretary has underscored the value of the U.S.-Kenya relationship, emphasized U.S. appreciation for Kenya's leadership on regional peace and security, and pledged that the United States will continue to support Kenya's deployment in Haiti. Major changes to U.S. foreign assistance by the Trump Administration, which have spurred debate in Congress and legal action, have implications for Kenya and could create new challenges for the relationship. The People's Republic of China, meanwhile, which is Kenya's largest trading partner and bilateral creditor, hosted Ruto for a state visit in April 2025.

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Overview

Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Kenya as an anchor state and strategic partner in East Africa, and as critical to counterterrorism efforts in the region. The country is subbut his alliance with elements of the opposition co-opted some of his most vocal critics. With the opposition divided, President Ruto is, by some accounts, favored to win re-election in 2027.

Kenya hosts one of the largest U.S. embassies in Africa, routinely receives senior U.S. officials for visits, and is a frequent destination for congressional travel. It has been a leading beneficiary of tariff benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; P.L. 106-200, as amended), which Congress has extended through the end of 2026. Under the first Trump Administration, the United States and Kenya launched negotiations on a free trade agreement—it would have been the first in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden Administration did not continue those talks, instead launching a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP). Kenya, which has faced a 10% tariff under President Trump's tariff policy, has engaged the Trump Administration in talks aimed at reaching a new bilateral trade arrangement.

The Trump Administration has maintained a warm relationship with Kenya, despite the tariff issue. Administration officials have described the country as a "longstanding American ally" and emphasized U.S. appreciation for Kenya's deployment to Haiti and leadership on regional peace and security issues. The country, which has regularly ranked among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid globally, has been affected by the Administration's foreign aid cuts, which have spurred congressional debate and legal action. In late 2025, Kenya became the first country to sign a bilateral agreement with the Trump Administration on global health cooperation. Under the five-year deal, which faces a court challenge in Kenya, the country is expected to gradually assume greater financial responsibility as U.S. assistance for health programs in the country declines.

Overview

Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Kenya as an anchor state and a strategic partner in East Africa, and as critical to counterterrorism efforts in the region. The country is Sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest economy and a regional hub for transportation and finance. It hosts the UN headquarters in Africa, one of four major UN offices globally. A majorpopular tourism destination known for its biodiversity and conservation efforts, Kenya is a regional leader in clean energy, drawing overroughly 90% of its electricity from renewable sources.¹ The countryIt has a vibrant tech scene that has been dubbed the "Silicon Savannah." Kenya's government has pursued opportunities to speak on behalf of Africa in global forums, including on climate change, conservation, and debt relief.

Kenya hosts one of the largest U.S. embassy in sub-Saharan Africa as well as U.S. forces supporting counter-terrorism operations in the region. The country has regularlyembassies in Africa and U.S. forces supporting regional counterterrorism operations. In 2024, the Biden Administration designated it as the United States' first Major Non-NATO Ally in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya has often ranked among the top U.S. foreign aid recipients globally, with health funding comprising the greatest share of bilateral aid, and it ishas been among the largest African recipients of U.S. counterterrorism assistance. Congressional interests in Kenya are wide-ranging, and it is a frequent destination for congressional travel; legislative action has focused predominately on democracy, human rights, and terrorism concerns. While U.S.-Kenya ties are close, Kenya's government also maintains a strategic partnership with the People's Republic of China (hereafter China), its largest trading partner and bilateral creditor. Economic hardship, corruption.

Economic frustration, historical land disputes, corruption, and police abuses fuelhave fueled grievances in Kenya, and election-relatedpolitical violence has threatened the country's reputation as an anchor state in a volatile region several times. Perceived impunity for state corruption and other abuses has been a trigger for protests, and police have often respondedoften respond with violence.² Freedom House ranks Kenya "Partly Free" in its Freedom in the World index, noting that despite regular elections, pervasive corruption and police brutality remain serious problems, and while Kenya's media and civil society are vibrant, journalists and human rights defenders face restrictive laws and intimidation.

Kenya's 2022 elections were the latestmost recent in a series of polls that have tested its democratic institutions. With incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta term limited, the race was a close contest between his deputy, William Ruto, and longtime opposition leader and five-time presidential candidate Raila Odinga. In a twist, Kenyatta backed Odinga, his formal rival, Odinga, over Ruto. Whenover Ruto, who led a populist, anti-establishment campaign, was declared the winner and won with just over 50% of the vote, Odinga challenged the result, alleging fraud. The court upheld Ruto's victory.

. Shadows from previous election-related violence and corruption allegations hang over linger over President Ruto, as they did over Kenyatta; both once faced charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC).³ After Ruto took office, Kenyan courts dropped corruption cases against his running mate (who has since been impeached) and several of his cabinet appointees at the request of the director of public prosecutions, whom Ruto later appointed as intelligence chief.⁴

President Ruto has sought to court foreign investment and position Kenya as a global voice on climate change and an advocate, on Africa's behalf, for climate finance and reforms to the international financial system reforms.⁴.⁵ Politics at home, however, sometimes compete with his international agenda. His administration faceshas faced major economic challenges, including a large debt burden, inflation, and high unemployment. After promisingHe has promised to transform the economy and cutreduce the cost of living, but some of his policy decisions have been unpopular, including his effort to cut a costly fuel subsidy that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) deemed unsustainable. The resulting spike in gas prices sparked public anger, prompting the government to partially reinstate the subsidy. . Tax hikes, cost of living concerns, and spending choices have fueled anti-government protests. Police reportedly killed 35 people during protests in 2023, prompting a warning that Kenya risked becoming "a police state."⁶ Ruto appeared to mend ties with Odinga in early 2024 and heavily backed Odinga's bid to chair the African Union (AU) Commission, effectively the AU's chief executive. In a blow to Ruto's foreign policy agenda, Odinga lost the AU leadership election in early 2025.

Ruto and Odinga's rapprochement has not allayed public frustration with the government. In June 2024, young Kenyans, dubbed "Gen Z," mobilized protests against legislation proposing new taxes. Fueled by a violent police response, the protests grew, prompting a political crisis and calls for Ruto's ouster. A spate of reported abductions and killings of government critics has followed. Ruto has reshuffled his cabinet several times, and in late 2024, his allies moved to impeach Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, with whom Ruto had fallen out. Ruto's rift with Gachagua poses new political problems for him as alliances shift ahead of the next elections, due in 2027.

Kenya—where 213 people were killed and over 4,000 injured in Al Qaeda's (AQ) 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy—continues to grapple with terrorist threats, most notably from the Somalia-based AQ affiliate Al Shabaab. While attacks near the Somali border are more common, several and cost of living concerns have fueled public frustration and protests against Ruto's government. Police violence against protesters and a spate of reported abductions and enforced disappearances of government critics in 2024-2025—which human rights groups attributed to security agents—prompted calls for the president's ouster. Ruto has reshuffled his cabinet several times, and his former deputy, Rigathi Gachagua, who was impeached in late 2024, has become a vocal critic. Gachagua is among several politicians that may challenge Ruto for the presidency in the 2027 elections. The upcoming elections will be the first in over twenty years in which Odinga, who passed away in late 2025 at age 80, is not on the ballot. Almost three decades after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing, Kenya continues to grapple with terrorist threats, primarily from the Somalia-based Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab.⁵ Attacks near the Somali border have been more common, but two high-profile attacks in Nairobi have underscored Al Shabaab's reach. A U.S. citizen was among 21 people killed in the 2019 DusitD2 hotel attack;, and several Americans were wounded in the 2013 Westgate mallMall attack, in which at least 67 people died. Al Shabaab killed a U.S. servicemember and two U.S. contractors in a 2020 attack on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan base used by the U.S. military near the Somali border. The United States has offered rewards for information related to the Dusit and Manda Bay attacks through the Rewards for Justice program, and leaders of the attacks have been designated for sanctions as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

Kenya contributes troops to the UN-backed AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM, previously known as ATMIS and AMISOM). Al Shabaab says its attacks in Kenya are, in part, retaliation for Kenya's military role in Somalia and characterizes U.S. and Kenyan operations there as part of a Western crusade against Muslims. The group draws recruits from Kenya's minority Muslim population (Kenyans reportedly comprise the largest share of its foreign fighters); security force abuses in Kenya have contributed to radicalization.

Kenya launched the U.S.-backed, UN-authorized multinational security support mission in Haiti in June 2024, as the Gen Z protests were escalating at home. Amid competing domestic and regional security concerns, the deployment of Kenyan Police for the mission—slowed by legal disputes and delays in expected international assistance—has been controversial domestically.

Kenya first deployed troops into Somalia in 2011, to create a buffer zone against Al Shabaab, and it later joined the UN-backed African Union (AU) mission in Somalia. The United States has provided substantial security assistance to support Kenya and other countries contributing troops to the AU mission, and the U.S. military, which has conducted counterterrorism operations in Somalia for over two decades, conducts occasional "collective self-defense" airstrikes in support of AU and Somali forces. Al Shabaab, which has drawn recruits from Kenya's minority Muslim population, says its attacks in Kenya are, in part, retaliation for Kenya's military role in Somalia and characterizes U.S. and Kenyan operations there as part of a Western crusade against Muslims.

In addition to its Somalia deployment, Kenya has led the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti, with U.S. support, since 2024. Amid competing domestic and regional security concerns, the deployment of Kenyan Police for the mission—which was slowed by legal disputes and hamstrung by shortfalls in international assistance—has been controversial domestically, but it has been praised by both the Biden and Trump Administrations.

Figure 1. Kenya

Source: CRS graphic. Data from CIA World Factbook, U.S. Census Bureau International Database, UNAIDS, and IMF; 2026 estimates unless noted.

Comparative size: slightly smaller than Texas Population: 57 million, 2.12% growth Official languages: English and Swahili Religions: Christian 86%, Muslim 11%, other 2% Life expectancy: 71.9 years Median age: 21.8 years Population under 15 years of age: 35.1% Fertility rate: 3.04 children born/woman HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate: 3.2% (2023) Adult literacy: 83% | male 86% female 80% (2022)

GDP: $140 billion, 4.86% growth, $2,595 per capita GDP composition: agriculture 21%, industry 16%, services 56% (2024) External debt: $41.8 billion (2025) Health expenditure: 4.5% of GDP (2021) Electricity access: 79% (2023) Major exports | partners: tea, cut flowers, garments, gold, tropical fruits | Uganda 10%, USA 10%, UAE 8%, Netherlands 8%, Pakistan 6% (2023) Major imports | partners: refined petroleum, palm oil, wheat, plastics, garments | China 22%, UAE 14%, India 10%, Saudi Arabia 5%, Malaysia 4% (2023)

Politics

Background. Kenya was essentially a one-party state from 1964 to 1991. After the transition to a multiparty system, ethnic identity, rather than ideology, became the primary line of political cleavage. No ethnic group in Kenya has a large enough voting bloc for its political leaders to gain or maintain power alone, however, so politicians form cross-ethnic political alliances, which periodically shift. This fluidity has helped fuel electoral violence and corruption.

For decades after independence, the ethnic groups of Kenya's first and second presidents, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin (the first and third largest ethnic groups), were seen to disproportionately benefit from the allocation of state resources, namely land, government jobs, and contracts. The heartlands of these groups, the central highlands and adjacent central Rift Valley, saw the largest state investment in schools, roads, and health services. Western Kenya (home to the second and fourth largest groups, the Luhya and Luo) and the predominantly Muslim coast and northeast were comparatively underdeveloped. The perception of ethnic favoritism fostered divisions.⁷

6

Daniel arap Moi, Kenya's long-ruling second president (1978-2002), dominated politics through repression, patronage, and electoral manipulation until, under donor and domestic pressure, he retired. The country's opposition parties came together, briefly, to defeat his chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (son of first president Jomo Kenyatta), in the 2002 elections. The crisis that followed the next elections, in 2007, remains important for understanding Kenyan politics today. Political realignments prior to thosethe polls created a particularly volatile ethnic dynamic, and when the incumbent president,President Mwai Kibaki, (a Kikuyu), was declared the winner in a close race amid allegations of riggingrigging allegations, protests followed and violence ensued, largely along ethnic lines. Some of the worst violence was between Kikuyu and Kalenjin (Kalenjin political leaders, whose politicians backed Kibaki's main opponent, Odinga, a Luo). Over six weeks, someroughly 1,300 people were killed and 600,000 displaced; over 100,000 private properties and almost 500 government properties were destroyed. The crisis hit the economy hard. Kenya was effectively paralyzed for two months before Kibaki and Odinga reached a power-sharing deal was brokered between Kibaki and Odinga brokered by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with U.S. support. Kibaki formed a coalition government with Odinga in a new prime minister post, agreeing to draft a new constitution and address sensitive land issues.

The 2017 Election Overturned, Shifting Alliances. Violence, rigging allegations, and police brutality marred the Kenyatta-Odinga rematch in 2017. When Kenyatta was declared the winner, the opposition brough a challenge toKenyatta's rematch with Odinga in 2017. The opposition challenged Kenyatta's win at the Supreme Court, which nullified the presidential result in a landmark ruling, citing "irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of results that affected the integrity of the poll." The court ordered a freshnew election, but the opposition boycotted it. After Kenyatta's victory, the, giving Kenyatta an easy victory. The opposition contested his legitimacy and held a mock inauguration to name Odinga "the people's president." The government declared thatit treasonous, shutting down media outlets and arresting opposition figures. Authorities ignored court orders overon the crackdown, leading theKenya's chief justice, among others, to warn that the government's disregard for the judiciary threatened the rule of law.¹⁰ Some Members of Congress and former U.S. diplomats also raised alarm.¹¹

When Kenyatta and Odinga announced a surprise deal—endorseddeal, facilitated by the United States—, to end the standoff in 2018, Ruto viewed, Ruto treated it as a betrayal, and a major political reconfiguration followedensued.¹².¹² Ruto's supporters characterized Kenyatta's deal with Odinga (known as "the Handshake") as intended to prevent Ruto from succeeding him, and when Kenyatta launched an anti-corruption drive, Ruto's allies said it disproportionately targeted politicians linked to him.¹³ Kenyatta and Odinga's effort to make constitutional changes, ostensibly to make politics more inclusive, was blocked by the judiciary. Ruto characterized the initiativeseen by some observers as intended to extend Kenyatta's power.

and was blocked by the judiciary.

The 2022 Elections. Kenya's 2022 polls occurred held elections in 2022 amid public frustration with high living costs, disillusion with the political class, and fear of another post-election crisis. Veteran opposition leader Odinga had gained the support of the incumbent president, but thatOdinga had the incumbent president's support for his fifth presidential bid, but the alliance alienated some opposition voters.¹⁴13 For some Kenyans, Kenyatta epitomized "the establishment." Ruto capitalized on economic frustrations and, with a Kikuyu running mate and political allies, divided the Kikuyu vote.¹⁵14 Odinga also had a Kikuyu running mate—, Martha Karua, Kenya's first female candidate on a major ticket—and Kenyatta's endorsement, but that support was not enough to secure victory.

Ruto is. Ruto, reportedly among Kenya's richest men and, had served for years in government, but during the race he emphasized his humble upbringing, casting himself as a champion for the poor and an outsider running against the establishment. He pitched a "bottom up" economic plan and pledged to reduce the cost of living. As an evangelical Christian, he elevated religion in his campaign. His alleged role in organizing violence against Kikuyu after the 2007 elections appears not to have stoppeddissuaded many Kikuyu from voting for him. Some analysts note that the community's political leadersKikuyu politicians had long branded Odinga as a destabilizing force, and some suggest that, by some accounts, economic frustration and grievances against the Kenyatta family factored into votes for Ruto.¹⁶

Ruto garnered 50.5% of the votes, 15 Ruto narrowly avoidingavoided a runoff against Odinga, who gained 48.9%gaining 50.5% of the votes cast. Turnout, the lowest in 15 years, hinted at voter apathy, particularly among young Kenyans. Observers described the pollselections as more peaceful and transparent than the three precedingpreceding three, but like past processespolls they were marred by rigging allegations and other controversies. Beyond the tight presidential race, the elections were notable in other ways. A record number of women ran in the 2022 elections, and more won parliamentary seats than ever before. Seven female governors were elected. The 2022 polls were reportedly among Africa's most expensive, both in terms of campaign spending and election administration. Kenya invested heavily in election technology, including biometric registration, to improve the credibility of the process; whether it improved public trust is debated.¹⁶ After Ruto took office, Kenyan courts dropped corruption cases against his running mate and several of his cabinet appointees at the request of the director of public prosecutions, whom Ruto later appointed as intelligence chief.17

2024 Protests. In June 2024, young Kenyans —dubbed "Gen Z"—organized protests against the government's Finance Bill, which proposed some $2.7 billion in additionalnew taxes to reducelower the budget deficit and borrowing.¹⁸ The protesters Protesters argued that the tax hikes would raise the cost of living foras Kenyans were already struggling, deter investors, and choke the economy. They raised objections tocriticized the government's spending choices, including on foreign travel, renovations and other nonessential expenditures, pay raises for government officialsgovernment pay raises, renovations, and the creation of new executive branch offices, such as those of the first lady and deputy first lady.¹⁹

18 Ostentatious displays of wealth by some legislators and cabinet members fueled ire.¹⁹ When police responded to the initial demonstrations, which began in mid-June, with tear gas, water cannons, arrests, and gunfire, the protests grew, and reported abductions by security forces exacerbated public anger.²⁰ On June 25, as tensTens of thousands protestedwere protesting in Nairobi and other cities, the National Assembly passed the bill (195 votes in favor, 106 against), spurring when the parliament passed the bill on June 25, 2024, which spurred outrage. Hours later, as police fired on demonstrators outside the gates of parliament, killing several people, some protesters stormed the complex.²¹ The government controversially deployed the military in response to the unrest.²²

The protests were unprecedented in scale, and they highlighted frustration with more than taxeshighlighting widespread frustration. Polls before the 2022 elections suggested that Kenyans saw the country heading in the wrong direction, and respondents identified management of; the economy aswas the top issue they wanted theirthe government to address, followed by corruption and unemployment.²³21 Ruto campaigned on these issues, and protesters. Protesters charged that he failed to deliver.²² charged that he failed to deliver. Opinion polls reflected a widespread view that cost of living had risen and the economy had further deteriorated after the elections.²⁴ Ostentatious displays of wealth by some legislators and cabinet members spurred public anger.²⁵

Ruto initially took a tough stance on what he termed the "treasonous events" onof June 25, but in subsequent days hehe later withdrew the tax bill and pledged spending cuts, a pay freeze, and reforms.²⁶23 The U.S. Embassy joinedand other Western embassies in expressingexpressed concern about the violence, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the tensions in a June 26 call with Ruto.²⁷ On July 11engaged Ruto on the situation.²⁴ Two weeks later, Ruto dismissed his cabinet and promised the formation of a "broad-based" new government. The dramatic move underscored the pressure he and Kenyan lawmakers were facing. When the protests continued into the next monthWhen protests continued, however, Ruto accused the U.S.-based Ford Foundation of sponsoring anarchy and violence by financing civil society groupscivic groups that he claimed had mobilized the protests. He also, and he reappointed several of the ministers he had initially removed. His government has since faced protests from teachers and health workers over salaries and working conditions.

sacked.²⁵

At least 60 people died and over 600 were injured around the 2024 protests and over 1,370 people were arrested, according to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR).²⁸.²⁶ Human rights groups have since raised growing subsequently raised alarm over a seriesdozens of abductions and killings of government critics and killings that they attributeattributed to state agents and characterize as a crackdown on dissent.²⁹ As of January 2025, KNCHR had recorded 89 enforced disappearances and 63 extrajudicial killings since June 2024.³⁰ In January, Justin Muturi, a sitting cabinet member and prominent Kikuyu politician, publicly accused Kenya's National Intelligence Service (NIS) of being behind the abduction of his son during the 2024 protests. Ruto sacked him in late March.

Political Realignments. Kenya's parliament voted in October 2024 to impeach Deputy President as a crackdown on dissent.²⁷ In early 2025, a cabinet member, Justin Muturi, accused Kenya's intelligence service of being behind the abduction of his son during the 2024 protests.²⁸ Muturi was Kenya's Attorney General during the 2024 protests (he lost the post when Ruto sacked most of his cabinet and was then appointed to a different ministry). Political Realignments. In late 2024, Kenya's parliament impeached Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, who faced allegations of corruption, inciting ethnic divisions, and support forsupporting the 2024 protests. His impeachment, pushed by the president's allies, highlighted growing tensions withinin Ruto's Kenya Kwanza coalition and evolvingshifting political alliances. Ruto named interior minister Kithure Kindiki as his new deputy president. Gachagua, who helped mobilize Kikuyu voters to back Ruto's electionfor Ruto in 2022, has hinted he may run against his former running mateRuto in 2027 and has sought new partners in the opposition. Justin Muturi, Ruto's former attorney general and public service minister,allies, including former President Kenyatta, Odinga's former running mate Martha Karua, and Justin Muturi. Muturi has leveled serious corruption allegations against Ruto in early 2025, accusing him of direct involvement in a series of, implicating him in controversial government deals worth over $2 billion with India's Adani Group and in a purported 2024 money laundering scheme with Russian oligarchs.³¹29 Ruto cancelled the Adani deals, worth over $2 billion, in late 2024 after Adani's directors were charged in U.S. court with bribery and fraud. Gachagua has also accused Ruto of personal business deals with insurgent groups in DRC and Sudan (see below).Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).³⁰

President Ruto, meanwhile, has deepened his alliance with former rival Odinga: in March 2025, Ruto announced a new agreement between his coalition and Odinga's party to collaborate and form a "broad-based government," and he appointed additional Odinga allies to senior government posts. The deal appears reminiscent of the one Kenyatta and Odinga struck in 2018.

What the political landscape will look like for the 2027 elections is still unclear, with a crowded field of potential contenders to challenge Ruto's bid for re-election, but the youth vote could be decisive. Polls and voting behavior in Kenya suggest that youth political participation declined over the past decade, but recent developments suggest that is changing. More educated than previous generations, young Kenyans are using new strategies to engage politically. The Gen Z movement, which has described itself as "tribeless" and "leaderless"—salient in a political environment long marked by ethnic identities—may be galvanizing a broader push for greater accountability among elected officials amid growing disaffection with the political class.³²

LGBTQ Rights. Human rights groups have raised concern that Kenya could follow Uganda in passing strict anti-LGBTQ legislation.³³Raila Odinga's party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Ruto was part of ODM from 2007, when he backed Odinga's presidential bid, until 2013, when he joined Kenyatta's presidential ticket against Odinga. Ruto mended ties with Odinga during the 2024 protests and appointed several ODM politicians to government posts, and he later backed Odinga's failed bid to lead the African Union Commission (the body's secretariat). In early 2025, Ruto and Odinga announced an agreement under which their parties would work together. The deal, reminiscent of Kenyatta and Odinga's 2018 rapprochement, has divided the opposition. After Odinga died in late 2025, his brother Oburu, 82, became the acting head of the party and formalized ODM's exit from the Azimio la Umoja coalition. ODM faces internal divisions as some in the party question the deal with Ruto and oppose backing him in 2027.³¹ The Azimio coalition, meanwhile, is now led by Kalonzo Musyoka, with backing from Kenyatta. Musyoka, 72, served as Kenya's vice president from 2008 to 2013 and was Odinga's running mate in 2013 and 2017.

The political landscape for the 2027 elections is still unfolding, but a crowded field of potential contenders appear to be positioning to challenge Ruto's re-election bid, and the youth vote could be decisive. Voting behavior in Kenya suggests that youth political participation declined over the past decade, and it is unclear whether the mobilization seen in the 2024 protests will translate to greater participation in elections. More educated than previous generations, young Kenyans are using new strategies to engage politically, but they also face new forms of repression.³² The "Gen Z" movement, which has described itself as "tribeless" and "leaderless"—salient in a political environment long marked by ethnic identities—has expressed disaffection with the current political class, but whether that will translate into a voting bloc remains to be seen.³³

LGBTQ Rights

Human rights advocates have raised concern that Kenya could follow Uganda in passing strict anti-LGBTQ legislation, an issue that has drawn concern from some Members of Congress.³⁴ A colonial-era law criminalizes "acts against the order of nature," but Kenya has been a relative refuge from persecution for LGBTQ persons in East Africa. Its Supreme Court ruled in 2023 that the government's refusal to register an LGBTQ rights group discriminated against the LGBTQ community's rights and was unconstitutional; the court later reaffirmedwas discriminatory and unconstitutional, and the court affirmed the community's right to associate. The rulings prompted a backlash, led by conservative politicians and evangelical churches, and anti-gay protests.³⁴ Ruto, who has assertedRuto, who has said there is "no room" for homosexuality in Kenya, expressed respect for the court's decision but said, "it doesn't mean we have to agree with it."³⁵ The stalled 2023 Family Protection Bill echoes Uganda's anti-homosexuality law. Ifruling prompted a backlash, led by conservative politicians and evangelical churches, and anti-gay protests.³⁶ Legislation proposed in 2023, the Family Protection Bill, echoed Uganda's anti-homosexuality law: if adopted, it would criminalize "promoting" homosexuality; punish same-sex relations with 10-50 years in jail and "aggravated homosexuality" (defined in the bill as same-sex relations with a minor or disabled person, or when a terminal disease is passed on) with the death penalty; and prohibitban LGBTQ parades and assemblies, related advocacy, and cross-dressing.

The bill was never formally tabled and remains stalled.

The Economy

Kenya is East Africa's largest economy (passing Ethiopia in 2025, per the IMF) and one of the fastest growing and most diverse in Africa. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy, but manufacturingservices, manufacturing, construction, and real estate also drive growth. The services sector leads in job creation. The, and the telecommunications industry is a global pioneer in mobile banking technology. U.S. government reports suggest that Kenya has fostered a positive investment climate, but corruption often influences the outcome of public tenders there and is a barrier to doing business.³⁷ With almost 40% of theWith almost 40% of its population under age 14, a coming surge in the labor force will present both challenges and opportunities. Kenya ranks as a lower-middle income country, but over a third of the population lives in poverty, per the World Bank, and a COVID-19-related recession in 2020, Kenya's first since the 1990s, fueled hardship. Efforts by the government to slow the pandemic's spread, including a curfew, school closings, restrictions on movement, and social distancing measures, had negative impacts on livelihoods. The economy rallied, but many Kenyans are struggling.³⁸ Kenya's economy has rallied since its COVID-19-related recession of 2020, but many Kenyans continue to struggle due to inflation.

Former President Kenyatta sought to improve Kenya's business environment and attract foreign investment during his tenure, but his development agenda and spending ballooned public debt.³⁶ The People's Republic of China (PRC, or China)39 China financed and built major infrastructure projects, including a railway and a port near the coastal town of Lamu, a UNESCO World Heritage site.³⁷40 The railway cost a fifth of the national budget; 90% of it was funded with loans from China's Export-Import Bank.³⁸41 The port is part of a large transport corridor project with South Sudan and Ethiopia that envisions a rail and road network, railway, airports, resort cities, an oil pipeline, and industrial areas. Environmentalists have raised concerns with the project. PlansA 2019 court ruling blocked plans for Kenya's first coal-fired power plant, also in Lamu, were suspended in 2019 when a court ruled that authorities had failed to do a thoroughin Lamu, over environmental impact assessmentconcerns.

The IMFInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned Kenya to contain its debt, which stood at 68% of GDP when Ruto started his term, up from 42% when Kenyatta took office.³⁹rose from 42% of GDP when Kenyatta took office to 68% when Ruto's term began.⁴² Ruto pledged to cut spending, promised greater transparency on loans from ChinaChinese loans, and signed up for a new IMF package to reduce debt risks.⁴⁰43 The IMF offered additional funding, bringing its total commitment to over $4.4 billion. KenyaRuto's government asked China for another $1 billion to finish stalled road projects in late 2023, and forand a slower repayment schedule. The IMF lauded Ruto's initial economic reforms, but the protests underscored the domestic opposition to his tax proposals, and his government has struggled with how to balance public resistance to new taxes against IMF pressure to increase tax revenue and the risk of debt default.⁴¹ Ruto has been outspokenthe risk of debt default and IMF pressure to increase tax revenue.⁴⁴ Ruto has been vocal in calling for international finance system reforms, asserting that African nations pay more, on average, to borrow than wealthier countries, and debt burdens leave many struggling to meet development goals and deal withrespond to climate change effects.⁴² In March.⁴⁵ In early 2025, the IMF and Kenya prematurely terminated a four-year $3.6 billion deal; Kenya seeks to negotiate a new program. The Kenyan government has, meanwhile, taken a new they are negotiating a new support program. In the meantime, Kenya secured a $1.5 billion loan from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to help finance its budget.

Climate Change and "Green Growth." Kenya generates most of its electricity from geothermal and hydroelectric sources. The country is developing its wind power capacity, with U.S. support, and is home to and a major trade and investment deal, and in late 2025 Kenya converted three Chinese railway loans from U.S. dollars to Chinese yuan to lower interest payments. In December 2025, President Ruto announced that the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) had agreed to a $1 billion debt-for-food security swap that would allow Kenya to replace costly existing debt with lower-cost financing on the condition that savings go to programs to boost food security.⁴⁶ Climate Change and "Green Growth" As the Kenyan government has emphasized, Kenya faces a range of climate-related threats and risks, including prolonged droughts, rising temperatures, severe flooding, and coastal sea levels rising faster than the global average.⁴⁷ Kenya's climate is highly variable, given its diverse geography, and it experiences significant rainfall variability, with parts of the country sometimes experiencing higher-than-average rainfall while other areas face prolonged dry spells. Kenya has struggled with recurrent drought since 2020, and while conditions improved in 2024, the situation has since deteriorated. Kenya has also experienced periods of intense rainfall and severe flooding, which has contributed to displacement, property and agricultural damage, and loss of life. The country has increasingly positioned itself as a regional leader in addressing climate change.⁴⁸ Kenya's economy is highly dependent on its natural resources, and its tourism sector centers on its fragile ecosystems. The country generates most of its electricity from geothermal and hydroelectric sources. Drought affects its hydropower generation, which accounts for almost 30% of its electricity generation and a quarter of installed capacity; the country is working to further develop geothermal power, its largest energy source, to reduce its vulnerability.⁴⁹ Kenya is also developing its wind power capacity and hosts Africa's largest wind farm. Ruto has pledged to phase out the use of fossil fuels for electricity by 2030 and urged other African leaders to embrace renewables.⁴³ (Ruto has, meanwhile, continued to express50 He has also, however, expressed support for mining Kenya's coal deposits.⁴⁴) As chair of the Committee of African Heads of State on Climate Change, he51 President Ruto has led Africa's negotiating group at the UN Climate Conference of the Parties (COP) talks, highlighting climate impacts that he calls a "living nightmare for millions of Kenyans, and hundreds of millions of Africans."⁴⁵52 Kenya hosted a continental summit on climate action in 2023, andduring which 17 African leaders signed the Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change, Africa's first joint position on the issue. Ruto is pushing a new Africa Green Industrialization Initiative, seekingpursuing investment in renewable power projects, and he wants to attract investment from companies seeking to build factories powered by renewable energy to reduce their carbon footprint.⁴⁶53 Kenya is also developing carbon capture facilities.⁵⁴ The country estimates that it needs $40 billion in investment over the next decade to meet its climate goals, per its climate action plan under the Paris Agreement; funding gaps, among other challenges, may constrain implementation.⁵⁵ Some reports suggest cuts in U.S. assistance for renewable energy programs could slow Kenya's effort to fully transition to clean energy sources.⁵⁶ Kenya is also developing carbon capture facilities.

Humanitarian Issues

Drought, Floods andand Food Insecurity. Recurrent drought and high food prices have driven food insecurity in Kenya. Pastoral communities were hit hard by a prolonged 2020-2022 drought in which almost 3 million livestock reportedly died, destroying livelihoods. Cattle raids in the north and Al Shabaab threats have also disrupted livelihoods and affected humanitarian access. El Niño-driven rains in 2024 facilitated some drought recovery, but also brought devastating flooding that killed almost 300several hundred people and displaced 280,000. The rainy seasons have since been below-average, and extremely poor rainfall during the late 2025 short rains season has intensified dry conditions in early 2026, fueling food insecurity in the country's arid and semi-arid areas.⁵⁷ By some estimates, as many as 3 million people in Kenya may face acute food insecurity this year.⁵⁸ Refugee Issues. Kenya hosts over 835 people and displaced 280,000.⁴⁷ Some experts say poor urban planning and land management have added to the country's flooding problems.⁴⁸ An estimated 2.8 million people in Kenya are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity between April and June 2025, with over 290,000 people facing emergency levels of need in the arid north.⁴⁹

Refugee Issues. Kenya hosts roughly 837,000 refugees and asylum seekers, 87% of whom live in camps.⁵⁰59 A majority are from Somalia and South Sudan, where insecurity (460,000 and 203,000, respectively, as of early 2026), where conflict, insecurity, and humanitarian need have driven rising refugee flows into Kenya. Funding shortfalls have led aid agencies to reduce assistance to refugees in Kenya at the same time that humanitarian operations in Somalia and South Sudan are also struggling with serious funding gaps.⁶⁰ Abrupt ration cuts in early 2025, prompted by the Trump Administration's aid freeze (see "U.S. Relations and Assistance") and other donor cuts, spurred violent clashes in one of Kenya's refugee camps; the aid cuts have increased food insecurity in the camps.⁶¹ The Kenyanrefugee numbers in Kenya to rise to 475,000 and 196,000, respectively, in early 2025. The government's stance toward refugees has shifted significantly over the past decade. In 2016, the Kenyatta government declared Kenya would no longer host refugees, 2015, after a major Al Shabaab attack in Kenya, then-Deputy President Ruto demanded that the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) relocate refugees from Dadaab, Kenya's largest refugee camp complex, where Kenyan authorities alleged Al Shabaab had ties.⁶² The Obama Administration intervened: then-Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to the country, praised its role as a refugee host, and pledged additional U.S. aid to help Kenya support refugees.⁶³ In 2016, the government declared that Kenya would no longer host refugees, again citing security concerns. Officials later clarified that the aim was to close Dadaab, the largest camp complex, which at the time hostedhad over 340,000 refugees, most from Somalia. Kenya's High Court blocked Dadaab's closure, ruling it discriminatory and unconstitutional. Authorities threatened to close Dadaab again in 2019 and told the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)UNHCR in 2021 that camp residents would be expelled if UNHCR did not devise a plan to close both the Dadaab and Kakuma complexes by 2022 (Kakuma is near the border with South Sudan and has historically hosted refugees from there). Humanitarian activists, arguing returns to Somalia and South Sudancountries in conflict were not sustainable, urged the government to offer refugees durable solutions withinin Kenya.

The country has sincegovernment adopted a progressive law in 2021 that provides new opportunities, rights, and protections for refugees within Kenya. Refugee advocates say it offers a promising model for refugee integration at a time when many countries are tightening restrictions.⁵¹64 The new policy, whichknown as the Shirika Plan, aims to move from a camp-centric model toward one of local integration,. It enjoys public support, but bureaucratic impediments pose challenges to its implementation.⁵² Under the new Shirika Plan, Dadaab and Kakuma will be transformed into integrated municipalities. Over 423,000 refugees currently reside in the Dadaab camps; 302,000 live in Kakuma.

Security Concerns

Terrorist activity65 Under the plan, the camps around Dadaab, with over 400,000 refugees, and Kakuma, with over 300,000 refugees, are being transformed into integrated municipalities. Security Issues Terrorist threats and conflict in neighboring countries have led Kenya to take an increasingly active role in regional security, butalthough banditry, cattle rustling, poaching, urban crime, and communaland intercommunal disputes place competing domestic demands on Kenya's security resources. Kenya has suffered multiple international terrorist attacks, and the concentration of potential international and domestic targets in Nairobi is a serious concern for Kenyan and foreign security officials.

Northeast Kenya faced a surge in Al Shabaab attacks in 2023, with 279 reported fatalities.⁵³ The uptick occurred in parallel with a major Somali offensive against the group. Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya declined in 2024, when 188 fatalities were recorded.⁵⁴ In 2025, the AU mission in Somalia transitioned to a new mandate and name, AUSSOM, with continued Kenyan participation. AUSSOM faces funding challenges as international donors continue to differ on an AU proposal to use UN assessed contributions to support the mission, which the United States has opposed.⁵⁵

Alongside terrorist threats, Kenya has been plagued by pastoralist militia activity, including cattle-rustling and banditry, in the northwest.⁵⁶ The government deployed the military into the area in 2023 to curb attacks and small arms proliferation, which reduced the scale of violence, but ongoing insecurity has fueled public frustration with the police deployment to Haiti.⁵⁷

Jihadist recruitment in Kenya is also a problem: Kenyans reportedly comprise the largest share of Al Shabaab's foreign fighters, and in 2024, a Kenyan national was convicted in U.S. court of conspiring to conduct a 9/11-style terrorist attack in the United States on Al Shabaab's behalf.⁶⁶ Studies suggest that local grievances in Kenya, including the perceived marginalization and mistreatment of Muslims, and security force abuses have contributed to radicalization.⁶⁷ Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya have been sporadic in the past five years, primarily consisting of ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting security forces, and largely concentrated in the northeast, near the Somali border.

Beyond its domestic anti-terrorism efforts and military operations near the Somali border, Kenya has conducted military operations in Somalia since 2011. The number of Kenyan troops in the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), declined in 2025 with the mission's transition to a new mandate. Kenya is expected to contribute 1,410 of AUSSOM's 11,900 personnel. AUSSOM faces funding gaps as international donors continue to differ on how to finance it; the United States opposes the AU proposal to use UN assessed contributions in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) to help finance the mission.⁶⁸

Alongside terrorist threats, Kenya has struggled with pastoralist militia activity, including cattle-rustling and banditry, in the northwest.⁶⁹ The government deployed the military in 2023 to curb attacks and small arms proliferation. The deployment lowered the scale of violence, but persistent insecurity fueled public frustration with the government's decision to deploy police to Haiti.⁷⁰

Selected Foreign Relations Issues

East Africa. Kenya has played a peacemaking role in aits troubled region on multiple occasions, hosting the talks that led to Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and facilitating negotiations on conflicts in Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)DRC, and South Sudan. With U.S. support and President Ruto's approval, former President Kenyatta played a leading role in the AU-mediated ceasefire deal between Ethiopia's government and Tigray authorities in 2022, and a Kenyan general leadscontinues to lead the AU ceasefire monitoring team there. Kenya continues its efforts to mediate among South Sudan's political and armed factions; Ruto has tapped Odinga to act as an envoy in regional efforts to deescalate the mounting tensions in the country.

On several occasions, U.S. diplomats have worked closely with Kenya on mediation efforts, including during the CPA and Tigray talks.

Some political actors and other observers have questioned Kenya's neutrality in some of the region's conflicts.⁷⁷ Former Deputy President Gachagua, for example, has accused Ruto of profiting from the conflicts in Sudan and DRC and helping warring factions smuggle gold from those countries through Kenya.⁷⁸ According to Gachagua, Ruto has had business ties with RSF leader Hemedti since 2023, and also has links with the M23 rebel group in DRC. Reports from non-governmental organizations have named Kenya as a hub for illicit gold flows from conflict-affected countries in the region to the UAE.⁷⁹

Ethiopia. Sometimes seen as competitors, Kenya and Ethiopia have generally maintained cordial relations, but instability in Ethiopia has been a concern for Kenya in recent years.⁸⁰ The two countries sometimes collaborate on shared security concerns, both in Somalia and along their shared border. They conducted joint operations against one of Ethiopia's rebel groups, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in early 2025, and subsequently signed a new defense pact, upgrading an arrangement last negotiated in 1963. Ruto has offered to mediate between Ethiopia and Egypt in their dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), although Egypt may see Ruto, who has described the dam as a "monumental achievement" for Ethiopia, as partial.⁸¹ Kenya has increased its electricity imports from Ethiopia to meet growing energy demands, and plans to buy power produced from the GERD.⁸² In 2023, the two countries opened the Ethiopia-Kenya Electricity Highway, a $1.2 billion World Bank project through which they now share power.⁸³

Somalia. Kenya-Somalia relations are complex. Ethnic Somalis comprise an estimated 6% of Kenya's population: while some arrived in recent decades as refugees, Kenya's colonial boundaries incorporated areas inhabited by ethnic Somalis, who are the predominant group in northeast Kenya. Historically marginalized, Somali Kenyans have nevertheless sometimes played prominent roles in Kenya's government, and currently hold several of the top security posts.⁸⁴

In the early 2000s, Kenya hosted peace talks that led to the formation of Somalia's transitional federal government. It operated from Nairobi for several years until regional security operations enabled its move to Somalia. After Al Shabaab took control of much of south-central Somalia in the late 2000s, Kenya sought to create a buffer zone between its border and Al Shabaab territory. In tandem with its military incursion into southern Somalia, Kenya backed local militia and was pivotal in the establishment of Jubaland, which became one of Somalia's most autonomous federal states.⁸⁵ Jubaland has sometimes been a point of friction between the governments of Kenya and Somalia.⁸⁶ Kenya's ties with the breakaway Republic of Somaliland is another area of tension: Kenya maintains a liaison office there, and in 2025 allowed Somaliland to open its own liaison office in Nairobi.⁸⁷ Kenya and Somalia also have an unresolved maritime boundary dispute.⁸⁸ Ruto announced in early 2026 that Kenya would reopen its land border with Somalia, which has been officially closed since 2011.⁸⁹

DRC. Kenya deployed troops to eastern DRC in 2022 to lead an East African force to stabilize areas affected by a Rwandan-backed rebellion; the force withdrew in late 2023 after DRC authorities complained that East African troops were unwilling to aggressively confront the rebels. Kenya has facilitatedconfront the rebels aggressively. Ruto has continued to position Kenya as a facilitator for peace talks on the eastern DRC crisis, despite apparent suspicion by some Congolese about Kenya's interests in the country. Regional leaders have tapped Kenyatta and four other former African presidents to advance the peace process.

DRC's president accused Ruto in 2024 of taking Rwanda's side in the conflict.⁹⁰ Former President Kenyatta has nevertheless remained involved in regional mediation efforts as an AU envoy. The African-led peace process is part of a broader set of international diplomatic efforts focused on the security crisis in eastern DRC, which include a major U.S.-led mediation effort between DRC and Rwanda.⁹¹ Sudan. President Ruto has also offered to facilitate talks between Sudan's warring parties, but Sudan's military government has accused him of bias toward the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Kenya's relations with Sudan's government deteriorated in 2024 after Ruto hosted a visit by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka "Hemedti," and hit a new low in Februaryearly 2025 when Kenya allowed the RSF to hold an event to announce a parallel government in a Nairobi conference facility owned by the Kenyan government. Sudanese authorities called it "tantamount to an act of hostility."⁶⁴92 Experts subsequently identified Kenyan ammunition among weapons reportedly captured from the RSF.⁹³ Ruto's former deputy has accused him of allowing the RSF to launder money from gold through Nairobi.⁶⁵94 Kenyan officials assert that they are neutral on the conflict and have called for sanctions on the warring parties' leaders for obstructing humanitarian aid.⁶⁶

In April 2025, former Deputy President Gachagua publicly alleged that Ruto was profiting from the conflicts in Sudan and DRC and helping warring factions smuggle gold from those countries through Kenya to the Middle East.⁶⁷ According to Gachagua, Ruto has had business ties with RSF leader Hemedti since 2023, and also has links with the M23 rebel group in DRC. Kenya has been named, alongside Uganda, as a hub for illicit gold flows from the region.⁶⁸

Haiti.⁶⁹95 The U.S. Treasury Department reported in early 2026 that one of Hemedti's brothers, whom Treasury sanctioned in 2024 for his role in procuring weapons for the group, holds a Kenyan passport.⁹⁶ Haiti.⁹⁷ In July 2023, Kenya responded to an appeal byfrom the government of Haiti for help with rising gang violence, offering to lead a multinational force to assist Haitian police restorein restoring order.⁷⁰98 The UN Security Council authorized the Multinational Security Support mission (MSS) in October 2023, with Kenyan police expected to comprise roughly half of the planned 2,000-person force. Kenya's parliament approved the government's request to deploy police to Haiti in late 2023, but Kenya's High Court blocked the deployment, ruling it unconstitutional. The opposition politician who brought the case argued that Kenya needs to prioritize its own security challenges; other observers raised concerns about the human rights record of the Kenyan police.⁷¹ Per the High Court ruling, a "reciprocal arrangement" with a host government is required for a police deployment. Kenyan and Haitian officials subsequently signed that agreement in March 2024, but when Haiti's prime minister subsequently resigned amid escalating gang activity, Kenya paused the deployment. The first contingent deployed in late June 2024, following the formation of a new Haitian government. As of April 2025, the MSS had only reached 40% of its planned force strength, with over 700 Kenyan police deployed. Kenya suffered its first fatality in February.

Israel/Gaza. Kenya has long-standing ties with Israel, which Kenyan officials call a "special partnership."⁷² Ruto expressed solidarity with Israel over the October 2023 attacks by Hamas, but faces domestic pressure over Israel's military operations in Gaza.⁷³ Kenya often votes in support ofthe force. Kenya's deployment faced legal challenges and delays; the first contingent arrived in Haiti in mid-2024.⁹⁹ Hamstrung by funding, personnel, and equipment shortfalls, the MSS struggled to carry out its mission, reaching barely 1,000 of the authorized 2,500 personnel (a majority Kenyan), and the security situation in Haiti continued to worsen.¹⁰⁰ Several Kenyan police officers were killed.

In September 2025, the UN Security Council authorized the transition of the MSS into a Gang Suppression Force (GSF), which has a more robust mandate and is slated to have up to 5,500 military and police officers.¹⁰¹ Like the MSS, the GSF is not a UN mission and is reliant on voluntary contributions, but the GSF is now supported logistically by a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), which is funded through assessed peacekeeping contributions. The GSF is led by a Standing Group of Partners, which includes the United States, Canada, Kenya, and other nations that contributed forces to the MSS.

Israel/Gaza. Kenya has longstanding ties with Israel, which Kenyan officials call a "special partnership."¹⁰² Ruto expressed solidarity with Israel over the October 2023 attacks by Hamas, but has faced domestic pressure over Israel's military operations in Gaza.¹⁰³ Kenya often supports Israeli positions at the United Nations, but has also voted in favor of full UN membership for Palestine. Kenya supported resolutions calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.

Iran. In 2023, Iranian President Ebraihim Raisi made Kenya the first stop on a trip aimed at bolstering Iran's ties with Africa (Raisi also visited Uganda and Zimbabwe), and he signed a range of cooperation agreements with President Ruto, describing the visit as a turning point in Iran-Kenya relations.¹⁰⁴ It was the first visit by an Iranian leader to Kenya in over a decade—during which time Iranian agents were implicated in several possible terrorist plots purportedly targeting Western or Israeli interests in Kenya.¹⁰⁵ In response to the U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran, the Ruto Administration has called for de-escalation and diplomacy, and it has condemned the retailatory strikes by Iran on the Gulf states.¹⁰⁶

Russia/Ukraine. Kenya was a vocal critic of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when it sat on the UN Security Council.⁷⁴107 The Ruto administration took a more ambiguous stance in early 2023, hosting the foreign ministers of Belarus and Russia and announcing plans for a trade pact with Russia. (Russia-Kenya trade is limited, particularly in comparison to U.S.-Kenya trade; imports from Russia consist primarily of iron, wheat, and fertilizers; Kenya's main export to Russia is tea.) Kenyan officials subsequently called Russia's decision to exit the Black Sea Grain Initiative "a stab in the back" that would disproportionally harm the drought-affected Horn of Africa.⁷⁵108 Ruto did not attend Russia's 2023 Africa Summit, and in early 2024, Kenya joined the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a coalition of countries that supports the defense of Ukraine.

Hundreds of Kenyans, meanwhile, have reportedly been recruited or forcibly conscripted into the Russian army to fight in Ukraine.¹⁰⁹ Some say they were recruited with offers of gainful employment in Russia, but then forced to fight in Ukraine, while others, including some former members of Kenya's security forces, were reportedly recruited to fight as mercenaries. Kenyan authorities assess that as many as 1,000 Kenyan citizens have been recruited to fight for Russia and have called for Russia to bar the conscription of Kenyans.¹¹⁰ The government has shut down recruitment agencies and is prosecuting several individuals on human trafficking charges.

China. China is Kenya's largest trading partner and largest bilateral lender. PRC loans, estimated at over $8 billion, account for almost 17% of the countryKenya's external debt (the World Bank is Kenya'sits largest external creditor).⁷⁶111 While Ruto has sought to strengthen U.S. ties, he has also sought to maintain a "robust friendship" with China, despite his anti-China rhetoric during his campaign.⁷⁷112 When Ruto was Kenyatta's deputy, their coalition cultivated ties with the Communist Party of China, an effort Ruto's party continued after his election.⁷⁸113 Ruto attended China's 2023 Belt and Road Forum and its Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2024, and in April 2025, China hosted him for a state visit in April 2025. China's foreign ministry described the state visit, the first by an African leader since FOCAC, as aimed at deepening the bilateral relationship and "promoting the solidarity and cooperation of the Global South."⁷⁹ Ruto, for his part,114 Ruto sought funding for new infrastructure projects, cooperation on green energy initiatives, trade deals, better loan terms, and China's support for reforms to multilateral institutions.⁸⁰115 Chinese companies reportedly signed deals worth $823 million in new investments. In polls, Kenyans have expressed greater support for the United States as a model than the PRC, but a majority of Kenyans view China positively.⁸¹January 2026, Kenya announced a preliminary trade deal with China that would remove tariffs on over 98% of Kenyan exports to the Chinese market. Opinion polls suggest most Kenyans view Chinese investment in their country positively but see the amount of debt Kenya owes to China as a serious problem.¹¹⁶

Renditions. Human rights groups have expressed alarm over a series of abductions and renditions of foreign dissidents from Kenya, which Amnesty International describes . The abduction and rendition of several foreign dissidents from Kenya has prompted alarm from human rights advocates, including Amnesty International, which describes them as part of a "growing and worrying trend in transitionaltransnational repression."⁸²117 Several prominent cases were reported in 2024, including: the rendition of Ugandan opposition leader Kizza Besigye in November, four Turkish refugees in October (seven Turkish nationals were abducted; three were released), and 36 Ugandan opposition supporters in July.⁸³118 A Rwandan human rights defender, Yusuf Ahmed Gasana, and a South Sudanese dissident, Morris Mabior Awikjok Bak, were abducted in Kenya and forcibly returned to their countries in 2023. Bak's rendition followed several renditions to South Sudan during Kenyatta's term; Bak, like the other South Sudanese, was registered as a refugee in Kenya. In January 2025, Tanzanian activist Maria Sarungi Tsehai., a prominent critic of her country's government, was abducted by unknown assailants in Nairobi but released several hours later. What role, if any, Kenyan security officialsagents played in these incidents is debated, but the cases may tarnishhave tarnished Kenya's reputation as a relative safe haven in the region.⁸⁴119

Wildlife and Environmental Conservation

Heavily reliant on tourism for foreign exchange earnings, Kenya has implemented measures to conserve its wildlife resources and is recognized as a leader in countering wildlife trafficking in Africa. It has a stringent regulatory and legislative environment around poaching and trafficking, and has enjoyed a dramatic drop in elephant and rhino poaching in the past decade.⁸⁵120 Many anti-trafficking initiatives are implemented through the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), which enforces wildlife laws and regulations and manages the national parks and reserves. Despite its efforts to curb the illicit wildlife trade, Kenya remains a transit country. Corruption and weaknesses in enforcement and prosecution of trafficking laws are an ongoing concern.

The U.S. government has long partnered with Kenya's government and civil society to address these issues and support other conservation efforts. The United States has provided training and equipment to the KWS and supports programs to protect the country's parks and animals. Roughly 65% of Kenya's famous wildlife live outside its KWS-protected parks, and conservation groups have worked with communities to establish over 200 community conservancies to protect wildlife and promote sustainable land use. The United States has supported these conservancies, which protect over 7 million hectares of land. Tourism, much of it wildlife-related, is an important source of revenue ($2.73.5 billion in 20232024) and jobs.⁸⁶121 Kenya lost an estimated $1 billion in tourism-related revenue during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Deforestation is a long-standing concern for Kenya. Kenya's Wangari Maathai, the first African woman to win the Nobel Prize, was recognized for her tree-planting campaign and broader contributions to sustainable development, democracy, and peace. President Ruto has proposed to plant 15 billion trees over 10 yearsby 2023 to combat climate change, but in 2023, he directed an end to a six-year-old logging ban, ostensibly to create jobs. A court suspended the decision, leaving the ban in place. Environmentalists warn that lifting the logging ban would risk reversing the gains Kenyathe country has made to improve its tree cover.⁸⁷122 Among other environmental initiatives, Kenya has sought to stem plastic pollution, including by banning plastic bags and single-use plastics in 2017. With stiff penalties, the law was initially successful, but the smuggling of bags from neighboring countries presents enforcement challenges.⁸⁸

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U.S. Relations and Assistance

The United States and Kenya have historically close ties. Over 100,000 Americans live in or visit Kenya every year, per the U.S. Embassy; the country is a popular destination in Africa for American tourists.The country is a popular destination in Africa for American tourists: over 300,000 Americans visited Kenya in 2024.¹²⁴ U.S. Embassy Nairobi is designated a high-threat, high-risk post, given terrorism concerns, and over 600hundreds of U.S. servicemembers, civilians, and contractors are in Kenya to support counterterrorism (CT) efforts in the region. Some are deployed to Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Camp Simba, a U.S. "base within a base"forward operating location adjacent to a Kenyan naval base on the coast near the Somali border.

Governance, human rights, and corruption concerns in Kenya sometimes complicate the bilateral relationship, and abuses by Kenyan security forces have posed challenges at times for security cooperation. Successive U.S. Administrations have pushed for greater accountability for political violence and unresolved corruption cases. In 2024, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), of which the United States is a member, added Kenya to its "grey list" of countries subject to increased monitoring for money laundering and terrorism financing.

Bilateral relations have fluctuated in the past two decades. The ICC cases were a significant point of friction, and President Kenyatta looked to other foreign partners, notably China, for diplomatic and economic support. DuringIn the tense period after the 2017 polls, however, U.S. diplomats helped to facilitate Kenyatta and Odinga's rapprochement, suggestinga sign of continued U.S. influence despite strains in the relationship. The Trump and Kenyatta administrations. The first Trump Administration took steps to improve ties, and announced a Strategic Partnership when Kenyatta visited the White House in 2018. Nearly $900 million in commercial deals were announced during the visit, and direct flights, once blocked over U.S. security concerns, started later that year. First Lady Melania Trump visited Kenya on her first solo international trip. The Trump Administration launched a Bilateral Strategic Dialogue with Kenya in 2019 and free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations in 2020.

Relations continued to improve under the Biden Administration. Kenya was the opening stop on Antony Blinken's first trip to subSub-Saharan Africa as Secretary of State, andduring which he attended the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. He stressed the importance ofhighlighted the strategic partnership and Kenya's regional peacemaking role during the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, when the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation was signed. First Lady Jill Biden visited Kenya in early 2023, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin went to Kenya on his first subSub-Saharan Africa tour in 2023, during which a five-year Framework for Defense Cooperation was finalized. The heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation Directors both visited in 2024.

The Biden Administration expressed support for a range of Kenyan initiatives, including on climate action and renewable energy. During Ruto's 2024 State Visitstate visit, the two governments made commitments on democracy, human rights, public health, security, and countering corruption, among other issues.⁸⁹125 They announced new initiatives on education, climate action, clean energy, carbon management, and sustainable development, and unveiled a partnership on semiconductor manufacturing in Kenya to strengthen the global supply chain. They launched the Nairobi-Washington Vision, which called on the international community to help developing countries manage debt while investing in economic growth. The Biden Administration pledged new funds for police professionalization, prison reforms, health, education, agriculture, and civil society. Two resolutions introduced during the visit, S.Res. 704 and H.Res. 1254, recognized Kenya's strategic importance to the United States and celebrated the 60^th anniversary of bilateral ties.

President Biden's ambassador to Kenya, prominent American business executive Meg Whitman, focused on pitching Kenya to U.S. businesses and investors, and trade and investment were top priorities for Kenya during Ruto's State Visit.⁹⁰state visit.¹²⁶ Microsoft and Coca Cola, among other U.S. businesses, announced major private sector deals around the visit. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which has facilitated investments in renewable energy, e-mobility, digital connectivity, and infrastructure in Kenya, revealed new commitments during the visit that brought the DFC's Kenya portfolio to over $1 billion. The Biden Administration, instead of continuing FTA negotiations, pursued a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP) with Kenya, which the U.S. Trade Representative described as an "ambitious roadmap for enhanced cooperation." For more, see CRS In Focus IF11526, U.S.-Kenya Trade Negotiations.

The current Trump Administration has characterized Kenya as an important U.S. ally in Africa.¹²⁷ Secretary Rubio has publicly engaged more often with President Ruto than other African leaders, discussing the conflicts in DRC, Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan; praising Kenya's "pivotal" role in the turbulent region; and expressing appreciation for the Haiti deployment.¹²⁸ President Ruto has publicly challenged the Trump Administration on some issues, including climate change and the defunding of some UN agencies.¹²⁹ The post of U.S. ambassador to Kenya has been vacant since the end of President Biden's term.

The Trump Administration's aid cuts (discussed below) and decision to dissolve the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have reduced the U.S. footprint in Kenya. The U.S. embassy now hosts one of four foreign aid "hubs" on the continent, however, and the DFC has based a regional representative in the country. The DFC has yet to announce new projects in Kenya, but President Ruto reported in late 2025 that, in addition to the debt-for-food security swap, the DFC was willing to collaborate with Kenya on food security, infrastructure, energy, and information and communications technology.¹³⁰ Kenya was the first country to sign one of the Administration's new "Health Cooperation Frameworks," under which the State Department has committed to continue global health funding for the next five years, albeit with planned assistance levels declining during that period.

U.S. Trade. U.S. goods trade with Kenya rose fromU.S. goods trade with Kenya totaled $1.5 billion in 2024 to over $1.8 billion in 2025, with over $782990 million in U.S. exports to Kenya, up over 61% from 2023, and $727 last year and almost $860 million in imports from Kenya..¹³¹ The U.S. goods trade surplus for 20242025 was overalmost $132 million, up from $45 million in 2024. Kenya has been a leading exporter under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I of P.L. 106-200, as amended) trade preference program and the largest textile exporter to the United States under AGOA. The country now faceshas faced a 10% tariff on exports to the United States per the Trump Administration's April 2025 trade action. Kenya has appealed for the extension of AGOA, which expires in September, and sought relief from the U.S tariff decision, sending a delegation to negotiate trade terms with U.S. officials in mid-April.⁹¹ The; the U.S. Trade Representative highlightedcited Kenya's 50% tariff on imports of U.S. corn and "burdensome regulatory requirements" on corn imports amongas among the "unfair trade practices" facing U.S. exporters.¹³² Kenya has sought relief from the tariff and lobbied for the extension of AGOA, which Congress reauthorized in January 2026 through the end of the year.¹³³ The February 20, 2026 U.S. Supreme Court ruling on tariffs imposed by President Trump under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) invalidated the April 2025 tariffs, but President Trump has declared new tariffs under a different statute, leaving Kenya with a 10% tariff on most exports to the United States.¹³⁴ The AGOA reauthorization does not override this duty "unfair trade practices" facing U.S. exporters.⁹²

The Trump Administration's stance toward Kenya appears positive, despite the trade dispute. Secretary of State Rubio has spoken repeatedly with President Ruto and lauded Kenya's role in the turbulent region. Rubio and Ruto have discussed the conflicts in DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, and Rubio has expressed appreciation for Kenya's Haiti deployment. The Trump Administration's aid cuts and decision to close the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have implications for U.S. relations with the country, although the full impact of assistance cuts in Kenya is not yet clear.

U.S. Assistance. Kenya has routinely been among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden Administration allocated roughly $477479 million in FY2023FY2024 bilateral aid for Kenya, largely focused on HIV/AIDS and other health programs; more than $340 million in FY2023/FY2024 emergency humanitarian aid; and over $60 million in FY2023/FY2024 for early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience (ER4) food security programs.⁹³ With U.S. assistance, the World Food Program has been supporting approximately 650,000 refugees in Kenya with food rations. The Biden Administration requested over $496 million in bilateral aid for FY2025135 The Biden Administration's FY2025 bilateral aid request for Kenya was over $496 million.

The United States has been the largest donor to Kenya's health sector, which saw child mortality drop by more than half and life expectancy rise by over 15 years from 2000-2020.⁹⁴136 The United States has cumulatively invested over $8 billion there under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) since 2003. From 2013 to 2023, HIV infections in Kenya fell 78% and related deaths dropped by 68%. The U.S. Embassy reported in 2023 that Kenya, which has roughly 1.4 million people living with HIV-AIDS, was on the verge of achieving the UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets (95% of people with HIV diagnosed, 95% of people who know they have HIV on anti-retroviral therapy, and 95% of those on treatment virally suppressed).⁹⁵137

Some implementers of U.S.-funded health programs in Kenya have reported that the Trump Administration's suspension of most U.S. foreign assistanceaid by the Trump Administration in late January 2025 has constrainedhindered their ability to maintain programs, despite public directives from Secretary Rubio to continue life-saving activities, including under PEPFAR.⁹⁶ Reports suggest dozens of aid contracts in Kenya have been terminated, although the Administration has not published data on how much aid previously obligated for Kenya has been affected.⁹⁷ PEPFAR represents over half of the funding for Kenya's HIV programming138 The Administration has not published data on how much aid previously obligated for Kenya was subsequently cut, but reports suggest that scores of aid contracts for Kenya were terminated. According to one analysis of the cuts, by late March 2025, the Trump Administration had terminated roughly $225 million in U.S. assistance for Kenya.¹³⁹ PEPFAR represented over half of the funding for Kenya's HIV programming before the aid cuts, and while the United States and Kenya were planning a transition toward self-sustainability for the HIV response by 2030, the abrupt changes have reportedly left Kenyan health authorities struggling to find nearly $260 million to sustain critical programs.⁹⁸

140 UNAIDS reported in April 2025 that the U.S. funding disruption had resulted in HIV treatment facilities working at reduced capacity, human resource shortfalls, and HIV prevention programs scaled down.⁹⁹141 Per UNAIDS, roughly 41,500 health care and community health workers funded under PEPFAR in Kenya were sent home or directed to stop work under the initial freeze; by the end of March, 11,000roughly a quarter of them were back at work.¹⁰⁰142 The U.S. funding freeze has also reportedly affected tuberculosis treatment and malaria programs in Kenya.¹⁰¹.¹⁴³ Kenya's health ministry has reportedly warned President Rutoin March 2025 that U.S. aid disruptions have triggered a "domino effect that imperils every link in the healthcare chain."¹⁰²

144 Other reports have since documented impacts of the U.S. aid changes on Kenya's healthcare system.¹⁴⁵

The U.S. assistance disruptions haveand cuts have had implications beyond the health sector. In early MarchMarch 2025, protesters and police clashed in Kakuma refugee camp after the World Food Program reduced rations due to funding shortfalls.¹⁰³ U.S. assistance, and some reports suggest the U.S. assistance cuts led to deaths in the camp.¹⁴⁶ Aid cuts have also led relief agencies to scale back food aid to Kenyans affected by severe drought.¹⁴⁷ U.S. support for wildlife conservation, primary education, food security, anti-corruption, and election integrity in Kenya arewere also among the contractsprograms reportedly terminated.¹⁰⁴ An analysis of the reported cuts by the Center for Global Development suggests that the Trump Administration has terminated roughly $225 million in assistance for Kenya.¹⁰⁵

Security Cooperation. The United States has supported an array of efforts to help build Kenya's capacity to counter terrorist attacks, secure its borders, and foster police accountability. The extent to which these programs are affected by the foreign assistance changes in 2025 is not yet clear. Kenya has been the largest sub-Saharan African recipient of State Department-administered anti-terrorism assistance for law enforcement. News reports suggest that training and aid via the U.S. Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR) helped an elite Kenyan unit respond rapidly to the 2019 DusitD2 hotel attack in Nairobi, significantly limiting the loss of life.¹⁰⁶ Separately, the Department of Defense (DOD) has notified Congress of over $400 million in CT "train and equip" support to Kenya in the past decade, including to support its role as a major troop contributor 148 In August 2025, as a result of the Administration's foreign aid review, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) terminated a $60 million MCC threshold program that aimed to improve transport and land use in Nairobi.

New Health Framework. In December 2025, the State Department announced Kenya as the first country to sign a "Health Cooperation Framework," a new bilateral arrangement through which the Trump Administration plans to provide assistance under its America First Global Health Strategy.¹⁴⁹ Under the Kenya deal, the United States would provide $1.6 billion in global health funding to the country over the next five years, supporting not only medicine and care but also health care infrastructure, while Kenya would increase its domestic health expenditures by $850 million over the five-year period, assuming greater financial responsibility as U.S. support decreases. According to the State Department, the compact would address "priority health programs in Kenya including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), malaria, maternal and child health, polio eradication, disease surveillance, and infectious disease outbreak response and preparedness."¹⁵⁰ The deal has been controversial in Kenya, in part due to data privacy concerns, and a Kenyan court has suspended its implementation pending a constitutional challenge.¹⁵¹

Security Cooperation. The United States has supported various efforts to help build Kenya's capacity to counter terrorist attacks, secure its borders, contribute to multinational stabilization operations, professionalize its security forces, and foster police accountability. The extent to which these programs have been affected by the Trump Administration's foreign aid cuts remains unclear. Kenya, which routinely receives U.S. military assistance, has also regularly been the largest sub-Saharan African recipient of State Department-administered Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) for law enforcement. Reports suggest that training and aid via the U.S. Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR), which is funded through ATA, helped an elite Kenyan unit respond rapidly to Al Shabaab's 2019 attack on the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi, significantly limiting the loss of life.¹⁵² Among other recent security assistane obligations, the State Department has provided over $71 million in funding for a major runway expansion at Kenya's Manda Bay Air Base, the latest U.S. upgrade at the site.¹⁵³

The Department of Defense (DOD) has notified over $500 million in CT "train and equip" support for Kenya in the past two decades, including to support its role as in the AU mission in Somalia. State Department-funded security assistance has also supported Kenya's deployment to Somalia, and ongoing deliberations over funding for AUSSOM have implications for the future of that mission. The Massachusetts National Guard is paired with Kenya in the State Partnership Program.

mission's future. Some Members of the 119^th Congress have sought to restrict the use of assessed contributions to the United Nations to support the AU mission through S. 1583.¹⁵⁴

The Biden Administration was a leading advocate for the MSS mission in Haiti and Kenya's role in it. Under Biden, the State Department and DOD pledged over $380 million in support for the mission to facilitate, including training, equipment, logistics and life support services, and salary support for participating officers; the Biden Administration reportedly overrode congressional holds in mid-2024 to obligate some of that fundingfunds for Kenya's deployment.¹⁰⁷155 Some Members of Congress have expressed reservationsraised concerns about the mission, but Secretary Rubio stated in his confirmation hearing that Kenyans "deserve a lot of credit for being willing to take on that mission," and he asserted in early 2025 that the United States would continue to support the MSS and that such supportreported in early 2025, after the Administration's aid review began, that U.S. support for the MSS would be excepted from the Administration's aid freeze.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless,156 Under the Trump Administration, the State Department has reported that the United States has provided over $1 billion to support the MSS; U.S. officials have asserted that "America cannot continue shouldering such a significant financial burden," and have called on other international donors to step up support.¹⁰⁹ The Administration has not indicated how much additional assistance, if any, it plans to provide for Kenya's deployment. Kenya reported in April 2025 that it has over 260 police officers trained and ready to join the mission, but they lack the equipment and logistical support to deploy.¹¹⁰

157 Kenya's role in the new Gang Suppression Force remains unclear, but the Administration has pledged continued support for the mission.

The new head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), Gen. Dagvin Anderson, has described Kenya as "a key partner for peace and security in Africa" and characterized the security partnership as one "built over many years around shared interests, shared challenges, and a shared commitment to regional stability."¹⁵⁸ Kenyan forces routinely participate in joint exercises organized by AFRICOM and Kenya often hosts Justified Accord, AFRICOM's largest exercise in East Africa, which is focused on enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. In 2025, Kenya co-hosted the African Chiefs of Defense Conference with AFRICOM, bringing together military leaders from more than three dozen African countries. The Massachusetts National Guard is paired with Kenya in the National Guard State Partnership Program.

Footnotes

6. 8. 18. 21. 26. 33. U.S. Trade Representative, 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 1, 2025; State Department, 2025 Investment Climate Statements, September 26, 2025. African Business, "Debt or development: What is Uhuru Kenyatta's real legacy?" , "Debt or development: What is Uhuru Kenyatta's real legacy?" African Business, August 22, 2022.

Bloomberg, "Kenya's Ruto breaks ranks, says Africa must leapfrog fossil fuel," October 4, 2022; William Ruto, "Walking Our Talk on Climate Action," Project Syndicate, May 2023.

69. 97. 102. 107. 111. Amnesty International (AI), "Uganda: Opposition politician's abduction in Kenya continues a "growing and worrying trend in transitional repression," November 20, 2024.

125. The White House, "Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits," April 2, 2025; U.S. Trade Representative (@USTradeRep), X post, April 7, 2025. AGOA was reauthorized in Div. I, §5019, of the FY2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75). On AGOA and tariffs, see CQ, "Ways and Means signs off on Africa and Haiti trade programs," December 10, 2025. The White House, "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes a Temporary Import Duty to Address Fundamental International Payment Problems," February 20, 2026. See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11398, Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 136. 148. 152. SFRC, "Risch on Biden Admin's Decision to Override Congress on Haiti MSS Funding," June 20, 2024.

, 2025.

1.	Washington Post, "Kenyan president aims to attract green investment during U.S. visit," May 17, 2024.
2.	The Conversation, "Why violence is a hallmark of Kenyan policing. And what needs to change," June 5, 2020; The New Humanitarian, "Kenya police violence is colonial and institutional, as well as political," June 26, 2025.
3.	The Economist, "Who is William Ruto?," August 16, 2022 and "Will William Ruto serve the people or himself and his pals?" October 25, 2022; and The New York Review, "The Political Education of William Ruto," March 8, 2023.
4.	On Kenyan civil society concerns, see, e.g., Kenya Human Rights Commission, "Nomination by President William Ruto of Mr. Noordin Haji for appointment of spy chief is an affront to the constitution of Kenya 2010," May 21, 2023.
5.	President of the Republic of Kenya, "Kenya will protect investors," July 13, 2023;See, e.g., Financial Times, "Kenyan leader says World Bank and IMF are 'hostage' to rich nations," June 23, 2023; Jaysim Hanspal and Nicholas NorbrookThe Africa Report, "Ruto wants 'fair conversation' over climate finance for Africa," The Africa Report, June 20, 2023.
6.	Kenya Human Rights Commission, "Kenya marching slowly into a police state," July 21, 2023.
75.	The 1998 Al Qaeda attack on the U.S. embassy killed 213 people, including 12 U.S. citizens, and injured over 4,000. Al Qaeda operatives simultaneously attacked the U.S. embassy in Tanzania, killing 11 people and injuring over 85.	For more, see Michela Wrong, It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, Harper Perennial: 2010.
	7.	The Commission of Inquiry's report is available at https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf.	Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bensouda, regarding Trial Chamber's decision to vacate charges against Messrs William Samoi Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, April 6, 2016.
9.	The Prosecutor v. Paul Gicheru, Document Containing Charges, ICC-01/09-01/20-125-Conf-AnxA, March 12, 2021.
10.	Daily Nation (Nairobi), "Maraga defends Judiciary, says court orders must be obeyed," February 7, 2018.
11.	Sen. Cory Booker and Chris Coons, "Statement on Current Political Situation in Kenya," February 7, 2018; Mark Bellamy and Johnnie Carson, "How and why the US should intervene in Kenya," African Arguments, February 2018.
12.	Daily Nation, "Ruto: Handshake between Uhuru and Raila was a stab in the back," March 6, 2022.
13.	Macharia Gaitho, "All you need to know about the clash between Kenyatta and Ruto," Al Jazeera, August 18, 2019.
14Al Jazeera, "All you need to know about the clash between Kenyatta and Ruto," August 18, 2019; Daily Nation, "Ruto: Handshake between Uhuru and Raila was a stab in the back," March 6, 2022. 13.	See, e.g., Deutsche Welle, "Kenya's disillusioned youth shun election," August 5, 2022; and Nanjala Nyabola, "The Kenyan Kakistocracy," The Nation (New York City), August 17, 2022.
1514.	Ruto's running mate, Rigathi Gachagua, faced corruption and money laundering charges during the 2022 elections. Before the polls, a court ordered him to forfeit $1.7 million in state funds it determined he had illicitly acquired.
1615.	Eromo EgbejuleAl Jazeera, "Courting the Kikuyu: Kenyan politicians split biggest voting bloc," Al Jazeera, August 6, 2022; and Nic Cheeseman, et al., "Three critical questions will determine the Kenyan election," The Elephant, July 26, 2022.
1716.	The East African, "Polls body on the spot as Kenyans prepare for region's most expensive election," May 6, 2022; Rose Mosero, "In Kenya's 2022 elections, technology and data protection must go hand-in-hand," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 8, 2022; Gabrielle Lynch, "Kenya's elections are proof of change since 2007 violence, but more reform is needed," The Conversation, September 6, 2022.
18.	Job Mwaura, "Kenya protests: Gen Z shows the power of digital activism—driving change from screens to the streets," The Conversation, June 22, 2024.
1917.	On Kenyan civil society concerns, see, e.g., Kenya Human Rights Commission, "Nomination by President William Ruto of Mr. Noordin Haji for appointment of spy chief is an affront to the constitution of Kenya 2010," May 21, 2023.	The Economist, "A new breed of protest has left Kenya's president tottering," June 27, 2024.
2019.	Statement by the Police Reforms Working Group Kenya, June 25, 2024.
21.	CNN, "CNN witnesses protesters being shot in Kenya," July 1, 2024.
22.	Reuters, "Kenyan activists rethink strategy after protests turn violent," July 4, 2024.
23Ellen Ioanes, "What Kenya's deadly protests are really about," Vox, June 29, 2024; Africa Report, "Kenya: How opulence of Ruto's allies sparked public anger before protests," July 1, 2024.
20.	Statement by the Police Reforms Working Group Kenya, June 25, 2024.
Afrobarometer, "For the first time in a decade, Kenyans see management of the economy as their most important problem," December 26, 2023 and "Dissatisfaction, disengagement mark outlook of young Kenyans," October 3, 2023.
2422.	TIFA Research, "Year-end poll: Kenyans' Reflections of 2023," December 29, 2023.
2523. Bloomberg.	Ellen Ioanes, "What Kenya's deadly protests are really about," Vox, June 29, 2024; Africa Report, "Kenya: How opulence of Ruto's allies sparked public anger before protests," July 1, 2024.
26.	Bloomberg, "Kenya prepares spending cuts after scrapping $2.3 billion taxes," June 28, 2024.
2724.	U.S. Embassy Nairobi, "Joint Statement by Ambassadors and High Commissioners on Protests," June 25, 2024; State Department, "Secretary Blinken's Call with Kenyan President William Ruto," June 26, 2024.
2825.	VOA, "Ruto falsely accuses Ford Foundation of funding violence in Kenya," July 25, 2024.	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), State of Human Rights in Kenya: July 2023-November 2024, November 20, 2024.
2927.	KNCHR, "Surge of abductions and killings in Kenya: A call for immediate action and accountability," October 31, 2024; CNN, "Kenyan government critics mysteriously disappeared. They came back silenced.," January 9 2025; Al Jazeera, "'Very worrying': Fear stalks Kenya as dozens of government critics abducted," March 4, 2025; Defenders Coalition, State of the Nation Address by National Civil Society Organizations, Press Statement, April 14, 2025.
3028.	Amnesty International (AI) statement on January 31, 2025 citing updated KNCHR figures.
31BBC News, "Kenyan minister alleges intelligence agency behind his son's abduction," January 15, 2025. 29.	Citizen (Nairobi), "'Irredeemably corrupt': Muturi drops bombshell linking President Ruto to shady multi-billion deals," April 4, 2025
32.
30.	Middle East Eye, "Kenya's former vice president calls for Ruto to be sanctioned over Sudan war," April 10, 2025.
31.	See, e.g., Africa Confidential, "The battle for ODM's soul," February 20, 2026; The Africa Report, "Kenya: Is Winnie Odinga positioning herself to inherit her father Raila's political mantle?" December 10, 2025.
32.	Amnesty International, "This Fear, Everyone is Feeling It": Tech-facilitated Violence Against Young Activists in Kenya, November 19, 2025; The Guardian, "'This is lawfare': Kenya 'weaponising the law' to silence critics and protesters," August 8, 2025.
Gabrielle Lynch, "Kenya has changed: Gen-Z protests and what they mean," Democracy in Africa, July 16, 2024.
3334.	Reuters, "Kenya could follow Uganda as East African nations wage war on LGBTQ rights," June 23, 2023.
34.	The Guardian, "Kenya's LGBTQ community wins bittersweet victory in battle for rights," March 3, 2023; The Guardian, "Exiles from Uganda's harsh anti-gay laws fear 'moral panic' legislation could follow them," July 7, 2025. On congressional concerns, see, e.g., H.Res. 1324 in the 118th Congress and Congressional Equality Caucus, "Equality Caucus on Ugandan Court Failing to Overturn Anti-Homosexuality Act," April 3, 2024.
35.	Reuters, "'No room' for gays in Kenya, says deputy president," May 4, 2015; and Reuters, "For LGBTQ Kenyans, court win prompts backlash as threats escalate," April 20, 2023.
36.	Charlie MitchellThe Guardian, "Kenya's LGBTQ community wins bittersweet victory in battle for rights," March 3, 2023; Evie Brown, "Navigating the politics of backlash: LGBTQ+ rights and the Family Protection Bill in Kenya," ODI Global, November 5, 2025.	37.
38.	World Bank, Poverty & Inequality Assessment 2023 (most recent available).
39.
3740.	See, e.g., Abdi Latif Dahir New York Times, "The troubles of Kenya's China-funded train," New York Times, August 9, 2022.
3841.	Jonathan KaimanLos Angeles Times, "'China has conquered Kenya': Inside Beijing's new strategy to win African hearts and minds," Los Angeles Times, " August 7, 2017.
3942.	Total public debt is estimated at $80 billion, of which $35 billion is owed to foreign lenders. Per the IMF's 2023 Debt Sustainability Analysis, multilateral creditors account for 47% of Kenya's external debt and bilateral creditors 28%. Almost 65% of Kenya's bilateral debt is to non-Paris Club members, mainly loans from China.
4043.	Reuters, "Kenya publishes loan documents for Chinese-built railway," November 7, 2022.
4144.	Deutsche Welle, "Kenya: Bumpy first year in office for William Ruto," September 12, 2023; New York Times, "Behind the deadly unrest in Kenya, a staggering and painful national debt," June 26, 2024.
4245.	William Ruto, "If you want our countries to address climate change, first pause our debts," New York Times, October 8, 2023.
4346.	Antony Sguazzin, "Kenya's Ruto breaks ranks, says Africa must leapfrog fossil fuel," Bloomberg, Reuters, "Kenya, US agency to proceed with $1 billion debt-for-food swap," December 4, 2025.
47.	World Meteorological Organization, "Kenya State of the Climate Report highlights growing climate risks," 2024.
48.	See Robina Abuya, Kenya's Green Leadership – Shaping Africa's Climate Future, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2025; and President of the Republic of Kenya, "Kenya to be Africa's Voice on Climate Change at the UN Security Council, President Kenyatta Says," November 1, 2022.
49.	International Energy Agency data.
50.
4451.	Business Daily, "Treasury targets coal excise duty as President Ruto backs local mining plans," January 1, 2024.
4552.	For Ruto's speech, see https://nation.africa/kenya/news/full-speech-read-ruto-s-stinging-message-at-cop27-4012092.
4653.	President of the Republic of Kenya, "Green growth is the answer to climate change," December 2, 2023; and BloombergBloomberg, "Africa's self-appointed climate champion makes the hard sell," December 8, 2023; Katharine Houreld, and Washington Post, "Kenyan president aims to attract green investment during U.S. visit, Washington Post," May 17, 2024.
47.	AP, "Poor Kenyans feel devastated by floods and brutalized by the government's response," May 11, 2024.
48.	Sean Avery, "Kenya's devastating floods expose decades of poor urban planning and bad land management," The Conversation, May 1, 2024.
49.	IPC, Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for February-March 2025 and Projection for April-June 2025.
50.	UNHCR, Kenya: Registered Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, as of 28 February 2025.
51.	Refugees International, Removing Red Tape to Get Kenya's Refugee Act Right, March 13, 2025.
52.	The New Humanitarian, Kenya embraces refugee integration – and citizens are on board," April 21, 2025.
53.	ACLED, "Assessing Al Shabaab's threat to the region as Somalia joints the East Africa Community," December 8, 2023 and "Kenya-Somalia border: Rising Al-Shabaab threat in the wake of ATMIS drawdown," September 1, 2023.
54.	ACLED data.
55.	Amani Africa, "Update briefing on the status and operations of the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia," April 10, 2025; Institute for Security Studies, "Funding for Somalia's new AU peace mission hangs in the balance," February 19, 2025. See also UN Security Council Resolution 2767 (2024), December 27, 2024.
5654.	"Diana Kruzman, "Welcome to Kenya's Great Carbon Valley: a bold new gamble to fight climate change," MIT Technology Review, December 22, 2025.
55.	For more, see Abuya, Kenya's Green Leadership.
56.	Shadrack Omuka, "USAID freeze puts Kenya's renewable energy ambitions at risk," The Progressive, June 4, 2025.
57.	FEWS NET, "Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes expanding as anomalous dry conditions intensify," January 2026.
58.	Action Against Hunger, "Escalating Malnutrition and Acute Food Shortage in Kenya's ASAL Counties Amid Worsening Drought," February 18, 2026.
59.	UNHCR, "Refugee and Asylum-seekers in Kenya," Operational Data Portal, data as of January 31, 2026.
60.	World Food Program, "WFP warns of catastrophic shortfalls in Somalia with millions at risk of deepening hunger crisis," February 20, 2026 and "Conflict and funding cuts fuel soaring hunger in South Sudan," November 18, 2025.
61.	WFP, WFP Kenya Country Brief, March 2025, March 31, 2025; The Guardian, "Refugees in Kenya's Kakuma camp clash with police after food supplies cut," March 5, 2025; The New Humanitarian, "Cut to the bone, The cost of ration cuts and delivery delays in Kenya's refugee camps," August 26, 2025.
62.	CNN, "Kenyan official to U.N.: Relocate world's largest refugee camp, or we'll do it," April 11, 2015.
63.	State Department, Remarks by Secretary Kerry, Press Availability in Nairobi, Kenya, May 4, 2015.
64.	Refugees International, Removing Red Tape to Get Kenya's Refugee Act Right, March 13, 2025.
65.	The New Humanitarian, "Kenya embraces refugee integration – and citizens are on board," April 21, 2025.
66.	Justice Department, "Cholo Abdi Abdullah sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to commit 9/11-style terrorist attack on behalf of al-Shabaab," December 22, 2025.
67.	Tricia Bacon, "Inside the Minds of Somalia's ascendant insurgents: An Identity, Mind, Emotions and Perceptions Analysis of Al-Shabaab," Program on Extremism at George Washington University, March 2022; UN Development Program (UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and Tipping Point for Recruitment, 2017.
68.	Partha Moman, "With AUSSOM's funding challenges here to stay, what are the options for the Mission's future in Somalia?" International Peace Institute, January 16, 2026; U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote – UN Security Council Resolution on AUSSOM, December 27, 2024.
For more on pastoralist and ethnic militia activity, see, e.g., ACLED, "Increasing Security Challenges in Kenya," March 2, 2023 and "Kenya: Government operation brings calm to North Rift region," August 4, 2023.
5770.	The New Humanitarian, "Kenya's security paradox: Police sent to Haiti as banditry plagues North Rift," September 4, 2024; Nation, "Renewed bandit attacks in Kerio Valley undermine government peace efforts," January 28, 2025.
5871.	See, e.g., New York Times, "Haiti, desperate for peace, turns to police notorious for violence," October 4, 2023; CNNCNN, "Dozens 'disappeared' by security forces, rights group says," July 19, 2016; Al Jazeera, "Killing Kenya," September 23, 2015; and UN Development Program, Journey to Extremism in Africa, September 2017.
59.	Standing Committee on Justice, Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on the Inquiry into Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances in Kenya, Senate, Twelfth Parliament, Republic of Kenya, October 2021.
60.	Missing Voices, End Police Impunity—2023 Annual Report, April 23, 2024.
61.	AFP, "Kenyan police charged with crimes against humanity over 2017 crackdown," October 28, 2022.
62.	Citizen (Nairobi), "Mudavadi says police brutality, use of excessive force do not happen in Kenya," February 15, 2024; and The Standard (Nairobi), "Interior CS Kindiki refutes claims of police brutality," July 25, 2023.
63.	Report of the National Taskforce on Police Reforms, November 2023.
64.	New York Times, "Amid regional diplomatic furor, Sudan's paramilitaries forge a rival government," February 23, 2025.
65.	Middle East Eye, "Kenya's former vice president calls for Ruto to be sanctioned over Sudan war," April 10, 2025.
66and Washington Post, "Kenya's heavy-handed war on terror," May 7, 2015.
72.	Missing Voices, 2023 Annual Report, April 2024 and 2024 Annual Report, May 2025.
73.	Human Rights Watch, "Kill Those Criminals": Security Force Violations in Kenya's 2017 Elections, October 2017.
74.	AFP, "Kenyan police charged with crimes against humanity over 2017 crackdown," October 28, 2022.
75.	Kenya Human Rights Commission, "Kenya marching slowly into a police state," July 21, 2023; HRW, "Unchecked Injustice": Kenya's Suppression of the 2023 Anti-Government Protests, November 5, 2024.
76.	Report of the National Taskforce on Police Reforms, November 2023.
77.	Al Jazeera, Peacemaker or peacebreaker? Why Kenya's good neighbour reputation is marred," March 6, 2025.
78.	The Africa Report, "Kenya: Ex-allies lambast Ruto, accuse him of war profiteering," April 11, 2025; The Standard (Nairobi), "Gachagua drops diplomatic bombshell on Ruto," April 8, 2025.
79.	Bloomberg, "Kenya serves as a hub for smuggled gold from region," June 3, 2025; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Tarnished hope: Crime and corruption in South Sudan's gold sector, May 2023.
80.	Mvemba Dizolele et al., Vying for Regional Leadership in the Horn of Africa: Kenya and Ethiopia, Competitors or Partners? February 24, 2025; President William Ruto, The Annual Report to Parliament on the State of National Security, November 2025.
81.	CapitalFM, "Ruto says Kenya backs fair Nile water use, urges Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan to pursue good-faith talks," September 9, 2025.
82.	The Africa Report, "Kenya's power crisis reality: Why Ethiopia still holds the switch," February 16, 2026.
83.	CNN, "The $1 billion electricity highway that allows Ethiopia and Kenya to share their power," December 14, 2024.
84.	Tabea Scharrer, "'Ambiguous citizens': Kenyan Somalis and the question of belonging," Journal of Eastern African Studies, June 16, 2018; Keren Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders: Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya, Ohio University Press: 2017; HRW, "Victory for Kenyans denied citizenship," February 26, 2025.
85.	For more, see International Crisis Group, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, February 15, 2012 and "Jubaland in jeopardy: The uneasy path to state-building in Somalia," May 21, 2013.
86.	New York Times, Somalia severs diplomatic ties with Kenya," December 15, 2020; ICG, "Ending the dangerous standoff in Southern Somalia," July 14, 2020; DefenseWeb, "The Jubaland Forces incursion: Safeguarding Kenya's territorial integrity amid regional volatility," October 7, 2025.
87.	The Africa Report, "Somaliland's Nairobi gambit: Embassy or provocation?" May 30, 2025.
88.	New York Times, "Why a sea dispute has Somalia and Kenya on edge," October 12, 2021.
89.	For more, see Deutsche Welle, "Security fears linger as Kenya set to open Somalia border," February 24, 2026.
90.	Africanews, "Conflict in eastern DRC: Tshisekedi criticizes Ruto on Nairobi process," August 13, 2024.
91.	See also CRS Insight IN12619, Peace Process in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Issues for Congress.
92.	New York Times, "Amid regional diplomatic furor, Sudan's paramilitaries forge a rival government," February 23, 2025.
93.	Bellingcat, "Kenyan weapons linked to Sudan's civil war," June 15, 2025.
94.	Middle East Eye, "Kenya's former vice president calls for Ruto to be sanctioned over Sudan war," April 10, 2025.
95.	Nation, "Mudavadi: Kenya wants warring Sudan leaders sanctioned," April 16, 2025.
96.	Treasury Department, "Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Rapid Support Forces Procurement Director, October 8, 2024 and Specially Designated Nationals List Update, February 19, 2026.
Nation, "Mudavadi: Kenya wants warring Sudan leaders sanctions," April 16, 2025.
67.	The Africa Report, "Kenya: Ex-allies lambast Ruto, accuse him of war profiteering," April 11, 2025; The Standard (Nairobi), "Gachagua drops diplomatic bombshell on Ruto," April 8, 2025.
68.	See, e.g., Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Tarnished hope: Crime and corruption in South Sudan's gold sector, May 31, 2023;
69.	For more on the Haiti situation, see CRS Insight IN12331, Haiti in Crisis: What Role for aDevelopments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission? and CRS Report R47394, Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy.
7098.	Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua (@DrAlfredMutua), X Post, July 29, 2023.
71.	99. Kenya's parliament approved the government's request to deploy police to Haiti in late 2023, but its High Court blocked the deployment, ruling that it required a "reciprocal arrangement" with a host government, which Kenyan and Haitian officials signed in early 2024. BBC, "Kenya court blocks police deployment to Haiti," January 26, 2024; Luke TaylorThe Guardian, "Kenya's offer to send police to Haiti sparks human rights concerns," The Guardian, August 5, 2023; New York Times, "Haiti, desperate for peace, turns to police notorious for violence," October 4, 2023.
72100.	The New Humanitarian, "The new Gang Suppression Force and what it means for Haitians," December 3, 2025.
101.	The Security Council authorized the GSF in Resolution 2793 (2025), sponsored by the United States and Panama..
The East African, "Kenya, Israel agree to enhance cooperation on health and security," July 29, 2021.
73103.	The Star (Nairobi), "Kenya stands with Israel, Ruto says amidst war with Palestine," October 8, 2023; President William Ruto (@WilliamsRuto), X Post, February 1, 2024.
74104.	VOA, "Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi Kicks Off Africa Tour in Kenya," July 12, 2023.
105.	The Star, "Police uncover terror plans by an Iranian national in Kenya," November 28, 2021.
106.	President William Ruto (@WilliamsSRuto), X post, March 2, 2026.
NPR, "Kenyan U.N. Ambassador compares Ukraine's plight to colonial legacy in Africa," February 22, 2022.
75108.	BBC News, "Russia's grain deal exit is a stab in the back—Kenya," July 18, 2023.
76109.	AFP, "Lies, horror, trauma: Kenyans recount forced Russian recruitment," February 9, 2026; Washington Post, "Kenyan job seekers were lured to Russia, then sent to die in Ukraine," February 2, 2026.
110.	BBC News, "Over 1,000 Kenyans enlisted to fight in Russia-Ukraine war," February 19, 2026.
Fergus Kell, "Kenya's debt struggles go far deeper than Chinese loans," Chatham House, May 31, 2023; Africa Center for Open Governance, Kenya's Debt Treadmill: The China Portfolio 2000-2024, December 2024.
77112.	During his campaign, Ruto pledged to deport Chinese nationals doing jobs that could be done by Kenyans. On his post-election shift, see, e.g., VOA, "After anti-China campaign, Kenya's Ruto does about-face," September 29, 2022.
78113.	CapitalFM, "Kenya: UDA seeks support of Communist Party of China to Strengthen Structures," August 17, 2023.
79114.	PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference, April 17, 2025.
80115.	Citizen, "Inside President Ruto's China Statestate visit," April 20, 2025. Star (Nairobi), "President Ruto takes the mic in Beijing, calls for global shake-up," April 23, 2025.
81.	Per a 2024 survey, 78% of Kenyans have a favorable view of the United States, while 73% have a favorable view of China. Pew Research Center, "More people view the U.S. positively than China across 35 surveyed countries," July 9, 2024; Afrobarometer, "Africans welcome China's influence but maintain democratic aspirations," November 15, 2021.
82.	AI116.	Pew Research Center, "Views of China in Middle-Income Countries," July 15, 2025.	117.
83118.	OHCHR, Comment by UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk on abduction of Ugandan opposition leader Kizza Besigye," November 21, 2024; BBC, "UN 'deeply concerned' Kenya returned Turkish refugees," October 21, 2024.
84119.	The Africa Report, "Is Kenya the new haven for international abductions?" January 17, 2025; BBC News, "'We live in fear – forced expulsions taint Kenya's safe haven image," November 6, 2024; VOA, "Top Kenyan official claims Kenya is 'safe haven' as cases of state-sanctioned abductions surge," November 28, 2024.
85120.	Andres SchipaniFinancial Times, "How Kenya turned the tide against ivory poachers," Financial Times, April 27, 2021.
86121.	BloombergCitizen, "Kenya's tourism sector hit record Ksh.452 billion earnings in 2024," September 23, 2025. 122 tourism earnings jump 32% to surpass pre-pandemic level," March 30, 2024.
87.	Lisa Fuchs, "Kenya's logging ban has been lifted—it's a political decision and a likely setback for conservation," The Conversation, July 22, 2023.
88123.	NPRNPR, "The toughest plastic bag ban is failing: A tale of smugglers, dumps and dying goats," August 9, 2023.
89124.	Kenya Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, Annual Tourism Sector Performance Report 2024.	White House, Fact Sheet: Kenya State Visit to the United States, May 23, 2024.
90126.	Nahal ToosiPOLITICO, "Meg Whitman's trying to be a different kind of US ambassador. Washington is noticing," POLITICO, May 22, 2024.
91.	See, e.g., William Ruto (@WilliamsRuto), X post, March 26, 2025.
92.	U.S. Trade Representative (@USTradeRep), X post, April 7, 2025.
93.	USAID, Kenya Assistance Overview, August 2024. For aid obligations, see foreignassistance.gov/cd/kenya/.
94May 22, 2024.
127.	See, e.g., State Department, "United States and Kenya sign five-year, $2.5 billion Health Cooperation Framework," December 4, 2025 and "Advancing Trump Administration priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa," September 25, 2025.
128.	See, e.g., State Department, Secretary Rubio's Meeting with Kenyan President Ruto," September 24, 2025 and "State Department, Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Kenyan President Ruto at the Signing of a Health Framework of Cooperation," December 4, 2025, and State Department readouts of Secretary Rubio's calls with President Ruto.
129.	Financial Times, "Kenya's Ruto says western leaders have broken 'climate blood pact'," September 8, 2025; France24, "'Unless the UN is reformed, its own survival is at stake,' Kenya's Ruto says," September 25, 2025; Daily Nation, "Kenya says defunding UN will be disastrous amid UN withdrawal," February 10, 2026.
130.	President William Samoei Ruto (@Williamsruto), X post, December 3, 2025.
131.	U.S. Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Kenya," accessed February 2026.
132.	133.	134.
135.	USAID, Kenya Assistance Overview, August 2024. For aid obligations, see foreignassistance.gov/cd/kenya/.
State Department, "The United States and Kenya: Strategic Partners," November 16, 2021. Alongside U.S. foreign assistance programs, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research-Africa have long-standing partnerships with Kenya, including on disease surveillance. The United States donated over 12 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to Kenya.
95137.	U.S. Embassy Nairobi, "PEPFAR in Kenya," August 10, 2023, available at https://ke.usembassy.gov/pepfar/.
96138.	See, e.g., Washington Post, "Trumps PEPFAR cuts upend the lives of Kenyan families battling HIV," April 5, 2025.
97139.	Justin Sandefur and Charles Kenny, "USAID Cuts: New Estimates at the Country Level," Center for Global Development (CGD), March 26, 2025.
98140.	Washington Post, "Trump's PEPFAR cuts upend the lives of Kenyan families battling HIV," April 5, 2025.
99141.	UNAIDS, "Impact of US funding freeze on HIV programmes in Kenya," April 5, 2025.
100142.	Washington Post, "Trump's PEPFAR cuts upend the lives of Kenyan families battling HIV," April 5, 2025.
101143.	New York Times, "Tuberculosis resurgent as Trump funding cut disrupts treatment globally," March 11, 2025.
102144.	Devex, "Kenyan govt internal memo warns of 'domino effect' of US health cuts," March 26, 2025.
103145.	Physicians for Human Rights, "The System is folding in on itself": The Impact of U.S. Global Health Funding Cuts in Kenya, July 2025.
146.	New Yorker, "The shutdown of U.S.A.I.D. has already killed hundreds of thousands," November 5, 2025 and "Rovina's Choice," November 4, 2025; The New Humanitarian, "Cut to the bone, The cost of ration cuts and delivery delays in Kenya's refugee camps," August 26, 2025; and Pro Publica, "Inside the Trump Administration's Man-Made Hunger Crisis," December 17, 2025.
147.	Reuters, "Drought deepens hunger in northern Kenya as aid cuts bite," February 19, 2026.
POLITICO, "'People will die': UN food aid agency warns Trump-led Western donor cuts will see millions starve," March 21, 2025.
104.	Devex, "How the US foreign aid freeze threatens African conservation work," February 2025; Afrianews, "Kenya wildlife park fears poacher resurgence after USAID cuts," August 26, 2025; "The Independent, "The struggle to protect wildlife around the world as Trump's aid cuts start to bite," August 1, 2025; TIME, "Her small business helps disabled kids learn. USAID cuts have pushed it towards bankrupcy," March 4, 2025. 149.
105.	Sandefur and Kenny, "USAID cuts: New estimates at the country level."
106For more, see State Department, America First Global Health Strategy, September 2025.
150.	State Department, "United States and Kenya Sign Five-Year, $2.5 Billion Health Cooperation Framework," December 4, 2025.
151.	Jurist, "Kenya dispach: High Court halts Kenya-US health deal over constitutional concerns," December 30 2025. On the data privacy concerns, see, e.g., Allan Maleche et al., "Health data protection and governance under the Kenya-US Health Agreement," Harvard Health and Human Rights Journal, December 17, 2025.
Reuters, "After Westgate Debacle, Quick End to Latest Kenyan Attack Shows Progress," January 20, 2019.
107.	Senate Foreign Relations Committee153.	Task & Purpose, "US starts $70 million upgrade to Kenyan airfield used in Somalia operations," February 1, 2026; Stars & Stripes, "Living quarters upgrade in works at Kenya camp key to US operations in Somalia," November 18, 2025.
154.	Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), "Risch, Cruz, Scott Introduce Bill to protect American taxpayer dollars from African peacekeeping operation," May 2, 2025.
155.
108156.	SFRC, Hearing on Pending Nominations, January 15, 2025; and State Department, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Dominican President Luis Abinader at a Joint Press Availability, February 6, 2025.
109157.	US. Mission to the United Nations, Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Haiti, April 21, 2025; State Department, "Advancing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities in Haiti: Deliverables and Next Steps," September 24, 2025.	158.	AFRICOM, "U.S.-Kenyan partnership advances security cooperation," January 29, 2026.
110.	Associated Press, "Haiti could face total chaos without more international support, UN envoy warns," April 21, 2025.