Colombia, a key U.S. security and economic partner in South America, continues to confront illegally armed groups and remains the world’s largest cocaine producer despite having

Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary

In August 2022, Gustavo Petro, Colombia’'s first leftist president and head of the Pacto Histórico (PH, or Historic Pact) politicalHistoric Pact (Pacto Histórico, or PH) coalition of left-leaning parties, took office for a four-year term. Petro promised to enact bold reforms to combat inequality, promote inclusion, and achieve peace in the country through negotiations with the country’'s remaining armed groups. The Petro government has shepherded tax, pension, and agricultural and pension reforms through the legislature, as well as and adopted a drug policy and national development plan focused on land redistribution and environmental protection. In October 2024, Petro’. In April 2025, Petro's approval rating stood at 3437%, considerably lower than when he took office. Observers have attributed Petro’'s flagging popular approval to the gradual collapse of his governing coalition, scandals involving his family and cabinet officials, the country’s sluggish economic growth (0.6% in 2023), and rising rural violence. Petro’s has largely abandoned his Total Peace initiative involving, which involved simultaneous negotiations with mostseveral armed groups—including the National Liberation Army (ELN)—has stalledthat the military is now confronting. Implementation of the 2016 peace accord with the FARC has also lagged.

For over two decades, Colombia has been a top U.S. ally and security partner in the Western Hemisphere. Over that periodhas faltered and may face further setbacks in the absence of initiatives formerly funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

U.S. Policy

Congress for FY2024 reduced U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on that assistance because of concerns that President Petro’s drug policies have fueled record coca cultivation and that his foreign policy positions, particularly his criticism of Israel, run counter to U.S. interestsincluded migration, trade, and environmental cooperation. Bilateral ties began to cool during the Biden Administration, partly because of President Petro's opposition to some U.S.-backed drug policies, decision to break diplomatic ties with Israel in May 2024, and social media rhetoric that some have characterized as antisemitic. Nevertheless, President Biden designated Colombia as a major non-NATO U.S. ally in 2022 and continued to use Colombia as a major implementer of U.S. security assistance programs in other countries. Tensions have heightened under the second Trump Administration. In January 2025, the Administration threatened a variety of repercussions after President Petro initially refused to receive a U.S. military aircraft transporting Colombian deportees. Relations could remain tense in light of U.S. foreign assistance cuts, drug policy differences, U.S. tariffs, and Colombia's decision to join China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Legislative Action

Colombia, the closest U.S. security partner in Latin America and the Caribbean, has received significant U.S. foreign assistance and congressional attention since the launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics and security assistance program that began in FY2000. U.S. assistance, totaling over $10 billion from State and Defense Department accounts between FY2000 and FY2018, helped the Colombian state—which faced potential collapse in the late 1990s—reduce homicides and kidnappings, regain control of its territory, and demobilize right- and left-wing armed groups.¹ Colombia has implemented U.S. security training programs for other countries in the region and developed sophisticated drug interdiction capacity. Despite those achievements, coca cultivation and potential cocaine production rose after 2013, and illegally armed groups have fought for control of the country’sterritory used for drug and other illicit industries. Colombian security forces have also been implicated in major human rights violations.

U.S.-Colombia relations have grown tense under the current leftist government of President Gustavo Petro, which took. Since taking office in August 2022 and, President Petro has pursued certain policy changes— including some related to counternarcotics—that have prompted some Members of Congress to question whether robust U.S. assistance for the country should continue.² The Petro government has worked with the United States on issues related to security and the rule of law, migration, and environmental conservation, as well as resolution of the crisis in Venezuela, the rule of law, and migration. Nevertheless, some Members of Congress have disagreed with some of President Petro’s rhetoric and what they view as Petro's antisemitic rhetoric and some policy positions, including his opposition to some U.S.-backed policies to reduce illicit drug suppliescrops.³ During the 118^th Congress, appropriators have disagreed on the amount of funding to provide to Colombia and the extent to which such assistance should be withheld until certain conditions are met.

This report provides background information on Colombia, an overview of and current political and economic conditions in the country, andas well as analysis for Congress on select issues in U.S.-Colombiabilateral relations.

Background

Colombia’'s vast and varied terrain—which includes the Andes mountains, Amazonian jungles, deserts, and grasslands—has posed governance challenges (see Figure 1). Despite its long history of democracy, Colombia has struggled to establish state control over its territory and to overcome a legacy of political violence that began in the 19^th century.⁴ In the 1960s, leftist groups, some inspired by the Cuban Revolution, accused the Colombian central government of neglecting rural areas, resulting in poverty, inequality, and highly concentrated land ownership. These groups

formed guerrilla organizations, including the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, or National Liberation Armyformed guerrilla organizations, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacion, or ELN), to challenge the state.⁵ In response, the Colombian government backed the creation of paramilitary organizations to protect landowners in areas without government security forces. By the 1980s, these paramilitaries had evolved into illegal armies that served private interests (landowners, ranchers, and drug traffickers). By the late 1990s, the FARC, ELN, and rightist, paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC) used revenue from cocaine trafficking to independently fund acts of terrorismlarge-scale violence—including massacres of civilians. The U.S. State Department designated the FARC and the ELN as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in 1997 and added the AUC to the FTO list in 2001.⁶ The FTO designations, particularly of the FARC and ELN, may have helped maintain U.S. support for Colombia's campaign against "narco-insurgents" in the post-9/11 environment in which terrorism, rather than drug trafficking, became the primary U.S. national security concern.⁷—including massacres of civilians.

With U.S. antidrug and counterterrorism support through Plan Colombia, President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) of the conservative Democratic Center (Centro Democrático, or CD) party rebuilt the Colombian military and weakened the FARC, although some security forces and allied paramilitaries continued to commit serious human rights abuses during his administration.⁶ On8 In November 11, 2024, the State Department sanctioned former General Mario Montoya Uribe, former commander of the Colombian military (2006-2008) who was allegedly involved in covering up extra-judicialextrajudicial killings of civilians disguised as combatant deaths.⁷9 With the FARC and the Colombian military having fought to a virtual stalemate, President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) launched secret talks with the FARC, formerly the largest and most powerful insurgent group in the Western Hemisphere, in 2011 that resulted in the signing of a historic 2016 peace accord.⁸

The peace accord, now part of Colombia’s constitution, enabled the demobilization and disarmament of more than 13,000 FARC fighters (roughly 800 dissidents refused to disarm) but proved controversial; its opponents included former President Uribe’s and Santos’ successor, Iván Duque (2018-2022).⁹ The accord included provisions on rural development; the FARC’s demobilization, disarmament, and subsequent political participation; illicit crops and drug trafficking; victims’ reparations and transitional justice; and verification that programs in the accord are implemented.¹⁰ By 2021, slow implementation of the accord’s stipulations and a10

Population: 52.2 million (2023, IMF estimate) Figure 1. Colombia at a Glance

Population: 53.1 million (2025, IMF estimate)

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Colombia’'s National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), and Trade Data Monitor (TDM).

In June 2022, Colombian voters elected former senator Gustavo Petro as president

The peace accord, now part of Colombia's constitution, enabled the demobilization and disarmament of more than 13,000 FARC fighters (roughly 800 dissidents refused to disarm) but proved controversial; its opponents included former President Uribe and Santos' successor, Iván Duque (2018-2022).¹¹ The accord included provisions on rural development; the FARC's demobilization, disarmament, and subsequent political participation; illicit crops and drug trafficking; victims' reparations and transitional justice; and verification that programs in the accord are implemented.¹² By 2021, slow implementation of the accord's stipulations and a continued lack of state presence and poverty in many areas had contributed to a resurgence in violence and other criminal activity.¹³ In 2021, the State Department removed the FARC from the FTO list but designated two FARC dissident groups that refused to demobilize—the FARC-People's Army (FARC-EP) and Segunda Marquetalia—as FTOs.¹⁴

In 2022, Colombian voters who supported Petro did so apparently in part out of a desire for change. Such voters reportedly had tired of lackluster growth, high unemployment and inflation, inadequate social policies, and tough policing policies that quashed protest during the Duque government.¹²15 Petro and Márquez presented bold social programs and initiatives to achieve peace, reduce inequality, and promote a green economy; Márquez’'s popularity drew support from marginalized Colombians, particularly in the Pacific Coast region.¹³

Initial Achievements

Following his election, Petro, who had surrounded himself with left-leaning loyalists as mayor, surprised observers by forging a multiparty congressional majority.¹⁴17 Led by PH and including the Conservative (Partido Conservador) and Liberal parties, which dominated Colombian politics in the 20^th century, Petro’'s initial legislative coalition had 77 of 108 seats in the Colombian Senate and 145 of 188 seats in the House. Petro also named an ideologically diverse cabinet. Opposition included the rightist Democratic Center and the Radical Change (Cambio Radical) parties.parties.

In August 2022, President Petro began his term promising sweeping changes—including peace, inclusion, and environmental protection—for the disenfranchised communities who overwhelmingly supported his candidacy. Although some proposed reforms have been enacted, President Petro has yet to deliver on many of his pledges. In 2022, President Petro quickly secured enactment of a legal framework for his Total Peace program, an ambitious initiative authorizing the government to negotiate with insurgent groups deemed to have political agendas, such as the ELN, as well as major criminal organizations (see the “"Security Conditions” section for further details).¹⁵" section). Petro also secured passage of a reform that raised government revenue through increased taxes on the wealthy and mining and oil companies, but his government has had difficulty investing this extra revenue and executing programs.¹⁶executing programs funded by that revenue.¹⁸ Weak public administration also could complicate implementation of the Petro government' Weak public administration

and budget constraints also could complicate implementation of the Petro government’s September 2023 drug strategy.¹⁷ With an estimated cost of s September 2023 drug strategy. Estimated to cost $21 billion over 10 years, thethis drug strategy prioritizes rural community assistancetargeted assistance to rural communities, voluntary crop substitution, and environmental and public health objectives over drug crop eradication.¹⁸

Setbacks and Challenges

In April 2023, President Petro reshuffled his cabinet to put loyalists in key positions; this prompted two parties, the Conservative Party and rightist “La U,”Union Party for the People (Partido de la Unión por la Gente, or La "U"), to leave his congressional coalition. Nevertheless, Colombia’'s Congress still approved Petro’'s four-year National Development Plan focused on land redistribution and environmental protection in May 2023 and enacted a constitutional amendment recognizing peasants’' land rights and creating agrarian courts to handle rural land disputes in June 2023.

By January 2024, two additional parties had left Petro’'s congressional coalition; the parties in the congressional coalition after their departure hold 48 of 108 seats in the Senate and 102 of 188 seats in the House. In April 2024, Colombia’'s Congress rejected Petro’'s healthcare reform that would have expanded state control over private insurers. In June 2024, legislators passed a diluted version of a pension reform that the government had proposed as key to strengthening the state pension fund and supporting citizens who lack savings. A. As of May 2025, a modified labor reform package has passed the Colombian House and is under consideration inbut not the Colombian Senate. Legislators removed some Petro -government-backed provisions that would have strengthened union rights and formalized peasant workers, but kept provisions to expand renumeration for those who work at night or on weekends and holidays and to, among other measures, create more categories of paid leave.¹⁹

In addition to facing pushback against some aspects of his legislative agenda, President Petro has grappled with eroding approval ratings, criminal complaints against his family and political associates, and sluggish economic growth markedhindered by declining investment.²⁰ PH-backed candidates performed relatively poorly in October 2023 local elections, even in traditionally left- leaning cities like Bogotá. In January21 Since 2024, prosecutors have charged Petro’'s son with accepting bribes from drug traffickers in exchange for political favors and a former cabinet minister with stealing from a disaster relief agency.²² The interior and foreign ministers appointed in February 2025 have been embroiled in a public feud; both have been accused of involvement in a campaign financing scandal.²³ President Petro has responded to setbacks with populist rhetoric and actions. For example, he directed government regulators to take over two major public-private health insurers after legislators rejected his proposed health reform.²⁴ In October 2024, President Petro dismissed the national electoral council's decision to investigate the financing of his 2022 campaign as a "coup."²⁵ On May 1, 2025, Petro characterized the Colombian Senate's vote against allowing a popular referendum on his labor reform that had stalled in the Colombian Congress "fraudulent."²⁶ Petro called for people to support the reform; labor unions responded by convening a 48-hour strike in late May to push the Colombian Senate to approve the labor reform.²⁷

As Petro has faced challenges during his term, so have leading opposition figures. In April 2024, the Colombian attorney general charged former President Uribe, once a key U.S. ally, with bribery and fraud. Uribe allegedly engaged in witness tampering to prevent disclosure of his former ties to paramilitary groups responsible for serious human rights violations; he has denied those charges.²⁸

Political attention in Colombia is focusing on legislative and presidential elections scheduled for March and May 2026, respectively. In April 2025, President Petro's approval rating hovered around 37%, and some analysts predicted that center-right parties could dominate the 2026 elections.²⁹ The left is seeking to unite behind one Petro-backed presidential candidate.³⁰ Early presidential contenders include Vicky Dávila, a conservative journalist; Sergio Fajardo, the centrist mayor of Medellín; and Gustavo Bolívar, the leftist former Senator and Minister of Social Prosperity under President Petro. It is yet unclear whether Bolívar is Petro's preferred candidate.

Over the past decade, the homicide rate in Colombia has remained relatively stable at less than half the rate recorded in the 1990s, but kidnappings and extortions have risen.³¹ In 2024, Colombia recorded a homicide rate of 25.4 per 100,000 people, just above the annual average recorded since 2015 but among the highest in Latin America.³² Kidnappings, a source of revenue and means of territorial control for illegally armed groups, fell from 2015 to 2021 before rising from 2022 to 2024 to levels not seen since 2013.³³ Even with that increase, kidnapping rates still remain well below conflict-era levels.³⁴ Extortion, perpetrated by armed groups and common criminals, has risen since about 2010, reaching 13,000 reported cases in 2024.³⁵

To date, the Petro administration's implementation of the 2016 peace accord and its Total Peace program have faced serious challenges. According to UN observers, while Petro's administration has prioritized rural land reform within peace accord implementation, violence committed by criminal groups against former combatants and vulnerable populations continued because of a lack of state presence in marginalized areas.³⁶ Separate negotiations with nine different armed groups under Total Peace have faced major setbacks. As military confrontations against groups engaged in negotiations declined through 2024, those groups fought each other for territorial control, massacred civilians, and carried out targeted killings of human rights defenders (see "Human Rights"). In January 2025, violence erupted in the northeastern region of Catatumbo near the Venezuelan border as the ELN, reportedly complicit with Venezuelan security forces, launched an offensive to regain coca-growing territory from a FARC dissident splinter group.³⁷ By early May 2025, the confrontation had caused some 117 deaths and displaced more than 65,000 people.³⁸

In 2025, the Petro government's approach to security appears to be shifting from negotiations to confrontation, and his drug policy has evolved to include manual crop fumigation; some observers assert that the Trump Administration's "pause" in foreign assistance may have hindered these efforts (see "U.S. Foreign Assistance").³⁹ In January 2025, in addition to announcing development projects for farmers in Catatumbo, Petro ended peace negotiations with the ELN, deployed troops to the region, and declared a state of emergency in the area. In February 2025, Petro appointed a retired general as defense minister and tasked him with confronting armed groups. In May 2025, the government arrested more than 200 suspected Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) members after the group killed 27 soldiers and police officers the prior month (the Gulf Clan is the largest criminal organization in Colombia).⁴⁰ The Petro administration has suspended negotiations with the Gulf Clan indefinitely. Amid record coca cultivation and U.S. pressure, the Petro government is also reportedly adopting drug policies it once opposed, including forced eradication and manual fumigation with glyphosate (see "Efforts Against Illegal Drugs and Organized Crime").⁴¹

communities, perpetrators of certain crimes could serve reduced sentences in non-prison settings as decided by the JEP.⁴²43 While all entities have taken steps to carry out their prescribed functions since the accord took effect, they have faced challenges that have slowed progress. Following are some of these developments:

• Truth Commission Report.⁴³Some analysts are concerned that the end of funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), formerly the largest donor supporting peace accord implementation, could further hinder progress, particularly at the JEP.⁴⁴ Selected developments related to these human rights mechanisms are discussed below:Truth Commission Report.⁴⁵ In June 2022, the Truth Commission published a report based on the testimony of some 30,000 victims of the armed conflict. The report estimated that some 450,000 people died between 1985 and 2018, 80% of whom were civilians. It attributed some 45% of these deaths to paramilitaries, 27% to guerrillas, and 12% to state agents. In addition, it estimatedIt estimated that more than 110,000 people were forcibly disappeared (52% by paramilitaries). The FARC reportedly perpetrated 75% of the cases of forced recruitment of children and 40% of an estimated 50,000 kidnappings. The report explores the complicated economic, political, and military interests of each of the armed groups involved in the conflict and makes recommendations to avoid such a conflict from reoccurring.

• Search Search Unit for Disappeared People.. Experts estimate that nearly 90,000 people remain missing as a result of the armed conflict but that many may have been buried without identification in cemeteries.⁴⁴46 Within five years of its creation in 2017, the unit located 12 people alive, recovered 766 sets of human remains, and created 23 regional search teams. Some analysts assess that a lack of funding, personnel, and forensic capability, as well as the ongoing conflict in some regions, has hindered identification efforts.

• The JEP and Emblematic Cases. The JEP has investigated emblematic cases including forced disappearances committed by the FARC and the “"false positives”" scandal in which the Colombian military and paramilitaries reportedly killed more than 6,000 civilians, most between 2002 and 2008, whom they claimed were FARC combatants.⁴⁵47 In 2022, FARC leaders publicly acknowledged their role in kidnapping more than 21,000 people over two decades.⁴⁶48 Similarly, some former military leaders have apologized for their roles in the “"false positives”" killings and have begun performing public works in affected communities.⁴⁷49 Still, some critics assert that the JEP has taken too long to address crimes committed during the conflict; these critics include a former army commander accused of being involved in 113 false positives.⁵⁰Many of the most serious human rights abuses in Colombia today, including massacres of civilians, killings of human rights defenders,⁵¹ gender-based violence, and forced child recruitment, are committed by illegally armed groups. In 2024, for example, a Colombian think tank, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Indepaz), documented 76 massacres with 267 victims (Figure 2).⁵² Similarly, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified 72 massacres in which 252 people were killed in 2024, the vast majority committed by illegally armed groups and criminal organizations. UN officials also verified more than 200 cases of forced child recruitment as well as widespread sexual violence, particularly in Indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and migrant communities.

(selected years since the signing of the 2016 peace accord)

Killings of human rights defenders have disproportionately affected community action groups, ethnic leaders, peasants and small farmers, and environmental activists. In 2023, Indepaz documented 188 assassinations of human rights defenders, 26.6% of whom were from community action groups and 23% of whom were Indigenous or Afro-Colombian (see Figure 3).⁵¹ In prior years, up to 26.9% of all human rights defenders killed reportedly were peasants and small farmers, many of whom were concerned about land rights and the environment. Global Witness, a human rights advocacy group, recorded 79 killings of environmental activists in 2023, making Colombia the most dangerous country in the world for environmental activists that year.⁵² These killings reportedly occurred even as more than 6,400 human rights defenders received protection from the Colombian government.⁵³

Source: CRS based on data from the Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Indepaz), “"Visor de Asesinato a Personas Lideres Sociales y Defenseores de Derechos Humanos en Colombia,”" accessed October 14, 2024, May 8, 2025; https://indepaz.org.co/visor-de-asesinato-a-personas-lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos- humanos-en-colombia/. Notes. Note: According to Colombia’'s interior ministry, community action groups are organizations that can represent their communities when seeking infrastructure or services from the government.

OHCHR and the State Department have alsoalso have documented human rights abuses by Colombian officials, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, and harsh prison conditions, in 2023.⁵⁴.⁵⁸ According to the State Department, the Colombian inspector general’'s office opened cases against alleged abuses by 39 members of Colombian security forces in 2023. In July 2023, Colombia’'s attorney general indicted a Colombian National Police (CNP) colonel on homicide charges for the death of two protesters killed in large protests in 2021. These killings had prompted U.S. congressional concern about the CNP’'s use of force against civilians.⁵⁵59 The State Department cited the “"high workload”" of judges, prosecutors, and investigators as barriers to additional investigations of serious offenses by government forces.⁵⁶

The Economy

Colombia, classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country, has the fourth- largest economy in Latin America; mining and energy exports have fueled economic growth. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Colombia’s economy contracted by 7.2% in 2020 but rebounded with 10.8% growth in 2021 and 7.3% growth in 2022.⁵⁷ Colombia’'s economic growth rate slowed to 0.6% in 2023, according to the IMF, reportedly because of an

Colombia continues to grapple with long-standing socioeconomic challenges. Economic growth helped reduce Colombia’'s poverty rate from more than 49.6% in 2005 to 28.6% in 2018, but inequality and poverty indicators have increased since 2020.⁶⁰ Poverty levels64 The poverty rate rose to 39.8% in 2020 because of the economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic—which included a sharp reduction in oil exports—before declining to 33.8% in 2021, according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.⁶¹32.7% in 2023.⁶⁵ Colombia remains a highly unequal society, including in the distribution of arable land; small farmers and ethnic communities often lack titles to their land, and ownership remains concentrated among large landholders.⁶²

President Petro has pledged to shift Colombia’'s economic model toward development based on renewable energy rather than mining and oil production; his government has not been approvingapproved new projects in the fossil fuel sectors. This move has hampered foreign direct investment, as oil and mining exports accounted for 55% of Colombia’s goods exports and about 6% of GDP in 2022.⁶³ Domestic investment also has lagged because of concerns about inflation, increases in corporate taxesIn 2024, FDI declined across most sectors (transportation, storage and communications, mining, and oil); total FDI dropped to the lowest level since 2021.⁶⁷ Domestic investment also has lagged, which Colombia's businesses association has attributed to concerns about the government's fiscal deficit and poor budget execution, insecurity, high interest rates, policy uncertainty, and the effects of wage increases and implemented (e.g., pension) and pendingpotential (e.g., labor) reforms.⁶⁴

Humanitarian Conditions

Persistent inequality and decades of armed conflict have contributed to serious humanitarian challenges in Colombia, particularly in rural and border regions. Colombia has improved its political, economic, and social indicators in the Fund for Peace’'s Fragile States Index (first issued in 2006), although indicators associated with achieving social cohesion have lagged behind those in other categories.⁶⁵69 Nevertheless, humanitarian challenges associated with ongoing armed conflict, a continued lack of state presence in remote parts of the country, climate change, and an influx of nearly 3 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees since 2014 have persisted.⁷⁰ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that some 8.39.1 million people in Colombia are in need of humanitarian aid.⁷¹

Following are some of the major humanitarian challenges in Colombia:

• Providing basic services for people who lack them. Some 3.2 million people in Colombia lacklacked access to potable water, and 78% of municipalities havehad limited access to health services.⁷⁰

• as of 2024.⁷⁵ Preparing for environmental issues Colombia is vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly flooding, which UN experts assert has been exacerbated by climate change. UN estimates indicate that some 2.9 million people are at risk of losing their livelihoods as a result.⁷¹

• Addressing Migration.76 Addressing migration. In addition to sheltering nearly 3 million Venezuelans, Colombia saw more than 520300,000 irregular migrants passedpass through Colombia in 2023in 2024 to access the Darién Gap into Panama, a stretch of dense rainforest along Colombia’'s border with Panama.⁷²

President Gustavo Petro has sought to establish a foreign policy that is less closely aligned with that of the United States and the European Union—Colombia’'s first- and third-ranked trade partners and largest foreign aid donors—than in the past. According to some analysts, Petro has aimed to establish a policy of “"strategic ambiguity”" regarding his government’'s foreign policy positions in an effort to elevate Colombia’'s global prestige as a “"middle power”" like Brazil, but it is not clear that this strategy has yet borne fruit.⁷³79 As an example, Petro’'s government has welcomed continued investment from the People’'s Republic of China (PRC, or China) in infrastructure, technology, and railroads and is considering joining China’. Colombia joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in May 2025.⁸⁰ Some analysts assess that the Petro government has pursued closer relations with the PRC without developing a strategy that considers the privacy and national security ramifications of PRC investments in strategic sectors.⁸¹ Petro also seeks to be a global leader on environmental issues, and Colombia hosted the 16^th Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in October 2024. Some observers contend that the Petro government has not adequately funded environmental protection agencies.⁸²

Some of President Petro's positions on key foreign policy issues aligned with those of the Biden Administration. For example, with respect to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Petro government voted for a September 2022 UN resolution defending Ukraine's territorial integrity and a February 2023 UN resolution calling for Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine. The Biden Administration also sought to use Petro as an intermediary to help convince Nicolás Maduro to accept the July 2024 presidential election results in Venezuela.⁸³

For over two decades, Colombia has been a top U.S. ally and security partner in the Western Hemisphere. During that time period, U.S. relations with Colombia expanded from mainly counternarcotics and counterterrorism cooperation to a broad bilateral agenda that included migration and peace accord implementation, among other topics. Designated by President Biden as a major non-NATO U.S. ally in 2022, Colombia has been a regional leader in drug interdiction and a key implementer of U.S. security cooperation programs.⁸⁷ With U.S. and international support, Colombia has provided temporary residence status to many of the nearly 3 million Venezuelans in the country who have fled the multifaceted crisis in neighboring Venezuela.⁸⁸ At the same time, President Petro's rhetoric on social media, opposition to U.S.-backed policies to reduce illicit drug supplies, and decision to break diplomatic ties with Israel in May 2024 over the conflict in Gaza strained U.S.-Colombian relations during the Biden Administration.⁸⁹ Since Petro took office, Congress has reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on the assistance provided (see "U.S. Foreign Assistance").

Tensions have heightened since the start of the second Trump Administration. On January 26, 2025, President Petro initially refused to allow U.S. military aircraft transporting Colombian deportees to land but backed down after President Trump threatened to impose a range of retaliatory tariffs on Colombia.⁹⁰ Although the two countries de-escalated the crisis by the end of the day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced travel sanctions on Colombian officials responsible for interference in the U.S. repatriation flights; it is unclear whether those travel restrictions remain in place.⁹¹ U.S.-Colombian relations could remain tense amid cuts in U.S. foreign assistance, drug policy differences, and U.S. tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration. President Petro's May 2025 trip to China for a Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) summit and decision to join the BRI could further strain relations.

Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance worldwide since the FY2000 launch of Plan Colombia. The focus of U.S. assistance efforts has changed over time, responding to changes in Colombia's long-running internal armed conflict and Colombian government priorities. U.S. assistance to Colombia, managed by the U.S. Department of State, has concentrated largely on counternarcotics and security support, including training Colombian military and police and supporting humanitarian demining efforts.⁹² The State Department also has supported efforts to strengthen Colombia's judicial system, diversify trade, counter terrorism, and promote human rights and democracy. Until the cancellation of most of its programs in March 2025, USAID focused on helping the Colombian government consolidate peace in formerly war-torn rural communities to foster increased investment, provide basic public services, carry out crop substitution programs, and advance citizen security. Starting in 2017, U.S. Administrations obligated more than $1.5 billion to support peace accord implementation (as of mid-2023).⁹³

(in thousands of current U.S. dollars)

Account

DA

61,000

70,000

80,000

86,000

77,000

90,500

ESF

146,328

154,100

144,000

129,000

128,500

GHP (State)

1,500

1,747

2,861

2,971

N/A

N/A

GHP (USAID)

3,000

1,970

9,000

8,750

N/A

8,750

INCLE

180,000

189,000

189,000

150,000

134,500

135,000

IMET

1,783

1,850

1,476

1,850

N/A

2,000

FMF

45,525

38,525

40,000

38,525

37,025

38,525

NADR

21,000

21,000

21,000

21,000

N/A

10,000

Total

460,200

453,096

413,275

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables—Foreign Operations, FY2020-FY2025; and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023.

Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; N/A = not available.

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables-Foreign Operations, FY2020-FY2025 and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023. Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs. a. This sum includes $14.8 million of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2). ).

b. This sum includes $15.0 million of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). c. This total does not include GHP, IMET, or NADR allocations. P.L. 118-47 did not designate specific funding amounts for Colombia under those accounts. ).

The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division F), and accompanying explanatory statement designate at least $377.5 million for Colombia, subject to certain restrictions and withholding conditions. That total is $66.5 million (15%) lower than the $444.0 million that the Administration had requested for Colombia in FY2024. An earlier FY2024 SFOPS bill that was passed by the House, H.R. 4665, did not designate a funding level for Colombia; the accompanying report, H.Rept. 118-146, stated that the Committee was deferring consideration of funding for Colombia because of concerns about the current Colombian government. The initial version of the SFOPS bill reported in the

Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §§2751 et seq.).⁹³ That designation grants Colombia privileged access to U.S. military training, equipment, and cooperative research and development projects, among other benefits.⁹⁴ In November 2022, Colombian Defense Minister Iván Velázquez and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met to reaffirm their commitment to U.S.-Colombia security cooperation and the importance of Colombia’s role in promoting security in the Western Hemisphere and globally.⁹⁵ TheIt includes $129 million in Economic Support Funds, of which $25 million is for Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities and $15 million is for human rights programming, as well as $135 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement aid and $77 million in Development Assistance.⁹⁸ Prior to obligation of that assistance, the legislation requires the Secretary of State to submit reports to relevant congressional committees describing Colombia's counternarcotics strategy, how U.S. funds would support its implementation, and how the Colombian government's policies align with U.S. national interests. Additionally, the FY2024 SFOPS act requires the State Department to withhold some security assistance for Colombia until the country has met certain counternarcotics- and human-rights-related requirements.

The Biden Administration requested $413.3 million in assistance for Colombia in FY2025. The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (P.L. 119-4), provides FY2025 foreign assistance for Colombia at the same level and under the same conditions as P.L. 118-47; country allocations for FY2024 and FY2025 are not yet publicly available. The Trump Administration has yet to send a full FY2026 foreign assistance request to Congress.

On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14169, "Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid."⁹⁹ The order sought to "pause" all U.S. foreign assistance for 90 days "pending reviews of such programs for programmatic efficiency and consistency with United States foreign policy." The Trump Administration's subsequent cancellation of thousands of U.S. assistance awards and contracts (including legislatively directed funding) and intention to close USAID as an independent agency reportedly has affected U.S. activities in Colombia focused on development, human rights, humanitarian needs, demining, and support to ethnic communities, among other programs.¹⁰⁰ Certain assistance aimed at enhancing security—including aviation support, counternarcotics programs, support for criminal justice entities, and training and regional security programs led by Colombia—has restarted following the pause.¹⁰¹

Still, some analysts assert that U.S. stop-work orders in early 2025 hindered the ongoing work of dozens of vetted units, aviation programs, and other security-related activities.¹⁰² Other analysts predict that such security assistance may not be as effective without complementary USAID programming (such as land titling and crop substitution programs) and that criminal groups may proliferate in communities formerly benefitting from USAID programs.¹⁰³ Humanitarian organizations are concerned that reductions in U.S. humanitarian aid will not be easily replaced by the Colombian government or other donors; the United States reportedly provided 68% of the humanitarian aid Colombia received in 2024.¹⁰⁴

Congress's consideration of what types and levels of foreign assistance to appropriate for Colombia in FY2026 and what conditions to place on that assistance could be informed by oversight efforts examining recent cuts and potential rescissions of foreign assistance. Congress may assess the effects of cuts in foreign assistance on the security, human rights, and humanitarian situation in Colombia; bilateral relations; and U.S.-bound drug flows from the country. Congress could enact legislation to authorize certain assistance to Colombia and/or continue to legislatively direct how assistance to Colombia should be spent.

Colombia receives the bulk of all Department of Defense (DOD) training and equipment provided to Latin America and the Caribbean, and also benefits from embedded U.S. advisors working on the modernization of military personnel, intelligence, and broader institutional practices. DOD provides training and equipment, among other support, through multiple accounts, the largest of which are authorized under Title 10, Section 333, of the U.S. Code Code for building the capacity of foreign security forces. In compliance with Leahy Law vetting requirements (22 U.S.C. §2378d), U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment.⁹⁷108 In FY2024, $15 million of the total $28.7 million in Section 333 funds provided to Colombia supported training for Colombian pilots and maintenance on U.S.-provided rotary-wing aircraft.⁹⁸ DOD has invested more than $10 million to help Colombia’s military conduct humanitarian demining.⁹⁹109 In addition to addressing security objectives, U.S. and Colombian forces collaborate on humanitarian programs to provide emergency assistance and infrastructure to vulnerable communities and have implemented humanitarian demining programs. DOD has donated 10 rapidly deployable emergency response bridges to help the Colombian military deliver emergency assistance rapidly in the event of a disaster.¹⁰⁰

Colombia has become a key implementer of U.S. security assistance programs and a leader of multinational maritime interdiction operations.¹⁰¹111 Through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, Colombian police and military officers have trained more than 50,000 police and other individuals from across the region sincefrom 2013 through September 2024.¹¹² In May 2025, Admiral Alvin Holsey, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, met with Colombian Minister of Defense Pedro Sánchez to discuss U.S.-Colombia bilateral defense cooperation and efforts to strengthen regional security.¹¹³

Congress plays critical roles in designing and overseeing security cooperation programs and in evaluating whether security cooperation activities are aligned with and meet U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.¹¹⁴ Pursuant to statutory authorities, the executive branch must regularly notify relevant committees about some security cooperation activities. Congress may exercise oversight by using annual authorizing legislation to establish temporary authorities or by modifying the U.S. Code on an enduring basis, reviewing planned activities and obligations, mandating reports, or holding relevant hearings.

For decades, controlling the flow of cocaine from Colombia to the United States has been a top congressional goal, albeit one that has been difficult to achieve given U.S. demand and cocaine’'s role as a primary source of revenue for criminal and illegally armed groups. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, cocaine resulted in more than 29,918 estimatedcontributed to an estimated 21,877 U.S. overdose deaths in 2023, up from 28,441 in 2022.¹⁰⁴ Some2024, down from 29,911 in 2023.¹¹⁵ The U.S. State Department assesses that some 97% of cocaine in the United States originates in Colombia.¹⁰⁵116 According to the U.S. Department of StateState Department, Colombia remains a committed U.S. counternarcotics partner and a regional leader in drug interdiction, but coca cultivation and potential cocaine production in the country reached record levels in 2023 before appearing to stabilize in 2024.¹¹⁷.¹⁰⁶ Although coca cultivation has been increasing for more than a decade since the end of aerial spraying, the Petro government’s drug policy, which emphasizes alternative-livelihoods programs over eradication,'s drug policy has apparently exacerbated that trend.¹⁰⁷

Other sources of illicit revenue for criminal organizations and illegally armed groups involved in cocaine trafficking include extortion, illicit mining, illegal logging, and alien smuggling. With gold prices at record levels, such groups have expanded their involvement in illicit mining, often in areas where coca crops are cultivated.¹⁰⁸119 Illicit mining is associated with environmental destruction, human trafficking, and money laundering.¹⁰⁹120 Illegal logging and deforestation in some regions are also closely correlated with coca cultivation; some activities conducted on illegally cleared land (including cattle ranching) are used as fronts for laundering drug profits.¹¹⁰121 Illicit mining, logging, and drug trafficking have wrought particular damage in remote areas of the Amazon near Colombia’'s borders with Brazil and Peru.¹¹¹122 While deforestation declined in 2023, many experts assert that the decline did not occur because of government efforts but as a result of the FARC-EMC prohibiting deforestation in areas under its control (as the FARC used to