Ecuador: Country Overview and U.S. Relations
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Updated January 29, 2025
Ecuador: Country Overview and U.S. Relations
Ecuador is an ethnically and geographically diverse country of 18.51 million people, encompassing portionsparts of South America’'s Pacific coast, Amazon Basin, and Andean highlands (see Figure 1). Ecuador faces a security crisis, with gangs fighting for control of drug trafficking routes and prisons, and reportedly attempting to influence politics.
In the 118th Congress, some Members called for increased U.S. assistance to Ecuador to address security challenges, with some voicing concern about human rights conditions and possible democratic erosion in Ecuador in late 2024119th Congress, some Members have commended Ecuador's government as a "valued partner" and called for an expansion of bilateral defense and security cooperation to combat transnational drug trafficking and other threats. Some Members have voiced concern about human rights conditions amid Ecuador's security crisis and possible attempts to undermine democratic processes. These Members called on the State Department to ensure U.S. security assistance does not contribute to potential human rights abuses by Ecuadorian security forces. The 119th Congress may assess security, economic, and human rights conditions in Ecuador—including any implications for regional security efforts and unauthorized migrant and illicit drug flows to the United States—and consider legislative and other measures to shape U.S.- Ecuadorbilateral relations.
Current Political Conditions
Ecuador held snap general elections in August 2023 to elect a new president and legislature (National Assembly). In November 2023, President Daniel Noboa, the head of the center-right National Democratic Action (ADN) political coalition,party first took office in November 2023. Ecuadorians elected Noboa took office to complete the term of his predecessor, Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023), after winning an October runoff vote. Lasso, who called the elections but did not run, had pushed for market-friendly political and economic reforms but faced opposition from Indigenous movements and a legislature dominated by leftist parties that had repeatedly tried to impeach him. The assassination of a presidential candidate and other political figures, allegedly by criminal groups, marred the 2023 elections.
Voters also elected new members to the 137-member unicameral National Assembly and approved national and regional referenda to halt oil and mineral extraction in two ecologically sensitive regions. The leftist Citizens Revolution party (RC), tied to former President Rafael Correa (2007-2017), won the most seats (51) in the National Assembly, followed by the anti-corruption Build Ecuador Movement (26), the conservative Social Christian Party (CSP) and allies (18), and the ADN (14).
Unlike his predecessor, President Noboa formed a legislative majority through a loose political alliance that included his ADN, the RC, and the CSP. The alliance enacted several Noboa-backed economic and energy-related reforms but broke down after Ecuadorian forces invaded the Mexican Embassy in Quito in April 2024 to detain former vice president and RC member Jorge Glas (2013-2018) on corruption charges; Glas had received asylum from Mexico.
Ecuador is to hold presidential and legislative elections on February 9, 2025, with a presidential runoff to be held in April if the winner does not obtain either 50% of the votes or at least 40% with a 10-percentage-point advantage over
the next highest vote winner. Those elected are to take office in May 2025 for a four-year term. The Noboa administration and the political opposition have clashed over whether President Noboa is subject to electoral rules requiring officials running for reelection to take a leave of absence while campaigning. The rules would require him to temporarily confer power to the vice president, with whom he has an ongoing political dispute. Noboa has used his executive authority to designate an interim vice president and temporarily confer presidential powers to her for short periods while he campaigns, prompting legal challenges.
Figure 1. Ecuador at a Glance
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ecuador’s National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (NISC), Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
Noboa also has secured some legislative victories. In June 2025, the legislature approved Noboa-backed security and government reforms, which, inter alia, restructured and increased the authority of the country's national intelligence system, broadened the legal use of lethal force by security forces, and increased prison sentences for minors. Some civil society and human rights groups have argued that the laws violate constitutional rights. In August 2025, Ecuador's constitutional court suspended several provisions of the new laws while it examines legal challenges to them, escalating tensions with the Noboa administration. Noboa's rhetoric against the constitutional court and his proposal for a constitutional reform, which would enable the impeachment of the court's judges, have prompted some observers to voice concerns about threats to judicial independence.
Violence has risen since roughly 2021, primarily because of increased competition among gangs affiliated with transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), including Mexican cartels and European crime groups. After decades of comparatively low homicide rates, violence surged after the COVID-19 pandemic; Ecuador reportedly recorded the highest homicide rate in South America in 2023 and 2024. High-fatality riots in prisons, from which criminal groups reportedly run their operations, have plagued Ecuador since 2020. These groups also are alleged to have infiltrated Ecuadorian politics and institutions. In late 2024, a judge convicted 20 people—including former judges, government officials, and police—for their roles in a corruption network linked to organized crime. Ecuador also has faced increased violence linked to illicit mining operations.Security Crisis Violence has risen over the past four years, primarily because of increased competition among gangs affiliated with transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), including Mexican cartels and European crime groups. After decades of comparatively low homicide rates, homicides surged after the COVID-19 pandemic—reportedly reaching 44.5 per 100,000 in 2023, among the highest rates in Latin America (most recent data available). High-fatality riots in prisons, from which criminal groups reportedly run their operations, have plagued Ecuador since 2020. These groups also are alleged to have infiltrated Ecuadorian politics and institutions. In late 2024, a judge convicted 20 people— including former judges, government officials, and police— for their roles in an extensiveformer President Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023), who had called snap elections held in August 2023. In April 2025, Noboa won a full four-year presidential term after obtaining 55.6% of the vote in a presidential runoff election against Luisa González of the left-leaning Citizen Revolution (RC)—an ally of U.S.-sanctioned, exiled RC party leader and former President Rafael Correa (2007-2017). Although González has alleged voter fraud in the election, international observers expressed confidence in the results, while noting some concerns about "conditions of inequity during the campaign" that favored Noboa's candidacy.
In February 2025 legislative elections, to elect all 151 members of the unicameral National Assembly, support was largely divided between ADN and RC. President Noboa's ADN has forged an informal legislative majority with the support of smaller parties. Meanwhile, the RC has grappled with intraparty turmoil following González's failed presidential run, reducing RC's legislative representation.
President Noboa's policymaking priorities have included tackling Ecuador's public security crisis and pursuing reforms aimed at improving government finances. In July 2025, the Noboa administration issued an executive order that aimed to reduce government spending and improve efficiency by eliminating 5,000 public sector jobs and reducing the number of executive ministries.
Security Crisis
corruption network linked to organized crime.
Rising insecurity in Ecuador has coincided with an increase in unauthorized migration from Ecuador to the United States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection encountered
Ecuador: Country Overview and U.S. Relations
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about 124,000 Ecuadorians at a U.S. land border in FY2024—a nearly 400% increase from FY2022 levels.
In January 2024, President Noboa declared the first of several states of emergency and “an "internal armed conflict”" after the leader of Ecuador’'s Los Choneros gang, José Macías Villamar, gang escaped from prison and a wave of violence swept the country. The order limited some constitutional rights, designated 22 criminal groups as terrorist organizations, and enabled the armed forces to conduct public security functions and take control of some of the country’s prisons to disrupt criminal operationsprisons. Ecuadorians voted to formalize the armed forces’' role in public security in an April 2024 referendum, approving eight additional security-related measures, including the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens.
Noboa Economic growth has declined since 2022. In 2024, the economy contracted by 2% amid security and energy challenges. In 2023 and 2024, economic growth was impeded by seasonal power blackouts due, in part, to drought—which limited hydroelectric power generation—and aging infrastructure. President Noboa has sought to boost foreign investment in Ecuador's energy sector, including from the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China), which has served as a key source of financing and investment since 2009. Some PRC-built infrastructure projects during this period reportedly have been plagued by operational deficiencies and increased Ecuador's indebtedness to China.’'s security efforts appear to have had mixed results. According to the government, homicide ratesgovernment, the annual homicide rate declined by nearly 16% in 2024 but has surged by nearly 47% in the first six months of 2025 compared to the previous year. Security forces have arrested high-profile criminals, including Macías Villamar, who was extradited to the United States in July 2025 in 2024, while kidnapping and extortion increased. Since January 2024, security forces have arrested several high-profile criminals; several politicians also have been assassinatedassassinated. Military control reportedlyreportedly has restored order in some prisons, but the prison system continues to grapple with deadly riots and the murder of prison officials but failed to suppress some deadly riots. Human Rights Watch has allegedalleged that some security forces have committed serious human rights violations.
Economic Situation
that some security forces have committed serious human rights violations. In December 2024, the disappearance and deaths of four children who had been detained by members of the armed forces sparked protests. The attorney general’s office has brought charges against 16 soldiers in connection with the children’s disappearances and has announced additional investigations into other alleged abuses by security forces.
Economic Situation
After a recession in 2020 due to the impact of the COVID- 19 pandemic, the economy recovered in 2021, growing by 9.8% (in part because of rising oil prices) before slowing to 6.2% and 2.3% growth in 2022 and 2023, respectively. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that growth will slow further to 0.3% and 1.2% in 2024 and 2025, respectively, amid security and energy challenges.
The Noboa administration has taken steps to improve Ecuador’s fiscal situation, including implementing reforms to increase tax revenue and reducing energy subsidies. In December 2024, IMF officials enabled the disbursement of about $500 million after a review of the country’s four- year,reduce energy subsidies and reopen the country's mining sector for the first time since 2018. In July 2025, IMF officials expanded a $4 billion financing agreement (approved in May 2024) to support structural reforms and Noboa’s policies.
Economic growth has been impeded by recurring power blackouts, due in part to severe drought (hydroelectric power generates nearly 80% of the country’s electricity) and aging infrastructure. Noboa declared an energy emergency in April 2024, and the National Assembly enacted two laws intended to improve efficiency and foster private investment in the energy sector. In late 2024, the energy crisis eased, aided by improved weather and resumed electricity imports from Colombia, which had paused exports to address its own energy shortages.
U.S.-Ecuador Relations
During his decade in power (2007-2017),, former President Correa’'s populist rhetoric and self-styled “"anti-imperialist”" policies contributed to friction in an otherwise historically
close U.S.-Ecuador relationship. Among other actions, Correa shutteredshuttered U.S. counterdrug operations at Manta Air Force Base in 2009 and expelled the U.S. ambassador in 2011. Closer bilateral relationsties resumed under Correa’s successors, including President Noboa.
In 2022, Congress enacted the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022, as Title LV, Subtitle B, of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 (P.L. 117-263). Authorized for five years, the act includes measures aimed at strengthening bilateral security cooperation and commercial ties to promote democracy and regional stability and counter malign foreign influence.
The Biden Administration expanded U.S. security cooperation with Ecuador. In 2023, the two countries launched the U.S.-Ecuador Defense Bilateral Working Group. In February 2024, President Noboa ratified two military cooperation agreements with the United States, establishing a framework for U.S. military personnel to operate in Ecuador and allowing for joint naval operations to combat drug trafficking and other illicit activities. Noboa has also advocated for reversing a constitutional ban on foreign military bases to enhance efforts to counter transnational crime. The U.S. Treasury Department also has imposed
Successive U.S. administrations have expanded security cooperation with Ecuador. The United States has provided equipment, technical assistance, and training to support Ecuador's antinarcotics efforts. In February 2024, President Noboa ratified two military cooperation agreements with the United States aimed at enhancing defense cooperation and combatting illicit maritime activities, including drug trafficking. Noboa also has proposed a national referendum to reverse a constitutional ban on foreign military bases to bolster efforts to counter TCOs with international partners. The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed asset-blocking sanctions on Los Choneros under Executive Order 14059.
The United States allocated an estimated $49 million to Ecuador in FY2023 (latest year available). Executive Order 14059, which levies sanctions on foreign persons involved in the global illicit drug trade.
U.S. assistance to Ecuador aimshas aimed to build capacity to counter TCOs, drug trafficking, and corruption and to improve economic integration for marginalized groups, among other activities. The Biden Administration allocated an estimated $49 million to Ecuador in FY2023. Congress did not designate an overall funding level for Ecuador inexplanatory statement accompanying the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division F), specified, Division F). The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 118-47 specifies $17.5 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) aid for Ecuador. It is unclear how the Trump Administration's review and subsequent cancellation of thousands of unspecified U.S. aid awards and contracts has affected programs in Ecuador, although some U.S.-backed antidrug efforts were reportedly impacted. The report accompanying the House-reported version of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.Rept. 119-217 to H.R. 4779), would designate at least $50 million in security assistance to Ecuador through the Foreign Military Financing and INCLE accounts.aid for Ecuador. It also directs the Secretary of State to work with the Secretary of Defense to submit an integrated security assistance strategy for Ecuador within 90 days.
The U.S.-Ecuador goods trade totaled $16. The 119th Congress may evaluate the Trump Administration's approach to U.S. trade policy with Ecuador and assess whether to address U.S.-Ecuador commercial ties through legislation. Congress also may assess broader U.S. policy objectives in Ecuador and consider whether to authorize or appropriate any future U.S. foreign aid for Ecuador, including to address concerns about the country's security conditions. 61 billion in 20232024, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, making the United States Ecuador’'s top trading partner. In 2020, the United States and Ecuador signedsigned a protocol to strengthen the 1990 U.S.-Ecuador Trade and Investment Council (TIC), which guides bilateral engagement on trade and investment issues. In April 2025, President Trump issued an executive order declaring a national emergency over "a lack of reciprocity" in bilateral trade and imposed a minimum tariff of 10% on all U.S. imports (including those from Ecuador), with certain exceptions, effective April 5, 2025. The tariff rate for Ecuador increased to 15% on August 7, 2025. In the 118th Congress, some Members called for increased U.S. engagement with Ecuador to help counter China's commercial influence in the country. A free trade agreement between Ecuador and China entered into force in May 2024.
a protocol to strengthen the 1990 U.S.-Ecuador Trade and Investment Council (TIC)—the primary mechanism for discussing bilateral trade and investment issues. In the 118th Congress, some Members called for increased U.S. engagement with Ecuador to help counter China’s commercial influence in the country. A free-trade agreement between Ecuador and China entered into force in May 2024.
The 119th Congress may assess U.S. efforts to improve Ecuador’s security conditions and strengthen economic ties as it considers options to authorize and fund foreign aid, security, and trade policy initiatives. Congress also may oversee the Trump Administration’s approach to bilateral relations through hearings and other oversight mechanisms.
Joshua Klein, Analyst in Foreign Affairs
IF11218
Ecuador: Country Overview and U.S. Relations
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11218 · VERSION 18 · UPDATED
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