U.S.-China Trade Relations

The People’U.S.-China Trade Relations

Goods: In 2023, China was the fourth-largest U.S. goods trading partner (with total trade at $575 billion), the fourth- largest U.S. export market ($147.8 billion), and the second largest source of U.S. imports ($427.2 billion). Total 2023 U.S.-China goods trade fell by 17% over 2022: U.S. exports fell by 5.1% and U.S. imports fell by 20.4% due to China’s slowdown and supply chain shifts out of China. (Figure 1.)

Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Services: China in 2023U.S. consumer goods and intermediates (e.g., auto parts and active pharmaceutical ingredients). At the same time, U.S. firms face a lack of market access reciprocity, trade barriers in key areas, a growing PRC state role in commercial activity, expanding industrial policies, and rules governing economic security and data. Trade concerns raised by U.S. officials and executives since the 1990s have broadened into a U.S. government focus on strategic competition with the PRC. The executive branch and Congress have debated approaches and acted to counter PRC practices that challenge U.S. economic leadership, distort markets, and hinder fair competition.

PRC Trade and Investment Terms

The PRC government controls or influences the purchase, financing, and price of the top U.S. exports to China—aircraft, semiconductors, medical equipment, agriculture, and energy. It has sought to enhance control of this trade and reduce reliance on U.S. imports by diversifying trade and advancing industrial policies that exploit foreign commercial ties to develop PRC capabilities. The PRC government also funds some PRC firms and foreign acquisitions with preferential lending and state-funded venture capital. While foreign firms may initially fill PRC gaps with their products, services, and capabilities, PRC plans set targets to displace foreign firms once China gains competencies. Examples include

Aerospace: To meet PRC terms, some U.S. firms have partnered with and transferred advanced U.S. technology to PRC state firms to jointly develop a PRC aircraft (C-919).

Semiconductors: The PRC government funds imports of U.S. equipment to support China's semiconductor industry.

Electric vehicles (EV): Some PRC government policies require firms to localize supply chains for EV batteries.

Medical devices and pharmaceuticals: PRC procurement rules set fixed prices, which increase cost pressures and encourage firms in these sectors to produce in China.

Biotechnology: Some PRC state firms have acquired foreign firms to enhance China's global position.

Critical minerals: China's dominant role in global extraction and processing supports PRC manufacturing.

Energy: Some PRC purchases of U.S. liquefied natural gas involved related PRC investment in U.S. export terminals.

Capital markets: China seeks U.S. financial investment in some strategic sectors in which it restricts U.S. competition.

Regarding U.S. investment in China, the PRC's economic system integrates state and corporate interests, enabling the government to use trade tools (e.g., antidumping, antitrust, technical standards, and procurement) as well as economic coercion and intellectual property (IP) theft activity to advantage its firms and economic development goals. PRC policies have often required foreign firms to transfer technology and capabilities in order to operate in strategic sectors. In February 2025, the American Chamber of Commerce reported that over 80% of its members said a lack of market access was affecting their PRC operations.

Trade and Investment Trends

Goods: In 2024, China was the fourth-largest U.S. goods trading partner (with total trade at $582.5 billion), the fourth-largest U.S. export market ($143.5 billion), and the third-largest source of U.S. imports ($438.9 billion). In 2024, U.S. exports to China fell by 2.9% and U.S. imports from China rose by 2.7% over 2023. The 2024 U.S. trade deficit with China increased by about $16 billion over 2023. (Figure 1.)

78.6 billion. Investment: In 2023, the U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in China was $126.9 billion, and China’'s FDI stock in the United States was $28.0 billion. (Figure 3.) In 2023, China accounted for 0.5% of total FDI stock in the United States, and; China accounted for 1.9% of U.S. FDI stock abroad.

Investments in China by U.S. private equity (PE) funds fell from $140 billion in 2019 to $4 billion in 2023, according to the data firm Preqin. S&P Global reports that U.S. PE and venture capital investments in China were $650 million in the first half of 2024.

According to the Department of the Treasury, as of January 2025 U.S. investors held $333.8 billion in PRC (mainland China and Hong Kong) securities; PRC holdings of U.S. securities were $1.8 trillion; and the PRC was the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries ($1.0 trillion) after Japan ($1.1 trillion). (This does not include PRC offshore holdings.)

Figure 1. U.S.-China Goods Trade (2001-2024)

Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Figure 2. U.S.-China Services Trade (2001-2023)

Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Figure 3. U.S.-China FDI Position (2013-2023)

Since 2017, U.S. national security policy has defined the PRC as a strategic competitor. In January 2025, President Trump issued the America First Trade Policy. It directs a review of trade issues that may affect the PRC to include the U.S. trade deficit; countries' trade, currency, and tax practices; U.S. trade remedies; U.S. de minimis imports; and fentanyl trade. Specific to China, the memorandum directs a review of PRC adherence to the Phase One trade deal; the four-year review of Section 301 actions on China; legislation on most-favored nation (MFN) tariff treatment for China; export controls; and rulemaking on connected vehicle technologies and outbound investment to China.

Tariffs: The executive branch's use of tariffs as a tool to advance trade, foreign policy, and economic goals has prompted debates about congressional trade authorities and oversight over U.S. trade policy and the costs and benefits of using tariffs to address PRC practices of concern. H.R. 694/S. 206 would revoke MFN tariff treatment for the PRC.

The executive branch has taken several tariff actions on PRC imports. In 2018, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411), the USTR concluded that the PRC engaged in forced technology transfer, cyber-enabled theft of U.S. IP and trade secrets, discriminatory and non-market licensing practices, and state-funded strategic acquisitions of U.S. assets. In response, the USTR imposed tariffs at rates that ranged from 7.5% to 25% on about $370 billion worth of U.S. imports from China. The PRC countered with tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. trade. In 2020, the United States and the PRC signed a Phase One deal, which addressed some issues but did not resolve many of the issues USTR had raised. In May 2024, the USTR issued the results of its review of tariffs; it extended most tariffs and raised tariffs by 25% to 100% on some goods (e.g., EVs and batteries, medical products, semiconductors, ship-to-shore cranes, solar cells, and steel and aluminum). Two other Section 301 investigations and actions on China involve semiconductors and shipping and shipbuilding.

In 2018, then-President Trump acted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on PRC steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), citing national security concerns. In February 2025, the President increased the aluminum tariffs to 25% and extended the aluminum and steel tariffs to countries that had been exempted. This policy shift could make PRC steel exports to the United States more price competitive vis-à-vis other exporters.

De Minimis Trade. Section 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows for U.S. imports under a de minimis threshold of $800 per shipment to enter free of tariffs, fees, and taxes. A surge in de minimis imports from China since 2018 prompted a range of legislation in the 118^th Congress. In January 2025, CBP proposed rules that would exclude PRC imports from de minimis treatment if subject to other U.S. trade actions.

Overcapacity. Emerging technology products made under PRC industrial policies are coming to market and driving PRC production overcapacity and exports. The U.S. 25% tariff on PRC EV imports may have shielded the U.S. market from the import surges that Europe has faced.

Forced Labor. Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits U.S. imports of products mined, manufactured, or produced with forced labor. P.L. 117-78 prohibits imports from Xinjiang, China, under a rebuttable presumption that they are made with forced labor. CBP enforcement of the provision remains a key oversight issue for Congress.

The PRC government controls or influences the purchase, financing, and price of some top U.S. exports to China— aircraft, semiconductors, medical equipment, agriculture, and energy. It has sought to enhance its control of this trade and reduce reliance on U.S. imports by diversifying trade and relying on industrial policies that seek to use U.S. commercial ties to develop China’s capabilities. Some U.S. firms may initially benefit from China’s need for foreign products, services, and capabilities to fill gaps while PRC policies set targets to displace foreign firms once China gains competencies. The government funds some PRC firms and foreign acquisitions with preferential lending and state-funded venture capital. Sectoral experiences include Aerospace: To meet PRC terms, some U.S. firms have partnered with and transferred advanced U.S. technology to PRC state firms to jointly develop a PRC aircraft (C-919). Semiconductors: The PRC government funds imports of U.S. equipment to support China’s semiconductor industry. Electric vehicles (EV): Some PRC government policies require firms to localize supply chains for EV batteries. Medical devices and pharmaceuticals: PRC procurement rules set fixed prices which increase cost pressures and encourage firms in these sectors to produce in China. Biotechnology: Some PRC state firms have acquired foreign firms to enhance China’s global position. Critical minerals: China’s dominant role in global extraction and processing supports PRC manufacturing. Energy: Some PRC purchases of U.S. liquefied natural gas involved related PRC investment in U.S. export terminals. Capital markets: China seeks U.S. financial investment in some strategic sectors in which it restricts U.S. competition.

The Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy defines the United States and China as being engaged in strategic competition. The Administration’s trade approach calls for the United States to “out-compete” China by investing in U.S. innovation and working with allies and partners to strengthen and diversify supply chains and to counter and constrain PRC practices of concern. The Biden Administration has sustained communication lines, and, in 2023, created bilateral working groups under the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce on financial, commercial, and export control issues. Some Members have promoted such efforts as a chance to express concerns and manage tensions. Other Members have said such fora should not replace U.S. actions to counter PRC practices of concern. The 118^th Congress passed legislation to restrict PRC digital platforms (e.g., TikTok) and is considering bills to address data security, U.S. outbound investment, PRC investment in the U.S. market, U.S. research ties with China, and export controls, among other issues. Congress has passed measures that support the U.S. semiconductor and EV sectors and counter PRC industrial policies, and is debating whether to restrict PRC ties to these sectors. In addition, P.L. 117-336 directed the imposition of penalties for PRC IP theft. Tariffs. In 2018, as part of an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411), the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) concluded that China engaged in forced technology transfer, cyber-enabled theft of U.S. IP and trade secrets, discriminatory and nonmarket licensing practices, and state-funded strategic acquisitions of U.S. assets. USTR imposed tariffs on an estimated $370 billion worth of U.S. imports from China. The PRC countered with tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. trade. China’s commitments in a 2020 “Phase One” deal did not resolve many of the concerns USTR had raised. In 2018, President Donald J. Trump acted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on PRC steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) over national security concerns about subsidies. Most Section 301 and 232 tariffs are still in effect. Congress has been examining the costs and benefits of using tariffs to address PRC practices of concern. In May 2024, USTR issued the results of its Section 301 tariff review. It extended most tariffs and proposed new tariffs of between 25% to 100% on some PRC goods in response to China “flooding global markets with artificially low-priced exports,” including on EVs, EV batteries, semiconductors, medical products, ship to shore cranes, solar cells, and steel and aluminum items. A Section 301 investigation initiated by USTR in April 2024 seeks to address PRC shipping and shipbuilding practices. Overcapacity. Emerging technology products made under PRC industrial policies are coming to market and driving PRC overcapacity and exports in sectors such as EVs. The U.S. imposes a 25% tariff on PRC EVs which may be shielding the U.S. market from PRC EV import surges that Europe faces, and USTR is proposing 100% tariffs on PRC EVs to address potential future import surges.