Chile: An Overview
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Updated October 15, 2024
Chile: An Overview
Chile, located along the Pacific coast of South America, traditionally has been one of the United States’ closest partners in Latin America. During the 118th Congress, the Senate consented to a tax treaty with Chile and some Members have assessed options for strengthening commercial and security ties while addressing emerging opportunities and challenges in bilateral relations.
Political and Economic Environment
Sources: CRS Visualization; Chile's Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas; International Monetary Fund; and Trade Data Monitor.Chile’s democratic tradition dates to the 19th century (Figure 1), traditionally has been a close U.S. partner in Latin America. The 119th Congress may assess U.S. economic and security ties with Chile, including the impact of U.S. tariffs, collaboration on critical minerals trade, and efforts to combat transnational crime, among other issues.
Political and Economic Environment
Chile's democratic tradition dates to the 19th century, but the country experienced 17 years of authoritarian rule after General Augusto Pinochet led a 1973 military coup that deposed the democratically elected socialist government of President Salvador Allende (1970-1973). More than 3,200 peoplepeople were killed or “"disappeared,”" and some 3737,000 people were imprisoned and/or tortured during the Pinochet dictatorship. Chile restored democratic governance in 1990, after nearly 56% of Chileans voted against continuing the Pinochet regime in a following a 1988 plebiscite.
Center-left and center-right coalitions dominated Chilean politics for three decades following the transition. Center- left coalitions held the presidency and majorities in Chile’s bicameral congress for most of that period, but Sebastián Piñera led his center-right coalition to power for two nonconsecutive presidential terms (2010-2014, 2018-2022). Both coalitions prioritized political stability and economic growth, eschewing ambitious structural reforms in favor of consensus-based politics, market-oriented economic policies, and incremental social change. Living standards improved significantly between 1990 and 2022, with real GDP per capita growing by an average of 4.7% per yeargross domestic product (GDP) per capita growing by 154% and the poverty rate falling from 68.5%68.5% to 6.5%. 6.5%.
Nevertheless, most Latinobarómetro polls since the mid- 1990s have shown a majority of Chileans to be dissatisfied with how democracy works in Chile. Chile has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and some Chileans express frustration with other disparities in Chilean society. Over the past 15 years, Chileans repeatedly have registered their discontent with the status quo through electoral swings and mass protests.
Constitutional Reform Process In late 2019, Chile’s political leadership agreed to a process to potentially replace the country’s 1980 constitution. The agreement was part of a broader effort to restore social peace after a month of sometimes violent protests against a transit fare increase and other perceived government failures. Chile’s democratic governments have amended the constitution extensively over the past 34 years but some Chileans view the Pinochet-era document as illegitimate and an impediment to a more inclusive democracy.
Although 78% of Chilean voters voted in favor of replacing the constitution in October 2020, 62% of voters rejected a
first draft in September 2022 and 56% rejected a second draft in December 2023. Many Chileans apparently perceived the first draft, written by a left-of-center convention, as too radical, and the second draft, finalized by a right-of-center council, as too conservative. Consequently, Chile’s 1980 constitution remains in place.
Figure 1. Chile at a Glance
Sources: CRS Graphics; Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas; International Monetary Fund; and Trade Data Monitor.
Boric Administration President Gabriel Boric was inaugurated to a four-year term in March 2022, a decade after rising to prominence as a leader of Chile’s student movement. Leading a left-wing coalition, he defeated right-wing populist José Antonio Kast with 56% of the vote in a December 2021 runoff election. Boric came to office pledging to address environmental concerns and usher in a new era of economic and social inclusion by strengthening the public education and health care systems, replacing the privatized pension system, and expanding the rights of historically marginalized groups.
Boric has struggled to enact his agenda, however, and his approval rating has hovered around his first-round vote share (26%) for most of his term, according to the Centro de Estudios Públicos. Boric had hoped to advance many of his proposals through the constitutional reform process that ultimately failed. Other proposals have stalled in the Chilean congress, where Boric must negotiate with centrist and opposition legislators to pass legislation. Although the congress has enacted measures to increase mining royalties, reduce tax evasion, raise the minimum wage, and reduce the work week from 45 to 40 hours, it rejected a revenue- raising tax reform intended to fund much of Boric’s agenda. Boric also is contending with a resurgent political right, which has capitalized on widespread public concern over rising crime and immigration to boost its support.
Boric’s political challenges have been compounded by difficult economic circumstances. GDP growth slowed from 11.3% in 2021 to 2.1% in 2022 and 0.2% in 2023, amid the government’s withdrawal of pandemic-era stimulus measures, rising inflation, and domestic and geopolitical uncertainty. Chile’s finance ministry forecasts
Chile: An Overview
https://crsreports.congress.gov
GDP growth of 2.6% in 2024 and 2.7% in 2025, driven, in part, by mining sector investments and rising real wages.
U.S.-Chile Relations
This dissatisfaction appears to be due to, in part, continued economic and social inequality amid a steady decline in Chile's economic growth rate and has contributed to repeated electoral swings and mass protests over the past 15 years.
President Gabriel Boric, a left-wing former student leader and legislator, was inaugurated to a four-year term in March 2022. He came to office pledging to address Chile's socioeconomic disparities, which had received renewed attention in the aftermath of mass protests in 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic. Boric had planned to advance portions of his agenda through a constitutional reform process launched in 2020, but Chileans voted to reject a Boric-backed constitutional rewrite in September 2022 as well as a subsequent, more conservative draft in December 2023. Although Boric's leftist and center-left allies lack majorities in both chambers of the Chilean congress, he has won legislative support for some policy changes. These include measures to increase government mining royalties, raise the minimum wage, reduce the work week from 45 to 40 hours, and modify the pension system. Polls suggest that Chileans have grown more concerned about security and immigration over the past four years. Although Chile remains among the safest countries in Latin America, homicides have increased over the past decade, driven, in part, by organized crime. For example, Tren de Aragua (TdA), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization of Venezuelan origin, reportedly has expanded into Chile and sought to control illicit markets such as migrant smuggling and human and drug trafficking. Some Chileans have linked rising crime rates to increased irregular migration. The Chilean government estimates that Chile's unauthorized migrant population increased from about 10,400 in 2019 to 337,000 in 2023, with Venezuelans accounting for 75% of the total. Chile's economy has experienced modest growth under Boric. Annual GDP growth averaged 1.8% between 2022 and 2024, amid the government's withdrawal of pandemic-era stimulus measures, elevated inflation, and domestic and geopolitical uncertainty. Chile's central bank projects 2.25%-2.75% GDP growth in 2025 as the expansionary effects of increased investment and household consumption are partially offset by the direct and indirect effects of U.S. tariffs on Chile's open, export-oriented economy. Chile held presidential and congressional elections on November 16, 2025. Boric is ineligible for reelection due to a constitutional prohibition on consecutive presidential terms. His former labor minister, Jeannette Jara of the left-wing Communist Party, won a plurality with 26.8% of the presidential vote. José Antonio Kast of the right-wing Republican Party, the 2021 presidential runner-up, finished second with 23.9% of the vote and is set to face Jara in a second-round runoff scheduled for December 14, 2025. Kast is favored to win, given that right-of-center candidates won a majority of the first-round vote and Jara's ceiling appears to be limited by her Communist Party membership and Boric's low approval rating (28% in October 2025). Kast has campaigned on combatting crime and illegal immigration and reducing taxes, regulations, and government spending, among other policy changes. Chileans also elected the entire Chamber of Deputies and nearly half of the Senate by proportional representation. The right-wing and center-right coalitions backing Kast in the runoff are expected to compose the largest bloc in the next congress, holding 76 of 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 25 of 50 seats in the Senate. The new legislators and president are to take office in March 2026.Boric Administration
2025 Elections
U.S.-Chile Relations
Although the U.S. government helped create the conditions for the 1973 military coup in Chile, Congress imposed restrictions on arms sales and military assistance to the Pinochet dictatorship (e.g., P.L. 94-329, §406), and the U.S. government advocated for and the United States helped foster the restoration of democracy during the 1980s. Since Chile's. Since the 1990 political transition, the United States and Chile have maintained close commercial and defense ties and worked to promote democracy and human rights throughout Latin America. In addition to assessing cooperation on those issues, some Members of Congress have called for the declassification of U.S. documents related to Chile (e.g., S.Con.Res. 20), examined opportunities for collaboration on critical minerals, and sought to address security challenges related to the U.S. Visa Waiver Program.
Trade and Investment Relations The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement entered into force in 2004 (P.L. 108-77). Total bilateral trade in goods totaled $34.3 billion in 2023, according to U.S. Department of Commerce data. U.S. goods exports to Chile amounted to $18.8 billion, with mineral fuels, machinery, and motor vehicles accounting for a majority. U.S. goods imports from Chile amounted to $15.6 billion, with copper, fish, and fruit accounting for a majority.
In June 2023, the U.S. Senate consented to the ratification of a bilateral treaty (Treaty Doc. 112-8) intended to encourage investment in both countries by preventing double taxation. The agreement entered into force in December 2023, after Chile—which originally ratified the treaty in 2015—approved the Senate’s reservations. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the accumulated stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Chile stood at $32.0 billion in 2023, with the largest investments in the finance, mining, and information sectors. The stock of Chilean foreign direct investment in the United States totaled $6.0 billion in 2023.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Chile’s commercial ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and their potential implications for U.S. and Chilean interests. In 2023, China was Chile’s top trade partner and the destination of 38% of Chile’s exports. According to the China Global Investment Tracker, PRC companies have invested at least $17.7 billion in Chile since 2010, with a particular focus on the energy and mining sectors. U.S. officials have encouraged Chile to adopt a national security-focused investment screening mechanism to protect critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies. To date, however, Chile’s leaders have demonstrated little interest in restricting PRC investments.
Critical Minerals Cooperation As of 2023, Chile was the world’s largest producer of copper and second largest producer of lithium, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Chile is also a top source for U.S. imports of both minerals, which are classified by the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, respectively, as “critical materials for energy” and “strategic materials of interest for national defense.”
Critical minerals trade is poised to increase over the next decade as U.S. industry seeks to secure inputs for electric vehicles and other emerging technologies. Chile may benefit from a U.S. consumer tax credit for electric vehicles included in P.L. 117-169, often referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. To qualify for the full credit, 50% of the value of the critical minerals in an electric vehicle’s battery (increasing to 80% in 2027) must be extracted or processed in the United States or in a U.S. free trade agreement partner country. Congress may monitor implementation of the act as well as developments related to the Boric administration’s national lithium strategy, which seeks to expand the Chilean government’s role in strategic projects and attract increased private investment.
Visa Waiver Program The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has designated Chile as a participating country in the Visa Waiver Program since 2014, allowing Chilean citizens who meet certain requirements to travel to the United States for tourism or business for up to 90 days without a visa. Chile has extended the same policy to U.S. citizens.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Chile’s inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program due to some Chileans allegedly traveling to the United States to participate in sophisticated burglary rings. The explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division C) directs DHS to brief the Appropriations Committees quarterly on the Chilean government’s efforts to counter “South American Theft Groups” until DHS verifies that it screens Chilean travelers against the Chilean government’s identity management and criminal databases.
Defense Cooperation The U.S. and Chilean governments engage regularly on defense matters, including through annual bilateral Defense Consultative Committee meetings. The U.S. and Chilean armed forces also engage in joint exercises to strengthen their capabilities and increase interoperability. In September 2024, for example, Chile hosted UNITAS, a U.S.-organized multinational maritime exercise conducted annually in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Congress oversees bilateral defense ties and appropriates funding for military assistance and security cooperation programs. The Biden Administration allocated $357,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) aid to Chile in FY2023 and requested $650,000 in IMET aid for Chile for FY2025; FY2024 allocations are not yet available. The U.S. Department of Defense occasionally provides equipment and other capacity-building support to Chile through the Excess Defense Articles program and its security cooperation authorities (e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§332- 333). Chile also purchases some U.S. military equipment. In 2023, Chile reportedly signed a $177 million contract with Lockheed Martin to modernize its fleet of F-16 aircraft. The U.S. State Department originally approved the Foreign Military Sale in 2020.
Peter J. Meyer, Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Chile: An Overview
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10880 · VERSION 17 · UPDATED
IF10880
Disclaimer
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Trade Relations
In 2024, total U.S.-Chilean trade in goods and services amounted to more than $48 billion, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Bilateral trade in goods totaled $35 billion, including $18.6 billion in U.S. exports to Chile and $16.5 billion in U.S. imports from Chile. Bilateral services trade reached nearly $13 billion, including $8.1 billion in U.S. exports to Chile and $4.9 billion in U.S. imports from Chile.
Under the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA; P.L. 108-77), which entered into force in 2004, nearly all U.S.-Chile goods trade is to be duty free. Since April 2025, however, President Trump has imposed a 10% tariff on imports from Chile under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.), citing a purported lack of reciprocity in trade relations. The Chilean government reportedly has been negotiating with the Trump Administration to address its concerns about U.S. tariffs. Some top U.S. imports from Chile—including refined copper cathodes—are exempt from the IEEPA tariffs as well as other tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended).
Congress may assess how the U.S.-Chile FTA and the Trump Administration's tariffs have affected bilateral trade and the U.S. and Chilean economies. Such assessments could inform congressional decisions regarding potential measures to codify, terminate, or modify the tariffs. Congress also could establish negotiating objectives for U.S. trade discussions with the Chilean government.
Critical Minerals Cooperation
As of 2024, Chile was the world's largest producer of copper and second largest producer of lithium, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Chile is also a top source for U.S. imports of both minerals and could become a supplier of other critical minerals, such as cobalt.
Some U.S. policymakers have characterized Chile as a "key partner" for developing secure critical mineral supply chains and reducing U.S. dependence on the People's Republic of China. The future of bilateral critical minerals trade is uncertain amid shifting U.S. trade and energy policies, including the FY2025 reconciliation law's (P.L. 119-21) repeal of a consumer tax credit for electric vehicles that stood to benefit Chile. Chilean policy is also in flux as the Boric administration implements a national lithium strategy that seeks to expand the Chilean government's role in strategic projects and attract private investment.
Several bills have been introduced in the 119th Congress that could influence U.S.-Chilean cooperation on critical minerals. Some of these bills (e.g., H.R. 4391, S. 2550, S. 2839) would authorize the executive branch to engage in international negotiations with the aim of establishing a coalition or alliance of countries that collaborate on critical mineral supply chains. Other measures (e.g., H.R. 5299 and S. 2296, Title XII, Subtitle G) would authorize the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, under certain circumstances, to support projects in countries like Chile that the World Bank classifies as high income.
Security Cooperation
The U.S. and Chilean governments have engaged regularly on defense matters. Such engagement has included annual bilateral meetings to discuss key defense priorities as well as joint exercises between U.S. and Chilean armed forces intended to strengthen their capabilities and increase interoperability. In FY2023, U.S. International Military Education and Training aid to Chile totaled $408,000.
The U.S. and Chilean governments also collaborate on law enforcement matters. Recent bilateral efforts have focused on countering "South American Theft Groups" that have engaged in sophisticated burglaries across the United States. These groups reportedly include some Chilean nationals who entered the United States under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, which allows individuals who meet certain requirements to travel to the United States for tourism or business for up to 90 days without a visa. The U.S. and Chilean governments also have cooperated on efforts to combat TdA. In September 2025, for example, the United States extradited three alleged TdA members to Chile, one of whom allegedly participated in the 2024 assassination of a Venezuelan dissident in Chile.
Congress oversees bilateral security ties and appropriates security assistance funding. During the FY2026 appropriations process, Congress could consider whether to appropriate military and/or law enforcement assistance specifically for Chile or to leave such allocation decisions to the executive branch. The National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 4779/H.Rept. 119-217), would not appropriate any assistance specifically for Chile. The bill would provide $13 million for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement activities in South America's Southern Cone, however, which could benefit Chile.