Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A Primer
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Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal
November 13, 2023
Government: A Primer
Ben Wilhelm
Government: A Primer
Updated August 11, 2026
(R45450)
Jump to Main Text of Report
This report provides an overview of statutory inspectors general (IGs) in the federal government,
Analyst in Government
including their structure, functions, and related issues for Congress.
Organization and
Management
Statutory IGs—established by law rather than administrative directive—are intended to be Statutory IGs—established by law rather than administrative directive—are intended to be
independent, nonpartisan officials who aim to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in the independent, nonpartisan officials who aim to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in the
federal government. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of federal government. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices ofinspectorinspectors general (OIGs) that general (OIGs) that
conduct various reviews of agency programs and operations—including audits, investigations, conduct various reviews of agency programs and operations—including audits, investigations,
inspections, and evaluations—and provide findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to inspections, and evaluations—and provide findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to
carry out their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant agency records and carry out their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant agency records and
information, and report findings and recommendations directly to Congress.information, and report findings and recommendations directly to Congress.
7470 statutory IGs currently operate across the statutory IGs currently operate across the
federal government. Statutory IGs can be grouped into federal government. Statutory IGs can be grouped intofour
three types: (1) establishment, (2) designated federal entity types: (1) establishment, (2) designated federal entity
(DFE), (DFE), or (3) other permanent(3) other permanent, and (4) special. A fourth class, special IGs, have been common in recent decades, but none are currently operating. Establishment . Establishment
(33 of 74(33) and DFE () and DFE (3130) IGs are governed by the Inspector ) IGs are governed by the Inspector
General Act of 1978, as amended, whereas other permanent General Act of 1978, as amended, whereas other permanent
(7) and special (3) IGsIGs (7) are governed by separate statutes. are governed by separate statutes.
Statutory authorities and requirements can differ among the Statutory authorities and requirements can differ among the
fourthree IG types, resulting in varied levels of independence, transparency, and accountability. IG types, resulting in varied levels of independence, transparency, and accountability.
This report also discusses special IGs, which are created by Congress to provide oversight regarding a particular issue for a limited time.
Statutory IGs are central actors on government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in establishing the structures and Statutory IGs are central actors on government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in establishing the structures and
authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of IGs in government agencies allows OIG personnel to authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of IGs in government agencies allows OIG personnel to
develop the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGsdevelop the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGs’' dual reporting structure— dual reporting structure—
to agency heads and to Congress—positions them to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and policies and to to agency heads and to Congress—positions them to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and policies and to
advise Congress on how to monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, therefore, may have an interest in ensuring advise Congress on how to monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, therefore, may have an interest in ensuring
that statutorythat IGs possess the resources and authorities necessary to fulfill their IGs possess the resources and authorities necessary to fulfill their oversight roles.
statutory duties.
As the federal government continues to evolve, so too does the role of IGs in government oversight. Agency programs and As the federal government continues to evolve, so too does the role of IGs in government oversight. Agency programs and
operations have increased in terms of breadth, complexity, and interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing operations have increased in terms of breadth, complexity, and interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing
demand to complete statutorily mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program demand to complete statutorily mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program
performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or technical programs, possibly performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or technical programs, possibly
in emerging policy areas; and (3) use of more complex analytical methods and tools. Congress may consider several options in emerging policy areas; and (3) use of more complex analytical methods and tools. Congress may consider several options
regarding IG structures, functions, and coordination as the role of IGs in government oversight evolves.
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Contents
Establishment of Statutory IGs ........................................................................................................ 1
Brief History of Statutory IGs Until 1978 ................................................................................. 1
Inspector General Act of 1978 .................................................................................................. 2
Central Tenets of the IG Act ............................................................................................... 2
Evolution of the IG Act ....................................................................................................... 2
Structure of the IG Community ....................................................................................................... 4
Types of IGs .............................................................................................................................. 4
Composition of Statutory IGs ................................................................................................... 5
Distribution of IGs Across Federal Entities .............................................................................. 5
Multiple IGs Operating for a Single Federal Entity ............................................................ 5
Single IG Operating for Multiple Federal Entities .............................................................. 6
Types of IG Reviews ....................................................................................................................... 7
Quality Standards ...................................................................................................................... 8
Type of Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 9
Scope of Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 9
IG Statutory Authorities and Requirements .................................................................................. 10
Oversight Jurisdiction .............................................................................................................. 11
Appointment Method .............................................................................................................. 12
Removal Method ..................................................................................................................... 13
Term Limits ............................................................................................................................. 14
Transparency of Budget Formulation and Proposals .............................................................. 14
Appropriations......................................................................................................................... 15
Reporting Requirements .......................................................................................................... 16
Semiannual Report ............................................................................................................ 16
Seven-Day Letter .............................................................................................................. 17
Top Management and Performance Challenges ................................................................ 17
Transparency of IG Reports and Recommendations ............................................................... 18
Oversight.gov .......................................................................................................................... 19
Coordination and Oversight of Statutory IGs ................................................................................ 19
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ............................................... 19
Other Coordinating Bodies ..................................................................................................... 21
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 22
Independence .................................................................................................................... 22
Appointment and Removal Methods ................................................................................ 23
Audit Follow-Up and Oversight of IG Recommendations ............................................... 25
Workforce Composition and Skills ................................................................................... 26
IG Effectiveness ................................................................................................................ 27
CIGIE Structure and Functions ......................................................................................... 27
Figures
Figure 1. Statutory IGs by Type and Authorizing Statute................................................................ 5
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Tables
Table 1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Statutory IG Types ....................................................... 4
Table 2. Multiple Statutory IGs Affiliated with a Single Federal Entity ......................................... 6
Table 3. Examples of a Single Statutory IG Affiliated with Multiple Federal Entities ................... 7
Table 4. Key Differences Among Common Types of IG Reviews .................................................. 8
Table 5. Appointment Methods for Statutory IGs ......................................................................... 13
Table A-1. Establishment IGs ........................................................................................................ 29
Table A-2. Designated Federal Entity (DFE) IGs .......................................................................... 31
Table A-3. Other Permanent IGs ................................................................................................... 32
Table A-4. Special IGs ................................................................................................................... 32
Table B-1. Comparison of Selected Statutory Authorities and Requirements for IGs .................. 34
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statutory Inspectors General by Type ...................................................................... 29
Appendix B. Selected IG Statutory Authorities and Requirements ............................................... 33
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 39
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his report provides an overview of statutory inspectors general (IGs)regarding IG structures, functions, and coordination as the role of IGs in government oversight evolves.
Congress created the inspectors general (IGs) to "shine a bright light on waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the Federal bureaucracy with the hope that the executive and legislative branches could work together to do something about those problems."1 IGs accomplish this mission by conducting audits and investigations, by making recommendations to agencies that promote efficiency and effectiveness, and by both preventing and detecting fraud in agency programs and operations. This report provides an overview of statutory IGs in the federal in the federal
government, including their structuregovernment, including their structure, and functions, functions, andas well as related issues for Congress.
Establishment of Statutory IGs
Statutory IGs related issues for Congress.
T
Report Roadmap
•
Establishment of Statutory IGs. History and evolution of the Inspector General Act of 1978.
•
Structure of the IG Community. Different types of IGs and their distribution across the government.
•
Types of IG Reviews. Differences among an IG audit, inspection or evaluation, and investigation.
•
IG Statutory Authorities and Requirements. Comparison of selected authorities and requirements across
different IG types.
•
Coordination and Oversight of Statutory IGs. Overview of the structure and functions of the Council of
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and other coordinating bodies.
•
Issues for Congress. High-level overview of broad issues facing statutory IGs.
Establishment of Statutory IGs
Statutory inspectors general (IGs) are intended to be independent, nonpartisan officials who are intended to be independent, nonpartisan officials who
prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within federal departments and prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within federal departments and
agencies. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of agencies. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices ofinspectorinspectors general (OIGs) that conduct general (OIGs) that conduct
audits, investigations, and other evaluations of agency programs and operations and produce audits, investigations, and other evaluations of agency programs and operations and produce
recommendations to improve them. Statutory IGs exist in recommendations to improve them. Statutory IGs exist inmore than 70 federal entities, including 70 federal entities, including
departments, agencies, boards, commissions, and government-sponsored enterprises.departments, agencies, boards, commissions, and government-sponsored enterprises.
Brief History of Statutory IGs Until 1978
The origins of The origins ofthe modern-day IGs can be traced to the late 1950s, with the statutory modern-day IGs can be traced to the late 1950s, with the statutory
establishment of an establishment of an“"IG and ComptrollerIG and Comptroller”" for the Department of State in 1959. Soon after, in for the Department of State in 1959. Soon after, in
1962, the Kennedy Administration created an IG for the Department of Agriculture.1962, the Kennedy Administration created an IG for the Department of Agriculture.12 Prior to the Prior to the
establishment of IGs in the federal government, agencies establishment of IGs in the federal government, agenciesoften employedsometimes had internal audit and internal audit and
investigative units to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.investigative units to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.2
3
In 1976, Congress established In 1976, Congress established the firsta statutory IG statutory IG that resembles the modern-day model for the for the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW; now the Department of Health and Human Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW; now the Department of Health and Human
Services).Services).34 Congressional investigations had uncovered widespread inefficiencies and Congressional investigations had uncovered widespread inefficiencies and
mismanagement of mismanagement ofthe department’HEW's programs and operations, as well as weaknesses within the s programs and operations, as well as weaknesses within the
department’department's audit and investigative units.s audit and investigative units.45 The House Committee on Government Operations The House Committee on Government Operations
investigative report recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of HEW place all audit investigative report recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of HEW place all audit
and investigation units and investigation units“"under the direction of a single official who reports directly to the Secretary and has no program operating responsibilities."6under the direction of a single official who reports directly to the
1 Congress established the Department of State “Inspector General and Comptroller” in 1959 (P.L. 86-108), and the
Secretary of Agriculture administratively created an IG in 1962. These two IGs have been described as early prototypes
for modern-day IGs. For more information on the history of IGs, see Paul Light, Monitoring Government, Inspectors
General and the Search for Accountability (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 23-43.
2 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations and Human Resources, Establishment of Offices of Inspectors General, hearings on H.R. 2819 and H.R.
4184, 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 24; June 1, 7, 13, 21, 29; and July 25, 27 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 478-
728.
3 P.L. 94-505, §401(h).
4 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Prevention and Detection of Fraud and Program Abuse), Tenth Report, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., January
26, 1976, H.Rept. 94-786 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
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Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A Primer
Secretary and has no program operating responsibilities.”5 This official would be responsible for This official would be responsible for
identifying identifying“"serious problemsserious problems”" and and “"lack of progress in correcting such problems.lack of progress in correcting such problems.”6"7 Congress Congress
ultimately established the HEW IG ultimately established the HEW IGunder this model7 as well as an IG forin statute based on this model8 and included an IG in the Department of the Department of
Energy under a similar model in 1977.8
Energy when it was created in 1977.9 Inspector General Act of 1978
The establishment of the HEW and Department of Energy IGs laid the groundwork for Congress The establishment of the HEW and Department of Energy IGs laid the groundwork for Congress
to create additional statutory IGs through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (hereinafter IG Act).to create additional statutory IGs through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (hereinafter IG Act).9
10 According to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs report that accompanied the According to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs report that accompanied the
legislation, the committee believed that extending the IG concept to more agencies would legislation, the committee believed that extending the IG concept to more agencies would
improve government programs and operations. The committee further identified IG independence improve government programs and operations. The committee further identified IG independence
from agency management as a key characteristic in fostering such improvementsfrom agency management as a key characteristic in fostering such improvements.10
Central Tenets of the IG Act
, stating that the IG model removes "the inherent conflict of interest which exists when audit and investigative operations are under the authority of an individual whose programs are being audited."11
Central Tenets of the IG Act
The IG Act initially created 12 IGs for federal The IG Act initially created 12 IGs for federal “establishments”"establishments" and provided a blueprint for IG and provided a blueprint for IG
authorities and responsibilities.authorities and responsibilities.1112 The act laid out three primary purposes for IGs: The act laid out three primary purposes for IGs:
1. conduct1. conducting audits and investigations of programs and operations of their affiliated audits and investigations of programs and operations of their affiliated
federal entities;federal entities;12
2. recommend13
2. recommending policies that promote the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of policies that promote the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of
agency programs and operations, as well as preventing and detecting waste, agency programs and operations, as well as preventing and detecting waste,
fraud, and abuse; andfraud, and abuse; and
3. keep
3. keeping the affiliated entity head and Congress the affiliated entity head and Congress “"fully and currently informedfully and currently informed”" of of
fraud and fraud and “"other serious problems, abuses, and deficienciesother serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies”" in such programs in such programs
and operations, as well as progress in implementing related corrective actions.and operations, as well as progress in implementing related corrective actions.13
14Evolution of the IG Act
Congress has substantially amended the IG Act Congress has substantially amended the IG Act threefour times since its enactment, as described times since its enactment, as described
below.below.1415 The amendments generally aimed to expand the number of statutory IGs and enhance The amendments generally aimed to expand the number of statutory IGs and enhance
their independence, transparency, and accountability.
5 Ibid., p. 11.
6 Ibid.
7 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, report to accompany H.R. 15390, 94th Congress, 2nd
sess., H.Rept. 94-1573 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
8 P.L. 95-91, §208.
9 P.L. 95-452; The IG Act, as amended, is listed in 5 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (IG Act), which is accessible at
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title5/part1/chapter4&edition=prelim.
10 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, report to accompany H.R. 8588, 95th Congress, 2nd sess.,
August 8, 1978, S.Rept. 95-1071 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), pp. 6-8.
11 Federal “establishments” consist of Cabinet-level departments and larger agencies in the executive branch.
Establishment IGs are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
12 Affiliated federal entity refers to an entity within the scope of an IG’s jurisdiction. For example, the Department of
Homeland Security and its components are considered an “affiliated federal entity” of the department’s IG.
13 5 U.S.C. §402.
14 In addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 vested certain OIGs with law enforcement authorities, including the
power to (1) carry a firearm; (2) make arrests without a warrant; and (3) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of
premises, or seizure of evidence. See P.L. 107-296, §812; listed in 5 U.S.C. §406(f).
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• their independence, transparency, and accountability.The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 (P.L. 100-504P.L. 100-504) expanded the expanded the
total number of statutory IGs, particularly by authorizing additional total number of statutory IGs, particularly by authorizing additional
establishment IGs and creating a new category of IGs for establishment IGs and creating a new category of IGs for“"designated federal designated federal
entities”entities" (DFEs). (DFEs).1516 The act also established a uniform salary rate and separate The act also established a uniform salary rate and separate
appropriations accounts for each establishment IG. Further, the act added several appropriations accounts for each establishment IG. Further, the act added several
new semiannual reporting requirements for IGs, such as a requirement for IGs to new semiannual reporting requirements for IGs, such as a requirement for IGs to
provide a list of each audit report issued during the reporting period. Finally, the provide a list of each audit report issued during the reporting period. Finally, the
law required external peer reviews of OIGs, during which a federal law required external peer reviews of OIGs, during which a federal“"audit entityaudit entity”
" reviews each OIGreviews each OIG’'s internal controls and compliance with audit standards.s internal controls and compliance with audit standards.
•
The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-409P.L. 110-409) established a new established a new
entity, the Council of Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), to coordinate to coordinate
and oversee the IG community, including an Integrity Committee to investigate and oversee the IG community, including an Integrity Committee to investigate
alleged IG wrongdoing. The law increased the uniform salary rate for alleged IG wrongdoing. The law increased the uniform salary rate for
establishment IGs and established a salary formula for DFE IGs. The act also establishment IGs and established a salary formula for DFE IGs. The act also
provided additional authorities and protections to enhance the independence of provided additional authorities and protections to enhance the independence of
IGs, such as budget protections, access to independent legal counsel, and IGs, such as budget protections, access to independent legal counsel, and
advanced congressional notification for the removal or transfer of IGs. Finally, advanced congressional notification for the removal or transfer of IGs. Finally,
the act further amended IG semiannual reporting obligations and required OIG the act further amended IG semiannual reporting obligations and required OIG
websites to include all completed audits and reports.websites to include all completed audits and reports.
•
The Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-317P.L. 114-317) aimed to
enhance enhanced IG access to IG access to, and use of and use of, agency records. The act exempted IGs from the agency records. The act exempted IGs from the
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA)Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA),16 which is intended17 to to
allow IGs to conduct computerized data comparisons across different agency allow IGs to conduct computerized data comparisons across different agency
automated record systems without the restrictions created by the CMPPA.automated record systems without the restrictions created by the CMPPA.1718 The The
act also directed CIGIE to resolve jurisdictional disputes between IGs and altered act also directed CIGIE to resolve jurisdictional disputes between IGs and altered
the membership structure and investigatory procedures of the CIGIE Integrity the membership structure and investigatory procedures of the CIGIE Integrity
Committee. Regarding transparency and accountability, the act required IGs to Committee. Regarding transparency and accountability, the act required IGs to
submit any documents containing recommendations for corrective action to submit any documents containing recommendations for corrective action to
agency heads and congressional committees of jurisdiction, as well as any agency heads and congressional committees of jurisdiction, as well as any
Member of Congress or other individuals Member of Congress or other individualsuponon request. request.
•
The Securing Inspector General Independence Act of 2022 and the Integrity
Committee Transparency Act of 2022 (Title LII of P.L. 117-263 (Title LII of P.L. 117-263, the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the FY2023
National Defense Authorization Act) sought to increase the independence of the ) sought to increase the independence of the
IG community by placing new limits on the removal of IGs, the management of IG community by placing new limits on the removal of IGs, the management of
vacancies, and the selection of acting IGs. The act increased the information that vacancies, and the selection of acting IGs. The act increased the information that
the President and heads of DFEs must provide to Congress prior to removal of an the President and heads of DFEs must provide to Congress prior to removal of an
IG. The amendments also limited the circumstances in which an IG may be IG. The amendments also limited the circumstances in which an IG may be
placed on non-duty status. When a vacancy in an IG position does occur, the act placed on non-duty status. When a vacancy in an IG position does occur, the act
limited those who may serve as an acting IG to certain officials within the IG limited those who may serve as an acting IG to certain officials within the IG
community and community andalso required the President to report to Congress if there are required the President to report to Congress if there are
extended periods in which an IG position is vacant and without a nominee. The extended periods in which an IG position is vacant and without a nominee. The
act also increased the IG communityact also increased the IG community’'s transparency to Congress by altering the s transparency to Congress by altering the
requirements for requirements forsemi-annualsemiannual reports and enhancing reporting by CIGIE reports and enhancing reporting by CIGIE’s
's Integrity Committee. Structure of the IG Community Types of IGsIntegrity Committee.
15 DFEs consist primarily of smaller entities, such as commissions, boards, and government-sponsored enterprises (e.g.,
National Science Foundation and Legal Services Corporation). DFE IGs are appointed by the affiliated entity heads.
16 The CMPPA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §552a.
17 See 5 U.S.C. §406(j).
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Structure of the IG Community
Types of IGs
Statutory IGs may be grouped into four types: (1) establishment, (2) Statutory IGs may be grouped into four types: (1) establishment, (2)designated federal entity
(DFE)DFE, (3) other permanent, and (4) special., (3) other permanent, and (4) special.1819 Federal laws explicitly define only the first two Federal laws explicitly define only the first two
types of IGstypes of IGs but not the latter two types, though stakeholders sometimes , though stakeholders sometimes divide IGs into these
four types. Consequently, thisdistinguish IGs according to common criteria for all four types. This report groups IGs into the four types report groups IGs into the four types based on criteria that are
commonly used to distinguish between IGsfollowing these commonly used criteria, including authorizing statute, appointment method, , including authorizing statute, appointment method,
affiliated federal entity and the branch of government in which it is located, oversight jurisdiction, affiliated federal entity and the branch of government in which it is located, oversight jurisdiction,
and oversight and oversightdurationduration. Table 1 describes each IG type according to these criteria. describes each IG type according to these criteria.
There are not any active special IGs presently, but Congress may create new special IGs in the future.20 Table 1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Statutory IG Types
Other
Feature
Establishment IG
DFE IG
Other Permanent IG
Special IG
Authorizing
IG Act
Individual statutes outside of the IG ActIndividual statutes outside of the IG Act
statute
Appointment Appointment
method
President, by and President, by and
Agency head
President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate
President, by and President, by and
method
with the advice and with the advice and
with the adviceconsent of Senate
and
with the advice and with the advice and
consent of consent of the
consent of Senate
consent of Senate
Senate
or
or
agency head
President alone
Affiliated federal Cabinet
Smaller entities (e.g.,
Certain legislative
Some affiliated with
entity
departments,
boards, commissions,
branch agencies
specified federal
Cabinet-level
and government-
Certain intelligence
entities; others not
agencies, and larger
sponsored enterprises)
agencies outside of
expressly affiliated
agencies in the
Certain intelligence
DOD
with a particular
executive branch
agencies within DOD
entity
Oversight
Authority to oversee the programs and
Authority to
jurisdiction
operations of an affiliated entity or entities
Senate
Authority to oversee the programs and operations of an affiliated entity or entities
Authority to oversee federal oversee federal
programs, programs,
operations, or funds operations, or funds
as specified in as specified in
authorizing statuteauthorizing statute
Oversight Oversight
duration
Permanent (no sunset date)Permanent (no sunset date)
Temporary (allowed
duration
to sunset)
Source: CRS analysis of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and authorizing statutes for other IGs.CRS analysis of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and authorizing statutes for other IGs.
Notes
Note: IGs can be grouped into types other than those listed based on a different set of criteria.IGs can be grouped into types other than those listed based on a different set of criteria.
18 The types do not include IGs for certain U.S. Armed Forces—the Army, Air Force, and Navy. (The Department of
Homeland Security IG oversees the U.S. Coast Guard.) While these service branch IGs are required by statute, they are
distinct from IGs under the IG Act and related provisions and are not generally considered among the “statutory
inspectors general,” including in this report. Further, the categories do not include nonstatutory IGs. For example, the
House of Representatives IG is authorized pursuant to House Rule II, clause 8. See CRS In Focus IF11024, Office of
the House of Representatives Inspector General, by Jacob R. Straus.
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Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A Primer
Composition of Statutory IGs
As of February 2023, 74
As of July 2026, 70 statutory IGs operate in the federal government. statutory IGs operate in the federal government.1921 The IG Act governs The IG Act governs
64 IGs, including63 IGs: 33 establishment and 33 establishment and 3130 DFE IGs. The remaining DFE IGs. The remaining 107 IGs are governed by IGs are governed by
individual statutes outside the IG Actindividual statutes outside the IG Act, including seven other permanent and three special IGs
(Figure 1). Five . Fiveout ofof the seven other permanent IGs operate for legislative branch agencies—the seven other permanent IGs operate for legislative branch agencies—the
Architect of the Capitol (AOC), Government Publishing Office (GPO), Government Architect of the Capitol (AOC), Government Publishing Office (GPO), Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Library of Congress (LOC), and U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). The Accountability Office (GAO), Library of Congress (LOC), and U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). The
remaining two operate for executive branch intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence remaining two operate for executive branch intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and Intelligence Community (IC). Agency (CIA) and Intelligence Community (IC).The three special IGs are the IGs for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), and
Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR).20 Appendix A lists current statutory IGs by type.lists current statutory IGs by type.
As of November 2023
Notes: The figure does not include IGs for certain U.S. Armed Forces—the Air Force, Army, and Navy. (The The figure does not include IGs for certain U.S. Armed Forces—the Air Force, Army, and Navy. (The
Department of Homeland Security IG, which is included in the Department of Homeland Security IG, which is included in the totals in the figure, oversees the U.S. Coast Guard.) While figure, oversees the U.S. Coast Guard.) While
these IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other statutory IGs and are these IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other statutory IGs and are
beyond the scope of this report. Further, the figure does not include beyond the scope of this report. Further, the figure does not includenonstatutorynon-statutory IGs, such as the IG for the IGs, such as the IG for the
House of Representatives.House of Representatives.
Distribution of IGs Across Federal Entities
The majority of IGs oversee the activities of a single affiliated federal entity and its components. The majority of IGs oversee the activities of a single affiliated federal entity and its components.
For example, the IG for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for For example, the IG for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for
evaluating programs and operations of the entire department and its components, such as the evaluating programs and operations of the entire department and its components, such as the
Federal Emergency Management AgencyFederal Emergency Management Agency. In some cases, however, multiple IGs operate for a
single entity. In other cases, one IG operates for multiple entities.
Multiple IGs Operating for a Single Federal Entity
Two Cabinet-level and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Two departments are affiliated with more than one IG: the Department of Defense departments are affiliated with more than one IG: the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of the Treasury. Both (DOD) and the Department of the Treasury. Bothdepartments have a department-wide IG and have a department-wide IG and
one or more separate IGs for certain components or programs one or more separate IGs for certain components or programs(Table 2).
19 This number does not reflect statutory IGs that have been abolished.
20 SIGTARP (P.L. 110-343, §121) is listed in 12 U.S.C. §5231, SIGAR (P.L. 110-181, §1229) is listed in 5 U.S.C.
§415 note, and SIGPR (P.L. 116-136, §4018) is listed in 15 U.S.C. §9053.
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(Table 2). Table 2. Multiple Statutory IGs Affiliated with a Single Federal Entity
Department of Defense (DOD) IGs
Department of the Treasury (DOT) IGs
DOD (department-wide)
DOT
DOD (department-wide) (department-wide)
Defense Intelligence AgencyDefense Intelligence Agency
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
National Geospatial Intelligence AgencyNational Geospatial Intelligence Agency
(Internal Revenue Service)
National Security Agency
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
(certain CARES Act programs)
National Reconnaissance Office
Source: CRS analysis of the Inspector General Act of 1978 and other statutes governing the listed IGs.CRS analysis of the Inspector General Act of 1978 and other statutes governing the listed IGs.
Notes: The table does not include IGs for U.S. Armed Forces within the DOD—the Air Force, Army, and The table does not include IGs for U.S. Armed Forces within the DOD—the Air Force, Army, and
Navy. While these military IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other Navy. While these military IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other
statutory IGs and are beyond the scope of this report. In addition, the table does not include the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) or the Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). Although SIGAR and SIGTARP might evaluate, respectively, DOD and DOT
programs, they are not housed in or affiliated with the departments. While the Special Inspector General for
Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) is similar in authority and function to SIGAR and SIGTARP, it is organized within
DOT under 15 U.S.C. §9053(a).
Single IG Operating for Multiple Federal Entities
statutory IGs and are beyond the scope of this report.
than one entity either on a permanent or temporary basis. The expansion of an IGthan one entity either on a permanent or temporary basis. The expansion of an IG’'s jurisdiction to s jurisdiction to
include multiple entities has generally stemmed from agency reorganizations or congressional include multiple entities has generally stemmed from agency reorganizations or congressional
concern regarding oversight of a particular agency or program.concern regarding oversight of a particular agency or program.21
23 Table 3 provides examples of IGs who have permanent expanded jurisdiction. In the past, provides examples of IGs who have permanent expanded jurisdiction. In the past,
Congress has also temporarily expanded IG jurisdiction to include operations of unaffiliated Congress has also temporarily expanded IG jurisdiction to include operations of unaffiliated
agencies. For example, Congress directed the GAO IG to serve concurrently as the IG for the agencies. For example, Congress directed the GAO IG to serve concurrently as the IG for the
Commission on Civil Rights for FY2012 and FY2013.Commission on Civil Rights for FY2012 and FY2013.2224 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, The Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2014, authorized the DOT IG to oversee the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 2014, authorized the DOT IG to oversee the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA), a nonfederal entity.23
21 A recent example of legislation that established such an arrangement is the Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 (P.L.
117-108; H.R. 3076), which abolished the OIG for the Postal Regulatory Commission and reorganized its functions
into the existing OIG for the United States Postal Service. See CRS Insight IN11685, Changes to Postal Regulatory
Commission Administration in the Postal Service Reform Act of 2022, by Ben Wilhelm.
22 P.L. 112-55, Division B, Title IV, 125 Stat. 628; P.L. 113-6, Division B, Title IV, 128 Stat. 266; GAO, OIG,
Semiannual Report, April 1, 2014-September 30, 2014, October 2014, p. 5, https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
667257.pdf.
23 P.L. 113-76, Division L, Title I; 128 Stat. 600. It is unclear whether the IG has overseen MWAA beyond FY2015.
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(MWAA), a nonfederal entity.25 Table 3. Examples of a Single Statutory IG Affiliated with Multiple Federal Entities
Office of
Inspector
Affiliated federal
entities
Authorizing statute
Authorizing statute
General
entities
Description
and U.S. Code citation
Intelligence
IC elements (defined
The IC IG is explicitly authorized to
P.L. 111-259, §405
Community
in 50 U.S.C. §3003)
oversee the programs and activities under
Codified in 50 U.S.C.
(IC)
The IC IG is explicitly authorized to oversee the programs and activities under the purview of the Director of National the purview of the Director of National
§3033
Intelligence (DNI), who serves as the head Intelligence (DNI), who serves as the head
of the IC. The IC IG replaced the now-of the IC. The IC IG replaced the now-
defunct IG for the Office of the DNI, defunct IG for the Office of the DNI,
whose jurisdiction was limited to this whose jurisdiction was limited to this
office and who had substantially less office and who had substantially less
authority and independence (P.L. 108-458authority and independence (P.L. 108-458,,
§1078).§1078).
Board of
(1) FRB
The FRB IG is explicitly authorized to
P.L. 111-P.L. 111-203, §§1011 and
Governors of
(2) Consumer
oversee the CFPB, which resulted from
1081
the Federal
Financial Protection
CFPB’s establishment as a new
Listed in 5 U.S.C.
Reserve
Bureau (CFPB)
“independent bureau”259, §405
The FRB IG is explicitly authorized to oversee the CFPB, which resulted from CFPB's establishment as a new "independent bureau" within the Federal within the Federal
§415(a)(2).
System (FRB)
Reserve System in 2010 under the Dodd-Reserve System in 2010 under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.Protection Act.
Department of (1) DOT
The DOT IG is expressly authorized to
P.L. 106-424, §12
Transportation (2) National
oversee the “financial management,
Codified in 49
The DOT IG is expressly authorized to oversee the "financial management, property management, and business operations" U.S.C.
(DOT)
Transportation Safety
property management, and business
§1137
Board (NTSB)
operations” of the NTSB. Congress of the NTSB. Congress
expanded the IGexpanded the IG’'s jurisdiction to cover s jurisdiction to cover
the NTSB in 2000 due to perceived lack the NTSB in 2000 due to perceived lack
of oversight of the board.of oversight of the board.
Department of (1) DOS
The DOS IG’s jurisdiction was expanded
P.L. 105-277, Division G,
State (DOS)
(2) Broadcasting
to include BBG upon the agency’s
Title XIII, Chapter 3,
Board of Governors
removal from the DOS and establishment
§1322
(BBG)
as an independent agency in 1998 under
Listed in 22 U.S.C.
the Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act. §6209a
U.S. Aid for
(1) USAID
The USAID IG has explicit authority to
P.L. 87-195, §239(e)
International
(2) Overseas Private
“conduct reviews, investigations, and
Listed in 22 U.S.C.
Development
Investment
inspections of all phases of the
§2199(e)
(USAID)
Corporation
Corporation’s activities and activities.”
U.S. Postal
(1) USPS
Under the Postal Service Reform Act of
P.L. 117-108, §209(a)P.L. 117-108, §209(a)
Service (USPS)
(2) Postal Regulatory
2022, the USPS IG “shall function as the
39 U.S.C. §202(e)39 U.S.C. §202(e)
Commission
Inspector General for the Postal
Regulatory Commission.”
Source: CRS analysis of statutes authorizing or expanding the oversight jurisdiction of each listed IG.CRS analysis of statutes authorizing or expanding the oversight jurisdiction of each listed IG.
Types of IG Reviews
IGs conduct reviews of government programs and operations. The genesis and frequency of such IGs conduct reviews of government programs and operations. The genesis and frequency of such
reviews can vary. reviews can vary.An IG generally conducts a review in response to a statutory mandate, at the
request ofCommon causes for IG reviews include statutory mandates, requests by Congress or other stakeholders (e.g., the President), Congress or other stakeholders (e.g., the President), or uponand self-initiation self-initiation. Reviews
can occur once or periodically based on particular information or concerns. IG reviews can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) . IG reviews can be grouped into three broad categories: (1)
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performance audits,24performance audits,26 (2) inspections or evaluations, and (3) investigations. (2) inspections or evaluations, and (3) investigations.2527 Table 4 and the and the
sections below discuss certain differences between the review types in terms of three sections below discuss certain differences between the review types in terms of three
characteristics: quality standards, scope of analysis, and type of analysis.characteristics: quality standards, scope of analysis, and type of analysis.
Table 4. Key Differences Among Common Types of IG Reviews
Characteristic
Performance Audita
Performance Audita
Inspection or Evaluation
Investigation
Quality
Generally Accepted
Quality Standards for Inspection
Quality Standards for
standards
Government Auditing
and Evaluation (also known as
Investigationsc,e
Standards (GAGAS, also
the Blue Book)c,d
known as the Yellow Book)b,c
Type of analysis
Generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS, also known as the Yellow Book)b,c
Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (also known as the Blue Book)c,d
Quality Standards for Investigationsc,e
Programmatic (compliance, efficiency and effectiveness, Programmatic (compliance, efficiency and effectiveness,
Nonprogrammatic (individual
internal control, prospective analysis)f
misconduct)
Scope of
Entire agency program or
internal control, prospective analysis)f
Specific aspect of a program
Actions of a government
analysis
operation
or operation or a specific
employee, contractor, or
agency facility
grantee
Source: CRS analysis of laws, regulations, and administrative directives governing statutory IGs.CRS analysis of laws, regulations, and administrative directives governing statutory IGs.
Notes: The table does not reflect all differences among audits, inspections or evaluations, and investigations. In The table does not reflect all differences among audits, inspections or evaluations, and investigations. In
addition, differences in the addition, differences in the“"scope of analysisscope of analysis”" between a performance audit and between a performance audit and an inspection or evaluation vary inspection or evaluation vary
and depend on the issue being evaluated. In some cases, the scope of analysis might be similar.and depend on the issue being evaluated. In some cases, the scope of analysis might be similar.
a.
a. In addition to performance audits, IGs must conduct, or hire an independent external auditor to conduct, In addition to performance audits, IGs must conduct, or hire an independent external auditor to conduct,
audits of agency financial statements (commonly referred to as a financial audit). See 31 U.S.C. §3521(e). audits of agency financial statements (commonly referred to as a financial audit). See 31 U.S.C. §3521(e).
Financial audits are beyond the scope of this report.Financial audits are beyond the scope of this report.
b.
b. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues a publication containing the GAGAS, which is The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues a publication containing the GAGAS, which is
accessible at https://www.gao.gov/yellowbook/accessible at https://www.gao.gov/yellowbook/overview.
c. overview.
c. The Council of The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) issues Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) issues Quality Standards for Federal
Offices of Inspectors General, known as the , known as the Silver Book, which apply to all IG reviews. The standards are , which apply to all IG reviews. The standards are
accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdfaccessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdf. d..
d. These CIGIE-issued standards are accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/These CIGIE-issued standards are accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/
QualityStandardsforInspectionandEvaluation-2020.pdfQualityStandardsforInspectionandEvaluation-2020.pdf.
e. .
e. These CIGIE-issued standards are accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/These CIGIE-issued standards are accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/
invprg1211appi.pdf. Criminal investigations conducted by OIGs with statutory law enforcement authority invprg1211appi.pdf. Criminal investigations conducted by OIGs with statutory law enforcement authority
are also governed by guidelines established by the Attorney General. See U.S. Department of Justice, are also governed by guidelines established by the Attorney General. See U.S. Department of Justice,
Guidelines for OIGs With"Attorney General Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority, December" December 8, 2003, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/ 2003, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/
default/files/files/agleguidelines.pdfdefault/files/files/agleguidelines.pdf.
f.
GAO’.
f. GAO's s Yellow Book identifies and defines four categories of performance audit objectives: (1) program identifies and defines four categories of performance audit objectives: (1) program
effectiveness and results, (2) internal control, (3) compliance, and (4) prospective analysis. See GAO, effectiveness and results, (2) internal control, (3) compliance, and (4) prospective analysis. See GAO,
Government Auditing Standards,: 2018 Revision, GAO-18-568G, GAO-18-568G, July 2018, pp. 10-14, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/pp. 10-14, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/
693136.pdf693136.pdf.
. Quality Standards
IG reviews are governed by different quality standards. IG reviews are governed by different quality standards. Under the IG Act, IG audits are subject to the generally IG audits are subject to the generally
accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) developed by GAO.accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) developed by GAO.2628 Inspections or Inspections or
evaluations and investigations, by contrast, are governed by separate standards developed by evaluations and investigations, by contrast, are governed by separate standards developed bythe
24 OIG audits can be divided into two subcategories: performance and financial. Financial audits are beyond the scope
of this report.
25 OIG investigations can be divided into two subcategories: criminal and administrative. IGs also perform other types
of reviews outside of these three categories. For example, the U.S. Postal Service IG periodically issues white papers
on certain topics, which are accessible at https://www.uspsoig.gov/document-type/white-papers.
26 See GAO, “The Yellow Book,” at https://www.gao.gov/yellowbook/overview.
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CIGIE.27CIGIE.29 While several standards are identical or similar across the three review types, the While several standards are identical or similar across the three review types, the
requirements to meet those standards differ requirements to meet those standards differby typedepending on the type of review. For example, one GAO report noted that IG . For example, one GAO report noted that IG
audits are audits are“"subject to more depth in the requirements for levels of evidence and documentation subject to more depth in the requirements for levels of evidence and documentation
supporting supportingfindings”the findings" than IG inspections. than IG inspections.28
30 IG Auditsvs.Versus Inspections or Evaluations:
Examples of Differences in the Quality Control Standard
Both IG audits and inspections or evaluations must adhere to a Both IG audits and inspections or evaluations must adhere to a “"quality controlquality control”" standard, but the requirements standard, but the requirements
to meet the standard differ between the two types of reviews.to meet the standard differ between the two types of reviews.
IG audit: GAO GAO’'s s Yellow Book requires an audit organization to, among other things requires an audit organization to, among other things, (1) monitor the quality of (1) monitor the quality of
audits and summarize the results of the monitoring process annuallyaudits and summarize the results of the monitoring process annually; and (2) identify a supervisor to manage an and (2) identify a supervisor to manage an
audit and audit andfulfil fulfill specific responsibilities, such as tracking the progress of the audit and reviewing work performed specific responsibilities, such as tracking the progress of the audit and reviewing work performed
by the audit team to ensure compliance with GAGAS.by the audit team to ensure compliance with GAGAS.29
31 IG inspection or evaluation: CIGIECIGIE’'s s Blue Book does not require annual reports on quality monitoring. does not require annual reports on quality monitoring.30
32 Further, the supervisory requirements for an inspection call only for Further, the supervisory requirements for an inspection call only for“"adequate supervisionadequate supervision”" that ensures that all that ensures that all
inspection team members understand the purpose and goals of the inspection.inspection team members understand the purpose and goals of the inspection.
Type of Analysis
IG audits and inspections or evaluations include programmatic analysis, which may involve IG audits and inspections or evaluations include programmatic analysis, which may involve
analyses related to the analyses related to thecompliance, internal control, or efficiency and effectiveness of agency efficiency and effectiveness of agency
programs and operationsprograms and operations.31 They also often include recommendations to improve such and whether they are compliant with legal and administrative requirements and controls.33 In these reviews, IGs often offer recommendations for agencies to improve those programs programs
and operations. IG investigations, by contrast, typically include nonprogrammatic analysis and and operations. IG investigations, by contrast, typically include nonprogrammatic analysis and
instead focus primarily on alleged misuse or mismanagement of an agencyinstead focus primarily on alleged misuse or mismanagement of an agency’'s programs, s programs,
operations, or resources by an individual government employee, contractor, or grantee. Unlike operations, or resources by an individual government employee, contractor, or grantee. Unlike
audits and inspections or evaluations, IG investigations can directly result in disciplinary actions audits and inspections or evaluations, IG investigations can directly result in disciplinary actions
that are criminal (e.g., indictments and prosecutions) or administrative (e.g., monetary payments, that are criminal (e.g., indictments and prosecutions) or administrative (e.g., monetary payments,
suspension/debarment, or termination of employment).suspension/debarment, or termination of employment).
Scope of Analysis
Performance audits may be broader in scope compared to inspections or evaluations and Performance audits may be broader in scope compared to inspections or evaluations and
investigations. investigations.A performance audit may assess the agency-wide Performance audits typically assess the implementation of implementation of aan entire program program
across multiple agency components and facilities. An inspection or evaluation, by contrast, across multiple agency components and facilities. An inspection or evaluation, by contrast,may
sometimesis more likely to focus on a specific aspect of a program or the operations of a particular agency facility focus on a specific aspect of a program or the operations of a particular agency facility
or geographic region containing agency facilities. Investigations typically focus on the actions of or geographic region containing agency facilities. Investigations typically focus on the actions of
a specific agency employee, grantee, or contractor for alleged misconduct or wrongdoing.
27 CIGIE’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation are outlined in the Blue Book and are accessible at
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/QualityStandardsforInspectionandEvaluation-2020.pdf. CIGIE’s Quality
Standards for Investigations are accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/invprg1211appi.pdf.
28 GAO, Inspectors General, Activities of the Department of State Office of the Inspector General, GAO-07-138, March
2007, p. 19, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/258069.pdf.
29 GAO, Government Auditing Standards 2018 Revision, July 2018, GAO-18-568G, pp. 89-91, at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/files.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-568g.pdf.
30 CIGIE, Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, January 2012, p. 8.
31 GAO’s Yellow Book identifies and defines four categories of performance audit objectives: (1) program effectiveness
and results, (2) internal control, (3) compliance, and (4) prospective analysis. The Yellow Book further states that these
objectives can be pursued simultaneously within a single audit. See GAO, Government Auditing Standards, 2018
Revision, GAO-18-568G, pp. 10-14, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/files.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-568g.pdf.
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a specific agency employee, grantee, or contractor for alleged misconduct or wrongdoing. Example of Differences in Units of Analysis Among an IG Performance Audit,
Inspection or Evaluation, and Investigation
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) IG conducted several reviews of veteran wait times and access to care The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) IG conducted several reviews of veteran wait times and access to care
that varied in scope and analysis, such asthat varied in scope and analysis, such as
•
an an audit of veteran wait times and timely access to care at multiple VA medical facilities across one Veterans of veteran wait times and timely access to care at multiple VA medical facilities across one Veterans
Integrated Service Network (VISN);Integrated Service Network (VISN);32
•34
an an inspection of veteran access to care and quality of care—including wait times—at one VA medical facility of veteran access to care and quality of care—including wait times—at one VA medical facility
within a specific VISN;within a specific VISN;33 and
•
35 and
an an investigation of employees at one VA medical facility within a specific VISN for allegedly manipulating wait of employees at one VA medical facility within a specific VISN for allegedly manipulating wait
times to meet scheduling appointment goals.times to meet scheduling appointment goals.34
36 IG Statutory Authorities and Requirements
IGs possess many authorities and responsibilities to carry out their respective missions, many of IGs possess many authorities and responsibilities to carry out their respective missions, many of
which aim to establish and protect IG independence from undue influence. For example, the IG which aim to establish and protect IG independence from undue influence. For example, the IG
Act grants covered IGs broad authority toAct grants covered IGs broad authority to
• conduct audits and investigations, which cannot be prohibited or prevented by the conduct audits and investigations, which cannot be prohibited or prevented by the
affiliated entity head (except, in some cases, for national security reasons);affiliated entity head (except, in some cases, for national security reasons);
•
access directly the records and information related to the affiliated entityaccess directly the records and information related to the affiliated entity’s
's programs and operations;programs and operations;
•
request assistance from other federal, state, and local government agencies;request assistance from other federal, state, and local government agencies;
•
subpoena information and documents;subpoena information and documents;
•
administer oaths when conducting interviews;administer oaths when conducting interviews;
•
independently hire staff and manage their own resources; andindependently hire staff and manage their own resources; and
•
receive and respond to complaints of waste, fraud, and abuse from agency receive and respond to complaints of waste, fraud, and abuse from agency
employees, whose identity is to be protected.employees, whose identity is to be protected.35
37The subsections below The subsections below andand Appendix B compare selected statutory authorities and requirements compare selected statutory authorities and requirements
by IG type: establishment, DFE, other permanent, and special. However, the manner in which by IG type: establishment, DFE, other permanent, and special. However, the manner in which
each IG interprets and implements these authorities and responsibilities can vary widely, thus each IG interprets and implements these authorities and responsibilities can vary widely, thus
potentially resulting in substantially different structures, operations, and activities across IGs.potentially resulting in substantially different structures, operations, and activities across IGs.
The discussion in this section focuses on IG authorities and requirements that are The discussion in this section focuses on IG authorities and requirements that are expressly
mandated in the applicable authorizing statute. in the applicable authorizing statute.36 Although special IGs and other permanent IGs in
the legislative branch are38 Although legislative branch IGs were not created under the IG Act, their authorizing statutes incorporate—and not created under the IG Act, their authorizing statutes incorporate—and
therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. These therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. These“"incorporation by reference" provisions are subject to some interpretation. Even when the authorizing statute for an IGincorporation by reference”
32 VA OIG, Veterans Health Administration, Audit of Veteran Wait Time Data, Choice Access, and Consult
Management in VISN 6, March 2, 2017, at https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/vaoig-16-02618-424.pdf.
33 VA OIG, Healthcare Inspection, Scheduling, Staffing, and Quality of Care Concerns at the Alaska VA Healthcare
System, Anchorage, Alaska, July 7, 2015, at https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-14-04077-405.pdf.
34 VA OIG, Administrative Summary of Investigation by the VA Office of the Inspector General in Response to
Allegations Regarding Patient Wait Times, VA Medical Center in Salisbury, North Carolina, October 4, 2016, at
https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/admin-reports/wait-times-14-02890-255.pdf.
35 5 U.S.C. §§403(a), 406(a), 406(e), and 407. Authorities and requirements may differ for IGs not explicitly covered
by the IG Act. For more information on selected IG authorities and requirements, see Appendix B.
36 Where possible, the subsections provide examples of instances in which IGs have elected to comply with a
nonmandatory provision.
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provisions are subject to some interpretation. Even when the authorizing statute for a special IG
or other permanent IG in the legislative branch clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific unequivocally incorporates a specific
provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent amendments to provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent amendments to
that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred after the enactment of the IGthe enactment of the IG’s
's authorizing statute.authorizing statute.37
39 Oversight Jurisdiction
As mentioned previously, establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs generally do not have As mentioned previously, establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs generally do not have
cross-agency jurisdiction and therefore evaluate only the programs, operations, and activities of cross-agency jurisdiction and therefore evaluate only the programs, operations, and activities of
their respective affiliated agencies. For example, the DHS IG must annually evaluate the their respective affiliated agencies. For example, the DHS IG must annually evaluate the
department’department's information security programs and practices, but it does not evaluate such programs s information security programs and practices, but it does not evaluate such programs
and practices and practicesfor another department.38in other departments.40 Oversight jurisdiction, however, can extend to nonfederal Oversight jurisdiction, however, can extend to nonfederal
third parties, such as contractors and grantees. For example, the IG for the National Archives and third parties, such as contractors and grantees. For example, the IG for the National Archives and
Records Administration audited the agencyRecords Administration audited the agency’'s management of grant fund use by certain grantees.s management of grant fund use by certain grantees.39
Some special41
Special IGs, by comparison, IGs, by comparison, possesshave sometimes possessed express cross-agency jurisdiction. They express cross-agency jurisdiction. They aremay be authorized authorized
to evaluate a specific program, operation, or activity irrespective of the agencies implementing to evaluate a specific program, operation, or activity irrespective of the agencies implementing
them. For instance, them. For instance,SIGAR overseesthe Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's (SIGAR's) oversight jurisdiction included all federal funding for programs and operations related to all federal funding for programs and operations related to
Afghanistan reconstruction, which Afghanistan reconstruction, whichinvolvesinvolved multiple agencies. SIGAR, therefore, multiple agencies. SIGAR, therefore, may examine
performed audits on topics such as government-wide efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security government-wide efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces.Forces.4042 The DOD IG, by contrast, may examine only reconstruction activities under DOD The DOD IG, by contrast, may examine only reconstruction activities under DOD’s
's purview, such as the militarypurview, such as the military’'s efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan Air Force.43
Appointment Method
Statutory IGs must be appointed "without regard to political affiliation" and "on s efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan Air Force.41
37 Although an argument can be made that the incorporation by reference includes subsequent amendments to the
referenced statute, it would also appear that traditional canons of statutory interpretation may suggest that the proper
construction of the authorizing statutes is that they incorporate only the text of the referenced provisions as they existed
at the time the applicable authorizing statute was adopted. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938), wherein the
court stated, “Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to
the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been
incorporated bodily into the adopting statute…. Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and
does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so taken unless it does so by express intent.” Legal
interpretation of the treatment of provisions incorporated by reference are beyond the scope of this report.
38 This assessment is required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act. See 44 U.S.C. §3555.
39 National Archives and Records Administration OIG, Audit of NARA’s Oversight of Selected Grantees’ Use of Grant
Funds, February 16, 2011, at https://www.archives.gov/files/oig/pdf/2011/audit-report-11-03.pdf.
40 See, for example, SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons Learned from
the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, September 2017, at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-17-62-
LL.pdf.
41 DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force, January 4,
2018, at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jan/29/2001870851/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-058-REDACTED.PDF.
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SIGPR and Pandemic Oversight
In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Recovery, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,42 which
provided funding to a number of federal agencies and programs in response to the pressures created by the
COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act also established a variety of oversight mechanisms to monitor how these
funds were used. This included the creation of the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) to
provide oversight of Department of the Treasury (DOT) programs included in Title IV of the CARES Act.43
Unlike the other two special IGs (the SIGAR and SIGTARP), SIGPR’s jurisdiction is limited to certain activities of
the DOT under the CARES Act and does not extend to other agencies. In addition, there has been disagreement
within DOT regarding the extent of SIGPR’s jurisdiction. SIGPR has argued that its jurisdiction extends to all DOT
programs under the CARES Act, while other DOT officials have argued that its jurisdiction is limited to Title IV
programs. In April 2021, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion concluding that the
SIGPR’s jurisdiction was limited to CARES Act Title IV programs.44 SIGPR has asked Congress to consider
expanding its jurisdiction.45
Appointment Method
Most statutory IGs (71 of 74) must be appointed “without regard to political affiliation” and “on
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law,
management analysis, public administration, or investigations.management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”46 The appointment qualifications
for the three special IGs do not include this “without regard to political affiliation” language, but
they do include the other language regarding integrity and technical expertise.47 Statutory IGs are
appointed under one of three different methods:
1. by the President, by and "44 Congress has used three different methods for the appointment of statutory IGs:1. by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senatewith the advice and consent of the Senate;
2. ("PAS appointments");
2. by the President aloneby the President alone ("PA appointments"); or
3. ; or
3. by the head of the affiliated federal entity.by the head of the affiliated federal entity.
As shown As shown inin Table 5, a total of a total of 38 out35 of of 7470 statutory IGs are appointed by the President statutory IGs are appointed by the President, 37 of
which—establishment IGs (33), other permanent IGs in the executive branch (2), the SIGTARP,
and SIGPR—require Senate confirmation. SIGAR is the only statutory IG with the advice and consent of the Senate. When SIGAR existed, the position was appointed by the appointed by the
PresidentPresident alone without Senate confirmation. without Senate confirmation. In addition, 36 out of 74The other 35 of 70 IGs are appointed by the IGs are appointed by the
heads of their affiliated federal entities: heads of their affiliated federal entities:designated federal entity (DFE)DFE (31) and other permanent (31) and other permanent
IGs in the legislative branch (5). Unlike other IGs, the IGs in the legislative branch (5). Unlike other IGs, theU.S. Capitol PoliceUSCP and Architect of the Capitol IGs must be appointed by their affiliated entity heads in consultation with other permanent IGs in the legislative branch.45
Table 5. Appointment Methods for Statutory IGs
33a
30b
2c
5d
0e
and Architect of the
42 P.L. 116-136.
43 CARES Act §4018(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. §9053(c)(1).
44 See “Authority of the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery to Oversee Programs Established Under the
CARES Act,” Memorandum Opinion for the Acting General Counsel Department of the Treasury, and the Special
Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery, April 29, 2021, at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1390936/download.
45 See, for example, Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress: April to June 2021, July 30, 2021, p. 20, at https://www.sigpr.gov/sites/sigpr/files/2021-07/SIGPR-
Quarterly-Report-June-2021-Final.pdf.
46 5 U.S.C. §403(a) and §415(c) (establishment and DFE IGs); 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(1)(a) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C.
§1909(b)(1) (USCP IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(1)(a) (LOC IG); 41 U.S.C. §3902(a) (GPO IG); 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(1) (GAO
IG). The CIA IG must also be selected “on the basis of compliance with security standards of [the CIA] and prior
experience in the field of foreign intelligence” (50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(1)).
47 It may be the case that the variation in qualification requirements for the special IGs might lead to the nomination of
individuals who were selected by the President in part due to their partisan backgrounds. If Congress is concerned
about potential partisanship from a nominee, the Senate could vet that concern during the confirmation process.
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Capitol IGs must be appointed by their affiliated entity heads in consultation with other
permanent IGs in the legislative branch.48
Table 5. Appointment Methods for Statutory IGs
President Nominates,
Agency or Entity
President
Authorizing Statutes
Senate Confirms
Head Appoints
Appoints
Total
Inspector General Act of
33a
31b
0
64
1978, as amended
Other statutes
4c
5d
1e
10
Total
37
36
1
74
Source: CRS analysis of authorizing statutes for the listed IGs. The table does not include statutory IGs that
have been abolished.
a. Includes all establishment IGs. See 5 U.S.C. §§403 and 401(1).
b. Includes all DFE IGs. See 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act), §415(c).
c. Includes the IGs for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Community, and the Special IG for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery. See, respectively, Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery. See, respectively,
50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. §3033(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. §5231(b)(1), and 15 U.S.C. §9053(b)(1).50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. §3033(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. §5231(b)(1), and 15 U.S.C. §9053(b)(1).
d.
d. Includes the IGs for the Architect of the Capitol, Government Accountability Office, Government Includes the IGs for the Architect of the Capitol, Government Accountability Office, Government
Publishing Office, Library of Congress, and Publishing Office, Library of Congress, and the U.S. Capitol Police. See, respectively, 2 U.S.C. U.S. Capitol Police. See, respectively, 2 U.S.C.
§1808(c)(1)(A), 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(1), 44 U.S.C. §3902(a), 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(1)(A), and 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1).§1808(c)(1)(A), 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(1), 44 U.S.C. §3902(a), 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(1)(A), and 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1).
e. Includes
e. Previously included the Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction. See 5 U.S.C. §415 note. the Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction. See 5 U.S.C. §415 note.
Removal Method
IGs can
Congress has provided that IGs may be removed or transferred to another position under one of two be removed or transferred to another position under one of two different methods: (1) by
methods (by the Presidentthe President, or or (2) by the head of the affiliated federal entityby the head of the affiliated federal entity), depending on how they were initially appointed. Establishment, special, and other . Establishment, special, and other
permanent IGs in the executive branch are removable or transferrable by the President.permanent IGs in the executive branch are removable or transferrable by the President.4946 In In
contrast, DFE IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are removable or contrast, DFE IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are removable or
transferrable by the heads of their affiliated entities.transferrable by the heads of their affiliated entities.5047 Additional procedures are required to Additional procedures are required to
remove or transfer certain IGsremove or transfer certain IGs as follows:as follows:
• DFE IG headed by a board, committee, or commission. Removal or transfer Removal or transfer
upon written concurrence of a two-thirds majority of the members of the board, upon written concurrence of a two-thirds majority of the members of the board,
committee, or commission.committee, or commission.51
• 48
U.S. Postal Service (USPS) IG. Removal uponRemoval upon written concurrence of at least written concurrence of at least
seven outseven of nine postal governors and of nine postal governors and three commissioners of the Postal Regulatory Commission and only "only “for causefor cause”" (e.g., malfeasance or (e.g., malfeasance or
neglect of duty).52
48 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(1)(A) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1) (USCP IG). For a summary of appointment methods for
the five legislative branch IGs, see CRS Insight IN11763, Appointment Methods for Legislative Branch Inspectors
General, by Ben Wilhelm.
49 5 U.S.C. §403(b) (establishment IGs); 5 U.S.C. §415 note (SIGAR); 12 U.S.C. §5231(b)(4) (SIGTARP); 50 U.S.C.
§3033(c)(4) (IC IG); 50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(6) (CIA IG).
50 5 U.S.C. §415(e) (DFE IGs); 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(2) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3) (USCP IG); 31 U.S.C.
§705(b)(2) (GAO IG); 44 U.S.C. §3902(b) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(2) (LOC IG).
51 5 U.S.C. §415(e)(1).
52 39 U.S.C. §202(e).
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• neglect of duty).49
USCP IG. Removal upon a Removal upon a “"unanimous voteunanimous vote”" of all voting members on the of all voting members on the
Capitol Police Board.Capitol Police Board.53
50In most cases, In most cases, Congress must receive advanced notice of an IG’statute directs the President to provide advance notice to Congress of an IG's removal or transfer. The s removal or transfer. The
removal authority must communicate to both houses of Congress, in writing, the removal authority must communicate to both houses of Congress, in writing, the“"substantive substantive
rationale”rationale" for the IG for the IG’'s removal or transfer 30 days in advance for establishment, DFE, and special s removal or transfer 30 days in advance for establishment, DFE, and special
IGs—representing IGs—representing68 out63 of of 7470 IGs. IGs.54 Additionally, this notice must include information on any Additionally, this notice must include information on any
“"open or completed inquiryopen or completed inquiry”" into the IG being removed. into the IG being removed.55
Advanced51
Advance notice requirements for removal vary across other permanent notice requirements for removal vary across other permanent IGsIG positions. Authorizing statutes . Authorizing statutes
for other permanent IGs in the executive branch require the same 30-day advanced written notice
(including substantive rationale)for the IC and CIA IGs require advance notice, but only to the congressional intelligence committees. but only to the congressional intelligence committees.
Authorizing statutes for the other permanent IGs in the legislative branch do not explicitly require Authorizing statutes for the other permanent IGs in the legislative branch do not explicitly require
advancedadvance notice and instead require written communication to Congress explaining the reason for notice and instead require written communication to Congress explaining the reason for
removal.56 Advanced notice to Congress is not explicitly required for transfers of other permanent
IGs.
Term Limits
All but two statutory IGs may serve indefinitelyremoval.52
Acting IGs
limits. The USPS IG is appointed to a seven-year term and can be reappointed for an unlimited limits. The USPS IG is appointed to a seven-year term and can be reappointed for an unlimited
number of terms.number of terms.5756 The USCP IG is appointed to serve a five-year term for up to three terms (15 The USCP IG is appointed to serve a five-year term for up to three terms (15
years total).years total).58
57 Similarly, special IG offices have been subject to sunset provisions leading to the wind down and closure of those offices when specified conditions, including set time periods, are met. Transparency of Budget Formulation and Proposals
Establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs in the executive branch are required to develop Establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs in the executive branch are required to develop
annual budget estimates that are distinct from the budgets of their affiliated entities. Further, such annual budget estimates that are distinct from the budgets of their affiliated entities. Further, such
budget estimates must include some transparency into the requested amounts before agency heads budget estimates must include some transparency into the requested amounts before agency heads
and the President can modify them.and the President can modify them.5958 The budget formulation and submission process for the The budget formulation and submission process for the
aforementioned IG types includes the following key steps:aforementioned IG types includes the following key steps:
• IG budget estimate to affiliated agency head. The IG submits an annual budget The IG submits an annual budget
estimate for its office to the affiliated entity head. The estimate must include (1) estimate for its office to the affiliated entity head. The estimate must include (1)
the aggregate amount for the IGthe aggregate amount for the IG’'s total operations, (2) a subtotal amount for s total operations, (2) a subtotal amount for
training needs, and (3) resources necessary to support CIGIE.60
53 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3).
54 The 68 IGs include establishment, DFE, and special IGs.
55 See 5 U.S.C. §403(b)(1)(B).
56 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(2) (AOC IG); 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(2) (GAO IG); 44 U.S.C. §3902(b) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C.
§185(c)(2) (LOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3) (USCP IG).
57 39 U.S.C. §202(e)(2)(a).
58 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(2).
59 5 U.S.C. §§406(g) and 415(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(n) (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C.
§3517(f)(2) (CIA IG).
60 Congress has appropriated funds directly to CIGIE’s Inspector General Council Fund for specific purposes. For
instance, Congress has provided funding in recent years to support the Oversight.gov website. See, for example,
Division D, Section 633 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-6) appropriating $2 million to the
Inspector General Council Fund.
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• training needs, and (3) resources necessary to support CIGIE.59
Agency budget request to President. The affiliated entity head compiles and The affiliated entity head compiles and
submits an aggregated budget request for the IG to the President. The budget submits an aggregated budget request for the IG to the President. The budget
request includes any comments from the IG regarding the entity headrequest includes any comments from the IG regarding the entity head’'s proposal.s proposal.
•
President’'s annual budget to Congress. The President submits an annual The President submits an annual
budget to Congress. The budget submission must include (1) the IGbudget to Congress. The budget submission must include (1) the IG’'s original s original
budget that was transmitted to the entity head, (2) the Presidentbudget that was transmitted to the entity head, (2) the President’'s requested s requested
amount for the IG, (3) the amount requested by the President for training of IGs, amount for the IG, (3) the amount requested by the President for training of IGs,
and (4) any comments from the IG if the Presidentand (4) any comments from the IG if the President’'s amount would s amount would “"substantially substantially
inhibit”inhibit" the IG from performing his or her duties. the IG from performing his or her duties.61
60This process provides IGs at least some budgetary independence from their affiliated entities, This process provides IGs at least some budgetary independence from their affiliated entities,
particularly by enabling Congress to perceive differences between the budgetary perspectives of particularly by enabling Congress to perceive differences between the budgetary perspectives of
IGs and affiliated agencies or the President. Governing statutory provisions outline the following IGs and affiliated agencies or the President. Governing statutory provisions outline the following
submission process, although it is unclear whether every IG interprets the statute similarly. submission process, although it is unclear whether every IG interprets the statute similarly.
Notably, one congressional committee investigation questioned whether the President was Notably, one congressional committee investigation questioned whether the President was
consistently following the IG Actconsistently following the IG Act’'s requirements for transparency of IG budget formulation.s requirements for transparency of IG budget formulation.62
61
Treatment of budget estimates for other permanent IGs in the legislative branch varies. The Treatment of budget estimates for other permanent IGs in the legislative branch varies. The
authorizing authorizingstatuesstatutes for the USCP for the USCP, LOC, and GAO IGs and LOC do not explicitly require the IGs to develop do not explicitly require the IGs to develop
budget estimates that are distinct from the affiliated entitybudget estimates that are distinct from the affiliated entity’'s budget request.s budget request.6362 The extent to which The extent to which
these budget estimate requirements apply to the these budget estimate requirements apply to thespecial IGs and the GPO and AOC IGs is
unclear.64 Some of these IGs have historically developed separate budget estimates.65
Appropriations
Federal laws explicitly provide establishment IGs and other permanent IGs in the executive
branch a separate appropriations account for their respective offices.66GPO and AOC IGs is unclear.63 As of 2024, the GAO OIG's budget estimate is developed separately and provided to Congress without alterations by the Comptroller General.64 Some of these IGs have historically developed separate budget estimates.65
Appropriations
The IG Act and other statutes explicitly create separate appropriations accounts for establishment IGs and other permanent IGs in the executive branch.66 This requirement provides This requirement provides
an additional level of budgetary independence from the affiliated entity by preventing attempts to an additional level of budgetary independence from the affiliated entity by preventing attempts to
limit, reallocate, or otherwise reduce IG funding once it has been specified in law, except as limit, reallocate, or otherwise reduce IG funding once it has been specified in law, except as
provided through established transfer and reprogramming procedures and related interactions provided through established transfer and reprogramming procedures and related interactions
between agencies and the appropriations committees.67
61 5 U.S.C. §§406(g) and 415(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(n) (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C.
§3517(f)(2) (CIA IG).
62 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Undermining Independent
Oversight, minority staff report, no date [released August 15, 2018], p. 2, at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/REPORT-Undermining%20Independent%20Oversight-
The%20President's%20Fiscal%20Year%202019%20Budget%20Does%20Not%20Adequately%20Support%20Federal
%20Inspectors%20General.pdf.
63 Authorizing statutes for the USCP, LOC, and GAO IGs do not incorporate the provision in Section 6 that contains
these budgetary requirements, nor do they include language establishing similar requirements. See 2 U.S.C.
§1909(d)(1) (USCP IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG).
64 Authorizing statutes for special IGs and the AOC and GPO IGs incorporate portions of Section 6 of the IG Act.
However, it is unclear whether this incorporation extends the requirements to those IGs. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1)
(AOC IG) and 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG); 12 U.S.C. §5231(d)(1) (SIGTARP); and 5 U.S.C. §415 note (SIGAR).
65 See, for example, the SIGTARP FY2022 budget justification at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/09.-
SIGTARP-FY-2022-CJ.pdf and the LOC FY2021 budget justification at https://www.loc.gov/static/portals/about/
reports-and-budgets/documents/budgets/fy2022.pdf#page=109.
66 31 U.S.C. §1105(a)(25); 50 U.S.C. §3517(f)(1) (CIA IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033(m) (IC IG).
67 For more information on reprogramming and transfers, see CRS Report R43098, Transfer and Reprogramming of
Appropriations: An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and Procedures, by Michelle D. Christensen; and CRS
Report R47019, The Executive Budget Process: An Overview, by Dominick A. Fiorentino and Taylor N. Riccard.
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between agencies and the appropriations committees.67
Appropriations for DFE IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch, in contrast, are Appropriations for DFE IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch, in contrast, are
part of the affiliated entitypart of the affiliated entity’'s appropriations account. Absent statutory separation of a budget s appropriations account. Absent statutory separation of a budget
account, the appropriations may be more susceptible to some reallocation of funds, although other account, the appropriations may be more susceptible to some reallocation of funds, although other
protections may apply.protections may apply.68 Authorizing68 Past authorizing statutes for special IGs statutes for special IGs dohave not explicitly not explicitly requirerequired separate separate
appropriations accounts, although in practice the President may propose, and Congress may fund, appropriations accounts, although in practice the President may propose, and Congress may fund,
special IGs through separately listed accounts.special IGs through separately listed accounts.6969
Reporting Requirements
Statutory IGs have various reporting obligations to Congress, the Attorney General, agency Statutory IGs have various reporting obligations to Congress, the Attorney General, agency
heads, and the public. Some reporting requirements are periodic, while others are triggered by a heads, and the public. Some reporting requirements are periodic, while others are triggered by a
specific event. The subsections below highlight some of the required reports for statutory IGs.specific event. The subsections below highlight some of the required reports for statutory IGs.7070
Semiannual Report
The IG Act requires establishment and DFE IGs to issue semiannual reports that summarize the The IG Act requires establishment and DFE IGs to issue semiannual reports that summarize the
activities of their offices. For example, the reports must include a summary of each audit and activities of their offices. For example, the reports must include a summary of each audit and
inspection or evaluation report issued before the start of the reporting period that includes inspection or evaluation report issued before the start of the reporting period that includes
“"outstanding unimplemented recommendationsoutstanding unimplemented recommendations”" and the aggregate potential cost savings of those and the aggregate potential cost savings of those
recommendations.recommendations.7171 The IG Act further requires DFE and establishment IGs to make semiannual The IG Act further requires DFE and establishment IGs to make semiannual
reports available to the affiliated entity head, Congress, and the public, as follows:reports available to the affiliated entity head, Congress, and the public, as follows:
• The The IG submits report to the submits report to the affiliated entity head by April 30 and October 31 by April 30 and October 31
each year.each year.
•
The aThe affiliated entity head submits the report to the submits the report to the appropriate congressional
committees within 30 days of receiving it. The report must remain unaltered, but within 30 days of receiving it. The report must remain unaltered, but
it may include additional comments from the agency head.it may include additional comments from the agency head.
•
The The affiliated entity head makes the report available to the makes the report available to the public within 60 days within 60 days
of receiving it.of receiving it.72
72Other permanent IGs must also issue semiannual reports, though required content can vary by Other permanent IGs must also issue semiannual reports, though required content can vary by
IG.73IG.73 For example, the semiannual report for the IC IG must include comparatively less For example, the semiannual report for the IC IG must include comparatively less
information on OIG activities than establishment and DFE IGs. Further, the IC IG has an information on OIG activities than establishment and DFE IGs. Further, the IC IG has an
additional reporting requirement to certify whether the IG has had additional reporting requirement to certify whether the IG has had“"full and direct access to all information" relevant to IG functions.74full and direct access to all
68 For example, appropriations committees may choose to allocate funding to an IG in ways that would require advance
notification of any attempt by an affiliated entity head to reprogram funds away from the IG to another purpose.
69 For example, the President’s FY2022 budget submission included a separate account for SIGTARP. See U.S. Office
of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix, pp. 1025-26, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/tre_fy22.pdf.
70 Federal laws sometimes assign one-time or periodic reporting requirements on a specific policy area or subject.
These requirements are beyond the scope of this report.
71 5 U.S.C. §405(a)(10).
72 Ibid., at §405(b).
73 Authorizing statutes for other permanent IGs in the legislative branch (except the GAO IG) incorporate portions of
Section 5 of the IG Act, which require IGs to issue semiannual reports. However, it is unclear whether this
incorporation extends all elements of the semiannual report required by the IG Act to these IGs. See 2 U.S.C.
§1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(c)(2) (USCP IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 44 U.S.C. §3903(a)
(GPO IG). Authorizing statutes for the GAO IG and other permanent IGs in the executive branch do not incorporate
Section 5 but establish separate semiannual reporting requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §705(e) (GAO IG); 50 U.S.C.
§3033(k)(1) (IC IG); 50 U.S.C. §3517(d)(1) (CIA IG).
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information” relevant to IG functions.74 Special IGs are required to issue quarterly reports rather Special IGs are required to issue quarterly reports rather
than semiannual reports, which must include a than semiannual reports, which must include a“"detailed statementdetailed statement”" of obligations, expenditures, of obligations, expenditures,
and revenues associated with the programs, funds, and activities that they oversee.and revenues associated with the programs, funds, and activities that they oversee.7575
Seven-Day Letter
Establishment, DFE, and most other permanent IGs (five out of seven) are required to Establishment, DFE, and most other permanent IGs (five out of seven) are required to
immediately report to their affiliated entity heads any immediately report to their affiliated entity heads any“"particularly serious or flagrant problems, particularly serious or flagrant problems,
abuses or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operationsabuses or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations”" at their affiliated at their affiliated
entities. The affiliated entity head must transmit the report unaltered to Congress within seven entities. The affiliated entity head must transmit the report unaltered to Congress within seven
calendar days.calendar days.7676 This type of report is commonly referred to as This type of report is commonly referred to as the “a "seven-day letter.seven-day letter.”" Authorizing Authorizing
statutes for the USCP and GAO IGs do not explicitly require issuance of seven-day letters, but statutes for the USCP and GAO IGs do not explicitly require issuance of seven-day letters, but
they may do so in practice.they may do so in practice.77 The extent to which such requirements apply to special IGs is
unclear.78
77 Top Management and Performance Challenges
The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires IGs for executive branch agencies to annually The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires IGs for executive branch agencies to annually
identify the identify the“"most serious management and performance challengesmost serious management and performance challenges”" facing their affiliated facing their affiliated
agencies and to track the agencyagencies and to track the agency’'s progress in addressing those challenges.s progress in addressing those challenges.7978 These are commonly These are commonly
referred to as top management and performance challenges (TMPCs). A covered IG must submit referred to as top management and performance challenges (TMPCs). A covered IG must submit
the statement to the affiliated entity head 30 days in advance of the entity headthe statement to the affiliated entity head 30 days in advance of the entity head’'s submission of s submission of
the Annual Financial Report (AFR) or Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). The the Annual Financial Report (AFR) or Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). The
agency head must include the statement unaltered (but with any comments) in the entityagency head must include the statement unaltered (but with any comments) in the entity’'s AFR or s AFR or
PAR. IGs for government corporations in the executive branch, as well as special IGs and other PAR. IGs for government corporations in the executive branch, as well as special IGs and other
permanent IGs in the legislative branch, are not explicitly required to identify TMPCs.permanent IGs in the legislative branch, are not explicitly required to identify TMPCs.80
79 However, some of these IGs have elected to do so.However, some of these IGs have elected to do so.8180 CIGIE has periodically released reports on CIGIE has periodically released reports on
common TMPCs facing multiple agencies.82
74 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(1)(b)(v). A similar requirement applies to the CIA IG. See 50 U.S.C. §3517(d)(1)(D).
75 12 U.S.C. §5231(i)(1) (SIGTARP); 5 U.S.C. §415 note (SIGAR); and 15 U.S.C. §9053(f)(1) (SIGPR).
76 5 U.S.C. §§405(d) and 415(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(2) (IG IC); and 50 U.S.C.
§3517(d)(2) (CIA IG). Authorizing statutes for the AOC, LOC, and GPO IGs clearly incorporate portions of Section 5
of the IG Act pertaining to the seven-day letter. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. 185(d)(1) (LOC IG);
and 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG).
77 Authorizing statutes for the USCP and GAO IGs do not incorporate portions of Section 5 of the IG Act requiring the
seven-day letter, nor do they establish similar requirements. See 2 U.S.C. §1909 (USCP IG); 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO
IG).
78 Authorizing statutes for SIGAR, SIGTARP, and SIGPR do not explicitly incorporate Section 5 of the IG Act, nor do
they establish similar requirements. However, their authorizing statutes state that the IGs “shall also have the
responsibilities and duties of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978,” which may include the
seven-day letter. See 12 U.S.C. §5231(c)(3) (SIGTARP) and 5 U.S.C. §415 (SIGAR).
79 31 U.S.C. §3516(d). In this context, executive branch agency is defined as a “department, agency, or instrumentality
in the executive branch of the United States Government,” but it excludes government corporations defined in 31
U.S.C. §9101. See 31 U.S.C. §102 and 31 U.S.C. §3501.
80 Ibid. 31 U.S.C. §9101 lists “Government corporations” that are exempt from issuing TMPCs.
81 For example, SIGTARP has identified TMPCs since at least Q4 of FY2017. The reports are accessible at
https://www.sigtarp.gov/Pages/Reports-Testimony-Home.aspx.
82 CIGIE, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Multiple Federal Agencies, February 2021, at
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/TMPC_report_02022021.pdf.
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common TMPCs facing multiple agencies.81 Transparency of IG Reports and Recommendations
Federal laws require varied levels of transparency for IG reports and related recommendations for Federal laws require varied levels of transparency for IG reports and related recommendations for
corrective action. The IG Act requires the following for establishment and DFE IGs:corrective action. The IG Act requires the following for establishment and DFE IGs:
• Public availability of semiannual reports. Semiannual reports must be made Semiannual reports must be made
available to the public available to the public “"upon request and at a reasonable cost.upon request and at a reasonable cost.”83
• "82 In practice, semiannual reports are routinely available on OIG websites and oversight.gov.
Audits and inspection or evaluation reports on OIG websites. Audit, Audit,
inspection, and evaluation reports must be posted on the OIGinspection, and evaluation reports must be posted on the OIG’'s website within s website within
three days of submitting final versions of the report to the affiliated entity head.three days of submitting final versions of the report to the affiliated entity head.84
• 83
Documents containing recommendations on OIG websites. Any Any “"document document
making a recommendation for corrective actionmaking a recommendation for corrective action”" must be posted on the OIG must be posted on the OIG’s
's website within three days of submitting the final recommendation to the affiliated website within three days of submitting the final recommendation to the affiliated
entity head.entity head.85
84 Additionally, oversight.gov includes a searchable database of open recommendations.85Application of these transparency requirements varies among other permanent IGs as follows:Application of these transparency requirements varies among other permanent IGs as follows:
• Semiannual reports. Four out of five other permanent IGs in the legislative Four out of five other permanent IGs in the legislative
branch are statutorily required to make semiannual reports available to the public branch are statutorily required to make semiannual reports available to the public
in the same manner specified in the IG Act.in the same manner specified in the IG Act.8686 The GAO IG and other permanent The GAO IG and other permanent
IGs in the executive branch, by contrast, are not explicitly required to make the IGs in the executive branch, by contrast, are not explicitly required to make the
reports publicly available.reports publicly available.87
• 87
Audits and inspections or evaluation reports on OIG websites. Authorizing Authorizing
statutes for all seven other permanent IGs do not explicitly require the IGs to post statutes for all seven other permanent IGs do not explicitly require the IGs to post
individual audit, inspection, or evaluation reports on their respective OIG individual audit, inspection, or evaluation reports on their respective OIG
websites.websites.88
• 88
Documents containing recommendations on OIG websites. The GAO IG and The GAO IG and
other permanent IGs in the executive branch are not explicitly required to post other permanent IGs in the executive branch are not explicitly required to post
documents containing recommendations on their respective OIG websites.documents containing recommendations on their respective OIG websites.8989 It is It is
unclear whether the AOC, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs must post such unclear whether the AOC, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs must post such
documents.documents.9090 Some IGs have elected to post certain reports on their websites. For Some IGs have elected to post certain reports on their websites. For
example, the GAO OIG website includes reports on audits and inspections or
83 5 U.S.C. §405(c).
84 5 U.S.C. §420(b).
85 5 U.S.C. §404(e)(1)(C).
86 Authorizing statutes for the AOC, GPO, LOC, and UCSP IGs clearly incorporate portions of Section 5 pertaining to
public availability of semiannual reports. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C.
§185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 2 U.S.C. §1909(c) (USCP IG).
87 Authorizing statutes for the GAO, CIA, and IC IGs do not incorporate Section 5 of the IG Act, nor do they establish
similar requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033 (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517 (CIA IG).
88 The authorizing statutes for the AOC, CIA, IC, GAO, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs do not incorporate Section 8M of
the IG Act, nor do they establish similar requirements. See 2 U.S.C. §1808 (AOC IG); 50 U.S.C. §3517 (CIA IG); 50
U.S.C. §3033 (IC IG); 44 U.S.C. §3903 (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185 (LOC IG); and 2 U.S.C. §1909 (USCP IG).
89 Authorizing statutes for the GAO, CIA, and IC IGs do not incorporate Section 4 of the IG Act, nor do they establish
similar requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033 (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517 (CIA IG).
90 The authorizing statutes for the AOC, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs incorporate portions of Section 4 of the IG Act.
However, whether such incorporation extends requirements for documents with recommendations to be posted on OIG
websites to these IGs is unclear. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C.
§185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 2 U.S.C. §1909(c) (USCP IG).
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example, the GAO OIG website includes reports on audits and inspections or evaluations as well as semiannual and peer review reports.evaluations as well as semiannual and peer review reports.9191 By contrast, the By contrast, the
USCP OIG website lists only peer review reports.92
Special IG reports are also subject to certain transparency requirements. The Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program’s authorizing statute requires the IG to make its
quarterly reports available to the public, but the statute does not explicitly require those reports to
be posted on a public website.93 SIGAR must make its quarterly reports available to the public
and post them on a public website in English and other languages that the IG determines “are
widely used and understood in Afghanistan.”94 SIGPR, by contrast, is only explicitly required,
under its authorizing statute, to issue its quarterly reports to Congress.95 The extent to which
special IGs must post individual audits, inspections, or evaluation reports and documents
containing recommendations on their websites or other public websites is unclear.96
Oversight.gov
USCP OIG website lists only peer review reports.92Oversight.gov The majority of IGs have elected to participate in The majority of IGs have elected to participate inOversightoversight.gov—an electronic repository .gov—an electronic repository
launched in October 2017 that contains most IG reports issued since 2014 and some earlier launched in October 2017 that contains most IG reports issued since 2014 and some earlier
reports.reports.9793 While While Oversightoversight.gov was originally created on the initiative of the oversight .gov was originally created on the initiative of the oversight
community, in 2020 Congress passed legislation requiring CIGIE to community, in 2020 Congress passed legislation requiring CIGIE to“"establish and maintainestablish and maintain”" the the
website and requiring most IGs to participatewebsite and requiring most IGs to participate.98.94 Unlike many individual OIG websites, Unlike many individual OIG websites,
Oversightoversight.gov features a searchable database that can filter reports across OIGs .gov features a searchable database that can filter reports across OIGs based onusing several several
criteria, such as a specific IG, review type, or keyword. criteria, such as a specific IG, review type, or keyword.Since January 2023 all IGs have been
listed as participants on the website. IGs determine which reports to post on the website, and IGs determine which reports to post on the website, and
most, but not all,most participating IGs post at least some reports. Many reports, including some not participating IGs post at least some reports. Many reports, including some not
published on published onOversightoversight.gov, are also available on individual OIG websites..gov, are also available on individual OIG websites.
Coordination and Oversight of Statutory IGs
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIGIE is the primary oversight and CIGIE is the primary oversight andcoordinativecoordinating body for the IG community. The council body for the IG community. The council
consolidated and replaced two IG coordinating bodies previously established by executive order:
91 GAO OIG, “Overview,” at https://www.gao.gov/ig/.
92 USCP OIG, “Office of the Inspector General,” at https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/office-inspector-general.
93 12 U.S.C. §5231(i)(5).
94 5 U.S.C. §415 note.
95 15 U.S.C. §9053(f).
96 The authorizing statutes for SIGAR, SIGTARP, and SIGPR do not incorporate Sections 4(b)(2), 5, or 8M of the IG
Act, nor do they establish similar requirements. However, their authorizing statutes state that the IGs “shall also have
the responsibilities and duties of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978,” which might include the
aforementioned transparency requirements. See 5 U.S.C. §415 note (SIGAR); 12 U.S.C. §5231(c)(3) (SIGTARP); and
15 U.S.C. §9053(c)(3) (SIGPR).
97 CIGIE, “CIGIE Launches Oversight.gov: IGs Found More Than $25 Billion in Potential Cost Savings in FY2017,
New Website Shows,” October 2, 2017, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/
CIGIE%20Announces%20Official%20Launch%20of%20Oversight_gov_10_02_17_Final.pdf. For more information
on the website, see https://oversight.gov/about. Many OIG websites have more complete libraries of older reports than
Oversight.gov does.
98 P.L. 116-260 §501 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021), codified at 5 U.S.C. §424(e). Congress has also
provided appropriations specifically to support Oversight.gov, including $850,000 in the FY2023 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328).
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the President’consolidated and replaced two IG coordinating bodies previously established by executive order: the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and s Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and
Efficiency.Efficiency.9995 CIGIE members include all statutory IGs along with other relevant officers, such as CIGIE members include all statutory IGs along with other relevant officers, such as
representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of Special Counsel. representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of Special Counsel.
The council chairperson is an IG elected from members of the council, and the Office of The council chairperson is an IG elected from members of the council, and the Office of
Management and Budget Management and Budget (OMB) Deputy Director for Management serves as the executive chairperson.Deputy Director for Management serves as the executive chairperson.100
96
Pursuant to the IG Act, CIGIEPursuant to the IG Act, CIGIE’'s mission is to s mission is to “"address the integrity, economy, and effectiveness address the integrity, economy, and effectiveness
of issues that transcend individual Government agenciesof issues that transcend individual Government agencies”" and and “"increase the professionalism and increase the professionalism and
effectiveness of [OIG] personnel.effectiveness of [OIG] personnel.”101"97 The IG Act vests CIGIE with several responsibilities to The IG Act vests CIGIE with several responsibilities to
accomplish this mission,accomplish this mission,10298 which can be grouped into the following categories: which can be grouped into the following categories:
• IG workforce training and development. CIGIE is required to support CIGIE is required to support
professional development for IGs.professional development for IGs.10399 It also maintains at least three training It also maintains at least three training
academies for auditors, investigators, inspectors/evaluators, and other personnel academies for auditors, investigators, inspectors/evaluators, and other personnel
in IG offices.in IG offices.104100 CIGIE also develops and maintains other resources and guides to CIGIE also develops and maintains other resources and guides to
aid OIG personnel in conducting their work.aid OIG personnel in conducting their work.105
• 101
Coordination of IG external peer reviews. CIGIE develops and manages the CIGIE develops and manages the
policies and procedures that govern how IGs conduct external peer review—a policies and procedures that govern how IGs conduct external peer review—a
process that involves one OIG assessing whether another OIGprocess that involves one OIG assessing whether another OIG’'s audits, s audits,
inspections, and investigations comply with the applicable quality standards.inspections, and investigations comply with the applicable quality standards.106
• 102
Investigations of alleged IG wrongdoing. The CIGIE Integrity Committee—the The CIGIE Integrity Committee—the
sole statutorily established committee within the council—receives, reviews, and sole statutorily established committee within the council—receives, reviews, and
refers for investigation allegations of misconduct by the IG or other OIG officials refers for investigation allegations of misconduct by the IG or other OIG officials
according to processes and procedures detailed in the IG Act.according to processes and procedures detailed in the IG Act.107
• 103
Identification of IG candidates. The IG Act requires CIGIE to submit The IG Act requires CIGIE to submit
recommendations of candidates for vacant IG positions to the appropriate recommendations of candidates for vacant IG positions to the appropriate the
appointing authority.appointing authority.108104 In response to this provision, the council established a In response to this provision, the council established a
Candidate Recommendations Panel, which identifies and vets candidates for IG Candidate Recommendations Panel, which identifies and vets candidates for IG
positions.positions.109
• 105
Cross-jurisdictional reports. CIGIE periodically publishes reports on issues that CIGIE periodically publishes reports on issues that
transcend individual agency and IG jurisdictions. For example, as mentioned transcend individual agency and IG jurisdictions. For example, as mentioned
previously, CIGIE periodically issues reports on cross-cutting top management
99 See Executive Order 12805, “Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs,” 57 Federal Register 20627, May 11,
1992; and Executive Order 12301, “Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs,” 46 Federal Register 19211, March
26, 1981.
100 5 U.S.C. §§424(b)(1) and 424(b)(2).
101 Ibid., at §424(a).
102 Ibid., at §424(c).
103 5 U.S.C. §424(c)(1)(E).
104 Ibid. See also CIGIE, “CIGIE Training Institute,” https://www.ignet.gov/content/cigie-training-institute.
105 See, for example, CIGIE, “Manuals and Guides,” https://ignet.gov/content/manuals-guides.
106 See, for example, CIGIE, “IG Peer Reviews,” https://www.ignet.gov/content/ig-peer-reviews.
107 5 U.S.C. §424(d). The committee is composed of six members—four IGs on CIGIE, the FBI representative on the
council, and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. The committee chairperson is elected to a two-year term
by the members of the committee.
108 5 U.S.C. §424(c)(1)(F).
109 For more information on the panel, see, for example, GAO, Inspectors General, Information on Vacancies and IG
Community Views on Their Impact, GAO-18-270, March 2018, p. 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690561.pdf.
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and performance challengespreviously, CIGIE periodically issues reports on cross-cutting TMPCs facing multiple agencies, such as facing multiple agencies, such as ITinformation technology security and security and
management.management.110
106Historically, CIGIE hasHistorically, CIGIE has not received received a direct appropriationlimited direct appropriations from Congress. Rather, the council is from Congress. Rather, the council is
primarily financed by the IG member offices, which contribute a pro rata amount of their annual funding to financed by the IG member offices, which contribute a pro rata amount of their annual funding to
CIGIE together with payments received in connection with attendance at CIGIE training. The CIGIE together with payments received in connection with attendance at CIGIE training. The
contributions are placed into a no-year revolving fund.contributions are placed into a no-year revolving fund.111
107 Other Coordinating Bodies
Other interagency mechanisms have been created by law or administrative directive to support Other interagency mechanisms have been created by law or administrative directive to support
coordination among IGs for specific issues. Current examples are described below.coordination among IGs for specific issues. Current examples are described below.112
• 108Lead Inspector General (LIG) for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).
The LIG is a formal coordination role assigned to the IG for DOD, the The LIG is a formal coordination role assigned to the IG for DOD, the
Department of State, or Department of State, orthe U.S. Agency for International Development.113USAID.109 The The
LIG provides comprehensive oversight of programs and operations in support of LIG provides comprehensive oversight of programs and operations in support of
OCO, including the management and coordination of all related audits, OCO, including the management and coordination of all related audits,
inspections or evaluations, and investigations conducted by the three IGs. The inspections or evaluations, and investigations conducted by the three IGs. The
chair of CIGIE must designate an LIG for each covered OCO.chair of CIGIE must designate an LIG for each covered OCO.
•
Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight (CIGFO). CIGFO is CIGFO is
composed of IGs for nine financial regulatory agencies and is chaired by the composed of IGs for nine financial regulatory agencies and is chaired by the
Treasury IG. The mission of CIGFO is to facilitate information sharing among Treasury IG. The mission of CIGFO is to facilitate information sharing among
the nine IGs and develop ways to improve financial oversight.the nine IGs and develop ways to improve financial oversight.114110 In some cases, In some cases,
CIGFO has engaged in activities that build upon existing work of individual IGs. CIGFO has engaged in activities that build upon existing work of individual IGs.
For example, CIGFO identified cross-cutting top management challenges facing For example, CIGFO identified cross-cutting top management challenges facing
all nine financial regulatory agencies.all nine financial regulatory agencies.115
• 111
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC). The PRAC is . The PRAC is
composed of nine IGs specified by law and additional IGs appointed by the composed of nine IGs specified by law and additional IGs appointed by the
PRAC’PRAC's chairperson.s chairperson.116112 The PRAC is tasked with conducting and supporting PRAC is tasked with conducting and supporting
oversight of the federal governmentoversight of the federal government’'s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and
the funds spent in support of that activity. the funds spent in support of that activity. The PRAC has a coordinating function PRAC has a coordinating function
among IGs and regarding issues that cross agency jurisdictional boundaries.117
110 CIGIE, “Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Multiple Federal Agencies,” at
https://www.ignet.gov/content/top-challenges.
111 5 U.S.C. §424(c)(3)(A)(ii); CIGIE, “Charter,” https://www.ignet.gov/content/charter; CIGIE, FY2018 Agency
Financial Report, November 14, 2018, pp. 32-33, at https://ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/
CIGIE_2018_Agency_Financial_Report.pdf; and email communication with CIGIE on December 13, 2018.
112 A past example of a statutory coordinating body is the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, which
consisted of federal IGs and was tasked with overseeing funds covered under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. For more information, see CRS Report R40572, General Oversight Provisions in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Requirements and Related Issues, by Clinton T. Brass.
113 P.L. 112-239, §848; listed in 5 U.S.C. §419.
114 P.L. 111-203, §989E; listed in 5 U.S.C. §424 note.
115 CIGFO, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Financial Regulatory Organizations, September
2018, at https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/Audit_Reports_and_Testimonies/
CIGFO%20TMPC%20Final%20Report%202019.pub.pdf.
116 P.L. 116-136 §15010; listen in 5 U.S.C. §424 note.
117 Ibid.
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Issues for Congress
among IGs and regarding issues that cross agency jurisdictional boundaries.113 In more recent years, Congress has recognized the potential long-term utility of the data analysis capacity that the PRAC has developed and that could be applied to support IG work in other contexts.114 For instance, the FY2025 budget reconciliation law, (P.L. 119-21), included a provision that pushed the statutory sunset for the PRAC from 2025 to 2034, appropriated additional funding for its operations, and extended its jurisdiction to include appropriations in the reconciliation bill.115Issues for Congress Statutory IGs play a key role in government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in Statutory IGs play a key role in government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in
establishing the structures and authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of establishing the structures and authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of
IGs in government agencies IGs in government agenciesallowswill ideally allow OIG personnel to develop the OIG personnel to develop the expertisecapacity necessary to review agency programs using expertise and best practices for effective administration. Further, the IG Act's necessary to conduct
in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGs’ dual reporting structure— dual reporting structure—IGs report to their agency to their agency
heads and Congress—positions heads and Congress—positionsthemIGs to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and
policies and to policies and toadviseinform Congress on how Congress on how toit might monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress,
therefore, may have an interest in ensuring that statutory IGs possess the resources and authorities therefore, may have an interest in ensuring that statutory IGs possess the resources and authorities
necessary to fulfill their oversight rolesnecessary to fulfill their oversight roles.
As the federal government continues to evolve, so too does the role of IGs in government
oversight. Agency programs and operations have increased in breadth, complexity, and
interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing demand to complete statutorily
mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program
performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or
technical programs, possibly in emerging policy areas;118 and (3) use of more complex analytical
methods and tools.
Congress may consider several options regarding IG structures, functions, and coordination as the
role of IGs in government oversight evolves.119 In serving Congress with nonpartisan and
objective analysis and research, CRS does not make recommendations or take positions on
particular options.
Independence
Federal laws and administrative in a manner that maintains the confidence of stakeholders in the integrity and competence of the IG community.
activities they evaluate. There is no standard definition, however, for what constitutes IG activities they evaluate. There is no standard definition, however, for what constitutes IG
independence. Rather, IGs derive independence from independence. Rather, IGs derive independence froma combination of statutory authorities and
requirementsseveral provisions of the IG Act, such as the requirement that IGs be appointed on the basis of integrity and , such as the requirement that IGs be appointed on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in certain skill sets, demonstrated ability in certain skill sets,and independence and transparency of IG budgets.120 It
could be argued that challenges remain to ensuring that IGs possess the requisite independence to
carry out their missionswithout regard to political affiliation, as well as the independence in staff selection and transparency of IG budgets.117 Nonetheless, a variety of recent personnel actions and other changes involving OIGs have called into question whether IGs can operate with the independence intended by Congress in the event that an Administration asserts broader authority to control or limit OIGs. Congress may consider several broad questions if it weighs further . Congress may consider several broad questions if it weighs further
options related to IG independence, such as the following:options related to IG independence, such as the following:
• What constitutes IG independence? IGs, agencies, and Congress may perceive IGs, agencies, and Congress may perceive
independence differently, and by extension, may interpret and exercise statutory independence differently, and by extension, may interpret and exercise statutory
authorities that affect independence in varied (and possibly divergent) ways. A authorities that affect independence in varied (and possibly divergent) ways. A
GAO report that assessed an IGGAO report that assessed an IG’'s level of independence stated the following:s level of independence stated the following:
118 For an example of such a proposal, see Amy C. Gaudion, “Recognizing the Role of Inspectors General in the U.S.
Cybersecurity Restructuring Task,” Belmont Law Review, vol. 9, no. 1 (2021), pp. 180-230 (suggesting that OIGs
might be well-positioned to support federal cybersecurity strategies).
119 Congress and other stakeholders have held events to commemorate the 20th, 25th, and 40th anniversaries of the IG
Act that have included discussions of many of the issues described in this section. See, for example, U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Inspector General Act: 20 Years Later, 105th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 9, 1998, S.Hrg. 105-737 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998); U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, 25th Anniversary of the Inspector
General Act—Where Do We Go From Here? 108th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2003, Serial No. 108-110 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 2004); and CIGIE, “Building on 40 Years of Excellence in Independent Oversight,” 2018, at
https://www.ignet.gov/2018-commemoration.
120 See, for example, 5 U.S.C. §§406(a)(7), 403(b), and 403(g).
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To a large extent, independence is a state of mind of the auditor. The extent to which
an auditor’s independence has been affected by surrounding influences cannot be
easily assessed by a third party. Any effort to assess auditor independence requires
considerable subjective judgment, and reasonable people have room for
disagreement.121
• To a large extent, independence is a state of mind of the auditor. The extent to which an auditor's independence has been affected by surrounding influences cannot be easily assessed by a third party. Any effort to assess auditor independence requires considerable subjective judgment, and reasonable people have room for disagreement.118 What factors affect IG independence? Several internal and external factors Several internal and external factors
may also affect an IGmay also affect an IG’'s independence. Examples of internal factors include self-s independence. Examples of internal factors include self-
interest, familiarity with agency personnel in units undergoing a review, and interest, familiarity with agency personnel in units undergoing a review, and
other other“"threats to independencethreats to independence”" outlined in CIGIE outlined in CIGIE’'s quality standards.s quality standards.122
119 Examples of external factors include IG statutory authorities—such as Examples of external factors include IG statutory authorities—such as
appointment and removal methods and access to agency records—structure and appointment and removal methods and access to agency records—structure and
leadership of the affiliated entity, and political influence. leadership of the affiliated entity, and political influence.
One emerging issue that may limit the ability of IGs to provide independent oversight indirectly are the budget and staff reductions that have occurred across the executive branch during the second Trump Administration and appear to have impacted at least some IG offices. One early analysis has found that the number of reports issued by some IGs fell dramatically in the first half of FY2026 compared to historic averages.120
• What is the appropriate balance between IG independence and agency
management? The IG Act established a dual reporting structure that requires IGs The IG Act established a dual reporting structure that requires IGs
to report to both Congress and their affiliated entity heads.to report to both Congress and their affiliated entity heads.123121 This structure This structure
creates potential tension between IGs and their affiliated entity heads. An IG, creates potential tension between IGs and their affiliated entity heads. An IG,
therefore, must maintain independence from the agency head to assess the therefore, must maintain independence from the agency head to assess the
agency’agency's programs and operations objectively while also fostering a working s programs and operations objectively while also fostering a working
relationship with agencies to ensure the effectiveness of those assessments.relationship with agencies to ensure the effectiveness of those assessments.124
Appointment and Removal Methods
122 In recent years, executive branch leaders have moved to further integrate OIGs into agency program implementation and, potentially, to increase agency control over OIGs.123 For instance, recent reporting indicates that some OIGs now have political appointees in management positions (in addition to the OIG), a marked deviation from past precedent regarding the separation among OIGs, their agencies, and Administration leaders.124Appointment and Removal Methods
As noted earlier in this report, IGs can generally be appointed under one of three methods: (1) by As noted earlier in this report, IGs can generally be appointed under one of three methods: (1) by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (PASthe President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS appointments); (2) by the President alone (PA); (2) by the President alone (PA appointments); or ); or
(3) by the affiliated entity head.(3) by the affiliated entity head.125 Observers have asserted that appointment and removal methods Observers have asserted that appointment and removal methods
affect an IGaffect an IG’'s independence and effectiveness—both directly and indirectly—though opinions s independence and effectiveness—both directly and indirectly—though opinions
vary regarding the level and type of impact. Following the removal of IGs during both the Obama vary regarding the level and type of impact. Following the removal of IGs during both the Obama
andand first Trump Administrations, the issue of removal has received particular attention in Congress. Trump Administrations, the issue of removal has received particular attention in Congress.125
126 Congress addressed some of its principal concerns regarding removal and IG independence with Congress addressed some of its principal concerns regarding removal and IG independence with
provisions included in the provisions included in theFY2023James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act National Defense Authorization Act (for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263P.L. 117-263), which require more substantive reporting to Congress prior to removals and limit the circumstances under which IGs can be removed or placed on non-duty status.127
), which
121 GAO, Inspectors General: Allegations About the Independence of the Former VA Inspector General, GAO/AMFD-
89-46, March 1989, p. 3, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/211076.pdf.
122 CIGIE, Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspectors General, August 2012, pp. 10 and 12-13,
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdf.
123 5 U.S.C. §403(a); 5 U.S.C. §404(a)(5).
124 Congress acknowledged the potential for such tension but stated that the “potential advantages far outweigh the
potential risks.” U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, report to accompany H.R. 8588, 95th
Congress, 2nd sess., August 8, 1978, S.Rept. 95-1071 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), p. 9. See also Partnership for
Public Service, Walking the Line, Inspectors General Balancing Independence and Impact, September 2016,
https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/0bd2a00052bc1e7c216c5ee89fc4b457-1491000841.pdf. The
Partnership for Public Service describes itself as a “nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that strives for a more effective
government for the American people.” For more information on the Partnership for Public Service, see
https://ourpublicservice.org/about/.
125 See CRS In Focus IF11546, Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress, by
Ben Wilhelm; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10476, Presidential Removal of IGs Under the Inspector General Act, by
Todd Garvey. For additional discussion of potential options for Congress to alter IG removal methods, see CRS Report
R46762, Congress’s Authority to Limit the Removal of Inspectors General, by Todd Garvey; and CRS In Focus
IF11698, Legislative Proposals Related to the Removal of Inspectors General in the 116th Congress, by Ben Wilhelm.
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require more substantive reporting to Congress prior to removals and limit the circumstances
under which IGs can be removed or placed on non-duty status.126
Direct Impact
Some observers have argued that the PAS appointment method strengthens IG independence. For Some observers have argued that the PAS appointment method strengthens IG independence. For
example, GAO general counsel Gary Kepplinger suggested that PAS-appointed IGs experience example, GAO general counsel Gary Kepplinger suggested that PAS-appointed IGs experience
greater organizational independence compared to agency-appointed IGs, noting that greater organizational independence compared to agency-appointed IGs, noting that“"the further the further
removed the appointment source is from the entity to be audited, the greater the level of removed the appointment source is from the entity to be audited, the greater the level of
independence.independence.”127"130 Others have asserted that PAS appointments—including converting an IG from Others have asserted that PAS appointments—including converting an IG from
agency appointment to a PAS appointment—might politicize the IG position and reduce IG agency appointment to a PAS appointment—might politicize the IG position and reduce IG
effectiveness.effectiveness.128
Similar debates exist131
Similar debate exists regarding IG removal methods. Some observers have expressed concern regarding IG removal methods. Some observers have expressed concern
over potential politicization of the IG removal process, which may undermine IG over potential politicization of the IG removal process, which may undermine IG
independence.independence.129132 Some have suggested that limiting the removal of IGs Some have suggested that limiting the removal of IGs “"for causefor cause” could
" could, if allowed, mitigate arbitrary removal (such as for political reasons) and enhance IG independence.mitigate arbitrary removal (such as for political reasons) and enhance IG independence.130133 Others Others
have asserted that this limitation might prevent the President or agency heads from removing IGs have asserted that this limitation might prevent the President or agency heads from removing IGs
for legitimate reasons (such as poor performance), thus diminishing IG accountability.for legitimate reasons (such as poor performance), thus diminishing IG accountability.131
Indirect Impact
134 While these are questions of long-standing interest regarding IGs, recent developments suggest that Congress may wish to consider whether OIGs are in a period of reduced independence and, if so, whether Congress should devise new legislative means of increasing their independence.
IG vacancies. Concerns exist that the IG vetting and confirmation processes (particularly PAS IG vacancies. Concerns exist that the IG vetting and confirmation processes (particularly PAS
appointments) take too long, leading to prolonged IG vacancies and use of acting IGs.appointments) take too long, leading to prolonged IG vacancies and use of acting IGs.132135 It could It could
also be argued that removal methods (such as also be argued that removal methods (such as“"for causefor cause”" removal and term limits) might increase removal and term limits) might increase
the number and length of IG vacancies.
126 Title LII, Subtitle A.
127 GAO, Inspectors General: Independent Oversight of Financial Regulatory Agencies, GAO-09-524T, March 25,
2009, pp. 3-4, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09524t.pdf.
128 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on
Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, The Roles and Responsibilities of Inspectors General
Within Financial Regulatory Agencies, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 2009, Serial No. 111-49 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2010), pp. 34, 46, 49, 53, and 70; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, The
Politicization of Inspectors General, minority staff report, October 21, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/
20050724160427/http://reform.democrats.house.gov/story.asp?id=726.
129 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Update and
Supplement to the Initial Report: The Firing of the Inspector General for the Corporation for National and Community
Service,” majority staff press release, March 2, 2010, at https://oversight.house.gov/report/update-and-supplement-to-
the-initial-report-the-firing-of-the-inspector-general-for-the-corporation-for-national-and-community-service/.
130 See, for example, GAO, Highlights of the Comptroller General’s Panel on Federal Oversight and The Inspectors
General, GAO-06-931SP, September 2006, pp. 2 and 5, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202958.pdf.
131 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on
Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, Inspectors General: Independence and Integrity, 110th
Cong., 1st sess., June 20, 2007, Serial No. 110-48 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), pp. 13, 34, and 105; and U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Strengthening the Unique Role of the
Nation’s Inspectors General, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 2007, S.Hrg. 110-587 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), pp.
134-139.
132 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Watchdogs
Needed: Top Government Investigator Positions Left Unfilled for Years, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 3, 2015, S.Hrg.
114-486 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015), pp. 2, 5, 8-10, 14, 16, 18-19, 23, 25, and 32.
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the number and length of IG vacancies. Alternatively, in 2025 and 2026, there have been persistently high IG vacancies, which is at least partly attributable to the pace at which nominations are being made and considered in the Senate.136
Some observers have argued that acting IGs are inherently, or may be perceived Some observers have argued that acting IGs are inherently, or may be perceived asto be, less , less
independent or effective compared to permanent IGsindependent or effective compared to permanent IGs, for various reasons. Examples include not for various reasons. Examples include not
having gone through formal vetting processes, reduced ability to set long-term strategies and having gone through formal vetting processes, reduced ability to set long-term strategies and
priorities, and perverse incentives not to report problems in agency operations or resist political priorities, and perverse incentives not to report problems in agency operations or resist political
pressure from agency heads—particularly for those seeking the permanent position.pressure from agency heads—particularly for those seeking the permanent position.133137 For For
example, in a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate for the example, in a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate for the115th115th Congress, Congress,
CIGIE stated thatCIGIE stated that
no matter how able or experienced an Acting Inspector General may be, a permanent IG no matter how able or experienced an Acting Inspector General may be, a permanent IG
has the ability to exercise more authority in settinghas the ability to exercise more authority in setting new policies and procedures and, by virtue policies and procedures and, by virtue
of the authority provided for in the IG Act, inevitably will be seen as having of the authority provided for in the IG Act, inevitably will be seen as having greater greater
independence.independence.134
138
Other observers have asserted that acting IGs are not inherently less independent, nor do they Other observers have asserted that acting IGs are not inherently less independent, nor do they
appear or are perceived appear or are perceivedasto be less independent, than permanent IGs. For example, in a GAO report, less independent, than permanent IGs. For example, in a GAO report,
some permanent IGs and OIG employees responding to a survey provided several reasons for some permanent IGs and OIG employees responding to a survey provided several reasons for
why acting IGs are not less independent than permanent IGs. Examples include that acting IGs why acting IGs are not less independent than permanent IGs. Examples include that acting IGs
have the same statutory authorities as permanent IGs, are held to the same standards as permanent have the same statutory authorities as permanent IGs, are held to the same standards as permanent
IGs, and are typically career OIG employees who prioritize independence.IGs, and are typically career OIG employees who prioritize independence.135
Audit Follow-Up and Oversight of IG Recommendations
While IGs are authorized to develop recommendations to improve government programs and
operations, they are not authorized to enforce them.136 Rather, agencies possess the authority to
ensure the implementation of IG recommendations and resolve any disagreements on
recommendations between the IG and the agency.137 Certain agencies must “take action to address
deficiencies” identified in IG reports or to certify that no action is necessary or appropriate.138
Congress and other observers have expressed concern about the total number of unimplemented
IG recommendations and potential barriers to resolving them, such as the quality and consistency
of agency and IG audit follow-up procedures, tracking unimplemented recommendations, and
determining the resolution of recommendations.139 Some observers have discussed options to
improve audit follow-up and oversight of IG recommendations, such as
• standardized and enhanced audit follow-up procedures, including defined roles
and responsibilities for IGs and their affiliated agencies;
133 Ibid., pp. 9, 16, and 45-47; GAO, Inspectors General, Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their
Impact, GAO-18-270, March 2018, pp. 27-41, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690561.pdf.
134 CIGIE, letter to Senator Mitch McConnell and the Honorable Harry Reid, November 7, 2016, p. 2,
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIE_Senate_Letter_IG_Vacancies_07Nov16%20(1).pdf.
135 GAO, Inspectors General, Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their Impact, GAO-18-270,
March 2018, pp. 28-41, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690561.pdf.
136 The IG Act prohibits IGs from undertaking “program operating responsibilities,” which includes enforcement of
recommendations. See 5 U.S.C. §§415(b) and 422(a)(2).
137 OMB, Audit Followup, Circular A-50, September 29, 1982, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2017/11/Circular-050.pdf.
138 See, for example, Department of the Treasury responsibilities outlined in 12 U.S.C. §5231(f).
139 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Regulatory
Affairs and Federal Management, Implementing Solutions: The Importance of Following Through on GAO and OIG
Recommendations, 114th Cong., 1st sess., December 10, 2015, S.Hrg. 114-265 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016).
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• systematic tracking of and reporting on the total number and status of IG
recommendations;140
• prioritization of IG recommendations; and
• a centralized, public database of all open recommendations.141
Workforce Composition and Skills
OIGs need personnel with an appropriate mix of skills to effectively pursue their statutory
missions to prevent and detect government waste, fraud, and abuse. Traditionally, OIG
workforces have been primarily composed of auditors and investigators, though OIG workforce
professions and skills have diversified.142 These positions generally require education and
experience in audit and investigative procedures, such as assessing agency programs according to
government auditing standards and compiling and analyzing evidence. However, the qualification
requirements for these positions may not require experience in certain specialty areas that OIGs
might evaluate, such as information technology (IT).143
Some have argued that OIGs should further diversify their workforces, including by building
expertise in specialty areas beyond auditing and investigations such as IT, cybersecurity, and data
analysis. Some observers have further argued that broadening the mix of OIG personnel skills
could improve the quality and utility of audits and inspections or evaluations.144 For example, it
could be argued that building IT expertise within an OIG might enhance audit findings and
recommendations related to securing and modernizing legacy IT systems—a key management
and performance challenge facing multiple agencies.145
140 See, for example, Project on Government Oversight (POGO), The Watchdogs After Forty Years: Recommendation
for our Nation’s Federal Inspectors General, July 9, 2018, p. 21. POGO describes itself as a “nonpartisan, independent
watchdog that investigates and exposes waste, corruption, and abuse of power, and when the government fails to serve
the public or silences those who report wrongdoing.” POGO’s mission further notes that the organization champions
“reforms to achieve a more efficient, ethical, and accountable federal government that safeguards constitutional
principles.” For more information on POGO, see https://www.pogo.org/; Bipartisan Policy Center, Oversight Matters:
What’s Next for Inspectors General, July 2018, pp. 9, 10, 15 and 16. The Bipartisan Policy Center describes itself as a
“non-profit organization that combines the best ideas from both parties to promote health, security, and opportunity for
all Americans. BPC drives principled and politically viable policy solutions through the power of rigorous analysis,
painstaking negotiation, and aggressive advocacy.” For more information on the Bipartisan Policy Center, see
https://bipartisanpolicy.org.
141 Oversight.gov allows some tracking of open recommendations (https://www.oversight.gov/recommendations).
Legislation has been introduced in recent Congresses that would direct CIGIE to establish a searchable database of all
open IG recommendations. See the Inspector General Recommendation Transparency Act of 2018 (S. 2178; 115th
Congress), and Inspector General Recommendation Transparency Act of 2016 (S. 3109; 114th Congress).
142 GAO, Inspectors General, Reporting on Independence, Effectiveness, and Expertise, GAO-11-770, September
2011, pp. 16-18.
143 See, for example, the OPM qualification standards requirements for the 0511 (Auditor), 1810 (Investigator), and
1811 (Criminal Investigator) positions, accessible at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-
qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/#url=List-by-Occupational-Series.
144 See, for example, the Partnership for Public Service, The Forward Looking Inspector General, November 14, 2017,
p. 9, at https://www.grantthornton.com/-/media/content-page-files/public-sector/pdfs/articles/2017/the-forward-
looking-IG.ashx; Bipartisan Policy Center, Oversight Matters, p. 26.
145 CIGIE, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Multiple Federal Agencies, April 18, 2018, pp. 3-5.
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IG Effectiveness
139
Role and Independence of CIGIE
and outputs rather than program outcomes.and outputs rather than program outcomes.146147 The Partnership for Public Service The Partnership for Public Service has characterized characterized
this dichotomy as this dichotomy as“"the difference between counting the number of people who show up at a job the difference between counting the number of people who show up at a job
training program, versus examining the number of attendees who get and keep a job after training program, versus examining the number of attendees who get and keep a job after
participating in the program.participating in the program.”147 Observers"148 These observers have further argued that greater emphasis on program have further argued that greater emphasis on program
outcomesoutcomes could better improve agency programs and operations and, by extension, increase IG could better improve agency programs and operations and, by extension, increase IG
effectiveness. Some IGs already assess program outcomes in addition to outputs and compliance. effectiveness. Some IGs already assess program outcomes in addition to outputs and compliance.
For example, a For example, a 2018 Department of Labor IG audit concluded that the Job Corps program could not Department of Labor IG audit concluded that the Job Corps program could not
demonstrate that it helped place participants in meaningful jobs related to their training demonstrate that it helped place participants in meaningful jobs related to their trainingdue
primarily toprimarily because of noncompliance with certain program policies and ineffective transition services. noncompliance with certain program policies and ineffective transition services.148
149
In addition, some observers have In addition, some observers have arguedclaimed that certain statutory requirements do not promote IG that certain statutory requirements do not promote IG
effectiveness. effectiveness.For exampleSimilarly to the critiques above, the Project on Government Oversight , the Project on Government Oversight has argued that statutorily required argued that statutorily required
metrics in IG semiannual reports focus on program outputs—such as the dollar value of metrics in IG semiannual reports focus on program outputs—such as the dollar value of
disallowed costs—but not necessarily on program disallowed costs—but not necessarily on programoutcomes149outcomes150 and that the IG peer review and that the IG peer review
process focuses on compliance with applicable quality standards and does not evaluate the quality process focuses on compliance with applicable quality standards and does not evaluate the quality
or effectiveness of an IGor effectiveness of an IG’'s work.s work.150151 Including an evaluation of IG performance and effectiveness Including an evaluation of IG performance and effectiveness
as part of the peer review process might impact how IGs approach, conduct, and report on audits as part of the peer review process might impact how IGs approach, conduct, and report on audits
and investigations.
CIGIE Structure and Functions
Some observers have argued that CIGIE’s structures and operations could be altered to strengthen
coordination and oversight of the IG community.151 Examples include the following:
• Strengthening oversight of the IG community. Examples include enhancing
the peer review process, expanding the duties of the CIGIE Integrity Committee,
and elevating the role of the CIGIE Candidate Recommendations Panel in vetting
IG candidates.
• Reforming reporting requirements. Examples include maintaining an index of
IG reporting requirements, developing standardized templates for semiannual
reports, statutorily altering required content in semiannual reports, and statutorily
requiring maintenance of and participation in Oversight.gov.
• Enhancing data analytics capabilities. Responsibilities could include
systematic tracking and analysis of data across IGs (such as IG vacancies and
budgets), strengthening analyses to identify cross-agency top management and
146 See, for example, Bipartisan Policy Center, Oversight Matters, p. 17.
147 Partnership for Public Service, The Forward-Looking Inspector General, November 4, 2017, p. 2.
148 U.S. Department of Labor, OIG, Job Corps Could Not Demonstrate Beneficial Job Training Outcomes, March 30,
2018, https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2018/04-18-001-03-370.pdf.
149 POGO, Inspectors General: Accountability is a Balancing Act, March 20, 2009, pp. 13-17, 47, and 97-98, archived
at http://www.pogoarchives.org/m/go/ig/accountability/ig-accountability-20090320.pdf; and POGO, Rating the
Watchdogs: Are Our Inspectors General Effective? August 10, 2018, https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/08/rating-
watchdogs-are-our-inspectors-general-effective/.
150 POGO, Inspectors General: Accountability is a Balancing Act, March 20, 2009, pp. 43-45, archived at
http://www.pogoarchives.org/m/go/ig/accountability/ig-accountability-20090320.pdf.
151 Congress has recently considered legislation that would increase CIGIE’s reporting requirements and make other
adjustments to the duties and organization of CIGIE. See IG Independence and Empowerment Act (H.R. 2662; 117th
Congress).
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performance challenges, and continuing development of an open
recommendations database.
• Enhancing coordination and resource sharing. CIGIE could, for example,
research and identify opportunities for IGs to utilize shared services.
• Reforming the CIGIE funding model. CIGIE and other stakeholders have
recommended authorizing a direct appropriation for the council to help facilitate
accomplishment of statutory duties as well as existing and proposed
administrative duties (such as further developing Oversight.gov).152
152 See, for example, Kathy A. Buller, Chair of the CIGIE Legislation Committee, letter to Lesley A. Field, Acting
Executive Chairperson, CIGIE, January 28, 2021, https://ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf.
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Appendix A. Statutory Inspectors General by Type
The four tables below list statutory inspectors general (IGs) by type—establishment, DFE, other
permanent, and special. The tables include the IG’and investigations.
Is the Role of IGs Evolving?
original authorizing statute. The tables do not include IGs that have been abolished or original authorizing statute. The tables do not include IGs that have been abolished or
administratively established.administratively established.
Table A-1. Establishment IGs
As of November 2023
Year
Original
initially
authorizing
(current name of agency listed)
Year initially
established
statute
Department of Health and Human Servicesa
1976
P.L. 94-505
Department of Energya
1977
P.L. 95-91
Department of Agriculture
1978
P.L. 95-452
Department of Commerce
established Originalauthorizingstatute Department of Health and Human Servicesa
Department of Energya
Department of LaborDepartment of Labor
Department of the InteriorDepartment of the Interior
Department of TransportationDepartment of Transportation
Department of Veterans AffairsDepartment of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency and Environmental Protection Agency andthe Chemical Safety Chemical Safety Hazard and
Investigation Boardb
and Hazard Investigation Boardb General Services AdministrationGeneral Services Administration
National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNational Aeronautics and Space Administration
Small Business AdministrationSmall Business Administration
Department of Education
1979
P.L. 96-88
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governorsc
1980
P.L. 96-465
Agency for International Development
1981
P.L. 97-113
Department of Defense
1982
P.L. 97-252
Railroad Retirement Board
1983
P.L. 98-76
Department of Justice
1988
P.L. 100-504
Department of the Treasury
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Personnel Management
Corporation for National and Community Service (AmeriCorps)
1993
P.L. 103-82
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)d
1993
P.L. 103-204
Social Security Administration
1994
P.L. 103-296
Treasury IG for Tax Administration
1998
P.L. 105-206
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)e
2000
P.L. 106-422
Department of Homeland Security
2002
P.L. 107-296
Export-Import Bank of the United States
2002
P.L. 107-189
Department of State and U.S. Agency for Global Mediac
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)d
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)e
Federal Housing Finance Agency (Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)f
2008
FHFA)f
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)g
National Security Agency (NSA)g
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)h
P.L. 110-289
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Year
Original
Office of Inspector General
initially
authorizing
(current name of agency listed)
established
statute
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)g
2014
P.L. 113-126
National Security Agency (NSA)g
2014
P.L. 113-126
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)h
2018
P.L. 115-141
Source: CRS analysis of the United States Code and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs.
Notes: “Federal establishments” are defined in 5 U.S.C. §401(1). IGs for establishments are appointed and are defined in 5 U.S.C. §401(1). IGs for establishments are appointed and
removable by the President. The table does not include previous establishment IGs that were abolished.removable by the President. The table does not include previous establishment IGs that were abolished.
a.
a. The IG Amendments Act of 1988 (P.L. 110-504) abolished the IGs for the Departments of Energy and The IG Amendments Act of 1988 (P.L. 110-504) abolished the IGs for the Departments of Energy and
Health, Health, Welfare, and EducationEducation, and Welfare and created IGs for the Department of Energy and Department of Health and created IGs for the Department of Energy and Department of Health
and Human Services as and Human Services as“establishments”"establishments" under the IG Act of 1978. under the IG Act of 1978.
b.
b. The EPA IG also oversees the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, which was established under The EPA IG also oversees the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, which was established under
the Clean Air the Clean Air Act Amendments Amendments Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-549of 1990 (P.L. 101-549).
c. ).
c. The Foreign AffairsThe Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act and Restructuring Act of 1998 ( (P.L. 105-P.L. 105-207277, §1322) expanded the Department of State IG, §1322) expanded the Department of State IG’s
's jurisdiction to include the jurisdiction to include the Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1998.
d. U.S. Agency for Global Media.
d. The FDIC was originally defined as a designated federal entity (DFE) under the IG Amendments Act of The FDIC was originally defined as a designated federal entity (DFE) under the IG Amendments Act of
1988. The Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act (P.L. 103-204) redesignated the FDIC as an 1988. The Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act (P.L. 103-204) redesignated the FDIC as an
establishment.establishment.
e.
e. The TVA was originally defined as a DFE under the IG Amendments Act of 1988. The The TVA was originally defined as a DFE under the IG Amendments Act of 1988. The Bil Bill to Amend the to Amend the
Inspectors General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) to Provide That Certain Designated Federal Entities Shall Be Inspectors General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) to Provide That Certain Designated Federal Entities Shall Be
Establishments Under Such Act, and For Other PurposesEstablishments Under Such Act, and For Other Purposes (P.L. 106-422(P.L. 106-422)), redesignated the TVA as an redesignated the TVA as an
establishment.establishment.
f. f.
The IG Amendments Act of 1988 originally defined the Federal Home Loan Bank Board as a DFE. The The IG Amendments Act of 1988 originally defined the Federal Home Loan Bank Board as a DFE. The
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-73) abolished the board, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-73) abolished the board,
replaced it with the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and designated the FHFB as a DFE. The Housing replaced it with the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and designated the FHFB as a DFE. The Housing
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-289) abolished the FHFB, replaced it with the FHFA, and and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-289) abolished the FHFB, replaced it with the FHFA, and
designated the FHFA as an establishment.designated the FHFA as an establishment.
g.
g. The NRO and NSA were originally defined as DFEs under the The NRO and NSA were originally defined as DFEs under the Intel igenceIntelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 (P.L. 111-259). The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113-126) redesignated the 2010 (P.L. 111-259). The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113-126) redesignated the
NRO and NSA as establishments.NRO and NSA as establishments.
h.
h. The FCC was originally defined as a DFE under the IG Amendments Act of 1988. The Consolidated The FCC was originally defined as a DFE under the IG Amendments Act of 1988. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141)), redesignated the FCC as an establishment. redesignated the FCC as an establishment.
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Table A-2. Designated Federal Entity (DFE) IGs
As of November 2023
Year
Original
initially
authorizing
(current name of agency listed)
established
statute
Amtrak
1988
P.L. 100-504
Year initiallyestablished
Originalauthorizingstatute
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Bureau of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Consumer FinancialProtectiona
Protectiona Commodity Futures Trading CommissionCommodity Futures Trading Commission
Consumer Product Safety CommissionConsumer Product Safety Commission
Corporation for Public Broadcasting
Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionEqual Employment Opportunity Commission
Farm Credit AdministrationFarm Credit Administration
Federal Election CommissionFederal Election Commission
Federal Labor Relations AuthorityFederal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime CommissionFederal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade CommissionFederal Trade Commission
Legal Services CorporationLegal Services Corporation
National Archives and Records AdministrationNational Archives and Records Administration
National Credit Union AdministrationNational Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the ArtsNational Endowment for the Arts
National Endowment for the HumanitiesNational Endowment for the Humanities
National Labor Relations BoardNational Labor Relations Board
National Science FoundationNational Science Foundation
Peace CorpsPeace Corps
Pension Benefit Guaranty CorporationPension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Smithsonian InstitutionSmithsonian Institution
U.S. International Trade CommissionU.S. International Trade Commission
U.S. Postal U.S. PostalServiceb
Serviceb U.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Denali Commission
1999
P.L. 106-31
Election Assistance Commission
2002
P.L. 107-252
Defense Intelligence Agency
2010
P.L. 111-259
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
2010
P.L. 111-259
Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely
Disabled (AbilityOne)
2015
P.L. 114-113P.L. 114-113
Disabled (AbilityOne)
U.S. International Development Finance CorporationU.S. International Development Finance Corporation
2018
P.L. 115-254P.L. 115-254
Source: CRS analysis of the CRS analysis of the United StatesU.S. Code and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs. and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs.
Notes:“"Designated federal entitiesDesignated federal entities”" (DFEs) are defined in 5 U.S.C. §415(a)(2). The table does not include (DFEs) are defined in 5 U.S.C. §415(a)(2). The table does not include
previous DFE IGs that were abolished.previous DFE IGs that were abolished.
a.
a. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, §1011 and §1081) The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, §1011 and §1081)
expanded the jurisdiction of the IG for the Federal Reserve Board to cover the Consumer Financial expanded the jurisdiction of the IG for the Federal Reserve Board to cover the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.Protection Bureau.
b.
b. The Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-108; §209(a)) expanded the jurisdiction of the IG for the The Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-108; §209(a)) expanded the jurisdiction of the IG for the
U.S. Postal Service to cover the Postal Regulatory Commission.U.S. Postal Service to cover the Postal Regulatory Commission.
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Table A-3. Other Permanent IGs
As of November 2023
Year
Original
initially
authorizing
U.S. Code
(current name of agency listed)
established
statute
citation
Government Publishing Officea
1988
P.L. 100-504
44 U.S.C. §3901-3903
Central Intelligence Agency
1989
P.L. 101-193
50 U.S.C. §3517
Library of Congress
2005
P.L. 109-55
2 U.S.C. §185
U.S. Capitol Police
2005
P.L. 109-55
2 U.S.C. §1909
Architect of the Capitol
2007
P.L. 110-161
2 U.S.C. §1808
Government Accountability Office
2008
P.L. 110-323
31 U.S.C. §705
Intelligence Community
2010
P.L. 111-259
50 U.S.C. §3033
Source: CRS analysis of the United States Code and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs.
Notes: Includes agency IGs that operate under individual statutes outside of the IG Act of 1978, as amended.
The table does not reflect other permanent IGs that were abolished.
a. Formerly the Government Printing Office.
Table A-4. Special IGs
As of November 2023
Year
Original
Office of Inspector General
initially
authorizing
U.S. Code
(current name of agency listed)
established
statute
citation
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR)
2008
P.L. 110-181
5 U.S.C. §415 note
Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP)
2008
P.L. 110-343
12 U.S.C. §5231
Special Inspector General for Pandemic
Recovery (SIGPR)
2020
P.L. 116-136
15 U.S.C. §9053
Source: CRS analysis of the United States Code and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs.
Notes: Includes IGs that operate under individual statutes outside of the IG Act of 1978, as amended, and have
statutory sunset dates. The table does not include previous special IGs that expired or were abolished.
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Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A Primer
Appendix B. Selected IG(current name of agency listed)
Year initiallyestablished
Original authorizing statute
U.S. Code citation
Government Publishing Officea
Statutory Authorities and
Requirements
Table B-1 compares selected statutory authorities and requirements across the four different types compares selected statutory authorities and requirements across the four different types
of statutory of statutoryIGsinspectors general (IGs) in the federal government. Unless otherwise noted in bold, the listed authorities in the federal government. Unless otherwise noted in bold, the listed authorities
and requirements apply to all IGs grouped under each type. and requirements apply to all IGs grouped under each type. The table focuses on IG authorities The table focuses on IG authorities
and requirements that are and requirements that are expressly mandated in the applicable authorizing statute. Although in the applicable authorizing statute. Although
special IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are not created under thespecial IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are not created under the Inspector General Act of 1978 (hereinafter IG Act), IG Act,
their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the
IG Act. These IG Act. These“"incorporation by referenceincorporation by reference”" provisions are subject to some interpretation. Even provisions are subject to some interpretation. Even
when the authorizing statute for a special IG or other permanent IG in the legislative branch when the authorizing statute for a special IG or other permanent IG in the legislative branch
clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary
regarding whether subsequent amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they regarding whether subsequent amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they
occurred occurred after the enactment of the IGthe enactment of the IG’'s authorizing statute.s authorizing statute.153
154
• Identical requirement. The requirement is identical to the corresponding The requirement is identical to the corresponding
requirement in the IG Act. The authorizing statutes for the listed IGs explicitly requirement in the IG Act. The authorizing statutes for the listed IGs explicitly
state the identical requirement or clearly incorporate the sections of the IG Act state the identical requirement or clearly incorporate the sections of the IG Act
that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.
•
Similar requirement. The requirement is similar The requirement is similar, but not identical, to a
to a corresponding requirement in the IG Act. The authorizing statutes for the listed corresponding requirement in the IG Act. The authorizing statutes for the listed
IGs explicitly state the similar requirement or clearly incorporate portions of the IGs explicitly state the similar requirement or clearly incorporate portions of the
sections of the IG Act that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.sections of the IG Act that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.
•
No similar requirement specified in authorizing statutes. The authorizing The authorizing
statutes for the listed IGs do not explicitly state the requirement, nor do they statutes for the listed IGs do not explicitly state the requirement, nor do they
incorporate sections of the IG Act containing the requirement. Does not apply to incorporate sections of the IG Act containing the requirement. Does not apply to
listed IGs.listed IGs.
•
Unclear requirement. The authorizing statutes for the listed IGs incorporate the The authorizing statutes for the listed IGs incorporate the
IG Act section that includes the requirement, but the requirement was added as an IG Act section that includes the requirement, but the requirement was added as an
amendment to the IG Act after enactment of the authorizing statutes for the listed amendment to the IG Act after enactment of the authorizing statutes for the listed
IGs. May or may not apply to the listed IGs.
153 Although an argument can be made that the incorporation by reference includes subsequent amendments to the
referenced statute, it would also appear that traditional canons of statutory interpretation may suggest that the proper
construction of the authorizing statutes is that they incorporate only the text of the referenced provisions as they existed
at the time the applicable authorizing statute was adopted. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938), wherein the
court stated, “Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to
the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been
incorporated bodily into the adopting statute…. Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and
does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so taken unless it does so by express intent.” Legal
interpretation of the treatment of provisions incorporated by reference are beyond the scope of this report.
Congressional Research Service
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link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 11 link to page 41
IGs. May or may not apply to the listed IGs. Table B-1. Comparison of Selected Statutory Authorities and Requirements for IGs
Unless otherwise noted in bold, the listed authorities and requirements apply to all IGs grouped under each typeUnless otherwise noted in bold, the listed authorities and requirements apply to all IGs grouped under each type
Other Permanent IG
Authority or
Establishment
DFE
Requirement
IG
IG
Executive Brancha
Legislative Branchb
Special IG
Requirement Establishment IG DFE IG
Executive Brancha
Legislative Branchb
Appointment, Removal, Term Limits, and Oversight Jurisdiction
Oversight
jurisdiction
Single-agency jurisdiction. Oversight of programs, operations, and activities under the jurisdiction of a single Oversight of programs, operations, and activities under the jurisdiction of a single
Cross-agency jurisdiction. Oversight of
jurisdiction
affiliated federal entity or entities (seeaffiliated federal entity or entities (see Table 3 for examples of exceptions)for examples of exceptions)
Cross-agency jurisdiction. Oversight of a program, operation, or activity a program, operation, or activity
irrespective of agency jurisdictionirrespective of agency jurisdiction
SIGPR: Jurisdiction over Jurisdiction over
Department of the TreasuryDepartment of the Treasury’s
's CARES Act Title IV programsCARES Act Title IV programs
Appointment
method
Appointed by President Appointed by President
Appointed by the affiliated
Appointed by
Appointed by the
Appointed by the President with the
method
with the advice and
entity head
President with the
affiliated entity head
advice and consent of the Senate
consent of the Senate
USPS IG: Appointed by a advice and consent of
USCP and AOC IGs:
SIGAR: Appointed by the President
majority vote of the Postal
the Senate
with the advice and consent of the Senate
Appointed by the
alone
Board governors and the
affiliated entity head in
Postal Regulatory
consultation with other
commissioners.d
legislative branch IGsc
Removal or
Removal or transfer by
Removal or transfer for
Removal only by
Removal only by
Removal or transfer by President
transfer method
President for any
any reason by the entity
President for any
affiliated entity head for
for any reason
reason
head, or upon written
reason
any reason
concurrence of two-thirds
USCP IG: Removal
majority of the governing
only upon unanimous
board, committee, or
vote of all voting
commission
members of the Capitol
USPS IG: Removal for
Police Board for any
USPS IG: Removal for cause only upon written upon written
reasonf
concurrence of seven out concurrence of seven out
of nine Postal Board of nine Postal Board
governors and three governors and three
Postal Regulatory
commissionerse
CRS-34
link to page 41 link to page 41
Other Permanent IG
Authority or
Establishment
DFE
Requirement
IG
IG
Executive Brancha
Legislative Branchb
Special IG
Congressional
President to notify
Affiliated entity head to
President to notify
Affiliated entity head to
President to notify Congress, in
notification of
Congress, in writing,
notify Congress, in writing, congressional
promptly notify
Postal Regulatory commissionerse
President to notify Congress, in writing, the substantive rationale for writing, the substantive rationale for
removal or
the substantive rationale the substantive rationale
intelligence
Congress, in writing,
removal or transfer no later than 30
transfer
for removal or transfer
for removal or transfer no
committees, in
the reasons for a
days before the action
no later than 30 days
later than 30 days before
writing, the
removal only upon such
before the action
the action
substantive rational
removalg
for removal no later
USCP IG: Capitol
than 30 days before
Police Board to notify
the action
removal or transfer no later than 30 days before the action
committees, in writing, committees, in writing,
the reasons for removal the reasons for removal
only upon such only upon such
removalh
Term limit
None
None
None
removalh
number of termsi
number of termsi
termsj
Salary, Appropriations, and Budget Formulation
Salary
Executive Schedule (EX) Not less than the average
EX III maximum, plus
Specific dol ar amount
EX III maximum, plus 3%
III maximum, plus 3%
total compensation of the
3%
below the salary of the
affiliated entity’s senior
affiliated entity head
level executivestermsj
Specific dollar amount below the salary of the affiliated entity head
GPO and LOC IGs:
No specific amount or No specific amount or
pay scale specified in pay scale specified in
authorizing statutesk
Budget
Standaloneauthorizing statutesk
Stand-alone annual budget estimate separate from affiliated agency annual budget estimate separate from affiliated agency’'s budget s budget
estimate
No similar requirement
Unclear requirementm
formulation
estimate
specified in authorizing
statutes (although
subject to congressional
direction)l
AOC and GPO IGs:
Unclear requirement
CRS-35
link to page 41 link to page 41
Other Permanent IG
Authority or
Establishment
DFE
Requirement
IG
IG
Executive Brancha
Legislative Branchb
Special IG
Appropriations
Separate appropriations
No separate account
Separate
Separate appropriations account in President's budget
No separate accountNo separate account
Required to issue quarterly reports No similar requirement specified in
account in President’s
appropriations
authorizing statutesn
budget
account in President’s
budget
Reporting Requirements
Semiannual or
Required to issue a semiannual report that
Similar requirement (IGs must issue a semiannual
Required to issue quarterly reports
quarterly reports
summarizes IG activities specified in the IG Act
report, but required elements of the report can
that include a detailed statement of
vary)
that include a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and all obligations, expenditures, and
revenues associated with covered revenues associated with covered
programs and activitiesprograms and activities
Seven-day letter
Required to report Required to report “"particularly serious or flagrant particularly serious or flagrant
Similar requirement
Identical requirement
Unclear requirement
problems, abuses, or deficienciesproblems, abuses, or deficiencies”" in agency programs in agency programs
GAO and USCP IGs:
or operations to affiliated entity head, who must or operations to affiliated entity head, who must
No similar requirement
transmit the report unaltered to appropriate transmit the report unaltered to appropriate
specified in authorizing
congressional committees and subcommittees within
statutes
seven days
Top management
Required to report the “most serious management and performance challenges
congressional committees and subcommittees within seven days
challenges
facing the agency” and the agency’
Required to report the "most serious management and performance challenges facing the agency" and the agency's progress in addressing those challengess progress in addressing those challenges
IGs for government corporations: Statutorily Statutorilyexempto
exempto
Transparency of IG Reports and Recommendations
Transparency of
reports and recommendations Semiannual reports. Required availability to the public Required availability to the public
Semiannual reports.
Semiannual reports.
Quarterly reports.
reports and
“upon request and at a reasonable cost”
No similar
Identical requirement
SIGTARP: Available to the public
recommendations
requirement specified GAO: No similar
upon request
in authorizing statutes requirement specified in "upon request and at a reasonable cost"
SIGAR: Available on a public
authorizing statute
website
SIGPR: Available to CongressAvailable to Congress
CRS-36
link to page 41 link to page 41
Other Permanent IG
Authority or
Establishment
DFE
Requirement
IG
IG
Executive Brancha
Legislative Branchb
Special IG
Audits and inspections or evaluations on website. Reports
Audits and inspections
Audits and inspections or
Audits and inspections or evaluations
(or portion of the reports) must be posted on the
or evaluations on
evaluations on website.
on website. Unclear requirement
OIG’s website within three days of submitting final
website. No similar
No similar requirement
versions of the reports to the affiliated entity head
requirement specified specified
in authorizing
in authorizing statutes statute
Documents with recommendations on website. Any
Documents with
Documents with
Documents with recommendations on
“website. Any "documents making a recommendation for corrective documents making a recommendation for corrective
recommendations on
recommendations on
website. Unclear requirement
action”action" must be posted on the OIG must be posted on the OIG’'s website within three days of submitting the final recommendation to the affiliated entity head
Documents with recommendations on website.s website within
website. No similar
website. Unclear
three days of submitting the final recommendation to
requirement specified requirement
the affiliated entity head
in authorizing statutes GAO IG: No similar
No similar requirement specified in requirement specified in
authorizing authorizingstatute
statutes
Source: CRS analysis of the IG Act and authorizing statutes for IGs established outside of the IG Act.CRS analysis of the IG Act and authorizing statutes for IGs established outside of the IG Act.
Notes: The table focuses on IG authorities and requirements that are The table focuses on IG authorities and requirements that are expressly mandated in the applicable authorizing statute. Although in the applicable authorizing statute. Althoughspecial IGs and other permanent other permanent
IGs in the legislative branch are not created under the IG Act, their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. It IGs in the legislative branch are not created under the IG Act, their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. It
should be noted that these should be noted that these“"incorporation by referenceincorporation by reference”" provisions are subject to some interpretation. Even when the authorizing statute for a special IG or other provisions are subject to some interpretation. Even when the authorizing statute for a special IG or other
permanent IG in the legislative branch clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent permanent IG in the legislative branch clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent
amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred after the enactment of the IGthe enactment of the IG’'s authorizing statute.s authorizing statute.
a.
b.
b. Includes the IGs for the Architect of the Capitol (AOC), Government Accountability Office, Government Publishing Office (GPO), Library of Congress (LOC), and Includes the IGs for the Architect of the Capitol (AOC), Government Accountability Office, Government Publishing Office (GPO), Library of Congress (LOC), and
U.S. Capitol Police (USCP).U.S. Capitol Police (USCP).
c.
c. 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1) (UCSP IG); 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(1)(A) (AOC IG).2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1) (UCSP IG); 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(1)(A) (AOC IG).
d.
d. 39 U.S.C. §202(e)(2).39 U.S.C. §202(e)(2).
e.
e. 39 U.S.C. §202(e)(3).39 U.S.C. §202(e)(3).
f. f.
2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3).2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3).
g.
g. Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3), the Capital Police Board must communicate the reasons for removing the USCP IG prior to the end of his/her term to the Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3), the Capital Police Board must communicate the reasons for removing the USCP IG prior to the end of his/her term to the House
Committee on Committee on House Administration, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.Administration, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.
h.
h. The committees include the The committees include the House Committee on Committee on House Administration, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and Administration, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and the House and Senate Committees on House and Senate Committees on
AppropriationAppropriations. See 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3).. See 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3).
i. i.
39 U.S.C. §202(e)(2).39 U.S.C. §202(e)(2).
j. j.
2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(2).2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(2).
CRS-37
k.
k. The authorizing statute for the GPO IG statesThe authorizing statute for the GPO IG states: “, "Any authority to make payments under this title [enacting this chapter and provisions set out as notes under Any authority to make payments under this title [enacting this chapter and provisions set out as notes under
Sections 101 and 3901 of this title] shall be effective only to such extent as provided in appropriations Acts.Sections 101 and 3901 of this title] shall be effective only to such extent as provided in appropriations Acts.”" See P.L. 100-504, Title II, §205, 102 Stat. 2531; 39 See P.L. 100-504, Title II, §205, 102 Stat. 2531; 39
U.S.C. §3901 note.U.S.C. §3901 note.
l. l.
In practice, the LOC IG has compiled and submitted In practice, the LOC IG has compiled and submitted standalonestand-alone annual budget estimates. In recent years, the House and Senate Committees on annual budget estimates. In recent years, the House and Senate Committees on AppropriationAppropriations have have
called for legislative branch agency budget requests to include separate sections for IG budget estimates. U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, conference report called for legislative branch agency budget requests to include separate sections for IG budget estimates. U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, conference report
to accompany H.R. 5895to accompany H.R. 5895, 115th, 115th Cong., Cong., 2nd2nd sess., H.Rept. 115-929 sess., H.Rept. 115-929 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2018), p. 201; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, , p. 201; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations,
report to accompany S. 1648report to accompany S. 1648, 115th, 115th Cong., Cong., 1st1st sess., S.Rept. 115-137 sess., S.Rept. 115-137 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2017), p. 5., p. 5.
m.
m. In practice, SIGAR and SIGTARP have compiled and submitted In practice, SIGAR and SIGTARP have compiled and submitted standalonestand-alone annual budget estimates for their respective offices. annual budget estimates for their respective offices.
n.
n. In practice, the PresidentIn practice, the President’'s annual budget submission has historically provided separate accounts for both SIGAR and SIGTARP OIGs.s annual budget submission has historically provided separate accounts for both SIGAR and SIGTARP OIGs.
o.
o. These include government corporations defined in 31 U.S.C. §9101. According to a CIGIE report, intelligence community IGs do not issue public top management These include government corporations defined in 31 U.S.C. §9101. According to a CIGIE report, intelligence community IGs do not issue public top management
and performance challenges reports. See CIGIE, and performance challenges reports. See CIGIE, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Multiple Federal Agencies, April 2018, p. 1, , April 2018, p. 1, at
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/CIGIE_Top_Challenges_Report_April_2018.pdfhttps://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/CIGIE_Top_Challenges_Report_April_2018.pdf.
CRS-38
Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A Primer
Author Information
Ben Wilhelm
Analyst in Government Organization and
Management
Acknowledgments
The original author of this report is former CRS analyst Kathryn Francis. Graphics and tables in
this report were designed by Amber Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R45450 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED
39
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1.
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4.
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36.
37.
5 U.S.C. §§403(a), 406(a), 406(e), and 407. Authorities and requirements may differ for IGs not explicitly covered by the IG Act. For more information on selected IG authorities and requirements, see Appendix B.
38.
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GAO OIG, "Inspector General," https://www.gao.gov/ig/.
92.
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Congress acknowledged the potential for such tension but stated that the "potential advantages far outweigh the potential risks." U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, report to accompany H.R. 8588, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., August 8, 1978, S.Rept. 95-1071, p. 9. See also Partnership for Public Service, Walking the Line: Inspectors General Balancing Independence and Impact, September 2016, https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Walking-the-Line.pdf. The Partnership for Public Service describes itself as a "nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that strives for a more effective government for the American people." Partnership for Public Service, "Privacy Policy," May 14, 2021, https://ourpublicservice.org/privacy-policy. For more information about the organization, see Partnership for Public Service, "About," https://ourpublicservice.org/about/.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, "Update and Supplement to the Initial Report: The Firing of the Inspector General for the Corporation for National and Community Service," press release, March 2, 2010, https://oversight.house.gov/report/update-and-supplement-to-the-initial-report-the-firing-of-the-inspector-general-for-the-corporation-for-national-and-community-service/.
133.
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137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
Project on Government Oversight (POGO), Inspectors General: Accountability Is a Balancing Act, March 20, 2009, pp. 13-17, 47, and 97-98, https://docs.pogo.org/report/2009/ig-accountability-20090320.pdf?_ga=2.139320883.1016789778.1785522306-1655324532.1785522306; and Peter Tyler, "Rating the Watchdogs: Are Our Inspectors General Effective?," POGO, August 10, 2018, https://www.pogo.org/analyses/rating-watchdogs-are-our-inspectors-general-effective.
151.
152.
153.
154.
Contents
- Establishment of Statutory IGs
- Brief History of Statutory IGs Until 1978
- Inspector General Act of 1978
- Central Tenets of the IG Act
- Evolution of the IG Act
- Structure of the IG Community
- Types of IGs
- Composition of Statutory IGs
- Distribution of IGs Across Federal Entities
- Types of IG Reviews
- Quality Standards
- Type of Analysis
- Scope of Analysis
- IG Statutory Authorities and Requirements
- Oversight Jurisdiction
- Appointment Method
- Removal Method
- Acting IGs
- Term Limits
- Transparency of Budget Formulation and Proposals
- Appropriations
- Reporting Requirements
- Semiannual Report
- Seven-Day Letter
- Top Management and Performance Challenges
- Transparency of IG Reports and Recommendations
- Oversight.gov
- Coordination and Oversight of Statutory IGs
- Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
- Other Coordinating Bodies
- Issues for Congress
- Independence
- Appointment and Removal Methods
- Role and Independence of CIGIE
- The IG's Role and Effectiveness
- Is the Role of IGs Evolving?
Tables
- Table 1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Statutory IG Types
- Table 2. Multiple Statutory IGs Affiliated with a Single Federal Entity
- Table 3. Examples of a Single Statutory IG Affiliated with Multiple Federal Entities
- Table 4. Key Differences Among Common Types of IG Reviews
- Table 5. Appointment Methods for Statutory IGs
- Table A-1. Establishment IGs
- Table A-2. Designated Federal Entity (DFE) IGs
- Table A-3. Other Permanent IGs
- Table B-1. Comparison of Selected Statutory Authorities and Requirements for IGs
Summary
This report provides an overview of statutory inspectors general (IGs) in the federal government, including their structure and functions, as well as related issues for Congress.
federal government. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of federal government. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of
inspections, and evaluations—and provide findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to inspections, and evaluations—and provide findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to
carry out their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant agency records and carry out their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant agency records and
information, and report findings and recommendations directly to Congress.information, and report findings and recommendations directly to Congress.
A total of A total of
federal government. Statutory IGs can be grouped into federal government. Statutory IGs can be grouped into
three types: (1) establishment, (2) designated federal entity types: (1) establishment, (2) designated federal entity
(DFE), (DFE), or (3) other permanent(3) other permanent
General Act of 1978, as amended, whereas other permanent General Act of 1978, as amended, whereas other permanent
Statutory authorities and requirements can differ among the Statutory authorities and requirements can differ among the
authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of IGs in government agencies allows OIG personnel to authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of IGs in government agencies allows OIG personnel to
develop the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGsdevelop the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGs
to agency heads and to Congress—positions them to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and policies and to to agency heads and to Congress—positions them to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and policies and to
advise Congress on how to monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, therefore, may have an interest in ensuring advise Congress on how to monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, therefore, may have an interest in ensuring
operations have increased in terms of breadth, complexity, and interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing operations have increased in terms of breadth, complexity, and interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing
demand to complete statutorily mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program demand to complete statutorily mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program
performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or technical programs, possibly performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or technical programs, possibly
in emerging policy areas; and (3) use of more complex analytical methods and tools. Congress may consider several options in emerging policy areas; and (3) use of more complex analytical methods and tools. Congress may consider several options
government, including their structuregovernment, including their structure
prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within federal departments and prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within federal departments and
agencies. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of agencies. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of
audits, investigations, and other evaluations of agency programs and operations and produce audits, investigations, and other evaluations of agency programs and operations and produce
recommendations to improve them. Statutory IGs exist in recommendations to improve them. Statutory IGs exist in
departments, agencies, boards, commissions, and government-sponsored enterprises.departments, agencies, boards, commissions, and government-sponsored enterprises.
Brief History of Statutory IGs Until 1978
The origins of The origins of
establishment of an establishment of an
1962, the Kennedy Administration created an IG for the Department of Agriculture.1962, the Kennedy Administration created an IG for the Department of Agriculture.
establishment of IGs in the federal government, agencies establishment of IGs in the federal government, agencies
investigative units to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.investigative units to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW; now the Department of Health and Human Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW; now the Department of Health and Human
Services).Services).
mismanagement of mismanagement of
investigative report recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of HEW place all audit investigative report recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of HEW place all audit
and investigation units and investigation units
identifying identifying
ultimately established the HEW IG ultimately established the HEW IG
Energy when it was created in 1977.9 Inspector General Act of 1978
The establishment of the HEW and Department of Energy IGs laid the groundwork for Congress The establishment of the HEW and Department of Energy IGs laid the groundwork for Congress
to create additional statutory IGs through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (hereinafter IG Act).to create additional statutory IGs through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (hereinafter IG Act).
10 According to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs report that accompanied the According to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs report that accompanied the
legislation, the committee believed that extending the IG concept to more agencies would legislation, the committee believed that extending the IG concept to more agencies would
improve government programs and operations. The committee further identified IG independence improve government programs and operations. The committee further identified IG independence
from agency management as a key characteristic in fostering such improvementsfrom agency management as a key characteristic in fostering such improvements
authorities and responsibilities.authorities and responsibilities.
fraud, and abuse; andfraud, and abuse; and
and operations, as well as progress in implementing related corrective actions.and operations, as well as progress in implementing related corrective actions.
below.below.
establishment IGs and creating a new category of IGs for establishment IGs and creating a new category of IGs for
appropriations accounts for each establishment IG. Further, the act added several appropriations accounts for each establishment IG. Further, the act added several
new semiannual reporting requirements for IGs, such as a requirement for IGs to new semiannual reporting requirements for IGs, such as a requirement for IGs to
provide a list of each audit report issued during the reporting period. Finally, the provide a list of each audit report issued during the reporting period. Finally, the
law required external peer reviews of OIGs, during which a federal law required external peer reviews of OIGs, during which a federal
" reviews each OIGreviews each OIG
and oversee the IG community, including an Integrity Committee to investigate and oversee the IG community, including an Integrity Committee to investigate
alleged IG wrongdoing. The law increased the uniform salary rate for alleged IG wrongdoing. The law increased the uniform salary rate for
establishment IGs and established a salary formula for DFE IGs. The act also establishment IGs and established a salary formula for DFE IGs. The act also
provided additional authorities and protections to enhance the independence of provided additional authorities and protections to enhance the independence of
IGs, such as budget protections, access to independent legal counsel, and IGs, such as budget protections, access to independent legal counsel, and
advanced congressional notification for the removal or transfer of IGs. Finally, advanced congressional notification for the removal or transfer of IGs. Finally,
the act further amended IG semiannual reporting obligations and required OIG the act further amended IG semiannual reporting obligations and required OIG
websites to include all completed audits and reports.websites to include all completed audits and reports.
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA)Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA)
allow IGs to conduct computerized data comparisons across different agency allow IGs to conduct computerized data comparisons across different agency
automated record systems without the restrictions created by the CMPPA.automated record systems without the restrictions created by the CMPPA.
act also directed CIGIE to resolve jurisdictional disputes between IGs and altered act also directed CIGIE to resolve jurisdictional disputes between IGs and altered
the membership structure and investigatory procedures of the CIGIE Integrity the membership structure and investigatory procedures of the CIGIE Integrity
Committee. Regarding transparency and accountability, the act required IGs to Committee. Regarding transparency and accountability, the act required IGs to
submit any documents containing recommendations for corrective action to submit any documents containing recommendations for corrective action to
agency heads and congressional committees of jurisdiction, as well as any agency heads and congressional committees of jurisdiction, as well as any
Member of Congress or other individuals Member of Congress or other individuals
IG community by placing new limits on the removal of IGs, the management of IG community by placing new limits on the removal of IGs, the management of
vacancies, and the selection of acting IGs. The act increased the information that vacancies, and the selection of acting IGs. The act increased the information that
the President and heads of DFEs must provide to Congress prior to removal of an the President and heads of DFEs must provide to Congress prior to removal of an
IG. The amendments also limited the circumstances in which an IG may be IG. The amendments also limited the circumstances in which an IG may be
placed on non-duty status. When a vacancy in an IG position does occur, the act placed on non-duty status. When a vacancy in an IG position does occur, the act
limited those who may serve as an acting IG to certain officials within the IG limited those who may serve as an acting IG to certain officials within the IG
community and community and
extended periods in which an IG position is vacant and without a nominee. The extended periods in which an IG position is vacant and without a nominee. The
act also increased the IG communityact also increased the IG community
requirements for requirements for
's Integrity Committee. Structure of the IG Community Types of IGs
Statutory IGs may be grouped into four types: (1) establishment, (2) Statutory IGs may be grouped into four types: (1) establishment, (2)
types of IGstypes of IGs
affiliated federal entity and the branch of government in which it is located, oversight jurisdiction, affiliated federal entity and the branch of government in which it is located, oversight jurisdiction,
and oversight and oversight
There are not any active special IGs presently, but Congress may create new special IGs in the future.20 Table 1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Statutory IG Types
Feature
DFE IG
Special IG
Authorizing statute
IG Act
method
Agency head
or
agency head
President, by andor
President alone
Affiliated federal entity
Cabinet departments, Cabinet-level agencies, and larger agencies in the executive branch
Smaller entities (e.g., boards, commissions, and government-sponsored enterprises)
Certain intelligence agencies within DOD
Certain legislative branch agencies
Certain intelligence agencies outside of DOD
Some affiliated with specified federal entities; others not expressly affiliated with a particular entity
Oversight jurisdiction
programs, programs,
operations, or funds operations, or funds
as specified in as specified in
authorizing statuteauthorizing statute
duration
Temporary (allowed to sunset)
Composition of Statutory IGs
individual statutes outside the IG Actindividual statutes outside the IG Act
(Figure 1). Five . Five
Architect of the Capitol (AOC), Government Publishing Office (GPO), Government Architect of the Capitol (AOC), Government Publishing Office (GPO), Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Library of Congress (LOC), and U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). The Accountability Office (GAO), Library of Congress (LOC), and U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). The
remaining two operate for executive branch intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence remaining two operate for executive branch intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and Intelligence Community (IC). Agency (CIA) and Intelligence Community (IC).
Figure 1. Statutory IGs by Type and Authorizing Statute
As of July 2026
Source: CRS analysis of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and authorizing statutes for other IGs.CRS analysis of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and authorizing statutes for other IGs.Notes: The figure does not include IGs for certain U.S. Armed Forces—the Air Force, Army, and Navy. (The The figure does not include IGs for certain U.S. Armed Forces—the Air Force, Army, and Navy. (The
Department of Homeland Security IG, which is included in the Department of Homeland Security IG, which is included in the totals in the figure, oversees the U.S. Coast Guard.) While figure, oversees the U.S. Coast Guard.) While
these IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other statutory IGs and are these IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other statutory IGs and are
beyond the scope of this report. Further, the figure does not include beyond the scope of this report. Further, the figure does not include
House of Representatives.House of Representatives.
The majority of IGs oversee the activities of a single affiliated federal entity and its components. The majority of IGs oversee the activities of a single affiliated federal entity and its components.
For example, the IG for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for For example, the IG for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for
evaluating programs and operations of the entire department and its components, such as the evaluating programs and operations of the entire department and its components, such as the
Federal Emergency Management AgencyFederal Emergency Management Agency
(DOD) and the Department of the Treasury. Both (DOD) and the Department of the Treasury. Both
one or more separate IGs for certain components or programs one or more separate IGs for certain components or programs
(Table 2). Table 2. Multiple Statutory IGs Affiliated with a Single Federal Entity
Department of Defense (DOD) IGs
Department of the Treasury (DOT) IGs
National Security Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
DOT (department-wide)
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (Internal Revenue Service)
Notes: The table does not include IGs for U.S. Armed Forces within the DOD—the Air Force, Army, and The table does not include IGs for U.S. Armed Forces within the DOD—the Air Force, Army, and
Navy. While these military IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other Navy. While these military IGs exist in statute, their structure and authorities differ significantly from other
Following Trump Administration action regarding the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the administration of foreign-assistance programs, the statutorily established OIG for the agency has continued to operate, providing oversight of the administration of funding previously administered by USAID and now managed by the Department of State.22
Congress has authorized some IGs to oversee the programs, operations, and activities of more Congress has authorized some IGs to oversee the programs, operations, and activities of morethan one entity either on a permanent or temporary basis. The expansion of an IGthan one entity either on a permanent or temporary basis. The expansion of an IG
include multiple entities has generally stemmed from agency reorganizations or congressional include multiple entities has generally stemmed from agency reorganizations or congressional
concern regarding oversight of a particular agency or program.concern regarding oversight of a particular agency or program.
23 Table 3 provides examples of IGs who have permanent expanded jurisdiction. In the past, provides examples of IGs who have permanent expanded jurisdiction. In the past,
Congress has also temporarily expanded IG jurisdiction to include operations of unaffiliated Congress has also temporarily expanded IG jurisdiction to include operations of unaffiliated
agencies. For example, Congress directed the GAO IG to serve concurrently as the IG for the agencies. For example, Congress directed the GAO IG to serve concurrently as the IG for the
Commission on Civil Rights for FY2012 and FY2013.Commission on Civil Rights for FY2012 and FY2013.
2014, authorized the DOT IG to oversee the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 2014, authorized the DOT IG to oversee the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA), a nonfederal entity.25 Table 3. Examples of a Single Statutory IG Affiliated with Multiple Federal Entities
Office of Inspector General
entities
Description
Intelligence Community (IC)
IC elements (defined in 50 U.S.C. §3003)
of the IC. The IC IG replaced the now-of the IC. The IC IG replaced the now-
defunct IG for the Office of the DNI, defunct IG for the Office of the DNI,
whose jurisdiction was limited to this whose jurisdiction was limited to this
office and who had substantially less office and who had substantially less
authority and independence (P.L. 108-458authority and independence (P.L. 108-458,
§1078).§1078).
Codified in 50 U.S.C. §3033
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)
(1) FRB
(2) Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.Protection Act.
P.L. 111-203, §§1011 and 1081
Listed in 5 U.S.C. §415(a)(2)
Department of Transportation (DOT)
(1) DOT
(2) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
expanded the IGexpanded the IG
the NTSB in 2000 due to perceived lack the NTSB in 2000 due to perceived lack
of oversight of the board.of oversight of the board.
P.L. 106-424, §12
Codified in 49 U.S.C. §1137
Department of State (DOS)
(1) DOS
(2) U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)
The DOS IG's jurisdiction was expanded to include USAGM upon the agency's removal from the DOS and establishment as an independent agency in 1998 under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.
P.L. 105-277, Division G, Title XIII, Chapter 3, §1322
Listed in 22 U.S.C. §6209a
U.S. Postal Service (USPS)
(1) USPS
(2) Postal Regulatory Commission
Under the Postal Service Reform Act of 2022, the USPS IG "shall function as the Inspector General for the Postal Regulatory Commission."
Source: CRS analysis of statutes authorizing or expanding the oversight jurisdiction of each listed IG.CRS analysis of statutes authorizing or expanding the oversight jurisdiction of each listed IG.
Types of IG Reviews
IGs conduct reviews of government programs and operations. The genesis and frequency of such IGs conduct reviews of government programs and operations. The genesis and frequency of such
reviews can vary. reviews can vary.
sections below discuss certain differences between the review types in terms of three sections below discuss certain differences between the review types in terms of three
characteristics: quality standards, scope of analysis, and type of analysis.characteristics: quality standards, scope of analysis, and type of analysis.
Table 4. Key Differences Among Common Types of IG Reviews
Characteristic
Investigation
Quality standards
Type of analysis
Nonprogrammatic (individual misconduct)
Scope of analysis
Entire agency program or operation
Specific aspect of a program or operation or a specific agency facility
Actions of a government employee, contractor, or grantee
Source: CRS analysis of laws, regulations, and administrative directives governing statutory IGs.CRS analysis of laws, regulations, and administrative directives governing statutory IGs.
Notes: The table does not reflect all differences among audits, inspections or evaluations, and investigations. In The table does not reflect all differences among audits, inspections or evaluations, and investigations. In
addition, differences in the addition, differences in the
and depend on the issue being evaluated. In some cases, the scope of analysis might be similar.and depend on the issue being evaluated. In some cases, the scope of analysis might be similar.
Financial audits are beyond the scope of this report.Financial audits are beyond the scope of this report.
accessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdfaccessible at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdf. d.
are also governed by guidelines established by the Attorney General. See U.S. Department of Justice, are also governed by guidelines established by the Attorney General. See U.S. Department of Justice,
default/files/files/agleguidelines.pdfdefault/files/files/agleguidelines.pdf
effectiveness and results, (2) internal control, (3) compliance, and (4) prospective analysis. See GAO, effectiveness and results, (2) internal control, (3) compliance, and (4) prospective analysis. See GAO,
Government Auditing Standards
693136.pdf693136.pdf
. Quality Standards
IG reviews are governed by different quality standards. IG reviews are governed by different quality standards. Under the IG Act, IG audits are subject to the generally IG audits are subject to the generally
accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) developed by GAO.accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) developed by GAO.
evaluations and investigations, by contrast, are governed by separate standards developed by evaluations and investigations, by contrast, are governed by separate standards developed by
requirements to meet those standards differ requirements to meet those standards differ
audits are audits are
supporting supporting
30 IG Audits
to meet the standard differ between the two types of reviews.to meet the standard differ between the two types of reviews.
IG audit: GAO GAO
audits and summarize the results of the monitoring process annuallyaudits and summarize the results of the monitoring process annually
audit and audit and
by the audit team to ensure compliance with GAGAS.by the audit team to ensure compliance with GAGAS.
31 IG inspection or evaluation: CIGIECIGIE
32 Further, the supervisory requirements for an inspection call only for Further, the supervisory requirements for an inspection call only for
inspection team members understand the purpose and goals of the inspection.inspection team members understand the purpose and goals of the inspection.
IG audits and inspections or evaluations include programmatic analysis, which may involve IG audits and inspections or evaluations include programmatic analysis, which may involve
analyses related to the analyses related to the
programs and operationsprograms and operations
and operations. IG investigations, by contrast, typically include nonprogrammatic analysis and and operations. IG investigations, by contrast, typically include nonprogrammatic analysis and
instead focus primarily on alleged misuse or mismanagement of an agencyinstead focus primarily on alleged misuse or mismanagement of an agency
operations, or resources by an individual government employee, contractor, or grantee. Unlike operations, or resources by an individual government employee, contractor, or grantee. Unlike
audits and inspections or evaluations, IG investigations can directly result in disciplinary actions audits and inspections or evaluations, IG investigations can directly result in disciplinary actions
that are criminal (e.g., indictments and prosecutions) or administrative (e.g., monetary payments, that are criminal (e.g., indictments and prosecutions) or administrative (e.g., monetary payments,
suspension/debarment, or termination of employment).suspension/debarment, or termination of employment).
Scope of Analysis
Performance audits may be broader in scope compared to inspections or evaluations and Performance audits may be broader in scope compared to inspections or evaluations and
investigations. investigations.
across multiple agency components and facilities. An inspection or evaluation, by contrast, across multiple agency components and facilities. An inspection or evaluation, by contrast,
or geographic region containing agency facilities. Investigations typically focus on the actions of or geographic region containing agency facilities. Investigations typically focus on the actions of
a specific agency employee, grantee, or contractor for alleged misconduct or wrongdoing. Example of Differences in Units of Analysis Among an IG Performance Audit,
that varied in scope and analysis, such asthat varied in scope and analysis, such as
Integrated Service Network (VISN);Integrated Service Network (VISN);
an an inspection of veteran access to care and quality of care—including wait times—at one VA medical facility of veteran access to care and quality of care—including wait times—at one VA medical facility
within a specific VISN;within a specific VISN;
times to meet scheduling appointment goals.times to meet scheduling appointment goals.
36 IG Statutory Authorities and Requirements
IGs possess many authorities and responsibilities to carry out their respective missions, many of IGs possess many authorities and responsibilities to carry out their respective missions, many of
which aim to establish and protect IG independence from undue influence. For example, the IG which aim to establish and protect IG independence from undue influence. For example, the IG
Act grants covered IGs broad authority toAct grants covered IGs broad authority to
by IG type: establishment, DFE, other permanent, and special. However, the manner in which by IG type: establishment, DFE, other permanent, and special. However, the manner in which
each IG interprets and implements these authorities and responsibilities can vary widely, thus each IG interprets and implements these authorities and responsibilities can vary widely, thus
potentially resulting in substantially different structures, operations, and activities across IGs.potentially resulting in substantially different structures, operations, and activities across IGs.
mandated in the applicable authorizing statute. in the applicable authorizing statute.
therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. These therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. These
provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent amendments to provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent amendments to
that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred after the enactment of the IGthe enactment of the IG
's authorizing statute.authorizing statute.
39 Oversight Jurisdiction
As mentioned previously, establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs generally do not have As mentioned previously, establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs generally do not have
cross-agency jurisdiction and therefore evaluate only the programs, operations, and activities of cross-agency jurisdiction and therefore evaluate only the programs, operations, and activities of
their respective affiliated agencies. For example, the DHS IG must annually evaluate the their respective affiliated agencies. For example, the DHS IG must annually evaluate the
and practices and practices
third parties, such as contractors and grantees. For example, the IG for the National Archives and third parties, such as contractors and grantees. For example, the IG for the National Archives and
Records Administration audited the agencyRecords Administration audited the agency
to evaluate a specific program, operation, or activity irrespective of the agencies implementing to evaluate a specific program, operation, or activity irrespective of the agencies implementing
them. For instance, them. For instance,
Afghanistan reconstruction, which Afghanistan reconstruction, which
performed audits on topics such as government-wide efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security government-wide efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces.Forces.
's purview, such as the militarypurview, such as the military
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law,
management analysis, public administration, or investigations.management analysis, public administration, or investigations.
PresidentPresident
heads of their affiliated federal entities: heads of their affiliated federal entities:
IGs in the legislative branch (5). Unlike other IGs, the IGs in the legislative branch (5). Unlike other IGs, the
As of July 2026
Authorizing Statutes
President Nominates, Senate Confirms
Agency or Entity Head Appoints
President Appoints
Total
Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended
0
63
Other statutes
7
Total
35
35
0
70
Source: CRS analysis of authorizing statutes for the listed IGs. The table does not include statutory IG positions that have been abolished.
a. Includes all establishment IGs. See 5 U.S.C. §§403 and 401(1). b. Includes all DFE IGs. See 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act), §415(c). c. Includes the IGs for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Community, the special IG for the50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. §3033(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. §5231(b)(1), and 15 U.S.C. §9053(b)(1).50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. §3033(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. §5231(b)(1), and 15 U.S.C. §9053(b)(1).
§1808(c)(1)(A), 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(1), 44 U.S.C. §3902(a), 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(1)(A), and 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1).§1808(c)(1)(A), 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(1), 44 U.S.C. §3902(a), 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(1)(A), and 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1).
Removal Method
methods (by the Presidentthe President
permanent IGs in the executive branch are removable or transferrable by the President.permanent IGs in the executive branch are removable or transferrable by the President.
contrast, DFE IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are removable or contrast, DFE IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are removable or
transferrable by the heads of their affiliated entities.transferrable by the heads of their affiliated entities.
remove or transfer certain IGsremove or transfer certain IGs as follows:as follows:
committee, or commission.committee, or commission.
removal authority must communicate to both houses of Congress, in writing, the removal authority must communicate to both houses of Congress, in writing, the
IGs—representing IGs—representing
Authorizing statutes for the other permanent IGs in the legislative branch do not explicitly require Authorizing statutes for the other permanent IGs in the legislative branch do not explicitly require
If an establishment IG position becomes vacant for any reason, the IG Act includes specific rules regarding the designation of an official to serve as an acting IG. Specifically, establishment IGs may designate, in writing, an official in their office as the "first assistant to the position of Inspector General." That individual automatically assumes the responsibilities of the IG on an acting basis if the IG position becomes vacant.53 The IG Act also provides that the President may select a different official to fulfill the duties of the IG on an acting basis so long as that individual meets certain qualifications, including having served in an OIG office for at least 90 of the 365 days before the vacancy occurred.54 The President may exercise this authority only after providing Congress with written notice 30 days in advance.55
Term Limits All but two statutory IGs are appointed to indefinite terms. The USPS and USCP IGs are subject to term . The USPS and USCP IGs are subject to termlimits. The USPS IG is appointed to a seven-year term and can be reappointed for an unlimited limits. The USPS IG is appointed to a seven-year term and can be reappointed for an unlimited
number of terms.number of terms.
years total).years total).
57 Similarly, special IG offices have been subject to sunset provisions leading to the wind down and closure of those offices when specified conditions, including set time periods, are met. Transparency of Budget Formulation and Proposals
Establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs in the executive branch are required to develop Establishment, DFE, and other permanent IGs in the executive branch are required to develop
annual budget estimates that are distinct from the budgets of their affiliated entities. Further, such annual budget estimates that are distinct from the budgets of their affiliated entities. Further, such
budget estimates must include some transparency into the requested amounts before agency heads budget estimates must include some transparency into the requested amounts before agency heads
and the President can modify them.and the President can modify them.
aforementioned IG types includes the following key steps:aforementioned IG types includes the following key steps:
the aggregate amount for the IGthe aggregate amount for the IG
request includes any comments from the IG regarding the entity headrequest includes any comments from the IG regarding the entity head
budget that was transmitted to the entity head, (2) the Presidentbudget that was transmitted to the entity head, (2) the President
amount for the IG, (3) the amount requested by the President for training of IGs, amount for the IG, (3) the amount requested by the President for training of IGs,
and (4) any comments from the IG if the Presidentand (4) any comments from the IG if the President
particularly by enabling Congress to perceive differences between the budgetary perspectives of particularly by enabling Congress to perceive differences between the budgetary perspectives of
IGs and affiliated agencies or the President. Governing statutory provisions outline the following IGs and affiliated agencies or the President. Governing statutory provisions outline the following
submission process, although it is unclear whether every IG interprets the statute similarly. submission process, although it is unclear whether every IG interprets the statute similarly.
Notably, one congressional committee investigation questioned whether the President was Notably, one congressional committee investigation questioned whether the President was
consistently following the IG Actconsistently following the IG Act
authorizing authorizing
budget estimates that are distinct from the affiliated entitybudget estimates that are distinct from the affiliated entity
these budget estimate requirements apply to the these budget estimate requirements apply to the
an additional level of budgetary independence from the affiliated entity by preventing attempts to an additional level of budgetary independence from the affiliated entity by preventing attempts to
limit, reallocate, or otherwise reduce IG funding once it has been specified in law, except as limit, reallocate, or otherwise reduce IG funding once it has been specified in law, except as
provided through established transfer and reprogramming procedures and related interactions provided through established transfer and reprogramming procedures and related interactions
part of the affiliated entitypart of the affiliated entity
account, the appropriations may be more susceptible to some reallocation of funds, although other account, the appropriations may be more susceptible to some reallocation of funds, although other
protections may apply.protections may apply.
appropriations accounts, although in practice the President may propose, and Congress may fund, appropriations accounts, although in practice the President may propose, and Congress may fund,
special IGs through separately listed accounts.special IGs through separately listed accounts.69
Reporting Requirements
Statutory IGs have various reporting obligations to Congress, the Attorney General, agency Statutory IGs have various reporting obligations to Congress, the Attorney General, agency
heads, and the public. Some reporting requirements are periodic, while others are triggered by a heads, and the public. Some reporting requirements are periodic, while others are triggered by a
specific event. The subsections below highlight some of the required reports for statutory IGs.specific event. The subsections below highlight some of the required reports for statutory IGs.70
Semiannual Report
activities of their offices. For example, the reports must include a summary of each audit and activities of their offices. For example, the reports must include a summary of each audit and
inspection or evaluation report issued before the start of the reporting period that includes inspection or evaluation report issued before the start of the reporting period that includes
recommendations.recommendations.
reports available to the affiliated entity head, Congress, and the public, as follows:reports available to the affiliated entity head, Congress, and the public, as follows:
it may include additional comments from the agency head.it may include additional comments from the agency head.
information on OIG activities than establishment and DFE IGs. Further, the IC IG has an information on OIG activities than establishment and DFE IGs. Further, the IC IG has an
additional reporting requirement to certify whether the IG has had additional reporting requirement to certify whether the IG has had
than semiannual reports, which must include a than semiannual reports, which must include a
and revenues associated with the programs, funds, and activities that they oversee.and revenues associated with the programs, funds, and activities that they oversee.75
Seven-Day Letter
immediately report to their affiliated entity heads any immediately report to their affiliated entity heads any
abuses or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operationsabuses or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations
entities. The affiliated entity head must transmit the report unaltered to Congress within seven entities. The affiliated entity head must transmit the report unaltered to Congress within seven
calendar days.calendar days.
statutes for the USCP and GAO IGs do not explicitly require issuance of seven-day letters, but statutes for the USCP and GAO IGs do not explicitly require issuance of seven-day letters, but
they may do so in practice.they may do so in practice.
77 Top Management and Performance Challenges
identify the identify the
agencies and to track the agencyagencies and to track the agency
referred to as top management and performance challenges (TMPCs). A covered IG must submit referred to as top management and performance challenges (TMPCs). A covered IG must submit
the statement to the affiliated entity head 30 days in advance of the entity headthe statement to the affiliated entity head 30 days in advance of the entity head
the Annual Financial Report (AFR) or Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). The the Annual Financial Report (AFR) or Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). The
agency head must include the statement unaltered (but with any comments) in the entityagency head must include the statement unaltered (but with any comments) in the entity
PAR. IGs for government corporations in the executive branch, as well as special IGs and other PAR. IGs for government corporations in the executive branch, as well as special IGs and other
permanent IGs in the legislative branch, are not explicitly required to identify TMPCs.permanent IGs in the legislative branch, are not explicitly required to identify TMPCs.
79 However, some of these IGs have elected to do so.However, some of these IGs have elected to do so.
common TMPCs facing multiple agencies.81 Transparency of IG Reports and Recommendations
Federal laws require varied levels of transparency for IG reports and related recommendations for Federal laws require varied levels of transparency for IG reports and related recommendations for
corrective action. The IG Act requires the following for establishment and DFE IGs:corrective action. The IG Act requires the following for establishment and DFE IGs:
three days of submitting final versions of the report to the affiliated entity head.three days of submitting final versions of the report to the affiliated entity head.
's website within three days of submitting the final recommendation to the affiliated website within three days of submitting the final recommendation to the affiliated
entity head.entity head.
in the same manner specified in the IG Act.in the same manner specified in the IG Act.
IGs in the executive branch, by contrast, are not explicitly required to make the IGs in the executive branch, by contrast, are not explicitly required to make the
reports publicly available.reports publicly available.
individual audit, inspection, or evaluation reports on their respective OIG individual audit, inspection, or evaluation reports on their respective OIG
websites.websites.
documents containing recommendations on their respective OIG websites.documents containing recommendations on their respective OIG websites.
unclear whether the AOC, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs must post such unclear whether the AOC, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs must post such
documents.documents.
USCP OIG website lists only peer review reports.92Oversight.gov The majority of IGs have elected to participate in The majority of IGs have elected to participate in
launched in October 2017 that contains most IG reports issued since 2014 and some earlier launched in October 2017 that contains most IG reports issued since 2014 and some earlier
reports.reports.
community, in 2020 Congress passed legislation requiring CIGIE to community, in 2020 Congress passed legislation requiring CIGIE to
website and requiring most IGs to participatewebsite and requiring most IGs to participate
criteria, such as a specific IG, review type, or keyword. criteria, such as a specific IG, review type, or keyword.
published on published on
Coordination and Oversight of Statutory IGs
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIGIE is the primary oversight and CIGIE is the primary oversight and
Efficiency.Efficiency.
representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of Special Counsel. representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of Special Counsel.
The council chairperson is an IG elected from members of the council, and the Office of The council chairperson is an IG elected from members of the council, and the Office of
Management and Budget Management and Budget (OMB) Deputy Director for Management serves as the executive chairperson.Deputy Director for Management serves as the executive chairperson.
of issues that transcend individual Government agenciesof issues that transcend individual Government agencies
effectiveness of [OIG] personnel.effectiveness of [OIG] personnel.
accomplish this mission,accomplish this mission,
academies for auditors, investigators, inspectors/evaluators, and other personnel academies for auditors, investigators, inspectors/evaluators, and other personnel
in IG offices.in IG offices.
aid OIG personnel in conducting their work.aid OIG personnel in conducting their work.
process that involves one OIG assessing whether another OIGprocess that involves one OIG assessing whether another OIG
inspections, and investigations comply with the applicable quality standards.inspections, and investigations comply with the applicable quality standards.
refers for investigation allegations of misconduct by the IG or other OIG officials refers for investigation allegations of misconduct by the IG or other OIG officials
according to processes and procedures detailed in the IG Act.according to processes and procedures detailed in the IG Act.
appointing authority.appointing authority.
Candidate Recommendations Panel, which identifies and vets candidates for IG Candidate Recommendations Panel, which identifies and vets candidates for IG
positions.positions.
management.management.
primarily financed by the IG member offices, which contribute a pro rata amount of their annual funding to financed by the IG member offices, which contribute a pro rata amount of their annual funding to
CIGIE together with payments received in connection with attendance at CIGIE training. The CIGIE together with payments received in connection with attendance at CIGIE training. The
contributions are placed into a no-year revolving fund.contributions are placed into a no-year revolving fund.
107 Other Coordinating Bodies
Other interagency mechanisms have been created by law or administrative directive to support Other interagency mechanisms have been created by law or administrative directive to support
coordination among IGs for specific issues. Current examples are described below.coordination among IGs for specific issues. Current examples are described below.
Department of State, or Department of State, or
LIG provides comprehensive oversight of programs and operations in support of LIG provides comprehensive oversight of programs and operations in support of
OCO, including the management and coordination of all related audits, OCO, including the management and coordination of all related audits,
inspections or evaluations, and investigations conducted by the three IGs. The inspections or evaluations, and investigations conducted by the three IGs. The
chair of CIGIE must designate an LIG for each covered OCO.chair of CIGIE must designate an LIG for each covered OCO.
Treasury IG. The mission of CIGFO is to facilitate information sharing among Treasury IG. The mission of CIGFO is to facilitate information sharing among
the nine IGs and develop ways to improve financial oversight.the nine IGs and develop ways to improve financial oversight.
CIGFO has engaged in activities that build upon existing work of individual IGs. CIGFO has engaged in activities that build upon existing work of individual IGs.
For example, CIGFO identified cross-cutting top management challenges facing For example, CIGFO identified cross-cutting top management challenges facing
all nine financial regulatory agencies.all nine financial regulatory agencies.
oversight of the federal governmentoversight of the federal government
the funds spent in support of that activity. the funds spent in support of that activity. The PRAC has a coordinating function PRAC has a coordinating function
among IGs and regarding issues that cross agency jurisdictional boundaries.113 In more recent years, Congress has recognized the potential long-term utility of the data analysis capacity that the PRAC has developed and that could be applied to support IG work in other contexts.114 For instance, the FY2025 budget reconciliation law, (P.L. 119-21), included a provision that pushed the statutory sunset for the PRAC from 2025 to 2034, appropriated additional funding for its operations, and extended its jurisdiction to include appropriations in the reconciliation bill.115Issues for Congress Statutory IGs play a key role in government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in Statutory IGs play a key role in government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in
establishing the structures and authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of establishing the structures and authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of
IGs in government agencies IGs in government agencies
heads and Congress—positions heads and Congress—positions
policies and to policies and to
therefore, may have an interest in ensuring that statutory IGs possess the resources and authorities therefore, may have an interest in ensuring that statutory IGs possess the resources and authorities
necessary to fulfill their oversight rolesnecessary to fulfill their oversight roles
Congress may consider several options regarding IG structures, functions, and coordination as the role of IGs in government oversight evolves.116 Some of these options relate to the long-term development of the IG community based on the expectations consistently articulated by Congress since the passage of the IG Act in 1978, while others relate to more immediate issues that arise from time to time given the role of IGs and reaction of other actors in the government.
Independence Federal laws and professional standards require IGs to be independent of the entities and/or standards require IGs to be independent of the entities and/oractivities they evaluate. There is no standard definition, however, for what constitutes IG activities they evaluate. There is no standard definition, however, for what constitutes IG
independence. Rather, IGs derive independence from independence. Rather, IGs derive independence from
demonstrated ability in certain skill sets, demonstrated ability in certain skill sets,
options related to IG independence, such as the following:options related to IG independence, such as the following:
authorities that affect independence in varied (and possibly divergent) ways. A authorities that affect independence in varied (and possibly divergent) ways. A
GAO report that assessed an IGGAO report that assessed an IG
interest, familiarity with agency personnel in units undergoing a review, and interest, familiarity with agency personnel in units undergoing a review, and
other other
119 Examples of external factors include IG statutory authorities—such as Examples of external factors include IG statutory authorities—such as
appointment and removal methods and access to agency records—structure and appointment and removal methods and access to agency records—structure and
leadership of the affiliated entity, and political influence. leadership of the affiliated entity, and political influence.
One emerging issue that may limit the ability of IGs to provide independent oversight indirectly are the budget and staff reductions that have occurred across the executive branch during the second Trump Administration and appear to have impacted at least some IG offices. One early analysis has found that the number of reports issued by some IGs fell dramatically in the first half of FY2026 compared to historic averages.120
to report to both Congress and their affiliated entity heads.to report to both Congress and their affiliated entity heads.
creates potential tension between IGs and their affiliated entity heads. An IG, creates potential tension between IGs and their affiliated entity heads. An IG,
therefore, must maintain independence from the agency head to assess the therefore, must maintain independence from the agency head to assess the
relationship with agencies to ensure the effectiveness of those assessments.relationship with agencies to ensure the effectiveness of those assessments.
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (PASthe President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS appointments); (2) by the President alone (PA); (2) by the President alone (PA appointments); or ); or
(3) by the affiliated entity head.(3) by the affiliated entity head.125 Observers have asserted that appointment and removal methods Observers have asserted that appointment and removal methods
affect an IGaffect an IG
vary regarding the level and type of impact. Following the removal of IGs during both the Obama vary regarding the level and type of impact. Following the removal of IGs during both the Obama
126 Congress addressed some of its principal concerns regarding removal and IG independence with Congress addressed some of its principal concerns regarding removal and IG independence with
provisions included in the provisions included in the
Early in the second Trump Administration, the President removed 18 establishment IGs without providing the statutorily required notice to Congress. When asked by reporters about the action the President stated, "I don't know them, but some people thought that some were unfair or some were not doing their job. It's a very standard thing to do."128 A group of these former IGs challenged their removal without notice in court, and while a court agreed that their removal was improper, it did not order their reinstatement at the preliminary injunction stage because the President would retain authority to remove each IG in compliance with the 30-day notice requirement.129
Direct Impact
example, GAO general counsel Gary Kepplinger suggested that PAS-appointed IGs experience example, GAO general counsel Gary Kepplinger suggested that PAS-appointed IGs experience
greater organizational independence compared to agency-appointed IGs, noting that greater organizational independence compared to agency-appointed IGs, noting that
removed the appointment source is from the entity to be audited, the greater the level of removed the appointment source is from the entity to be audited, the greater the level of
independence.independence.
agency appointment to a PAS appointment—might politicize the IG position and reduce IG agency appointment to a PAS appointment—might politicize the IG position and reduce IG
effectiveness.effectiveness.
over potential politicization of the IG removal process, which may undermine IG over potential politicization of the IG removal process, which may undermine IG
independence.independence.
" could, if allowed, mitigate arbitrary removal (such as for political reasons) and enhance IG independence.mitigate arbitrary removal (such as for political reasons) and enhance IG independence.
have asserted that this limitation might prevent the President or agency heads from removing IGs have asserted that this limitation might prevent the President or agency heads from removing IGs
for legitimate reasons (such as poor performance), thus diminishing IG accountability.for legitimate reasons (such as poor performance), thus diminishing IG accountability.
Indirect Impact
IG appointment and removal methods may also indirectly affect independence by contributing to IG appointment and removal methods may also indirectly affect independence by contributing toIG vacancies. Concerns exist that the IG vetting and confirmation processes (particularly PAS IG vacancies. Concerns exist that the IG vetting and confirmation processes (particularly PAS
appointments) take too long, leading to prolonged IG vacancies and use of acting IGs.appointments) take too long, leading to prolonged IG vacancies and use of acting IGs.
also be argued that removal methods (such as also be argued that removal methods (such as
independent or effective compared to permanent IGsindependent or effective compared to permanent IGs, for various reasons. Examples include not for various reasons. Examples include not
having gone through formal vetting processes, reduced ability to set long-term strategies and having gone through formal vetting processes, reduced ability to set long-term strategies and
priorities, and perverse incentives not to report problems in agency operations or resist political priorities, and perverse incentives not to report problems in agency operations or resist political
pressure from agency heads—particularly for those seeking the permanent position.pressure from agency heads—particularly for those seeking the permanent position.
example, in a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate for the example, in a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate for the
CIGIE stated thatCIGIE stated that
has the ability to exercise more authority in settinghas the ability to exercise more authority in setting new policies and procedures and, by virtue policies and procedures and, by virtue
independence.independence.
appear or are perceived appear or are perceived
some permanent IGs and OIG employees responding to a survey provided several reasons for some permanent IGs and OIG employees responding to a survey provided several reasons for
why acting IGs are not less independent than permanent IGs. Examples include that acting IGs why acting IGs are not less independent than permanent IGs. Examples include that acting IGs
have the same statutory authorities as permanent IGs, are held to the same standards as permanent have the same statutory authorities as permanent IGs, are held to the same standards as permanent
IGs, and are typically career OIG employees who prioritize independence.IGs, and are typically career OIG employees who prioritize independence.
Changes to CIGIE's role in the organization of the IG community may impact its independence. Historically, CIGIE has served as a forum for IGs to develop the specialized skills and standards of the community. It also serves a number of other IG community functions that may help preserve independence and promote effectiveness of OIGs. These include activities such as maintaining oversight.gov as a public resource for IG reports and recommendations, operating the Integrity Committee to receive and review reports of potential misconduct by senior officials in the IG community, identifying and recommending qualified candidates to serve as IGs, and leading cross-cutting oversight activities such as those of the PRAC. While CIGIE is integral to the activities of the IG community, concerns and calls for reforms have been discussed in recent years.140
One significant discussion has revolved around the effectiveness of the Integrity Committee and whether its processes are sufficiently fair and transparent.141 Oversight of the IGs themselves has been challenging for the community and other stakeholders because of the need to balance the value of robust independence for OIGs with the need to ensure that they are themselves accountable when problems arise in their operations. At the request of Members of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, GAO recently completed a study of the Integrity Committee and recommended several changes to Integrity Committee processes focused on improving and standardizing reporting and other processes.142
Another CIGIE-related issue that Congress might wish to address is the agency's funding structure. Historically, CIGIE operations have been funded largely by assessments paid from the appropriations of its member OIGs. Congress has also chosen, in many fiscal years, to provide CIGIE with a line item appropriation specifically to support the operations and development of oversight.gov.143
The IG community has asked Congress on a number of occasions to change this funding model by providing a line item appropriation for all CIGIE operations.144 While Congress has not chosen to implement this request from CIGIE in the past, it might consider doing so following a decision by OMB officials in September 2025 not to apportion appropriated funds for CIGIE, effectively shutting down the agency for over a month.145 While OMB eventually made funding available in November 2025, during that time, oversight.gov and a number of OIG websites hosted by CIGIE were offline.146 This meant that IG reports for many agencies were not widely available, nor were a number of web portals through which the public can report potential waste, fraud, and abuse. The IG's Role and Effectiveness Some observers have asserted that IG reviews disproportionately focus on program compliance Some observers have asserted that IG reviews disproportionately focus on program complianceand outputs rather than program outcomes.and outputs rather than program outcomes.
this dichotomy as this dichotomy as
training program, versus examining the number of attendees who get and keep a job after training program, versus examining the number of attendees who get and keep a job after
participating in the program.participating in the program.
outcomesoutcomes could better improve agency programs and operations and, by extension, increase IG could better improve agency programs and operations and, by extension, increase IG
effectiveness. Some IGs already assess program outcomes in addition to outputs and compliance. effectiveness. Some IGs already assess program outcomes in addition to outputs and compliance.
For example, a For example, a 2018 Department of Labor IG audit concluded that the Job Corps program could not Department of Labor IG audit concluded that the Job Corps program could not
demonstrate that it helped place participants in meaningful jobs related to their training demonstrate that it helped place participants in meaningful jobs related to their training
effectiveness. effectiveness.
metrics in IG semiannual reports focus on program outputs—such as the dollar value of metrics in IG semiannual reports focus on program outputs—such as the dollar value of
disallowed costs—but not necessarily on program disallowed costs—but not necessarily on program
process focuses on compliance with applicable quality standards and does not evaluate the quality process focuses on compliance with applicable quality standards and does not evaluate the quality
or effectiveness of an IGor effectiveness of an IG
as part of the peer review process might impact how IGs approach, conduct, and report on audits as part of the peer review process might impact how IGs approach, conduct, and report on audits
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been notable developments in how stakeholders view the role of IGs in preventing fraud and other issues in agency programs. The IG Act has always provided that one purpose of IGs is to "prevent and detect fraud and abuse" in agency programs and operations.152 However, largely on the basis of the scope of fraud and other challenges for pandemic relief programs, there has been increased interest in leveraging the expertise of OIGs to identify and address potential fraud earlier in the program implementation process. This interest can be seen in initiatives in both the Biden and second Trump Administrations involving IGs in the development of anti-fraud programs.153
Some Members of Congress have also been interested in the potential benefits of such activities. For example, legislation introduced during the 119th Congress, the Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act (H.R. 8312), would expand many of the data analysis and sharing activities of the PRAC to a broader range of government activities and reorganize the capacity and functions of the PRAC into a long-term office within the Department of the Treasury. While such changes have the potential to improve anti-fraud systems across federal programs, Congress might also wish to consider potential trade-offs related to IG independence, especially as IGs are asked to audit or evaluate, and potentially criticize, anti-fraud procedures they may have had a hand in designing.
Appendix A. Statutory Inspectors General by Type The three tables below list statutory inspectors general (IGs) by type—establishment, DFE, and other permanent. The tables include the IG's affiliated entity, year of establishment, and s affiliated entity, year of establishment, andoriginal authorizing statute. The tables do not include IGs that have been abolished or original authorizing statute. The tables do not include IGs that have been abolished or
administratively established.administratively established.
Table A-1. Establishment IGs
As of April 2026
Office of Inspector Generalestablished Originalauthorizingstatute Department of Health and Human Servicesa
1976
1977
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment of Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment of LaborDepartment of Labor
Department of the InteriorDepartment of the Interior
Department of TransportationDepartment of Transportation
Department of Veterans AffairsDepartment of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency and Environmental Protection Agency and
and Hazard Investigation Boardb General Services AdministrationGeneral Services Administration
National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNational Aeronautics and Space Administration
Small Business AdministrationSmall Business Administration
1978
Department of Education
1979
1980
U.S. Agency for International Development
1981
Department of Defense
1982
Railroad Retirement Board
1983
Department of Justice
Department of the Treasury
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Personnel Management
1988
Corporation for National and Community Service (AmeriCorps)
1993
1993
Social Security Administration
1994
Treasury IG for Tax Administration
1998
2000
Department of Homeland Security
2002
Export-Import Bank of the United States
2002
2008
2014
2014
2018
Source: CRS analysis of the U.S. Code and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs.
Notes: "Federal establishments"removable by the President. The table does not include previous establishment IGs that were abolished.removable by the President. The table does not include previous establishment IGs that were abolished.
and Human Services as and Human Services as
establishment.establishment.
Establishments Under Such Act, and For Other PurposesEstablishments Under Such Act, and For Other Purposes (P.L. 106-422(P.L. 106-422
establishment.establishment.
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-73) abolished the board, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-73) abolished the board,
replaced it with the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and designated the FHFB as a DFE. The Housing replaced it with the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and designated the FHFB as a DFE. The Housing
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-289) abolished the FHFB, replaced it with the FHFA, and and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-289) abolished the FHFB, replaced it with the FHFA, and
designated the FHFA as an establishment.designated the FHFA as an establishment.
NRO and NSA as establishments.NRO and NSA as establishments.
Table A-2. Designated Federal Entity (DFE) IGs
As of June 2026
Office of Inspector GeneralAmtrak
Appalachian Regional CommissionAppalachian Regional CommissionBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Bureau of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Consumer Financial
Protectiona Commodity Futures Trading CommissionCommodity Futures Trading Commission
Consumer Product Safety CommissionConsumer Product Safety Commission
Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionEqual Employment Opportunity Commission
Farm Credit AdministrationFarm Credit Administration
Federal Election CommissionFederal Election Commission
Federal Labor Relations AuthorityFederal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime CommissionFederal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade CommissionFederal Trade Commission
Legal Services CorporationLegal Services Corporation
National Archives and Records AdministrationNational Archives and Records Administration
National Credit Union AdministrationNational Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the ArtsNational Endowment for the Arts
National Endowment for the HumanitiesNational Endowment for the Humanities
National Labor Relations BoardNational Labor Relations Board
National Science FoundationNational Science Foundation
Peace CorpsPeace Corps
Pension Benefit Guaranty CorporationPension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Smithsonian InstitutionSmithsonian Institution
U.S. International Trade CommissionU.S. International Trade Commission
U.S. Postal U.S. Postal
Serviceb U.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
1988
Denali Commission
1999
Election Assistance Commission
2002
Defense Intelligence Agency
2010
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
2010
Disabled (AbilityOne)
2015
2018
Notes:
previous DFE IGs that were abolished.previous DFE IGs that were abolished.
Protection Bureau.Protection Bureau.
Table A-3. Other Permanent IGs
As of June 2026
Office of Inspector General1988
44 U.S.C. §3901-3903
Central Intelligence Agency
1989
50 U.S.C. §3517
Library of Congress
2005
2 U.S.C. §185
U.S. Capitol Police
2005
2 U.S.C. §1909
Architect of the Capitol
2007
2 U.S.C. §1808
Government Accountability Office
2008
31 U.S.C. §705
Intelligence Community
2010
50 U.S.C. §3033
Source: CRS analysis of the U.S. Code and original authorizing statutes for the listed IGs.
Notes: Includes agency IGs that operate under individual statutes outside of the IG Act of 1978, as amended. The table does not reflect other permanent IGs that were abolished.
a. Formerly the Government Printing Office. Appendix B. Selected Inspectors General Statutory Authorities and RequirementsTable B-1 compares selected statutory authorities and requirements across the four different types compares selected statutory authorities and requirements across the four different types
of statutory of statutory
and requirements apply to all IGs grouped under each type. and requirements apply to all IGs grouped under each type. The table focuses on IG authorities The table focuses on IG authorities
and requirements that are and requirements that are expressly mandated in the applicable authorizing statute. Although in the applicable authorizing statute. Although
special IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are not created under thespecial IGs and other permanent IGs in the legislative branch are not created under the Inspector General Act of 1978 (hereinafter IG Act),
their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the
IG Act. These IG Act. These
when the authorizing statute for a special IG or other permanent IG in the legislative branch when the authorizing statute for a special IG or other permanent IG in the legislative branch
clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary
regarding whether subsequent amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they regarding whether subsequent amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they
occurred occurred after the enactment of the IGthe enactment of the IG
Information on recently sunsetted special IGs is included for reference and to support potential creation of special IGs in the future.
The list below defines and explains recurring terms included in the table:The list below defines and explains recurring terms included in the table:state the identical requirement or clearly incorporate the sections of the IG Act state the identical requirement or clearly incorporate the sections of the IG Act
that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.
IGs explicitly state the similar requirement or clearly incorporate portions of the IGs explicitly state the similar requirement or clearly incorporate portions of the
sections of the IG Act that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.sections of the IG Act that contain the requirement. Applies to the listed IGs.
incorporate sections of the IG Act containing the requirement. Does not apply to incorporate sections of the IG Act containing the requirement. Does not apply to
listed IGs.listed IGs.
amendment to the IG Act after enactment of the authorizing statutes for the listed amendment to the IG Act after enactment of the authorizing statutes for the listed
IGs. May or may not apply to the listed IGs. Table B-1. Comparison of Selected Statutory Authorities and Requirements for IGs
Authority or
Requirement Establishment IG DFE IG
Other Permanent IG
Special IG (former provisions provided for reference)
Oversight
jurisdiction
irrespective of agency jurisdictionirrespective of agency jurisdiction
SIGPR: Jurisdiction over Jurisdiction over
Department of the TreasuryDepartment of the Treasury
's CARES Act Title IV programsCARES Act Title IV programs
Appointment
method
Appointed by the affiliated entity head
USPS IG: Appointed by a majority vote of the Postal Board governors and the Postal Regulatory commissioners.d
Appointed by President with the advice and consent of the Senate
Appointed by the affiliated entity head
USCP and AOC IGs: Appointed by the affiliated entity head in consultation with other legislative branch IGscAppointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
SIGAR: Appointed by the President alone
Removal or transfer method
Removal or transfer by President for any reason
Removal or transfer for any reason by the entity head, or upon written concurrence of two-thirds majority of the governing board, committee, or commission
of nine Postal Board of nine Postal Board
governors and three governors and three
Removal only by President for any reason
Removal only by affiliated entity head for any reason
USCP IG: Removal only upon unanimous vote of all voting members of the Capitol Police Board for any reasonf
Removal or transfer by President for any reason
Congressional notification of removal or transfer
Affiliated entity head to notify Congress, in writing, the substantive rationale for removal or transfer no later than 30 days before the action
President to notify congressional intelligence committees, in writing, the substantive rational for removal no later than 30 days before the action
Affiliated entity head to promptly notify Congress, in writing, the reasons for a removal only upon such removalg
USCP IG: Capitol Police Board to notify certain congressional certain congressionalcommittees, in writing, committees, in writing,
the reasons for removal the reasons for removal
only upon such only upon such
removalh
President to notify Congress, in writing, the substantive rationale for removal or transfer no later than 30 days before the action
Term limit
None
USPS IG: Seven-year term limit for unlimited Seven-year term limit for unlimitednumber of termsi
None
USCP IG: Five-year term limit for up to three Five-year term limit for up to threeNone
Salary, Appropriations, and Budget Formulation
Salary
Executive Schedule (EX) III maximum, plus 3%
Not less than the average total compensation of the affiliated entity's senior level executives
EX III maximum, plus 3%
GPO and LOC IGs:
No specific amount or No specific amount or
pay scale specified in pay scale specified in
EX III maximum, plus 3%
Budget formulation
estimate
Unclear requirement
GAO: identical requirement
Unclear requirementm
Appropriations
Separate appropriations account in President's budget
No separate account
No similar requirement specified in authorizing statutesn
Reporting Requirements
Semiannual or quarterly reports
Required to issue a semiannual report that summarizes IG activities specified in the IG Act
Similar requirement (IGs must issue a semiannual report, but required elements of the report can vary)
revenues associated with covered revenues associated with covered
programs and activitiesprograms and activities
Seven-day letter
Similar requirement
Identical requirement
GAO and USCP IGs: No similar requirement specified in authorizing statutesNo similar requirement specified in authorizing statutesUnclear requirement
Top management challenges
IGs for government corporations: Statutorily Statutorily
No similar requirement specified in authorizing statutes
reports and recommendations Semiannual reports. Required availability to the public Required availability to the public
Semiannual reports. No similar requirement specified in authorizing statutes
Semiannual reports. Identical requirement
Quarterly reports.
SIGTARP: Available to the public upon request
SIGAR: Available on a public website
SIGPR: Available to CongressAvailable to Congress
Audits and inspections or evaluations on website. Reports (or portion of the reports) must be posted on the OIG's website within three days of submitting final versions of the reports to the affiliated entity head
Audits and inspections or evaluations on website. No similar requirement specified in authorizing statutes
Audits and inspections or evaluations on website. No similar requirement specified in authorizing statute
Audits and inspections or evaluations on website. Unclear requirement
authorizing authorizing
statutes
Documents with recommendations on website. Unclear requirement
Documents with recommendations on website. Unclear requirement
Notes: The table focuses on IG authorities and requirements that are The table focuses on IG authorities and requirements that are expressly mandated in the applicable authorizing statute. Although in the applicable authorizing statute. Although
IGs in the legislative branch are not created under the IG Act, their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. It IGs in the legislative branch are not created under the IG Act, their authorizing statutes incorporate—and therefore make applicable—certain provisions of the IG Act. It
should be noted that these should be noted that these
permanent IG in the legislative branch clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent permanent IG in the legislative branch clearly and unequivocally incorporates a specific provision of the IG Act, interpretation may vary regarding whether subsequent
amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred amendments to that incorporated provision apply to the IGs if they occurred after the enactment of the IGthe enactment of the IG
Additionally, while there are no current special IGs under the definition used in this report, information on recent special IGs is included in this table for reference.
a. Includes IGs for the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community.Includes IGs for the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community.f. f.
U.S.C. §3901 note.U.S.C. §3901 note.
called for legislative branch agency budget requests to include separate sections for IG budget estimates. U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, conference report called for legislative branch agency budget requests to include separate sections for IG budget estimates. U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, conference report
to accompany H.R. 5895to accompany H.R. 5895, 115th
report to accompany S. 1648report to accompany S. 1648, 115th
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/CIGIE_Top_Challenges_Report_April_2018.pdfhttps://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/CIGIE_Top_Challenges_Report_April_2018.pdf
.
The original author of this report is former CRS analyst Kathryn Francis. Graphics and tables in this report were designed by Amber Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist.
Footnotes
Sen. Chuck Grassley, "Inspectors General," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 166 (June 18, 2020), p. S3088.
Congress established the Department of State "Inspector General and Comptroller" in 1959 (P.L. 86-108), and the Secretary of Agriculture administratively created an inspector general (IG) in 1962. These two IGs have been described as early prototypes for modern-day IGs. For more information on the history of IGs, see Paul Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability (Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 23-43.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources, Establishment of Offices of Inspectors General, hearings on H.R. 2819 and H.R. 4184, 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 24; June 1, 7, 13, 21, 29; and July 25, 27, pp. 478-728.
P.L. 94-505, §401(h).
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Prevention and Detection of Fraud and Program Abuse), Tenth Report, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., January 26, 1976, H.Rept. 94-786.
H.Rept. 94-786, p. 11.
H.Rept. 94-786.
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, report to accompany H.R. 15390, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 94-1573.
P.L. 95-91, §208.
P.L. 95-452. The IG Act, as amended, is listed in 5 U.S.C. §§401 et seq., https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title5/part1/chapter4&edition=prelim.
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, report to accompany H.R. 8588, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., August 8, 1978, S.Rept. 95-1071, p. 7.
Federal "establishments" consist of Cabinet-level departments and larger agencies in the executive branch. Establishment IGs are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This included the establishment, by statute, of an IG for the Department of Agriculture. The State Department's "IG and controller" was brought into the framework of the IG Act in 1980.
Affiliated federal entity refers to an entity within the scope of an IG's jurisdiction. For example, the Department of Homeland Security and its components are considered an "affiliated federal entity" of the department's IG.
5 U.S.C. §402.
In addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 vested certain offices of inspectors general (OIGs) with law enforcement authorities, including the power to (1) carry a firearm; (2) make arrests without a warrant; and (3) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence. See Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), §812; 5 U.S.C. §406(f).
DFEs consist primarily of smaller entities, such as commissions, boards, and government-sponsored enterprises (e.g., National Science Foundation and Legal Services Corporation). DFE IGs are appointed by the affiliated entity heads.
The CMPPA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §552a. For more information on the CMPPA, see CRS Report R47325, Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act: Data Integration and Individual Rights, by Natalie R. Ortiz.
See 5 U.S.C. §406(j).
The types do not include IGs for certain U.S. Armed Forces—the Army, Air Force, and Navy. (The Department of Homeland Security IG oversees the U.S. Coast Guard.) While these service branch IGs are required by statute, they are distinct from IGs under the IG Act and related provisions and are not generally considered among the "statutory IGs," including in this report. The position of IG in the uniformed services has its own history distinct from that of the more modern statutory IGs discussed in this report. Additionally, the categories do not include non-statutory IGs. For example, the House of Representatives IG is authorized pursuant to House Rule II, clause 8. See CRS In Focus IF11024, Office of the House of Representatives Inspector General, by Jacob R. Straus.
Special IGs that recently wound down their operations include the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP).
This number does not reflect statutory IG positions that have been abolished.
The exact position and role of the USAID OIG remains uncertain pending potential congressional action on the administration of foreign assistance programs. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2026, Congress continued to fund the USAID OIG and reiterated its statutory jurisdiction. See USAID OIG, "Oversight Plan, FY 2026-FY 2027, 2026, https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2026-05/USAID%20IG%20FY%20%E2%80%9826-27%20oversight%20plan_0.pdf.
A recent example of legislation that established such an arrangement is the Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-108), which abolished the OIG for the Postal Regulatory Commission and reorganized its functions into the existing OIG for the U.S. Postal Service. See CRS Insight IN11685, Changes to Postal Regulatory Commission Administration in the Postal Service Reform Act of 2022, by Ben Wilhelm.
P.L. 112-55, Division B, Title IV, 125 Stat. 628; P.L. 113-6, Division B, Title IV, 128 Stat. 266; Government Accountability Office (GAO) OIG, Semiannual Report: April 1, 2014-September 30, 2014, OIG-15-1SP, October 2014, p. 5, https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667257.pdf.
P.L. 113-76, Division L, Title I; 128 Stat. 600. It is unclear whether the IG has overseen MWAA beyond FY2015.
OIG audits can be divided into two subcategories: performance and financial. Financial audits are beyond the scope of this report.
OIG investigations can be divided into two subcategories: criminal and administrative. IGs also perform other types of reviews outside of these three categories. For example, the U.S. Postal Service IG periodically issues white papers on certain topics, which are accessible at https://www.uspsoig.gov/reports?field_publication_date=&field_publication_date_1=&report_type%5B10%5D=10.
5 U.S.C. §404(ab)(1). For these audit standards see GAO, Government Auditing Standards (aka Yellow Book), https://www.gao.gov/yellowbook/overview.
CIGIE, Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (aka Blue Book), December 2020, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/QualityStandardsforInspectionandEvaluation-2020.pdf; and CIGIE, Quality Standards for Investigations, November 15, 2011, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/invprg1211appi.pdf.
GAO, Inspectors General: Activities of the Department of State Office of Inspector General, GAO-07-138, March 2007, p. 19, https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/258069.pdf.
GAO, Government Auditing Standards: 2018 Revision, GAO-18-568G, July 2018, pp. 89-91, https://www.gao.gov/assets/files.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-568g.pdf.
CIGIE, Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, December 2020, p. 8.
GAO's Yellow Book identifies and defines four categories of performance audit objectives: (1) program effectiveness and results, (2) internal control, (3) compliance, and (4) prospective analysis. The Yellow Book further states that these objectives can be pursued simultaneously within a single audit. See GAO, Government Auditing Standards: 2018 Revision, GAO-18-568G, July 2018, pp. 10-14, https://www.gao.gov/assets/files.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-568g.pdf.
VA OIG, Veterans Health Administration: Audit of Veteran Wait Time Data, Choice Access, and Consult Management in VISN 6, March 2, 2017, https://www.vaoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2017-03/VAOIG-16-02618-424.pdf.
VA OIG, Healthcare Inspection – Follow-Up of Scheduling, Staffing, and Quality of Care Concerns at the Alaska VA Healthcare System, Anchorage, Alaska, March 9, 2017, https://www.oversight.gov/reports/healthcare-inspection-follow-scheduling-staffing-and-quality-care-concerns-alaska-va.
VA OIG, Administrative Summary of Investigation by the VA Office of Inspector General in Response to Allegations Regarding Patient Wait Times: VA Medical Center in Salisbury, North Carolina, October 4, 2016, https://www.vaoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2016-10/wait-times-14-02890-255.pdf.
Where possible, the subsections provide examples of instances in which IGs have elected to comply with a nonmandatory provision.
Although an argument can be made that the incorporation by reference includes subsequent amendments to the referenced statute, it would also appear that traditional canons of statutory interpretation may suggest that the proper construction of the authorizing statutes is that they incorporate only the text of the referenced provisions as they existed at the time the applicable authorizing statute was adopted. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938), wherein the Supreme Court stated, "Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily into the adopting statute. … Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption, and does not include subsequent additions or modifications by the statute so taken unless it does so by express intent." Legal interpretation of the treatment of provisions incorporated by reference are beyond the scope of this report.
This assessment is required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-283; 44 U.S.C. §3555).
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) OIG, Audit of NARA's Oversight of Selected Grantees' Use of Grant Funds, February 16, 2011, https://www.archives.gov/files/oig/pdf/2011/audit-report-11-03.pdf.
See, for example, SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, September 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo121786/pdf/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo121786.pdf.
DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force, January 4, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jan/29/2001870851/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-058-REDACTED.PDF.
5 U.S.C. §403(a) and §415(c) (establishment and DFE IGs); 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(1)(a) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1) (USCP IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(1)(a) (LOC IG); 41 U.S.C. §3902(a) (GPO IG); 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(1) (GAO IG). The CIA IG must also be selected "on the basis of compliance with security standards of [the CIA] and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence" (50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(1)).
2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(1)(A) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(1) (USCP IG). For a summary of appointment methods for the five legislative branch IGs, see CRS Insight IN11763, Appointment Methods for Legislative Branch Inspectors General, by Ben Wilhelm.
5 U.S.C. §403(b) (establishment IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(c)(4) (IC IG); 50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(6) (CIA IG). Past special IGs have also been removable by the President.
5 U.S.C. §415(e) (DFE IGs); 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(2) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3) (USCP IG); 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(2) (GAO IG); 44 U.S.C. §3902(b) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(2) (LOC IG).
5 U.S.C. §415(e)(1).
39 U.S.C. §202(e).
2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3).
See 5 U.S.C. §403(b)(1)(B).
2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(2) (AOC IG); 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(2) (GAO IG); 44 U.S.C. §3902(b) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(2) (LOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3) (USCP IG).
5 U.S.C. §404(h)(2). If no "first assistant to the position of Inspector General" has been designated, then the Principal Deputy Inspector General of the OIG assumes the duties of the IG. 2 U.S.C. §1808(c)(2) (AOC IG); 31 U.S.C. §705(b)(2) (GAO IG); 44 U.S.C. §3902(b) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(c)(2) (LOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(3) (USCP IG).
5 U.S.C. §403(h)(2)(C).
5 U.S.C. §403(h)(2)(C).
39 U.S.C. §202(e)(2)(a).
2 U.S.C. §1909(b)(2).
5 U.S.C. §§406(g) and 415(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(n) (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517(f)(2) (CIA IG).
Congress has appropriated funds directly to CIGIE's Inspector General Council Fund for specific purposes. For instance, Congress has provided funding in recent years to support the oversight.gov website. See, for example, Division D, Section 633 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-6) appropriating $2 million to the Inspector General Council Fund.
5 U.S.C. §§406(g) and 415(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(n) (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517(f)(2) (CIA IG).
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Undermining Independent Oversight, minority staff report, no date [released August 15, 2018], p. 2, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20180816170616/https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REPORT-Undermining%20Independent%20Oversight-The%20President's%20Fiscal%20Year%202019%20Budget%20Does%20Not%20Adequately%20Support%20Federal%20Inspectors%20General.pdf.
Authorizing statutes for the USCP, LOC, and GAO IGs do not incorporate the provision in Section 6 that contains these budgetary requirements, nor do they include language establishing similar requirements. See 2 U.S.C. §1909(d)(1) (USCP IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG).
Authorizing statutes for special IGs and the AOC and GPO IGs incorporate portions of Section 6 of the IG Act. However, it is unclear whether this incorporation extends the requirements to those IGs. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG) and 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG); 12 U.S.C. §5231(d)(1) (SIGTARP); and 5 U.S.C. §415 note (SIGAR).
31 U.S.C. §705(f)(2).
See, for example, SIGTARP, Congressional Budget Justification and Annual Performance Plan and Report: FY 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/09.-SIGTARP-FY-2022-CJ.pdf, and LOC Fiscal 2022 Budget Justification, p. 105, https://www.loc.gov/static/portals/about/reports-and-budgets/documents/budgets/fy2022.pdf#page=109.
31 U.S.C. §1105(a)(25); 50 U.S.C. §3517(f)(1) (CIA IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033(m) (IC IG).
For more information on reprogramming and transfers, see CRS Report R43098, Transfer and Reprogramming of Appropriations: An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and Procedures, by Michelle D. Christensen; and CRS Report R47019, The Executive Budget Process: An Overview, by Dominick A. Fiorentino and Taylor N. Riccard.
For example, appropriations committees may choose to allocate funding to an IG in ways that would require advance notification of any attempt by an affiliated entity head to reprogram funds away from the IG to another purpose.
For example, the President's FY2022 budget submission included a separate account for SIGTARP. See U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2022: Appendix, pp. 1025-1026, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2022-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2022-APP.pdf.
Federal laws sometimes assign one-time or periodic reporting requirements on a specific policy area or subject. These requirements are beyond the scope of this report.
5 U.S.C. §405(a)(10).
5 U.S.C. §405(b).
Authorizing statutes for other permanent IGs in the legislative branch (except the GAO IG) incorporate portions of Section 5 of the IG Act, which require IGs to issue semiannual reports. However, it is unclear whether this incorporation extends all elements of the semiannual report required by the IG Act to these IGs. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. §1909(c)(2) (USCP IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG). Authorizing statutes for the GAO IG and other permanent IGs in the executive branch do not incorporate Section 5 but establish separate semiannual reporting requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §705(e) (GAO IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(1) (IC IG); 50 U.S.C. §3517(d)(1) (CIA IG).
50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(1)(b)(v). A similar requirement applies to the CIA IG. See 50 U.S.C. §3517(d)(1)(D).
12 U.S.C. §5231(i)(1) (SIGTARP); 5 U.S.C. §415 note (SIGAR); and 15 U.S.C. §9053(f)(1) (SIGPR).
5 U.S.C. §§405(d) and 415(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(2) (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517(d)(2) (CIA IG). Authorizing statutes for the AOC, LOC, and GPO IGs clearly incorporate portions of Section 5 of the IG Act pertaining to the seven-day letter. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. 185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG).
Authorizing statutes for the USCP and GAO IGs do not incorporate portions of Section 5 of the IG Act requiring the seven-day letter, nor do they establish similar requirements. See 2 U.S.C. §1909 (USCP IG) and 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG).
31 U.S.C. §3516(d). In this context, executive branch agency is defined as a "department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch of the United States Government," but it excludes government corporations defined in 31 U.S.C. §9101. See 31 U.S.C. §102 and 31 U.S.C. §3501.
31 U.S.C. §3516(d). 31 U.S.C. §9101 lists each "Government corporation" that is exempt from issuing TMPCs.
See, for example, Architect of the Capitol Office of Inspector General, Fiscal Year 2025 Statement of Management Opportunities and Performance Challenges, January 20, 2026, https://www.oversight.gov/reports/fiscal-year-2025-statement-management-opportunities-and-performance-challenges.
CIGIE, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Multiple Federal Agencies, February 2021, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/TMPC_report_02022021.pdf.
5 U.S.C. §405(c).
5 U.S.C. §420(b).
5 U.S.C. §404(e)(1)(C).
CIGIE, "Open Recommendations," https://www.oversight.gov/reports/recommendations.
Authorizing statutes for the AOC, GPO, LOC, and UCSP IGs clearly incorporate portions of Section 5 pertaining to public availability of semiannual reports. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 2 U.S.C. §1909(c) (USCP IG).
Authorizing statutes for the GAO, CIA, and IC IGs do not incorporate Section 5 of the IG Act, nor do they establish similar requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033 (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517 (CIA IG).
The authorizing statutes for the AOC, CIA, IC, GAO, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs do not incorporate Section 8M of the IG Act, nor do they establish similar requirements. See 2 U.S.C. §1808 (AOC IG); 50 U.S.C. §3517 (CIA IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033 (IC IG); 44 U.S.C. §3903 (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185 (LOC IG); and 2 U.S.C. §1909 (USCP IG).
Authorizing statutes for the GAO, CIA, and IC IGs do not incorporate Section 4 of the IG Act, nor do they establish similar requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §705 (GAO IG); 50 U.S.C. §3033 (IC IG); and 50 U.S.C. §3517 (CIA IG).
The authorizing statutes for the AOC, GPO, LOC, and USCP IGs incorporate portions of Section 4 of the IG Act. However, whether such incorporation extends requirements for documents with recommendations to be posted on OIG websites to these IGs is unclear. See 2 U.S.C. §1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 44 U.S.C. §3903(a) (GPO IG); 2 U.S.C. §185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 2 U.S.C. §1909(c) (USCP IG).
USCP OIG, "The Office of the Inspector General," https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/office-inspector-general.
CIGIE, "CIGIE Launches Oversight.gov: IGs Found More Than $25 Billion in Potential Cost Savings in FY 2017, New Website Shows," October 2, 2017, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIE%20Announces%20Official%20Launch%20of%20Oversight_gov_10_02_17_Final.pdf. For more information on the website, see "About Oversight.gov," https://www.oversight.gov/about/oversightgov. Many OIG websites have more complete libraries of older reports than oversight.gov does. While it now appears that all IGs post most or all public reports to oversight.gov, it is possible that some reports are not available on the site.
P.L. 116-260 §501 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021), codified at 5 U.S.C. §424(e). Congress has also provided appropriations specifically to support oversight.gov, including $850,000 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328).
See Executive Order 12805 of May 11, 1992, "Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs," 57 Federal Register 20627, May 14, 1992; and Executive Order 12301 of March 26, 1981, "Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs," 46 Federal Register 19211, March 30, 1981.
5 U.S.C. §§424(b)(1) and 424(b)(2).
5 U.S.C. §424(a).
5 U.S.C. §424(c).
5 U.S.C. §424(c)(1)(E).
5 U.S.C. §424(c)(1)(E). See also CIGIE, "CIGIE Training Institute," https://www.ignet.gov/content/cigie-training-institute.
See, for example, CIGIE, "Manuals & Guides," https://ignet.gov/content/manuals-guides.
See, for example, CIGIE, "IG Peer Reviews," https://www.ignet.gov/content/ig-peer-reviews.
5 U.S.C. §424(d). The committee is composed of six members—four IGs on CIGIE, the FBI representative on the council, and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. The committee chairperson is elected to a two-year term by the members of the committee.
5 U.S.C. §424(c)(1)(F).
For more information on the panel, see, for example, GAO, Inspectors General: Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their Impact, GAO-18-270, March 2018, p. 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690561.pdf.
CIGIE, "Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Multiple Federal Agencies," https://www.ignet.gov/content/top-challenges.
5 U.S.C. §424(c)(3)(A)(ii); CIGIE, "Charter," https://www.ignet.gov/content/charter; CIGIE, Fiscal Year 2018: Agency Financial Report, November 14, 2018, pp. 32-33, https://ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIE_2018_Agency_Financial_Report.pdf; and CRS email communication with CIGIE on December 13, 2018.
A past example of a statutory coordinating body is the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, which consisted of federal IGs and was tasked with overseeing funds covered under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. For more information, see CRS Report R40572, General Oversight Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Requirements and Related Issues, by Clinton T. Brass.
P.L. 112-239, §848; listed in 5 U.S.C. §419.
P.L. 111-203, §989E; listed in 5 U.S.C. §424 note.
CIGFO, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing Financial Regulatory Organizations, September 2018, https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/Audit_Reports_and_Testimonies/CIGFO%20TMPC%20Final%20Report%202019.pub.pdf.
P.L. 116-136 §15010; listed in 5 U.S.C. §424 note.
P.L. 116-136 §15010; listed in 5 U.S.C. §424 note.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations, Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs, hearing, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., January 13, 2026.
Congress and other stakeholders have held events to commemorate the 20th, 25th, and 40th anniversaries of the IG Act. These events have included discussions of many of the issues described in this section. See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Inspector General Act: 20 Years Later, hearing, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., September 9, 1998, S.Hrg. 105-737; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, 25th Anniversary of the Inspector General Act—Where Do We Go from Here?, hearing, 108th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2003, Serial No. 108-110; and CIGIE, "Building on 40 Years of Excellence in Independent Oversight," 2018, https://www.ignet.gov/2018-commemoration.
See, for example, 5 U.S.C. §§403(b), 406(a)(7), and 406(g).
GAO, Inspectors General: Allegations About the Independence of the Former VA Inspector General, GAO/AMFD-89-46, March 1989, p. 3, http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/211076.pdf.
CIGIE, Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General, August 2012, pp. 10 and 12-13, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdf.
Jaron León and Chris Piper, "Oversight Diminished: Federal Watchdogs Are Conducting Less Oversight as Their Staffs Shrink," Partnership for Public Service, July 29, 2026, https://ourpublicservice.org/know-the-facts/resource-library/publications/trump-inspector-general-oig-conducting-less-oversight-staff-shrink.
5 U.S.C. §403(a); 5 U.S.C. §404(a)(5).
See the section "Is the Role of IGs Evolving?"
See Sean Michael Newhouse, "Federal Oversight Faces 'Structural Conflict' as Political Appointees Enter IG Offices," Government Executive, June 1, 2026, https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2026/06/federal-oversight-conflict-political-appointees-ig/413888/.
Currently, there are no IGs appointed by the President without the advice and consent of the Senate, but there have been in the past, and Congress may create such a position in the future.
See CRS In Focus IF11546, Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress, by Ben Wilhelm; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10476, Presidential Removal of IGs Under the Inspector General Act, by Todd Garvey. For additional discussion of potential options for Congress to alter IG removal methods, see CRS Report R46762, Congress's Authority to Limit the Removal of Inspectors General, by Todd Garvey; and CRS In Focus IF11698, Legislative Proposals Related to the Removal of Inspectors General in the 116th Congress, by Ben Wilhelm.
Title LII, Subtitle A. President Biden removed the Inspector General of the Railroad Retirement Board in 2024 under these new requirements. See CRS Insight IN12363, Removal of Inspectors General: The First Tests of New Statutory Requirements, by Ben Wilhelm.
David Nakamura, "Trump Defends Ousting at Least 15 Independent Inspectors General in Late-Night Purge," Washington Post, January 25, 2025.
See, for example, Jory Heckman, "Judge Finds Trump Unlawfully Fired Agency IGs, but Won't Reinstate Them," Federal News Network, September 24, 2025, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/agency-oversight/2025/09/trump-unlawfully-fired-17-agency-igs-judge-finds-but-wont-reinstate-them/.
GAO, Inspectors General: Independent Oversight of Financial Regulatory Agencies, GAO-09-524T, March 25, 2009, pp. 3-4, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09524t.pdf.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, The Roles and Responsibilities of Inspectors General Within Financial Regulatory Agencies, hearing, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 2009, Serial No. 111-49, pp. 34, 46, 49, 53, and 70; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, "Politicization of Inspectors General," minority staff report, October 21, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20050724160427/http://reform.democrats.house.gov/story.asp?id=726. It is not clear how the recent Supreme Court ruling in Trump v. Slaughter might affect Congress's options regarding the appointment and removal of IGs. For discussion of the potential implications of the decision, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11448, Trump v. Slaughter and the Future of For-Cause Removal Protections, by Benjamin M. Barczewski, Todd Garvey, and Jonathan M. Gaffney.
See, for example, GAO, Highlights of the Comptroller General's Panel on Federal Oversight and The Inspectors General, GAO-06-931SP, September 2006, pp. 2 and 5, https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202958.pdf.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, Inspectors General: Independence and Integrity, hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., June 20, 2007, Serial No. 110-48, pp. 13, 34, and 105; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation's Inspectors General, hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 2007, S.Hrg. 110-587, pp. 134-139.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Watchdogs Needed: Top Government Investigator Positions Left Unfilled for Years, hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 3, 2015, S.Hrg. 114-486, pp. 2, 5, 8-10, 14, 16, 18-19, 23, 25, and 32.
For real-time information on IG vacancies, see Oversight.gov, "Inspector General Vacancies," https://www.oversight.gov/about/inspectors-general-vacancies.
S.Hrg. 114-486, pp. 9, 16, and 45-47; GAO, Inspectors General: Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their Impact, GAO-18-270, March 2018, pp. 27-41, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690561.pdf.
Letter from Micheal E. Horowitz, CIGIE chair, and Allison C. Lerner, CIGIE vice chair, to Sen. Mitch McConnell and Sen. Harry Reid, November 7, 2016, p. 2, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIE_Senate_Letter_IG_Vacancies_07Nov16%20(1).pdf.
GAO, Inspectors General: Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their Impact, GAO-18-270, March 2018, pp. 28-41, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690561.pdf.
See, for example, Sean Michael Newhouse, "Inspector General Group Would be Axed Under New House GOP Bill," GovExec, July 22, 2026, https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2026/07/inspector-general-group-would-be-axed-under-new-house-gop-bill/414923/.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Subcommittee on Government Operations and the Federal Workforce, Oversight of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., July 23, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC73107/text.
GAO, Inspectors General Integrity Committee: Strengthened Oversight and Policy Needed to Ensure Consistent Investigations, GAO-26-107922, May 2026, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107922.pdf.
See, for example, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026; 140 Stat. 173, p. 467.
See, for example, letter from Joaquin Ferrao, chair, CIGIE Legislation Committee, to Jason Miller, Executive Chair, CIGIE, February 22, 2023, https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIELegislativePriorities118thCongress.pdf.
See letter from Sen. Susan Collins and Sen. Chuck Grassley to Russell Vought, director of OMB, September 29, 2025, https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/collins_grassley_to_omb_-_cigie_prac.pdf.
See Sean Michael Newhouse and Natalie Alms, "Trump Administration Resumes Funding for Inspectors General Hub After Previously Blocking It," Government Executive, November 18, 2025, https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2025/11/trump-administration-resumes-funding-inspectors-general-hub-after-previously-blocking-it/409615/.
See, for example, Bipartisan Policy Center, Oversight Matters, p. 17.
Partnership for Public Service, The Forward-Looking Inspector General, November 4, 2017, p. 2.
U.S. Department of Labor OIG, Job Corps Could Not Demonstrate Beneficial Job Training Outcomes, March 30, 2018, https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2018/04-18-001-03-370.pdf.
POGO, Inspectors General: Accountability Is a Balancing Act, pp. 43-45.
5 U.S.C. §402(b)(2)(B).
See CRS Report R47593, Pandemic Oversight: The Biden Administration's New Anti-Fraud Proposal, coordinated by Ben Wilhelm, pp. 12-13 (regarding Biden Era "gold standard meetings" involving OMB, OIGs, and agencies) and Executive Order 14395 of March 19, 2026, "Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud," 91 Federal Register 13485, March 19, 2026 (establishing an anti-fraud task force involving a range of Administration officials, including IGs).
See footnote 39.