Russia’s Security Operations in Africa

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Updated January 2, 2025

Russia’s Security Operations in Africa

Russia's Security Operations in Africa

Updated April 8, 2026 (IF12389)

Thousands of Russian security personnel have deployed to Africa since 2017, offering support to regimes facing insurgent threats and other challengesover the past decade, offering security support in exchange for payment or access to natural resources, in what some analysts refer to as a “military-business model.” Russia has expanded operations and placed them under more explicit state control since mid-2023, after formally disbanding"military-business model." Initially, the Wagner Group, —a nominally private military company (PMC) that had spearheaded activities in Africa. Russia has rebranded deployments as a new “Africa Corps” overseen by its military intelligence agency, often referred to as the GRU. On the ground, Africa Corps operations appear to comprise a mix of Russian state personnel, various PMCs, and former Wagnerlinked to the Russian government—spearheaded such activities in Africa, starting around 2017. Russia formally disbanded the Wagner Group in 2023 and has since rebranded and restructured Wagner's Africa operations as the "Africa Corps," overseen by Russia's military intelligence agency. On the ground, Africa Corps activities may involve a mix of Russian state, ex-Wagner, and other PMC personnel. Russia has also reportedly pursued military basing deals in Africa, including in Sudan.

, including in Sudan and Libya.

Some African leaders appear to view Russian personnel as furnishing valuable support (such as regime protection and combat assistance) that others are unwilling or unable to provide. For Moscow’'s part, security activitiesmissions in Africa— paired with information operations—appear to fit within a global strategy to undermine the West and its image as a reliable security partner. Russian and African elites may also derive profits. U.S. officials have argued that Russian atrocities and economic exploitation undermine stability in Africa. The U.S. Treasury Department has reported that gold and other resources from Africa have helped Russia evade sanctions and fund military efforts in Ukraine.

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2023 that gold and other resources from Africa helped Russia evade sanctions. Russia has also recruited African nationals for its war in Ukraine, including by using what some reports describe as deceptive campaigns.

Many African countries have warm ties with Russia, with which over 40 reportedly have military cooperation agreements—though most have not openly partnered with Russian security personnelthe Wagner Group or Africa Corps. Some African leaders, including in Algeria and Ghana,Algeria and Ghana, have voiced concernconcerns about Russian deployments toin neighboring countries.

Key Areas of Activity

As of April 2026, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mali appear to host the largest Russian deployments in Africa, totaling thousands of personnel along with military logistics facilities. The Wagner Group initiated activities in those countries, as well as Sudan, between 2017 and 2021. Libya's importance as a Russian logistical hub may have increased following regime change in 2024 in Syria, which hosted Russian military bases.

Since Wagner's demise in 2023, smaller Russian contingents have arrived in new countries (Figure 1), including Burkina Faso and Niger, where military juntas seized power in 2022-2023 and formed a Russian-backed alliance with Mali. Russian forces arrived in 2024 in Niger, which previously hosted the second-largest U.S. military presence in Africa neighboring states.

Some reports suggest that Ukraine has tried to challenge Russian forces in Africa, including in Sudan and Mali. In mid-2024, a Ukrainian official said that Ukraine had aided rebels in Mali who killed dozens of Russian and Malian forces in an ambush. The claim led several West African countries to cut ties with Ukraine and sparked regional criticism. The extent of Ukraine’s support was uncertain.

Key Areas of Activity The Wagner Group initiated missions in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mali between 2017 and 2021. As of late 2024, CAR, Libya, and Mali continued to host the largest Russian deployments in Africa, including military logistics facilities. Smaller Russian contingents have arrived in other countries since mid-2023 (Figure 1), including Burkina Faso and Niger, where military regimes have formed a Russian-backed alliance with Mali and moved to leave the Economic Community of West African States. Russian forces arrived in Niger—previously host to the second-largest U.S. military presence in Africa—in April 2024, as the United States withdrew its its more than 1,000 troopstroops under pressure from the ruling junta.

. In early 2026, Russian personnel reportedly helped repel a militant attack on Niger's international airport. Russian personnel have also deployed to Equatorial Guinea, where they have reportedly trained presidential guard forces.

Figure 1. Russian Security Operations: Key Countries

Source: CRS, from U.S. government statements and news reports.

Reports suggest that Russia may seek to expand activities into countries such as Chad, and that Russian personnel may already be active in other countries, such as Togo Some reports suggest that Russia's Africa Corps may expand (or has already expanded) into more countries, such as Chad in the Sahel; Madagascar, which had a military coup in 2025; and/or Togo, which in 2025 signed a military cooperation agreement with Moscow that reportedly provides for port access. One analyst has posited that Russia's appeal in the Sahel may nonetheless have reached a "high-water mark," given Russia's economic constraints and apparent inability to fully curb security challenges. The Wagner Group sent counterinsurgency forces to Mozambique in 2019 but withdrew after heavy casualties.

Russia’'s security partnerships have leveraged Cold War-era ties in Africa, as well as and the vulnerabilities and ambitions of particularindividual leaders. Russian operators also have exploitedhave used, and stoked, local grievances and resentment of Western powers and UN peacekeeping missions. Russian forces’ scorched-earth tactics may appeal to some leaders struggling to reverse insurgent gains. In CAR and Mali, Russian support has enabled state forces to retake territory from rebel groups— albeit accompanied by abusesoperations. In CAR and Mali, Russian support has enabled state forces to retake territory from rebel groups—albeit accompanied by human rights abuses. In Libya, Russia has aided an armed group that has sought state power. Russian forces' scorched-earth counterinsurgency tactics may appeal to some leaders struggling to reverse insurgent gains. Leaders chafing at arms embargoes or human rights criticism may view Russia as a counterweightcounterweight to Western donor pressure. In the Sahel, Russian partnership has become a symbol of leaders’ ' populist rejection of French postcolonial influence. In Libya, Wagner is aiding an armed group that has sought state power. Some surveys suggest that positive views of Russia are rising in Africa, although evidence is mixed. that positive views of Russia are rising in Africa, including among young people.

Syria’s Asad regime provided Russia with military bases that served as logistical hubs for operations in Africa. Syria’s regime change in late 2024 may therefore affect Russian operations in and through the region. In December 2024, unnamed U.S. and Libyan officials stated that Russia was moving some military equipment from Syria to Libya.

CAR. About 175 Russian “"instructors,”" including Wagner personnel, entered CAR in late 2017, after Russia obtained an exemption to a UN arms embargo exemption to provide weapons to CAR’s military. Russian personnel rose as high as 2,100 in 2021 as they played a key role in military operations against rebel groups. President Faustin-Archange Touadera has reportedly had Russians in his personal guard and as his advisors. Former Wagner-affiliated companies arethe military. The number of Russian personnel reportedly rose to some 2,100 in 2021 as they played a key role in military operations to retake territory from rebel groups, then fell to about 1,500 as of early 2026. Russians have reportedly provided personal security to President Faustin-Archange Touadera and served as his advisors. Former Wagner-affiliated firms are reportedly active in private security, mining, timber, and other commerce. President Touadera was reelected in late 2025 to a third term, with apparent Russian support, after removing constitutional term limits and cowing the opposition. Africa Corps since appears to have wrested control of ex-Wagner networks in CAR, something President Touadera reportedly resisted amid pressure from Moscow to pay directly for defense services, versus Wagner's self-funding model. Libya. private security, mining, and commerce. As of mid-2024, Russia was reportedly refurbishing a military base that a presidential advisor described as a future regional hub for up to 10,000 Russian personnel. UN peacekeepers in CAR have reportedly been targets of Russian disinformation.

Russia’s Security Operations in Africa

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Libya. Libya’s importance as a Russian logistical hub may increase due to regime change in Syria. Wagner personnel Wagner personnel reportedly began providing support in 2018 to Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar, a rival to Libya’'s internationally-recognized government in Tripoli. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) describeddescribed Wagner forces as providing vital support to the LNA’'s failed 2019- 2020 campaign to seize Tripoli. According to AFRICOM, Wagner’'s presence totaled about 2,000 as of 2020, but declined in 2022 as some personnel left for Ukraine; current numbers are uncertain. At the time of Syria's regime change in 2024, the Biden Administration drew international attention to reported shipments of Russian weaponry to LNA-controlled areas; transfers of Africa Corps personnel also reportedly took place. Reports suggest such shipments were ongoing as of early 2026. Mali. As many as 2,500 Russian personnel were reportedly deployed as of early 2026 in Mali, where they have supported combat operations against Islamist and separatist insurgents. Mali's military junta reportedly reached a deal with the Wagner Group in late 2021, at a cost of as some personnel left for Ukraine. In mid-2024, U.S. officials criticized reported new shipments of Russian weaponry and transfers of Africa Corps personnel to LNA-controlled eastern and southern Libya as “destabilizing” for Libya and the region. Mali. A military junta seized power in 2020 and reportedly contracted with Wagner in 2021 to support operations against Islamist insurgents. Bamako agreed to pay Wagner $10 million per month, according to U.S. officials. Wagner’the State Department. Wagner's entry intensified diplomatic strains with France, which withdrew 2,400 troops from Mali in 2022, ending a U.S.-backed counterterrorism mission. In 2023, the junta forced the exit of a UN peacekeeping operation that had supported a 2015 peace accord with separatist rebels. The junta later ended the accord. In late 2023contributing to France's withdrawal in 2022 of thousands of troops that had conducted counterterrorism operations with U.S. support. In 2023, a UN peacekeeping mission ended at the junta's demand. Later that year, with Russian support, Malian state forces reclaimedrecaptured the separatist stronghold of Kidal, a longstanding goal. Separatist and Islamist insurgents dealt a heavy setback to Russian forces in northern Mali in July 2024, killing dozens in an ambush. Sudan. Wagner-affiliated entities have reportedly been active in Sudan since former President Omar al Bashir struck a series of deals with Russia in 2017. Associated firms have beenThe Africa Corps formally took control of ex-Wagner networks in Mali in mid-2025. Russian forces have since reportedly helped protect fuel imports amid an Islamist militant blockade on Bamako.

In 2024, separatist and Islamist insurgents killed dozens of Russian forces and Malian soldiers in an ambush. A Ukrainian official asserted that Ukraine had aided the rebel attack. This claim sparked regional criticism of Ukraine and led several Sahel countries to cut diplomatic ties.

Sudan. Russia-affiliated entities reportedly became active in Sudan after then-President Omar al Bashir struck a series of deals with Moscow in 2017. Wagner-linked firms were involved in gold mining— (in collaboration with elements of Sudan’'s security forces—) and in training and provision of security services security service provision. In 2022, Wagner operatives werewas implicated in a scheme to smugglesmuggling gold from Sudan to Russia. In mid-2023, after fightingwar broke out between Sudan’'s rival security forces, the U.S. Treasury Department reportedDepartment reported that Wagner had supplied Sudan’'s Rapid Support Forces with surface-to-air missiles to fight the military. Russia subsequently later offered support to the military-led government, reportedly with the aim of securingto secure access for a naval base on Sudan’'s Red Sea coast. Potential Issues for Congress Oversight. Congress has enacted various legislation requiring the executive branch to report on Russian PMC activities and influence in Africa and worldwide (e.g., under several provisions of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-263). A possible issue for Congress is whether existing reports enable sufficient review of Russia’s activities and U.S. responses, or whether new, amended, or consolidated requirements are warranted. Sanctions. The United States has sanctioned the Wagner Group under executive orders pertaining to Russia and its war on Ukraine, transnational organized crime, and the conflict in CAR. A number of individuals and entities active in Africa are also designated for U.S. sanctions due to ties with Wagner. These designations freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction, prohibit transactions with U.S. persons, and impose visa and entry restrictions (for individuals). The State Department, citing actions in CAR, named the Wagner Group as an Entity of Particular Concern under the

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105- 292) in 2022, but has not redesignated it in later years. Congress may seek to evaluate the effectiveness of current sanctions, the resources required to enforce them, and the impact (if any) on regional perceptions of Russia. Congress may also assess the potential need to amend or update sanctions in light of Wagner’s formal dissolution in 2023 and the restructuring of Russia’s Africa deployments. Congress may examine U.S. coordination with partners such as the European Union and United Kingdom, which maintain similar sanctions in Africa. In the 118^th Congress, Members considered legislation aimed at requiring the Secretary of State to designate the Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (S. 416/H.R. 506). Such a designation could have implications for U.S. relations with African governments that reportedly contracted directly with Wagner, such as in Mali. Conditionality. Congress may consider whether to restrict or condition U.S. aid and/or support for multilateral lending to governments that host or pursue partnerships with Russian security personnel. (U.S. aid to several such governments is already subject to legal restrictions due to military coups and other factors.) Conditions could impact humanitarian conditions and may have other consequences for U.S. diplomatic relations and contacts.

Offering Alternatives. News reports indicate that the Biden Administration offered CAR’s President Touadera alternative security arrangements and incentives in a bid to decrease Wagner’s influence, in coordination with European countries and Rwanda, which has troops in CAR. In 2023, U.S. officials reportedly considered offering military aid to Burkina Faso in order to deter a deal with Wagner. Congress may consider whether to authorize, fund, or condition the use of such tools. It may be possible in some cases to convince African leaders to pursue options other than a Russian deployment. Such offers may provide undesired incentives, such as potentially encouraging leaders to signal an interest in working with Russia in order to attract U.S. interest. Policy risks also may arise from U.S. support to authoritarian or abusive regimes.

Strategic Competition and U.S. Messaging. Some African leaders and commentators have chafed at U.S. pressure to avoid working with Russia, including with regard to legislative proposals and other congressional actions. For example, leaders in southern Africa assailed the Countering Malign Russian Activities Globally Act (H.R. 9374), which the House passed in 2022, as a U.S. effort to restrict African diplomatic relations. Such reactions reflect enduring sensitivities over state sovereignty and the legacy of the Cold War (and U.S. policies) in the region. Russia’s reframing of operations as state-to-state cooperation, versus PMC or “mercenary” deployments, may further complicate U.S. diplomatic and congressional messaging.

Alexis Arieff, Coordinator, Specialist in African Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

Russia’s Security Operations in Africa

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12389 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED

IF12389

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In late 2025, Russia's ambassador to Sudan said the base plan was on hold.

Potential Issues for Congress

Oversight Issues. The extent to which the United States should seek to counter Russia's security activities in Africa (if at all) is a potential issue for Congress. The Trump Administration's 2025 National Security Strategy states a goal to "reestablish strategic stability with Russia," and does not specify an approach to Russia's operations in Africa. More broadly, Congress may review the Administration's foreign assistance and diplomatic staffing policies, which could affect the tools and resources available to respond to Russia in the region.

Congress has enacted legislation requiring the executive branch to report on Russia's military footprint and influence in Africa and worldwide, which could inform oversight and legislative approaches (e.g., §1241 of P.L. 119-60, the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act). Congress may consider whether existing reports enable sufficient review of Russia's activities and U.S. responses; whether new, amended, or consolidated requirements are warranted; or whether to sunset this line of inquiry.

Sanctions. Multiple individuals and entities in Africa have been sanctioned under U.S. executive orders pertaining, among other things, to Russia's foreign activities and war on Ukraine, transnational organized crime, and the conflict in CAR. Many of these designations cite ties to the Wagner Group, which is sanctioned under several U.S. programs. In early 2026, amid efforts to improve security cooperation with Mali, the Trump Administration lifted Russia-related sanctions on three senior Malian officials who had been designated for facilitating Wagner's activities.

Potential issues for Congress include the effectiveness of current sanctions, the resources required to enforce them, and the impact (if any) on Russian and U.S. influence, respectively. Congress could also assess the potential need to amend or update Wagner-linked designations in light of Russia's restructuring of its Africa deployments. Congress may examine U.S. coordination with European countries, which maintain some similar sanctions in Africa.

U.S. Security Cooperation. How to approach security cooperation with African governments that have partnered with Russian forces is a possible issue for Congress, including whether to restrict cooperation —or, alternately, explicitly authorize and/or fund it. Legislative restrictions or conditions could deter some African governments from pursuing deals with the Africa Corps, or in some cases, could provoke backlash. Restrictions may also constrain U.S. cooperation on shared objectives, such as counterterrorism. (Certain U.S. security aid for some Africa Corps partner states is already subject to legal restrictions due to military coups or other factors.) In some cases, U.S. security cooperation could serve as an alternative to Russian support, although the extent to which the two are interchangeable may be debated. Managing potentially sensitive activities with a partner force that is working closely with a U.S. adversary may also prove challenging, and policy risks can arise from U.S. support to authoritarian or abusive regimes. Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for a "Countering Russian Influence Fund" for use in, and to strengthen U.S. and NATO security cooperation with, countries in Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, not in Africa (see §7047 of Div. F, P.L. 119-75).