Iraq
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Updated October 25, 2024
Iraq
The Republic of Iraq (Figure 1), with a substantial history of U.S. involvement, large energy resources, and a growing, diverse population, continues to experience security and political challenges that are further complicated by competition between outside powers, including neighboring Iran and the United States. U.S. military operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 involved billions of dollars in U.S. investments in Iraq’s reconstruction and stabilization. After withdrawing in 2011, U.S. forces returned to the country in 2014 at the Iraqi government’s invitation to assist Iraqis in defeating the Islamic State group (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL). Through September 2024, about 2,400 U.S. military forces remained deployed in Iraq to provide advice and aid to Iraqi security forces, including the peshmerga forces of the federally recognized Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Biden Administration has supported continued U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation and encouraged Iraqi leaders to fight corruption and respect citizens’ rights.
Iran’s ties to some Iraqi parties and militias complicate U.S.-Iraqi relations, and some Iraqis with ties to the Iranian government lead calls for the expulsion of U.S. and other foreign forces from Iraq. Iran-backed groups’ attacks on U.S. and coalition forces have prompted U.S. response strikes in a pattern that intensified after the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. Iraq’s government has criticized U.S. strikes as inconsistent with the coalition’s mission and has engaged in talks with the United States to determine a timeline for an end to the coalition’s mission and presence.
In September 2024, U.S. officials announced the coalition’s mission in Iraq would end by September 2025, with coalition forces in Iraq continuing to support anti-IS missions in Syria “until at least September 2026,” subject to security conditions and ongoing consultations. Iraqi and U.S. officials have stated their intent to continue security cooperation and training on a bilateral and enduring basis.
The 118th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Biden Administration’s requests for U.S. foreign aid and security assistance for Iraq. Members also may consider steps to shape U.S.-Iraq economic ties, influence relations between Iraq’s national government and the KRG, address humanitarian needs, and promote human rights, including those of religious and ethnic minorities.
Background
Iraq
Ongoing competition for influence in Iraq between outside powers, especially neighboring Iran and the United States, complicates Iraqi decision making. Related pressures have increased since October 2023; Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups launched a campaign of attacks through 2024 against Israel and on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria in the context of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. Since 2024, Israel-Iran conflict and U.S. strikes on Iran have resulted in greater international attention to Iraq's orientation and sovereignty. The collapse of the Iran-backed Asad government in Syria rekindled Iraqi concerns about Syria-based terrorism threats and altered the context for planned changes to U.S. and coalition military operations in Iraq. U.S. military forces remain deployed in Iraq to provide advice and aid to Iraqi security forces, including the peshmerga forces of the federally recognized Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). U.S. plans jointly developed with Iraqi security officials are providing for the relocation and consolidation of U.S. forces in Iraq as counter-Islamic State coalition operations come to an end. Iraqi and U.S. officials have stated their intent to continue security cooperation and training on an enduring bilateral basis. Some U.S. diplomatic personnel temporarily departed from Iraq in June 2025, as tensions involving Iran increased. Following U.S. strikes against nuclear targets in Iran in June 2025, several unclaimed drone attacks in Iraq have targeted locations in the Kurdistan region and some sites hosting U.S. troops. The 119th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq's relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Trump Administration's FY2026 requests for U.S. security assistance and foreign aid for Iraq and planned changes to the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Members also may consider steps to shape U.S.-Iraq security cooperation and economic ties, influence relations between Iraq's national government and the KRG, and monitor the rights of Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities.
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
Background
Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the invasion ended the decades-long rule dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party but ushered in a period of chaos, violence, and political transition from which the country struggled to emerge. U.S. forces
withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled IS insurgents to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq from 2014 to 2018. Iraqis leveraged new U.S. and coalition military support to defeat the Islamic State, but as of 2024, some IS remnants remain active, especially in disputed territories between the Kurdistan region and areas to the south secured by national government forces. IS fighters are also active in Syria, where U.S.-backed forces detain thousands of IS fighters and thousands of Iraqi nationals await repatriation.
Iraq’s government still struggles to meet the demands of its citizens for more accountable, transparent, and responsive governance. During mass protests in 2019 and 2020, security forces and politically aligned militias killed hundreds of demonstrators, but protestors succeeded in bringing down the government formed after the 2018 national election and prompted changes to Iraq’s electoral system that were then reversed in 2023. A caretaker government led the country through a severe economic and fiscal crisis in 2020 and 2021 but lacked a legislative mandate for new initiatives.
Figure 1. Iraq
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
Iraq’s Government Grapples with Internal Divisions and External Pressures
Following an October 2021 early legislative election for Iraq’s unicameral Council of Representatives (COR), government formation talks devolved into stalemate. After a year marked by contested judicial decisions, protests, high-profile resignations, and some armed confrontations, Iraqi parties in October 2022 formed a power-sharing government led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani, the nominee of the Shia political coalition known as
Iraq
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the Coordination Framework (CF). The ruling State Administration Coalition combines the CF parties, the principal Kurdish and Sunni parties, and aligned independents. It is the first government since 2003 that does not include all major political factions, following the resignation and withdrawal of followers of Shia religious and social movement leader Muqtada Al Sadr, who won the most seats in the 2021 election.
Sudani, like his predecessors, faces challenges posed by patterns of patronage and corruption in the Iraqi government, Iraq’s fiscal dependence on oil export revenue, Iraq’s assertive neighbors, and the activities of armed non- state actors, including militia groups associated with some CF members. In 2023, Iraqi leaders enacted a three-year $153 billion budget of expansionary public spending and hiring. Sudani’s government has struggled to implement service improvement elements of its platform, and patterns of spending extend and deepen Iraq’s fiscal vulnerability to declines in world oil prices. Political competition among the government’s coalition partners may grow more acute as the 2025 election approaches.
Sudani has adopted a nationalist posture toward unilateral foreign military operations and attacks inside Iraq, criticizing actions by Iran, Turkey, and the United States. His government has described Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups’ attacks as illegal and inconsistent with Iraq’s desire to continue security cooperation with foreign partners.
Views from the Kurdistan Region
Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq’s 2005 constitution recognizes the authority of the KRG in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG independence referendum, national forces reassert control over some disputed territories.
The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in the COR. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his son, Masrour Barzani is KRG prime minister. Nechirvan Barzani is KRG president and is the prime minister’s cousin. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged, and struggles within the PUK’s leading Talibani family shape PUK relations with the KDP and parties in Baghdad. The KDP and PUK retain separate politically aligned militia and security force units, in spite of U.S. efforts to encourage the unification and depoliticization of the KRG security sector.
As of 2025, IS threats in Iraq have diminished, but some remnants of the group remain active in remote areas, including disputed territories between the Kurdistan region and areas to the south secured by national government forces. Joint Iraqi-U.S. operations have targeted IS leaders in Iraq since 2024, with several senior figures eliminated. IS fighters also are active in eastern Syria, where U.S.-backed partner forces are negotiating with Syria's interim authorities while detaining thousands of IS fighters and IS-associated persons, including Iraqis awaiting repatriation. As conflict inside Iraq has receded, opportunity has emerged for many Iraqis, but unresolved domestic issues, regional tension, rising temperatures and water shortages may cloud Iraq's future. Since 2022, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani has led a power-sharing government that is the first since 2003 not to include all of Iraq's leading political factions. An uneasy partnership between several Shia Arab parties and Iraq's major Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties has enabled the ruling State Administration Coalition to enact expansive public spending legislation and advance U.S.-supported banking reforms. Political rivalry and national government differences with Kurdish leaders over security and federalism, including energy policy and revenue sharing, have limited the government's effectiveness. Sudani has adopted a nationalist posture toward unilateral foreign military operations in Iraq and Iraqi airspace, criticizing actions by Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United States. His government has described Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups' attacks as illegal and inconsistent with Iraq's desire to continue cooperation with foreign partners. Transitions in U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation arrangements are being implemented as Iraqis navigate a period of renewed political campaigning in 2025. National elections are planned for November 11, and candidate, coalition, and party registration had closed as of June. Prime Minister Sudani is seeking a second term and intends to lead a new electoral list (the "Reconstruction and Development Alliance") to compete against some of his current partners in the Shia-led Coordination Framework (CF) coalition. Iraq's electoral law has been revised to return it to a framework expected to benefit party-backed candidates over independents. Victors in the election will faces challenges posed by strains between the national government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Iraq's fiscal dependence on oil export revenue, Iraq's assertive and troubled neighbors, and the activities of Iraqi armed non-state actors, including militia groups associated with some CF members. Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between Iraqi Kurdistan's two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq's constitution recognizes KRG authority in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG independence referendum, national forces reasserted control of some disputed territories. The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in parliament. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged and have delayed the formation of a new KRG cabinet since the 2024 regional election. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his son, Masrour Barzani is KRG prime minister. Nechirvan Barzani is KRG president and is the prime minister's cousin. The KDP and PUK retain separate politically aligned militia and security force units, despite U.S. efforts to encourage the unification and depoliticization of the KRG security sector. The United States cooperates with the KRG and supports the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over oil production, the budget, territory, and security. Baghdad has maintained conditions on the transfer of funds to the KRG, contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains. Since 2022, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) has issued a series of rulings that have affected the KRG’s autonomy, including rulings that have found the KRG oil and gas sector law unconstitutional, temporarily barred and set new conditions for fiscal transfers, Iran's influence in Iraq also grew during this period as several Shia militia groups mobilized and later were consolidated into the national security apparatus under the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Election Looms and Pressures Mount
Views from the Kurdistan Region
invalidated long-standing KRG electoral
arrangements, and required the transfer of KRG revenue to national authorities for payment of KRG employees.
Iraq has opposed Turkey’'s unilateral military presence and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish forces targethave targeted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK's 2025 decision to disarm and initial steps taken to implement this decision may prompt changes in Turkey's posture.
U.S. Partnership and the 119th Congress
In 2024, Iraqi and U.S. officials the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). KRG and Iraqi officials have called on the PKK to leave the region, and Iraq and Turkey signed a bilateral counterterrorism and military agreement in August 2024.
Partnership with the United States
After a two-year bilateral strategic dialogue, U.S. and Iraqi leaders agreed in July 2021 on the transition of the U.S. military presence in Iraq to a noncombat advisory mission. Since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, Iran- backed Iraqi groups have resumed and expanded attacks on U.S. forces, prompting U.S. counterstrikes that have drawn Iraqi criticism. Iraqi and U.S. officials have outlined plans to end the counter-IS coalition mission in Iraq in 2025, with Iraq hosting Syria-focused coalition forces into 2026. Subsequent bilateralThose plans are now being implemented. Subsequent security cooperation may include a residual U.S. force presence.
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra has been closed since 2018. In January 2024, President Biden nominated Tracey Ann Jacobson to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $7.98.2 billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 20242025, and has appropriated related funds available through September 20252026, including aid to the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) subject to Baghdad’'s approval and pursuant to a nonbinding U.S.-KRG 2022 memorandum of understanding.
The
Through 2024, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development fundfunded security, economic, stabilization, and democracy programs in parallel to Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Defense Department Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) and Global Train and Equip (10 U.S.C. 333) security assistance. The United States was the top humanitarian funding donor for Iraq in 2022, and provided more than $114 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2023. The Administration requests $285.7 million for foreign aid programs for Iraq in FY2025, along with $380.75 million in FY2025 CTEF funds for Iraq. Defense appropriations bills in the House (H.R. 8774) and Senate (S. 4921) would provide the requested CTEF amount.
Iraq has withheld funds owed to Iran for Iraqi electricity purchases consistent with U.S. sanctions. The Biden Administration has renewed related sanctions waivers and has approved some related in-kind humanitarian transfers to Iran and transfers of Iraq-withheld funds to third countries.
As U.S. and Iraqi officials work to define a framework for future cooperation, Congress may consider Iraq’s relations with Iran and its other neighbors, KRG-Baghdad relations, human rights, religious freedom, and other issues in assessing bilateral ties and executive branch requests.
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
IF10404
Iraq
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10404 · VERSION 47 · UPDATED
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