China Primer: Human Rights
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Updated October 8, 2024
China Primer: Human Rights
Overview
The nongovernmental human rights organization Freedom House describes China’s party-state as an “authoritarian regime” that “China Primer: Human Rights
Overview
The People's Republic of China (PRC or China)'s party-state is an "authoritarian regime" that "has become increasingly repressive in recent years," according to the nongovernmental human rights organization Freedom House..” Some analysts argue China has moved in a totalitarian direction. The party-state is dominated by one person, Xi Jinping, who became Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary in 2012 and began a norm-breaking third five-year term in 2022. Xi has attempted to enforce greater ideological and cultural conformity and ever tighter control over society, aided by the use of digital technologies. In October 2022, the 20th Central Committee of the CPC selected Xi to serve a norm-breaking, third, five-year term.
Amid the apparent deepening repression in the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)—and in the broader context of an increasingly competitive bilateral relationship—U.S. policymakers have imposedtighter control over society, aided by digital technologies. PRC leaders long have asserted that human rights standards vary by country, that economic development is a key human right, and that a country's human rights policies are an "internal affair."
Amid apparent deepening repression in China, U.S. policymakers have implemented measures intended to deter PRC human rights abuses, prevent U.S. complicity in such abuses, and/or hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2020, U.S. actions have focused, in particular, on responding to reports of mass detentions and forced labor of ethnic Uyghur and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and elsewhere in China. The U.S. State Department has assessedDepartment of State first assessed in January 2021 that PRC policies and practices in the XUAR constitute crimes against humanity and genocide.
Further Reading: CRS In Focus IF10281, China Primer: Uyghurs; CRS Report R43781, The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and Implementation; and CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy. For information on Hong Kong, see, and reaffirmed this assessment most recently in its annual human rights reports covering 2024 (the department has not yet released human rights reports covering 2025). In the PRC's Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), measures adopted by both central PRC and local HKSAR authorities have eroded Hong Kong residents' civil rights and stifled the city's civic culture and media. See CRS In Focus IF12070, China Primer: Hong Kong.
Selected Human Rights Issues
Under Xi’'s leadership, China has further restricted and suppressed civil society, religious and ethnic minority groups, human rights defenders, speech, the press, and academic discourseand media. The party-state has closed much of the space that had previouslypreviously had existed for limited social activism. The PRC oversees one of the most extensive internet censorship systems in the world, which includes blockingblocks major foreign news and social media sites, censoringcensors domestic social media platforms, and banningbans foreign messaging apps.
According to the U.S. Department of State, arbitrary arrest, detention, and enforced disappearance are "systemic" in China,Department of State, “[PRC] law grants public security officers broad administrative detention powers and the ability to detain individuals for extended periods without formal arrest or criminal charges,” and police target religious leaders and adherents, rights lawyers and activists, independent journalists, and dissidents and their family members for arbitrary detention or arrest. The nonprofit Dui Hua
Foundation has compiled a list of over 7,300 cases of political and religious prisoners in China. PRC leaders long have asserted that human rights standards vary by country, that economic development is a key human right, and that a country’s human rights policies are an “internal affair.”
Popular protests have continued under Xi Jinping’s rule, often focused on economic grievances. Despite the government’s efforts to silence negative public opinion during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022), localized protests against lockdown conditions and the government’s suppression of information and speech emerged in the spring of 2022 and culminated in widespread demonstrations led by university students in November of that year. The November demonstrations were highly unusual in China for being national in character and scope, directly challenging the CPC and top leaders, galvanizing a relatively broad swath of society, and partially achieving their aims. Following the demonstrations, various PRC cities began to loosen COVID-19 lockdown measures while the CPC cracked down on the budding protest movement.
Religious and Ethnic Minority Policies
The PRC constitution provides for many civil and political rights, including the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and demonstration. Other provisions in China's constitution and laws, however, circumscribe or place conditions on these freedoms, and the state routinely restricts these freedoms in practice. Popular protests in China are common and often focused on local and/or economic grievances. China Dissent Monitor, a Freedom House initiative that tracks protest activities in China, identified 5,014 instances of dissent in 2025. Protests in China generally are quashed before becoming widespread, highly-publicized demonstrations. One exception was in 2022, when people across the country protested COVID-19 lockdown conditions and the government's suppression of information and speech. Following the protests, the CPC cracked down on the budding protest movement, but also moved quickly to end lockdown measures.In 2016, Xi Jinping launched a policy known as “Sinicization,” by which the CPC requires religious and ethnic minorities to “assimilate” or conform to majority Han Chinese culture as defined by the CPC and adhere to “core socialist values.” The PRC government has mandated, for example, that schools in minority regions teach most courses in Mandarin rather than in minority languages. Since 2018, new regulations require. As of March 2025, the nonprofit Dui Hua Foundation identified 7,157 active cases of political prisoners in China.
Civil and Political Rights
Rights of Religious and Ethnic Minorities
The Department of State has consistently designated China as a "Country of Particular Concern" for "particularly severe violations of religious freedom" under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292, as amended). In 2016, Xi launched a policy known as "Sinicization," by which the CPC requires religious and ethnic minorities to "assimilate" or conform to majority Han Chinese culture as defined by the CPC and adhere to "core socialist values." The PRC government has mandated, for example, that schools and other institutions use Mandarin rather than minority languages. Since 2018, regulations have required religious organizations to obtain government permission for nearly every aspect of their operations, submit to greater state supervision, and register clergy in a national database. The government enacted regulations in 2022 thatto restrict internet use and online worship among religious groups. The government has continued to arrest and to persecute practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual exercise. The State Department has consistently designated China as a “Country of Particular Concern” for “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292).
Tibetans
Tibetans: Human rights issues in Tibetan areas of China include religious and political repression and, forced assimilation, and the incarceration of hundreds of political prisoners. Since 2018, the PRC government has required Tibetan monks and nuns to undergo education in CPC ideology and to demonstrate “"political reliability.”" Authorities have arbitrarily detained and imprisoned hundreds of Tibetan writers, intellectuals, and cultural figures on broad charges of “splittism” or “"separatism.”" PRC assimilation policies in Tibetan areas have included resettling and urbanizing nomads and farmers, which havepolicies that include elements of forced labor, according to some reports.
Uyghurs: Between 2017 and 2019, XUAR authorities arbitrarily detained more than 1 million ethnic Uyghur and other Muslims in "vocational education and training" facilities, also known as "reeducation" elements of forced labor, according to some reports. The International Tibet Network
China Primer: Human Rights
https://crsreports.congress.gov
documents over 700 political prisoners in Tibet. The CPC insists that PRC laws, and not Tibetan Buddhist religious traditions, govern the process by which lineages of Tibetan lamas are reincarnated, and that the state has the right to choose the successor to the Tibetan spiritual leader, the 89- year-old 14th Dalai Lama, who lives in exile in India.
Uyghurs
Between 2017 and 2019, XUAR authorities arbitrarily detained over 1 million ethnic Uyghur and other Muslims in “vocational education and training” facilities, also known as “reeducation” centers. Detainees generally were not accused of crimes, but rather were held on the basis of past religious, cultural, scholarly, social, and online activities, as well as foreign travel, that the government later deemed “"extremist,” “" "pre-criminal,”" or potentially terrorist. Detainees were compelled to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs as a condition for their release. Treatment in the centers reportedly included food deprivation, psychological pressure, sexual abuse, forced sterilization, medical neglect, torture, and forced labor. Since 2019, the XUAR government appears to have released some detainees, prosecuted many as criminals, and sent others to work in factories. Some reeducation centers appear to have been converted to high-security prisons and new prisons have been built. Tens of thousands of Uyghurs have been coercively employed as agricultural or factory labor in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. The whereabouts of hundreds of prominent Uyghur intellectuals and cultural figures remains unknown.
In August 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights determined that China’s counterterrorism and counter-“extremism” strategies have led to “interlocking patterns of severe and undue restrictions on a wide range of human rights” and may constitute crimes against humanity. It called on China to “release all individuals arbitrarily deprived of their liberty” and “urgently repeal” all discriminatory laws and policies against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the XUAR.
Selected U.S. Policy Tools
Foreign Assistance: Congressional appropriations have funded efforts to promote human rights, the rule of law, civil society, and internet freedom in China, as well as Tibet-related programs that promote sustainable development, environmental conservation, and the preservation of indigenous culture. These have included programs supported by relevant agencies as well as by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private nonprofit organization funded primarily by congressional appropriations. As part of its 2025 foreign aid review, the Trump Administration reportedly terminated numerous China-related human rights programs. The Administration also sought to withhold appropriated funding for NED.• Democracy and Human Rights Programs: Since 2001, congressional appropriations have funded efforts to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and internet freedom in China, as well as programs to promote sustainable development, environmental conservation, and the preservation of indigenous culture in Tibetan areas. These include programs administered by relevant agencies as well as by the National Endowment for DemocracyIn 2026, UN human rights experts said that PRC policies to relocate millions of other Uyghurs through labor transfer programs are in many cases "so severe that they may amount to forcible transfer and/or enslavement as a crime against humanity."
Women's Rights
The protection of women's rights in China is uneven, and authorities sometimes harass and arbitrarily detain women's rights activists. Facing a looming demographic crisis, the CPC in the past decade has pivoted away from its "one child" policy, which limited women's reproductive choices to suppress population growth. It is now implementing pro-natalist policies, some of which exacerbate existing challenges faced by women, such as domestic violence, discrimination, and economic inequality, according to some observers. PRC authorities reportedly continue to conduct forced abortions and sterilizations of Uyghur women.
Selected U.S. Policy Tools
, a private nonprofit organization funded primarily by congressional appropriations.
• International Media: U.S. government-funded Voice
of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) provide external sources of independent or alternative news and opinion to audiences in China. Both media outlets broadcast in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Tibetan, and RFA provides a Uyghur language service.
• Targeted Legislation: Congress has enacted numerous
laws to respond to human rights developments and
laws to respond to human rights developments and related issues in Tibet and Xinjiang specifically. U.S. policy toward Tibet is largely guided by the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003, P.L. 107-228). Recent Title VI, Subtitle B of P.L. 107-228, as amended). Other Tibet-related legislation includes the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-330), the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (Division FF, Title III, Subtitle E of P.L. 116-260), and the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet- China Dispute Act (P.L. 118-70). ). Recent Xinjiang- focused legislation includes the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145) and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA, P.L. 117-78). Some). Other provisions contained inof broader enacted bills also have addressed human rights issues in China (e.g., Sec.Section 7401 of P.L. 118-31).
Targeted Sanctions and Export Restrictions: The executive branch has made use of broad authorities enacted by Congress, including theP.L. 118-31, concerning appointment of an intelligence community coordinator on PRC atrocities).
• Targeted Sanctions: The Global Magnitsky Human
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), as; implemented underthrough Executive Order 13818), , authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions and visa denials or revocations against foreignrestrictions against some PRC individuals orand entities responsible for human rights abuses or corruption. Other authorities also provide for visa sanctions, including against the immediate family members of human rights violators.
• Export Restrictions: The United States may impose
. The United States also has imposed restrictions on the sale or transfer of certain U.S. goods and services to certain PRC entities for the purpose of protecting of human rightshuman rights reasons, pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act (Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115- 232).
).
• Forced Labor Import Restrictions: Section 307 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1307) forbids the importation of products into the United States that were produced with forced labor. UFLPA in part creates a rebuttable presumption that Xinjiang-related imports are made with forced labor.
Congressional Considerations
The CPC generally appears to generally view U.S. human rights advocacy as a challenge to its hold on power, and some analysts contend the United States’ capacity to impose costs sufficient to deter PRC policies that violateU.S. capacity to deter PRC human rights violations is limited. Others argue that sanctions and international pressure, to which they contend the CPC is sensitive, can help moderate China’'s practices. Congress may, at a broad level, debate the overarching goals of U.S. human rights policy and the differing possible benefits, costs, risks, and likelihoods of success of these goals, as well as assess the effectiveness of U.S. actions to date. Specific considerations may also include whether/how to: raise human rights in bilateral diplomacy with China; bolster restrictive measures against PRC persons implicated in human rights abuses; coordinate greater international pressure on China to abide by its human rights obligations; and strengthen support for civil society and censorship circumvention efforts.
Thomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs Michael A. Weber, Specialist in Foreign Affairs
IF12265
China Primer: Human Rights
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12265 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Relative to other administrations, the second Trump Administration has downgraded human rights as a U.S. foreign policy concern and has taken actions (some noted above) that appear to have curtailed certain longstanding U.S. efforts to promote human rights in China. The Administration's immigration policies (e.g., concerning refugees) also may have implications for victims of human rights abuses in China seeking protection in the United States. As with prior administrations, Congress may conduct oversight over executive branch actions and consider whether to accept, reject, or seek to modify executive branch policy approaches. The consolidated FY2026 appropriations bill enacted in February 2026 (P.L. 119-75) appropriates resources for certain activities to promote human rights in China that the Trump Administration has curtailed or sought to curtail.