Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission
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Haiti in Crisis: What Role for a Multinational Security Support Mission?
Updated December 27, 2024
The Biden Administration sought to support Haitian-led efforts to restore political stability and security and the MSS; the Trump Administration has highlighted the increasing violence in Haiti and has suggested options for regional bodies and countries to take the lead on combating gang violence. The 119th Congress may consider options for addressing violence and instability in Haiti, including potential appropriations for the MSS or other security efforts.Haiti’Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission
continued to deteriorate in 2024. According to the United Nations, more than 5,350 people were killed and more than 2,155 others injured by gang violence in 2024, compared with an estimated 4,789 killed in 2023. The gangs—some of which are aligned with political elites—amassed control over territory and illicit markets amid the deeply unpopular government of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who assumed officepolitical instability following the July 2021 assassination of then- President Jovenel Moïse. Henry resigned in April 2024 after the formation of a Since April 2024, Haiti has been governed by a Transitional Presidential Council (TPC). The TPC, tasked with governing until elections can be convened, has been plagued by allegations of corruption and infighting.
Origins of the Multinational Security Support Mission
In October 2022, then-Prime Minister Ariel Henry requested (TPC).
The TPC initially selected Garry Conille to serve as acting prime minister until elections could be convened, if possible, by 2026. The TPC has been plagued by corruption allegations, which have challenged its perceived legitimacy. In November 2024, the TPC removed Conille and appointed Alix Didier Fils-Aimé as prime minister, amid worsening violence and alleged power struggles between Conille and the TPC. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the gang violence (including attacks on commercial aircraft) and political instability in Haiti.
The Biden Administration has sought to support Haiti, in part, by helping fund a UN-authorized, Kenya- led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) to address gang violence and promote security. Some Members have supported the MSS; others have criticized what they viewed as inadequate planning for the mission. Six months after the first Kenyan police officers arrived, experts assess that the MSS remains underfunded, undermanned, and unable to quell gang-related violence.
Origins of the Multinational Security Support Mission
In October 2022, then-Prime Minister Henry requested the deployment of an international force to help the Haitian National Police (HNP) quell insecurity and facilitate humanitarian aid. Canada, Brazil, and other Western Hemisphere countries Western Hemisphere countries, some of which participated in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH; 2004-2017), declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. MINUSTAH remains controversial in Haiti due to alleged sexual abuse by some of its forces and its inadvertent introduction of cholera into the country. into the country.
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In July 2023, Kenya announced it would considerconsider leading a multinational force in Haiti and sending up to 1,000 police, if authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Whereas U.S. and Caribbean Community (CARICOM)CARICOM) officials praised Kenya, some analysts questionedquestioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police and whether they could overcome language and cultural barriers. Others opposedopposed any international security force, arguing that previous foreign interventions in Haiti had failed.
In October 2023, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2699 authorizing a non-UN-conducted multinational force, financed by voluntary contributions, to provide security for critical infrastructure and operational support to the HNP for 12 months; the mission's mandate was extended, through Resolution 2751, until October 2, 2025..
Current Status
Kenya’'s deployment of the MSS was delayed until June 2024 amid debate in Kenya about the deployment’s constitutionality's constitutionality and the need to conclude a court-ordered bilateral security agreement with Haiti. Kenya also delayed deployment until the TPC replaced Prime Minister Henry.
MSS leaders have developed delayed deployment until a new Haitian government took power.
As of November 2024, the MSS consisted of over 380 personnel from Kenya, some 25 from Jamaica, and 2 from Belize. In addition to U.S. funding (see below), UN officials report at least $96.8 million in donations, primarily from Canada.
As of May 2025, the United Nations reported there was $110.9 million—primarily from Canada—in the Haiti MSS Trust Fund. As of March 2025, the MSS mission consisted of just over 1,000 personnel from Kenya, Jamaica, Belize, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Some observers suggest the MSS mission may need to be strengthened. In an October 2024 letter to the Secretary-General, the TPC president requested that the MSS be transformed into a UN peacekeeping mission; the Secretary-General asserted in February 2025 that such a transition is "not assessed as a feasible option." The Secretary-General specified that, "such a transition could be considered once significant progress has been made in substantially reducing gang territorial control." Reportedly, up to 90% of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs. In April 2025, the UN Special Representative to Haiti stated that Haiti is on the verge of "total chaos." Most recently, the TPC reportedly has begun using drones to combat criminal gangs. The Biden Administration sought to support Haiti, in part, by funding the MSS to help address gang violence and promote security. Some Members of Congress have supported the MSS; others have criticized what they view as inadequate planning for the mission. Almost a year after the first Kenyan police officers arrived, experts assess that the MSS remains underfunded, understaffed, and unable to quell gang-related violence. On February 6, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States "will continue to support the mission" and that he had issued a waiver to allow approximately $40 million of security assistance to flow to the MSS mission and the Haitian National Police amid the Trump Administration's foreign assistance "pause." In May 2025, the Administration designated the Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Further, in May 20 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rubio suggested that the Organization of American States (OAS) could play a larger role in Haiti and potentially coordinate a security mission, asserting that the MSS "alone will not solve this problem." The Secretary also stated that the Trump Administration is "prepared to play a leading role" in supporting the OAS but that buy-in would be necessary from other partners in the region. Congress did not specifically designate any U.S. foreign assistance for Haiti to help quell insecurity or support the MSS mission or the HNP in FY2024 or FY2025 appropriations legislation. Congress may consider whether to designate funding for such activities during the FY2026 appropriations process. Congress also may examine how the Trump Administration's foreign assistance policies, including allocations, reprogramming, and/or recissions of funds, may impact the situation in Haiti. Additionally, Congress may consider legislation that could complement U.S. security assistance efforts, such as bills to impose sanctions on those who collude with Haitian gangs (e.g., H.R. 2643, S. 1854).MSS leaders have developed an operational plan and created an oversight mechanism to monitor the mission’'s conduct. Participating personnel are subject to UN vetting, and those receiving U.S. support are to complete U.S. human rights vetting pursuant to the Leahy Laws (22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C. §362).
U.S. Policy
Congressional Considerations
During the Biden Administration, the United States pledged at least $380 million to support the MSS. That total included $100 million in foreign assistance and $200 million in Department of Defense enabling support. U.S. support for the MSS aimed to complement assistance provided to train and equip the HNP through bilateral U.S. programs and the multi-donor UN Basket Fund.
). Some human rights experts have advocated additional training and mechanisms to prevent and punish human rights violations. Others have raised concerns about a perceived lack of transparency on the MSS’s rules of engagement.
Some observers express concerns about Haiti’s increasingly complex security situation, suggesting the MSS mission may need to be strengthened. The MSS’s partner, the HNP, is weak, and at times allegedly complicit with criminal groups. In September 2024, a top UN expert on Haiti stated that the MSS has been inadequately equipped and insufficiently resourced.
The Biden Administration discussed the possibility of transitioning the MSS into a traditional UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) with Kenya, Haiti, and others at the UNSC. On September 30, 2024, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2751, extending the current MSS mandate for another 12 months. At a November 2024 UNSC meeting, Russia and China opposed conversion of the MSS into a PKO.
U.S. Funding and Congressional Considerations
The United States has pledged at least $380 million to support the MSS. In October 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced $100 million in foreign assistance for the MSS and $100 million in Department of Defense (DOD) funds for enabling support; in March 2024, Blinken announced the DOD commitment had doubled to $200 million. Additionally, via presidential drawdown authority (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(2)), President Biden authorized the transfer of at least $70 million in defense articles and services from U.S. stocks to Haiti—$10 million in March and $60 million in April. Haiti and/or Kenya may receive additional DOD funding. U.S. support for the MSS is intended to complement assistance provided to train and equip the HNP through bilateral U.S. programs and the multi-donor UN Basket Fund.
The United States allocated $230.9 million to Haiti in FY2023, including $45 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance focused primarily on the HNP. The Administration requested $356.7 million in bilateral aid to Haiti in FY2025, including $169 million in INCLE funding—$100 million of which would support the MSS.
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In addition to evaluating the FY2025 budget request, Congress may consider whether to provide funding for Haiti and the MSS and/or whether to shape how prior year appropriations are used in Haiti.
The House-passed version of the FY2025 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations act, 2025 (H.R. 8771/H.Rept. 118-554), recommends the Department of State continue building the HNP’s capacity to counter violent gangs, among other recommendations and reporting requirements. The Senate-introduced version of the FY2025 SFOPS bill (S. 4797/S.Rept. 118- 200) would require the Secretary of State to submit a report on the MSS detailing the funding, cost, duration, objectives, exit strategy, U.S. national interest, objectives achieved, lessons learned, and any allegations of misconduct and steps taken to hold perpetrators accountable.
Author Information
Karla I. Rios Analyst in Latin American Affairs
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