Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
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Updated August 15, 2024
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
U.S. policy toward Taiwan (which also calls itself the Republic of China or ROC) has long prioritized the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The United States supports Taiwan’s efforts to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) from using force to gain control of the archipelago, which the PRC claims as its territory but has never controlled. The U.S. government has sought to strengthen its own ability to deter PRC military aggression. The PRC, for its part, claims the United States uses Taiwan as a “pawn” to undermine and contain China. Congress and the President have enacted legislation aimed at strengthening U.S.-Taiwan defense ties. A key challenge for U.S. policymakers is supporting Taiwan’s defense without triggering the conflict that U.S. policy seeks to prevent. For more information, see CRS Report, Taiwan Defense Issues for Congress.
Figure 1. Taiwan
Source: Graphic by CRS.
Taiwan’s Security Situation
Taiwan’s leaders have tasked Taiwan’s technologically advanced military with deterring—and if necessary, defeating—PRC military aggression. Taiwan enjoys strategic advantages, including geography and climate. The Taiwan Strait is some 70 nautical miles (nm) wide at its narrowest point, and some 220 nm wide at its widest. Weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at certain times of the year. Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and densely populated west coast are largely unsuitable for amphibious landing and invasion operations. Taiwan’s leaders since 2017 have grown the defense budget; from 2019 to 2023, spending increased by an average of nearly 5% per year, and as a percentage of GDP increased from 2% to 2.5%. In August 2024, Taiwan President Lai Ching- te announced that Taiwan’s defense budget would increase by 6% in 2025, to approximately $19.7 billion. In 2022,
Taiwan embarked on a “realignment” of its military force structure, including the extension of compulsory military service from four months to one year (implemented beginning in 2024) and efforts to expand reserve, civil defense, and territorial defense capabilities. Taiwan’s defense relationship with the United States also confers political and military advantages.
Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance across the Strait. The Communist Party of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a decades-long modernization program focused primarily on developing the capabilities needed to annex Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA is, or soon will be, able to execute a range of military campaigns against Taiwan. The PLA trains for operations such as missile strikes, seizures of Taiwan’s small outlying islands, blockades, and—the riskiest and most challenging campaign for the PLA—an amphibious landing and takeover of Taiwan’s main island.
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil- military relations are strained for historical, political, and bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food, water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to external disruption. According to some observers, Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is insufficient, and its military struggles to recruit, retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear what costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety and security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or able to bear in the face of PRC armed aggression.
Biden Administration officials state that a PRC invasion of Taiwan is “neither imminent nor inevitable.” In 2023, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns said PRC leader Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA “to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion. Now that does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027 or any other year. But it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.”
PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan The PRC engages in persistent non-combat operations that some analysts say are eroding Taiwan’s military advantages and readiness. Such “gray zone” actions include • large and increasingly complex military exercises near
Taiwan;
• near-daily air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan,
including frequent sorties across the so-called “median line,” an informal north-south line bisecting the Strait that PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
• routine naval patrols across the median line, some as
close as 24 nm from Taiwan’s main island;
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
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• unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and
encircling Taiwan; and
• stepped-up air and maritime activities near Kinmen—an
outlying island administered by Taiwan near the PRC city of Xiamen—including reported flights of unmanned aerial vehicles in the airspace over Kinmen in 2022 and an increase in coast guard patrols around Kinmen “to strengthen law enforcement inspections” since a February 2024 clash between Taiwan’s coast guard and a PRC vessel that left two PRC citizens dead.
The PRC government often ramps up such activities following high-profile engagements between senior U.S. policymakers and Taiwan leaders.
The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to Taiwan’s islands in peacetime could undermine Taipei’s ability to assess whether the PLA is using “routine” operations or exercises to obscure preparations for an attack. PLA use of such operations as cover for an attack could significantly shorten the time Taiwan has to respond. Gray zone activities also provide the PLA with training and intelligence-gathering opportunities. They strain Taiwan’s forces, which face growing operational and maintenance costs associated with responding to PLA activities. Some observers assess Beijing uses these coercive but nonviolent operations to sow doubt in Taiwan’s people about Taiwan’s military capabilities and to create political pressure for Taipei to acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on unification.
U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense
The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties with Taiwan since 1980, when President Carter terminated a 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. (The United States terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan and withdrew its military personnel in 1979.) The robust defense relationship includes arms transfers; routine bilateral defense dialogues and planning; and training activities in both the United States and Taiwan, including, since 2023, using International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. U.S.-Taiwan defense relations have substantially contributed to Taiwan’s military capabilities.
Figure 1. Taiwan Source: Graphic by CRS. The Communist Party of China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a decades-long modernization program focused primarily on developing the capabilities needed to annex Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA is, or soon would be, able to execute a range of military campaigns against Taiwan, including missile strikes, seizures of Taiwan's small outlying islands, blockades, and—what would be the riskiest and most challenging campaign for the PLA—an amphibious landing and takeover of Taiwan's main island. In 2023, then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Burns said PRC leader Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA "to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion" of Taiwan; Burns noted this was a goal related to military capabilities, not necessarily an indication of Xi's intent to start a war. Among Taiwan's advantages in the face of the threat of PRC aggression is U.S. political and military support (see below). Another advantage is geography. The Taiwan Strait is roughly 70 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, and weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at certain times of the year. Taiwan's mountainous terrain and densely populated west coast are poorly suited for amphibious landing and invasion operations. Taiwan's government has initiated programs to strengthen military readiness and increased its defense budget, which grew at an average rate of nearly 5% per year from 2019 to 2023. In 2024, Taiwan spent roughly 2.5% of its GDP on defense; Taiwan's president has said he intends to increase defense spending to more than 3% of GDP in 2025. President Donald Trump has suggested that Taiwan spend 10% of its GDP on defense. Taiwan faces domestic challenges in realizing its defense goals, and its policymakers disagree over how best to deter the PRC from using force against Taiwan. While both of Taiwan's leading political parties say they support increased investment in Taiwan's defense, budget fights between its executive branch and opposition-controlled legislature in 2025 exacerbated concerns held by some about Taiwan's ability to ensure adequate defense funding. Taiwan's military struggles to recruit, train, and retain personnel, and some observers argue Taiwan's civil defense preparedness is insufficient. Taiwan's energy, food, water, communications, and other infrastructure is vulnerable to external disruption. At a societal level, it is not clear what costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety, and lives—Taiwan's people would be willing or able to bear in the face of a cross-Strait war. In addition to training for large-scale military operations against Taiwan, the PRC engages in persistent non-combat operations that erode Taiwan's military advantages and readiness. These "gray zone" actions include frequent military exercises and near-daily patrols in the vicinity of Taiwan (including frequent sorties across the so-called "median line," an informal north-south line bisecting the Strait that PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022); cyber operations; uncrewed combat aerial vehicle flights encircling Taiwan; and stepped-up law enforcement activities near the Taiwan-administered Kinmen Islands located just off the PRC coast. These activities offer the PLA training and intelligence-gathering opportunities and strain Taiwan's forces, which face growing operational and maintenance costs from responding to PLA activities. The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to Taiwan's islands in peacetime could undermine Taipei's ability to discern whether the PLA is using such activities to obscure preparations for an attack. Gray zone tactics could also have strategic value for the PRC. Some observers assess the PRC uses these activities to sow doubt about Taiwan's military capabilities among Taiwan civilians and to create political pressure for Taipei to acquiesce to Beijing's insistence on unification. Many observers believe PRC leaders may prefer to gradually assume control over Taiwan through gray zone coercion and political warfare rather than to risk a large-scale conflict that could possibly draw the PRC and the United States—two nuclear powers—into war. The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties with Taiwan since the United States terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1979 and a mutual defense treaty in 1980. The defense relationship encompasses arms transfers, routine bilateral defense dialogues and planning, and military training. A challenge for U.S. policymakers is supporting Taiwan's defense without triggering the conflict that U.S. policy seeks to prevent. PRC leaders have warned their U.S. counterparts that Taiwan is "the first red line that cannot be crossed" in U.S.-China relations. The PRC has responded to U.S. military support for Taiwan and high-level U.S.-Taiwan engagements by accusing the United States of "playing with fire," and by escalating gray zone coercion against Taiwan. Following then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan, the PRC stepped up military operations near Taiwan and established a "new normal" for the PLA's presence in the area.U.S. Strategy and Policy Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
Overview
The People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) claims but has never controlled Taiwan, a self-governing democracy of 23.4 million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. PRC leaders have stated their preference to unify peacefully with Taiwan, but have insisted on the right to use force to bring Taiwan under PRC control. U.S. policy toward Taiwan (which formally calls itself the Republic of China, or ROC) has prioritized the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For more than 75 years, the U.S. government has sought to strengthen Taiwan's and its own ability to deter PRC military aggression. The PRC, for its part, has claimed the United States uses Taiwan as a "pawn" to "contain" China. Congress has played a role in supporting U.S.-Taiwan defense ties, and has authorized new programs and appropriated funds to support Taiwan's defense since 2022. For more background on cross-Strait relations and U.S. policy toward Taiwan, see CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Susan V. Lawrence.
Taiwan's Security Situation
PRC "Gray Zone" Activities Targeting Taiwan
U.S. Support for Taiwan's Defense
U.S. Strategy and Policy
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.), enacted immediately following the termination of official relations, includes multiple security- related provisions. Among other things, the TRA states that it is U.S. policy to “"make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability”" and “"to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
The TRA does not require the United States to defend Taiwan, but by stating it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity to do so, the TRA creates “"strategic ambiguity”" about potential U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack. Some observers advocate making a more formal U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. Supporters of such a shift argue that "strategic clarity"a shift to “strategic clarity” argue such clarity is necessary to deter an increasingly capable and assertive PRC. Supporters of strategic
ambiguity argue that the long-standing policy encourages restraint by both Beijing and Taipei and incentivizes Taipei to invest more in its own defense.
Successive U.S. administrations have encouraged Taiwan to pursue an “asymmetric” strategy to make it prohibitively costly for the PRC to annex Taiwan by force."asymmetric" defense strategy (sometimes called a "porcupine strategy"), the goal of which is to make Taiwan difficult for the PRC to quickly subdue or "swallow." This approach envisions Taiwan investing in capabilities intended to cripplestymie an amphibious invasion through a combination of anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and other similarly small, distributable, and relatively inexpensive weapons systems. Taiwan’'s government has adopted this approach to some extent, but some (including some stakeholders in Taiwan’'s defense establishment) argue that Taiwan must continue to invest in conventional capabilities (e.g., fighter jets and large warships) to deter gray zone coercion short of an invasion. Uncertainty as to whether, how, and for how long the United States might aid Taiwan in the event of an attacka cross-Strait war informs these debates.
Arms Transfers Over the past seven decades, Taiwan has consistently been one of the largest purchasers of U.S. defense equipment through the Foreign Military Sales process. Some observers argue Taiwan’s military is insufficiently equipped to defeat a PRC armed attack. Further, some observers argue the war in Ukraine has revealed problems with the U.S. defense industrial base and have raised concerns about defense suppliers’ ability to produce and deliver weapons to Taiwan in a timely fashion. In part as a response to these concerns, Congress has taken steps to increase and expedite arms transfers to Taiwan, including but not limited to:
Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The
Arms Transfers and Security Cooperation
U.S. arms transfers have been the most concrete U.S. contribution to Taiwan's defense capabilities. Most of these transfers are Foreign Military Sales (FMS). From 2015 to 2025, the executive branch notified Congress of more than $28 billion in FMS to Taiwan.
Beyond FMS, the 117th Congress authorized new avenues to transfer arms to Taiwan with the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA; Title LV, Subtitle A of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for FY2023, P.L. 117-263). TERA made P.L. 117-263) for the first time authorized the provision of FMF (essentially, loans or grants a foreign government may use to purchase U.S. arms) for Taiwan, although Congress did not appropriate funds for those grants. The State Department later notified Congress of its intent to obligate $135 million for FMF for Taiwan using other authorities. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47) makes available not less than $300 million in FMF for Taiwan. Emergency supplemental appropriations for FY2024 (P.L. 118-50) include an additional $2 billion for FMF for the Indo-Pacific; Taiwan could be a recipient.
Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA; 22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3))(PDA). TERA amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(3)) to make PDA available to Taiwan for the first time, authorizing the provision to Taiwan of up to $1 billion annually in defense articles and services directly from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) stocks. Seven months later, the Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to exercise this authority to transfer $345 million of defense equipment to Taiwan. P.L. 118-50 appropriates $1.9 billion for the replacement of DOD stocks transferred to Taiwan via PDA and for reimbursement of DOD defense services and military education and training provided to Taiwan or to countries that “provided support to Taiwan at the request of the United States.”
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12481 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
IF12481
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation includes training in the United States and in Taiwan, which, although generally not widely publicized, appears to be expanding. Taiwan began receiving training through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in 2023.
The 118th Congress established the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative (TSCI) in the FY2025 NDAA (P.L. 118-159), authorizing assistance to "enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities." The FY2026 NDAA bills reported out of the House and Senate armed services committees include provisions related to Taiwan and the TSCI. The House Committee on Armed Services-reported bill would authorize $1 billion for the TSCI for FY2026; the House-passed DOD Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 4016) would appropriate $500 million for the TSCI, $100 million more than the FY2025 enacted level. The President's FY2026 budget request includes $1 billion for the TSCI.