Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview,
February 6March 13, 2024 , 2024
U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress
Jim Zanotti
On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
terrorist organization, or FTO) led surprise attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip. terrorist organization, or FTO) led surprise attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip. TheMore than
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
stunning nature, scope, and 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals (including at least 35 U.S. citizens in Israel) were killed. Hamas and other groups also seized 253 hostages on October 7. The stunning nature, scope, and Jeremy M. Sharp lethality of the attacks and apparent intelligence failures have become lethality of the attacks and apparent intelligence failures have become

a subject of analysis for a subject of analysis for Specialist in Middle Israeli and U.S. officials. Iran reportedly provides material support to Israeli and U.S. officials. Iran reportedly provides material support to
Jeremy M. Sharp
Hamas, and according to Hamas, and according to Eastern Affairs U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but President Joe U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but President Joe
Specialist in Middle
Biden said in October “there is Biden said in October “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack. no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.
Eastern Affairs

In response to the October 7 attacks, Israel declared war on Hamas and launched aerial In response to the October 7 attacks, Israel declared war on Hamas and launched aerial
bombardment and ground operations in Gaza. bombardment and ground operations in Gaza. Reportedly, more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign

nationals (including 35 U.S. citizens in Israel) andAs of March 12, 2024, more than more than 2731,000 Palestinians in Gaza have ,000 Palestinians in Gaza have
been killed as of February 5, 2024. Hamas and other groups also seized around 240 hostages on October 7. been killed. Israel and Hamas Israel and Hamas
agreed to a multiday pause in fighting in late November. During the pause, 110 hostages held in Gaza and 250 Palestinian agreed to a multiday pause in fighting in late November. During the pause, 110 hostages held in Gaza and 250 Palestinian
prisoners held by Israel were released. Hamas and others reportedly hold some 130 personsprisoners held by Israel were released. Hamas and others reportedly hold some 130 persons, including about six Americans.
The United Nations has stated that the (with at least 30 probably dead), including about five living Americans. The situation in Gaza, with an estimated 1.7 million Gazans displaced (out of a population situation in Gaza, with an estimated 1.7 million Gazans displaced (out of a population
of approximately 2.1 million people) constitutes a of approximately 2.1 million people) constitutes a major humanitarian crisis—having already faced dire economic and
humanitarian conditions before the conflict. Some goods are entering Gaza via Egypt and Israel, and U.S. and U.N. officials
have sought to boost this aid. More than 60% of the housing units in Gaza have reportedly been destroyed or damaged.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently articulated Israeli goals of securing the hostages’ return and
destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. As tens of thousands of troops have withdrawn and military
operations have decreased somewhat in intensity in early 2024, Israeli leaders continue debating the level and type of military
pressure to apply and the urgency of a hostage-return deal. As of early January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) controls
some areas above ground in northern Gaza, while it engages inhumanitarian crisis. More than 60% of the housing units in Gaza have reportedly been destroyed or damaged. Some food and other essential supplies have entered Gaza via Egypt and Israel during the conflict, but delays and other obstacles to transporting aid through crossings and Israeli checkpoints and then safely delivering it—particularly in northern Gaza—contributed to a late February U.N. assessment that one-quarter of Gaza’s people were “one step away from famine.” Amid an international outcry, assistance deliveries have increased; they remain short of U.N.-assessed needs. In early March, the United States and other countries began taking steps to provide additional humanitarian aid to Gaza via airdrops and a planned maritime corridor, while Israel opened a new land crossing directly into northern Gaza. In response to worsening food insecurity in Gaza, President Biden has ordered the U.S. military to construct a temporary port just offshore from Gaza to facilitate commercial shipments of assistance from Cyprus. The Department of Defense estimates that the port will be ready for use around 60 days from March 8. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for “total victory,” the elimination of Hamas, and the return of all hostages. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has reportedly gained control over key areas of northern Gaza, withdrawn some of its forces, and shifted somewhat toward lower-intensity warfare while continuing operations farther south in an effort to target Hamas and its operations farther south in an effort to target Hamas and its
top leaders. Hamas’s tunnels make urban warfare more challenging. top leaders. Hamas’s tunnels make urban warfare more challenging. Negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, and Qatar have sought to resolve sticking points between Israel and Hamas on a potential multi-week cease-fire and hostage-prisoner exchange deal. The Biden Administration has stated that Israel has the The Biden Administration has stated that Israel has the
right to defend itself, and has resisted calls from other international actors for an indefinite cease-fire. However, U.S. leaders right to defend itself, and has resisted calls from other international actors for an indefinite cease-fire. However, U.S. leaders
have urged Israel to minimize have urged Israel to minimize casualties and increase humanitarian assistance in Gaza. The Administration also has publicly stated concerns about Israel’s plans to eventually move its forces into Gaza’s southernmost city of Rafah, urging Israel not to advance on the city without a credible plan to protect the over 1 million civilians living there—most of whom earlier fled other conflict areas. Differences between officials from the United States, Israel, and the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA)casualties and reduce the intensity of their operations, amid debate regarding how the
prosecution of the conflict may affect long-term outcomes.
Differences between U.S., Israeli, and PA officials on post-conflict security and governance for Gaza may intensify the on post-conflict security and governance for Gaza may intensify the
challenges involved. U.S. officials have expressed support for a resumption of PA administration in Gaza after the PA challenges involved. U.S. officials have expressed support for a resumption of PA administration in Gaza after the PA
undertakes certain reforms, as part of efforts to move toward a two-state solution; PA and other Arab leaders insist on undertakes certain reforms, as part of efforts to move toward a two-state solution; PA and other Arab leaders insist on
progress toward a Palestinian state for them to cooperate with this transition. progress toward a Palestinian state for them to cooperate with this transition. Netanyahu openly opposesPrime Minister Netanyahu has made statements opposing a PA return to power a PA return to power
in Gaza, and has in Gaza, and has pledged to continue insistinginsisted that Israel that Israel should have full security control of “all territory west of the Jordan River,” have full security control of “all territory west of the Jordan River,”
asserting that his asserting that his years-long stance has prevented stance has prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state. the establishment of a Palestinian state.
U.S. officials have sought to reduce risks that the conflict could expand geographically. In the West Bank, amid violence and
tensions between Palestinians and Israelis that could affect stability there, the Administration has imposed sanctions on some
extremist Israeli settlers, delayed a firearms shipment to Israel, and made efforts to persuade Israel to ease or end measures
that have precipitously decreased the revenues of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA). Additionally, the Iran-
backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (another FTO) has exchanged fire with Israel and could create a second front
at the Israel-Lebanon border. U.S. officials are reportedly seeking to help facilitate the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from
border areas to alleviate obstacles to the return of some 80,000 evacuated Israelis to their homes in the north. Israeli officials
have threatened possible military action if the issue is not resolved diplomatically. As of early February, post-October 7
attacks by the Iran-supported Houthi militia in Yemen (targeting commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandab strait in
the Red Sea) and by Iran-allied groups in Iraq and Syria (targeting U.S. forces in both countries and Jordan) have triggered
strikes against these groups by the U.S. military.
In an October 2023 supplemental budget request, President Biden asked Congress to appropriate more than $14 billion in In an October 2023 supplemental budget request, President Biden asked Congress to appropriate more than $14 billion in
Israel-related funding, and more than $9 billion in global humanitarian assistance Israel-related funding, and more than $9 billion in global humanitarian assistance amounts that could partly be allocated for that could partly be allocated for
Gaza, the West Bank, and IsraelGaza, Israel, and the surrounding region. Members of Congress have expressed differing views on the request and its various . Members of Congress have expressed differing views on the request and its various
elements, with elements, with bills introduced in early February in both the House and the Senatesome debate focused on what level of oversight or conditionality (if any) to place on security assistance to Israel and humanitarian assistance to Gaza. The House and Senate have each passed bills and continue to deliberate on the way forward. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 1011 link to page 11 link to page link to page 11 link to page 1113 link to page link to page 1213 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 5 link to page 16 5 link to page 16 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Contents
Conflict Overview ........................................................................................................................... 1
Initial Attacks, Ongoing Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis ..................................................... 1
Areas of Possible Conflict Expansion ....................................................................................... 3
Political Developments ...........................Political Developments and Implications .................................................................................. 4
U.S. Policy ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Israeli Military Operations ..............and Policies .......................................................................................... 5
Potential Post-Conflict Scenarios ............. 5 Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians ................................................................................. 6
U.S. Military Deployments ....Potential Post-Conflict Scenarios ................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Expedited Arms Deliveries to Israel ................................................................................. 7
Possible New U.S. Sales of Combat Aircraft to Israel8 Supplemental Appropriations Legislation .............................................................. 8
Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians ...................................... 8 Possible Options for Congress.............................................................. 8
Supplemental Appropriations Legislation ......................................... 10 Conditioning Aid to Israel ........................................ 9
Possible Options for Congress................................................................................ 10 Congressional Review of Arms Sales to Israel .................................................. 11
Additional U.S. Assistance for Israel and Possible Conditions ................................................ 11
11 Additional Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians and Israel ........to Gaza and UNRWA ....................................................... 12 11
Monitoring U.S. Security Assistance for Human Rights Purposes ......................................... 12

Figures
Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map ......................................................................................... 2

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 13


Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 5 link to page 5 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Conflict Overview
Initial Attacks, Ongoing Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organization, or FTO) led a series of surprise attacks from the Gaza Strip against Israel terrorist organization, or FTO) led a series of surprise attacks from the Gaza Strip against Israel
((seesee Figure 1)..1 Palestine Islamic Jihad (or PIJ, another FTO) claimed that its forces also Palestine Islamic Jihad (or PIJ, another FTO) claimed that its forces also
participated in the attacks, and other militants outside of Hamas and PIJ may also have joined. participated in the attacks, and other militants outside of Hamas and PIJ may also have joined.
The assault targeted Israeli military bases and civilian areas during The assault targeted Israeli military bases and civilian areas during the finala Jewish high holiday. Jewish high holiday.
The October 7 attacks’ scope and lethality had no precedent in the 16 years since Hamas seized The October 7 attacks’ scope and lethality had no precedent in the 16 years since Hamas seized
control of Gaza. The nature of the violence stunned Israelis and many others, and includes control of Gaza. The nature of the violence stunned Israelis and many others, and includes
allegations of sexual violence.allegations of sexual violence.1
2 The apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault or limiting its impact The apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault or limiting its impact
have become a subject of debate in Israel and elsewhere. Some analysts have said that Israel may have become a subject of debate in Israel and elsewhere. Some analysts have said that Israel may
have missed signals, over-relied on technological solutions, and/or misread Hamas’s intentions.have missed signals, over-relied on technological solutions, and/or misread Hamas’s intentions.23
Whether or not Iran had a role in the attack remains a question. Iran reportedly provides material Whether or not Iran had a role in the attack remains a question. Iran reportedly provides material
support to Hamas, and according to U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but support to Hamas, and according to U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but
President Joe Biden said in October “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.President Joe Biden said in October “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.34
In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet declared war on Hamas, and Prime Minister Benjamin In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet declared war on Hamas, and Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu formed an emergency unity government Netanyahu formed an emergency unity government with an opposition partyand “war management cabinet” with key opposition figure Benny Gantz and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Israel also initially . Israel also initially
halted supplies from Israeli territory to Gaza of electricity, food, and fuel. Since the outbreak of halted supplies from Israeli territory to Gaza of electricity, food, and fuel. Since the outbreak of
conflict, Israel and Egypt—via consultations with U.S. and U.N. officials—have coordinated the conflict, Israel and Egypt—via consultations with U.S. and U.N. officials—have coordinated the
use of Egypt’s Rafah crossing with Gaza, and later also Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing, to bring use of Egypt’s Rafah crossing with Gaza, and later also Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing, to bring
some international aid into the territory in a way that seeks to prevent diversion by Hamas. some international aid into the territory in a way that seeks to prevent diversion by Hamas.
Israel’s military mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, has bombarded targets in Gaza from Israel’s military mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, has bombarded targets in Gaza from
the air, and undertaken ground operations as well. About 1.7 million of Gaza’s roughly 2.1 the air, and undertaken ground operations as well. About 1.7 million of Gaza’s roughly 2.1
million people have been displaced from their homes (some multiple times) and million people have been displaced from their homes (some multiple times) and most face
profound humanitarian challenges (discussed below).face a dire “humanitarian situation” (discussed below).5 Reportedly, over 60% of Gaza’s housing units have been destroyed or damaged.6 At various points in the conflict, Hamas and At various points in the conflict, Hamas and
other Gaza-based militants have fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. As of other Gaza-based militants have fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. As of early February,
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) controls some areas above ground in northern Gaza, while it
engages in operations farther south in an effort to target Hamas and its top leaders—including in
Hamas’s vast network of tunnels. Reportedly as of February 5, 2024, more than 1,200 Israelis and
foreign nationals (including 35 U.S. citizens in Israel) and more than 27,000 Palestinians in Gaza
had been killed, and over 60% of Gaza’s housing units have been destroyed or damaged.4

1 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Herzog reveals Hamas ‘Captive Taking Handbook’ in CNN interview,”
October 15, 2023; “Blinken calls sexual violence inflicted by Hamas ‘beyond anything I’ve seen,’” CNN, December
10, 2023.
2mid-March, the Israel Defense 1 For historical context on the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and factors contributing to the current round of violence, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 2 UN News, “‘Clear and convincing information’ that hostages held in Gaza subjected to sexual violence, says UN Special Representative,” March 4, 2024. 3 Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago,” Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago,” New York Times, ,
November 30, 2023; Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Experts React: Assessing the Israeli Intelligence November 30, 2023; Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Experts React: Assessing the Israeli Intelligence
and Potential Policy Failure,” October 25, 2023. and Potential Policy Failure,” October 25, 2023.
34 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript,” CBS News, October 15, 2023; White Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript,” CBS News, October 15, 2023; White
House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” October House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” October
10, 2023. For more information on Hamas, its possible reasons for the attacks, and Iranian material support for Hamas, 10, 2023. For more information on Hamas, its possible reasons for the attacks, and Iranian material support for Hamas,
see CRS In Focus IF12549, see CRS In Focus IF12549, Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
4 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and
Israel | Flash Update #111,” February 5, 2024; “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact | Day 121,”
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

1

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map

Hamas and other groups reportedly seized around 240 Israeli and foreign national hostages on
October 7, including some Americans. Recovering hostages has been a major Israeli and U.S.
concern. Qatar, Egypt, and the United States facilitated a multiday pause in fighting between
Israel and Hamas in the final week of November. During the pause, 110 hostages held in Gaza
(including two U.S.-Israeli dual citizens) and 250 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were
released.5 Hamas and other groups reportedly still hold around 130 persons in Gaza, including
about six Americans, but reports suggest that some of these hostages could be dead.6
The conflict’s impact on civilians has generated a humanitarian crisis. As of early February, U.N.
and World Health Organization officials have raised many public health concerns associated with
overcrowding; acute water, food, and fuel shortages; poor sanitation; and challenges to hospitals’
safety and functionality.7

February 55 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” February 5, 2024. 6 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact | Day 157,” March 12, 2024. Palestinian housing damage figures come from the Hamas-controlled government media office in Gaza. Congressional Research Service 1 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress Forces (IDF) had consolidated ground operations in parts of northern Gaza, while it continues operations farther south; Hamas and other militias have continued mortar and other attacks. Since January, Israel has withdrawn tens of thousands of troops and shifted somewhat toward lower-intensity warfare. Israeli leaders have said they eventually plan to conduct a major ground operation to secure Gaza’s southernmost city of Rafah to corner Hamas’s leaders and intact fighting units, triggering major U.S. and international concern about the safety and welfare of the over 1 million civilians there—most of whom earlier fled other conflict areas. Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map Reportedly as of March 12, 2024, more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals (including at least 35 U.S. citizens in Israel) were killed as a result of the October 7 attacks, more than 31,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed, and more than 245 Israeli soldiers died since Israel’s military began ground operations in Gaza.7 While various estimates indicate that between 6,000 and 13,000 of some 30,000 Hamas fighters have been killed, Hamas’s unconventional tactics and tunnel network have helped its resilience and allowed its most senior leaders to elude Israel.8 Hamas and other groups reportedly seized 253 Israeli and foreign national hostages on October 7, including some Americans.9 Recovering hostages has been a major Israeli and U.S. concern. 7 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #137,” March 12, 2024; Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Tel Aviv, Israel, , 2024; Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Tel Aviv, Israel,
November 3, 2023. Palestinian casualty figures November 3, 2023. Palestinian casualty figures and housing damage figures come from the Hamas-controlled health come from the Hamas-controlled health
ministry and government media office in Gaza, respectively. Additionally, Israel reported that the bodies of around
1,500 dead militants had been found as of October 10 in southern Israeli areas recaptured by its military. More than 220
Israeli soldiers have been killed since Israel’s military began ground operations in Gaza.
5 Erin Banco, “Gaza hostage talks hit roadblock, raising fears of prolonged captivity” Politico, December 7, 2023. Four
hostagesministry in Gaza. 8 Marcus Walker et al., “Why Hamas Thinks It Still Could Win the War,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2024; “Gaza airstrike takes out senior Hamas recruiter as IDF raises troop death toll to 246,” Times of Israel, March 4, 2024. 9 “Israel says 253 people taken hostage on October 7, announcing firm number for the first time,” CNN, January 17, 2024. Congressional Research Service 2 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress Qatar, Egypt, and the United States facilitated a multiday pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas in the final week of November. During the pause, 110 hostages held in Gaza (including (including two U.S.-Israeli dual citizens) and 250 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were released.10 Hamas and other groups reportedly still hold around 130 persons in Gaza (including about five living Americans), with reports suggesting that at least 30 of these hostages are probably dead.11 Throughout the humanitarian crisis, U.N. and World Health Organization (WHO) officials have raised many public health concerns associated with overcrowding; acute water, food, and fuel shortages; poor sanitation; and challenges to hospitals’ safety and functionality.12two Americans) were released before the late November pause.
6 Peter Saidel et al., “Hamas Took More Than 200 Hostages from Israel,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2024. On
December 15, Israeli forces killed three unarmed Israeli hostages who were attempting to surrender to them.
7 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #111,” February 5, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

2

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Observers debate how to apportion blame between Israel and Hamas for dangers to civilians and Observers debate how to apportion blame between Israel and Hamas for dangers to civilians and
the worsening of already dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza. While those faulting Israel argue the worsening of already dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza. While those faulting Israel argue
that Israeli actions have inflicted casualties and limited life-sustaining supplies, those blaming that Israeli actions have inflicted casualties and limited life-sustaining supplies, those blaming
Hamas assert that Hamas personnel in Gaza and other militants reportedly contribute to making Hamas assert that Hamas personnel in Gaza and other militants reportedly contribute to making
civilian areas and facilities unsafe by operating in or near them.civilian areas and facilities unsafe by operating in or near them.8
Areas of Possible Conflict Expansion
Since the October 7 attacks, significant U.S. and international attention has focused on the extent
to which conflict might expand in other areas of the region.
West Bank. Tensions and violence have continued between Palestinians and Israelis. West Bank-
based officials from the Palestinian Authority/Palestine Liberation Organization (PA/PLO)
appear to be in a difficult position. While they do not endorse Hamas, they have refrained from
publicly condemning it, perhaps because of a perceived spike in West Bank Palestinian support
for Hamas that may stem from Hamas’s military actions, the prisoner releases it has secured, and
civilian suffering in Gaza.9 U.S. officials and lawmakers have signaled concerns related to Israeli
actions in the West Bank that may affect stable living conditions for Palestinians. The
Administration has imposed visa bans on some extremist Israeli settlers,10 delayed a firearms
shipment to Israel,11 and has called on Israel to ease or end measures that have precipitously
decreased PA revenues since October 7.12 Additionally, in early February, President Biden issued
an executive order authorizing “financial sanctions against those directing or participating in
certain actions, including acts or threats of violence against civilians, intimidating civilians to
cause them to leave their homes, destroying or seizing property, or engaging in terrorist activity in
the West Bank”;13 and imposed sanctions on four individuals.14
Iran-backed actors elsewhere. Iran supports several non-state actors across the Middle East, and
armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen expressing support for the October 7 attacks
have attacked Israeli or U.S. positions. Israel has exchanged fire with the Shia Islamist group
Lebanese Hezbollah (an FTO) and Palestinian militants across Israel’s northern border with
Lebanon. If these clashes escalate, Hezbollah’s arsenal of some 150,000 missiles and rockets
could pose a grave threat to Israeli strategic sites and population centers.15 U.S. officials are
reportedly seeking to broker a withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from border areas to facilitate the

8 See, for example, Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Under Scrutiny Over Gaza, Israel Points to Civilian Toll of
U.S. Wars,” New York Times, November 7, 2023.
9 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Public Opinion Poll No. 90,” published December 13, 2023.
10 Department of State, “Announcement of Visa Restriction Policy to Promote Peace, Security, and Stability in the
West Bank,” December 5, 2023.
11 Nancy A. Youssef and Vivian Salama, “Washington Is Blocking Shipment of Rifles to Israel,” Wall Street Journal,
December 14, 2023.
12 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” January 9, 2024; Letter dated December
20, 2023 from 12 Senators to President Biden, available at
https://www.heinrich.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_potus_west_bank.pdf; “In ‘frustrating’ call, Biden said to tell
PM to resolve Palestinian tax funds issue,” Times of Israel, December 29, 2023.
13 White House, “Statement from National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Action to Promote Peace, Security, and
Stability in the West Bank,” and “Executive Order on Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace,
Security, and Stability in the West Bank,” February 1, 2024.
14 Department of State, “Announcement of Further Measures to Promote Peace, Security, and Stability in the West
Bank,” February 1, 2024.
15 Yehoshua Kalisky, “Precision Missiles, UAVs, and Tens of Thousands of Fighters: Hezbollah’s Order of Battle,”
Institute for National Security Studies, October 19, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

3

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

return of an estimated 80,000 evacuated Israelis to their homes in the north.16 Israeli officials have
threatened wider military action to address the issue absent a diplomatic resolution.17
As of early 2024, post-October 7 attacks by the Houthi militia in Yemen have targeted shipping
lanes that transit the Bab al Mandab strait—significantly disrupting maritime trade and triggering
military responses from U.S. and United Kingdom forces.18 Groups in Iraq and Syria have
attacked U.S. forces stationed in the region over 160 times, including a January 29 drone attack in
Jordan that killed three U.S. soldiers and injured more than 40. In early February, U.S. forces
conducted additional retaliatory strikes against Iranian and Iran-backed forces in Iraq and Syria.19
Political Developments
Israel. Israel’s “war management cabinet” includes key opposition figure Benny Gantz (a former
defense minister and chief IDF commander) alongside Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense
Minister Yoav Gallant.20 Netanyahu has consistently articulated Israeli goals of securing the
hostages’ return and destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities.21 As tens of
thousands of troops have withdrawn and military operations have decreased somewhat in
intensity in early 2024, Israeli leaders have debated how to proceed. Reportedly, Netanyahu,
Gallant, and top military commanders refuse to leave Hamas in control of Gaza, and argue that
continued military pressure—perhaps for a year or more—may be necessary to obtain hostages’
release.22 Apparently Gantz and some non-voting observers in the war cabinet have expressed
support for getting hostages released urgently given the dangers they face, even if it requires a
lengthy cease-fire.23
Some analysts have questioned “whether Hamas can be toppled as Gaza’s governing and military
power under the existing strategy.”24 While the IDF estimates that some 10,000 out of 30,000
Hamas fighters have been killed, Hamas’s unconventional tactics and tunnel network have helped
its resilience and allowed its most senior leaders to elude Israel.25 Netanyahu has reportedly said
that Israel might accept their expulsion, rather than their killing or capture.26
As of early February, negotiations are reportedly ongoing for a proposed hostage-prisoner
exchange that could pause the fighting for several weeks or more. Israeli officials are apparently

16 “Warning of war, IDF says over 3,000 Hezbollah sites in Lebanon, Syria struck so far,” Times of Israel, February 4,
2024. U.S. officials also have said they hope that an easing of tensions could allow a return of displaced people from
southern Lebanon (reportedly around 86,000) to their homes. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a
Press Availability,” January 9, 2024; “Israel and Lebanon are prepping for a war neither wants, but many fear it’s
becoming inevitable,” Associated Press, February 1, 2024.
17 Euan Ward et al., “Israel says it killed another Hezbollah commander after back-and-forth attacks,” New York Times,
January 9, 2024.
18 CRS Insight IN12301, Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
19 “U.S. launches strikes in Iraq, Syria, nearly 40 reported killed,” Reuters, February 3, 2024.
20 Barak Ravid, “Israel’s Netanyahu forms unity government with ex-Defense Minister Gantz,” Axios, October 11,
2023; and Jeremy Sharon, “Netanyahu, Gantz agree to form emergency unity government,” Times of Israel, October
11, 2023.
21 Israel Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by PM Netanyahu,” January 18, 2024.
22 Neri Zilber, “Can Israel achieve its war goals in Gaza?” Financial Times, January 30, 2024.
23 Ibid.; “Eisenkot, Gantz said to urge hostage deal for long halt to war; PM, Gallant opposed,” Times of Israel, January
15, 2024.
24 Zilber, “Can Israel achieve its war goals in Gaza?”
25 Ibid.
26 Michael Horovitz, “Expulsion of Hamas leaders from Gaza on the table, PM said to tell hostage families,” Times of
Israel, January 3, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

4

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

debating the specifics of the proposed exchange and how it might affect Israeli military
operations, while Hamas may be bargaining for a cessation of hostilities.27
Arab states. Popular sentiment has placed pressure on Arab governments to oppose Israeli
actions in Gaza,28 even though many Arab leaders might welcome an end to Hamas rule there.29
Together with other members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab countries have
called for an end to “Israeli aggression against Gaza13 Worsening of Humanitarian Crisis and U.S./International Response During February 2024, developments indicated that the humanitarian crisis in Gaza was intensifying, including: • Fewer truckloads coming into Gaza. The daily average of trucks bringing in food and other humanitarian assistance prior to October 7 had been 500. According to U.N. figures, it was around 150 in January but dipped to under 50 during the second week of February. The average has since returned to slightly above the January levels.14 Possible contributing factors for the drop included various supply chain delays described by U.N. officials (including delays related to security and transport problems within Gaza, as discussed below), as well as some Israeli political protestors seeking to block the convoys.15 Facing charges from U.N. officials that it was not adequately facilitating aid delivery, Israel denied being responsible for bottlenecks at crossings16 and blamed humanitarian organizations for supply-laden trucks remaining idle inside Gaza, while the U.N. asserted that safe access to the trucks was sometimes lacking.17 • Breakdown of security and safe transport within Gaza. Major challenges emerged in transporting assistance to needy populations within Gaza. Gaza-based police largely stopped escorting convoys after multiple fatal attacks by Israeli forces against some of the police; Israeli officials claim that some of the police have sought to siphon goods to Hamas.18 Without police escorts, hungry crowds and armed gangs have reportedly looted some aid convoys before they could reach their planned delivery points.19 During one such 10 Erin Banco, “Gaza hostage talks hit roadblock, raising fears of prolonged captivity” Politico, December 7, 2023. Four hostages (including two Americans) were released before the late November pause. 11 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Reveals Hostage Toll: 30 Are Dead,” New York Times, February 7, 2024; Monica Pronczuk et al., “Aid Ship Heads to Gaza as Hezbollah Takes Aim at Northern Israel,” New York Times, March 13, 2024. 12 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #137,” March 12, 2024; WHO, “oPT Emergency Situation Update,” Issue 24, March 3, 2024. 13 See, for example, Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Under Scrutiny Over Gaza, Israel Points to Civilian Toll of U.S. Wars,” New York Times, November 7, 2023; Jason Willick, “We can’t ignore the truth that Hamas uses human shields,” Washington Post, November 14, 2023; Avner Gvaryahu, “The Myth of Israel’s ‘Moral Army,’” Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2024. 14 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact | Day 157,” March 12, 2024. 15 UN-OCHA, “Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024.” 16 “Human Rights Watch says Israel is violating order from top U.N. court by blocking aid to Gazans,” Associated Press, February 26, 2024; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Security Void Takes Toll on Gaza Aid Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2024. 17 “Why isn’t desperately needed aid reaching Palestinians in Gaza?,” Associated Press, February 21, 2024. 18 David S. Cloud and Carrie Keller-Lynn, “As Israel Drives Out Hamas, Lawlessness Hampers Gaza Aid Efforts,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2024. 19 Barak Ravid and Laurin-Whitney Gottbrath, “U.S. officials warn: Gaza ‘is turning into Mogadishu,’” Axios, February 24, 2024. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 9 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress incident on February 29, more than 100 people were kil ed and 700 injured by some combination—subject to conflicting accounts—of gunfire from Israeli forces, stampeding, and vehicular trauma.20 Additionally, Israeli forces have reportedly limited convoys’ access to northern Gaza during the conflict, citing security reasons.21 In late February, a U.N. official stated that one-quarter of Gaza’s population was “one step away from famine.”22 Reports indicate that some 300,000 in northern Gaza are particularly at risk23—with multiple cases of young children dead or near death from malnutrition.24 In early March, the United States and some other countries began airdropping food and supplies to people in Gaza, while acknowledging that the airdrops—given their relative inefficiency—could only supplement rather than substitute for ground-level aid deliveries.25 Additionally, Israel has prepared a new land crossing to allow aid to flow directly into northern Gaza.26 According to senior U.S. officials, Israel also plans to surge more trucks coming from Jordan through the Kerem Shalom crossing, and to coordinate with the United States, the Republic of Cyprus, and other countries to inspect assistance that wil be prepared in coming weeks for maritime shipment from Cyprus directly to Gaza.27 Reportedly, endeavors funded by the European Union and United Arab Emirates aim to send amphibious supply vessels from Cyprus to Gaza in coming days.28 For more information on U.S. policy on this issue, including plans to facilitate maritime shipments, as announced in President Biden’s State of the Union address, see “Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians” below. Additionally, since the October 7 attacks, significant U.S. and international attention has focused on the extent to which conflict might expand in other areas of the region, including the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen/Red Sea.29 Political Developments and Implications Possible cease-fire and/or continuation of conflict. Negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, and Qatar have sought to persuade Israel and Hamas to accept a proposed hostage-prisoner exchange that could pause the fighting for several weeks or more.30 A temporary cease-fire deal did not materialize before the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (March 10-April 9), leading to speculation about a possible spike in regional tensions.31 While the return of some hostages to Israel could alleviate domestic pressure on the Netanyahu government, it may face difficult debates about whether and how continued or resumed fighting 20 Raja Abdulrahim et al., “Wait for Food Ended in Chaos, Panic and Death,” New York Times, March 2, 2024. 21 Claire Parker, “How Israel’s restrictions on aid put Gaza on the brink of famine,” Washington Post, March 3, 2024. 22 United Nations Security Council Meeting, “Famine Imminent in Gaza, Humanitarian Officials Tell Security Council, Calling for Immediate Ceasefire,” SC/15604, February 27, 2024. 23 “Gaza cease-fire talks fail to achieve a breakthrough with Ramadan just days away, Egypt says,” Associated Press, March 6, 2024. 24 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact | Day 157,” March 12, 2024. 25 “How US airdrops of humanitarian aid into Gaza can help and why the operation is complicated,” Associated Press, March 2, 2024. 26 “UN uses new land route from Israel to reach northern Gaza,” Reuters, March 12, 2024. 27 White House, “Background Press Call on Humanitarian Aid for Gaza Ahead of the State of the Union,” March 7, 2024. 28 Hiba Yazbek et al., “U.S. and E.U. Plan to Bring More Aid to Gaza by Sea,” New York Times, March 9, 2024; Sune Engel Rasmussen et al., “Sea Plan Tests U.S., Allies Ability to Help,” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2024. 29 CRS In Focus IF12587, Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas; CRS Insight IN12301, Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard; CRS Insight IN12309, Iraq: Attacks and U.S. Strikes Reopen Discussion of U.S. Military Presence, by Christopher M. Blanchard. 30 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Hamas’ top priority in hostage deal is Palestinians’ return to northern Gaza,” Axios, March 4, 2024. 31 Rory Jones and Dov Lieber, “Hamas Pins Survival Hopes on Ramadan,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2024; “Hamas envoys leave Cairo, with deadlocked hostage deal talks to resume next week,” Times of Israel, March 7, 2024. Congressional Research Service 4 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress might help it achieve its declared war aims of recovering hostages and destroying Hamas’s military and governing capacity in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated on March 10 that Israel has destroyed “three-quarters of Hamas’s fighting terrorism battalions” and that additional warfare would not “take more than two months.”32 Arab states. Popular sentiment has placed pressure on Arab governments to oppose Israeli actions in Gaza,33 even though many Arab leaders might welcome an end to Hamas rule there.34 Together with other members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab countries have called for an end to “Israeli aggression against the Gaza strip,” more humanitarian aid, and a freeze on ,” more humanitarian aid, and a freeze on
international arms exports to Israel.international arms exports to Israel.3035
International organizations. On November 15, the On November 15, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution adopted Resolution
2712, which called for “urgent and extended humanitarian pauses” and the “immediate and 2712, which called for “urgent and extended humanitarian pauses” and the “immediate and
unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and other groups,” and urged all parties to unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and other groups,” and urged all parties to
refrain from depriving civilians in Gaza of “basic services and humanitarian assistance refrain from depriving civilians in Gaza of “basic services and humanitarian assistance
indispensable to their survival.” On December 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2720, indispensable to their survival.” On December 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2720,
which called for “urgent steps to immediately allow safe, unhindered, and expanded humanitarian which called for “urgent steps to immediately allow safe, unhindered, and expanded humanitarian
access and to create the conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities.” The United States access and to create the conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities.” The United States
abstained from both resolutions. On January 26, the abstained from both resolutions. On January 26, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that it found that it
had jurisdiction over allegations by South Africa that Israel may have committed acts of had jurisdiction over allegations by South Africa that Israel may have committed acts of
genocide, and ordered Israel (among other provisional measures) to prevent the commission of or genocide, and ordered Israel (among other provisional measures) to prevent the commission of or
incitement to genocideincitement to genocide, and to “enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and to “enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and
humanitarian assistance” to Palestinians in Gazahumanitarian assistance” to Palestinians in Gaza, and to report on its compliance with the Court’s
order one month later.31.36
U.S. Policy
Israeli Military Operations and Policies
The U.S. government has stated its support for military operations by Israel to defend itself in line The U.S. government has stated its support for military operations by Israel to defend itself in line
with international law, including in Gaza. with international law, including in Gaza. President Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary
of Defense Lloyd Austin, and other Administration officials have visited Israel and other
countries in the region since the outbreak of conflict. U.S. officials have publicly opposed calls U.S. officials have publicly opposed calls
for an indefinite cease-fire, citing Israel’s right to defend itself.for an indefinite cease-fire, citing Israel’s right to defend itself.3237 Nevertheless, U.S. officials have Nevertheless, U.S. officials have
voiced support for voiced support for “humanitariantemporary pauses pauses” and additional hostage-prisoner exchanges. and additional hostage-prisoner exchanges.
While President Biden appears to broadly support Israel’s stated objectives of ending Hamas rule While President Biden appears to broadly support Israel’s stated objectives of ending Hamas rule
in Gaza, he and Administration officials have sought to convince their Israeli counterparts to take in Gaza, he and Administration officials have sought to convince their Israeli counterparts to take
steps to minimize casualties, reduce the intensity of their operations, steps to minimize casualties, reduce the intensity of their operations, and step up humanitarian
aid.33 In early January, a National Security Council spokesperson said the Israeli goal of

27 “Hamas said to insist on deal that will end war, withdraw IDF troops from Gaza,” Times of Israel, February 4, 2024.
28step up humanitarian aid, and avoid “reoccupation.”38 The Administration’s public criticism of Israel appears to have 32 Paul Ronzheimer and Carlo Martuscelli, “Netanyahu vows to defy Biden’s ‘red line’ on Rafah,” Politico (Europe), March 10, 2024. 33 Cathrin Schaer, “Gaza conflict: Arab attitudes are hardening against Israel,” Deutsche Welle, December 20, 2023. Cathrin Schaer, “Gaza conflict: Arab attitudes are hardening against Israel,” Deutsche Welle, December 20, 2023.
29 “Many Arab governments would like to see Hamas gone,” Economist, November 16, 2023.
3034 Robert Satloff, “From War to Peace in the Middle East? Observations from a Regional Tour,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 23, 2024. 35 “Arab-Islamic summit adopts resolution on Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people,” “Arab-Islamic summit adopts resolution on Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people,” Arab News, November , November
12, 2023. 12, 2023.
3136 ICJ Order, ICJ Order, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza
Strip (South Africa v. Israel), January 26, 2024. , January 26, 2024.
3237 Joe Biden, “The U.S. won’t back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas Biden, “The U.S. won’t back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas.”
33,” Washington Post, November 18, 2023. 38 Ibid.; White House, “Remarks by President Biden at a Hanukkah Holiday Reception,” December 11, 2023; White House, White House, “Remarks by President Biden at a Hanukkah Holiday Reception,” December 11, 2023; White House,
“Remarks by President Biden at a Campaign Reception,” December 12, 2023.“Remarks by President Biden at a Campaign Reception,” December 12, 2023. A National Security Council (continued...)
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

5 5

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

degrading Hamas’s ability to carry out attacks inside Israel is attainable, but it is unlikely that
Israel can eliminate the group and its ideology.34
Potential Post-Conflict Scenarios
The Administration has been conferring with Israeli and PA officials on security and governance
for Gaza after conflict ends or abates. Tensions between supporting domestically legitimate
Palestinian self-rule and safeguarding Israel’s capacity to monitor and stifle potential threats may
intensify the challenges involved. In November, President Biden articulated the following
principles:
To start, Gaza must never again be used as a platform for terrorism. There must be no
forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, no reoccupation, no siege or blockade,
and no reduction in territory…. As we strive for peace, Gaza and the West Bank should be
reunited under a single governance structure, ultimately under a revitalized Palestinian
Authority, as we all work toward a two-state solution…. The international community must
commit resources to support the people of Gaza in the immediate aftermath of this crisis,
including interim security measures, and establish a reconstruction mechanism to
sustainably meet Gaza’s long-term needs.35
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has indicated that the PA would only govern Gaza—which Hamas
forcibly seized from the PA in 2007—in the context of significant progress toward establishing a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with a capital in East Jerusalem.36 Secretary Blinken
has indicated that such progress is unlikely to be easy or “happen overnight,”37 and reportedly has
tasked the State Department to evaluate options for implementing a two-state solution—with U.S.
recognition of a Palestinian state as one possibility—“in a way that assures security for Israel.”38
U.S. and PA officials have reportedly discussed possible mechanisms for improving PA
leadership, and domestic legitimacy. Some leading Palestinian figures argue that the PA cannot be
strengthened via reforms without Israel granting it greater control over its revenues and security.39
Prime Minister Netanyahu has insisted that only Israel can demilitarize Gaza, and openly opposes
the PA returning, purportedly because of rhetorical and financial support he argues the PA
provides for terrorism.40 In January, after President Biden reiterated his commitment to an
eventual two-state solution, Netanyahu pledged to continue insisting that Israel have full security
control of “all territory west of the Jordan River,” and said that this stance has prevented the
establishment of a Palestinian state.41 Netanyahu may calculate that opposition to a two-state
solution and PA rule in Gaza might rally domestic support for him and the ultra-nationalist figures
in his government. The significant dip in Netanyahu’s public approval rating since the October 7

34 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC sharpened as the conflict has continued, and it has pressed Israel not to proceed with major military operations in Rafah without clearly planning for the safety and welfare of civilians.39 Asked on March 9 whether an Israeli invasion of Rafah would be a red line, Biden said, “It is a red line but I’m never going to leave Israel. The defense of Israel is still critical. So there’s no red line (in which) I’m going to cut off all weapons so they don’t have the Iron Dome to protect them.”40 U.S. Measures Regarding the West Bank While Gaza has been the primary center of attention, smaller-scale violence has continued in the West Bank involving Palestinian militants, Israeli forces, and Israeli settlers. U.S. officials and lawmakers have signaled concerns related to Israeli actions in the West Bank that may endanger Palestinians’ lives or property.41 On February 1, President Biden issued Executive Order 14115, authorizing “financial sanctions against those directing or participating in certain actions, including acts or threats of violence against civilians, intimidating civilians to cause them to leave their homes, destroying or seizing property, or engaging in terrorist activity in the West Bank”;42 and the Administration imposed sanctions (including visa bans) on four individuals.43 In March, one journalist wrote that language in E.O. 14115 authorizing sanctions against government officials who undermine West Bank stability by failing to enforce policies could be used as leverage to distance Prime Minister Netanyahu from his ultra-nationalist coalition partners.44 Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for FY2024, the United States has announced more than $180 million in humanitarian assistance for emergency relief efforts in the region since October 7.45 USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance had committed $96.5 million in assistance for Gaza and the West Bank; the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration had committed $51 million for Gaza and the West Bank via the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and $18.2 million for the region via another implementing partner.46 The Department of State has announced a temporary pause in U.S. funding to UNRWA, pending further review of allegations that some UNRWA employees were involved in the October 7 attacks.47 spokesperson has said a transitional period is plausible where “in the immediate aftermath, Israeli forces would be present for a specific period of time and for tactical security purposes.” White House, “Press Gaggle with NSC Coordinator for Strategic Coordinator for Strategic
Communications John Kirby,” Communications John Kirby,” January 3, 2024.
35 Joe Biden, “The U.S. won’t back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas,” Washington Post, November 18,
2023.
36 Additionally, PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh has reportedly said that the PA would be prepared to govern
Gaza only if there is a complete Israeli military withdrawal. David S. Cloud, “Israel Eases Opposition to Palestinian
Rule,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2023.
37 Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Remarks to the Press,” January 10, 2024.
38 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: State Department reviewing options for possible recognition of Palestinian state,” Axios,
January 31, 2024.
39 “US wants shakeup of Palestinian Authority to run Gaza after Hamas,” Reuters, December 16, 2023.
40 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Israel’s Three Prerequisites for Peace,” Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2023.
41 Israel Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by PM Netanyahu,” January 21, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

6

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

attack could lead to his government’s collapse and new Knesset elections sometime in 2024.42
Prospects for any Hamas role in post-conflict PA governance, which some leading PA figures
appear to be discussing, would likely encounter U.S. and Israeli opposition.43
Major U.S. policy issues related to post-conflict scenarios in Gaza could include the following:
• Resolving potential differences between U.S., Israeli, and PA officials. It is
unclear whether or not the parties can move from the starting points discussed
above to compromises on aspects of post-conflict governance and security.44
• Role of PA security forces. Reportedly, “U.S. and Palestinian officials have
discussed a plan to retrain 1,000 former [PA] security forces officers in Gaza and
a further 3,000 to 5,000 in the West Bank who would work in Gaza after the
war,”45 with training presumably under the auspices of the U.S. Security
Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC).46
• Arab states’ role. Egypt, Jordan, and Arab Gulf states may be reluctant to help
transition Gaza (by contributing troops, advisers, or funding) toward PA self-rule
or help with reconstruction if doing so might be perceived domestically and
internationally as enabling indefinite Israeli occupation. Thus, Arab state
participation may depend on diplomatic progress toward Palestinian statehood.47
U.S. Military Deployments
Since October 7, President Biden has positioned additional U.S. military assets and personnel to
the Middle East in an apparent effort to support Israel and Arab partners, deter Iran and Iranian-
supported groups from widening the war, and prepare for contingencies, such as an evacuation of
U.S. citizens. As of early February 2024, the guided-missile destroyers USS Carney and USS
Gravely were positioned in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, where U.S. warships have been
regularly intercepting Houthi missiles; the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group was
positioned in the Red Sea; and the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) was positioned
in the eastern Mediterranean.48
U.S. Expedited Arms Deliveries to Israel
Since October 7, the Biden Administration has expedited the provision of U.S. military and
security assistance to Israel. As of late January 2024, one report indicated that since October 7,
the United States had dispatched 280 transport planes and 40 ships to deliver 25,000 tons of

42 See, for example, James Shotter and Neri Zilber, “‘Benjamin Netanyahu — yes or no?’: the looming choice for
Israeli voters,” Financial Times, February 1, 2024.
43 Benoit Faucon et al., “Hamas Starts Planning for End of Gaza War,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2023.
44 “Gallant’s post-war Gaza plan: Palestinians to run civil affairs with global task force,” Times of Israel, January 4,
2024. Israel and Egypt are reportedly negotiating the future parameters of their coordination at the Egypt-Gaza border,
based on Israeli allegations that this border has been the “main avenue” for Hamas to smuggle weapons and illicit
goods into Gaza. Summer Said and Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Israel Presses Egypt over Its Gaza Border,” Wall Street
Journal, January 8, 2024.
45 Benoit Faucon et al., “U.S. Presses Palestinians to Plan for Postwar Security,” Wall Street Journal, December 16,
2023.
46 For more on the USSC and U.S. security assistance for the PA, see archived CRS Report RL34074, The
Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
47 “US officials discuss post-war Gaza governance plans with Palestinian Authority and Arab nations,” CNN,
December 8, 2023.
48 “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker,” USNI News, February 5, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

7

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

armaments and equipment to Israel.49 The same report noted that due to global shortages in
certain types of armaments, the Israeli government had postponed certain defense export
contracts in order to redirect resources for domestic combat operations.50
Emergency Arms Sale to Israel
In December, the Biden Administration notified Congress of proposed sales to Israel of tank cartridges ($106.5
mil ion on 12/8) and artil ery shells ($147.5 mil ion on 12/29). In both instances, the Administration said it was
invoking emergency authorities codified in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) that allow the President
to waive congressional review of an arms sale if the President states in a formal notification to Congress that “an
emergency exists” requiring an immediate sale “in the national security interests of the United States.”51
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), both sales wil be from U.S. Army inventory or U.S. Army
stock, a possible reference to the U.S.-maintained stockpile in Israel, known as War Reserve Stocks for Allies-
Israel (WRSA-I). Amendments to the authorization of WRSA-I in a Senate-introduced version of the supplemental
appropriations bil for Israel (see below) would waive congressional notification of sales to Israel from WRSA-I, by
replacing 30-day congressional notification with “or as far in advance of such transfer as is practicable as
determined by the President on a case-by-case basis during extraordinary circumstances impacting the national
security of the United States.” The House version of a supplemental appropriations bil would shorten
congressional review to 15 days. Several Members of Congress have objected to the Administration’s use of
emergency authority to bypass congressional review.52
Possible New U.S. Sales of Combat Aircraft to Israel
In January 2024, sources reported that the United States and Israel are in the process of finalizing
up to three different sales of fixed-wing (25 F-35Is and 25 F-15IAs) and rotary-wing aircraft (12
Apache helicopters) to Israel.53 While the delivery of such items are likely years away, reports
also note that Israel has been “accelerating acquisition of various kinds of aerial munitions,”
worth “hundreds of millions of dollars.”54
Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians
During President Biden’s October 18 visit to Israel, he announced $100 million in U.S.
humanitarian assistance for Gaza and the West Bank, to “help support over a million displaced
and conflict-affected people with clean water, food, hygiene support, medical care, and other
essential needs” via “trusted partners including UN agencies and international NGOs.”55
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for FY2024 as of mid-
January, USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance had committed $43.3 million in assistance
for Gaza and the West Bank; and the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration had committed $51 million for Gaza and the West Bank via the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and $18.2 million for the
region via another implementing partner.56 The Department of State has announced a temporary

49 Yuval Sade, “Global Ammunition Shortage Forces Israel to Limit Bombing,” Ynet News, January 28, 2024.
50 Ibid.
51 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—M830a1 120mm Tank Cartridges,” December 9, 2023.
52 Alex Gangitano, “Senate Democrats scoff at Biden’s Israel arms sale,” The Hill, January 3, 2024. See also, “Senator
Risch Letter to Blinken,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 26, 2024.
53 Amos Harel and Ben Samuels, “U.S. and Israel Finalize Major Military Aircraft Deals Amid Gaza War,” Haaretz,
January 25, 2024.
54 Ibid.
55 White House, “U.S. Announcement of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People,” October 18, 2023.
56 USAID, Levant Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #3, January 16, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

8

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

“pause” in unobligated U.S. funding to UNRWA, pending further review of allegations that 12
UNRWA employees were involved in the October 7 attacks.57
Some lawmakers have sponsored legislation or written letters calling for a halt to humanitarian
aid in Gaza and/or greater monitoring of whether or not any U.S. assistance to Gaza and the West
Bank may previously have been diverted—or be at risk of future diversion—by Hamas or other
groups.58 Other lawmakers have called for additional humanitarian aid for the Palestinians.59
Also, lawmakers are debating the extent to which UNRWA or alternative implementing partners
can provide humanitarian assistance while limiting the risks of misconduct.60
Supplemental Appropriations Legislation
In an October 19 Oval Office speech, President Biden announced an emergency supplemental
budget request to support U.S. partners, including Ukraine, Israel, and others, and address other
domestic and global issues.61 In sum, the President seeks over $14 billion in Israel-related
funding. For over three months, the House and Senate have considered respective versions of
supplemental appropriations legislation, focused not just on Israel, but other foreign policy and
domestic matters as well, such as assistance to Ukraine and Taiwan and reforming U.S. border
and tax policies.62
In early February 2024, leadership in both the House and Senate announced revised supplemental
appropriations legislation. On February 3, House leaders released a base text (H.R. 7217), which
would provide the full amount requested by the President (with additional defense funds for
artillery and munitions), while adding $2.5 billion in FY2024 Presidential Drawdown Authority
(22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1)) for Israel, which “shall not take effect” unless the Secretary of State
determines and reports to Congress that the exercise of such authority is in response to the
situation in Israel. The bill also would provide $3.3 billion in defense funds to the Department of
Defense (DOD) for ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
operations. President Biden has said he would veto the stand-alone Israel aid bill.63
A day later, Senate leaders introduced a revised bill (the original Senate supplemental had been
introduced in early December as S.Amdt. 1371 to H.R. 815) appropriating a total of $118.3
billion for a range of foreign and domestic issues. The bill has been introduced as a new

57 Department of State Press Briefing, January 30, 2024. According to this source, total U.S. funding for UNRWA
(which provides services to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, in addition to those in Gaza and the West Bank) in
FY2024 has been $121 million.
58 Text of October 24 letter from 24 Representatives to USAID Director Samantha Power available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24080806-23-10-23-letter-to-usaid-re-gaza-west-bank-funding-copy.
Lawmakers in both chambers have introduced bills during the 118th Cong. that would prohibit any U.S. funding for
Palestinians in Gaza absent a presidential certification that (among other things) the assistance would not benefit
Hamas or other terrorist organizations or affiliates. Senate version: S. 489; House version: H.R. 5996.
59 Text of November 8 letter from 26 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/letter_to_president_biden_on_gaza.pdf.
60 CRS Insight IN12316, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA): Overview and the U.S. Funding Pause, by Rhoda Margesson and Jim Zanotti.
61 The request is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-regarding-critical-
national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf.
62 The only bill to receive a vote to date is H.R. 6126, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024,
which the House passed on November 2, 2023 (by a vote of 226-196). That bill would provide $14.3 billion in Israel-
related supplemental appropriations, but would offset the proposed additional appropriations for Israel by rescinding
$14.3 billion for the Internal Revenue Service.
63 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/H.R.-7217-Israel-Security-Supplemental-
Appropriations-Act-2024-SAP.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

9

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

substitute amendment to H.R. 815.64 Among other things, this bill would provide $14.1 billion in
Israel-related supplemental appropriations, including:
• $4.4 billion for DOD’s response to the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza and related
expenses;
• $801.4 million for U.S. Army ammunition procurement to respond to the
situation in Israel;
• $4 billion in DOD funding for Iron Dome and David’s Sling defense systems;
• $3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $769.3 million of which is
specified for Off-Shore Procurement (OSP), though that figure “may be
exceeded, if agreed by the United States and Israel, following consultation with
the Committees on Appropriations.” The Senate bill also would authorize the
Secretary of State to waive congressional notification on the FMF funds provided
in the bill “if the Secretary of State determines that to do so is in the national
security interest of the United States”;
• $1.2 billion in DOD funding for the Iron Beam laser-based defense system being
developed by Israel; and
• $100 million to the Department of State for Worldwide Security Protection and
the response to the situation in Israel.
In addition, the revised Senate bill, like its House counterpart and the President’s request, also
includes proposed provisions that would amend the Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
2005 (P.L. 108-287, §12001) to permit the transfer of previously prohibited categories of defense
articles to the Government of Israel, and temporarily waive limitations on the total value of
defense stockpiles located in Israel and set aside for Israel’s use per 22 U.S.C. §2321h(b). As
previously mentioned, the House bill would shorten the congressional review period for such
transfers to 15 days; the Senate-introduced bill specifies that congressional review take place “as
far in advance of such transfer as is practicable as determined by the President on a case-by-case
basis during extraordinary circumstances impacting the national security of the United States.”
There are several other differences between the House- and Senate-introduced Israel-related
supplemental appropriations bills. The Senate bill authorizes $7.8 billion in Presidential
Drawdown Authority for FY2024 without specifying a foreign recipient. In addition to providing
Israel-related funding, the Senate-introduced bill would match the President’s request by
appropriating over $9 billion via global humanitarian accounts that could be partly allocated to
address the needs of those affected by the crisis in Gaza and Israel (including in neighboring
countries): $5.65 billion in International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and $3.495 billion in
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). The House bill does not include these funds.
The House-introduced bill would mandate a report describing all security assistance provided to
Israel since the October 7 attacks; the Senate-introduced bill would not. The Senate-introduced
bill includes $85 million in additional appropriations for other entities, including $75 million in
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for assistance to the
Middle East and $10 million in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) for a U.S. contribution to the
Multinational Force and Observers mission in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to enhance force protection
capabilities. Finally, the Senate-introduced bill would provide $2.44 billion to replace combat
expenditures for weapons in the Red Sea and CENTCOM’s other areas of operations.

64 Senate Appropriations Committee, “Murray Releases Text of Bipartisan National Security Supplemental,” February
4, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

10

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Since the Senate-introduced bill includes global humanitarian assistance funds, some of which
may be used to support the Palestinians, appropriators added new restrictions in the February
2024 revised bill, explicitly prohibiting funds (notwithstanding any other provision of law)
appropriated in the bill (and prior acts) for contributions to UNRWA. The bill also requires the
Secretary of State to certify and report to Congress (no later than March 1, 2024) on U.S.
oversight policies and procedures for monitoring assistance in Gaza.
Possible Senate Amendments to the Supplemental Appropriations Bill for Israel
Since the initial release of the Senate draft supplemental appropriations bil in December 2023, several Senators
have announced amendments, some of which may be re-introduced as the Senate considers its latest bil . On
December 7, 13 Senators (currently 18 co-sponsors65) published a “discussion draft” of an amendment to H.R.
815 that would (1) require that the weapons received by any country under this bil are used in accordance with
U.S. law, international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict; (2) require that, per existing law (Section
620i(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act), the President obtain assurances that any country receiving weapons via this
bil cooperate ful y with U.S.-supported efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need; and (3)
require that the President report to the Congress within 30 days on whether each country receiving U.S. security
assistance through this bil is, among other things, using U.S.-funded military equipment in accordance with their
intended purposes.66 In January 2024, Senator Tim Kaine announced that he had filed an amendment to “strike a
provision in the proposed national security supplemental funding bil that waives oversight requirements for U.S.
funding for Israel under the Foreign Military Financing Program.”67 Senator Schatz also has announced that he is
planning to file an amendment (with 48 co-sponsors) reaffirming U.S. support for a “negotiated comprehensive
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two states with Israelis and Palestinians living side by side in
peace, security, dignity, and mutual recognition.”68
Possible Options for Congress
Additional U.S. Assistance for Israel and Possible Conditions
Lawmakers may consider whether to increase, maintain, decrease, or condition existing U.S.
support for Israel. In December 2023, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.Res. 504, a privileged
resolution, which would have mandated that the State Department provide Congress with
information on Israel’s human rights practices within 30 days of passage, pursuant to Section
502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. After receiving the report, Congress, by joint
resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to Israel. On January 16,
2024, the Senate voted 72-11 to table a motion to discharge S.Res. 504 from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.69 One report, which the White House has denied,70 has suggested that the
White House is considering whether to slow or pause U.S. munitions deliveries to Israel as

65 Liz Goodwin and Yasmeen Abutaleb, “Growing number of Senate Democrats question Biden’s Israel strategy,”
Washington Post, January 19, 2024.
66 Sen. Chris Van Hollen, “Van Hollen, Durbin, Kaine, Schatz & Colleagues Announce Amendment Requiring that
Use of U.S. Supplemental Aid Comply with U.S., International Law,” December 7, 2023.
67 Sen. Tim Kaine, “Kaine to File Amendment to Maintain Congressional Oversight of Foreign Military Assistance,”
January 9, 2024.
68 Rachel Oswald, “Schatz says two-state solution amendment has 48 co-sponsors,” Roll Call, January 24, 2024.
69 Roll Call Vote 118th Congress - 2nd Session, available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-
resolution/504/actions?s=1&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22s.res.504%22%7D
70 “White House rejects report US considering slowing weapons sales to Israel,” Jerusalem Post, January 28, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

11

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

leverage for achieving specific U.S. requests, such as Israeli cooperation in providing more aid to
Palestinian civilians.71
Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians and Israel
As mentioned above, the President’s October supplemental budget request includes more than $9
billion in humanitarian assistance potentially usable for needs in and around Gaza, the West
Bank, and Israel from the MRA and IDA accounts. Members of Congress are debating the scope
and conditions under which humanitarian assistance should be appropriated or allocated,
including with respect to UNRWA.72 In early November 9, 2023. 39 White House, “Readout of Vice President Harris’s Meeting with Member of Israeli War Cabinet Gantz,” March 4, 2024. 40 “Biden makes contradictory comments on Gaza ‘red line’ in MSNBC interview,” Reuters, March 9, 2024. 41 Letter from 12 Senators to President Biden dated December 20, 2023, at https://www.heinrich.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_potus_west_bank.pdf; Department of State, “Announcement of Visa Restriction Policy to Promote Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank,” December 5, 2023. 42 “Executive Order 14115 of February 1, 2024: Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank,” Federal Register, vol. 89, no. 24, February 5, 2024, pp. 7605-7608. 43 Department of State, “Announcement of Further Measures to Promote Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank,” February 1, 2024. 44 Yair Rosenberg, “Biden’s New Doomsday Option Against Israeli Settlers,” The Atlantic, March 6, 2024. 45 USAID, Levant Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4, March 8, 2024. 46 Ibid. 47 Department of State Press Briefing, January 30, 2024. According to this source, total U.S. funding for UNRWA (which provides services to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, in addition to those in Gaza and the West Bank) in FY2024 has been $121 million. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress U.S. Military Involvement in Airdrops and Facilitating Maritime Corridor to Gaza As the humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated, some lawmakers have called on the Administration to directly deliver aid to Gaza, in coordination with Israel.48 In early March, United States Central Command—in concert with Jordan—began a series of airdrops of food into Gaza as part of a broader U.S. government policy to work with allies and partners to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian assistance to Gaza by land, air, and sea.49 Casualties have reportedly resulted from at least one airdrop; U.S. officials have said U.S. airdrops were not to blame.50 In his March 7 State of the Union address, President Biden announced that the U.S. military would lead an emergency mission to establish a port on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine, and temporary shelters.51 Administration officials said that the mission wil be “conducted by the [Army’s] 7th Transportation Brigade from Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, and other forces, [and] wil deploy DOD’s Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability, or JLOTS, with a goal of beginning delivery operations in approximately 60 days [emphasis added].”52 Any logistics ships wil reportedly need armed escorts when in range of the coast.53 Some have described the plan as “fraught with uncertainty” given security risks, delivery issues, and other obstacles.54 According to U.S. officials, the plan involves the fol owing: • Offshore construction of a temporary pier and causeway with capacity to eventually deliver more than 2 mil ion meals per day (according to one journalist, “conservatively Gaza needs 6.6 mil ion meals a day”), without placing any of the over 1,000 U.S. military personnel involved in the operation onshore in Gaza.55 • Logistical and security coordination that includes Israeli inspection of aid in Cyprus, commercial shipping to Gaza enabled by a U.S. military-led coalition, and distribution of assistance within Gaza by the U.N. and other organizations,56 with Israel providing security.57 Potential Post-Conflict Scenarios The Administration has reportedly been conferring with Israeli, PA, and Arab state officials on security and governance for Gaza after conflict ends or abates. Tensions between supporting domestically legitimate Palestinian self-rule and safeguarding Israel’s capacity to monitor and stifle potential threats may intensify the challenges involved. Biden Administration officials have said that a revamped PA should ultimately take responsibility for post-conflict governance in Gaza, while diplomatic efforts continue toward an eventual two-state solution.58 PA President Mahmoud Abbas has indicated that the PA would only govern Gaza—which Hamas forcibly seized from the PA in 2007—in the context of significant progress 48 Senator Jeff Merkley, “The U.S. Should Immediately Mobilize ‘Operation Gaza Relief,’” February 16, 2024; Heather Mongilio, “Pentagon Has No Plans to Send U.S. Navy Hospital Ship to Middle East,” USNI News, February 29, 2024. 49 White House, “Background Press Call on the Humanitarian Assistance Airdrop into Gaza,” March 2, 2024. 50 “Israel-Hamas war: U.S. official rejects claims that U.S. airdrop killed civilians,” NBC News, March 8, 2024. 51 White House, “Remarks by President Biden in State of the Union Address,” March 7, 2024. 52 DOD News, “DOD to Construct Pier to Deliver Humanitarian Aid to Gaza,” March 8, 2024. 53 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Widens Aid Effort for the People in Gaza, Even as It Backs Israel,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2024. 54 Rasmussen et al., “Sea Plan Tests U.S., Allies Ability to Help.” 55 Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds a Press Briefing,” March 8, 2024. 56 White House, “Background Press Call on Humanitarian Aid for Gaza Ahead of the State of the Union,” March 7, 2024. 57 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Air Force One Departure | Joint Base Andrews, MD,” March 8, 2024. 58 Biden, “The U.S. won’t back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas.” Congressional Research Service 7 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress toward establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza that has a capital in East Jerusalem.59 President Biden has said that the PA “must prepare to build a state that accepts peace, [and] does not harbor terrorist groups like Hamas and [Palestine] Islamic Jihad.”60 U.S. Ambassador to Israel Jack Lew has signaled that “an over the horizon process that includes a vision for a demilitarized Palestinian state” would be an important factor in persuading Arab countries to consider improving relations with Israel, supporting PA reform, and backing Gaza’s reconstruction.61 U.S. and PA officials have reportedly discussed possible mechanisms for improving PA leadership and domestic legitimacy. Some leading Palestinian figures argue that the PA cannot be strengthened via reforms without Israel granting it greater control over its revenues and security.62 Prospects for any Hamas role in post-conflict PA governance, which some leading PA figures appear to be discussing, would likely encounter U.S. and Israeli opposition.63 Prime Minister Netanyahu has insisted that only Israel can demilitarize Gaza, and has argued that the PA should not rule Gaza because he alleges it provides rhetorical and financial support for terrorism.64 In January, after President Biden reiterated his commitment to an eventual two-state solution, Netanyahu has insisted that Israel should have full security control of “all territory west of the Jordan River,” and said that his years-long stance has prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state.65 Netanyahu may calculate that opposition to a two-state solution might rally domestic support for him and the ultra-nationalist figures in his coalition. The significant dip in Netanyahu’s public approval rating since the October 7 attack could lead to his government’s collapse and new Knesset elections sometime in 2024.66 U.S. Expedited Arms Deliveries to Israel Since October 7, the Biden Administration has expedited the provision of U.S. military and security assistance to Israel. Most U.S. arms deliveries have been for regular munitions (e.g., 155 mm artillery shells or tank rounds) and precision-guided munitions. According to one February account in the Wall Street Journal, the Administration is currently considering new deliveries of over a thousand each of MK-82 bombs, KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munitions kits, and FMU-139 bomb fuses, while, since the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks, the United States has provided Israel “roughly 21,000 precision-guided munitions” and “Israel has used roughly half.”67 Supplemental Appropriations Legislation In an October 19 Oval Office speech, President Biden announced an emergency supplemental budget request to support U.S. partners, including Ukraine, Israel, and others, and to address other 59 “Receiving US State Secretary, President Abbas demands immediate end to Israel’s aggression on Gaza,” WAFA News Agency, November 5, 2023. 60 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan After a Meeting,” February 12, 2024. 61 U.S. Embassy in Israel, “Ambassador Lew’s Remarks to the National Israel Mission of the Conference of Presidents,” February 18, 2024. 62 “US wants shakeup of Palestinian Authority to run Gaza after Hamas,” Reuters, December 16, 2023. 63 Benoit Faucon et al., “Hamas Starts Planning for End of Gaza War,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2023. 64 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Israel’s Three Prerequisites for Peace,” Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2023. 65 Israel Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by PM Netanyahu,” January 21, 2024. 66 See, for example, James Shotter and Neri Zilber, “‘Benjamin Netanyahu—yes or no?’: the looming choice for Israeli voters,” Financial Times, February 1, 2024. 67 Nancy A. Youssef, Jared Malsin, “U.S. Is Preparing to Send Bombs, Other Arms to Israel,” Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2024. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress domestic and global issues.68 In sum, the President seeks over $14 billion in Israel-related funding. In the nearly five months since then, the House and Senate have considered respective versions of supplemental appropriations legislation addressing Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, Taiwan, and domestic matters such as U.S. border and tax policies. To date, there have been three votes on supplemental appropriations bills, all of which would have come close to matching the President’s Israel-related request but differed in other respects. On November 2, 2023, the House passed (by a vote of 226-196) H.R. 6126, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024. That bill would provide $14.3 billion in Israel-related supplemental appropriations but would offset the proposed additional appropriations for Israel by rescinding $14.3 billion for the Internal Revenue Service. On February 6, 2024, the House failed to pass (by a vote of 180-250)69 H.R. 7217, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024. On February 13, 2024, the Senate passed, via a substitute amendment (by a vote of 70-29), H.R. 815, a bill that would provide $14.1 billion in Israel-related supplemental appropriations, including • $4.4 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza and related expenses; • $801.4 million for U.S. Army ammunition procurement to respond to the situation in Israel; • $4 billion in DOD funding for Iron Dome and David’s Sling defense systems; • $3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $769.3 million of which is specified for Off-Shore Procurement (OSP), though that figure “may be exceeded, if agreed by the United States and Israel, following consultation with the Committees on Appropriations.” The Senate bill also would authorize the Secretary of State to waive congressional notification on the FMF funds provided in the bill “if the Secretary of State determines that to do so is in the national security interest of the United States”; • $1.2 billion in DOD funding for the Iron Beam laser-based defense system being developed by Israel; and • $100 million to the Department of State for Worldwide Security Protection and the response to the situation in Israel. In addition, H.R. 815 also includes proposed provisions that would amend the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-287, §12001), to permit the transfer of previously prohibited categories of defense articles to the Government of Israel and temporarily waive limitations on the total value of defense stockpiles located in Israel and set aside for Israel’s use, per 22 U.S.C. §2321h(b). In addition to providing Israel-related funding, H.R. 815 would match the President’s request by appropriating over $9 billion via global humanitarian accounts that could be partly allocated to address the needs of those affected by the crisis in Gaza and Israel (including in neighboring countries): $5.65 billion in International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and $3.495 billion in Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). H.R. 815 includes global humanitarian assistance funds, some of which may be used to support the Palestinians, but the bill would explicitly prohibit funds (notwithstanding any other provision of law) appropriated in the bill (and prior 68 The request is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-regarding-critical-national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf. 69 H.R. 7217 had been considered under Suspension of the Rules, which requires approval by at least two-thirds of voting members. Congressional Research Service 9 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress acts) for contributions to UNRWA. The bill also would require the Secretary of State to certify and report to Congress on U.S. oversight policies and procedures for monitoring assistance in Gaza. H.R. 815 also would provide $2.44 billion to replace combat expenditures for weapons in the Red Sea and CENTCOM’s other areas of operations. As of mid-March 2024, some House lawmakers are considering using a Discharge Petition (218 signatures needed) to bring to the House floor H.R. 7372, the Defending Borders, Defending Democracies Act, a bill that would provide amounts related to Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan. It includes $10.7 billion in Israel-related appropriations (though no FMF). Unlike the Senate-passed H.R. 815, H.R. 7372 does not include global humanitarian funding. Some House lawmakers also are considering a second discharge petition to force a floor vote on H.R. 815.70 Possible Options for Congress Conditioning Aid to Israel Lawmakers may consider whether to increase, maintain, decrease, or condition existing U.S. support for Israel. As humanitarian conditions in northern Gaza have reached critical levels, some lawmakers have called on President Biden to enforce Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), which prohibits providing certain assistance to foreign countries that block or impede delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance.71 Other lawmakers have warned against an Israeli military operation in Rafah and argued that U.S. assistance should not support action that runs counter to National Security Memorandum-20 (NSM-20) on Safeguards and Accountability with Respect to Transferred Defense Articles and Defense Services (described below).72 Other Members criticized NSM-20 and the February Executive Order on the West Bank (E.O. 14115), and have opposed tightening conditions on U.S. military aid to Israel.73 To date, the White House has continued to indicate its overall public support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.74 When asked whether the Administration intends to restrict military aid to Israel per Section 620I of the FAA, State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said, “That is not a judgment that we have made.”75 According to one report, President Biden has “privately expressed skepticism to some Democrats that withholding weaponry to Israel would be effective, arguing that while Jerusalem would like more security aid, it does not currently need it.”76 However, another report suggests that President Biden is considering conditioning military aid if Israel were to conduct large scale operations in Rafah.77 70 Stephen Groves, “House Democrats and centrist Republicans launch separate efforts to force a vote on Ukraine aid,” Associated Press, March 12, 2024. 71 Senator Bernie Sanders, “Sanders, Van Hollen, Merkley, and Five Colleagues Urge President Biden to Enforce U.S. Law with Netanyahu,” March 12, 2024. 72 Representative Joaquin Castro, “Reps. Castro, Raskin, and Schakowsky Lead 30+ House Democrats in Urgent Appeal to Prevent Israeli Ground Invasion of Rafah,” March 6, 2024; “US Democrats question arms to Israel over Gaza concerns,” Reuters, March 6, 2024. 73 Andrew Solender, “Israel aid fight in Congress reignited by threat of Rafah invasion,” Axios, March 13, 2024; Senator Rick Scott, “Sens. Rick Scott, Tom Cotton & Colleagues to Biden: Rescind Directives Intended to Undermine Israelis,” February 29, 2024. 74 Department of State Press Briefing, March 4, 2024. 75 Department of State Press Briefing, March 11, 2024. 76 “As pressure mounts, Biden reportedly remains unwilling to condition aid to Israel,” Times of Israel, March 1, 2024. 77 Alexander Ward and Jonathan Lemire, “If Israel invades Rafah, Biden will consider conditioning military aid to Israel,” Politico, March 11, 2024. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress To date, President Biden has taken other steps that the Administration has identified as aimed at promoting adherence to international law and accountability for U.S. arms deliveries to Israel. On February 8, President Biden issued NSM-20, a new National Security Memorandum. Among other things, the directive requires that prior to the transfer of any U.S. defense article, the Departments of State and Defense must obtain written assurances from the recipient country that it will use any such defense articles in accordance with international humanitarian law and, as applicable, other international law.78 According to one report, the White House has tasked the Department of State with providing it a list of pending defense export licenses for Israel to help U.S. officials prioritize deliveries and consider if there are issues which require “deconfliction.”79 Congressional Review of Arms Sales to Israel As the Biden Administration has expedited arms deliveries to Israel, some lawmakers are concerned that U.S. officials are either taking steps to bypass congressional review or have not provided Congress a full accounting of U.S. military support to Israel.80 Since the October 7 attacks, there have been only two FMS notified to Congress (both were under emergency circumstances and therefore bypassed congressional review).81 According to one report, other FMS cases for Israel were either previously approved for delivery and accelerated, taken from the U.S. stockpile in Israel (known as War Reserve Stock for Allies-Israel or WRSA-I), and/or were not notified to Congress because their dollar value fell below the prior notice threshold82 for transfers to Israel.83 Department of State officials have been cited as saying that there are currently 600 active cases of potential military transfer or sales—with a total value of more than $23 billion—between the United States and Israel, and that U.S. officials have “followed the procedures Congress itself has specified to keep members well-informed and regularly brief members even when formal notification is not a legal requirement.”84 Additional Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza and UNRWA As mentioned above, the President’s October supplemental budget request includes more than $9 billion in humanitarian assistance potentially usable for needs in and around Gaza and Israel from the MRA and IDA accounts. In February, the Administration said it expected $1.4 billion of this amount to be planned for Gaza.85 Members of Congress are debating the scope and conditions under which humanitarian assistance should be appropriated, including with respect to UNRWA 78 White House, “National Security Memorandum on Safeguards and Accountability with Respect to Transferred Defense Articles and Defense Services,” February 8, 2024. 79 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: White House asks State Dept., Pentagon for Israel-bound weapons list,” Axios, March 7, 2024. 80 Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine to File Amendment to Maintain Congressional Oversight of Foreign Military Assistance,” January 9, 2024. 81 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—M830a1 120mm Tank Cartridges,” December 9, 2023, and “Israel – 155mm Artillery Ammunition,” December 29, 2023. 82 Per the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), in the case of sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally notify Congress 15 calendar days before proceeding with the sale. The prior notice threshold values for transfers to these recipients are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 83 See, Jared Malsin and Nancy A. Youssef, “How the U.S. Arms Pipeline to Israel Avoids Public Disclosure,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2024. 84 Ibid. 85 Department of State Press Briefing, February 5, 2024. Congressional Research Service 11 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress or alternative implementing partners.86 Some lawmakers have sponsored legislation or written letters calling for a halt to humanitarian aid in Gaza and/or greater monitoring of whether or not any U.S. assistance may previously have been diverted—or be at risk of future diversion—by Hamas or other groups.87 Other lawmakers have called for additional humanitarian aid for the Palestinians.88 In February 2024, 25 Senators wrote a letter to February 2024, 25 Senators wrote a letter to
President Biden urging his Administration to work with Israel to increase humanitarian aid access President Biden urging his Administration to work with Israel to increase humanitarian aid access
to Gaza and to Gaza and to investigate employee wrongdoing at UNRWA “so that the resumption of U.S. investigate employee wrongdoing at UNRWA “so that the resumption of U.S.
assistance through UNRWA, when appropriate, remains possible.”assistance through UNRWA, when appropriate, remains possible.”7389
Monitoring U.S. Security Assistance for Human Rights Purposes
Since the IDF began its operations in Gaza, some critics have accused Israel of causing excessive Since the IDF began its operations in Gaza, some critics have accused Israel of causing excessive
civilian casualties and possible misuse of U.S. defense equipment.civilian casualties and possible misuse of U.S. defense equipment.74 Biden Administration
officials also have become more vocal in their call for Israeli attentiveness to civilian casualties.75
U.S. officials also have asserted that Israel is making efforts to reduce the number of civilian
casualties. According to White House National Security Spokesperson John Kirby, “They’ve [the
Israelis] relied less on air power, structured their ground operations in such a way, to try to be
more targeted and precise. I get this all the time that they’re ignoring us, that they’re not listening
to us, and frankly, the facts just don’t bear that out.”76 According to one report, the United States
and Israel have set up a bilateral channel to investigate reports of civilian harm, noting:
Through the channel, which has been active for the last few weeks, Washington raises with
the Israelis “every specific incident of concern” related to Israel's military campaign in
Gaza, another U.S. official said. The Israelis investigate and provide feedback to the
Americans. In some instances, the Israelis have conveyed additional information that sheds
light on an incident while in others, they admitted they “made a mistake,” the officials said,
without specifying which ones.77
One report from mid-December indicated that the Biden Administration is withholding the
delivery of 27,000 M4 and M16 rifles for Israel’s national police due to concerns that such
armaments may be transferred to civilians under an initiative led by Israel’s ultra-nationalist
National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir.78

71 Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube, “Biden administration discussing slowing some weaponry deliveries to Israel to
pressure Netanyahu,” NBC News, January 28, 2024.
72 CRS Insight IN12316, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA): Overview and the U.S. Funding Pause, by Rhoda Margesson and Jim Zanotti.
7390 The IDF has maintained that while individual soldiers may have committed criminal offenses and are subsequently under investigation, the military as a whole has complied with international legal obligations and that noncombatant casualty figures have been deliberately exaggerated by Hamas.91 Reportedly, the Department of State is investigating the use of U.S. weaponry in Israeli airstrikes in Gaza that resulted in civilian casualties and the IDF’s use of white phosphorus munitions in Lebanon.92 According to a Department of State spokesperson, “We do seek to thoroughly assess reports of civilian harm by authorized recipients of U.S.-provided defense articles around the world.”93 In December 2023, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.Res. 504, a privileged resolution, which would have mandated that the Department of State provide Congress with a report on Israel’s human rights practices within 30 days of passage, pursuant to Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. After receiving such a report, Congress, by joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to Israel. On January 16, 2024, the Senate voted 72-11 to table a motion to discharge S.Res. 504 from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.94 86 CRS Insight IN12316, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): Overview and the U.S. Funding Pause, by Rhoda Margesson and Jim Zanotti. 87 Text of October 24 letter from 24 Representatives to USAID Director Samantha Power, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24080806-23-10-23-letter-to-usaid-re-gaza-west-bank-funding-copy. Lawmakers in both chambers have introduced bills during the 118th Congress that would prohibit any U.S. funding for Palestinians in Gaza absent a presidential certification that (among other things) the assistance would not benefit Hamas or other terrorist organizations or affiliates. Senate version: S. 489; House version: H.R. 5996. 88 Text of November 8 letter from 26 Senators to President Biden, available at https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_president_biden_on_gaza.pdf. 89 Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy, Van Hollen, Coons, Merkley, 21 Colleagues Urge Biden Administration to Work Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy, Van Hollen, Coons, Merkley, 21 Colleagues Urge Biden Administration to Work
with Israel to Take 5 Steps to Get More Humanitarian Aid into Gaza,” February 2, 2024. with Israel to Take 5 Steps to Get More Humanitarian Aid into Gaza,” February 2, 2024.
7490 See, for example, Brian Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible for What Israel Does with American Weapons? See, for example, Brian Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible for What Israel Does with American Weapons?,” ”
Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2023. , November 17, 2023.
75 Department of Defense, “‘A Time for American Leadership’: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at
the Reagan National Defense Forum (As Delivered),” Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, December 2, 2023.
76 “White House spokesman: Israel is relying less on its Air Force in Gaza,” Israel National News, January 30, 2024.
77 “Gaza: US sets up channel with Israel seeking answers on civilian casualties,” Reuters, January 25, 2024.
78 Nancy A. Youssef and Vivian Salama, “Washington Is Blocking Shipment of Rifles to Israel,” Wall Street Journal,
December 14, 202391 David S. Cloud, “Israel’s Military Investigates Soldiers for Misconduct,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2024. 92 Dion Nissenbaum and Vivian Salama, “Tensions Build Between Netanyahu and Biden,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2024. 93 “US reviewing reports of civilian harm by Israel, State Dept says,” Reuters, February 13, 2024. 94 Roll Call Vote 118th Cong. - 2nd Session, available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-resolution/504/actions. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

12 12

---

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress


Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Jeremy M. Sharp Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs



Acknowledgments
Former Research Assistant Michael H. Memari, CRS Geospatial Information Systems Analysts Molly Cox Former Research Assistant Michael H. Memari, CRS Geospatial Information Systems Analysts Molly Cox
and Cassandra Higgins, and Visual Information Specialists Amber Wilhelm and Brion Long contributed to and Cassandra Higgins, and Visual Information Specialists Amber Wilhelm and Brion Long contributed to
this report. this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R47828 R47828 · VERSION 1720 · UPDATED
13 13

---