Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

in Brief

Updated March 7, 2025

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R45122

Congressional Research Service

SUMMARY

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

10, 2026 (R45122) Jump to Main Text of Report

Contents

• Background: Taliban Takeover
• Taliban Government
• Foreign Relations
• Economic Contraction and Humanitarian Crisis
• Terrorist Groups
• Afghan Women and Girls
• U.S. Policy and Congressional Action
• U.S. Ends Efforts to Relocate and Resettle Afghan Allies
• U.S. Ends Foreign Assistance in Afghanistan
• Sanctions and Afghan Central Bank Reserves
• Other Issues
• Outlook

Summary

Afghanistan under the Taliban, the Sunni Islamist group that retook power in 2021 as the United States ended its 20-year military and development mission in Afghanistan, remains one of the world’'s poorest countries and a haven for some international terrorist groups. Many of the challenges that U.S. policymakers sought to address after 2021 persist, though Afghanistan appears to have receded as a U.S. priority and it is unclear what considerations, beyond terrorism concerns, might shape Trump Administration policy toward the country.

U.S. policy under the second Administration of President Donald Trump has been characterized by reversals of post-2021 U.S. efforts to provide assistance to the people of Afghanistan and to secure the removal and resettlement of Afghans who worked for the United States and former U.S.-backed government.

The Taliban's post-2021 rule has nearly exceeded their previous 1996-2001 rule in length, and has arguably far surpassed it in terms of internal control and de facto international acceptance. The Taliban do not currently appear to face political or armed opposition that represent a serious threat to the group or its authoritarian rule. Signs of dissension in the group’'s ranks have emerged along various lines have emerged, although the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes. NoRussia is the sole country hasto officially recognizedrecognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’'s government, although severaldozens of others operate embassies in Kabul and/or have allowed the Taliban to staff Afghan diplomatic facilities abroad. The United States does not recognize the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan and reports there are no U.S. diplomatic or military personnel in the country.

Members of Congress have focused on several aspects of the Taliban’s renewed rule and related implications for U.S. interests, including the following:

• Counterterrorism. The Islamic State (a historic Taliban adversary) and Al Qaeda (a historic partner) continue to maintain a presence in Afghanistan. While Al Qaeda has maintained its close relationship with the Taliban, the Afghanistan-based Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, or ISKP) has violently opposed the Taliban. ISKP is presently seen as a much more significant threat within Afghanistan and beyond, having conducted major terrorist attacks in Russia and Iran in 2024.

• Afghan women and girls. The Taliban have implemented severe restrictions on women and girls in Afghanistan that may constitute crimes against humanity, according to United Nations experts. These restrictions, including bans on girls attending school above the primary level and on women working in nearly any capacity, reportedly have had hugely detrimental impacts, most immediately on the health and well-being of Afghan women and girls, as well as on Afghanistan’s economy and society more broadly.

• U.S. assistance. In response to Afghanistan’s intersecting humanitarian and economic crises, the United States allocated nearly $3 billion for humanitarian and development assistance between October 2021 and December 2024. Some Members of Congress have voiced concern over reports that some U.S. aid has been diverted by, or otherwise benefitted, the Taliban. The Trump Administration’s moves to freeze aid funds globally and terminate most assistance awards reportedly have led to the closure of dozens of Afghan non- governmental organizations that received U.S. funding via United Nations (UN) agencies or other entities.

• Relocation and resettlement

Aspects of Taliban rule in Afghanistan include the following:

• A severely degraded human rights situation. The Taliban have placed extreme restrictions on women and girls, including bans on general education above the primary level and on formal employment in nearly any capacity.
• The continued presence of terrorist groups, including the Islamic State (a historic Taliban adversary) and Al Qaeda (a historic partner).
• A slowly stabilizing economy amidst ongoing humanitarian needs by nearly half of Afghans.

The second Trump Administration has reversed the Biden Administration's foreign assistance and immigration policies toward Afghanistan.

U.S. assistance. The United States disbursed over $3.8 billion for humanitarian and development assistance in Afghanistan after October 2021. As of mid-2025, the Trump Administration "has terminated all foreign assistance awards with activities in Afghanistan," per the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which itself terminated in January 2026.

Relocation and resettlement of Afghan allies. For over three years after the U.S. withdrawal, the United States facilitated the relocation of Afghan allies who worked on behalf of former U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Between August 2021 and August 2024, nearly 150, resettling over 190,000 Afghans resettled in the United States; tens of thousands of additional Afghans who remain in Afghanistan or other countries potentially qualify for various forms of immigration relief, including Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs). President Donald Trump’s January 2025 suspension of refugee admission reportedly prevented some Afghans from entering the United States, and the Administration has reportedly directed the State Department office that has overseen Afghan resettlement efforts to plan for its closure.

Congressional oversight of U.S. policy on Afghanistan has included numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy, including from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which is statutorily mandated to terminate in January 2026.

To date, the Trump Administration does not appear to have undertaken any major actions with regard to Afghanistan specifically, though Administration moves to suspend foreign aid disbursements and refugee processing have had implications for some Afghans as noted above. Potential future U.S. policy issues could relate to President Trump’s stated desire for the return of U.S.-origin military materiel from Afghanistan or, more broadly, U.S. approaches toward Afghanistan and the Taliban calibrated to align with the Trump Administration’s stated foreign policy objectives of making the United States stronger, safer, and more prosperous.

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Clayton Thomas Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Background: Taliban Takeover

The chapter of Afghan history that ended with the Taliban’in the United States between August 2021 and mid-2025. The Trump Administration has ended these relocation efforts and has shuttered the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE). Citing national security concerns (including in the wake of the November 2025 shooting in Washington, DC, of two National Guard members by an Afghan national), the Administration has also suspended the processing of all visas to Afghans, including Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs).

Afghanistan appears to have since receded as a subject of public attention and as a foreign policy priority in the aftermath of the Taliban's 2021 takeover; "Afghanistan" does not appear in either the 2025 National Security Strategy or the 2026 National Defense Strategy. A Trump Administration State Department official stated in February 2026 congressional testimony that a review of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan "is an ongoing process" and committed to "letting [Congress] know when we reach some sort of consensus." Proposed legislation in the 119^th Congress includes measures that would require reports on U.S. efforts to oppose foreign assistance to the Taliban by other countries (agreed to in the House in June 2025) and on Taliban restrictions on Afghan women and girls.

Background: Taliban Takeover

The chapter of Afghan history that ended with the Taliban's 2021 return to power arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored the group. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States and its allies suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of a resilient Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction effortssecurity, development, economic, and humanitarian assistance. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven improvements in most measures of human development, although Afghanistan remained one of the world’'s poorest and most corrupt countries.

By the end of the first Trump Administration, the United States had agreed to a full military withdrawal—in a February 2020 deal with the Taliban¹—and drawn down overall troop numbers to 2,500. Amidst Taliban territorial gains and continued infighting within the U.S.-backed Afghan government, President Joe Biden confirmed in April 2021 that international forces would depart by autumn 2021. In the ensuing months, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the country. While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, other areas were taken with minimal fighting as the collapse of the Afghan government and its security forces accelerated.² Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan military forces, fled the country on August 15, 2021. Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same day, taking effective control of the country.

Taliban Government

On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “"caretaker government”" to rule Afghanistan. The Taliban refer to their autocratic government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone strike, holds supreme power as the group’'s reclusive emir.³ All members of the governmentcabinet are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’'s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or UN sanctions.

Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’'s ranks along various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes, governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’'s consensus-based decisionmaking.⁴ Points of tension reportedly have existed between members of the group’'s political wing and its military leaders over which deserves the most credit for the group’s

1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies.

2 David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 18, 2021.

3 He has made few reported public appearances, and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available. “Taliban supreme leader addresses major gathering in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, July 1, 2022.

4 Andrew Watkins, “What’s next for the Taliban’s leadership amid rising dissent?” U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), April 11, 2023.

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victory;⁵ between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who may be dissatisfied with post-conflict conditions;⁶ and between those with different ideological perspectives (including on education for girls; see below).⁷

The Taliban’'s victory;⁵ between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who may be dissatisfied with post-conflict conditions;⁶ and between those with different ideological perspectives (including on education for girls; see below).⁷ Some also identify a divide between Haibatullah's inner circle (which, along with the emir, is based in Kandahar) and more pragmatic leaders in Kabul.⁸ According to one media report, Haibatullah ordered a nationwide internet and telecommunications shutdown in late September 2025; it ended days later, reportedly due to advocacy and action of Kabul-based figures.⁹ Still, UN sanctions monitors describe the group as "largely unified and obedient to" Haibatullah.¹⁰ The Taliban's 2021 takeover did not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as an apparent lack of support for the former government, according to many analysts.⁸11 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have peacefully demonstrated to advocate for their rights andin the years after the Taliban takeover to express opposition to the Taliban.⁹group.¹² The Taliban have often violently dispersed these protests and have sought to stifle dissenting voices. Despite these apparent deficits in popular backing for the Taliban, no significant organized opposition has emerged.¹⁰

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Foreign Relations

The Taliban appear eager to develop ties with Afghanistan’'s neighbors, and the group has maintained a significantly higher level of diplomatic engagement than in the 1990s. Though no country has formally recognizedit did while in power in the 1990s. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to formally recognize the Taliban government (three countries did in the 1990s). UN sanctions monitors relay that the Taliban operate 42 "representative offices" abroad and that there are 28 "foreign missions and international organizations represented in Kabul."¹⁴ Pakistan.¹⁵did in the 1990s), many reportedly operate diplomatic facilities in Kabul and/or have allowed Taliban officials to operate Afghan diplomatic facilities abroad.

Pakistan.¹¹ Pakistan played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and (covertly) for much of its subsequent insurgency.¹²16 Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph for Pakistan’'s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani leaders.¹³17 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.

However, the Taliban’'s return to power has posed challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’'s victory arguably has given a morale and likely material boost to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i Taliban-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization).¹⁴18 TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek the Afghan Taliban's mediation of several ceasefires.¹⁹ Sporadic cross-border clashes between Taliban and Pakistani forces over the past two years (including Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan in 2024 and 2025) escalated in February 2026 into "open war," per Pakistan's defense minister, ending a shaky October 2025 ceasefire. February 2026 terrorist attacks in Pakistan led to Pakistani airstrikes throughout Afghanistan, a subsequent "retaliatory operation" along the border by Taliban forces, and fighting that remains ongoing as of early March. The conflict reportedly has left hundreds dead (per mutually denied claims from each side) and closed the countries' border crossings, disrupting hundreds of millions of dollars in trade.²⁰

Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by Pakistan's expulsion of Afghans since 2023, including nearly 900,000 in 2025 alone, and by the Taliban's diplomatic outreach to India.²¹

Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban's 1990s rule but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for Afghanistan's ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Nearly 1.9 million Afghans returned from Iran in 2025 as a result of "Iran's intensified deportations of undocumented migrants."²² It is unclear what impact, if any, U.S.-Iran conflict since February 2026 and potential changes to the Iranian government's capabilities and composition might have on Iran-Afghanistan relations.

Central Asia. Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors have taken varied approaches to the Taliban government. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the long- TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces increased after

5 “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” ANI, February 15, 2022.

6 Sabawoon Samim, “New lives in the city: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 2, 2023.

7 Hassan Abbas, “The internal splits that threaten the Taliban’s rule,” Chatham House, July 28, 2023.

8 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid, “Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.

9 “The Taliban use stun guns, fire hoses and gunfire to break up Afghan women protesting beauty salon ban,” Associated Press, July 20, 2023; Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022.

10 Khorshied Nusratty and Julie Ray, “Freedom fades, suffering remains for women in Afghanistan,” Gallup, November 10, 2023. Figures aligned with the former Afghan government formed the National Resistance Front (NRF) in 2021 and have appealed for U.S. and international support; the NRF has claimed attacks on Taliban forces but does not appear to have either the military capabilities or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten the Taliban’s position.

11 For more, see CRS Report R47565, Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

12 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018).

13 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021.

14 Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan after the Taliban’s Afghanistan takeover,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 16, no. 5 (May 2023).

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August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires.¹⁵ Pakistani government officials have criticized the Taliban’s “failure to control the TTP” and described terrorism as “a major irritant” in the bilateral relationship.¹⁶ Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government forces have intermittently clashed (including December 2024 Pakistani airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan), as well as by the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.¹⁷ In November 2023, Pakistan’s government abruptly ordered unregistered Afghan refugees to leave Pakistan, displacing hundreds of thousands and further escalating tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan.¹⁸

Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Disputes over water rights and refugees persist, along with sporadic border clashes.¹⁹

Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors have taken varied approaches to the Taliban government. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline, and have had official engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered shelter to anti-Taliban figures, a consequence both of Tajikistan’'s own struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’Afghanistan's second -largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule. Tajikistan government officials reportedly engaged the Taliban in 2024, signaling a possible shift toward acceptance of the group’s rule.²⁰

The People’s Republic of China (PRC)'s rule. Clashes at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border escalated in 2025, and the Taliban's construction of a canal to divert water from the Amu Darya River could spark tensions with its other Central Asian neighbors.²³ The People's Republic of China (PRC, or China). The prospect of greater PRC influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some congressional attention since the Taliban takeover. China, which played a relatively limited role in Afghanistan under the former government,. Although PRC-based firms made some economic investments in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban takeover, but major projects havedid not come to fruition due to instability, the lack of infrastructure, and other limitations.²¹24 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has embraced Taliban rule, accepting the credentials of a Taliban ambassador in Beijing in June 2024 (the first in the world) and sending its foreign minister to Kabul in August 2025. Economic Contraction and Humanitarian Crisis

The Taliban's return to power resulted in an economic contraction and deepened the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, long one of the world's poorest and most aid-dependent countries. Immediately following the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, Afghanistan's economy contracted by over 20%, followed by a contraction of 6.2% in 2022, partially as a result of the cutoff of international assistance. The country's economy reached a "low equilibrium" as some foreign aid resumed over the course of 2022, and a UN official assessed in December 2022 that the Taliban's economic management was "more effective than expected."²⁵ The World Bank assessed in November 2025 that "Afghanistan's economy is expanding modestly, supported by low inflation and stronger revenues," and estimated that while the economy grew by 4.3% in FY2025, rapid population growth driven by refugee returns decreased per capita GDP by 4%.²⁶ As contributions from international donors decrease, the World Bank projects an increase in domestic revenue collection, "signaling a gradual shift toward self-reliance."²⁷

The economic contraction exacerbated what was already, prior to August 2021, a severe humanitarian crisis driven primarily by conflict, natural disasters, and the COVID-19 pandemic. After dramatic increases in food insecurity in 2021 and 2022, the UN World Food Program (WFP) reported in July 2024 that "food security has improved in 2024 largely thanks to food and nutrition assistance that supported up to half the Afghan people."²⁸ UN agencies project that nearly 22 million Afghans—almost half the population—will require humanitarian assistance in 2026.²⁹ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projects that nearly 4 million Afghan children and over 1 million pregnant or breastfeeding women will experience acute malnutrition in the first half of 2026.³⁰

The UN's 2026 Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) seeks $1.7 billion to assist 17.5 million people; the 2025 HNRP of $2.4 billion was 38% funded, at $913 million, as of December 2025.³¹ In addition to the United States' termination of all assistance in Afghanistan in 2025 (see below), other international donors "have also reduced their official development assistance and humanitarian budgets"; UN agencies in 2025 described assisting fewer people in Afghanistan and reprioritizing programming to focus on areas of most severe needs.³²

Terrorist Groups

Violent Islamist extremist groups, including Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda (AQ), have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have interacted with them in varying ways.

Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has opposed the Taliban since the former's 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban's Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State's universalist vision of a global caliphate.³³ Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”²²

15 “Islamist militants present fresh challenge to Pakistan,” Reuters, January 31, 2023.

16 “Dar calls terrorism ‘big hurdle’ in ties with Afghanistan,” Dawn, March 3, 2025; “Pakistan urges UNSC to ask Afghan Taliban to cut ties with TTP, eliminate terrorism,” Dawn, March 7, 2024.

17 Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban.” Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.

18 Asfandyar Mir, “In major rift, Pakistan ramps up pressure on Taliban,” USIP, November 16, 2023.

19 “What caused deadly Afghan-Iran border clashes? What happens next?,” Al Jazeera, May 30, 2023.

20 Bruce Pannier, “Tajikistan’s Taliban conundrum,” FPRI, November 25, 2024.

21 Abubakar Siddique, “The limits of China’s budding relationship with Afghanistan’s Taliban,” RFE/RL, June 4, 2023.

22 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022.

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U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power

Counterterrorism

Violent Islamist extremist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently.

Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has opposed the Taliban since the former’s 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global caliphate.²³ ISKP has launched multiple attacks in Afghanistan against the Taliban, killing a prominent Taliban government official in December 2024; against Afghan civilians, mostly targeting Afghanistan’'s Hazara (Shia) minority; and against externally oriented targets in the country, including attacks on the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul.²⁴ The Taliban have reportedly conducted dozens of raids against the group since 2022, killing and arresting ISKP operatives.²⁵

According to various assessments, ISKP strategy has shifted in light of Taliban pressure. a 2026 attack that killed a Chinese national in Kabul.³⁴ ISKP was also responsible for the August 26, 2021, suicide bombing at Kabul's international airport that killed 13 U.S. servicemembers during the U.S. evacuation operation. In 2023, outside experts and U.S. officials reportedly assessed that ISKP was seeking to focus on external operations, in part “"to evade the Taliban.”²⁶"³⁵ Those assessments appear to have been borne out in 2024, with large-scale, mass casualty attacks attributed to ISKP in Iran and Russia. UN sanctions monitors reported in July 2024 that ISKP “aspires to control Afghan territory from which to infiltrate neighboring countries” and that counter-ISKP operations in Europe illustrate the group’s “renewed willingness, multiplied efforts, and potential capacity to carry out large-scale attacks on European soil.”²⁷

While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable than Al Qaeda, the July 2022 U.S. killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul drew considerable attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.²⁸ February 2026 that while "security operations of regional States and military actions by the Taliban" led to "fewer attacks" by ISKP, the group "retained significant operational and combat capability and the ability to rapidly replace fighters, including through online recruitment."³⁶ Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, thoseTaliban-Al Qaeda ties have persisted for decades. UN sanctions monitors reported in December 2025 that while the "Afghan theater remains the symbolic homeland for" Al Qaeda, the Taliban "maintain tight control" over Al Qaeda and its activities, given the "risks associated with [AQ's] presence in Afghanistan" to the Taliban.³⁷ U.S. official assessments in 2025 largely aligned with that view, concluding that Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is a "safe haven" for Al Qaeda but that AQ leaders "probably continue to comply with Taliban restrictions against external attack planning and other operations."³⁸ Afghan Women and Girls

Between 2001 and 2021, women played public roles in many aspects of economic, political, and social life in Afghanistan, with protections for women enshrined in the country's 2004 constitution. The Taliban have fully reversed those dynamics, making Afghanistan "the most repressive country in the world regarding women's rights," according to a 2023 assessment from the head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).³⁹

Upon taking power in 2021, the Taliban closed the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban's highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The ministry monitors the implementation of Taliban edicts that impose new restrictions on Afghan women.⁴⁰ ties have persisted for decades. UN sanctions monitors reported in July 2024 that the Taliban “have significantly constrained” Al Qaeda but relayed that AQ “reorganization and training activities, as well as new travel into Afghanistan, indicate that the group still uses Afghanistan as

23 Borhan Osman, “ISKP’s battle for minds: What are its main messages and who do they attract?,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 12, 2016.

24 Hazaras compose 10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule, but Hazaras are still subjected to discrimination and harassment; many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras. Shivam Shekhawar and Anjjali Shrivastav, “Between a rock and hard place: The Hazaras in Afghanistan,” Observer Research Foundation, March 4, 2024; Gul Hassan Mohammadi, “The plight of the Hazaras under the Taliban government,” Diplomat, January 24, 2024.

25 Tricia Bacon, “The Islamic State in Khorasan Province: Exploiting a counterterrorism gap,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 11, 2024.

26 Aaron Zelin, “ISKP goes global: External operations from Afghanistan,” Washington Institute, September 11, 2023; Natasha Bertrand and Katie Bo Lillis, “New US intelligence suggests al Qaeda unlikely to revive in Afghanistan, but officials warn ISIS threat remains,” CNN, September 8, 2023.

27 UN Security Council, Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2024/556, released July 2024.

28 CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.

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a permissive haven under the Taliban.”²⁹ U.S. official assessments in 2024 largely aligned with that view, concluding that Al Qaeda was at an “operational nadir” and maintaining a “low profile” in Afghanistan to comply with Taliban “directives against conducting external operations and recruitment.”³⁰

From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials described as an “over-the-horizon” approach.³¹ In March 2024 testimony, Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael “Erik” Kurilla said with respect to Afghanistan that “we are getting some insights” but that “it is very difficult.”³² Some Members of Congress have criticized the approach.³³

Afghan Women and Girls³⁴

Afghanistan under the renewed rule of the Taliban is “the most repressive country in the world regarding women’s rights,” according to the head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).³⁵ Between 2001 and 2021, women played public roles in many aspects of economic, political, and social life in Afghanistan, with protections for women enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution.

Upon taking power in 2021, the Taliban closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The ministry monitors the implementation of Taliban edicts that impose new restrictions on Afghan women.³⁶ Those edicts include a December 2021 prohibition on women driving long distances or flying without a male guardian, a May 2022 decree mandating punishments for the male relatives of women who do not wear hijabs that fully cover their bodies, and a November 2022 decision to ban women from public parks and bath houses.³⁷41 UN experts warn that Taliban policies toward women may constitute gender persecution, a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as “"gender apartheid."⁴² In July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the Taliban's leader and chief justice for "the crime against humanity of persecution … on gender grounds."⁴³

Education. In March 2022, the Taliban announced that secondary schools for girls would remain closed, shocking many observers.⁴⁴ In December 2022, the Taliban broadened prohibitions by suspending women from attending university.⁴⁵ As of 2026, the country's rapidly increasing number of madrasas, or religious schools, are the only form of public education available to girls above the primary level. Some Afghan women have reportedly continued to provide informal education to girls in private "secret schools" or online, though those efforts are impeded by technological and infrastructure challenges.⁴⁶

Employment. The Taliban have also placed restrictions on women's ability to work, contributing to a decrease in the female labor force participation rate from around 15% in 2021 to 5% since 2022.⁴⁷ In the private sector, cumbersome requirements on businesses to maintain gender-segregated offices, and Taliban monitoring and interreference, have reportedly inhibited women's employment. One late 2025 analysis posits that women ownership of and employment in small-scale, largely home-based enterprises (which the Taliban have in some ways facilitated) offers opportunities for international support.⁴⁸

In December 2022, the Taliban banned women from working for national and international NGOs, threatening to suspend the licenses of NGOs that do not comply; in April 2023, the Taliban further banned women from working for UN entities in Afghanistan, a restriction the Taliban tightened in September 2025 by forbidding Afghan women from entering UN compounds. Many foreign aid implementing partners halted their work after the announcement of the NGO restriction, but some reportedly resumed some operations after reaching "acceptable workarounds" with local authorities.⁴⁹ The late 2025 analysis mentioned above described a "patchwork of restrictions" and "major bureaucratic hassles," with opportunities for women varying by NGOs' geographic area of operation and activities.⁵⁰

Debates over Taliban Policy and Societal Views. Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada has defended Taliban restrictions on women and girls as having "been taken for the betterment of women as half of society in order to provide them with a comfortable and prosperous life according to the Islamic Shariah."⁵¹ Other Taliban figures reportedly oppose some of the restrictions, particularly on girls' education (and some have educated their own daughters abroad).⁵² One senior Taliban official explicitly criticized the girls' education ban in January 2025, after which he left Afghanistan under disputed circumstances.⁵³ The evidently greater influence of the group's traditionally conservative leaders, the unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves, and the apparent readiness of the Taliban to accept international isolation and opprobrium suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.

A 2025 UN study found that 92% of Afghans surveyed supported girls' education at the secondary level.⁵⁴ Some Afghan women reportedly have supported the Taliban or welcomed its assumption of power because of their own beliefs, social or economic pressures, or the reduction of violence that has followed the group's takeover.⁵⁵

U.S. Policy and Congressional Action U.S. Ends Efforts to Relocate and Resettle Afghan Allies

The Taliban's August 15, 2021, entry into Kabul triggered the mass evacuation of tens of thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and Afghans who had worked for the United States and/or the former Afghan government (sometimes referred to as Afghan allies). U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of "over 120,000" people, including 6,000 U.S. citizens and 3,000 third country nationals, with "the remainder … Afghans designated by the Department of State."⁵⁶

After that operation ended on August 30, 2021, U.S. officials continued efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan allies. Afghan relocation and resettlement efforts were overseen by the Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE), created by the State Department in October 2021 and authorized by Congress in Section 7810 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159).⁵⁷ According to the State Department's May 2025 budget request for FY2026, "Since August 2021, over 190,000 Afghans have settled in the United States through the [Enduring Welcome] program and its predecessor, Operation Allies Welcome."⁵⁸

According to a February 2025 media report, the Trump Administration directed CARE to develop plans to close by April.⁵⁹ In a May 2025 congressional notification about a broader departmental reorganization, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to eliminate the CARE office and realign its functions to the Afghanistan Affairs Office. In July 2025, as the State Department worked to implement the reorganization, "all leadership team members" in the CARE office reportedly received reduction-in-force notices.⁶⁰ The State Department stated in its FY2026 budget request that it had "discontinued Afghan relocation activities," requested no funds for Enduring Welcome (previously funded at an estimated $2 billion in FY2024 and $1.3 billion in FY2025), and said it would "shut down" Enduring Welcome by the end of FY2025.⁶¹

Beyond the end of Enduring Welcome and closure of the CARE office, the second Trump Administration has taken steps that have eliminated, suspended, or restricted the primary means via which Afghans had previously entered the United States after 2021, including the following:

• The January 2025 suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) due to the asserted inability of the United States "to absorb large number of migrants, and in particular, refugees, into its communities in a manner that does not compromise the availability of resources for Americans, that protects their safety and security, and that ensures the appropriate assimilation of refugees," pursuant to Executive Order 14163.
• June and December 2025 presidential proclamations suspending the entry of nationals from certain countries, including Afghanistan ("travel bans"), that "cannot meet basic criteria for identifying their nationals and residents who pose national security and public safety threats and for sharing information with the United States."⁶²
• The July 2025 termination of Afghanistan's Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation, on the basis that "there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their safety."⁶³
• The State Department's announcement, after an Afghan national who had received asylum in April 2025 was arrested and charged with the shooting of two members of the West Virginia National Guard in Washington, DC, that it was no longer issuing visas for Afghans.⁶⁴

One advocate estimated in 2025 that the end of relocation efforts could leave 200,000 Afghans "without paths to the U.S.," including 150,000 in Afghanistan and a further 50,000 awaiting processing in third countries.⁶⁵

In January 2026, House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Representative Gregory Meeks stated that the Administration had notified the committee of its intent to end relocation operations at Camp As Sayliyah (CAS) in Qatar by the end of FY2026; both Meeks and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Senator Jeanne Shaheen voiced opposition to the decision and urged the Administration to relocate Afghans remaining at the site and not, as Shaheen wrote, "pressure any Afghan ally to return to life under the Taliban."⁶⁶ According to one media report, a State Department spokesperson said all occupants would be relocated (without specifying where) by March 31, 2026, and would not be returned to Afghanistan.⁶⁷ A late January 2026 media report indicates there are "around 800" evacuees at CAS, with some having been at the site since 2021.⁶⁸

U.S. Ends Foreign Assistance in Afghanistan

According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the United States disbursed over $3.8 billion in humanitarian and development assistance for Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, making it the largest international donor for the country during that period.⁶⁹

On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14169, pausing foreign assistance obligations and payments for 90 days to conduct a review of the "programmatic efficiency and consistency with United States foreign policy" of assistance programs.⁷⁰ According to SIGAR, the State Department subsequently deemed "all active awards with activities in Afghanistan" as "not aligned with the Administration's foreign policy priorities" and terminated them in spring 2025.⁷¹ USAID relayed to SIGAR that the "termination of all awards in Afghanistan heightened the risk of seizure of assets by the [Taliban] because of the large quantity of assets requiring disposition within a short period and the lack of active USAID or USG-funded implementing partners to transfer or donate items to."⁷² SIGAR reported that three programs related to Afghanistan remained operational as of July 2025: two programs to support Afghan students earning university degrees online or at the Doha campus of the American University of Afghanistan, and support for the UN Office of Drugs and Crime's Afghanistan Opium Survey.

According to media reports, the cutoff of U.S. assistance has led to the closure of "nearly 450 health centers" across Afghanistan, as well as a reduction in food assistance and rise in malnutrition.⁷³

In June 2025, the House agreed without objection to H.R. 260, which would direct the submission of a report on post-August 2021 "direct cash assistance" programs in Afghanistan, as well as a strategy to "discourage foreign countries and nongovernmental organizations from providing foreign assistance to the Taliban."

Sanctions and Afghan Central Bank Reserves

U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain; it is unclear to what extent they may be affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan.⁷⁴ After the Taliban's takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions (including taxes and the other administrative expenses mentioned above).⁷⁵ The second Trump Administration does not appear to have taken any public actions specifically related to those sanctions or exceptions.

The United States also maintains a hold on the U.S.-based assets of the Afghan central bank, imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul, to prevent the Taliban from accessing the funds. The Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on those assets, which total around $7 billion.⁷⁶ On February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it would "seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for the benefit of the Afghan people," pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.⁷⁷ In September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an "Afghan Fund" (based in Switzerland) to "make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy."⁷⁸ As of March 2025 (per a congressionally mandated State Department report), the fund had reached nearly $4 billion and had not made any disbursements.⁷⁹ The most recent publicly notified meeting of the Board, which is made up of two representatives from the U.S. and Swiss governments and two U.S.-based Afghan economists, appears to have taken place in June 2025.

Other Issues

U.S. Detainees in Afghanistan. Several Americans have been identified as detained by the Taliban in Afghanistan, including Dennis Coyle and Mahmood Shah Habibi.⁸⁰ Five U.S. citizens were released in 2025, including one freed after September 2025 talks in Kabul between U.S. and Taliban officials.⁸¹ A U.S. official in February 2026 condemned the Taliban's "insurgent tactic of hostage diplomacy," stating that the Taliban, "in exchange for Americans currently detained, have openly sought the release of an al-Qaida operative detained in Guantanamo Bay."⁸² The State Department warns that "U.S. citizens should not travel to Afghanistan for any reason" as they "are targets of kidnapping and hostage-taking."⁸³ In March 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced Afghanistan's designation as a State Sponsor of Wrongful Detention.⁸⁴

Bagram Air Base. President Trump has at times spoken of his desire for the United States to reestablish a presence at Bagram Air Base, saying in September 2025, "We want that base back," citing what he characterized as its strategic importance vis-a-vis China.⁸⁵ It is unclear under what conditions, if any, the Taliban might allow U.S. forces to reoccupy the sprawling site or, if they were not to allow it, to what extent the United States would be willing or able to do so coercively.

Outlook

The Taliban's 2021 takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny in the United States, but Afghanistan appears to have since receded as a subject of public attention and as a foreign policy priority.⁸⁶ "Afghanistan Withdrawal" and "Afghanistan Policy" were the first two issues listed as "priority oversight matters" in the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 118^th Congress; for the 119^th Congress, the first two "priority oversight matters" listed are "China" and "Pacific Region," with "Afghanistan" coming 10^th.⁸⁷ "Afghanistan" does not appear in either the 2025 National Security Strategy or the 2026 National Defense Strategy.

In June 2025, one U.S. official stated that "our focus in Afghanistan has narrowed" and that the top U.S. priority with respect to Afghanistan is "protecting U.S. citizens, including mitigating terrorist threats and securing the release of all detained Americans," arguing that "it is time for change to come from within Afghanistan."⁸⁸ In a February 2026 hearing, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia Chairman Bill Huizenga stated that there was an "ongoing review of strategy and policies toward Afghanistan" within the Administration; argued that "there are many outstanding questions in Congress about the nature of U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and where it is going"; and asked Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Paul Kapur, "when can we expect information on the State Department's Afghan policy." Kapur responded that the review "is an ongoing process" and committed to "remaining in touch" and "letting you know when we reach some sort of consensus." ⁸⁹

The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues to obtain these benefits. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.⁹⁰ One analysis concludes that increased engagement with Afghanistan "may require too much concerted diplomatic effort in a world distracted by other crises" and projects that "Afghanistan will remain near the bottom of international priorities unless the country once again exports terrorism or surges of migrants."⁹¹

gender apartheid.”³⁸

29 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2716 (2023) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2024/499, released July 2024.

30 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 5, 2024; Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Enduring Sentinel and other U.S. Government Activities Related to Afghanistan, February 29, 2024.

31 See, for example, White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, April 14, 2021.

32 “House Armed Services Committee holds hearing on Middle East and North Africa challenges,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 21, 2024.

33 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa, hearing, 118^th Cong., 1^st, sess., March 2023.

34 See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas.

35 UNAMA, “The UN in Afghanistan calls for an immediate end to draconian restrictions on the rights of women and girls by the de facto authorities,” March 8, 2023.

36 UNAMA, “De facto authorities’ moral oversight in Afghanistan: Impacts on human rights,” July 2024.

37 Belquis Ahmadi, “Taliban escalate new abuses against Afghan women, girls,” United States Institute of Peace (USIP), October 27, 2022; “Tracking the Taliban’s (Mis)Treatment of Women,” USIP, updated September 2023.

38 United Nations, Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, June 15, 2023.

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Congressional Research Service R45122 · VERSION 66 · UPDATED 13

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