CRS INSIGHT Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

INSIGHTi

Election Worker Safety and Privacy

Updated September 9, 2024

Concerns about election workers’Election Worker Safety and Privacy

Concerns about election workers' safety and privacy have been reported in surveys, news articlessurveys, news articles, and congressional hearings from the 2020 elections through the current election cycle. Those concernsconcerns, along with a perceived increase in politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave,leave or consider leaving, their rolespositions. This Insight provides a brief overview of recent federal activity on election worker safety and privacy.

Background

Federal law prohibitsprohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including intimidationintimidation to discourage servingservice as a poll watcher or election official or in response to such service; interferenceinterference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’' exercise of their duties; and intimidation for for helping voters register or cast a votevoters register or cast a vote. Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws, such as prohibitions against voter intimidation or harassing or threateningagainst voter intimidation or harassing or threatening interstate communications, might also apply to some conduct.

Some Many state and local officials have responded to the have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have includedFor example, some election officials have included local law enforcement in poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented or implemented new security measures in their offices. State legislators have established new prohibitions or protectionsTwenty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted or updated legislation addressing protections for election workers since 2020, as of July 2025, such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits intimidating election officials to interfere with their work and an Oregon law that extendsextended existing privacy protections to election workers. Some Members might choose to defer to state and local officials on any further responses to this issue, while others might see a role for the federal government. Federal Agency Activity Following the 2020 elections, the executive branch of the federal government took some new actions on election worker safety and privacy. The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a task force in July 2021 to address threats to election workers; and DOJ, the existing privacy protections to election workers.

Federal Activity

The executive branch has taken some action on election worker safety and privacy since the 2020 elections. In July 2021, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of an Election Threats Task Force “to address the rise in threats against election workers, administrators, officials, and others associated with the electoral process.” DOJ has reportedly charged 20 individuals and secured 15 convictions related to the task force as of September 2024.

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

IN11831

Congressional Research Service 2

In addition to enforcement efforts, federal agencies have provided resources and support for election workers. For example, DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) authorized or required grantees to use certain grant funds to help protect elections or election workers. The EAC also expanded its election security offerings, including with resources on Election Assistance Commission (EAC) administer certain grant funds that might be used to address threats to election workers. DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency also offers publications and services to help election officials respond to physical and online threats; the EAC hosted a panel on election official security and mental health; and DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) provided services to help election officials address physical and online threats, Election Security Advisors (ESAs) to help them navigate its services, and funding for an Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) that has helped identify and address safety concerns.

The current status of some of that new executive branch activity is uncertain. The website for DOJ's task force has been archived, with the last noted update as of this writing dating to May 2025. The EAC is without commissioners following their resignations and removals in April and July 2026, although the agency has indicated that it believes work like administering grants and providing resources can proceed in the absence of commissioners.

DHS proposed eliminating funding for CISA's election security program in the FY2026 congressional budget justification it released in June 2025 and the FY2027 budget justification it released in April 2026, proposing cutting the $39.61 million it reported previously allocating for the program. CISA discontinued funding for the EI-ISAC in 2025 and reportedly placed the ESAs on administrative leave. It did not stand up an Election Day situation room for the 2025 elections as it had in recent election cycles, and some state and local officials have reported limited access in recent months to services the agency previously provided.

CISA released an updated election infrastructure security plan for 2026 on September 24. The plan indicates that the agency's Regional Directors are currently serving as ESAs for their regions and that CISA is making an information-sharing platform available to fusion centers and state and local election officials for the 2026 election cycle. It also lists services the agency offers election officials and its efforts to provide them with security clearances and briefings on election threats.

Congressional Activity

Congress designated $39.61 million of the funding it appropriated for CISA in P.L. 119-86 for the agency's election security work, including ESAs and the EI-ISAC. Legislation introduced in the 119^th Congress would also provide for federal funding for the EI-ISAC, and some Members have written to DHS and DOJ to encourage them to continue or clarify the status of activities related to election worker safety and privacy.

Some Members have also introduced measures in the 119^th Congress to address other issues related to election worker safety and privacy, including proposals to

• prohibit intimidating election workers to interfere with or retaliate for performance of official duties;
• prohibit intimidating any person for exercising EAC or election administration duties or for current or previous status as a participant in election administration;
• extend an existing prohibition on intimidation in elections to include intimidation for processing or scanning ballots or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying votes;
• prohibit intimidating or interfering with election officials by force or violence, with enhanced penalties for bodily injury;
• prohibit physically damaging polling places, tabulation centers, or other election infrastructure to interfere with election administration or vote tabulation or certification, with enhanced penalties for bodily injury;
• direct the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with other federal entities, to report on threats to elections, including physical and cybersecurity threats;
• prohibit interfering with helping voters register or vote, and provide for a private right of action for violations of the prohibition;
• define an existing prohibition on interference in elections by government employees as including using official authority to affect poll workers' or election officials' actions at polling places and interrupting or delaying voting-related activity;
• prohibit unauthorized possession of firearms at election sites, with enhanced penalties for death;
• establish a rebuttable presumption that persons carrying visible firearms in certain elections-related contexts are violating an existing prohibition on intimidation in elections;
• prohibit distributing false artificial intelligence-generated depictions of election officials to intimidate or harass an official;
• extend the statute of limitations for violations of existing prohibitions on intimidation in elections;
• extend existing privacy protections to election workers and their families;
• direct DOJ to offer law enforcement and federal attorneys training on threats to election workers and assign special agents to Federal Bureau of Investigation field offices to investigate such threats;
• establish a program to provide states with ongoing funding for protecting election workers, among other purposes; and
• authorize grants for recruiting and training election workers, protecting their personal information, or providing them with physical and social media security services.

As of this writing, none of the above measures had advanced beyond committee referral.

and released a related web page and video series; and the EAC’s Board of Advisors adopted a resolution condemning threats against election workers and calling for additional agency resources to help protect them.

There has also been activity on the issue in Congress. Election administrators and other witnesses have addressed threats to election workers in testimony to several congressional committees, including in

• 2021: July 28, October 21, and October 26;

• 2022: January 20, May 19, June 13, June 21, June 22, July 20, July 27, August 3 (Senate Judiciary), August 3 (Senate Rules), and August 11;

• 2023: March 10, March 23, March 28, April 27, June 7 (House), June 7 (Senate), June 14, September 27, November 1, and December 5; and

• 2024: March 12, and May 1.

In the 117^th Congress, the majority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform released a report about the effects of election misinformation and disinformation, including threats to election workers, that drew on responses from election officials to letters from the then-chairs of the committee and the Committee on House Administration. Some Senators have also written to federal agencies to request updates or action on threats to election workers, such as a public service announcement to local law enforcement.

Some legislation in the current Congress aims to address election worker security directly, including through proposals to

• prohibit intimidation of election workers with intent to intimidate or to interfere with or retaliate for performance of official duties (H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, S. 1318);

• prohibit interference with helping voters register, vote, or both (H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, H.R. 1583);

• prohibit intimidation of or interference with election officials that involves force, violence, or threats of force or violence (S. 4; S. 3912);

• prohibit intimidation of or interference with election agents, vendors, and contractors (S. 4; S. 3912);

• prohibit physically damaging or threatening to physically damage election infrastructure with intent to interfere with election administration or vote tabulation or certification (S. 4; S. 3912);

• extend an existing prohibition on intimidation to include intimidation for processing or scanning ballots or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying votes (H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, S. 1318, H.R. 3130/S. 1487);

• prohibit knowing distribution of artificial intelligence-generated media that falsely depicts an election official with intent to intimidate or harass an official (S. 4714);

• prohibit removal or suspension of local election administrators except for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office (H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, H.R. 5046/S. 2575);

• create privacy protections for, or extend existing privacy protections to, election workers and their families (H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, S. 1318);

Congressional Research Service 3

IN11831 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED

• prohibit possession of unauthorized firearms at federal election sites (H.R. 2471);

• direct the EAC to study state poll worker safety and recruitment programs (H.R. 7413); and

• direct DOJ to provide law enforcement and federal attorneys with training and resources for addressing threats to election workers and assign a special agent to each Federal Bureau of Investigation field office to investigate such threats (S. 1318).

Legislation has also been introduced to authorize funding states might use to address threats to election workers. For example, some Members have proposed funding for protecting election workers (H.R. 5292/S. 630); recruiting and training them (H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, H.R. 5292/S. 630, S. 1318); supplementing their pay (H.R. 3436/S. 1609); providing them with physical security services and social media threat monitoring (S. 1318); and preventing disclosure of their personal information (S. 1318).

Author Information

Sarah J. Eckman Analyst in American National Government

^{Karen L. Shanton}

Analyst in American National Government

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.