Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

Changes from March 1, 2024 to July 9, 2024

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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries:
~~March 1~~July 9, 2024 , 2024
A Primer
Paul K. Kerr
In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other
Specialist in Specialist in
states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section
Nonproliferation Nonproliferation
123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of

reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required
Acting Section Research Acting Section Research
for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which
Manager Manager
Congress may act on a proposed agreement. Congress may act on a proposed agreement.

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What Is a “Section 123” Agreement?
Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et
seq.),1 all significant U.S. nondefense nuclear cooperation with other countries requires a nuclear seq.),1 all significant U.S. nondefense nuclear cooperation with other countries requires a nuclear
cooperation agreement.2 Significant nuclear cooperation includes the transfer of U.S.-origin cooperation agreement.2 Significant nuclear cooperation includes the transfer of U.S.-origin
special nuclear material3 subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes, special nuclear material3 subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes,
and the export of reactors and critical parts of reactors. Section 123 agreements are required for and the export of reactors and critical parts of reactors. Section 123 agreements are required for
the export of commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) export licensing the export of commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) export licensing
authority (10 C.F.R. 110).4 authority (10 C.F.R. 110).4
Such agreements, which are “congressional-executive agreements” requiring congressional Such agreements, which are “congressional-executive agreements” requiring congressional
approval, set the terms of reference and authorize cooperation but do not guarantee that approval, set the terms of reference and authorize cooperation but do not guarantee that
cooperation will take place. The AEA includes requirements for an agreement’s content, cooperation will take place. The AEA includes requirements for an agreement’s content,
conditions for the President to exempt an agreement from those requirements, presidential conditions for the President to exempt an agreement from those requirements, presidential
determinations and other supporting information to be submitted to Congress, conditions determinations and other supporting information to be submitted to Congress, conditions
affecting the implementation of an agreement once it takes effect, and procedures for Congress to affecting the implementation of an agreement once it takes effect, and procedures for Congress to
consider and approve the agreement. consider and approve the agreement.
Section 123 of the AEA requires that any agreement for nuclear cooperation meet nine Section 123 of the AEA requires that any agreement for nuclear cooperation meet nine
nonproliferation criteria and that the President submit any such agreement to the House nonproliferation criteria and that the President submit any such agreement to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Department Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Department
of State is required to provide the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment of State is required to provide the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement (NPAS), which the President is to submit, along with the agreement, to those two Statement (NPAS), which the President is to submit, along with the agreement, to those two
committees. The State Department is also required to provide a classified annex to the NPAS, committees. The State Department is also required to provide a classified annex to the NPAS,
prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS is meant to explain prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS is meant to explain

1 The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) (P.L. 95-242) to 1 The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) (P.L. 95-242) to
include stringent nonproliferation requirements for significant U.S. nuclear exports. For example, the act required include stringent nonproliferation requirements for significant U.S. nuclear exports. For example, the act required
~~nonnuclear-~~non-nuclear weapon states to have comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for weapon states to have comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for
entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. For existing and future agreements, the NNPA entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. For existing and future agreements, the NNPA
added a provision for Congress to review export licenses. The act also included a provision for halting exports if a added a provision for Congress to review export licenses. The act also included a provision for halting exports if a
country tested a nuclear device, violated safeguards agreements, or continued nuclear weapons-related activities. country tested a nuclear device, violated safeguards agreements, or continued nuclear weapons-related activities.
The AEA also authorizes U.S. government transfer to foreign governments of information, as well as certain The AEA also authorizes U.S. government transfer to foreign governments of information, as well as certain
components, related to nuclear weapons. The AEA authorizes the export of nuclear reactors and related information for components, related to nuclear weapons. The AEA authorizes the export of nuclear reactors and related information for
naval propulsion. This report does not cover such agreements. naval propulsion. This report does not cover such agreements.
2 Section 57b. (2) of the AEA allows for limited forms of nuclear cooperation related to the “development or 2 Section 57b. (2) of the AEA allows for limited forms of nuclear cooperation related to the “development or
production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States” without a nuclear cooperation agreement if that production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States” without a nuclear cooperation agreement if that
activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy following a determination that it “will not be inimical to the activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy following a determination that it “will not be inimical to the
interest of the United States.” Agreements governing such cooperation are also known as “Section 810” agreements, interest of the United States.” Agreements governing such cooperation are also known as “Section 810” agreements,
after 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 810. (See after 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 810. (See “Part 810 Agreements.”) ”)
A nuclear cooperation agreement is not required for transmission of nuclear-related information, except for restricted A nuclear cooperation agreement is not required for transmission of nuclear-related information, except for restricted
data. “Restricted data,” defined by the statute, means “all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of data. “Restricted data,” defined by the statute, means “all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of
atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy.” Restricted data, however does not “include data declassified or removed from the Restricted production of energy.” Restricted data, however does not “include data declassified or removed from the Restricted
Data [sic] category” pursuant to the AEA. A nuclear cooperation agreement is necessary, though not necessarily Data [sic] category” pursuant to the AEA. A nuclear cooperation agreement is necessary, though not necessarily
sufficient, to permit the transfer of restricted data. sufficient, to permit the transfer of restricted data.
3 “Special nuclear material,” defined by the AEA, means “(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 233 or 235, 3 “Special nuclear material,” defined by the AEA, means “(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 233 or 235,
and any other material” that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “determines to be special nuclear material, but and any other material” that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “determines to be special nuclear material, but
does not include source material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include does not include source material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include
source material.” The AEA defines “source material” as “(1) uranium, thorium, or any other material” determined by source material.” The AEA defines “source material” as “(1) uranium, thorium, or any other material” determined by
the NRC “to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the NRC “to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as
the Commission may by regulation determine.” the Commission may by regulation determine.”
4 For a list of commodities, see http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/export-import.html. 123 agreements are not required 4 For a list of commodities, see http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/export-import.html. 123 agreements are not required
for U.S. exports of nuclear-related dual-use items, which are controlled for export by the Commerce Department. for U.S. exports of nuclear-related dual-use items, which are controlled for export by the Commerce Department.
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

the agreement’s compliance with the AEA nonproliferation requirements. The President must also the agreement’s compliance with the AEA nonproliferation requirements. The President must also
make a written determination “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and make a written determination “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and
will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.” will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
Requirements Under the Atomic Energy Act
Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for engaging in nuclear cooperation with Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for engaging in nuclear cooperation with
another country. another country.
• • Section 123a. states that the proposed agreement is to include the terms, states that the proposed agreement is to include the terms,
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists nine criteria that conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists nine criteria that
the agreement must meet. This section also contains provisions for the President the agreement must meet. This section also contains provisions for the President
to exempt an agreement from any of these criteria and specifies information the to exempt an agreement from any of these criteria and specifies information the
executive branch must provide to Congress. executive branch must provide to Congress.
• • Section 123b. specifies the process for submitting the text of the agreement to specifies the process for submitting the text of the agreement to
Congress. Congress.
• • Section 123c. specifies the procedure for congressional approval of cooperation specifies the procedure for congressional approval of cooperation
agreements that are limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear material or agreements that are limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear material or
cover reactors larger than 5 megawatts electric [MWe]). This report does not cover reactors larger than 5 megawatts electric [MWe]). This report does not
discuss such agreements. discuss such agreements.
• • Section 123d. specifies the procedure for congressional approval of agreements specifies the procedure for congressional approval of agreements
that do cover significant nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear material or that do cover significant nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear material or
reactors larger than 5 MWe), including exempted agreements. reactors larger than 5 MWe), including exempted agreements.
Section 123a., paragraphs (1) through (9), lists nine criteria that an agreement with a Section 123a., paragraphs (1) through (9), lists nine criteria that an agreement with a ~~nonnuclear-~~
non-nuclear weapon state must meet unless the President determines an exemption is necessary. These include weapon state must meet unless the President determines an exemption is necessary. These include
guarantees that guarantees that
• safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment continue in perpetuity; • safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment continue in perpetuity;
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards are • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards are
applied in applied in ~~nonnuclear-~~non-nuclear weapon states;5 weapon states;5
• nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive device or for any other • nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive device or for any other
military purpose; the United States has the right to demand the return of military purpose; the United States has the right to demand the return of
transferred nuclear materials and equipment, as well as any special nuclear transferred nuclear materials and equipment, as well as any special nuclear
material produced through their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear material produced through their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear
explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement; explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement;
• no retransfer of material or restricted data occur without U.S. consent; • no retransfer of material or restricted data occur without U.S. consent;
• recipient states maintain physical security on transferred nuclear material; • recipient states maintain physical security on transferred nuclear material;
• recipient states obtain approval before enriching or reprocessing transferred • recipient states obtain approval before enriching or reprocessing transferred
nuclear material or nuclear material produced with materials or facilities nuclear material or nuclear material produced with materials or facilities
transferred pursuant to the agreement; transferred pursuant to the agreement;
• recipient states obtain U.S. advance approval for storage of transferred plutonium • recipient states obtain U.S. advance approval for storage of transferred plutonium
and highly enriched uranium; and and highly enriched uranium; and

5 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, which states that such 5 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, which states that such
agreements “should provide for the Agency’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied” to all agreements “should provide for the Agency’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied” to all
nuclear material of potential proliferation concern “in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, nuclear material of potential proliferation concern “in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material
is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
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• any material or facilities produced or constructed through use of sensitive nuclear • any material or facilities produced or constructed through use of sensitive nuclear
technology transferred under the cooperation agreement is subject to all of the technology transferred under the cooperation agreement is subject to all of the
above requirements. above requirements.
Although some experts have advocated requiring governments to forgo enrichment and Although some experts have advocated requiring governments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing (a nonproliferation commitment sometimes referred to as the “Gold Standard”) as a reprocessing (a nonproliferation commitment sometimes referred to as the “Gold Standard”) as a
condition for concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Atomic Energy Act does not condition for concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Atomic Energy Act does not
include such a requirement (seinclude such a requirement (see Appendix B). .
Exempted vs. Nonexempted Agreements
The President may exempt an agreement for cooperation from any of the requirements in Section The President may exempt an agreement for cooperation from any of the requirements in Section
123a. if the President determines that the requirement would be “seriously prejudicial to the 123a. if the President determines that the requirement would be “seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and
security.” The AEA provides different requirements, conditions, and procedures for exempt and security.” The AEA provides different requirements, conditions, and procedures for exempt and
nonexempt agreements.6 To date, all of the Section 123 agreements in force are nonexempt nonexempt agreements.6 To date, all of the Section 123 agreements in force are nonexempt
agreements.7 The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of agreements.7 The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of
2006 (P.L. 109-401) exempted nuclear cooperation with India from some of the AEA’s 2006 (P.L. 109-401) exempted nuclear cooperation with India from some of the AEA’s
requirements.8 requirements.8
Congressional Review
Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear cooperation agreement for two Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear cooperation agreement for two
time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session.9 The President must submit the text of the time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session.9 The President must submit the text of the
proposed agreement, along with required supporting documents (including the unclassified proposed agreement, along with required supporting documents (including the unclassified
NPAS) to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. NPAS) to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The President is to consult with the committees “for a period of not less than 30 days of The President is to consult with the committees “for a period of not less than 30 days of
continuous session.” After this period of consultation, the President is to submit the agreement to continuous session.” After this period of consultation, the President is to submit the agreement to
Congress, along with the classified annex to the NPAS and a statement of the President’s approval Congress, along with the classified annex to the NPAS and a statement of the President’s approval
of the agreement and determination that it will not damage U.S. national security interests. This of the agreement and determination that it will not damage U.S. national security interests. This
action begins the second period, which consists of 60 days of continuous session. In practice, the action begins the second period, which consists of 60 days of continuous session. In practice, the
President has sent the agreement to Congress at the beginning of the full 90-day period, which President has sent the agreement to Congress at the beginning of the full 90-day period, which
begins on the date of transmittal. Typically, the 60-day period has immediately followed the begins on the date of transmittal. Typically, the 60-day period has immediately followed the
expiration of the 30-day period. The President transmits the text of the proposed agreement along expiration of the 30-day period. The President transmits the text of the proposed agreement along
with a letter of support with a national security determination, the unclassified NPAS, its with a letter of support with a national security determination, the unclassified NPAS, its
classified annex, and letters of support for the agreement from the Secretary of State and the classified annex, and letters of support for the agreement from the Secretary of State and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

6 Nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT are provided for in the AEA, and 6 Nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT are provided for in the AEA, and
are therefore nonexempt agreements. The NPT defines nuclear-weapon states as those that exploded a nuclear weapon are therefore nonexempt agreements. The NPT defines nuclear-weapon states as those that exploded a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. All other NPT states-parties are States. All other NPT states-parties are ~~nonnuclear-~~non-nuclear weapon states. weapon states.
7 The United States has concluded more than 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, as well as similar agreements 7 The United States has concluded more than 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, as well as similar agreements
with the European Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA. See with the European Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA. See Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy
Could Help Increase Commercial Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries, ,
Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-36, November 2010. Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-36, November 2010.
8 See CRS Report RL33016, 8 See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
9 When calculating periods of “continuous session” under the AEA, every calendar day is counted, including Saturdays 9 When calculating periods of “continuous session” under the AEA, every calendar day is counted, including Saturdays
and Sundays. Only days on which either chamber has adjourned for more than three days pursuant to the adoption a and Sundays. Only days on which either chamber has adjourned for more than three days pursuant to the adoption a
concurrent resolution authorizing the adjournment do not count toward the total. If Congress adjourns its final session concurrent resolution authorizing the adjournment do not count toward the total. If Congress adjourns its final session
sine die, continuity of session is broken, and the count must start anew when it reconvenes. , continuity of session is broken, and the count must start anew when it reconvenes.
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If the President has not exempted the agreement from any Section 123a requirements, the If the President has not exempted the agreement from any Section 123a requirements, the
agreement may enter into force after the end of the 60-day period unless, during that time, agreement may enter into force after the end of the 60-day period unless, during that time,
Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. In Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. In
order for an exempted agreement to enter into force, Congress must adopt a joint resolution of order for an exempted agreement to enter into force, Congress must adopt a joint resolution of
approval and it must become law by the end of the 60-day period. At the beginning of this 60-day approval and it must become law by the end of the 60-day period. At the beginning of this 60-day
period, joint resolutions of approval or disapproval, as appropriate, are to be automatically period, joint resolutions of approval or disapproval, as appropriate, are to be automatically
introduced in each house. During this period, the committees are to hold hearings on the proposed introduced in each house. During this period, the committees are to hold hearings on the proposed
agreement and “submit a report to their respective bodies recommending whether it should be agreement and “submit a report to their respective bodies recommending whether it should be
approved or disapproved.” If either committee has not reported the requisite joint resolution of approved or disapproved.” If either committee has not reported the requisite joint resolution of
approval or disapproval by the end of 45 days, the resolution is automatically discharged from approval or disapproval by the end of 45 days, the resolution is automatically discharged from
further consideration of the measure. After the joint resolution is reported or discharged, Congress further consideration of the measure. After the joint resolution is reported or discharged, Congress
is to consider it under expedited procedures, as established by Section 130.i. of the AEA. is to consider it under expedited procedures, as established by Section 130.i. of the AEA.
Congress has used procedures outside the above-described process to adopt legislation approving Congress has used procedures outside the above-described process to adopt legislation approving
some nuclear cooperation agreements (sesome nuclear cooperation agreements (see Appendix C). .
Section 202 of P.L. 110-369, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Section 202 of P.L. 110-369, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, which President Bush signed into law October 8, 2008, Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, which President Bush signed into law October 8, 2008,
amended Section 123 of the AEA to require the President to keep the Senate Foreign Relations amended Section 123 of the AEA to require the President to keep the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee “fully and currently informed of any Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee “fully and currently informed of any
initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation.” cooperation.”
Export Licensing
The AEA sets out procedures for licensing exports to states with which the United States has The AEA sets out procedures for licensing exports to states with which the United States has
nuclear cooperation agreements. (Sections 126, 127, and 128 codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. nuclear cooperation agreements. (Sections 126, 127, and 128 codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
2155, 2156, 2157). Each export of nuclear material, equipment, or technology requires a specific 2155, 2156, 2157). Each export of nuclear material, equipment, or technology requires a specific
export license or other authorization. The NRC is required to meet criteria in Sections 127 and export license or other authorization. The NRC is required to meet criteria in Sections 127 and
128 when authorizing export licenses. These criteria are as follows: 128 when authorizing export licenses. These criteria are as follows:
• Application of IAEA safeguards to any material or facilities proposed to be • Application of IAEA safeguards to any material or facilities proposed to be
exported, material or facilities previously exported, and to any special nuclear exported, material or facilities previously exported, and to any special nuclear
material used in or produced through the use thereof (these are not material used in or produced through the use thereof (these are not
comprehensive safeguards, but safeguards required under NPT Article III.2). comprehensive safeguards, but safeguards required under NPT Article III.2).
• Nothing exported can be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on • Nothing exported can be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on
or development of any nuclear explosive device. or development of any nuclear explosive device.
• Recipient states must have adequate physical security on “such material or • Recipient states must have adequate physical security on “such material or
facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or
produced through the use thereof.” produced through the use thereof.”
• Recipient states are not to retransfer exported nuclear materials, facilities, • Recipient states are not to retransfer exported nuclear materials, facilities,
sensitive nuclear technology, or “special nuclear material produced through the sensitive nuclear technology, or “special nuclear material produced through the
use of such material” without prior U.S. approval. use of such material” without prior U.S. approval.
• Recipient states may not reprocess or alter in form or content exported nuclear • Recipient states may not reprocess or alter in form or content exported nuclear
material or special nuclear material produced though the use of exported nuclear material or special nuclear material produced though the use of exported nuclear
material without prior U.S. approval. material without prior U.S. approval.
• The foregoing conditions must be applied to any nuclear material or equipment • The foregoing conditions must be applied to any nuclear material or equipment
that is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient by or that is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient by or
through the use of any exported sensitive nuclear technology. through the use of any exported sensitive nuclear technology.
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• Section 128 requires that recipient • Section 128 requires that recipient ~~nonnuclear-~~non-nuclear weapon states must have weapon states must have
comprehensive IAEA safeguards. comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
The President must judge that the proposed export or exemption will “not be inimical to the The President must judge that the proposed export or exemption will “not be inimical to the
common defense and security” or that any export of that type “would not be inimical to the common defense and security” or that any export of that type “would not be inimical to the
common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes.” The common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes.” The
executive branch may also consider other factors, such as “whether the license or exemption will executive branch may also consider other factors, such as “whether the license or exemption will
materially advance the nonproliferation policy of the United States by encouraging the recipient materially advance the nonproliferation policy of the United States by encouraging the recipient
nation to adhere” to the NPT; whether “failure to issue the license or grant the exemption would nation to adhere” to the NPT; whether “failure to issue the license or grant the exemption would
otherwise be seriously prejudicial” to U.S. nonproliferation objectives; and whether the recipient otherwise be seriously prejudicial” to U.S. nonproliferation objectives; and whether the recipient
nation has agreed to conditions identical to those laid out in Section 127. nation has agreed to conditions identical to those laid out in Section 127.
Section 126b.(2) contains a provision for the President to authorize an export in the event that the Section 126b.(2) contains a provision for the President to authorize an export in the event that the
NRC deems that the export would not meet Section 127 and 128 criteria. The President must NRC deems that the export would not meet Section 127 and 128 criteria. The President must
determine “that failure to approve an export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of determine “that failure to approve an export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” In U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” In
that case, the President would submit an executive order, along with a detailed assessment and that case, the President would submit an executive order, along with a detailed assessment and
other documentation, to Congress for 60 days of continuous session. After 60 days of continuous other documentation, to Congress for 60 days of continuous session. After 60 days of continuous
session, the export would executed unless Congress were to adopt a concurrent resolution of session, the export would executed unless Congress were to adopt a concurrent resolution of
disapproval.10 disapproval.10
Section 128b.(2) contains a provision for the President to waive termination of exports by Section 128b.(2) contains a provision for the President to waive termination of exports by
notifying Congress that the state has adopted comprehensive safeguards or that the state has made notifying Congress that the state has adopted comprehensive safeguards or that the state has made
significant progress toward adopting such safeguards, or that U.S. foreign policy interests dictate significant progress toward adopting such safeguards, or that U.S. foreign policy interests dictate
reconsideration. Such a determination would become effective unless Congress were to adopt a reconsideration. Such a determination would become effective unless Congress were to adopt a
concurrent resolution of disapproval within 60 days of continuous session. concurrent resolution of disapproval within 60 days of continuous session.
Additionally, Section 129b.(1) forbids the export of “nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive Additionally, Section 129b.(1) forbids the export of “nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive
nuclear technology” to any country designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.11 Section 129b.(3) nuclear technology” to any country designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.11 Section 129b.(3)
allows the President to waive this provision. allows the President to waive this provision.
Iran-Related Restrictions
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010 (P.L. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010 (P.L.
111-195), which became law on July 1, 2010, contains additional restrictions on licensing nuclear 111-195), which became law on July 1, 2010, contains additional restrictions on licensing nuclear
exports to countries with entities that have been sanctioned for conducting certain types of exports to countries with entities that have been sanctioned for conducting certain types of
nuclear weapons-related transactions with Iran. Section 102a.(2)(A) of the law states that “no nuclear weapons-related transactions with Iran. Section 102a.(2)(A) of the law states that “no
license may be issued for the export, and no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer” license may be issued for the export, and no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer”
of “any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that are of “any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that are
or would be subject to an agreement for cooperation between the United States” and such or would be subject to an agreement for cooperation between the United States” and such
countries. Section 102 a.(2)(B), however, allows the President to waive these restrictions. Section countries. Section 102 a.(2)(B), however, allows the President to waive these restrictions. Section
102a.(2)(C) allows the President to authorize licenses for nuclear exports “on a case-by-case 102a.(2)(C) allows the President to authorize licenses for nuclear exports “on a case-by-case

10 In light of the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in 10 In light of the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, passing a concurrent resolution could invite a legal , passing a concurrent resolution could invite a legal
challenge because it is arguably unconstitutional. Although not provided for in the AEA, Congress could choose to pass challenge because it is arguably unconstitutional. Although not provided for in the AEA, Congress could choose to pass
a joint resolution of disapproval or a bill stating in substance it did not approve. a joint resolution of disapproval or a bill stating in substance it did not approve.
11 Section 129b. (2) states that the prohibitions described in the previous section “shall not apply to exports, reexports, 11 Section 129b. (2) states that the prohibitions described in the previous section “shall not apply to exports, reexports,
transfers, or retransfers of radiation monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, seals, cameras, tamper-indication transfers, or retransfers of radiation monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, seals, cameras, tamper-indication
devices, nuclear detectors, monitoring systems, or equipment necessary to safely store, transport, or remove hazardous devices, nuclear detectors, monitoring systems, or equipment necessary to safely store, transport, or remove hazardous
materials ... except to the extent that such technologies, equipment, seals, cameras, devices, detectors, or systems are materials ... except to the extent that such technologies, equipment, seals, cameras, devices, detectors, or systems are
available for use in the design or construction of nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.” available for use in the design or construction of nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.”
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basis” to entities (which have not been sanctioned) in countries subject to the restrictions basis” to entities (which have not been sanctioned) in countries subject to the restrictions
described above.12 described above.12
Subsequent Arrangements
Section 131 of the AEA details procedures for subsequent arrangements to nuclear cooperation Section 131 of the AEA details procedures for subsequent arrangements to nuclear cooperation
agreements concluded pursuant to Section 123. Such arrangements are required for forms of agreements concluded pursuant to Section 123. Such arrangements are required for forms of
nuclear cooperation requiring additional congressional approval, such as transfers of nuclear nuclear cooperation requiring additional congressional approval, such as transfers of nuclear
material or technology and cooperating states’ enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear materials material or technology and cooperating states’ enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear materials
transferred pursuant to the agreement. Subsequent arrangements may also include arrangements transferred pursuant to the agreement. Subsequent arrangements may also include arrangements
for physical security, storage, or disposition of spent nuclear fuel; the application of safeguards on for physical security, storage, or disposition of spent nuclear fuel; the application of safeguards on
nuclear materials or equipment; or “any other arrangement which the President finds to be nuclear materials or equipment; or “any other arrangement which the President finds to be
important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.” important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.”
Before entering into a subsequent arrangement, the Secretary of Energy must publish in the Before entering into a subsequent arrangement, the Secretary of Energy must publish in the
Federal Register a determination that the arrangement “will not be inimical to the common a determination that the arrangement “will not be inimical to the common
defense and security.” A proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before 15 days defense and security.” A proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before 15 days
after publication of both this determination and notice of the proposed arrangement. The after publication of both this determination and notice of the proposed arrangement. The
Secretary of State is required to prepare an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Secretary of State is required to prepare an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement (NPAS) if, “in the view of” the Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Statement (NPAS) if, “in the view of” the Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of
Defense, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a proposed subsequent arrangement “might Defense, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a proposed subsequent arrangement “might
significantly contribute to proliferation.” The Secretary of State is to submit the NPAS to the significantly contribute to proliferation.” The Secretary of State is to submit the NPAS to the
Secretary of Energy within 60 days of receiving a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement. Secretary of Energy within 60 days of receiving a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement.
The President may waive the 60-day requirement if the Secretary of State so requests, but must The President may waive the 60-day requirement if the Secretary of State so requests, but must
notify both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee of any notify both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee of any
such waiver and the justification for it. The Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent such waiver and the justification for it. The Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent
arrangement before receiving the NPAS. arrangement before receiving the NPAS.
Section 131 specifies requirements for certain types of subsequent arrangements. Section 131b. Section 131 specifies requirements for certain types of subsequent arrangements. Section 131b.
describes procedures for the executive branch to follow before entering into a subsequent describes procedures for the executive branch to follow before entering into a subsequent
arrangement involving the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear material or nuclear material arrangement involving the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear material or nuclear material
produced with U.S.-supplied nuclear technology. These procedures also cover subsequent produced with U.S.-supplied nuclear technology. These procedures also cover subsequent
arrangements allowing the retransfer of such material to a “third country for reprocessing” or “the arrangements allowing the retransfer of such material to a “third country for reprocessing” or “the
subsequent retransfer” of more than 500 grams of any plutonium produced by reprocessing such subsequent retransfer” of more than 500 grams of any plutonium produced by reprocessing such
material. The Secretary of Energy must provide both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and material. The Secretary of Energy must provide both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and
Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a report describing the reasons for entering into the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a report describing the reasons for entering into the
arrangement. Additionally, 15 days of continuous session must elapse before the Secretary may arrangement. Additionally, 15 days of continuous session must elapse before the Secretary may
enter into the arrangement, unless the President judges that “an emergency exists due to enter into the arrangement, unless the President judges that “an emergency exists due to
unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate entry” into the arrangement. In such a case, the unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate entry” into the arrangement. In such a case, the
waiting period would be 15 calendar days. waiting period would be 15 calendar days.
If a subsequent arrangement described in the above paragraph involves a facility that has not If a subsequent arrangement described in the above paragraph involves a facility that has not
processed spent nuclear reactor fuel prior to March 10, 1978 (when the Nuclear Nonproliferation processed spent nuclear reactor fuel prior to March 10, 1978 (when the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act of 1978 was enacted), the Secretaries of State and Energy must judge that the arrangement Act of 1978 was enacted), the Secretaries of State and Energy must judge that the arrangement
“will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation.” In making this judgment, the “will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation.” In making this judgment, the
Secretaries are to give “foremost consideration ... to whether or not the reprocessing or retransfer Secretaries are to give “foremost consideration ... to whether or not the reprocessing or retransfer
will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any
diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear weapon state could transform the diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear weapon state could transform the

12 For details on these sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, 12 For details on these sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
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diverted material into a nuclear explosive device.”13 For a subsequent arrangement involving diverted material into a nuclear explosive device.”13 For a subsequent arrangement involving
reprocessing in a facility that has processed spent nuclear reactor fuel prior to March 10, 1978, reprocessing in a facility that has processed spent nuclear reactor fuel prior to March 10, 1978,
the Secretary of Energy will “attempt to ensure” that reprocessing “shall take place under the Secretary of Energy will “attempt to ensure” that reprocessing “shall take place under
conditions” that would satisfy the timelyconditions” that would satisfy the timely- warning conditions described above. Section 131f. warning conditions described above. Section 131f.
specifies procedures for congressional approval of subsequent arrangements involving the storage specifies procedures for congressional approval of subsequent arrangements involving the storage
or disposition of foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States. or disposition of foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States.
Section 133 states that, before approving a subsequent arrangement involving certain transfers of Section 133 states that, before approving a subsequent arrangement involving certain transfers of
special nuclear material, the Secretary of Energy must consult with the Secretary of Defense “on special nuclear material, the Secretary of Energy must consult with the Secretary of Defense “on
whether the physical protection of that material during the export or transfer will be adequate to whether the physical protection of that material during the export or transfer will be adequate to
deter theft, sabotage, and other acts of international terrorism which would result in the diversion deter theft, sabotage, and other acts of international terrorism which would result in the diversion
of that material.”14 If the Secretary of Defense determines that “the export or transfer might be of that material.”14 If the Secretary of Defense determines that “the export or transfer might be
subject to a genuine terrorist threat,” that Secretary is required to provide a written risk subject to a genuine terrorist threat,” that Secretary is required to provide a written risk
assessment of the risk and a “description of the actions” that he or she “considers necessary to assessment of the risk and a “description of the actions” that he or she “considers necessary to
upgrade physical protection measures.” upgrade physical protection measures.”
Examples of Subsequent Arrangements
U.S.-Japan Agreement
The first test of the subsequent arrangement provisions came in August 1978, when the The first test of the subsequent arrangement provisions came in August 1978, when the
Department of Energy informed the House and Senate foreign relations committees of a Japanese Department of Energy informed the House and Senate foreign relations committees of a Japanese
request for approval of the transfer of spent fuel assemblies from Japan to the United Kingdom request for approval of the transfer of spent fuel assemblies from Japan to the United Kingdom
for reprocessing. This was the first “subsequent arrangement” approved. The United States and for reprocessing. This was the first “subsequent arrangement” approved. The United States and
Japan entered into similar arrangements until 1988, when the two governments revised their Japan entered into similar arrangements until 1988, when the two governments revised their
nuclear cooperation agreement. That agreement included an “implementing agreement,” which nuclear cooperation agreement. That agreement included an “implementing agreement,” which
provided 30-year advance consent for the transfer of spent fuel from Japan to Europe for provided 30-year advance consent for the transfer of spent fuel from Japan to Europe for
reprocessing. While controversial, Congress did not block the nuclear cooperation agreement. reprocessing. While controversial, Congress did not block the nuclear cooperation agreement.
A subsequent arrangement was also necessary for the sea transport from Europe to Japan of A subsequent arrangement was also necessary for the sea transport from Europe to Japan of
plutonium that had been separated from the Japanese spent fuel. The Department of Energy plutonium that had been separated from the Japanese spent fuel. The Department of Energy
approved a Japanese request for 30-year advance consent for the sea transport of plutonium. It approved a Japanese request for 30-year advance consent for the sea transport of plutonium. It
was submitted to Congress as a subsequent arrangement, and took effect in October 1988. was submitted to Congress as a subsequent arrangement, and took effect in October 1988.
U.S.-India Agreement
The U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India grants New Delhi consent to reprocess The U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India grants New Delhi consent to reprocess
nuclear material transferred pursuant to the agreement, as well as “nuclear material and by-nuclear material transferred pursuant to the agreement, as well as “nuclear material and by-
product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or
equipment so transferred.” However, the agreement also includes a requirement that India first equipment so transferred.” However, the agreement also includes a requirement that India first
build a new national reprocessing facility to be operated under IAEA safeguards. The two build a new national reprocessing facility to be operated under IAEA safeguards. The two
countries signed a subsequent arrangement on July 30, 2010, which governs the procedures for countries signed a subsequent arrangement on July 30, 2010, which governs the procedures for
operating two new reprocessing facilities in India. The agreement also describes procedures for operating two new reprocessing facilities in India. The agreement also describes procedures for
U.S. officials to inspect and receive information about physical protection measures at the new U.S. officials to inspect and receive information about physical protection measures at the new
facilities. The arrangement would not have taken effect if Congress had adopted a joint resolution facilities. The arrangement would not have taken effect if Congress had adopted a joint resolution

13 These provisions also apply to facilities that, prior to March 18, 1978, did not have a subsequent arrangement for 13 These provisions also apply to facilities that, prior to March 18, 1978, did not have a subsequent arrangement for
reprocessing. reprocessing.
14 This section applies to “the export or transfer of more than 2 kilograms of plutonium or more than 5 kilograms of 14 This section applies to “the export or transfer of more than 2 kilograms of plutonium or more than 5 kilograms of
uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233 or the isotope 235.” uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233 or the isotope 235.”
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of disapproval within 30 days of continuous session; Congress did not adopt such a resolution.15 of disapproval within 30 days of continuous session; Congress did not adopt such a resolution.15
If India were to construct any additional facilities to reprocess fuel from U.S.-supplied reactors, a If India were to construct any additional facilities to reprocess fuel from U.S.-supplied reactors, a
new subsequent arrangement would need to be submitted to Congress. new subsequent arrangement would need to be submitted to Congress.
Termination of Cooperation
Section 129a. of the AEA requires that the United States end exports of nuclear materials and Section 129a. of the AEA requires that the United States end exports of nuclear materials and
equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any ~~nonnuclear-~~non-nuclear weapon state that, after March 10, weapon state that, after March 10,
1978, the President determines to have detonated a nuclear explosive device; terminated or 1978, the President determines to have detonated a nuclear explosive device; terminated or
abrogated IAEA safeguards; materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or engaged in abrogated IAEA safeguards; materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or engaged in
activities involving source or special nuclear material and having “direct significance” for the activities involving source or special nuclear material and having “direct significance” for the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and “has failed to take steps which, in manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and “has failed to take steps which, in
the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities.” the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities.”
Section 129a. also requires that the United States halt exports to any nation the President Section 129a. also requires that the United States halt exports to any nation the President
determines to have materially violated the terms of an agreement for cooperation with the United determines to have materially violated the terms of an agreement for cooperation with the United
States; assisted, encouraged, or induced any States; assisted, encouraged, or induced any ~~nonnuclear-~~non-nuclear weapon state to obtain nuclear explosives weapon state to obtain nuclear explosives
or the materials and technologies needed to manufacture them; or retransferred or entered into an or the materials and technologies needed to manufacture them; or retransferred or entered into an
agreement for exporting reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a agreement for exporting reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a ~~nonnuclear-~~
non-nuclear weapon state, unless in connection with an international agreement to which the United States weapon state, unless in connection with an international agreement to which the United States
subscribes. subscribes.
The President can waive termination of exports if the President determines that “cessation of such The President can waive termination of exports if the President determines that “cessation of such
exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of ~~United States~~U.S. nonproliferation nonproliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” The President must submit objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” The President must submit
this determination to Congress, which is then to be referred to the House Committee on Foreign this determination to Congress, which is then to be referred to the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 60 days of continuous session. The Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 60 days of continuous session. The
determination becomes effective unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing the determination becomes effective unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing the
determination. determination.
Part 810 Agreements16
Section 57.b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act allows for limited forms of nuclear cooperation Section 57.b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act allows for limited forms of nuclear cooperation
related to the “development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United related to the “development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United
States” if that activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy following a determination States” if that activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy following a determination
that it “will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.” The Secretary may only make that it “will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.” The Secretary may only make
such a finding with “the concurrence of the Department of State, and after consultation with the such a finding with “the concurrence of the Department of State, and after consultation with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], the Department of Commerce, and the Department of
Defense.”17 Authorizations of such activities are also known as “Part 810 authorizations,” after 10 Defense.”17 Authorizations of such activities are also known as “Part 810 authorizations,” after 10
Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 810. Part 810 regulations describe activities that are Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 810. Part 810 regulations describe activities that are
“generally authorized” by the Secretary of Energy and activities that require “specific “generally authorized” by the Secretary of Energy and activities that require “specific
authorization” by the Secretary. Some “generally authorized activities” are limited to a list of authorization” by the Secretary. Some “generally authorized activities” are limited to a list of

15 Section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (P.L. 15 Section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (P.L.
110-369), which approved the U.S.-India cooperation agreement, specifies procedures (different from those described 110-369), which approved the U.S.-India cooperation agreement, specifies procedures (different from those described
in the Atomic Energy Act) for Congress to consider subsequent arrangements to that agreement. in the Atomic Energy Act) for Congress to consider subsequent arrangements to that agreement.
16 See CRS In Focus IF11183, 16 See CRS In Focus IF11183, Nuclear Cooperation: Part 810 Authorizations, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. , by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin. Nikitin.
17 The Secretary must also consult the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the case of transfers to China or 17 The Secretary must also consult the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the case of transfers to China or
Russia. Russia.
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

“generally authorized destinations.”18 These regulations also detail “reporting requirements for “generally authorized destinations.”18 These regulations also detail “reporting requirements for
authorized activities.” authorized activities.”
Part 810 authorizations mostly involve unclassified nuclear technology transfer and services, such Part 810 authorizations mostly involve unclassified nuclear technology transfer and services, such
as nuclear reactor designs, nuclear facility operational information and training, and nuclear fuel as nuclear reactor designs, nuclear facility operational information and training, and nuclear fuel
fabrication. Civil nuclear cooperation agreements under Section 123 of the AEA are not required fabrication. Civil nuclear cooperation agreements under Section 123 of the AEA are not required
for an 810 authorization or for transmission of nuclear-related information, except for restricted for an 810 authorization or for transmission of nuclear-related information, except for restricted
data. The NRC may also authorize activities governed by Part 810 authorizations under a 123 data. The NRC may also authorize activities governed by Part 810 authorizations under a 123
agreement or under a subsequent arrangement to such an agreement. agreement or under a subsequent arrangement to such an agreement.
Part 810.9 includes “[w]hether the United States has an agreement for cooperation in force Part 810.9 includes “[w]hether the United States has an agreement for cooperation in force
covering exports to the country or entity involved” as a factor for the Secretary of Energy to use covering exports to the country or entity involved” as a factor for the Secretary of Energy to use
in determining that an activity “will not be inimical to the interest [sic] of the United States.” in determining that an activity “will not be inimical to the interest [sic] of the United States.”
Moreover, the list of “generally authorized destinations” is “based principally on the United Moreover, the list of “generally authorized destinations” is “based principally on the United
States agreements for civil nuclear cooperation,” according to guidance from the National States agreements for civil nuclear cooperation,” according to guidance from the National
Nuclear Security Administration.19 Nuclear Security Administration.19

18 A list of such destinations is available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/10/appendix-A_to_part_810. 18 A list of such destinations is available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/10/appendix-A_to_part_810.
19 https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/nei_faqs_final_9-12-16_final_gc-53_adh.pdf. 19 https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/nei_faqs_final_9-12-16_final_gc-53_adh.pdf.
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Appendix A. Key Dates for Bilateral Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation (“Section 123”) Agreements
Table A-1. Key Dates
Most Recent
Agreement
Original
Country
Signed
Entered into Force Duration
Expiration
Renewal Termsa Agreementb

Argentina Argentina
February 29, 1996 February 29, 1996
October 16, 1997 October 16, 1997
30 years 30 years
October 16, 2027 October 16, 2027
Extension by Extension by
agreement of the agreement of the
parties parties
Australi Australiac
May 4, 2010 May 4, 2010
December 22, 2010 December 22, 2010
30 years 30 years
December 22, December 22,
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
1956 1956
2040 2040
renewals after 30 renewals after 30
years years
Brazil Brazil
October 14, 1997 October 14, 1997
September 15, 1999 September 15, 1999
30 years 30 years
September 15, September 15,
Extension by Extension by
1972 1972
2029 2029
agreement of the agreement of the
parties parties
Canada Canada
June 23, 1999 June 23, 1999
December 13, 1999 December 13, 1999
30 years 30 years
January 1, 2030 January 1, 2030
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
1955 1955
renewals after 30 renewals after 30
years years
Chin Chinad
April 13, 2015 April 13, 2015
October 29, 2015 October 29, 2015
30 years 30 years
October 29, 2045 October 29, 2045
None specified None specified
1985 1985
European European
November 7, 1995 November 7, 1995
April 12, 1996 April 12, 1996
30 years 30 years
April 12, 2026 April 12, 2026
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
1958 1958
Atomic Atomic
renewals after 30 renewals after 30
Energy Energy
years years
Community Community
(Eurato(Euratom)e

Indi Indiaf
October 10, 2008 October 10, 2008
December 6, 2008 December 6, 2008
40 years 40 years
December 6, 2048 December 6, 2048
Automatic 10-yr Automatic 10-yr
renewals after 40 renewals after 40
years years
Indonesia Indonesia
June 30, 1980 June 30, 1980
December 30, 1981 December 30, 1981
50 years 50 years
December 30, December 30,
None specified None specified
1960 1960
2031 2031
International May 11, 1959 International May 11, 1959
August 7, 1959 August 7, 1959
95 years 95 years
August 7, 2054 August 7, 2054
None specified None specified
1959 1959
Atomic Atomic
( (~~Amended~~amended
Energy Energy
in 1974, in 1974,
Agency Agency
1980, 1980,
(IAEA) (IAEA)
~~Renewed~~renewed
in 2014) in 2014)
Japan Japan
November 4, 1987 November 4, 1987
July 17, 1988 July 17, 1988
30 years 30 years
July 17, 2018 July 17, 2018
Remains in force Remains in force
1968 1968
until terminated by until terminated by
a party a party

Kazakhstan Kazakhstan
November 18, 1997 November 5, 1999 November 18, 1997 November 5, 1999
30 years 30 years
November 5, 2029 None specified November 5, 2029 None specified
Republic of Republic of
November 24, 1972 November 25, 2015 November 24, 1972 November 25, 2015
20 years 20 years
November 24, November 24,
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
1956 1956
Korea Korea
(proposed renewal (proposed renewal
2035 2035
renewals after 20 renewals after 20
agreement signed agreement signed
years years
June 15, 2015) June 15, 2015)
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Most Recent
Agreement
Original
Country
Signed
Entered into Force Duration
Expiration
Renewal Termsa Agreementb
Mexico Mexico
May 7, 2018 May 7, 2018
November 2, 2022 November 2, 2022
30 years 30 years
November 2, 2052 None specified November 2, 2052 None specified

Morocco Morocco
May 30, 1980 May 30, 1980
May 16, 1981 May 16, 1981
30 years 30 years
May 16, 2021 May 16, 2021
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
renewals after 30 renewals after 30
years years
Nor Norwayg
June 11, 2016 June 11, 2016
January 19, 2017 January 19, 2017
30 years 30 years
January 19, 2047 January 19, 2047
None specified None specified
1984 1984
Philippines Philippines
November 16, 2023 November 16, 2023 ~~In congressional~~July 2, 2024
30 years 30 years
Thirty years after Thirty years after
Discussions on Discussions on

~~review period~~
entry into force entry into force
extension to begin extension to begin
no less than 2 no less than 2
years before years before
expiration expiration

Russian Russian
May 6, 2008 May 6, 2008
January 11, 2011 January 11, 2011
30 years 30 years
January 11, 2041 January 11, 2041
None specified None specified
Federation Federation
South South
August 25, 1995 August 25, 1995
December 4, 1997 December 4, 1997
25 years + 1995 agreement 25 years + 1995 agreement
None specified None specified
1957 1957
Afri Africah
4-year 4-year
expired December expired December
extensio extensionc 4, 2022. Extension 4, 2022. Extension
in force until in force until
December 4, 2026 December 4, 2026
Switzerland Switzerland
October 31, 1997 October 31, 1997
June 23, 1998 June 23, 1998
30 years 30 years
June 23, 2028 June 23, 2028
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
1965 1965
renewals after 30 renewals after 30
years years
Taiwan Taiwan
December 20, 2013 December 20, 2013
June 22, 2014 June 22, 2014
amended amended
none none
n/a n/a
1955 1955
(TECRO) (TECRO)
in 1974, in 1974,
to 30 to 30
years; years;
renewed renewed
in 2014 to in 2014 to
indefinite indefinite
duration duration

Turkey Turkey
July 26, 2000 July 26, 2000
June 2, 2008 June 2, 2008
15 years 15 years
June 2, 2023 June 2, 2023
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr
renewals after 15 renewals after 15
years years

Ukraine Ukraine
May 6, 1998 May 6, 1998
May 28, 1999 May 28, 1999
30 years 30 years
May 28, 2029 May 28, 2029
None specified None specified

United Arab May 21, 2009 United Arab May 21, 2009
December 17, 2009 December 17, 2009
30 years 30 years
December 17, December 17,
None specified None specified
Emirates Emirates
2039 2039
United United
May 4, 2018 May 4, 2018
December 31, 2020 December 31, 2020
30 years 30 years
December 31, December 31,
None specified None specified
Formerly Formerly
Kingdom Kingdom
2050 2050
under under
EURATOM EURATOM
agreement agreement
Vietnam Vietnam
May 6, 2014 May 6, 2014
October 3, 2014 October 3, 2014
30 years 30 years
October 3, 2044 October 3, 2044
Automatic 5-yr Automatic 5-yr

renewals after 30 renewals after 30
years years
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Sources: CRS; Text of Agreements; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “123 CRS; Text of Agreements; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “123
Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation.”Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/123-agreements-peaceful-cooperationhttps://www.energy.gov/nnsa/123-agreements-peaceful-cooperation.
a. If renewal terms are not specified, then a new Section 123 agreement would need to be negotiated and a. If renewal terms are not specified, then a new Section 123 agreement would need to be negotiated and
submitted to Congress for the required review. submitted to Congress for the required review.
b. The “Original Agreement” field refers to the year that the first civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was b. The “Original Agreement” field refers to the year that the first civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was
concluded with that country. If it is blank, the current agreement is the first such agreement. concluded with that country. If it is blank, the current agreement is the first such agreement.
c. A bilateral Section 123 agreement on the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information was concluded c. A bilateral Section 123 agreement on the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information was concluded
in 2021. in 2021. Agreement Between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom on the Exchange of Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Information, Message from the President of the United States, 117th Cong., 1st sess., H.Doc. , 117th Cong., 1st sess., H.Doc.
117-77, December 2, 2021. 117-77, December 2, 2021.
d. P.L. 99-183 approved the original 1985 agreement but prohibited licenses from being issued until the d. P.L. 99-183 approved the original 1985 agreement but prohibited licenses from being issued until the
President certified that transferred items would be used for solely peaceful purposes and reported to President certified that transferred items would be used for solely peaceful purposes and reported to
Congress on China’s nonproliferation policies. Fol owing the Tiananmen Square crackdown, P.L. 101-246 Congress on China’s nonproliferation policies. Fol owing the Tiananmen Square crackdown, P.L. 101-246
(FY1990 Foreign Relations Authorization Act) also suspended nuclear cooperation with China. President (FY1990 Foreign Relations Authorization Act) also suspended nuclear cooperation with China. President
Clinton issued the required waiver, report, and certification in January 1998. The required congressional Clinton issued the required waiver, report, and certification in January 1998. The required congressional
review period ended on March 18, 1998, and implementation of the agreement was then allowed. See also review period ended on March 18, 1998, and implementation of the agreement was then allowed. See also
CRS Report RL33192, CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and , by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and
Paul K. Kerr. Paul K. Kerr.
e. Euratom member states include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, e. Euratom member states include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
f. f.
P.L. 109-401 and P.L. 110-369 approved the agreement with conditions. See CRS Report RL33016, P.L. 109-401 and P.L. 110-369 approved the agreement with conditions. See CRS Report RL33016, U.S.
Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
g. P.L. 114-320 approved the 2016 renewal agreement. g. P.L. 114-320 approved the 2016 renewal agreement.
h. h. Text of Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the U.S. and the Republic of South Africa
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Communication from the President of the United States, 117th Cong., , 117th Cong.,
2nd sess., H.Doc. 117-139, September 2, 2022. 2nd sess., H.Doc. 117-139, September 2, 2022.
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Appendix B. Enrichment and Reprocessing
Restrictions
Although some experts have advocated requiring governments to forgo enrichment and Although some experts have advocated requiring governments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing (a nonproliferation commitment sometimes referred to as the “Gold Standard”) as a reprocessing (a nonproliferation commitment sometimes referred to as the “Gold Standard”) as a
condition for concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does condition for concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does
not include such a requirement. In recent years, the United States has attempted to persuade not include such a requirement. In recent years, the United States has attempted to persuade
certain countries with which it is negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements to forgo enrichment certain countries with which it is negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements to forgo enrichment
and reprocessing and conclude Additional Protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency and reprocessing and conclude Additional Protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards agreements; past U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements have not included these (IAEA) safeguards agreements; past U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements have not included these
additional components. The AEA does mandate that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements require additional components. The AEA does mandate that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements require
U.S. consent for any “alteration in form or content” (to include enrichment or reprocessing) of U.S. consent for any “alteration in form or content” (to include enrichment or reprocessing) of
U.S.-origin material or any material processed in a plant containing transferred U.S. nuclear U.S.-origin material or any material processed in a plant containing transferred U.S. nuclear
technology. Such agreements also require U.S. consent for any retransfer of material or technology. Such agreements also require U.S. consent for any retransfer of material or
technology. technology.
The United States has argued that its December 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the The United States has argued that its December 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) could set a useful precedent for mitigating the dangers of nuclear United Arab Emirates (UAE) could set a useful precedent for mitigating the dangers of nuclear
proliferation.20 For example, President Barack Obama’s May 21, 2009, letter transmitting the proliferation.20 For example, President Barack Obama’s May 21, 2009, letter transmitting the
agreement to Congress argued that the agreement had “the potential to serve as a model for other agreement to Congress argued that the agreement had “the potential to serve as a model for other
countries in the region that wish to pursue responsible nuclear energy development.” Similarly, countries in the region that wish to pursue responsible nuclear energy development.” Similarly,
then-State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley described the agreement as “the gold standard” then-State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley described the agreement as “the gold standard”
during an August 5, 2010, press briefing, although the Obama Administration generally did not during an August 5, 2010, press briefing, although the Obama Administration generally did not
use this term when describing its nuclear cooperation policies. use this term when describing its nuclear cooperation policies.
The U.S.-UAE agreement’s status as a potential model is grounded in two nonproliferation The U.S.-UAE agreement’s status as a potential model is grounded in two nonproliferation
provisions not found in other U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. First, the agreement requires provisions not found in other U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. First, the agreement requires
the country to bring into force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement before the the country to bring into force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement before the
United States licenses “exports of nuclear material, equipment, components, or technology” United States licenses “exports of nuclear material, equipment, components, or technology”
pursuant to the agreement.21 Second, the agreement states that the UAE pursuant to the agreement.21 Second, the agreement states that the UAE
shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engage in shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engage in
activities within its territory for, or relating to, the enrichment or reprocessing of material, activities within its territory for, or relating to, the enrichment or reprocessing of material,
or for the alteration in form or content (except by irradiation or further irradiation or, if or for the alteration in form or content (except by irradiation or further irradiation or, if
agreed by the Parties, post-irradiation examination) of plutonium, uranium 233, high agreed by the Parties, post-irradiation examination) of plutonium, uranium 233, high
enriched uranium, or irradiated source or special fissionable material. enriched uranium, or irradiated source or special fissionable material.
The U.S.-UAE agreement also provides the United States with the right to terminate nuclear The U.S.-UAE agreement also provides the United States with the right to terminate nuclear
cooperation and to require the return of any nuclear “material, equipment or components ... and cooperation and to require the return of any nuclear “material, equipment or components ... and
any special fissionable material produced through their use” if, after the agreement’s entry into any special fissionable material produced through their use” if, after the agreement’s entry into
force, the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in force, the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in
activities within its territory relating to enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.”22 activities within its territory relating to enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.”22
Notwithstanding its characterization of the U.S.-UAE agreement, the Obama Administration Notwithstanding its characterization of the U.S.-UAE agreement, the Obama Administration
announced in December 2013 after an interagency review that renouncing domestic enrichment announced in December 2013 after an interagency review that renouncing domestic enrichment

20 For more information, see CRS Report R40344, 20 For more information, see CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S.
Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr. , by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
21 The IAEA Board of Governors approved the Protocol March 3, 2009. The UAE signed it the next month, and 21 The IAEA Board of Governors approved the Protocol March 3, 2009. The UAE signed it the next month, and
brought it into force December 20, 2010. brought it into force December 20, 2010.
22 The AEA requires that there is no enrichment or reprocessing by the recipient state of transferred nuclear material or 22 The AEA requires that there is no enrichment or reprocessing by the recipient state of transferred nuclear material or
nuclear material produced with materials or facilities transferred pursuant to the agreement without prior approval. nuclear material produced with materials or facilities transferred pursuant to the agreement without prior approval.
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and reprocessing would not be a prerequisite to concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement for and reprocessing would not be a prerequisite to concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement for
all countries, and each partner country would be considered individually.23 The U.S. nuclear all countries, and each partner country would be considered individually.23 The U.S. nuclear
cooperation agreement with Vietnam, which the two governments concluded in 2014, did not cooperation agreement with Vietnam, which the two governments concluded in 2014, did not
include a provision requiring the country to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, although the include a provision requiring the country to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, although the
agreement’s preamble includes a political commitment stating that Vietnam intends to rely on agreement’s preamble includes a political commitment stating that Vietnam intends to rely on
international markets for its nuclear fuel supply, rather than acquiring sensitive nuclear international markets for its nuclear fuel supply, rather than acquiring sensitive nuclear
technologies.24 technologies.24

23 Daniel Horner, “U.S. Policy of Nuclear Pacts Detailed,” 23 Daniel Horner, “U.S. Policy of Nuclear Pacts Detailed,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2014. , January/February 2014.
24 For more information about the Vietnam agreement, see CRS Report R43433, 24 For more information about the Vietnam agreement, see CRS Report R43433, U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark E. Manyin. , by Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark E. Manyin.
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Appendix C. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
Approvals Outside Atomic Energy Act Process
Congress has used legislation to approve nuclear cooperation agreements that did not use the Congress has used legislation to approve nuclear cooperation agreements that did not use the
legislative process mandated by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. legislative process mandated by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended.
Australia25
On May 5, 2010, President Barack Obama submitted a renewed U.S.-Australia nuclear On May 5, 2010, President Barack Obama submitted a renewed U.S.-Australia nuclear
cooperation agreement to Congress for approval. H.R. 6411, which the House adopted on cooperation agreement to Congress for approval. H.R. 6411, which the House adopted on
November 30, 2010, would have approved the agreement even if there had not been sufficient November 30, 2010, would have approved the agreement even if there had not been sufficient
legislative days remaining in the 111th Congress; the Senate did not adopt its version of the bill (S. legislative days remaining in the 111th Congress; the Senate did not adopt its version of the bill (S.
3844). These bills were not needed because the 111th Congress contained a sufficient number of 3844). These bills were not needed because the 111th Congress contained a sufficient number of
days for the agreement to enter into force. days for the agreement to enter into force.
China26
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan submitted the first U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement In 1985, President Ronald Reagan submitted the first U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement
to Congress, which adopted a joint resolution, P.L. 99-183, requiring that the President make to Congress, which adopted a joint resolution, P.L. 99-183, requiring that the President make
certain nonproliferation-related certifications in order for the agreement to be implemented. P.L. certain nonproliferation-related certifications in order for the agreement to be implemented. P.L.
99-183 required a presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of 99-183 required a presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of
continuous session of Congress. P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal continuous session of Congress. P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991, imposed sanctions on China, including suspending nuclear cooperation and Years 1990 and 1991, imposed sanctions on China, including suspending nuclear cooperation and
requiring an additional presidential certification on Beijing’s nuclear nonproliferation assurances. requiring an additional presidential certification on Beijing’s nuclear nonproliferation assurances.
Before a summit with China, President William Clinton on January 12, 1998, signed the required Before a summit with China, President William Clinton on January 12, 1998, signed the required
certifications regarding China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices. Clinton also issued certifications regarding China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices. Clinton also issued
a certification and waived a sanction imposed under P.L. 101-246. Congressional review ended on a certification and waived a sanction imposed under P.L. 101-246. Congressional review ended on
March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented. March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented.
India27
P.L. 109-401, which became law on December 18, 2006, permitted the President to waive several P.L. 109-401, which became law on December 18, 2006, permitted the President to waive several
provisions of the AEA with respect to a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. On September provisions of the AEA with respect to a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. On September
10, 2008, President George W. Bush submitted to Congress a determination that P.L. 109-401’s 10, 2008, President George W. Bush submitted to Congress a determination that P.L. 109-401’s
requirements for such an agreement to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-requirements for such an agreement to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-
369, which approved the agreement, into law on October 8, 2008. 369, which approved the agreement, into law on October 8, 2008.
Norway
The President submitted an extension of the U.S.-Norway nuclear cooperation agreement to The President submitted an extension of the U.S.-Norway nuclear cooperation agreement to
Congress on June 14, 2016. P.L. 114-320, which became law on December 16, 2016, approved Congress on June 14, 2016. P.L. 114-320, which became law on December 16, 2016, approved
the agreement “[n]otwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration” in the AEA, the agreement “[n]otwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration” in the AEA,

25 For more information, see CRS Report R41312, 25 For more information, see CRS Report R41312, U.S.-Australia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress, ,
by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Bruce Vaughn. by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Bruce Vaughn.
26 For more information, see CRS Report RL33192, 26 For more information, see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary , by Mark Holt, Mary
Beth D. Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr. Beth D. Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr.
27 For more information, see CRS Report RL33016, 27 For more information, see CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul , by Paul
K. Kerr. K. Kerr.
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thereby addressing concerns that that there was an insufficient number of legislative days thereby addressing concerns that that there was an insufficient number of legislative days
remaining in the 114th Congress for congressional consideration. remaining in the 114th Congress for congressional consideration.

Author Information

Paul K. Kerr Paul K. Kerr
Mary Beth D. Nikitin Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation Specialist in Nonproliferation
Acting Section Research Manager Acting Section Research Manager

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