Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
March 5, 2024
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Kristin Archick
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Updated March 7, 2025
(R46259)
Jump to Main Text of Report
Summary
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Specialist in European
Ireland, which is one of four component Ireland, which is one of four component
“nations”"nations" of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Affairs
often referred to as often referred to as
“"the Troubles,the Troubles,
”" has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has
reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK
((
unionists). Many Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish and ). Many Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish and
desiresupport a united a united
Ireland (Ireland (
nationalists).).
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In recent years, congressionalprocess. U.S. development aid provided through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) has sought to encourage economic development and reconciliation. Congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, human rights, and addressing Northern Ireland hearings have focused on the peace process, human rights, and addressing Northern Ireland
’s 's legacy of violence (often termed legacy of violence (often termed
dealing with the past). Some Members ). Some Members
also are concerned abouthave expressed interest in how how
Brexit—the UK—the UK
’s 's withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement.
The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern IrelandThe resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland
’'s constitutional s constitutional
status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with
the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from
London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK
security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, implementing the peace agreement proved challenging. In 2007, the Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, implementing the peace agreement proved challenging. In 2007, the
pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated with the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated with the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however, and Brexit Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however, and Brexit
and other contentious issues have hindered the functioning of Northern Irelandand other contentious issues have hindered the functioning of Northern Ireland
’'s government in recent years. Assembly s government in recent years. Assembly
elections took place in May 2022, but the DUP blocked the work of the Assembly and prevented the formation of a new elections took place in May 2022, but the DUP blocked the work of the Assembly and prevented the formation of a new
Executive to protest the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. In late January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of Executive to protest the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. In late January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of
measures proposed by the UK government to address Brexit-related concerns and ended its boycott on Northern Irelandmeasures proposed by the UK government to address Brexit-related concerns and ended its boycott on Northern Ireland
’s 's power-sharing institutions, paving the way for the devolved government to be reestablished in early February 2024. Other power-sharing institutions, paving the way for the devolved government to be reestablished in early February 2024. Other
issues facing Northern Ireland in its search for peace and reconciliation include reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the issues facing Northern Ireland in its search for peace and reconciliation include reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the
past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market
and customs union, the land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping promote peace and a dynamic and customs union, the land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping promote peace and a dynamic
cross-border economy. The UK and the EU agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland to cross-border economy. The UK and the EU agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland to
retain this open border in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Implementation of the protocol—which began in January retain this open border in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Implementation of the protocol—which began in January
2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and exacerbated tensions in the region. 2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and exacerbated tensions in the region.
In February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—aimed at resolving In February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—aimed at resolving
challenges posed by the protocol. The DUP, however, asserted that the Windsor Framework did not fully address the partychallenges posed by the protocol. The DUP, however, asserted that the Windsor Framework did not fully address the party
’s 's concerns and pressed for additional changesconcerns and pressed for additional changes
. The resulting, resulting in the January 2024 deal between the UK government and the DUP January 2024 deal between the UK government and the DUP
seeks to ease trade further between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and to reassure unionists of Northern Ireland’s place within the UK. Brexit has renewed debate about Northern Ireland. Brexit has renewed debate about Northern Ireland
’'s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn
Fein and others for a Fein and others for a
border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join Ireland., or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join Ireland.
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
The 1998 Peace Agreement ............................................................................................................. 2
Key Elements ............................................................................................................................ 2
Implementation ......................................................................................................................... 3
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions .............................................................................. 3
Decommissioning ............................................................................................................... 4
Policing ............................................................................................................................... 4
Security Normalization ....................................................................................................... 5
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity ............................................................... 5
Initiatives to Further the Peace Process ........................................................................................... 6
Recent Political Instability and Latest Developments ..................................................................... 7
The May 2022 Assembly Election ............................................................................................ 8
2024 Reestablishment of the Devolved Government ................................................................ 9
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process ..................................................................................... 10
Sectarian Divisions .................................................................................................................. 10
Dealing with the Past ............................................................................................................... 11
Stormont House Agreement Provisions ............................................................................ 13
The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 ............................ 13
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity ........................................................... 15
Paramilitary Concerns ....................................................................................................... 15
The Dissident Threat ......................................................................................................... 16
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity .................................................................... 17
Implications of Brexit .................................................................................................................... 18
The Irish Border and Post-Brexit Arrangements ..................................................................... 18
The Northern Ireland Protocol .......................................................................................... 19
The Protocol’s Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions ............................. 20
The 2023 Windsor Framework ......................................................................................... 22
The 2024 UK-DUP Deal ................................................................................................... 23
Economic Concerns ................................................................................................................ 26
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects ..................................................................... 27
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests ........................................................................................ 29
Support for the Peace Process ................................................................................................. 29
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland .................................................................................... 31
International Fund for Ireland ................................................................................................. 32
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland ............................................ 2
Tables
Table 1. Northern Ireland 2022 Election Results ............................................................................ 8
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33
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Overview
Overview
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as
“"the the
Troubles,Troubles,
”" has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map in has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map in
Figure 1).1 At its 1 At its
core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities.
Protestants in Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support Northern Protestants in Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support Northern
Ireland’Ireland's continued incorporation in the UK (s continued incorporation in the UK (
unionists). Many Catholics in Northern Ireland ). Many Catholics in Northern Ireland
consider themselves Irish and consider themselves Irish and
desiresupport a united Ireland ( a united Ireland (
nationalists). In the past, more militant ). In the past, more militant
unionists (unionists (
loyalists) and more militant nationalists () and more militant nationalists (
republicans) were willing to use force) were willing to use force
and resort to violence to achieve their goals. to achieve their goals.
22 Results from the 2021 census Results from the 2021 census
, released in September 2022, indicate that for the first time in Northern Ireland indicate that for the first time in Northern Ireland
’'s history, more people in Northern Ireland s history, more people in Northern Ireland
are from a Catholic background (45.7% of the population) than from a Protestant are from a Catholic background (45.7% of the population) than from a Protestant
or other Christian background background
(43.5% of the population).(43.5% of the population).
3
3
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights, Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights,
housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists, housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists,
loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans. loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans.
Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on
the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between
1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government).1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government).
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to
the conflict. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate Majority Leader George the conflict. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill ClintonMitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill Clinton
’'s special adviser on Ireland. The UK s special adviser on Ireland. The UK
and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks
announced an agreement on April 10, 1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday announced an agreement on April 10, 1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday
Agreement (for the day on which it was concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.Agreement (for the day on which it was concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.
4
4
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement, Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
implementation of the peace accord implementation of the peace accord
has beenproved challenging. Tensions and distrust persist among challenging. Tensions and distrust persist among
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more
broadly. Northern Ireland continues to grapple with a number of issues in its search for peace and broadly. Northern Ireland continues to grapple with a number of issues in its search for peace and
reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and addressing Northern Irelandreconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and addressing Northern Ireland
’'s legacy s legacy
of violence (often termed of violence (often termed
dealing with the past) is particularly controversial. The UK) is particularly controversial. The UK
’s 's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2020—or Brexit—has added to divisions within Northern Ireland, renewed questions about Northern Ireland'withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2020—or Brexit—has added to divisions within
1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland, with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the remaining one-sixth of the island.
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as Ulster. Technically and historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
3 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, “Northern Ireland 2021 Census Results,” at https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/2021-census/results/main-statistics.
4 The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized in the United States.
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Northern Ireland, renewed questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the s constitutional status as part of the
UK, and contributed to political instability in the power-sharing institutions. In late January 2024, UK, and contributed to political instability in the power-sharing institutions. In late January 2024,
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s leading unionist party accepted new measures proposed by the UK s leading unionist party accepted new measures proposed by the UK
government to address certain Brexit-related concerns, thereby enabling Northern Irelandgovernment to address certain Brexit-related concerns, thereby enabling Northern Ireland
’s 's devolved government to be restored in early February 2024 after a two-year suspension.devolved government to be restored in early February 2024 after a two-year suspension.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the Northern Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the Northern
Ireland peace process and Ireland peace process and
have encouraged encouraged
the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, as full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, as
well as subsequent accords and initiatives. well as subsequent accords and initiatives.
President Biden visited Northern Ireland (and Ireland) in April 2023 to mark the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday AgreementThe United States has provided aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986 to encourage economic development and foster reconciliation. Some Members of . Some Members of
Congress have been particularly interested in police reforms and human rights in Northern Congress have been particularly interested in police reforms and human rights in Northern
Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development and foster reconciliation. Ireland. Some Members of Some Members of
Congress also have demonstrated an interest in BrexitCongress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit
’'s implications for Northern Ireland.s implications for Northern Ireland.
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland
Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).
The 1998 Peace Agreement
Key Elements
The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political
settlement reached by Northern Irelandsettlement reached by Northern Ireland
’'s political parties and an international treaty between the s political parties and an international treaty between the
UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the
consent principle——
that is, a change in Northern Irelandthat is, a change in Northern Ireland
’'s status can come about only with the consent of the majority s status can come about only with the consent of the majority
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of Northern Ireland’of Northern Ireland's people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the s people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the
agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Irelandagreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland
’'s population and a s population and a
majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in
Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding
obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for
future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power (known as power (known as
Strand One). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several ). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several
issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary
weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of
prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious, and the final prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious, and the final
agreed text thus reflected some degree of agreed text thus reflected some degree of
“"constructive ambiguity.constructive ambiguity.
”
"
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new
“"North-SouthNorth-South
”" and and
“"East-WestEast-West
”" institutions institutions
((
Strand Two and and
Strand Three, respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two , respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two
strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and
southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-
Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises
representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland,
Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Implementation
Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in
separate referendums on May 22, 1998, but implementing the agreement was difficult. For years, separate referendums on May 22, 1998, but implementing the agreement was difficult. For years,
decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s devolved government. Ongoing sectarian strife and sporadic violence from s devolved government. Ongoing sectarian strife and sporadic violence from
dissident republican and loyalist groups that refused to accept the peace process also fed mistrust dissident republican and loyalist groups that refused to accept the peace process also fed mistrust
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement mandated power-sharing in the devolved As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement mandated power-sharing in the devolved
government between unionists and nationalists and called for establishing a new Northern Ireland government between unionists and nationalists and called for establishing a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive. To ensure neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the Assembly and Executive. To ensure neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the
Assembly (of 108 members at the time), the agreement required that Assembly (of 108 members at the time), the agreement required that
“"key decisionskey decisions
”" receive receive
cross-community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly cross-community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly
members). The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other members). The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other
ministers with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be ministers with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be
allocated to political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.allocated to political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.
The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The
devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, was delayed by unionist concerns about devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, was delayed by unionist concerns about
the status of weapons decommissioning. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority the status of weapons decommissioning. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority
over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December
1999. Over the next few years, the issue of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican 1999. Over the next few years, the issue of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican
Army (IRA)—contributed to the suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of Army (IRA)—contributed to the suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of
direct rule from London several times between 2000 and 2002. (See direct rule from London several times between 2000 and 2002. (See
“Decommissioning,” below.)
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
"Decommissioning," below.)
In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern IrelandIn May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland
’'s devolved government was s devolved government was
restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which
strongly supports Northern Irelandstrongly supports Northern Ireland
’'s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the
staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA. Regularly scheduled staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA. Regularly scheduled
Assembly elections in 2011 and 2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led Assembly elections in 2011 and 2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led
by the DUP and Sinn Fein. At the same time, various incidents—including protests in 2012 and by the DUP and Sinn Fein. At the same time, various incidents—including protests in 2012 and
2013 over the use of flags and emblems and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein leader in connection 2013 over the use of flags and emblems and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein leader in connection
with the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the devolved governmentwith the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the devolved government
’s 's stability. Brexit and other contentious issues led to the collapse of the power-sharing institutions stability. Brexit and other contentious issues led to the collapse of the power-sharing institutions
between 2017 and 2020, and again between February 2022 and February 2024 (see between 2017 and 2020, and again between February 2022 and February 2024 (see
“Recent Political Instability and Latest Developments”). "Political Developments since 2016").
Decommissioning
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states,
“"those who hold those who hold
office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded
or removed from office.or removed from office.
”" Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its
weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as
tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls.tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls.
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to
pursue objectives through pursue objectives through
“"exclusively peaceful means.exclusively peaceful means.
”5"5 In September 2005, Northern Ireland In September 2005, Northern Ireland
’s 's Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had
put all of its arms put all of its arms
“"beyond use,beyond use,
”" asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable
matched estimates provided by the security forces.matched estimates provided by the security forces.
66 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning The IICD also confirmed decommissioning
by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.
Policing
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between
unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was
established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Irelandestablished to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland
’'s former, 92% s former, 92%
Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and
human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in
fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent
commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers
(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI (from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI
introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.
7
7
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the
new Policing Board, a democratic Policing Board, a democratic
oversight bodyoversight body
established as part of the police reforms. Many viewed Sinn Fein. Many viewed Sinn Fein
’'s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI
and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new
police forcePSNI. In 2007, . In 2007,
however, Sinn Fein members voted to support the police and join the Policing Board. Sinn Feinhowever, Sinn Fein members voted to support the police and join the Policing Board. Sinn Fein
’s
5 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005. 6 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005. 7 See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
's decision was seen as historic, given the IRAdecision was seen as historic, given the IRA
’'s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target.
In 2010, the DUP and Sinn Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve In 2010, the DUP and Sinn Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve
policing and justice powers from London to Belfast. policing and justice powers from London to Belfast.
In 2011, theThe 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded
, with officials asserting that it had fulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commission.8 As of late 2021, Catholic officers made up 32% of the PSNI’s roughly 7,000 officers. Concerns persist, however, in 2011.
According to the most recent data available, Catholic officers currently make up around 33% of the PSNI's roughly 6,300 officers.8 Concerns persist that not enough Catholics are seeking to join the PSNI (due to both lingering suspicions that not enough Catholics are seeking to join the PSNI (due to both lingering suspicions
about the police within the Catholic/nationalist community and ongoing fears that Catholic police about the police within the Catholic/nationalist community and ongoing fears that Catholic police
recruits may be targeted by dissident republicansrecruits may be targeted by dissident republicans
, especially following a 2023 data breach involving the personal information of more than 10,000 police officers and support staff opposed to the peace process). Budget ). Budget
constraints and other issues, including low morale, also are impacting recruitmentconstraints and other issues, including low morale, also are impacting recruitment
and could lead to a reduction in the overall size of the PSNI to below 6,000 officers by 2025.9
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement called for “. PSNI officials have warned that current overall staffing levels are insufficient. In September 2024, the PSNI outlined a plan to increase the size of the force to 7,000 officers by 2028.9
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement called for "as early a return as possible to normal security as early a return as possible to normal security
arrangements in Northern Ireland,arrangements in Northern Ireland,
”" including the removal of security installations. In February including the removal of security installations. In February
2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July 2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July
2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a 2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a
regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no
longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
In accordance with the Good Friday AgreementIn accordance with the Good Friday Agreement
’'s provisions related to human rights and equality, s provisions related to human rights and equality,
the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR, an international treaty of the Council of Europe10) into Northern into Northern
Ireland law and established a Ireland law and established a
new Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Commission and
a newan Equality Commission Equality Commission
for Northern Ireland. Some nationalistsfor Northern Ireland. Some nationalists
, however, continue have continued to press for more progress to press for more progress
in the area of human rights and equality and argueand have argued that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights. that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights.
Consideration for a Bill of Rights was provided for in the Good Friday Agreement, but the issue Consideration for a Bill of Rights was provided for in the Good Friday Agreement, but the issue
has long been controversialhas long been controversial
and consensus. Consensus on the way forward—between unionists and on the way forward—between unionists and
nationalists, as well as with the UK government—remains elusive.nationalists, as well as with the UK government—remains elusive.
The Good Friday Agreement also calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and The Good Friday Agreement also calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
support for the Irish language (Gaelic). Giving Gaelic the same official status as English and calls support for the Irish language (Gaelic). Giving Gaelic the same official status as English and calls
for a stand-alone Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland, however, were sensitive issues for many for a stand-alone Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland, however, were sensitive issues for many
unionists. A 2020 deal to restore the power-sharing institutions included a compromise to unionists. A 2020 deal to restore the power-sharing institutions included a compromise to
recognize Gaelic as an official language in Northern Ireland and promote its use while also recognize Gaelic as an official language in Northern Ireland and promote its use while also
protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English that many unionists protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English that many unionists
consider important to their heritage). In October 2022, the UK Parliament approved legislation consider important to their heritage). In October 2022, the UK Parliament approved legislation
enacting the language and cultural measures agreed in 2020 into law.10
8 BBC News, “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” March 28, 2011. 9 Julian O’Neill, “Catholic Recruitment an Issue as PSNI Turns 20,” BBC News, November 2, 2021; Belfast Telegraph, “Damage Done to Police by Budget Cuts Will Take Years to Reverse, MPs Warned,” June 22, 2023; Ben Quinn, “Catholic Officers ‘Asking If They Should Bring Firearms to Mass,’ After PSNI Leak,” Guardian, September 5, 2023. 10 The Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Act 2022 received royal assent in December 2022. Enda McClafferty, “Irish Language and Ulster Scots Bill Clears Final Hurdle in Parliament,” BBC News, October 26, 2022.
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enacting the language and cultural measures agreed in 2020 into law.11
Initiatives to Further the Peace Process
Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
as complete. as complete.
Since 2013, howeverBetween 2013 and 2015, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish , the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish
governments governments
have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation. made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation.
Major endeavors Major endeavors
includeincluded the following: the following:
• The 2013 Haass Initiative. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most
divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.
1112 In particular, Haass was tasked with In particular, Haass was tasked with
making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of
parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass
released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was
unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.
12
• 13
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In 2014, financial pressures and In 2014, financial pressures and
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
tested Northern Irelandtested Northern Ireland
’'s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments
convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing
structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the
resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland
political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating
measures), balance the budget, address Northern Irelandmeasures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland
’'s heavy reliance on the s heavy reliance on the
public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive
departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included
measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past.
Continued disagreements Disagreements over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled
implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.
13
• 14
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. In November 2015, the UK and Irish In November 2015, the UK and Irish
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare
reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Irelandreform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland
’'s budget s budget
and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the Assembly and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the Assembly
from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election after the May from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election after the May
2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments, and made 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments, and made
provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start Agreement provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start Agreement
also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the parties were also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the parties were
unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to deal with the unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to deal with the
past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing concerns about past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing concerns about
paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein official in paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein official in
connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.14
11 Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003. 12 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf.
13 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement.
14 The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,” November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland.
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Recent Political Instability and Latest Developments
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns persist about the stability of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and the fragility of community relations. In January 2017, theconnection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.15Political Developments Since 2016
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, political challenges persist and community relations remain fragile. As noted previously, regularly scheduled Assembly elections were held in May 2016 and the DUP and Sinn Fein subsequently formed a power-sharing government. In January 2017, this devolved government collapsed amid a scandal over a devolved government collapsed amid a scandal over a
renewable energy program, differences between the DUP and Sinn Fein on a potential Irish renewable energy program, differences between the DUP and Sinn Fein on a potential Irish
Language Act and the legalization of same-sex marriage (Sinn Fein supported both measures, Language Act and the legalization of same-sex marriage (Sinn Fein supported both measures,
whereas the DUP opposed them), and unease in Northern Ireland over Brexit in the wake of the whereas the DUP opposed them), and unease in Northern Ireland over Brexit in the wake of the
June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Snap Assembly elections were held in March June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Snap Assembly elections were held in March
2017. It took nearly three years—until January 2020—to reestablish the devolved government, 2017. It took nearly three years—until January 2020—to reestablish the devolved government,
led at the time by then-First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and then-Deputy First Minister led at the time by then-First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and then-Deputy First Minister
Michelle OMichelle O
’'Neill of Sinn Fein.Neill of Sinn Fein.
15
Over16
In the last the last
fourfive years, Northern Ireland officials have been tested by the years, Northern Ireland officials have been tested by the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)COVID-19 pandemic and by challenges resulting from the implementation of the post- pandemic and by challenges resulting from the implementation of the post-
Brexit trade and customs rules for Northern Ireland, Brexit trade and customs rules for Northern Ireland,
which seek to preserveaimed at preserving an open border on the an open border on the
island of Ireland while also respecting the rules of the EU single market and customs union. island of Ireland while also respecting the rules of the EU single market and customs union.
Set Initially set out in a protocol to the UKout in a protocol to the UK
’'s withdrawal agreement with the EU, many unionists viewed these s withdrawal agreement with the EU, many unionists viewed these
post-Brexit arrangements as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK (i.e., Great Britain) post-Brexit arrangements as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK (i.e., Great Britain)
and endangering the UKand endangering the UK
’'s constitutional integrity. Implementation of the protocol—which began s constitutional integrity. Implementation of the protocol—which began
in January 2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK in January 2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK
and contributed to heightened tensions. (See and contributed to heightened tensions. (See
“"Implications of Brexit,Implications of Brexit,
”" below.) below.)
Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit
arrangements in the protocol exacerbated unionist concerns about their British identity being arrangements in the protocol exacerbated unionist concerns about their British identity being
under threat and may have been a factor in the violence and rioting that erupted in several cities under threat and may have been a factor in the violence and rioting that erupted in several cities
and towns across Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Much of this rioting was and towns across Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Much of this rioting was
carried out by young people and was concentrated in economically disadvantaged communities carried out by young people and was concentrated in economically disadvantaged communities
where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence. The violence where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence. The violence
also followed a decision in late March 2021 against prosecuting violations of COVID-19 social also followed a decision in late March 2021 against prosecuting violations of COVID-19 social
distancing restrictions at a large funeral in 2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. For many distancing restrictions at a large funeral in 2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. For many
unionists, this incident at the 2020 funeral reinforced their unionists, this incident at the 2020 funeral reinforced their
long-standing views of a double views of a double
standard in standard in
policingthe PSNI and the judiciary in favor of nationalists. Frustration and boredom due to the and the judiciary in favor of nationalists. Frustration and boredom due to the
COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people, also may have factored into the rioting.COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people, also may have factored into the rioting.
16
17
Although the DUP backed Brexit (it was the only major Northern Ireland political party to do so), Although the DUP backed Brexit (it was the only major Northern Ireland political party to do so),
implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland prompted political turmoil within the DUP in the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland prompted political turmoil within the DUP in
2021. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader in late May 2021 and as first minister in 2021. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader in late May 2021 and as first minister in
June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, a DUP member of the UK ParliamentJune 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, a DUP member of the UK Parliament
at the time, became, became
the leader of the leader of the
DUP in late June 2021DUP in late June 2021
, (the DUPthe DUP
’'s second new leader in a months second new leader in a month
). (Donaldson resigned as DUP leader in late March 2024, and Gavin Robinson became the DUP's new leader).18 Paul Givan, a DUP member of Paul Givan, a DUP member of
the Northern Ireland Assembly, succeeded Foster as first ministerthe Northern Ireland Assembly, succeeded Foster as first minister
.
in June 2021.
In February 2022, then-First Minister Givan resigned to protest the Northern Ireland protocol and In February 2022, then-First Minister Givan resigned to protest the Northern Ireland protocol and
the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations on resolving difficulties with the protocol. Givan’s
15 Northern Ireland’s devolved government was restored in 2020 following a power-sharing deal that addressed a number of key issues, including health, education, language and cultural issues, and the sustainability of Northern Ireland’s political institutions. Government of the UK, New Decade, New Approach, January 9, 2020, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf.
16 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,” Politico, April 7, 2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,” New York Times, April 8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021.
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the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations on resolving difficulties with the protocol. Givan's resignation also forced then-Deputy First Minister Oresignation also forced then-Deputy First Minister O
’'Neill to step down. The first minister and Neill to step down. The first minister and
deputy first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns, the other also ceases to deputy first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns, the other also ceases to
hold office. As a result, the Northern Ireland Executive was unable to meet or make decisions (the hold office. As a result, the Northern Ireland Executive was unable to meet or make decisions (the
Northern Ireland Assembly was able to continue working on legislation already in progress).Northern Ireland Assembly was able to continue working on legislation already in progress).
17 19
The May 2022 Assembly Election
Regularly scheduled Assembly elections were held on May 5, 2022. For the first time in Northern Regularly scheduled Assembly elections were held on May 5, 2022. For the first time in Northern
Ireland’Ireland's history, Sinn Fein won the largest number of seats in the 90-member Assembly and s history, Sinn Fein won the largest number of seats in the 90-member Assembly and
surpassed the DUP as the largest party in the Assembly (seesurpassed the DUP as the largest party in the Assembly (see
Table 1). Decreased support for the . Decreased support for the
DUP appeared to be driven by dissatisfaction with the partyDUP appeared to be driven by dissatisfaction with the party
’'s leadership on Brexit and internal s leadership on Brexit and internal
party divisions. Sinn Fein strongly supports a united Ireland but centered its election campaign on party divisions. Sinn Fein strongly supports a united Ireland but centered its election campaign on
everyday concerns, such as the rising costs of living and health care. The smaller, cross-everyday concerns, such as the rising costs of living and health care. The smaller, cross-
community Alliance Party made significant gains, attributed to voter frustration with Northern community Alliance Party made significant gains, attributed to voter frustration with Northern
Ireland’Ireland's identity politics and frequent instability in the power-sharing institutions.s identity politics and frequent instability in the power-sharing institutions.
1820 Voter turnout Voter turnout
was 63%. (Also see text box, was 63%. (Also see text box,
“"Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland,Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland,
”" below.) below.)
Following the election, the DUP blocked the work of the Assembly and the formation of a new Executive to exert pressure on the UK government to address unionist objections to the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol. Sinn Fein and other nationalists generally have supported the protocol’s post-Brexit arrangements as necessary to maintain an open border on the island of Ireland. In late February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—to resolve the challenges posed by the Northern Ireland protocol. The DUP, however, asserted that the Windsor Framework did not fully address the party’s concerns about the protocol and that further progress would be necessary before the DUP would agree to reestablish Northern Ireland’s devolved government. (See “Implications of Brexit” and “The Windsor Framework,” below.)
Table 1. Northern Ireland 2022 Election Results
Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
Political Party
Political Party
|
# of Seats
+/- Seats
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
27
—
27
|
—
|
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
25
-3
25
|
-3
|
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
17
+9
17
|
+9
|
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
9
-1
9
|
-1
|
Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-
left)
8
|
-4
|
8
-4
left)
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
1
—
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
1
—
Independent (unionist)
2
+1
Source: BBC News, “
1
|
—
|
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
|
1
|
—
|
Independent (unionist)
|
2
|
+1
|
Source: BBC News, "Northern Ireland Assembly Election Results 2022,Northern Ireland Assembly Election Results 2022,
”" at https://www.bbc.com/news/ at https://www.bbc.com/news/
election/2022/election/2022/
northern-ireland/results.
Following the May 2022 election, the DUP blocked the work of the Assembly and the formation of a new Executive to exert pressure on the UK government to address unionist objections to the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol. Sinn Fein and other nationalists generally supported the protocol's post-Brexit arrangements as necessary to maintain an open border on the island of Ireland. In late February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—to resolve the challenges posed by the Northern Ireland protocol. The DUP, however, asserted that the Windsor Framework did not fully address the party's concerns about the protocol and that further progress would be necessary before the DUP would agree to reestablish Northern Ireland's devolved government. (See "Implications of Brexit" and "The Windsor Framework," below.)
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
northern-ireland/results.
17 Jayne McCormack, “Givan Resignation Triggers Fresh Political Crisis in NI,” BBC News, February 3, 2022. 18 NPR.org, “Sinn Fein Celebrates an Historic Election Win in Northern Ireland,” May 7, 2022; Mark Landler, “As Britain Turned Away from EU, Northern Ireland Turned to Sinn Fein,” New York Times, May 7, 2022; Mark Devenport, “How Alliance Number Nerds Turned Single Digits into a Surge,” BBC News, May 9, 2022.
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Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a
united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in Northern Ireland and Ireland (with united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in Northern Ireland and Ireland (with
members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political
party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received
considerable support from working-class Catholics. considerable support from working-class Catholics.
In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein, replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neil Mary Lou McDonald has led Sinn Fein since 2018. Michelle O'Neill has led Sinn Fein in the Northern has led Sinn Fein in the Northern
Ireland Assembly Ireland Assembly
and is considered the party’s “northern leader”since 2017; she is also the party; she is also the party
’'s deputy leader.s deputy leader.
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since
2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The 2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The
party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists
as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage.
Sir Jeffrey DonaldsonGavin Robinson has led the DUP since has led the DUP since
June 2021. late March 2024 (he initially served in an interim capacity and was confirmed as party leader in May 2024).
Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party that is centrist and liberal in political The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party that is centrist and liberal in political
orientation. It argues for reforming the devolved governmentorientation. It argues for reforming the devolved government
’'s power-sharing rules to promote greater stability s power-sharing rules to promote greater stability
and reflect growing support for nonsectarian parties. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.and reflect growing support for nonsectarian parties. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the
UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement.
Doug BeattieMike Nesbitt has has
led the UUP since led the UUP since
May 2021. August 2024.
Social Democratic and LabourLabour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that
supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the
negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement.
The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015.
2024 Reestablishment of the Devolved Government
Throughout the rest of 2023Claire Hanna has led the SDLP since October 2024.
2024 Reestablishment of the Devolved Government
Following the February 2023 Windsor Framework, the UK government sought to address the DUP, the UK government sought to address the DUP
’'s remaining s remaining
concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland and facilitate the establishment concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland and facilitate the establishment
of a new devolved government. In late January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of measures of a new devolved government. In late January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of measures
proposed by the UK government—set out in a new proposed by the UK government—set out in a new
Safeguarding the Union command paper— command paper—
that outlinesthat outlined some operational changes to the Windsor Framework to ease trade further between some operational changes to the Windsor Framework to ease trade further between
Northern Ireland and Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Great Britain and
seeks to reassure unionists of Northern Irelandreassure unionists of Northern Ireland
’'s place s place
within the UK.within the UK.
1921 Despite some concerns among several DUP party officials about the command Despite some concerns among several DUP party officials about the command
paper and accompanying implementing legislation, the DUP decided to end its boycott of paper and accompanying implementing legislation, the DUP decided to end its boycott of
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s power-sharing institutions and enter into a new devolved government.s power-sharing institutions and enter into a new devolved government.
2022 (See (See
“"Implications of BrexitImplications of Brexit
”" and and
“"The 2024 UK-DUP Deal,The 2024 UK-DUP Deal,
”" below.) below.)
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s Assembly and new Executive began work on February 3, 2024. For the first s Assembly and new Executive began work on February 3, 2024. For the first
time in Northern Irelandtime in Northern Ireland
’'s history, the position of first minister is now held by a Sinn Fein s history, the position of first minister is now held by a Sinn Fein
member, Michelle Omember, Michelle O
’'Neill. Sinn Fein was entitled to the position of first minister because it won Neill. Sinn Fein was entitled to the position of first minister because it won
the largest number of Assembly seats in the May 2022 election, although the roles of first the largest number of Assembly seats in the May 2022 election, although the roles of first
minister and deputy minister are equal. DUP Assembly member Emma Little-Pengelly assumed minister and deputy minister are equal. DUP Assembly member Emma Little-Pengelly assumed
the role of deputy first minister. Both First Minister Othe role of deputy first minister. Both First Minister O
’'Neill and Deputy First Minister Little-Neill and Deputy First Minister Little-
Pengelly Pengelly
have pledged to serve pledged to serve
“all”"all" people and communities in Northern Ireland.23
As part of the deal to restore the devolved government, the UK government agreed to people and communities in Northern Ireland.21
19 In the UK, command papers are official publications that present major government initiatives to Parliament “by command” of the sovereign. See UK Parliament, “About Command Papers,” at https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/publications/government/.
20 Shawn Pogatchnik, “DUP Agrees to Drop Boycott of Northern Ireland Power-Sharing,” Politico, January 30, 2024; Jayne McCormack and Finn Purdy, “Stormont: Assembly to Sit on Saturday as DUP Boycott Ends,” BBC News, February 1, 2024.
21 Brendan Hughes and Matt Fox, “Stormont: Michelle O’Neill Makes History as Nationalist First Minister,” BBC (continued...)
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As part of the deal to restore the devolved government, the UK government also agreed to provide a £3.3 billion (about $4.2 billion) financial package for Northern Ireland to help address provide a £3.3 billion (about $4.2 billion) financial package for Northern Ireland to help address
budgetary pressures (due in part to the delay in reestablishing the devolved government). Funding budgetary pressures (due in part to the delay in reestablishing the devolved government). Funding
priorities priorities
includeincluded increasing public sector pay amid high inflation and recent large-scale strikes increasing public sector pay amid high inflation and recent large-scale strikes
(by health care and transportation workers, teachers, civil servants, and others), improving (by health care and transportation workers, teachers, civil servants, and others), improving
infrastructure, and enhancing investment. The UK government also recommitted to devolving infrastructure, and enhancing investment. The UK government also recommitted to devolving
corporate tax powers to Northern Irelandcorporate tax powers to Northern Ireland
’'s power-sharing institutions, which would allow s power-sharing institutions, which would allow
Northern Ireland to set a lower corporate tax rate than the UK rate (of 25%) to compete more Northern Ireland to set a lower corporate tax rate than the UK rate (of 25%) to compete more
effectively with the lower corporate tax rate in the Republic of Ireland.effectively with the lower corporate tax rate in the Republic of Ireland.
22 24
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process
More than 25 years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the past remains ever-present More than 25 years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the past remains ever-present
in Northern Ireland and the search for peace and reconciliation remains challenging. Difficult in Northern Ireland and the search for peace and reconciliation remains challenging. Difficult
issues include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading, issues include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading,
protests, and the use of flags and emblems), dealing with Northern Irelandprotests, and the use of flags and emblems), dealing with Northern Ireland
’'s legacy of violence, s legacy of violence,
addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity, and furthering addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity, and furthering
economic development and equality.economic development and equality.
Sectarian Divisions
Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and Catholic communities Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and Catholic communities
existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern Ireland remain mostly existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern Ireland remain mostly
single-identity communities. In March 2022, single-identity communities. In March 2022,
despite some opposition from the DUP and other stakeholders, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation to increase the number of the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation to increase the number of
integrated school places and establish targets for the number of children educated in integrated integrated school places and establish targets for the number of children educated in integrated
schools.23 As of May 2023, out of roughly 1,100schools.25 For the 2024-2025 academic year, out of roughly 1,100 nursery, primary, and post-primary schools in Northern Ireland, there were schools in Northern Ireland, there were
70 73 formally integrated schools, educating formally integrated schools, educating
about 8% of pupils.8% of pupils.
24
26
In some areas in Northern Ireland, In some areas in Northern Ireland,
peacepeace walls separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods. separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods.
Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern IrelandEstimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland
’s 's Departments of Justice and Housing have responsibility for Departments of Justice and Housing have responsibility for
the majority of peace walls (currently around 60), butaround 60 peace walls; when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed
roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is
estimated at over 100.estimated at over 100.
2527 Northern Ireland Northern Ireland
’'s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls
since 2013since 2013
, but surveys. Surveys of public attitudes indicate of public attitudes indicate
continued support for the walls support for the walls
in many communities.26remains in some communities.28 One poll conducted in 2019 found that 42% of those interviewed wanted the walls One poll conducted in 2019 found that 42% of those interviewed wanted the walls
News, February 3, 2024; William Booth and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Ireland Gets Its First Sinn Fein First Minister in Historic Shift,” Washington Post, February 3, 2024. 22 Margaret Canning, “Northern Ireland Businesses Welcome Prospect of Corporation Tax Devolution Contained in DUP Deal,” Belfast Telegraph, January 31, 2024; Northern Ireland Office, “UK Government Confirms £3.3bn Spending Settlement for Restored Northern Ireland Executive,” press release, February 13, 2024. 23 Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated Education: Stormont Passes Bill Despite DUP Opposition,” BBC News, March 9, 2022. 24 Northern Ireland Department of Education, A Strategy for Integrated Education in Northern Ireland, May 3, 2023. 25 Rory Carroll, “Belfast’s Peace Walls: Potent Symbols of Division Are Dwindling—But Slowly,” Guardian, April 7, 2023; “What Is a Peace Wall? An Explainer,” Irish News, July 27, 2023. 26 Julian O’Neill, “NI Troubles: I Would Love to See That Wall Coming Down,” BBC News, January 29, 2023; Rebecca Black, “Progress Continues to Be Made in Bid to Transform Northern Ireland’s Peace Walls,” Irish News, December 31, 2023.
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to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same survey also found that 37% of to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same survey also found that 37% of
respondents had never interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the respondents had never interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the
nearest peace wall.nearest peace wall.
2729 Another 2019 survey Another 2019 survey
, however, and subsequent reporting suggests a gradual attitudinal change in suggests a gradual attitudinal change in
support of removing the peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.support of removing the peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.
28
30
Sectarian divisions are often apparent during the annual summer Sectarian divisions are often apparent during the annual summer
marching season, when many , when many
unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant history. unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant history.
Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held through or Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held through or
close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist parades as close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist parades as
triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often provoked fierce triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often provoked fierce
violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission, which arbitrates violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission, which arbitrates
disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have repeatedly argued for disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have repeatedly argued for
abolishing the commission.abolishing the commission.
2931 Efforts over the years to address the contentious issue of parading Efforts over the years to address the contentious issue of parading
and related protests have stalled repeatedly.and related protests have stalled repeatedly.
Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland. Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland.
A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at
Belfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on such Belfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on such
issues between the unionist and nationalist communitiesissues between the unionist and nationalist communities
. The protests, mostly by unionists and loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent. In . In 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess these 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess these
contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. After several issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. After several
delays, the commissiondelays, the commission
’'s report was published in late 2021. The report contains over 40 s report was published in late 2021. The report contains over 40
recommendations, but the commission was unable to reach agreement on some key issues, recommendations, but the commission was unable to reach agreement on some key issues,
including related to flags and memorials. Critics including related to flags and memorials. Critics
questionquestioned the report the report
’'s value given the delays, s value given the delays,
costs (£800,000, or about $1.1 million), and lack of an accompanying implementation plan.costs (£800,000, or about $1.1 million), and lack of an accompanying implementation plan.
30 32
Dealing with the Past
Fully addressing Northern IrelandFully addressing Northern Ireland
’'s legacy of violence and pursuing justice for crimes committed s legacy of violence and pursuing justice for crimes committed
during the Troubles has beenduring the Troubles has been
exceedingly difficult and often contentious. Reaching consensus on difficult and often contentious. Reaching consensus on
the best way to deal with the past is challenging in large part because many unionists and the best way to deal with the past is challenging in large part because many unionists and
nationalists continue to view the Troubles differently and retain competing narratives. Cases of nationalists continue to view the Troubles differently and retain competing narratives. Cases of
suspected collusion between UK security institutions, Northern Irelandsuspected collusion between UK security institutions, Northern Ireland
’'s former police force, and s former police force, and
paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles have been particularly difficult to resolve.paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles have been particularly difficult to resolve.
The Good Friday Agreement asserted that, The Good Friday Agreement asserted that,
“"it is essential to acknowledge and address the it is essential to acknowledge and address the
suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.
”" In 2008, the In 2008, the
Northern Ireland Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors to support Northern Ireland Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors to support
victims and their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming from the victims and their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming from the
Troubles also Troubles also
have existed. Theseexisted. These
have included investigations into conflict-related deaths by a included investigations into conflict-related deaths by a
dedicated PSNI unit; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of dedicated PSNI unit; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of
historical cases involving allegations of police misconduct; fact-finding coroner inquests; and historical cases involving allegations of police misconduct; fact-finding coroner inquests; and
public inquiries, such as the Saville inquiry (concluded in 2010) into the January 1972 Bloody public inquiries, such as the Saville inquiry (concluded in 2010) into the January 1972 Bloody
27 Northern Ireland Department of Justice, Public Attitudes to Peace Walls 2019 Findings, June 2020. 28 International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019. 29 The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades. 30 Jayne McCormack, “Flags Report: Stormont Publishes £800k Report Without Action Plan,” BBC News, December 1, 2021; Northern Ireland Executive Office, Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition – Final Report, December 1, 2021.
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Sunday incident in which the British Army shot 28 people, resulting in 14 deaths.Sunday incident in which the British Army shot 28 people, resulting in 14 deaths.
3133 Since 2016, Since 2016,
an independent police team—known as Operation Kenova—also has investigated several cases of an independent police team—known as Operation Kenova—also has investigated several cases of
suspected collusion during the Troublessuspected collusion during the Troubles
and reviewed more than 200 related murders.32
.
Critics argue these various legal processes have represented a piecemeal approach and have given Critics argue these various legal processes have represented a piecemeal approach and have given
some deaths or incidents priority over others. some deaths or incidents priority over others.
Many observersObservers note that progress in investigations note that progress in investigations
has been slow and has resulted in few prosecutions. has been slow and has resulted in few prosecutions.
As of According to the latest publicly available information, as of mid-2022, over 900 conflict-related cases 2022, over 900 conflict-related cases
(involving nearly 1,200 deaths) were awaiting investigation by the PSNI.(involving nearly 1,200 deaths) were awaiting investigation by the PSNI.
33 According to UK authorities,34 UK authorities report that between 2015 and 2021, historical reviews and investigations resulted in prosecutions between 2015 and 2021, historical reviews and investigations resulted in prosecutions
of nine people for Troubles-related deaths.of nine people for Troubles-related deaths.
3435 Troubles-era criminal prosecutions have faced legal Troubles-era criminal prosecutions have faced legal
hurdles as the passage of time hurdles as the passage of time
may make it more difficult to meet the high evidentiary barhas, in some cases, diminished the quality of evidence. Some . Some
experts also point out the expense and time involved with some of these processes; for example, experts also point out the expense and time involved with some of these processes; for example,
the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday cost £195 million (more than $300 million) and took 12 the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday cost £195 million (more than $300 million) and took 12
years to complete.years to complete.
35
36
The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the
Troubles Troubles
has been contentiousalso has posed challenges. UK veterans groups and some Members of Parliament argue that . UK veterans groups and some Members of Parliament argue that
Troubles-related investigations and prosecutions have disproportionately focused on the actions Troubles-related investigations and prosecutions have disproportionately focused on the actions
of the armed forces and former police officers. They note that PSNI investigations involving the of the armed forces and former police officers. They note that PSNI investigations involving the
British Army British Army
have accounted for 30% of its legacy case workload but that the Army was accounted for 30% of its legacy case workload but that the Army was
responsible for 10% of the overall deaths during the conflict.responsible for 10% of the overall deaths during the conflict.
36
37
Other officials and analysts reject arguments that legacy investigations and prosecutions have Other officials and analysts reject arguments that legacy investigations and prosecutions have
predominantly targeted veterans. Between 2011 and 2019, Northern Irelandpredominantly targeted veterans. Between 2011 and 2019, Northern Ireland
’'s Public Prosecution s Public Prosecution
Service (PPS) undertook prosecutions in eight legacy cases involving republican paramilitaries, Service (PPS) undertook prosecutions in eight legacy cases involving republican paramilitaries,
four cases involving loyalist paramilitaries, and five cases involving former military personnel.four cases involving loyalist paramilitaries, and five cases involving former military personnel.
37 38 Several prosecutions of former British soldiers have collapsed in recent years.Several prosecutions of former British soldiers have collapsed in recent years.
38 The first and only conviction (since39 Since the 1998 peace agreement the 1998 peace agreement
), the only conviction of a member of the armed forces for a Troubles- of a member of the armed forces for a Troubles-
related offense occurred in November 2022, when a Northern Ireland court convicted a British related offense occurred in November 2022, when a Northern Ireland court convicted a British
Army veteran of manslaughter for killing a civilian in 1988.Army veteran of manslaughter for killing a civilian in 1988.
39
Most recently, in40 In February 2024, the PPS announced that four British Army veterans would be February 2024, the PPS announced that four British Army veterans would be
prosecuted for murder or attempted murder in two incidents that occurred in Belfast in May 1972. Veterans’ advocates have criticized the PPS decision as being “rushed through” ahead of the May 2024 deadline to end most Troubles-related prosecutions mandated in new UK legislation (see “The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023,” below). The only other
31 Thirteen deaths occurred on Bloody Sunday; another person wounded on Bloody Sunday died several months later. 32 Operation Kenova, “Five Years On: More than 200 Murders Now Under Review by Kenova,” press release, August 10, 2021.
33 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill Explanatory Notes, May 17, 2022, p. 6, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0010/en/220010en.pdf.
34 Government of the UK, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021, p. 20, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
35 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010. 36 Claire Mills and David Torrance, Investigation of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland, UK House of Commons Library, May 18, 2022, pp. 20-21.
37 Ibid., pp. 29-30. Also see, Edward Burke, “The Trouble with Northern Ireland Legacy Cases,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), April 22, 2021.
38 David Young, “Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, “Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021. 39 Rory Carroll, “Ex-Soldier Who Shot Dead Civilian During Troubles Convicted of Manslaughter,” Guardian, November 25, 2022.
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prosecuted for murder or attempted murder in two incidents that occurred in Belfast in May 1972. The only other prosecution of a former British soldier for Troubles-related offenses currently underway is that prosecution of a former British soldier for Troubles-related offenses currently underway is that
against against
“"Soldier FSoldier F
”" for two of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings and for attempted murder of five for two of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings and for attempted murder of five
others wounded on Bloody Sunday.others wounded on Bloody Sunday.
40 41
Stormont House Agreement Provisions
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address
“"legacy legacy
issues”issues" (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative). These bodies were to (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative). These bodies were to
include a new Historical Investigation Unit (HIU) to take forward the work of the PSNI and include a new Historical Investigation Unit (HIU) to take forward the work of the PSNI and
PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the Troubles and a new Independent PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the Troubles and a new Independent
Commission for Information Retrieval to enable victims and survivors to seek and privately Commission for Information Retrieval to enable victims and survivors to seek and privately
receive information about conflict-related violence (separate from the judicial process). The receive information about conflict-related violence (separate from the judicial process). The
Stormont House Agreement also provided for establishing an oral history archive and an Stormont House Agreement also provided for establishing an oral history archive and an
Implementation and Reconciliation Group to promote reconciliation and reduce sectarianism.Implementation and Reconciliation Group to promote reconciliation and reduce sectarianism.
41
42
Efforts to enact these legacy mechanisms in UK law, however, stalled for years amid differences Efforts to enact these legacy mechanisms in UK law, however, stalled for years amid differences
between the UK government and various stakeholders on certain aspects of how these bodies between the UK government and various stakeholders on certain aspects of how these bodies
would function. In particular, some nationalists and would function. In particular, some nationalists and
many human rights advocates objected to the human rights advocates objected to the
UK governmentUK government
’'s insistence on proposed s insistence on proposed
“"national security caveatsnational security caveats
”" pertaining to the disclosure pertaining to the disclosure
of sensitive or classified information. Unionists voiced concern that the proposed HIU could of sensitive or classified information. Unionists voiced concern that the proposed HIU could
unfairly target former soldiers and police officers. Successive government crises also impeded unfairly target former soldiers and police officers. Successive government crises also impeded
work on implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Irelandwork on implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland
’'s legacy of violence.s legacy of violence.
42 43
The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023
As part of the 2020 agreement to reestablish Northern IrelandAs part of the 2020 agreement to reestablish Northern Ireland
’'s power-sharing institutions, the s power-sharing institutions, the
UK government of then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson pledged to introduce legislation to set up UK government of then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson pledged to introduce legislation to set up
the legacy bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020 and the legacy bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020 and
subsequently in July 2021, however, the UK government outlined new proposals to address subsequently in July 2021, however, the UK government outlined new proposals to address
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s past, including changes to the legacy mechanisms called for in the Stormont s past, including changes to the legacy mechanisms called for in the Stormont
House Agreement. These proposals informed the governmentHouse Agreement. These proposals informed the government
’'s decision to introduce the Northern s decision to introduce the Northern
Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill in the UK Parliament in May 2022. UK Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill in the UK Parliament in May 2022. UK
officials argued that the new approach set out in the bill would prioritize information recovery for officials argued that the new approach set out in the bill would prioritize information recovery for
victims and families, protect military veterans from prosecution, and encourage wider societal victims and families, protect military veterans from prosecution, and encourage wider societal
reconciliation.reconciliation.
43
Despite considerable 44
Despite opposition to the legislation within and outside of Northern Ireland opposition to the legislation within and outside of Northern Ireland
(discussed below), the UK House of Commons passed the bill in July 2022, by a vote of 282 to (discussed below), the UK House of Commons passed the bill in July 2022, by a vote of 282 to
217. The bill was supported mostly by the majority Conservative Party. The opposition Labour 217. The bill was supported mostly by the majority Conservative Party. The opposition Labour
Party and others voted against the bill; no Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland
40 “Bloody Sunday: Soldier F Prosecution Resumes in Court,” BBC News, September 28, 2022; “Former British Soldier to Stand Trial over Bloody Sunday Killings Half a Century Ago,” Associated Press, December 14, 2023; James Crisp, “Four More Troubles Veterans Prosecuted as Cases ‘Rushed Through’ Before Amnesty Deadline,” Telegraph, February 8, 2024.
41 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement.
42 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth Gordon, “Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018. 43 Government of the UK, “Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Outline Way Forward to Address the Legacy of the Troubles,” press release, May 17, 2022; UK Parliament, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation)
Act 2023, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3160.
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Party and others voted against the bill; no Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland supported it. In January 2023, the UK government of supported it. In January 2023, the UK government of
then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (who became Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (who became
Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in October 2022) introduced several amendments Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in October 2022) introduced several amendments
to the bill, largely in response to concerns raised by victims and survivors. Following some delays to the bill, largely in response to concerns raised by victims and survivors. Following some delays
and resistance in the UK House of Lords, the UK Parliament gave final approval to the bill in and resistance in the UK House of Lords, the UK Parliament gave final approval to the bill in
September 2023. The bill subsequently received royal assent and became UK law.September 2023. The bill subsequently received royal assent and became UK law.
44
45
Among other measures, the legislation (commonly referred to as the Legacy Act) Among other measures, the legislation (commonly referred to as the Legacy Act)
establishes a established a new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR) charged new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR) charged
with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The Legacy Act also with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The Legacy Act also
establishesestablished a conditional immunity scheme that would provide immunity from prosecution for a conditional immunity scheme that would provide immunity from prosecution for
Troubles-related offenses for individuals that Troubles-related offenses for individuals that
cooperatecooperated with the ICRIR. Furthermore, the act banned criminal investigations into Troubles-related incidents by any UK authority other than the ICRIR, ended most coroner inquests, and prohibited future civil claims for Troubles-related misconduct. The act mandated all investigations to cease, except those in support of prosecutions already underway, by May 1, 2024 (the same day the ICRIR began work).46
with the ICRIR. The act essentially would draw to a close most investigations and prosecutions of incidents during the Troubles. (For more information on these and other key provisions, see the text box below.)
As noted above, many stakeholders responded negatively to the Legacy Act. Although UK As noted above, many stakeholders responded negatively to the Legacy Act. Although UK
veterans groups veterans groups
and campaigners largely welcomed the legislation, victims groups and human largely welcomed the legislation, victims groups and human
rights advocates rights advocates
have beenwere critical. All Northern Ireland political parties expressed opposition to critical. All Northern Ireland political parties expressed opposition to
the legislation.the legislation.
4547 Nationalists contended that ending investigations and most prosecutions would Nationalists contended that ending investigations and most prosecutions would
circumvent justice for victims and families and would allow the UK government to cover up the circumvent justice for victims and families and would allow the UK government to cover up the
truth about the statetruth about the state
’'s actions during the Troubles. Unionists objected to what they viewed as s actions during the Troubles. Unionists objected to what they viewed as
establishing moral equivalency between the actions of soldiers and paramilitaries. The Irish establishing moral equivalency between the actions of soldiers and paramilitaries. The Irish
government also expressed serious concerns about various aspects of the legislation, including government also expressed serious concerns about various aspects of the legislation, including
“regret”"regret" that it that it
departsdeparted from the approach envisioned in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. from the approach envisioned in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement.
46 48
Legal experts Legal experts
questionquestioned whether certain provisions, especially those related to investigations and whether certain provisions, especially those related to investigations and
the immunity scheme, the immunity scheme,
arewere compatible with UK commitments in the European Convention on compatible with UK commitments in the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), an international treaty of the Council of Europe.47
The ICRIR was established in December 2023 and is expected to begin work in summer 2024. The Legacy Act faces a number of judicial challenges in UK courts, however, Human Rights. Victims' groups and families filed several judicial challenges to the Legacy Act in UK courts, and the Irish and the Irish
government government
has filed a case against the act before the ECHRfiled a case against the act before the ECHR
’'s European Court of Human Rights. s European Court of Human Rights.
In late In February 2024, the Belfast High Court found that the immunity provisions in the Legacy February 2024, the Belfast High Court found that the immunity provisions in the Legacy
Act were in breach of the ECHR. Responding to the High Court’s ruling, UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Chris Heaton-Harris asserted that the UK government remained committed to implementing the Legacy Act. The UK government is expected to appeal the High Court’s ruling.48
44 Government of the UK, “Government Tables Amendments to NI Troubles Legacy Legislation,” press release, January 17, 2023; BBC News, “Troubles Legacy Bill Enters Law After Receiving Royal Assent,” September 19, 2023.
45 See, for example, UK Parliament, Hansard, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, volume 717, debated on July 4, 2022, at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2022-07-04/debates/854CCB3A-19C5-4724-9CF2-A2B02E6D9086/NorthernIrelandTroubles(LegacyAndReconciliation)Bill.
46 Molly Killeen, “Irish PM Urges UK Not to Act Alone as Troubles Legacy Bill Introduced,” EurActiv, May 18, 2022; Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ireland Welcomes Decision by Council of Europe on Northern Ireland Legacy Issues,” press release, June 10, 2022. 47 The UK is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights as a member of the Council of Europe, a leading European human rights body that the UK helped found in 1949. The Council of Europe is an entirely separate organization from the EU. Lisa O’Carroll, “Troubles Legacy Bill Risks Breaching Human Rights Law, UK Warned,” Guardian, October 26, 2022.
48 BBC News, “Troubles Legacy: Controversial Bill Facing More Legal Challenges,” September 18, 2023; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Ireland to Sue UK over Law Blocking Probes into Northern Irish Violence,” Politico, December 20, 2023; Megan Specia, “Immunity for Troubles Violence Violates Human Rights, Belfast Court Rules,” New York Times, February 28, 2024.
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The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act: Key Provisions
For the purposes of the legislation (commonly referred to as the Legacy Act), the period of the Troubles is defined as being from January 1966 to April 10, 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Key provisions of the Legacy Act include the fol owing.
A New Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR). The ICRIR is charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The ICRIR is to be “demand led”—it will not review every death or serious injury but rather will do so at the request of family members, survivors, or certain government authorities. Findings are to be provided to the person who requested the review and made publicly available (in most cases). The ICRIR also is required to produce and publish a historical record of all Troubles-related deaths not subject to a request for a review. Requests must be made within the first five years of the ICRIR’s operation. The ICRIR consists of six commissioners, to be supported by ICRIR officers and equipped with the necessary expertise and police investigatory powers (for the primary purpose of information recovery). UK government authorities are required to provide “ful disclosure” to the ICRIR. A New Conditional Immunity Scheme. The Legacy Act provides immunity from prosecution for Troubles-related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIR. Individuals must apply for immunity, and an ICRIR judicial panel must be satisfied that a person requesting immunity has provided an account that is true to the best of that person’s knowledge or belief. Once granted by the ICRIR, immunity cannot be revoked. Immunity would not be granted to individuals for past Troubles-related convictions or to subjects of ongoing prosecutions. Ending Non-ICRIR Investigations and Limiting Prosecutions. The Legacy Act bans criminal investigations into Troubles-related incidents by any UK authority other than the ICRIR. All ongoing investigations are to cease, except those in support of prosecutions already underway by May 2024 (which will be allowed to continue to conclusion). The ICRIR may refer individuals not granted immunity for prosecution. Ending Inquests and Civil Claims. The Legacy Act ends inquests (a fact-finding investigation) that have not reached an advanced stage (as of May 2024) and prohibits future inquests into Troubles-related deaths. The act also bans future civil claims for Troubles-related conduct. Memorialization Initiatives. The Legacy Act provides for efforts to memorialize the Troubles. Among other measures, the act outlines and would fund an oral history initiative to encourage people from all backgrounds to share their experiences of the Troubles and listen to those of others. The act also provides for the establishment of an independent academic initiative to study themes and patterns related to the Troubles and mandates the preparation and publication of a “memorialization strategy” with concrete recommendations (including whether a Troubles museum or similar project would be beneficial).
Sources: Joanna Dawson et al., Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill 2022-2023, UK House of Commons Library, May 20, 2022; and Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office, Explainers Relating to the
Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, May 25, 2022.
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Act were in breach of the ECHR.49
In July 2024, a new UK government led by Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the Labour Party took office following parliamentary elections and committed to "repealing and replacing" the Legacy Act.50 In December 2024, UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Hilary Benn began the process of repealing provisions in the Legacy Act related to the conditional immunity scheme and the ban on civil claims by presenting a remedial order for parliamentary approval. The UK government intends to maintain the ICRIR as a body for information recovery and to implement reforms to strengthen its independence. Secretary of State Benn also has announced plans to introduce legislation at a later date to reinstate inquests and to amend some of the Legacy Act's information disclosure provisions. Proposed changes to the information disclosure provisions would seek to respond to a September 2024 Northern Ireland Court of Appeal ruling that the Legacy Act gave the UK government too much discretion over the ICRIR's disclosure of sensitive information. In January 2025, the UK government filed an appeal seeking legal clarity on some aspects of the September 2024 ruling.51
Some victims' groups and human rights advocates have expressed concerns that Secretary of State Benn's proposals fall short of fully repealing and replacing the Legacy Act. In particular, those of this view criticize the decision to retain the ICRIR, arguing that the proposed changes to the body would be merely cosmetic. Some victims' advocates also regard the repeal process as too slow, especially as legislation to reinstate inquests has not yet been introduced in parliament. Some veterans' groups continue to support the Legacy Act and oppose plans to repeal it.52
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the
Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. In 2015, the UK Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. In 2015, the UK
government commissioned a study on the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups. government commissioned a study on the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.
This review found that all the main paramilitary groups that operated during the Troubles still This review found that all the main paramilitary groups that operated during the Troubles still
existexisted, but they , but they
areremained on cease-fire and the leadership of each group, on cease-fire and the leadership of each group,
“"to different degrees,to different degrees,
” is “" was "committed to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives.committed to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives.
”" At the same time, the review At the same time, the review
concluded that individual members of paramilitary groups concluded that individual members of paramilitary groups
stillcontinued to represent a threat to national represent a threat to national
securitysecurity
and public order, including through their involvement in organized crime.53
In 2017, a , including through their involvement in organized crime.49
49 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20, 2015. This report focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks during the Troubles under the (continued...)
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In 2017, a new four-member Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) was established to four-member Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) was established to
monitor paramilitary activity and monitor paramilitary activity and
to report annually on progress toward ending such activity. The report annually on progress toward ending such activity. The
UK and Irish governments each named one UK and Irish governments each named one
representativecommissioner to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland
Executive named two.Executive named two.
5054 In its In its
sixthseventh annual report, released in annual report, released in
December 2023February 2025, the IRC , the IRC
statesstated that, "intimidation, coercive control, and threats linked to paramilitary groups continue to persist and remain a real concern." The IRC noted some progress during 2024, including a lowering of the Northern Ireland terrorism threat level from "severe" to "substantial," but also noted that "a further worrying feature of the situation in 2024 was that there was a paramilitary element involved in a number of racist incidents related to immigration."55 In recent years, IRC commissioners and other observers also have raised concerns that paramilitary groups and structures continue to pose “a continuing threat to individuals and society” and “coercive control continues to be an unacceptable feature of life in many communities where the paramilitaries operate.” The IRC supports a holistic approach that combines policing and criminal justice responses with measures to address the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing communities in which paramilitaries operate. The IRC also argues for direct engagement with paramilitary groups to promote voluntary action by the groups to bring about disbandment and a definitive end to paramilitarism.51
Concerns also exist about the degree to which divisions over Brexit could further enhance about the degree to which divisions over Brexit could further enhance
paramilitary influence, prompt a resurgence in paramilitary activity, and otherwise affect the peace process. In March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing support for the Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements for the Northern Ireland. Although these loyalist groups remain on cease-fire, they also warned that Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to the “permanent destruction” of the peace accord (see “Implications of Brexit” below).52
The Dissident Threat
paramilitary influence.56
The IRC supports addressing paramilitarism with an approach that combines policing and criminal justice responses with measures to tackle the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing communities in which paramilitaries operate. The IRC also has argued for considering direct engagement with paramilitaries to promote voluntary disbandment. Other Northern Ireland officials have cautioned that engagement could legitimize paramilitaries; they advocate instead for greater investment in policing and community development.57
Security assessments indicate that dissident groups not on cease-fire and opposed to the 1998 Security assessments indicate that dissident groups not on cease-fire and opposed to the 1998
peace accord continue to peace accord continue to
present significantpose threats. Dissident republican groups are regarded as threats. Dissident republican groups are regarded as
posing the greatest terrorist threat in Northern Irelandposing the greatest terrorist threat in Northern Ireland
, although concerns persist about the public order challenges posed by smaller dissident loyalist groups.53 At the same time, dissident groups but do not have the same capacity to mount a sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the do not have the same capacity to mount a sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the
1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA
during the height of the Troubles.during the height of the Troubles.
According to UK security services, there are currently four58
Four main dissident republican groups main dissident republican groups
exist currently: the : the
Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblacht (ANP), and the New IRA Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblacht (ANP), and the New IRA
(which reportedly was formed in 2012).(which reportedly was formed in 2012).
59 These groups have sought to target police officers, prison These groups have sought to target police officers, prison
officers, and other members of the security services in particular. officers, and other members of the security services in particular.
Between 2009 and 2017, dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers, and two prison officers.54
Authorities are especially alarmed by the threat posed by the New IRA, which has carried out a Authorities are especially alarmed by the threat posed by the New IRA, which has carried out a
string of high-profile attacks in recent years. Police suspect the New IRA of shooting and
name of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
50 The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007.
51 Independent Reporting Commission Sixth Report, December 5, 2023, at https://www.ircommission.org/news/irc-sixth-report-published-5-december-2023.
52 As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,” Politico, March 5, 2021.
53 MI5, “MI5 in Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/mi5-in-northern-ireland. 54 In 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a small splinter group formed in opposition to the cease-fire. MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland.
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string of high-profile attacks in recent years. The New IRA claimed responsibility for shooting and critically wounding a senior and prominent PSNI detective, John Caldwell, in Omagh in February critically wounding a senior and prominent PSNI detective, John Caldwell, in Omagh in February
2023 (the New IRA has claimed responsibility).552023.60 The New IRA also was responsible for the The New IRA also was responsible for the
April 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry April 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry
(also known as Derry).(also known as Derry).
5661 Although less active Although less active
generally than the New IRA, in March 2023, ANP warned than the New IRA, in March 2023, ANP warned
that it would consider the families of PSNI officers to be targets as well.that it would consider the families of PSNI officers to be targets as well.
57 62
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity
Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal opportunity for Catholics and Protestants.
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s economy has made considerable s economy has made considerable
advances since the 1990sadvances since the 1990s
but also has faced challenges. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland
’'s economy grew an average s economy grew an average
of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from
over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.
5863 The 2008-2009 global recession led to a prolonged The 2008-2009 global recession led to a prolonged
downturn in the region and economic recovery was slow and uneven for downturn in the region and economic recovery was slow and uneven for
many years but years but
gradually improved between 2013 and 2019. Like elsewhere in the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic gradually improved between 2013 and 2019. Like elsewhere in the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic
and resulting restrictions on social and business activity affected Northern Irelandand resulting restrictions on social and business activity affected Northern Ireland
’'s economy in s economy in
2020, but economic activity largely recovered in 2021.2020, but economic activity largely recovered in 2021.
59
64
Since mid-2022, Since mid-2022,
highhigher energy costs energy costs
, and a rise in inflation inflation
, and increased and interest rates have interest rates have
been a drag on affected Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s economy, s economy,
resulting incontributing to some quarterly fluctuations in economic output and some quarterly fluctuations in economic output and
a risingan increased cost of living. cost of living.
Between the third quarters of 2002 and 2023, howeverAs inflation and interest rates began to ease in mid-2023, Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland
’s 's economic output increased by economic output increased by
2.2%. Some analysts suggest that Northern Ireland has weathered the economic difficulties of the last few years better overall than the UK. In3% between the third quarters of 2023 and 2024; in comparison to pre- comparison to pre-
pandemic levels in 2019, economic activity in Northern Ireland pandemic levels in 2019, economic activity in Northern Ireland
has shown stronger growth (6.2in the third quarter of 2024 showed stronger growth (9.7%, driven largely by the services sector) than%, driven largely by the services sector) than
in the UK ( the UK (
1.5%).2.9%).65 Northern Ireland Northern Ireland
’s 's unemployment rate for October-December unemployment rate for October-December
20232024 was was
21.6%, lower than the UK average .6%, lower than the UK average
unemployment rate of 3.8%.60 At the same time, the recent stalemate in restoring Northern Ireland’s devolved government impacted Northern Ireland’s budget and the authorities’ ability to respond to the rising cost of living, especially for public sector workers, and led to months of labor unrest and strikes in late 2023 and early 2024.61
unemployment rate of 4.4%.66
Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities
also persist in Northern Ireland. Income persist in Northern Ireland. Income
levels and living standardslevels in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK
’'s 12 s 12
55 Julian O’Neill, “Omagh Police Shooting: John Caldwell Attack Causes Shockwaves in PSNI,” BBC News, February 25, 2023; Allison Morris, “New IRA Still Main Suspect in DCI Caldwell Shooting, Chief Constable Tells Policing Board,” Belfast Telegraph, March 2, 2023. 56 The New IRA claimed responsibility for McKee’s death but reportedly issued an apology; the group asserted that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the riots but had hit McKee by accident. See Ed O’Loughlin, “New IRA Apologizes for Killing of Journalist in Northern Ireland,” New York Times, April 23, 2019. 57 Seanin Graham, “PSNI Officers Warned of Republican Dissident Threat to their Families,” Irish Times, March 7, 2023.
58 Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic Strategy, Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011.
59 Valentina Romei and Chris Giles, “Northern Ireland Economy Has Outperformed Rest of UK, ONS Figures Show,” Financial Times, November 29, 2021; John Campbell, “COVID-19: NI Economic Recovery May Be Weaker Than Originally Thought,” BBC News, February 28, 2022. 60 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 3 2023, January 11, 2024; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 14, 2024.
61 Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Ireland Grinds to a Freezing Halt Over Public Pay Dispute,” Reuters, January 18, 2024; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland in 2024: A Land of Misery,” Politico, January 19, 2024.
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economic regions, Northern Ireland had the third-lowest gross domestic product per capita in 2021 (£27,154, or about $34,360), below the UK’s average (£33,967, or about $42,980).62 Northern Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (26.8% in the third quarter of 2023), economic regions, Northern Ireland had the third-lowest gross domestic product per capita in 2022 (£29,674, or about $38,236), below the UK's average (£37,076, or about $47,773).67 Northern Ireland has a persistently higher rate of economic inactivity (26.6% in the fourth quarter of 2024) than the UK overall (21.5% in the same quarter), exacerbated by long-term illness and disability in the aftermath of the pandemic, and a high exacerbated by long-term illness and disability in the aftermath of the pandemic, and a high
proportion of working-age individuals with no formal qualifications.proportion of working-age individuals with no formal qualifications.
6368 Studies indicate the Studies indicate the
historically poorest areas in Northern Ireland remain sohistorically poorest areas in Northern Ireland remain so
, and many of these bore the brunt of the and many of these bore the brunt of the
Troubles. Although many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, Troubles. Although many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic,
others are predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged others are predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged
areas in Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called areas in Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called
peace dividend..
64
69
At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The
gap in workforce participation between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since gap in workforce participation between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since
1990 and has converged in the last few years. According to the most recent data available from 1990 and has converged in the last few years. According to the most recent data available from
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s Equality Commission, in s Equality Commission, in
20212022, for the first time, the share of , for the first time, the share of
Protestants and Catholics in Northern IrelandCatholics in Northern Ireland
’'s workforce s workforce
was 50:50. (In(50.1%) was larger than the share of Protestants (49.9%); in comparison, in 1990, the share of comparison, in 1990, the share of
Protestants in Northern IrelandProtestants in Northern Ireland
’'s workforce was 65%, while the share of Catholics was 35%s workforce was 65%, while the share of Catholics was 35%
).65 .70
Implications of Brexit66
Brexit71
In the UKIn the UK
’'s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored
remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The
UK began negotiations with the EU on the terms of its withdrawal in 2017 and concluded these UK began negotiations with the EU on the terms of its withdrawal in 2017 and concluded these
negotiations in late 2019. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020negotiations in late 2019. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020
, ending its 47-year membership in the bloc. The UK continued . The UK continued
to apply EU rules and to participate in the EUto apply EU rules and to participate in the EU
’'s single market and customs union until the end of s single market and customs union until the end of
an 11-month transition period that concluded on December 31, 2020.an 11-month transition period that concluded on December 31, 2020.
67 Brexit has added to divisions within72
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland and posed considerable challenges, with potential implications Northern Ireland and posed considerable challenges, with potential implications
for Northern Irelandfor Northern Ireland
’s peace process's devolved government, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status. , economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status.
The Irish Border and Post-Brexit Arrangements
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law
62 Matthew Ward and Daniel Harari, Regional and National Economic Indicators, UK House of Commons Library, February 14, 2024.
63 Ulster University, Economic Inactivity: Who, What, Where, Why?, January 2024; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 14, 2024.
64 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November 2017; Duncan Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony of Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The United States Role in Reaffirming the Good Friday Agreement, 117th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 2021; Pivotal Public Policy Forum NI, Reconciliation and Deprivation: Twin Challenges for Northern Ireland, May 2023.
65 Data applies to Northern Ireland’s “total monitored workforce,” as defined in and required by Northern Ireland’s fair employment legislation; “total monitored workforce” does not include the self-employed, school teachers, or those in private sector companies with ten or less employees. Northern Ireland Equality Commission, Fair Employment
Monitoring Report No. 32, released April 21, 2023.
66 For more background on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
67 In December 2020, UK and EU negotiators also concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which sets out terms for post-Brexit trade and economic relations, as well as cooperation on a range of other issues.
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Even before Brexit, demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which Catholics now outnumber Protestants) and changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The initial post-Brexit trade arrangements for Northern Ireland arguably enhanced a sense of unionist disenfranchisement, partly by raising concerns that Northern Ireland could be drawn closer to the Republic of Ireland's economic orbit and this could be a precursor to a united Ireland. Brexit also eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments. As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.73
The Irish Border and Post-Brexit Arrangements
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and
nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland
belonged to the EUbelonged to the EU
’'s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an
important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped
produce a dynamic cross-border economy.produce a dynamic cross-border economy.
Preventing a Preventing a
hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland
was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UKwas a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK
’'s withdrawal agreement with s withdrawal agreement with
the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-
Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent
dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets, dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets,
endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would
threaten the regionthreaten the region
’'s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.
68
74
Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
“frictionless”"frictionless" trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People
in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across
the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends.
Estimates suggest there areStudies conducted in 2017-2018 suggested there were upward of 300 upward of 300
public and private border crossing points along the borderpublic and private border crossing points along the border
today; during the Troubles, only a ; during the Troubles, only a
fraction of crossing points were openfraction of crossing points were open
, and hour-long delays due to security measures and and hour-long delays due to security measures and
bureaucratic hurdles were common.bureaucratic hurdles were common.
69
75
In early 2019, the UK Parliament rejected an initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in In early 2019, the UK Parliament rejected an initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in
large part because of concerns that arrangements for the Irish border would have kept the UK tied large part because of concerns that arrangements for the Irish border would have kept the UK tied
too closely to the EU single market and customs union. Some Brexit advocates contended that too closely to the EU single market and customs union. Some Brexit advocates contended that
Ireland and the EU were exaggerating the security concerns about the border. Those of this view Ireland and the EU were exaggerating the security concerns about the border. Those of this view
also noted that, although the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security also noted that, although the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security
arrangements (including the removal of security installations arrangements (including the removal of security installations
“"consistent with the level of consistent with the level of
threat”threat"), it does not explicitly require an open border. The Irish government and many officials ), it does not explicitly require an open border. The Irish government and many officials
and stakeholders in Northern Ireland and the UK argued that an open border had become intrinsic and stakeholders in Northern Ireland and the UK argued that an open border had become intrinsic
to peace and to ensuring fulfillment of the Good Friday Agreementto peace and to ensuring fulfillment of the Good Friday Agreement
’'s provisions on north-south s provisions on north-south
cooperation on cross-border issues (such as transportation, agriculture, and the environment).cooperation on cross-border issues (such as transportation, agriculture, and the environment).
70 76
The Northern Ireland Protocol and Implementation Challenges
In October 2019, the EU and the government of then-UK Prime Minister Johnson reached a In October 2019, the EU and the government of then-UK Prime Minister Johnson reached a
revised withdrawal agreement with a renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure revised withdrawal agreement with a renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure
an open border on the island of Ireland.an open border on the island of Ireland.
7177 Under the terms of the protocol, which also sought to Under the terms of the protocol, which also sought to
safeguard the rules of the EU single market, Northern Ireland safeguard the rules of the EU single market, Northern Ireland
remainswould remain legally in the UK customs legally in the UK customs
territory but territory but
maintainswould maintain regulatory alignment with the EU. The protocol's provisions eliminated regulatory alignment with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for all practical purposes in the EU single market and customs union for goods.
68 Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,” Guardian, February 7, 2018.
69 Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” New York Times, August 5, 2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,” Belfast Telegraph, December 17, 2018. 70 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” Politico, June 12, 2019. 71 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration.
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This eliminates the need for checks on trade in goods at the land border between Northern Ireland the need for checks on trade in goods at the land border between Northern Ireland
and Irelandand Ireland
, but essentially but essentially
createscreated a regulatory and customs border in the Irish Sea between a regulatory and customs border in the Irish Sea between
Northern Ireland and Great Britain (often termed the Northern Ireland and Great Britain (often termed the
Irish Sea border). Any physical checks ). Any physical checks
necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance for goods moving from Great Britain to necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance for goods moving from Great Britain to
Northern Ireland would be conducted at ports or points of entry away from the politically Northern Ireland would be conducted at ports or points of entry away from the politically
sensitive land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland.sensitive land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland.
The DUP and other unionists strongly opposed these The DUP and other unionists strongly opposed these
“"Northern Ireland-onlyNorthern Ireland-only
”" arrangements, arrangements,
contending the provisions in the protocol would treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of contending the provisions in the protocol would treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of
the UK and would jeopardize Northern Irelandthe UK and would jeopardize Northern Ireland
’'s economy, its participation in the UKs economy, its participation in the UK
’'s internal s internal
market, and the regionmarket, and the region
’'s position as part of the UK. The DUP and other unionists also objected to s position as part of the UK. The DUP and other unionists also objected to
what they viewed as a lack of sufficient democratic consent in the development or amendment of what they viewed as a lack of sufficient democratic consent in the development or amendment of
EU rules that would apply in Northern Ireland. In an effort to address such concerns, negotiators EU rules that would apply in Northern Ireland. In an effort to address such concerns, negotiators
included a provision in the revised protocol making its renewal after four years subject to the included a provision in the revised protocol making its renewal after four years subject to the
consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly. consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
In light of the large majority won by then-Prime In light of the large majority won by then-Prime
Minister JohnsonMinister Johnson
’'s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, the s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, the
DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiatedUK Parliament approved the withdrawal withdrawal
agreement in agreement in
the UK ParliamentJanuary 2020. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020.
The Northern Ireland protocol took effect on January 1, 2021 (after the 11-month transition period) . Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020.
The Protocol’s Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit, demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which Catholics now outnumber Protestants) and changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The post-Brexit trade arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol appear to have enhanced the sense of unionist disenfranchisement, partly by raising fears that Northern Ireland would be drawn closer to the Republic of Ireland’s economic orbit and that this could be a precursor to a united Ireland. Brexit also eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments. As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.72
The Northern Ireland protocol took effect on January 1, 2021 and implementation and operational and implementation and operational
challenges soon emerged. The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering challenges soon emerged. The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering
Northern Ireland from Great Britain posed trade and administrative difficulties for some Northern Ireland from Great Britain posed trade and administrative difficulties for some
businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland, despite initial grace periods for full businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland, despite initial grace periods for full
implementation of the new rules for agri-food products, medicines, and other items.implementation of the new rules for agri-food products, medicines, and other items.
7378 Problems Problems
included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for Northern Ireland supermarkets included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for Northern Ireland supermarkets
dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK.74
72 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” Irish Times, January 30, 2020; Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Guardian, April 5, 2021; Pat Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Irish Times, June 11, 2021. 73 Since the protocol took effect, physical checks necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance are being conducted at ports or points of entry on the northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain.
74 See, for example, Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021; “British Supermarkets May Shift Supply Chains to EU if Northern Ireland Trade Not Addressed,” Reuters, July 17, 2021.
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Tensions within Northern Ireland and between the UK and the EU were aggravated further in 2021 by several other issues related to implementation of the protocol. These issues included a dispute in late January 2021 over EU export controls on COVID-19 vaccines that could have impacted Northern Ireland, as well as the UK’s unilateral decisions to extend a number of grace periods that limited regulatory checks on certain goods. The EU subsequently initiated several legal infringement processes against the UK for breaching the terms of the protocol, which ultimately could have led to the UK’s referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, often commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ), potential fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.75
dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK.79
The UK government and the DUP increasingly argued that the protocol was not sustainable, The UK government and the DUP increasingly argued that the protocol was not sustainable,
called for substantial changes to the protocol, and repeatedly threatened to suspend parts of it.called for substantial changes to the protocol, and repeatedly threatened to suspend parts of it.
76 80 Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish government maintained that the protocol was the only Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish government maintained that the protocol was the only
viable option to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. The EU rejected UK and DUP calls viable option to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. The EU rejected UK and DUP calls
to fundamentally renegotiate the protocol and asserted that any measures to resolve to fundamentally renegotiate the protocol and asserted that any measures to resolve
implementation problems must be found implementation problems must be found
“"within the frameworkwithin the framework
”" of the protocol. of the protocol.
77
UK-EU talks81
The UK and EU engaged in discussions to address issues with the protocol to address issues with the protocol
, but talks were contentious and progress was slow. The were contentious and progress was slow. The
role of the EU institutionsrole of the EU institutions
—especially the Court of Justice of the EU—in enforcing EU rules and settling disputes related to the protocol in enforcing EU rules and settling disputes related to the protocol—especially the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, often commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ)—was particularly controversial. UK officials and the DUP was particularly controversial. UK officials and the DUP
contended that such EU oversight infringed on UK sovereigntycontended that such EU oversight infringed on UK sovereignty
, while the EU firmly opposed any changes to the role of the EU institutions, including the CJEU. EU officials also consistently . EU officials also consistently
raised concerns that the UK was not implementing certain aspects of the protocol (including raised concerns that the UK was not implementing certain aspects of the protocol (including
building and properly staffing custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data, and building and properly staffing custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data, and
properly declaring goods entering Northern Ireland).78 In June 2022, with UK-EU discussions largely stalled, the UK government led by then-Prime Minister Johnson introduced legislation to give the government authority to unilaterally disregard parts of the protocol and make changes to its operation. The EU viewed the proposed UK legislation as violating the terms of the protocol and international law, and launched additional infringement proceedings against the UK.79
Shortly after assuming office in late October 2022, new UK Prime Minister Sunak indicated that he would prefer that the UK and EU reach a “negotiated outcome” to the challenges posed by the protocol.80 UK-EU talks on the protocol resumed and gained momentum in late 2022 and early 2023. In January 2023properly declaring goods entering Northern Ireland).82
UK-EU negotiations on the protocol's implementation were largely stalled for most of 2022, but they gained momentum after then-UK Prime Minister Sunak assumed office in October 2022. In one sign of potential progress, the UK and the EU reached a trade data-sharing agreement in January 2023. This data-sharing agreement provided the EU , the UK and the EU reached a trade data-sharing agreement, giving the EU
75 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; Steven Erlanger, “Europe Says Britain Is Violating International Law Over Northern Ireland,” New York Times, March 15, 2021. 76 See, for example, Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, and Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021.
77 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021. 78 Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to Exert Brexit Pressure,” Financial
Times, June 8, 2021; Institute for Government, “Northern Ireland Protocol: Ongoing UK-EU Disagreements,” January 26, 2022.
79 Government of the UK, “Government Introduces Bill to Fix the Northern Ireland Protocol,” press release, June 13, 2022; UK Parliament, Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3182; European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Launches Four New Infringement Procedures Against the UK,” press release, July 22, 2022.
80 “New British PM Rishi Sunak Tells Taoiseach He Wants ‘Negotiated Outcome’ to NI Protocol,” thejournal.ie, October 26, 2022; “Rishi Sunak: Where Does the New PM Stand on the NI Protocol?,” BBC News, October 27, 2022.
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access to UK technology systems and detailed, real-time information on goods entering Northern access to UK technology systems and detailed, real-time information on goods entering Northern
Ireland from Great Britain and those possibly at risk of entering Ireland and the EU market.Ireland from Great Britain and those possibly at risk of entering Ireland and the EU market.
81 83
The 2023 Windsor Framework82
Framework84
On February 27, 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement in principle—the On February 27, 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement in principle—the
Windsor Framework—to address implementation challenges and other concerns with the Windsor Framework—to address implementation challenges and other concerns with the
Northern Ireland protocol. The Windsor Framework includes a command paper from the UK Northern Ireland protocol. The Windsor Framework includes a command paper from the UK
government presenting the solutions agreed to by the UK and the EU and a joint UK-EU political government presenting the solutions agreed to by the UK and the EU and a joint UK-EU political
declaration. Both the UK and the EU stressed that the Windsor Framework sought to provide declaration. Both the UK and the EU stressed that the Windsor Framework sought to provide
solutions to protocol-related issues affecting everyday life for people and businesses in Northern solutions to protocol-related issues affecting everyday life for people and businesses in Northern
Ireland. UK and EU officials officially approved the Windsor Framework in March 2023. Key Ireland. UK and EU officials officially approved the Windsor Framework in March 2023. Key
areas addressed in the Windsor Framework include the following:areas addressed in the Windsor Framework include the following:
• Trade and Customsand Customs. The Windsor Framework The Windsor Framework
establishesestablished a system of a system of
“"green green
and red lanesand red lanes
”" for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Checks for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Checks
and customs paperwork and customs paperwork
arewould be significantly reduced for significantly reduced for
“"green lanegreen lane
”" goods goods
remaining in Northern Ireland but stay in place for remaining in Northern Ireland but stay in place for
“"red lanered lane
”" goods destined for goods destined for
(or at risk of entering) Ireland and the EU market. The UK and the EU also (or at risk of entering) Ireland and the EU market. The UK and the EU also
agreed to simpler rules for certain agri-food products entering Northern Ireland agreed to simpler rules for certain agri-food products entering Northern Ireland
and that UK health and safety standards (rather than EU standards) would apply and that UK health and safety standards (rather than EU standards) would apply
to all retail food and drink intended for end consumption in Northern Ireland to all retail food and drink intended for end consumption in Northern Ireland
(thereby ensuring that Northern Ireland consumers (thereby ensuring that Northern Ireland consumers
cancould still buy certain iconic still buy certain iconic
British products, such as fresh sausages). These new trade rules came into force British products, such as fresh sausages). These new trade rules came into force
in October 2023. An expanded and strengthened UK trusted trader scheme and in October 2023. An expanded and strengthened UK trusted trader scheme and
new data-sharing and labeling arrangements help to oversee the trade and new data-sharing and labeling arrangements help to oversee the trade and
customs provisions and safeguard the EU single market.customs provisions and safeguard the EU single market.
•
EU Rules and Governance. According to According to
the UK governmentUK officials, the Windsor , the Windsor
Framework Framework
removesremoved 1,700 pages of EU law from applying in Northern Ireland 1,700 pages of EU law from applying in Northern Ireland
(including more than 60 EU food and drink rules covering over 1,000 pages) and (including more than 60 EU food and drink rules covering over 1,000 pages) and
thus also thus also
eliminateseliminated the EU Court of Justice the EU Court of Justice
’s “'s "interpretation and oversight in interpretation and oversight in
those areas.those areas.
”" In doing so, the Windsor Framework In doing so, the Windsor Framework
narrowsnarrowed the range of EU laws the range of EU laws
applicable in Northern Ireland to less than 3% overall, which applicable in Northern Ireland to less than 3% overall, which
“"are there solely, are there solely,
and only as strictly necessaryand only as strictly necessary
”" to maintain Northern Ireland to maintain Northern Ireland
’'s access to the EU s access to the EU
single market.single market.
8385 The EU, however, The EU, however,
stressesstressed that the CJEU remains the that the CJEU remains the
“"sole and sole and
ultimate arbiter of EU lawultimate arbiter of EU law
”" and and
has the “would have the "final say on EU law and single market final say on EU law and single market
issues.issues.
”84"86 In other words, In other words,
in the EU's view, the Windsor Framework does not change the role of the the Windsor Framework does not change the role of the
81 Annabelle Dickson et al., “EU and UK Agree ‘Way Forward’ on Post-Brexit Goods Data in Fresh Sign of Progress,” Politico, January 9, 2023.
82 Information in this section is based on the package of documents that comprise the Windsor Framework, released February 27, 2023, and available from the Government of the UK, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework. This section also draws from various news sources and the European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework, a New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” February 27, 2023.
83 See Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 3, 13, and 21, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1138989/The_Windsor_Framework_a_new_way_forward.pdf.
84 See, for example, European Commission, “A New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; and Comments by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during press conference with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, February 27, 2023, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtxuqaFwsk0.
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CJEU in interpreting EU law in disputes over EU rules that continue to apply in CJEU in interpreting EU law in disputes over EU rules that continue to apply in
Northern Ireland. Both the EU and the UK pledged to work together to resolve any future issues before resorting to formal dispute-settlement proceedings.
• The Stormont BrakeNorthern Ireland.
The Stormont Brake and Other Consent Mechanisms. A new mechanism known as the A new mechanism known as the
Stormont brake allows
the UK government—at the request of 30would allow Members of Northern Ireland Members of Northern Ireland
’s Assembly (from at least two parties)—to stop the application of new or amended 's Legislative Assembly to formally object to the automatic application of changes in EU goods rules that may have a EU goods rules that may have a
“"significant impact" on "everyday life" in Northern Ireland. Any request to trigger the brake would need the support of at least 30 MLAs from at least two political parties. The actual decision to trigger the brake would rest with the UK government. As part of the Windsor Framework package, the UK government also asserted that, with some exceptions, it would not agree to adding any new EU law to those that apply in Northern Ireland unless the Assembly indicated cross-community support.87
significant and lasting impact” on “everyday” life in Northern Ireland. UK officials assert that this brake gives the UK the power to “veto” changes to EU goods rules applicable in Northern Ireland.85 The EU emphasizes that the new mechanism would be triggered “under the most exceptional circumstances” and as a “last resort,” in accordance with a detailed process in the Assembly.86 Once the brake is triggered by the UK, the EU rule change cannot be implemented; the UK and EU would engage in dialogue to try to resolve concerns and find a solution. If the EU disagreed with the UK’s decision to trigger the Stormont Brake, the matter would be referred to an independent arbitration panel (rather than the CJEU).
• Taxes and State AidAid. The Windsor Framework The Windsor Framework
allowsallowed certain UK VAT rules to certain UK VAT rules to
apply in Northern Ireland (rather than EU rules)apply in Northern Ireland (rather than EU rules)
, and and
for the UK the UK
mayto diverge from diverge from
EU rules on the structure of excise duties. The framework also EU rules on the structure of excise duties. The framework also
clarifiesclarified the the
circumstances in which EU state aid rules apply in Northern Ireland.circumstances in which EU state aid rules apply in Northern Ireland.
•
Other IssuesIssues. The Windsor Framework The Windsor Framework
easeseased rules in several other areas, rules in several other areas,
including the movement of pets between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and including the movement of pets between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
on all types of parcels from people or businesses in Great Britain to friends, on all types of parcels from people or businesses in Great Britain to friends,
family, and consumers in Northern Ireland. Medicines approved for use by the family, and consumers in Northern Ireland. Medicines approved for use by the
UK’UK's medicines regulator also s medicines regulator also
willwould be available in Northern Ireland at the same be available in Northern Ireland at the same
time and under the same conditions as in the rest of the UK.time and under the same conditions as in the rest of the UK.
As part of the Windsor Framework, the UK government agreed to halt the passage of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill in the UK Parliament and the EU agreed it would no longer proceed with the seven legal infringement challenges pending against the UK in relation to the protocol. Both the UK and the EU Both the UK and the EU
have sought to portray the Windsor Framework as opening a sought to portray the Windsor Framework as opening a
new era of UK-EU relations based on cooperation and dialogue.new era of UK-EU relations based on cooperation and dialogue.
87
The 2024 UK-DUP Deal
Then-DUP leader Donaldson and other DUP officials recognized that the Windsor Framework DUP leader Donaldson and other DUP officials recognized that the Windsor Framework
represented a significant effort to address unionist concerns about the Northern Ireland protocol. represented a significant effort to address unionist concerns about the Northern Ireland protocol.
However, the DUP ultimately found the solutions posed by the Windsor Framework to be However, the DUP ultimately found the solutions posed by the Windsor Framework to be
insufficient and continued to block reestablishing Northern Irelandinsufficient and continued to block reestablishing Northern Ireland
’'s power-sharing institutions. s power-sharing institutions.
DUP critics contended that among other issues with the Windsor Framework, some EU laws DUP critics contended that among other issues with the Windsor Framework, some EU laws
would still apply in Northern Ireland and that the Irish would still apply in Northern Ireland and that the Irish
seaSea border remained. Some in the DUP also wanted more clarity on the operation of the Stormont brake.88 border remained. Some in the DUP
85 Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 5, 7, 23, and 24. 86 The Stormont brake process is set out in a Unilateral Declaration by the UK in Annex 1 of the Draft Decision of the
Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee Laying Down Arrangements Relating to the Windsor Framework, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1139421/Draft_Decision_of_the_Withdrawal_Agreement_Joint_Committee_on_laying_down_arrangements_relating_to_the_Windsor_Framework.pdf.
87 Andy Bounds, “Freedoms Versus Safeguards—The Northern Ireland Deal Viewed from Brussels,” Financial Times, March 2, 2023; Christina Gallardo, “Devil in the Details: 5 Potential Snags in the UK’s Big EU Deal,” Politico, March 5, 2023.
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also wanted more clarity on the operation of the Stormont brake.88 The UK government continued The UK government continued
negotiations with the DUP throughout 2023 to address remaining concerns about the post-Brexit negotiations with the DUP throughout 2023 to address remaining concerns about the post-Brexit
arrangements and restore Northern Irelandarrangements and restore Northern Ireland
’'s devolved government.s devolved government.
On January 30, 2024, the DUPOn January 30, 2024, the DUP
’'s leadership endorsed a package of measures proposed by the UK s leadership endorsed a package of measures proposed by the UK
government and agreed to end the partygovernment and agreed to end the party
’'s boycott of Northern Irelands boycott of Northern Ireland
’'s power-sharing s power-sharing
institutions. The next day, the UK government published details of the deal in a command paper, institutions. The next day, the UK government published details of the deal in a command paper,
Safeguarding the Union, along with draft legislation to implement parts of the proposed measures , along with draft legislation to implement parts of the proposed measures
(two pieces of legislation were subsequently debated and approved by the UK parliament).(two pieces of legislation were subsequently debated and approved by the UK parliament).
8989 UK UK
officials reportedly officials reportedly
have sought to portray the changes outlined in sought to portray the changes outlined in
Safeguarding the Union as as
“significant”"significant" but also stressed that they but also stressed that they
dowould not alter the not alter the
“fundamentals”"fundamentals" of the Windsor of the Windsor
Framework as agreed with the EU.Framework as agreed with the EU.
9090 Some analysts Some analysts
assessassessed that the changes to the post-Brexit that the changes to the post-Brexit
trading rules for Northern Ireland in the UK-DUP deal trading rules for Northern Ireland in the UK-DUP deal
arewere relatively minimal and they relatively minimal and they
characterizecharacterized Safeguarding the Union as designed largely to reassure unionists of Northern as designed largely to reassure unionists of Northern
Ireland’Ireland's place in the UK.s place in the UK.
9191 Key measures in Key measures in
Safeguarding the Union includeincluded the following: the following:
• Facilitating Trade and Protecting the UK’s Internal MarketFacilitating Trade and Protecting the UK's Internal Market. Checks and . Checks and
paperwork on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland paperwork on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland
willwould be be
reduced. The Windsor Frameworkreduced. The Windsor Framework
’s “'s "green lanegreen lane
”" (for goods remaining in (for goods remaining in
Northern Ireland) Northern Ireland)
is towould be replaced with an be replaced with an
“"internal UK market systeminternal UK market system
”" for for
goods remaining within the UK, and there goods remaining within the UK, and there
willwould be no routine checks except for be no routine checks except for
those conducted as part of a risk-based approach to tackle criminality, smuggling, those conducted as part of a risk-based approach to tackle criminality, smuggling,
or disease. To use the new internal UK market system, businesses or disease. To use the new internal UK market system, businesses
willwould still be still be
required to join a UK trusted trader scheme. The Windsor Frameworkrequired to join a UK trusted trader scheme. The Windsor Framework
’s “'s "red lane" wouldred lane” will remain (for goods destined for or at risk of entering Ireland and the EU remain (for goods destined for or at risk of entering Ireland and the EU
market), although the UK government market), although the UK government
assessesassessed that more than 80% of goods that more than 80% of goods
moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland
willwould take place under the UK take place under the UK
internal market system. internal market system.
Then-DUP leader Donaldson DUP leader Donaldson
assertsasserted that these and other that these and other
provisions effectively provisions effectively
“"[remove] the border in the UK[remove] the border in the UK
’'s internal market.s internal market.
”92"92 The The
command paper also command paper also
includesincluded measures to reinforce measures to reinforce
“"unfettered accessunfettered access
”" for for
Northern Ireland goods and businesses to the UK internal market.Northern Ireland goods and businesses to the UK internal market.
•
Reaffirming Northern Ireland’s Place within's Place Within the UK. Legislation introduced Legislation introduced
with the command paper (and subsequently approved by the UK Parliament) with the command paper (and subsequently approved by the UK Parliament)
seekssought to make explicit that the Windsor Framework does not prejudice Northern to make explicit that the Windsor Framework does not prejudice Northern
Ireland’Ireland's constitutional status within the UK or the regions constitutional status within the UK or the region
’'s status as part of the s status as part of the
UK economy (including the UKUK economy (including the UK
’'s customs territory and internal market). In addition, the UK government s customs territory and internal market). In
88 Shawn Pogatchnik, “DUP Won’t Be Pushed into Accepting UK-EU Deal on Northern Ireland—But Sees an Attractive Veto,” Politico, February 27, 2023; Enda McClafferty, “Brexit Deal: Both Yes and No Carry Risks for DUP,” BBC News, February 28, 2023. 89 Government of the UK, Safeguarding the Union, released January 31, 2024, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ba3b7bee7d490013984a59/Command_Paper__1_.pdf. Also see, David Torrance, Northern Ireland Devolution: Safeguarding the Union, UK House of Commons Library, March 4, 2024.
90 As quoted in, “DUP Says Stormont Deal Has Delivered ‘Fundamental Change’ to UK-EU Trading Rules,” BreakingNews.ie, January 31, 2024.
91 John Campbell, “DUP Deal: Government Command Paper Bids to Reassure Unionists,” BBC News, February1, 2024; Peter Foster, “Four Years on and Brexit Still Isn’t Done,” Financial Times, February 1, 2024; Joël Reland, “The Northern Ireland Deal Offers Meaningful Change—If Westminster Keeps Its Word,” UK in a Changing Europe, February 2, 2024.
92 As quoted in, John Campbell, “DUP Deal Aimed at Restoring Power Sharing in Northern Ireland Is Published,” BBC News, January 31, 2024.
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addition, the UK government has committed to screening future UK legislation committed to screening future UK legislation
for for
“"significant adverse implications for Northern Irelandsignificant adverse implications for Northern Ireland
’'s place in the UK s place in the UK
internal market.internal market.
”" The command paper also The command paper also
setsset out several measures or proposals out several measures or proposals
to strengthen ties between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, including through to strengthen ties between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, including through
establishing a new East-West Council (to deepen connections between Northern establishing a new East-West Council (to deepen connections between Northern
Ireland and the rest of the UK in areas such as trade, transport, education, and Ireland and the rest of the UK in areas such as trade, transport, education, and
culture) and a new Intertrade UK body (to focus on promoting trade in both culture) and a new Intertrade UK body (to focus on promoting trade in both
directions between Northern Ireland and Great Britain).directions between Northern Ireland and Great Britain).
• Clarifying
Clarifying Operational Arrangements for the Stormont Brake. The UK The UK
government hasgovernment pledged to ensure that Members of the Northern Ireland pledged to ensure that Members of the Northern Ireland
Assembly have the information needed to make Assembly have the information needed to make
“"full usefull use
”" of the brake by of the brake by
publishing operational guidance. The UK government also committed to give publishing operational guidance. The UK government also committed to give
Assembly members early warning and notice of Assembly members early warning and notice of
new or amendedchanges to EU legislation EU legislation
that could affect Northern Ireland and be subject to the brake.that could affect Northern Ireland and be subject to the brake.
93
93Some in the DUP Some in the DUP
continuecontinued to find the measures in to find the measures in
Safeguarding the Union to be insufficient and to be insufficient and
opposed the partyopposed the party
’'s decision to agree to reestablish Northern Irelands decision to agree to reestablish Northern Ireland
’'s devolved government. s devolved government.
Those of this view argued that the changes in the UK command paper were largely cosmetic and Those of this view argued that the changes in the UK command paper were largely cosmetic and
that the Irish Sea border would still exist.that the Irish Sea border would still exist.
94 DUP leader Donaldson pledged to continue working to deliver “further change” as needed in the future.9594 Some nationalists Some nationalists
also raised concerns that raised concerns that
some elements in the UK command paper could undermine north-south cooperation (between some elements in the UK command paper could undermine north-south cooperation (between
Northern Ireland and Ireland) and the spirit of the Good Friday Agreement.96
The EU announced it would “analyze” the package of measures in Safeguarding the Union but Irish officials responded positively and press reports indicate that the operational changes to the Windsor Framework would be acceptable to the EU.97 Some experts assess that managing and overseeing implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland will continue to require careful attention and oversight by officials and authorities in the UK, EU, and Northern Ireland. A vote on maintaining Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit arrangements is expected to be held in the Northern Ireland Assembly in December 2024.98
93 For more information on the January 2024 UK-DUP deal and the measures outlined in the Safeguarding the Union command paper, also see Peter Foster and Jude Webber, “What Is in the New Northern Ireland Deal and How Will It Work?,” Financial Times, January 31, 2024; John Campbell, “DUP Deal: What Exactly Is in the Safeguarding the Union Paper?,” BBC News, January 31, 2024; John Curtis, Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework: New
Devolution Deal, UK House of Commons Library, February 1, 2024; Jill Rutter and Matthew Fright, “Government Deal with the DUP to Restore Power Sharing in Northern Ireland,” Institute for Government, February 1, 2024. 94 See, for example, David Lynch and Nick Lester, “DUP Split over Stormont Deal as Nigel Dodds Says Sea Border Concerns Remain,” BreakingNews.ie., February 1, 2024; Adrian Rutherford, “Three Top DUP Figures Say There Is ‘No Dispute’ That Irish Sea Border Remains,” Belfast Telegraph, February 10, 2024. 95 As quoted in Jonathan McCambridge, “DUP Is Not Split and Support for New Deal Is Absolutely Decisive—Donaldson,” Independent.co.uk, January 31, 2024. 96 See, for example, Freya McClements, “UK Government ‘Undermining’ Belfast Agreement with Pro-unionist Stance, SDLP Leader Says,” Irish Times, February 12, 2024. 97 European Commission, “Joint Statement Following Today’s Call Between Executive Vice-President Sefcovic and UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron,” press release, January 31, 2024; John Campbell, “Deal Aimed at Restoring Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Is Published,” BBC News, January 31, 2024; Rory Carroll and Eleni Courea, “Northern Ireland: What Does the New Post-Brexit Deal Mean?,” Guardian, January 31, 2024. 98 Anton Spisak, “A New Equilibrium in Northern Ireland: Can It Last?,” Centre for European Reform, March 1, 2024.
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Economic Concerns
Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’Northern Ireland and Ireland) and the spirit of the Good Friday Agreement.95
In December 2024, in accordance with the terms agreed in the Northern Ireland protocol/Windsor Framework, the Northern Ireland Assembly held a vote on whether to maintain the region's post-Brexit arrangements. MLAs approved continuing the arrangements by a majority vote of 48 to 36. Sinn Fein, Alliance, and SDLP MLAs voted in favor; DUP, UUP, and other unionist MLAs voted against. Given the lack of cross-community support, the post-Brexit arrangements were approved to continue for another four years (if maintaining the arrangements had received cross-community support, they would have been extended for eight years).96
Economic Concerns
Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit's possible s possible
economic consequences for Northern Ireland. Studies indicate that Northern Ireland depends economic consequences for Northern Ireland. Studies indicate that Northern Ireland depends
more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the
UK.99 In 2022UK.97 In 2023, approximately , approximately
6870% of Northern Ireland% of Northern Ireland
’'s exports went to the EU, including about s exports went to the EU, including about
4854% to Ireland, which % to Ireland, which
wasremains Northern Ireland Northern Ireland
’'s top single export and import partner.s top single export and import partner.
100
Maintaining98
Many officials and analysts in Northern Ireland and Ireland viewed maintaining an open border after Brexit an open border after Brexit
was viewed as importantas crucial to protecting the island to protecting the island
’'s cross-s cross-
border economyborder economy
and, as well as labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis. Many labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis. Many
manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north and manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north and
south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and
alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for
processing and packaging.processing and packaging.
10199 The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro
and small businesses, which dominate Northern Irelandand small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland
’'s economy.s economy.
102
100
UK and DUP leaders UK and DUP leaders
assertedassert that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to
Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In
20222023, sales to other parts of the UK , sales to other parts of the UK
(£15.8(£17.1 billion) were billion) were
more thanalmost double the value of exports to Ireland (£ double the value of exports to Ireland (£
6.48.7 billion) and nearly six billion) and nearly six
times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.
76 billion). billion).
103 The DUP consistently argued that the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol would be detrimental to the region’s economy and101 The DUP objected in part to the post-Brexit arrangements because of concerns that they could negatively impact Northern Ireland's economic ties to the UK; DUP officials also argued that the new rules and administrative burdens would increase costs for that the new rules and administrative burdens would increase costs for
Northern Ireland businesses and consumers.102
businesses and consumers. Such economic concerns were a key reason that the DUP and other unionists pushed for changes to the protocol.104
Supporters of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland Supporters of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland
arguemaintain that they offer the region that they offer the region
unique economic opportunities. unique economic opportunities.
Following the agreement on the Windsor Framework in 2023, then-Prime Minister Sunak touted the potential economic benefits of Prime Minister Sunak touted the potential economic benefits of
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s privileged access to both the UK internal market and the EU single markets privileged access to both the UK internal market and the EU single market
, especially following agreement on the Windsor Framework in 2023.105.103 As part of the UK customs As part of the UK customs
union, Northern Ireland also union, Northern Ireland also
will beis able to participate in future UK trade deals. able to participate in future UK trade deals.
Experts suggest Some officials and experts suggested the post-Brexit arrangements may help make Northern Ireland a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment.104
In a November 2024 poll by Queen's University Belfast, 48the post-Brexit arrangements may help increase the competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland business leaders have reported broad satisfaction with the post-Brexit arrangements and noted that they have a number of benefits, including keeping cross-border trade open.106 In a February 2024 poll by Queen’s University Belfast, 56% of respondents viewed the Northern
99 Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016; Lisa O’Carroll, “Pro-Brexit UK Regions More Dependent on EU for Exports, Study Finds,” Guardian, July 17, 2022. 100 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics 2022, December 13, 2023, at https://datavis.nisra.gov.uk/economy-and-labour-market/northern-ireland-economic-trade-statistics-2022.html.
101 Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019.
102 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, April 4, 2023, at https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/Overview-of-NI-Trade-April-2023.pdf.
103 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics 2022, December 13, 2023.
104 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019; Democratic Unionist Party, Remove the Protocol, at https://mydup.com/policies/remove-ni-protocol.
105 See, for example, Andrew McDonald, “Sunak Gives EU Windsor Framework the Hard Sell in Belfast,” Politico, February 28, 2023.
106 Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” Politico, July 9, 2021.
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Ireland protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive impact on Northern Ireland’s economy and 68% regarded these post-Brexit arrangements as potentially beneficial.107
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’% of respondents viewed the Northern Ireland protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive impact on Northern Ireland's economy and 63% regarded the post-Brexit arrangements as potentially beneficial.105 In early March 2025, Northern Ireland Secretary of State Benn reportedly stated that most goods were "flowing relatively smoothly" between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.106 Some DUP officials and Northern Ireland retailers continue to report implementation problems with the post-Brexit trading rules, including for small businesses. Critics of Northern Ireland's post-Brexit arrangements also note reports that the region's dual access to both the UK and EU markets has not yet yielded new foreign direct investment in Northern Ireland.107
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland's constitutional status. Sinn Fein has argued s constitutional status. Sinn Fein has argued
that that
“"Brexit changes everythingBrexit changes everything
”" and could generate greater support for a united Ireland. and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.
108108 Since Since
the 2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a the 2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a
border poll (a referendum on (a referendum on
whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the
hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday
Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll, in line with the consent principle. Any Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll, in line with the consent principle. Any
decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the UK decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the UK
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who must call one if it Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who must call one if it
“"appears likelyappears likely
”" that that
“"a majority of a majority of
those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United
Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.
”109
"109
At present, At present,
most opinion polls indicate that opinion polls indicate that
a majority ofmore people in Northern Ireland continue to people in Northern Ireland continue to
support the regionsupport the region
’'s position as part of the UK. A February 2024 poll s position as part of the UK. A December 2023 survey published in the Irish
Times found that 51% of those polled support Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK versus 30% in support of a united Ireland.110 Another poll from February 2024 found 54% in favor of found 54% in favor of
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s continued position within the UK compared with 39% for a united Ireland.s continued position within the UK compared with 39% for a united Ireland.
111 As such, the current UK government is not expected to call a border poll on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. In the January 2024 command paper Safeguarding the Union, the UK government asserted that based on recent polling, the UK government “sees no realistic prospect of a border poll leading to a united Ireland” and, following the restoration of the devolved government, “Northern Ireland’s future in the UK will be secure for decades to come and as such the conditions for a border poll are unlikely to be objectively met.”112
Several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and influence whether a border poll is called in the medium to longer term. As seen by Northern Ireland’110 A poll conducted by the Irish Times in the second half of 2024 found that 48% of those polled supported Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK versus 34% in favor of a united Ireland (with 14% undecided). In comparison to previous Irish Times polling in 2022 and 2023, the 2024 results indicated a slight decrease in support for Northern Ireland's continued position within the UK and a small uptick in support for a united Ireland.111
Several factors could influence whether momentum builds for a border poll in the medium to longer term. As seen by Northern Ireland's 2021 census results, s 2021 census results,
demographics are shifting in Northern Ireland, with those of a Catholic background now demographics are shifting in Northern Ireland, with those of a Catholic background now
outnumbering those of a Protestant background. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern outnumbering those of a Protestant background. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern
Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with Ireland and greater economic integration (data indicate a significant increase in cross-border trade since 2021).113 Sinn Fein’s success in
107 David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward, Testing the Temperature 10: What Do Voters in Northern Ireland Think
About the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, the Windsor Framework, and the ‘Safeguarding the Union’ Deal?, Queen’s University Belfast, February 2024. 108 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016. 109 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998. 110 In December 2023, the Irish Times published the results of polls in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland examining public attitudes on Irish unification. For an overview of the results, see Pat Leahy et al., “North and South: What We Know Now, and What We Want to Investigate in Future,” Irish Times, January 27, 2024. The survey data is available from the Royal Irish Academy, at https://www.ria.ie/news/arins-analysis-and-research-ireland-north-and-south/north-and-south-surveys-data-now-published.
111 Suzanne Breen, “More People in NI Would Vote to Stay Part of UK If Border Poll Was Called,” Belfast Telegraph, February 18, 2024.
112 Government of the UK, Safeguarding the Union, released January 31, 2024, Annex B, p. 68, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ba3b7bee7d490013984a59/Command_Paper__1_.pdf.
113 Shawn Pogatchnik, “All-Ireland Trade Booming in Post-Brexit Economy,” Politico, February 15, 2022; Morwenna Coniam, “Irish Trade with Britain, Northern Ireland Climbs Despite Brexit,” Bloomberg.com, August 15, 2022; Ireland Central Statistics Office, “Record Levels of Exports and Imports in 2022,” February 15, 2023; Ryan McAleer, “Trade in 2023: The Year When the Protocol Became the Windsor Framework,” Irish News, December 27, 2023.
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Northern Ireland’s May 2022 Assembly election and May 2023 local council elections,Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with Ireland and greater economic integration (reports indicate increased cross-border trade since 2021).112 Despite a decrease in vote share for Sinn Fein in elections in Ireland in 2024, Sinn Fein's electoral successes in Northern Ireland and key party key party
leader Michelle O’Neill’s new role as First Minister, and the party’s growing popularity and electoral gains in Ireland also could increase momentum for a border poll.114
leader Michelle O'Neill's role as First Minister could keep political attention focused on the question of a possible border poll.113
Societal attitudes in Northern Ireland are changing as well, especially among young people, who Societal attitudes in Northern Ireland are changing as well, especially among young people, who
may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities. Analysts suggest that non-may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities. Analysts suggest that non-
aligned voters who do not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in aligned voters who do not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in
any future border poll and that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish any future border poll and that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish
unification more by its implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions unification more by its implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions
than by identity politics.than by identity politics.
115114 The aforementioned The aforementioned
December 2023 poll indicatesIrish Times poll conducted in 2024 found that roughly that roughly
21% 18% of respondents in Northern Ireland from a Catholic background were opposed to Irish unificationof respondents in Northern Ireland from a Catholic background were opposed to Irish unification
, as were 44% of those identifying as neither Catholic nor Protestant.116
and 16% were undecided.115
Irish unification also would be subject to IrelandIrish unification also would be subject to Ireland
’'s consent and approval. Opinion polls in Ireland s consent and approval. Opinion polls in Ireland
consistently show a relatively high level of support for unification (typically over 60%).consistently show a relatively high level of support for unification (typically over 60%).
117 The 116 In 2021, the Irish government Irish government
has launched a launched a
“"Shared IslandShared Island
”" initiative to promote cross-border initiative to promote cross-border
dialoguecooperation, dialogue, and and
research on common challenges. research on common challenges.
The Irish government maintainsIrish officials have asserted that voters, both north and that voters, both north and
south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would
be accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.be accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.
118
117
Some concerns exist in Ireland about unification, including the possibility that it could spark Some concerns exist in Ireland about unification, including the possibility that it could spark
renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland and its potential economic costs. The UK provides renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland and its potential economic costs. The UK provides
Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about $13 billion) budget subsidy to make Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about $13 billion) budget subsidy to make
up the shortfall in the regionup the shortfall in the region
’'s tax revenues. Although part of this subsidy helps to fund Northern s tax revenues. Although part of this subsidy helps to fund Northern
Ireland’Ireland's share of the UKs share of the UK
’'s national debt and s national debt and
sizeable defense spending—costs that would not be defense spending—costs that would not be
incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Irelandincurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland
’'s budget deficit points to concerns about s budget deficit points to concerns about
the regionthe region
’'s economy and reliance on the public sector. s economy and reliance on the public sector.
An AprilIn a 2021 poll 2021 poll
found that, 67% of 67% of
people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54% reported they would be unwilling people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54% reported they would be unwilling
to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.
119 In the118 In a December 2023 December 2023
Irish Times poll conducted poll conducted
in Ireland, 52% of respondents believed that Irish unity would be costly in the short termin Ireland, 52% of respondents believed that Irish unity would be costly in the short term
but , even if beneficial in the long term.119
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
beneficial in the long term.120
114 See, for example, Megan Specia, “Northern Ireland Has a Sinn Fein Leader. It’s a Landmark Moment,” New York
Times, February 3, 2024.
115 See, for example, Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Financial
Times, April 6, 2021; Rory Carroll, “It’s Closer Now Than It’s Ever Been: Could There Soon Be a United Ireland?,” Guardian, October 6, 2022; Megan Stack, “Is Ireland Headed for a Merger?,” New York Times, November 21, 2023.
116 See footnote 110.
117 In the December 2023 Irish Times poll, for example, 64% of respondents in Ireland supported unification while 16% were opposed. See footnote 110.
118 “Leo Varadkar Says Border Poll Not Appropriate at This Time,” BBC News, July 3, 2022; Jude Webber, “Ireland’s Reunification Talk Grows Louder,” Financial Times, October 9, 2022. 119 Fionnan Sheahan, “Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay for It,” Irish Independent, May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a United Ireland?,” Irish Times, May 7, 2021.
120 John Garry et al., “Northern Protestants Pessimistic on Benefits of Irish Unity,” Irish Times, December 5, 2023.
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U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework
for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping
the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full
implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRAimplementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA
’'s armed campaign in 2005 and the s armed campaign in 2005 and the
restoration of the devolved government in 2007.restoration of the devolved government in 2007.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In
October 2009, then-U.S. 2009, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged
Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
’'s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In
February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. The Obama February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. The Obama
Administration also welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and Administration also welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and
the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Like its predecessors, the
first Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Ireland. In Ireland. In
November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson asserted that the United States 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson asserted that the United States
remained remained
“"ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement
and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.
”121"120 In March 2020, President Trump appointed In March 2020, President Trump appointed
his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S.
special envoySpecial Envoy to Northern Ireland. to Northern Ireland.
122
President BidenPresident Biden
has close ties to Ireland and is, a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
peace processpeace process
. President Biden has, repeatedly asserted a strong and enduring U.S. commitment to repeatedly asserted a strong and enduring U.S. commitment to
the Good Friday Agreement.the Good Friday Agreement.
123121 Following the May 2022 Assembly election, the U.S. State Following the May 2022 Assembly election, the U.S. State
Department called on Northern Ireland political leaders to work together to reestablish a Department called on Northern Ireland political leaders to work together to reestablish a
functioning power-sharing government and functioning power-sharing government and
assertedstated that the United States that the United States
“"remains deeply remains deeply
committed to preserving the peace dividend of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and will committed to preserving the peace dividend of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and will
always strive to protect these gains for all communities.always strive to protect these gains for all communities.
”124"122 President Biden visited Northern President Biden visited Northern
Ireland in April 2023 to mark the peace accordIreland in April 2023 to mark the peace accord
’s 25th anniversary.125's 25th anniversary.123 In February 2024, the Biden In February 2024, the Biden
Administration welcomed the restoration of Northern IrelandAdministration welcomed the restoration of Northern Ireland
’'s devolved government.s devolved government.
126
124
Many Members of Congress have Many Members of Congress have
actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
decades. In the decades. In the
118th118th Congress, for example, the Senate agreed Congress, for example, the Senate agreed
to S.Res. 157 (by unanimous consent S.Res. 157 (by unanimous consent
in May 2023) reiterating support for the Good Friday Agreement and commemorating its in May 2023) reiterating support for the Good Friday Agreement and commemorating its
25th 25th anniversary. Over the years, congressional hearings and resolutions have addressed various anniversary. Over the years, congressional hearings and resolutions have addressed various
aspects of implementing the Good Friday Agreement. A aspects of implementing the Good Friday Agreement. A
2022 hearing in hearing in
July 2022 centered onthe 117th Congress centered on the role of young young
people in Northern Ireland and their role in maintaining peace and shaping Northern Ireland’s
121 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,” November 1, 2017.
122 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021. 123 See, for example, the White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Virtual Bilateral Meeting,” March 17, 2022; and the White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar of Ireland,” March 17, 2023.
124 U.S. Department of State, “Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Results,” press release, May 7, 2022. 125 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden Marking the 25th Anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,” April 12, 2023. 126 The White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Restoration of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly,” press release, February 3, 2024.
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future.127 Some Members of Congress also have a long-standing interest in policing issues and human rights in Northern Ireland, and the status of Troubles-related investigations and incidents of suspected collusion between state security agencies and paramilitary groups (including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 killing of Raymond McCord Jr.).
Two hearings in 2022 discussed the continued need for accountability and justice for victims of the Troubles, sparked in part by congressional concerns about the UK government’s plans to establish a conditional immunity scheme and end most Troubles-era investigations and prosecutions.128 In March 2022, the House passed H.Res. 888 (117th Congress) commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings; the resolution called for justice for the victims and their families, and noted opposition to “any proposal” by the UK government to “implement amnesty or statute of limitation laws that would end or inhibit investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the Troubles, including on Bloody Sunday.” In January 2023, 27 Members of Congress sent a letter to UK Prime Minister Sunak expressing “grave concern” that the proposed legacy legislation “denies justice, suppresses the will of the people of Northern Ireland, and conceals the truth of the past.”129 A subsequent August 2023 letter from 16 Members of Congress to Prime Minister Sunak and other UK officials expressed similar concerns ahead of the enactment of the legacy legislation in September 2023.130
In the 117th Congress, some Members urged President Biden to appoint a new special envoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process, especially in light of heightened Brexit-related tensions and the stalemate in reestablishing Northern Ireland’s devolved government.131 In December 2022, the U.S. State Department announced the appointment of former Representative Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic Affairs.132 The United States has long been a key trading partner and an important source of investment for Northern Ireland.133 The U.S. Special Envoy position is to focus on supporting economic development and growth in Northern Ireland—including through attracting more U.S. investment to Northern Ireland—and strengthening people-to-people ties. In October 2023, Special Envoy Kennedy led a U.S. business delegation to Northern Ireland in an effort to
127 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The Role of
Young People in Fostering Peace in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022.
128 Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland: Accountability at Risk, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2022; and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, Truth
and Accountability for Victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 2022.
129 The January 2023 letter is available at https://boyle.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/boyle.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/boyle-et-al-letter-to-pm-sunak.pdf.
130 Ray O’Hanlon, “Congress Members Protest British Legacy Bill,” Irish Echo, August 13, 2023. 131 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Irish Times, May 13, 2021; Kerry O’Shea, “Congressional Group Reiterates U.S. Commitment to Northern Ireland,” IrishCentral.com, August 5, 2022. 132 U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic Affairs,” press statement, December 19, 2022. 133 According to UK government statistics, the United States accounted for 11.4% of Northern Ireland’s exports and 6.7% of its imports in 2022. Officials in Northern Ireland regard the United States as the region’s “largest source of high-value, technology rich” foreign direct investment and according to U.S. officials, Northern Ireland has attracted nearly $2 billion in U.S. investment over the past decade; over 230 U.S. businesses operate in and employ more than 30,000 people in Northern Ireland. See Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, UK Regions Imports and
Exports of Goods by Country and World Region, at https://uktradeingoodsmap.nisra.gov.uk; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, “US and NI Investment Stronger Than Ever,” June 23, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “Special Online Briefing with Joseph Kennedy III,” April 27, 2023.
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encourage investment opportunities in light of Northern Ireland’s unique access post-Brexit to both the UK and EU markets.134
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland
President Biden and other Administration officials have repeatedly stressed that Brexit must not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process or jeopardize the open border on the island of Ireland. The Biden Administration has expressed concerns about Brexit-related tensions in Northern Ireland and conveyed support for the Northern Ireland protocol as “a way to manage the practical challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island of Ireland.135 President Biden and other Administration officials consistently urged the UK to reach a negotiated solution with the EU to resolve the challenges in implementing the protocol’s post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.136 President Biden welcomed the February 2023 announcement that the UK and the EU had concluded the Windsor Framework to address challenges posed by the protocol, asserting that the new framework was “an essential step to ensuring that the hard-earned peace and progress of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is preserved and strengthened.”137
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for Northern Ireland. A hearing in October 2019 focused on maintaining peace and stability in Northern Ireland in light of Brexit; many Members expressed support for ensuring an open border on the island of Ireland post-Brexit.138 Like the Biden Administration, some Members have welcomed the Windsor Framework as a way to resolve difficulties with the Northern Ireland protocol, protect the gains of the peace process, and facilitate the return of Northern Ireland’s devolved government.139 S.Res. 157 (agreed in the 118th Congress, noted previously) also expressed support for the Windsor Framework and urged that it be implemented “in good faith ... to ensure trade continues to flow smoothly within the United Kingdom and maintain an open border on the island of Ireland, while protecting the European Union’s single market.”
Amid heightened tensions in Northern Ireland in recent years, some in Congress tied their support for a possible future U.S.-UK free trade agreement to protecting the peace process (negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden Administration has not resumed these talks to date). Both H.Res. 585 (116th Congress, passed in December 2019) and S.Res. 117 (117th Congress, passed in May 2021) reaffirmed support for the Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit and asserted that any future U.S.-UK trade or other bilateral agreements must consider Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland. S.Res. 134 (117th Congress, passed in May 2022) expressed support for concluding U.S. trade agreements
134 Amanda Ferguson, “U.S. Business Delegation Probes Post-Brexit Opportunities in Northern Ireland,” Reuters, October 26, 2023.
135 The White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
136 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom,” press release, October 25, 2022. 137 The White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023. 138 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, Protecting the
Good Friday Agreement from Brexit, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019.
139 See, for example, Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Statement on Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; Ray O’Hanlon, “Biden, Reps. Welcome Framework Deal,” Irish Echo, March 1, 2023.
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with both the UK and the EU; it noted that doing so should be “contingent” upon a UK-EU agreement that “fully protects and preserves the Good Friday Agreement.”140
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States has contributed more than $549 million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.141
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities, and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process.
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have encouraged the IFI to place greater focus on reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the same time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as largely wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way.
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years).
Since FY2011, successive Administrations have allocated funds from Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year to the IFI from ESF funding between FY2011 and FY2014, $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million for FY2020, $2.5 million for FY2021, and $3 million for FY2022.
140 Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, U.S.-UK Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. 141 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland.
Congressional Research Service
32
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Author Information
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R46259 · VERSION 12 · UPDATED
33 people in maintaining peace in Northern Ireland.125
Some Members of Congress also have a long-standing interest in policing issues and human rights in Northern Ireland. In March 2022, the House passed H.Res. 888 (117th Congress) commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings and calling for justice for the victims and their families. Two hearings in 2022 discussed accountability and justice for victims of the Troubles, sparked in part by congressional concerns about the UK government's plans to establish a conditional immunity scheme and end most Troubles-era investigations and prosecutions.126 In 2023, some Members of Congress sent letters to the UK government expressing concerns about the UK legacy legislation.127 In July 2024, 25 Members sent a letter to new UK Prime Minister Starmer urging his government to swiftly repeal and replace the Legacy Act.128 Some Members continue to follow the status of Troubles-related investigations and incidents of suspected collusion between state security agencies and paramilitary groups, including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane. In November 2024, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing on the status of the Finucane case and UK government plans to hold a public inquiry.129
In the 117th Congress, some Members urged President Biden to appoint a new special envoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process in light of heightened Brexit-related tensions and the stalemate in reestablishing Northern Ireland's devolved government.130 In December 2022, the U.S. State Department announced the appointment of former Representative Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic Affairs. The United States has long been a key trading partner and an important source of investment for Northern Ireland.131 The Biden Administration tasked the Special Envoy to focus on supporting economic development and growth in Northern Ireland—including through attracting more U.S. investment to Northern Ireland—and strengthening people-to-people ties.132
Views on Brexit's Implications for Northern Ireland
President Biden and other Administration officials repeatedly stressed the view that Brexit must not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process or jeopardize the open border on the island of Ireland. President Biden and other Administration officials urged the UK to reach a negotiated solution with the EU to resolve the challenges in implementing the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.133 President Biden welcomed the February 2023 announcement that the UK and the EU had concluded the Windsor Framework, asserting that the new framework was "an essential step to ensuring that the hard-earned peace and progress of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is preserved and strengthened."134
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit's implications for Northern Ireland. A 2019 hearing in the 116th Congress focused on maintaining peace and stability in Northern Ireland in light of Brexit; many Members expressed support for ensuring an open border on the island of Ireland post-Brexit.135 Some Members also welcomed the Windsor Framework as a way to resolve difficulties with the Northern Ireland protocol, protect the gains of the peace process, and facilitate the return of Northern Ireland's devolved government.136 S.Res. 157 (agreed in the 118th Congress, noted previously) also expressed support for the Windsor Framework.
Amid heightened tensions in Northern Ireland in recent years, some in Congress tied their support for a possible future U.S.-UK free trade agreement to protecting the peace process (negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement began during the Trump Administration, but did not proceed during the Biden Administration). Both H.Res. 585 (116th Congress, passed in December 2019) and S.Res. 117 (117th Congress, passed in May 2021) reaffirmed support for the Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit and asserted that any future U.S.-UK trade or other bilateral agreements must consider Brexit's impact on Northern Ireland. S.Res. 134 (117th Congress, passed in May 2022) expressed support for concluding U.S. trade agreements with both the UK and the EU; it noted that doing so should be "contingent" upon a UK-EU agreement that "fully protects and preserves the Good Friday Agreement."137
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. According to the U.S. State Department, as of 2022, the United States had contributed more than $549 million to the IFI since its establishment.138 The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.139
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities, and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
Successive U.S. Administrations and some Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Many observers have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process. Some U.S. officials and Members of Congress also encouraged the IFI to place greater focus on reconciliation activities and welcomed its 2006 decision to do so. At times, critics have questioned the IFI's effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as largely wasteful or as potentially reinforcing sectarianism by requiring project recipients and attendees to identify their religion or community background in an attempt to ensure cross-community participation.140
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern Ireland's improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years).
Starting in FY2011, successive Administrations allocated funds from Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year in ESF to the IFI between FY2011 and FY2014; $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019; $2 million for FY2020; $2.5 million for FY2021; $3 million for FY2022; and $4 million for FY2023. With the Trump Administration's decision to pause and review foreign assistance in January 2025 and reported subsequent cancellation of assistance awards, it is unclear what funds, if any, might be allocated for the IFI in the future.
Footnotes
1.
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In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland, with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the remaining one-sixth of the island.
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2.
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Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as Ulster. Technically and historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
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3.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency Census 2021, "Main Statistics for Northern Ireland: Religion," Statistical Bulletin, September 22, 2022, at https://www.nisra.gov.uk/system/files/statistics/census-2021-main-statistics-for-northern-ireland-phase-1-statistical-bulletin-religion.pdf.
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4.
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The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized in the United States.
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5.
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"IRA Statement in Full," BBC News, July 25, 2005.
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6.
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Mark Davenport, "IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?," BBC News, September 26, 2005.
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7.
|
See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
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8.
|
Police Service of Northern Ireland, see Strength of Police Service Statistics and Workforce Composition Statistics, both updated regularly, available at https://www.psni.police.uk/about-us/our-publications-and-reports/our-publication-scheme/who-we-are-and-what-we-do.
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9.
|
Julian O'Neill, "PSNI Numbers at Watershed Moment—Chief Constable," BBC News, September 17, 2024; Rebecca Black, "NI Chief Constable Concerned over Lack of Catholics Applying to Join Police," Independent, February 11, 2025.
|
10.
|
The UK is a party to the ECHR as a member of the Council of Europe, a leading European human rights body that the UK helped found in 1949. The Council of Europe is an entirely separate organization from the EU.
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11.
|
The Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Act 2022 received royal assent in December 2022.
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12.
|
Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush's special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003.
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13.
|
For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/haass-report-proposed-agreement.
|
14.
|
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement.
|
15.
|
The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, "News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland," November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland.
|
16.
|
Northern Ireland's devolved government was restored in 2020 following a power-sharing deal that addressed a number of key issues, including health, education, language and cultural issues, and the sustainability of Northern Ireland's political institutions. Government of the UK, New Decade, New Approach, January 9, 2020, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deal-to-see-restored-government-in-northern-ireland-tomorrow.
|
17.
|
Shawn Pogatchnik, "Northern Ireland 'Playing with Matches' amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions," Politico, April 7, 2021; Stephen Castle, "Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface," New York Times, April 8, 2021; Dan Haverty, "How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland," Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021.
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18.
|
Donaldson resigned as DUP leader in late March 2024 after being arrested and charged with 18 sexual assault offenses, which allegedly occurred between 1985 and 2008. See, Julian O'Neill, "Donaldson Pleads Not Guilty to Sexual Offence Charges," BBC News, September 10, 2024.
|
19.
|
Jayne McCormack, "Givan Resignation Triggers Fresh Political Crisis in NI," BBC News, February 3, 2022.
|
20.
|
Jill Lawless and Peter Morrison, "Sinn Fein Eyes Historic Win in Northern Ireland Election," AP News, May 4, 2022; Mark Landler, "As Britain Turned Away from EU, Northern Ireland Turned to Sinn Fein," New York Times, May 7, 2022; Mark Devenport, "How Alliance Number Nerds Turned Single Digits into a Surge," BBC News, May 9, 2022.
|
21.
|
In the UK, command papers are official publications that present major government initiatives to Parliament "by command" of the sovereign. See UK Parliament, "About Command Papers," at https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/publications/government/.
22.
|
Shawn Pogatchnik, "DUP Agrees to Drop Boycott of Northern Ireland Power-Sharing," Politico, January 30, 2024; Jayne McCormack and Finn Purdy, "Stormont: Assembly to Sit on Saturday as DUP Boycott Ends," BBC News, February 1, 2024.
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23.
|
Brendan Hughes and Matt Fox, "Stormont: Michelle O'Neill Makes History as Nationalist First Minister," BBC News, February 3, 2024; William Booth and Amanda Ferguson, "Northern Ireland Gets Its First Sinn Fein First Minister in Historic Shift," Washington Post, February 3, 2024.
|
24.
|
Margaret Canning, "Northern Ireland Businesses Welcome Prospect of Corporation Tax Devolution Contained in DUP Deal," Belfast Telegraph, January 31, 2024; Northern Ireland Office, "UK Government Confirms £3.3bn Spending Settlement for Restored Northern Ireland Executive," press release, February 13, 2024.
|
25.
|
Robbie Meredith, "Integrated Education: Stormont Passes Bill Despite DUP Opposition," BBC News, March 9, 2022.
|
26.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, "Annual Enrolments at Schools and in Funded Pre-School Education in Northern Ireland, 2024-25," February 27, 2025, see in particular Tables 1b and 2a, at https://datavis.nisra.gov.uk/DEstatistics/annual-enrolments-schools-and-funded-pre-school-education-northern-ireland-202425.html.
|
27.
|
Rory Carroll, "Belfast's Peace Walls: Potent Symbols of Division Are Dwindling—But Slowly," Guardian, April 7, 2023; "What Is a Peace Wall? An Explainer," Irish News, July 27, 2023.
|
28.
|
Julian O'Neill, "NI Troubles: I Would Love to See That Wall Coming Down," BBC News, January 29, 2023; Rebecca Black, "Progress Continues to Be Made in Bid to Transform Northern Ireland's Peace Walls," Irish News, December 31, 2023.
|
29.
|
Northern Ireland Department of Justice, Public Attitudes to Peace Walls 2019 Findings, June 2020.
|
30.
|
International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019; Niall McCracken, "Divided by a Peace Wall, United Through Friendship," BBC News, August 3, 2023.
|
31.
|
The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades.
|
32.
|
Jayne McCormack, "Flags Report: Stormont Publishes £800k Report Without Action Plan," BBC News, December 1, 2021; Northern Ireland Executive Office, Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition – Final Report, December 1, 2021.
|
33.
|
Thirteen deaths occurred on Bloody Sunday; another person wounded on Bloody Sunday died several months later.
|
34.
|
Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill Explanatory Notes, May 17, 2022, p. 6, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0010/en/220010en.pdf.
|
35.
|
Government of the UK, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland's Past, July 14, 2021, p. 20, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
|
36.
|
James Clarke, "Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?," BBC News, June 14, 2010.
|
37.
|
Claire Mills and David Torrance, Investigation of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland, UK House of Commons Library, May 18, 2022, pp. 20-21.
|
38.
|
Ibid., pp. 29-30. Also see, Edward Burke, "The Trouble with Northern Ireland Legacy Cases," Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), April 22, 2021.
|
39.
|
David Young, "Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader's Murder Collapses," Irish Times, May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, "Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers," BBC News, July 2, 2021.
|
40.
|
Rory Carroll, "Ex-Soldier Who Shot Dead Civilian During Troubles Convicted of Manslaughter," Guardian, November 25, 2022; BBC News, "Aidan McAnespie Killing: Ex-Soldier David Holden Withdraws Appeal," November 7, 2023.
|
41.
|
James Crisp, "Four More Troubles Veterans Prosecuted as Cases 'Rushed Through' Before Amnesty Deadline," Telegraph, February 8, 2024; Chris Page, "Bloody Sunday Murder Accused to Stand Trial in September" BBC News, February 18, 2025.
|
42.
|
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement.
|
43.
|
Anne Cadwallader, "Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth," Irish Times, December 31, 2015; "Villiers Meets U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute," Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth Gordon, "Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government," BBC News, May 11, 2018.
|
44.
|
Government of the UK, "Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Outline Way Forward to Address the Legacy of the Troubles," press release, May 17, 2022; UK Parliament, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3160.
|
45.
|
Government of the UK, "Government Tables Amendments to NI Troubles Legacy Legislation," press release, January 17, 2023; BBC News, "Troubles Legacy Bill Enters Law After Receiving Royal Assent," September 19, 2023.
|
46.
|
For more information, see Northern Ireland Office, Explainers Relating to the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, May 25, 2022; and Joanna Dawson et al., Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill 2022-2023, UK House of Commons Library, July 14, 2023.
|
47.
|
See, for example, UK Parliament, Hansard, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, volume 717, debated on July 4, 2022, at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2022-07-04/debates/854CCB3A-19C5-4724-9CF2-A2B02E6D9086/NorthernIrelandTroubles(LegacyAndReconciliation)Bill.
|
48.
|
Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, "Ireland Welcomes Decision by Council of Europe on Northern Ireland Legacy Issues," press release, June 10, 2022.
|
49.
|
BBC News, "Troubles Legacy: Controversial Bill Facing More Legal Challenges," September 18, 2023; Shawn Pogatchnik, "Ireland to Sue UK over Law Blocking Probes into Northern Irish Violence," Politico, December 20, 2023; Megan Specia, "Immunity for Troubles Violence Violates Human Rights, Belfast Court Rules," New York Times, February 28, 2024.
|
50.
|
Northern Ireland Office, Statement from the Secretary of State Following the King's Speech, July 17, 2024.
|
51.
|
Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 Statement, Written Statement to Parliament, July 29, 2024; Northern Ireland Office, Secretary of State Oral Statement on Northern Ireland Legacy, Oral Statement to Parliament, December 4, 2024; Northern Ireland Office, Written Evidence from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the UK House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, February 12, 2025.
|
52.
|
See, for example, BBC News, "Mixed Reaction to Government's Legacy Act Repeal from Victims," December 5, 2024; and Rebecca Black, "British Army Veterans of Northern Ireland Troubles March on Westminster," London Evening Standard, February 5, 2025.
|
53.
|
Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20, 2015. This report focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks during the Troubles under the name of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
|
54.
|
The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007.
|
55.
|
Independent Reporting Commission Seventh Report, February 25, 2025, at https://www.ircommission.org/publications/irc-seventh-report.
|
56.
|
Shawn Pogatchnik, "Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?," Politico, March 5, 2021; Julian O'Neill, "NI Protocol: Warning Over Loyalist Paramilitaries Gaining Momentum," BBC News, December 12, 2022.
|
57.
|
Julian O'Neill, "Disbandment Talks Could Legitimize Paramilitaries, Warns Long," BBC News, February 27, 2025.
|
58.
|
See, for example, Rory Carroll, "Northern Ireland Republican Dissidents Lurk in the Shadows Hoping to be Noticed," Guardian, February 23, 2023.
|
59.
|
ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire in 2018, although a small splinter group formed in opposition to the cease-fire. Also see Zoe Manzi, "Northern Ireland Related Terrorism," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, January 15, 2024.
|
60.
|
Julian O'Neill, "Omagh Police Shooting: John Caldwell Attack Causes Shockwaves in PSNI," BBC News, February 25, 2023; Allison Morris, "New IRA Still Main Suspect in DCI Caldwell Shooting, Chief Constable Tells Policing Board," Belfast Telegraph, March 2, 2023.
|
61.
|
The New IRA claimed responsibility for McKee's death but reportedly issued an apology; the group asserted that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the riots but had hit McKee by accident. See Ed O'Loughlin, "New IRA Apologizes for Killing of Journalist in Northern Ireland," New York Times, April 23, 2019.
|
62.
|
Seanin Graham, "PSNI Officers Warned of Republican Dissident Threat to Their Families," Irish Times, March 7, 2023.
|
63.
|
Orla Ryan, "Northern Ireland's Economic Fears," BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic Strategy, Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011.
|
64.
|
Valentina Romei and Chris Giles, "Northern Ireland Economy Has Outperformed Rest of UK, ONS Figures Show," Financial Times, November 29, 2021; John Campbell, "COVID-19: NI Economic Recovery May Be Weaker Than Originally Thought," BBC News, February 28, 2022.
|
65.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 3 2024, January 16, 2025.
|
66.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 18, 2025.
|
67.
|
Matthew Ward and Daniel Harari, Regional and National Economic Indicators, UK House of Commons Library, February 19, 2025.
|
68.
|
Ulster University, Economic Inactivity: Who, What, Where, Why?, January 2024; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 18, 2025.
|
69.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November 2017; Duncan Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Pivotal Public Policy Forum NI, Reconciliation and Deprivation: Twin Challenges for Northern Ireland, May 2023.
|
70.
|
Data applies to Northern Ireland's "total monitored workforce," as defined in and required by Northern Ireland's fair employment legislation; "total monitored workforce" does not include the self-employed, school teachers, or those in private sector companies with ten or less employees. Northern Ireland Equality Commission, Fair Employment Monitoring Report No. 33, released July 10, 2024.
|
71.
|
For more background on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
|
72.
|
In December 2020, UK and EU negotiators also concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which sets out terms for post-Brexit trade and economic relations, as well as cooperation on a range of other issues.
|
73.
|
Ceylan Yeginsu, "In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal," New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon Carswell, "Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland," Irish Times, January 30, 2020; Rory Carroll, "Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists' Fear of Marginalisation," Guardian, April 5, 2021; Pat Leahy, "NI Protocol Tensions Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations," Irish Times, June 11, 2021.
|
74.
|
Henry McDonald, "Police Chief Says 'Hard Brexit' Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target," Guardian, February 7, 2018.
|
75.
|
Sarah Lyall, "On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace," New York Times, August 5, 2017; Maeve Sheehan, "Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points," Belfast Telegraph, December 17, 2018.
|
76.
|
John Campbell, "Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?," BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom McTague, "Brexit's Ulster Problem," Politico, June 12, 2019.
|
77.
|
Government of the UK, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration; and Government of the UK, New Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-protocol-on-irelandnorthern-ireland-and-political-declaration.
|
78.
|
Since the protocol took effect, physical checks necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance have been conducted at ports or points of entry on the northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain.
|
79.
|
See, for example, Shawn Pogatchnik, "Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare," Politico, January 13, 2021; "British Supermarkets May Shift Supply Chains to EU if Northern Ireland Trade Not Addressed," Reuters, July 17, 2021.
|
80.
|
See, for example, Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, and Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021.
|
81.
|
European Commission, "Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today's Announcement by the UK Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland," press release, July 21, 2021.
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82.
|
"UK Says That Brussels Trying to 'Exploit' Biden Visit to Exert Brexit Pressure," Financial Times, June 8, 2021; Institute for Government, "Northern Ireland Protocol: Ongoing UK-EU Disagreements," January 26, 2022.
|
83.
|
Annabelle Dickson et al., "EU and UK Agree 'Way Forward' on Post-Brexit Goods Data in Fresh Sign of Progress," Politico, January 9, 2023.
|
84.
|
Information in this section is based on the package of documents that comprise the Windsor Framework, released February 27, 2023, and available from the Government of the UK, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework. This section also draws from various news sources and the European Commission, "Questions and Answers: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework, a New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland," February 27, 2023.
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85.
|
See Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 3, 13, and 21, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1138989/The_Windsor_Framework_a_new_way_forward.pdf.
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86.
|
See, for example, European Commission, "A New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework," press release, February 27, 2023; and Comments by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during press conference with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, February 27, 2023, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtxuqaFwsk0.
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87.
|
Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 22-25.
|
88.
|
Shawn Pogatchnik, "DUP Won't Be Pushed into Accepting UK-EU Deal on Northern Ireland—But Sees an Attractive Veto," Politico, February 27, 2023; Enda McClafferty, "Brexit Deal: Both Yes and No Carry Risks for DUP," BBC News, February 28, 2023.
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89.
|
Government of the UK, Safeguarding the Union, released January 31, 2024, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ba3b7bee7d490013984a59/Command_Paper__1_.pdf. Also see, David Torrance, Northern Ireland Devolution: Safeguarding the Union, UK House of Commons Library, April 3, 2024.
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90.
|
As quoted in, "DUP Says Stormont Deal Has Delivered 'Fundamental Change' to UK-EU Trading Rules," BreakingNews.ie, January 31, 2024.
|
91.
|
John Campbell, "DUP Deal: Government Command Paper Bids to Reassure Unionists," BBC News, February1, 2024; Peter Foster, "Four Years on and Brexit Still Isn't Done," Financial Times, February 1, 2024; Joël Reland, "The Northern Ireland Deal Offers Meaningful Change—If Westminster Keeps Its Word," UK in a Changing Europe, February 2, 2024.
|
92.
|
As quoted in, John Campbell, "DUP Deal Aimed at Restoring Power Sharing in Northern Ireland Is Published," BBC News, January 31, 2024.
|
93.
|
For more information on the January 2024 UK-DUP deal and the measures outlined in the Safeguarding the Union command paper, also see Peter Foster and Jude Webber, "What Is in the New Northern Ireland Deal and How Will It Work?," Financial Times, January 31, 2024; John Campbell, "DUP Deal: What Exactly Is in the Safeguarding the Union Paper?," BBC News, January 31, 2024; John Curtis, Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework: New Devolution Deal, UK House of Commons Library, February 1, 2024; Jill Rutter and Matthew Fright, "Government Deal with the DUP to Restore Power Sharing in Northern Ireland," Institute for Government, February 1, 2024.
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94.
|
See, for example, David Lynch and Nick Lester, "DUP Split over Stormont Deal as Nigel Dodds Says Sea Border Concerns Remain," BreakingNews.ie., February 1, 2024; Adrian Rutherford, "Three Top DUP Figures Say There Is 'No Dispute' That Irish Sea Border Remains," Belfast Telegraph, February 10, 2024.
|
95.
|
See, for example, Freya McClements, "UK Government 'Undermining' Belfast Agreement with Pro-unionist Stance, SDLP Leader Says," Irish Times, February 12, 2024.
|
96.
|
See Northern Ireland Assembly, Democratic Consent Resolution, at https://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/plenary/details.aspx?&ses=0&doc=419985&pn=0&sid=vd. Also see, "Stormont Votes to Extend Post-Brexit Trading Arrangements," BBC News, December 10, 2024.
|
97.
|
Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016; Lisa O'Carroll, "Pro-Brexit UK Regions More Dependent on EU for Exports, Study Finds," Guardian, July 17, 2022.
|
98.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics 2023, December 11, 2024, at https://datavis.nisra.gov.uk/economy-and-labour-market/northern-ireland-economic-trade-statistics-2023.html.
|
99.
|
See, for example, Simon Marks, "Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey," Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, "Brexit: How Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?," BBC News, September 22, 2019.
|
100.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, April 4, 2023.
|
101.
|
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics 2023, December 11, 2024.
|
102.
|
John Campbell, "Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI," BBC News, October 22, 2019; Democratic Unionist Party, Remove the Protocol, at https://mydup.com/policies/remove-ni-protocol.
|
103.
|
Andrew McDonald, "Rishi Sunak Gives EU Windsor Framework Deal the Hard Sell in Belfast," Politico, February 28, 2023.
|
104.
|
See, for example, Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, "Minister Pitches the North's Unique Business Proposition to US Business Leaders," press release, March 14, 2024.
|
105.
|
David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward, Testing the Temperature 12: What Do Voters in Northern Ireland Think About the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland/Windsor Framework?, Queen's University Belfast, November 2024.
|
106.
|
As quoted in "Goods 'Flowing Relatively Smoothly' Between NI and GB – Benn," BBC News, March 4, 2025.
|
107.
|
Clodagh Rice, "No Evidence of Dual Market Access Attracting NI Investment," BBC News, October 16, 2024; John Campbell, "Small Businesses Being 'Crucified' by Sea Border," BBC News, December 4, 2024; John Campbell, "Supermarkets Still Facing Sea Border Problems," BBC News, February 22, 2025.
|
108.
|
Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016.
|
109.
|
UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
|
110.
|
Suzanne Breen, "More People in NI Would Vote to Stay Part of UK If Border Poll Was Called," Belfast Telegraph, February 18, 2024.
|
111.
|
Support for Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK was 50% in 2022 and 51% in 2023; support for Irish unification was 27% in 2022 and 31% in 2023. Pat Leahy, "Support for Irish Unification Growing in Northern Ireland, Poll Finds," Irish Times, February 7, 2025.
|
112.
|
Shawn Pogatchnik, "All-Ireland Trade Booming in Post-Brexit Economy," Politico, February 15, 2022; Morwenna Coniam, "Irish Trade with Britain, Northern Ireland Climbs Despite Brexit," Bloomberg.com, August 15, 2022; Ireland Central Statistics Office, "Record Levels of Exports and Imports in 2022," February 15, 2023; Ryan McAleer, "Trade in 2023: The Year When the Protocol Became the Windsor Framework," Irish News, December 27, 2023; John Campbell, "Value of NI Sales and Exports Up, New Figures Suggest," BBC News, December 11, 2024.
|
113.
|
See, for example, Megan Specia, "Northern Ireland Has a Sinn Fein Leader. It's a Landmark Moment," New York Times, February 3, 2024; Padraic Halpin and Amanda Ferguson, "Sinn Fein Struggles Deal Blow to Nationalists' United Ireland Dream," Reuters, November 21, 2024.
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114.
|
See, for example, Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, "Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland," Financial Times, April 6, 2021; Rory Carroll, "It's Closer Now Than It's Ever Been: Could There Soon Be a United Ireland?," Guardian, October 6, 2022; Megan Stack, "Is Ireland Headed for a Merger?," New York Times, November 21, 2023.
|
115.
|
Pat Leahy, "Support for Irish Unification Growing in Northern Ireland, Poll Finds," Irish Times, February 7, 2025.
|
116.
|
In the 2024 Irish Times poll, for example, 64% of respondents in Ireland supported unification while 17% were opposed. Pat Leahy, "Support for Irish Unification Growing in Northern Ireland, Poll Finds," Irish Times, February 7, 2025.
|
117.
|
See, for example, "Leo Varadkar Says Border Poll Not Appropriate at This Time," BBC News, July 3, 2022; Jude Webber, "Ireland's Reunification Talk Grows Louder," Financial Times, October 9, 2022.
|
118.
|
Fionnan Sheahan, "Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay for It," Irish Independent, May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, "What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a United Ireland?," Irish Times, May 7, 2021.
|
119.
|
John Garry et al., "Northern Protestants Pessimistic on Benefits of Irish Unity," Irish Times, December 5, 2023.
|
120.
|
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks," November 1, 2017.
|
121.
|
See, for example, the White House, "Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Virtual Bilateral Meeting," March 17, 2022; and the White House, "Readout of President Joe Biden's Meeting with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar of Ireland," March 17, 2023.
|
122.
|
U.S. Department of State, "Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Results," press release, May 7, 2022.
|
123.
|
The White House, "Remarks by President Biden Marking the 25th Anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement," April 12, 2023.
|
124.
|
The White House, "Statement from President Joe Biden on the Restoration of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly," press release, February 3, 2024.
|
125.
|
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The Role of Young People in Fostering Peace in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022.
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126.
|
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland: Accountability at Risk, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2022; and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, Truth and Accountability for Victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 2022.
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127.
|
Office of Rep Brendan Boyle, "Boyle, Keating, Fitzpatrick Lead Congressional Letter to British Prime Minister Over Northern Ireland Legacy Legislation," press release, January 20, 2023; Ray O'Hanlon, "Congress Members Protest British Legacy Bill," Irish Echo, August 13, 2023.
|
128.
|
Office of Rep. Brendan Boyle, "Boyle Leads Bipartisan Letter to New British Prime Minister Calling for Immediate Repeal of Troubles Act," press release, July 15, 2024.
|
129.
|
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland: The Patrick Finucane Case, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., November 19, 2024.
|
130.
|
Suzanne Lynch, "US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy," Irish Times, May 13, 2021; Kerry O'Shea, "Congressional Group Reiterates U.S. Commitment to Northern Ireland," IrishCentral.com, August 5, 2022.
|
131.
|
According to UK statistics, the United States accounted for 14.1% of Northern Ireland's exports and 8.7% of its imports in 2023. Officials in Northern Ireland regard the United States as the region's "largest source of high-value, technology rich" foreign direct investment. In April 2023, the U.S. Special Envoy asserted that Northern Ireland had attracted nearly $2 billion in U.S. investment over the past decade and over 230 U.S. businesses were operating in and employing more than 30,000 people in Northern Ireland. See Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, UK Regions Imports and Exports of Goods by Country and World Region, at https://uktradeingoodsmap.nisra.gov.uk; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, "US and NI Investment Stronger Than Ever," June 23, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, "Special Online Briefing with Joseph Kennedy III," April 27, 2023.
|
132.
|
U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, "Announcement of Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic Affairs," press statement, December 19, 2022.
|
133.
|
See, for example, the White House, "Readout of President Joe Biden's Call with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom," press release, October 25, 2022.
|
134.
|
The White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023.
|
135.
|
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, Protecting the Good Friday Agreement from Brexit, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019.
|
136.
|
See, for example, Office of Rep. Nancy Pelosi, "Pelosi Statement on Windsor Framework," press release, February 27, 2023; Ray O'Hanlon, "Biden, Reps. Welcome Framework Deal," Irish Echo, March 1, 2023.
|
137.
|
Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, U.S.-UK Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
|
138.
|
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Ireland, fact sheet, June 2, 2022.
|
139.
|
The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland.
|
140.
|
See, for example, Sean Byrne et al., "The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland," International Politics, vol. 47, no. 2 (2010), pp. 229-250.
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