U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
September 27October 4, 2023 , 2023
the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
Peter J. Meyer
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
Specialist in Latin
Specialist in Latin
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
American and Canadian
American and Canadian
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Affairs
Affairs
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since
the 1990s. Over the past decade, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region
the 1990s. Over the past decade, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region
have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combating have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combating
drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening
drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening
security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated resources to programs intended to combat security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated resources to programs intended to combat
HIV/AIDS and foster stability in Haiti, address security concerns in the Caribbean, and respond to the political and HIV/AIDS and foster stability in Haiti, address security concerns in the Caribbean, and respond to the political and
humanitarian crises in Venezuela and their impact on the broader region. Since 2020, U.S. policymakers have taken steps to humanitarian crises in Venezuela and their impact on the broader region. Since 2020, U.S. policymakers have taken steps to
adjust U.S. assistance efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and its secondary socioeconomic effects in Latin adjust U.S. assistance efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and its secondary socioeconomic effects in Latin
America and the Caribbean. America and the Caribbean.
FY2024 Budget Request
The Biden Administration requested nearly $2.5 billion in foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024 The Biden Administration requested nearly $2.5 billion in foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024
under accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That total is under accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That total is
$366.2 million (17.4%) above the amount allocated for the region in FY2022, including supplemental appropriations. The $366.2 million (17.4%) above the amount allocated for the region in FY2022, including supplemental appropriations. The
Administration’s FY2024 budget request also included $52.0 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—a small, Administration’s FY2024 budget request also included $52.0 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—a small,
independent U.S. government agency that supports grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean. independent U.S. government agency that supports grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Stemming irregular migration remains a top Administration priority in the region. The Administration requested $945.8
Stemming irregular migration remains a top Administration priority in the region. The Administration requested $945.8
million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America—million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America—
$240.9 million (34.2%) more than the FY2022 allocation for Central America. The Administration also requested $51.4 $240.9 million (34.2%) more than the FY2022 allocation for Central America. The Administration also requested $51.4
million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund intended to support migration management throughout Latin million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund intended to support migration management throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean. In August 2023, the Administration requested an additional $782.0 million of emergency America and the Caribbean. In August 2023, the Administration requested an additional $782.0 million of emergency
supplemental foreign assistance to respond to irregular migration in the region. supplemental foreign assistance to respond to irregular migration in the region.
Among other regional priorities in FY2024, the Administration requested $444.0 million for Colombia to support
Among other regional priorities in FY2024, the Administration requested $444.0 million for Colombia to support
counternarcotics efforts, peace accord implementation, and the integration of Venezuelan migrants; $291.5 million for Haiti counternarcotics efforts, peace accord implementation, and the integration of Venezuelan migrants; $291.5 million for Haiti
to restore democratic institutions, improve security, and address health and economic challenges; $111.4 million for Mexico to restore democratic institutions, improve security, and address health and economic challenges; $111.4 million for Mexico
to strengthen the rule of law and combat illicit drugs; and $64.5 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). to strengthen the rule of law and combat illicit drugs; and $64.5 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
Legislative Developments
As of As of
September 26,early October 2023, Congress has not concluded action on FY2024 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 2023, Congress has not concluded action on FY2024 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. The House Appropriations Committee reported its FY2024 SFOPS bill (H.R. Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. The House Appropriations Committee reported its FY2024 SFOPS bill (H.R.
4665/H.Rept. 118-146) on July 17, 2023, and the 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) on July 17, 2023, and the
bill was passed by the House on September 28, 2023. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a separate SFOPS bill (S. Senate Appropriations Committee reported a separate SFOPS bill (S.
2438/S.Rept. 118-71) on July 20, 2023.2438/S.Rept. 118-71) on July 20, 2023.
Congress may draw from those bills Congress has not taken further action on either bill. It passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 118-15) on September 30, 2022, that largely funds foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2023 level until November 17, 2023.
Congress may draw from H.R. 4665 and S. 2438 as it considers final FY2024 appropriations. Both measures would direct funding levels as it considers final FY2024 appropriations. Both measures would direct funding levels
and/or restrictions for certain programs in Latin America and the Caribbean; other programs would be left for allocation by and/or restrictions for certain programs in Latin America and the Caribbean; other programs would be left for allocation by
the Administration, subject to overall enacted appropriations levels. Both bills would provide more funding than the the Administration, subject to overall enacted appropriations levels. Both bills would provide more funding than the
Administration requested for the CBSI. The measures diverge significantly on Colombia; S. 2438 would provide more Administration requested for the CBSI. The measures diverge significantly on Colombia; S. 2438 would provide more
assistance than the Administration requested, and H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146 would assistance than the Administration requested, and H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146 would
defer consideration of fundingnot specify a funding level for for
Colombia due to concerns about the Colombian government’s policies. Colombia due to concerns about the Colombian government’s policies.
In addition to determining aid levels and objectives for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024, Members of the 118th
In addition to determining aid levels and objectives for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024, Members of the 118th
Congress could consider authorization legislation or use their various oversight mechanisms to help guide U.S. foreign Congress could consider authorization legislation or use their various oversight mechanisms to help guide U.S. foreign
assistance policy in the region. assistance policy in the region.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean ...................................................... 2
Biden Administration’s FY2024 Foreign Assistance Budget Request ............................................ 4
Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts ................................................................. 5
Major Country and Regional Initiatives .................................................................................... 7
Inter-American Foundation ...................................................................................................... 11
Emergency Supplemental Request ........................................................................................... 11
Legislative Developments ............................................................................................................. 12
Options for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 15
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean ........................................................................ 1
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2021 ......................... 3
Tables
Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean by Account: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request ............................................... 6
Table 2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request ............ 9
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation Appropriations: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request ............... 11
Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives:
FY2024 Appropriations Legislation ........................................................................................... 13
Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: FY2022 Actual ............................................................................................ 17
Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: FY2024 Request .......................................................................................... 18
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and
by Country or Regional Program: FY2022 Actual and FY2024 Request .................................. 17
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
Introduction
Foreign assistance (also referred to as Foreign assistance (also referred to as
foreign aid in this report) is one of the tools the United in this report) is one of the tools the United
States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.1 States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.1
Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of countries in the region, as well as the broad Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of countries in the region, as well as the broad
range of these countries’ ties to the United States (range of these countries’ ties to the United States (
seesee Figure 1 for a map of Latin America and for a map of Latin America and
the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political, the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political,
socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating
democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive
traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared
security challenges, such as transnational crime. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign security challenges, such as transnational crime. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign
assistance funds for Latin America and the Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and assistance funds for Latin America and the Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and
the executive branch agencies that allocate, program, and administer them. the executive branch agencies that allocate, program, and administer them.
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
1 For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213,
1 For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213,
Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S.
Programs and Policy, by Emily M. McCabe and Nick M. Brown. , by Emily M. McCabe and Nick M. Brown.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
assesses trends in aid to the region; analyzes the Biden Administration’s FY2024 base and assesses trends in aid to the region; analyzes the Biden Administration’s FY2024 base and
supplemental budget requests for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for supplemental budget requests for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and examines International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and examines
congressional action on FY2024 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs congressional action on FY2024 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
(SFOPS) appropriations. (SFOPS) appropriations.
TheThe Appendix provides detailed aid allocations by foreign assistance provides detailed aid allocations by foreign assistance
account and country or regional program for FY2022 and the FY2024 request (FY2023 account and country or regional program for FY2022 and the FY2024 request (FY2023
allocations are not yet publicly available). allocations are not yet publicly available).
Report Notes
To compare the Biden Administration’s FY2024 foreign assistance request with previous years’ appropriations,
To compare the Biden Administration’s FY2024 foreign assistance request with previous years’ appropriations,
most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State Department or the most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State Department or the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries or regional U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries or regional
programs. The foreign assistance accounts examined in this report accounted for 60.3% of the total aid obligated programs. The foreign assistance accounts examined in this report accounted for 60.3% of the total aid obligated
by all U.S. agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2021 (the most recent year for which comprehensive by all U.S. agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2021 (the most recent year for which comprehensive
data are available). data are available).
Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign
assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and
Refugee Assistance. Some countries also receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of Refugee Assistance. Some countries also receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of
Defense, Defense,
Mil enniumMillennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, and International Development Finance Corporation, Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, and International Development Finance Corporation,
or from multilateral organizations that the United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American or from multilateral organizations that the United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American
States, Inter-American Development Bank, and Pan American Health Organization. This report examines some of States, Inter-American Development Bank, and Pan American Health Organization. This report examines some of
these assistance sources briefly but otherwise excludes them from the analysis due to data inconsistencies. these assistance sources briefly but otherwise excludes them from the analysis due to data inconsistencies.
Source: ForeignAssistance.gov. ForeignAssistance.gov.
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2021, the United States provided $100.4 America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2021, the United States provided $100.4
billion ($209.9 billion in constant 2021 dollars) of assistance to the region.2 U.S. assistance billion ($209.9 billion in constant 2021 dollars) of assistance to the region.2 U.S. assistance
spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for
Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in Latin Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in Latin
America and the Caribbean in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. America and the Caribbean in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba.
After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979
assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United
States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist
insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in
the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Central American civil conflicts (seUnion and the end of the Central American civil conflicts (se
e Figure 2).
2 These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and
2 These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and
Caribbean countries (identified inCaribbean countries (identified in
Figure 1) and regional programs. The Department of Defense has not yet reported its and regional programs. The Department of Defense has not yet reported its
final assistance obligations for FY2020 or FY2021. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. final assistance obligations for FY2020 or FY2021. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S.
Department of State, at https://foreignassistance.gov/. Department of State, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
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Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2021
(obligations in constant 2021 dollars)
(obligations in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: CRS Graphics, using data from ForeignAssistance.gov. CRS Graphics, using data from ForeignAssistance.gov.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies, adjusted for inflation. Comprehensive data for Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies, adjusted for inflation. Comprehensive data for
FY2022 and FY2023 are not yet available. FY2022 and FY2023 are not yet available.
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of
assistance were partially due to increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance. assistance were partially due to increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation
in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance.3 In in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance.3 In
addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive
earthquake in 2010. earthquake in 2010.
Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive
Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its
Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed
conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined
with his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of with his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of
U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010,
Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida
Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a
similar program for the countries of the Caribbean, known as the Caribbean Basin Security similar program for the countries of the Caribbean, known as the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI). Initiative (CBSI).
U.S. foreign assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean have shifted over the past
U.S. foreign assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean have shifted over the past
decade to respond to periods of development progress in the region as well as subsequent decade to respond to periods of development progress in the region as well as subsequent
3 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
3 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
see CRS In Focus IF10797, see CRS In Focus IF10797,
PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther; , by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther;
and CRS Report RL32427, and CRS Report RL32427,
Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown. , by Nick M. Brown.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
setbacks. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America
setbacks. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America
decreased from 45.3% to 30.4%, largely due to stronger economic growth and the implementation decreased from 45.3% to 30.4%, largely due to stronger economic growth and the implementation
of more effective social policies.4 Health and education indicators also improved significantly of more effective social policies.4 Health and education indicators also improved significantly
during that period. In 2019, the World Bank classified most Latin American and Caribbean during that period. In 2019, the World Bank classified most Latin American and Caribbean
countries as “upper middle income” and a few as “high income” economies.5 Some countries, countries as “upper middle income” and a few as “high income” economies.5 Some countries,
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to
others in the region based on their own development experiences. Although overall U.S. others in the region based on their own development experiences. Although overall U.S.
assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean remained fairly stable, the U.S. government assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean remained fairly stable, the U.S. government
concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to the changes in the region. concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to the changes in the region.
In the past few years, U.S. assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean have expanded
In the past few years, U.S. assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean have expanded
as many countries in the region have seen setbacks in long-term development and new challenges as many countries in the region have seen setbacks in long-term development and new challenges
have emerged.6 Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin American and have emerged.6 Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin American and
Caribbean countries around 2015 amid a decline in global commodity prices. These conditions Caribbean countries around 2015 amid a decline in global commodity prices. These conditions
deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic swept away more than a decade of deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic swept away more than a decade of
development gains.7 Political conditions also have deteriorated as governments in Venezuela and development gains.7 Political conditions also have deteriorated as governments in Venezuela and
Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule, Haiti has been unable to reestablish an elected Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule, Haiti has been unable to reestablish an elected
government since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and widespread corruption government since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and widespread corruption
and violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere in the region. These challenges and violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere in the region. These challenges
have contributed to political unrest and large-scale migration flows throughout Latin America and have contributed to political unrest and large-scale migration flows throughout Latin America and
the Caribbean.8 the Caribbean.8
Biden Administration’s FY2024 Foreign Assistance
Budget Request9
For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested nearly $2.5 billion of foreign assistance for For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested nearly $2.5 billion of foreign assistance for
Latin America and the Caribbean under accounts managed by the State Department and USAID. Latin America and the Caribbean under accounts managed by the State Department and USAID.
That total is $366.2 million (17.4%) above the total amount allocated for the region in FY2022, That total is $366.2 million (17.4%) above the total amount allocated for the region in FY2022,
including supplemental appropriations (including supplemental appropriations (
seesee Table 1; FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly
available). The Administration also requested $52.0 million for the IAF, a small, independent U.S. available). The Administration also requested $52.0 million for the IAF, a small, independent U.S.
government agency that supports grassroots development in the region (seegovernment agency that supports grassroots development in the region (see
“Inter-American
Foundation”). In August 2023, the Administration requested an additional $782.0 million of . In August 2023, the Administration requested an additional $782.0 million of
emergency supplemental foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean intended to emergency supplemental foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean intended to
address irregular migration (seeaddress irregular migration (see
“Emergency Supplemental Request”). .
4 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
4 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
Social Panorama of Latin America and
the Caribbean 2022, November 24, 2022, p. 19. , November 24, 2022, p. 19.
5 World Bank, “The World by Income and Region,” at https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/
5 World Bank, “The World by Income and Region,” at https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/
the-world-by-income-and-region.html. the-world-by-income-and-region.html.
6 For more information on recent challenges in the region, see CRS Insight IN12092,
6 For more information on recent challenges in the region, see CRS Insight IN12092,
Latin America and the
Caribbean: Issues for the 118th Congress, by Peter J. Meyer. , by Peter J. Meyer.
7 ECLAC,
7 ECLAC,
Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022. , January 2022.
8 See, for example, Moisés Naím, “Why Hard-Liners Are Gaining Steam in Latin America,” 8 See, for example, Moisés Naím, “Why Hard-Liners Are Gaining Steam in Latin America,”
Politico Magazine, July , July
12, 2022; and Michael Stott, “Repression and Poverty Trigger Record Migration in the Americas,” 12, 2022; and Michael Stott, “Repression and Poverty Trigger Record Migration in the Americas,”
Financial Times, ,
September 11, 2022. September 11, 2022.
9 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State,
9 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State,
Congressional
Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024, April 2023; and U.S. Department of State, , April 2023; and U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary
Tables, Fiscal Year 2024, April 2023., April 2023.
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Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts10
The Administration’s FY2024 foreign aid budget proposal requested $970.7 million (39.3% of the The Administration’s FY2024 foreign aid budget proposal requested $970.7 million (39.3% of the
total for Latin America and the Caribbean) through the total for Latin America and the Caribbean) through the
Development Assistance (DA) account, account,
which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-
income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as
agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental
protection. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration proposed a $314.2 million protection. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration proposed a $314.2 million
(47.9%) increase in DA funding for the region, with the majority of the additional assistance (47.9%) increase in DA funding for the region, with the majority of the additional assistance
allocated to activities intended to address root causes of migration from Central America and to allocated to activities intended to address root causes of migration from Central America and to
restore democratic institutions and support development in Haiti. The request also included restore democratic institutions and support development in Haiti. The request also included
additional funding to advance environmental objectives, such as forest conservation in the additional funding to advance environmental objectives, such as forest conservation in the
Amazon Basin and climate change resilience in the Caribbean, as well as to support Venezuelan Amazon Basin and climate change resilience in the Caribbean, as well as to support Venezuelan
migrant integration throughout South America. migrant integration throughout South America.
Another $532.1 million (21.5%) of the Administration’s request for the region would be provided
Another $532.1 million (21.5%) of the Administration’s request for the region would be provided
through the through the
Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, the primary purpose of which is to account, the primary purpose of which is to
promote special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs promote special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs
generally aim to promote political and economic stability and often are indistinguishable from generally aim to promote political and economic stability and often are indistinguishable from
programs funded through the DA account, though the State Department rather than USAID makes programs funded through the DA account, though the State Department rather than USAID makes
ESF policy and program decisions. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration ESF policy and program decisions. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration
sought a $30.7 million (6.1%) increase in ESF assistance for the region. Among other changes, sought a $30.7 million (6.1%) increase in ESF assistance for the region. Among other changes,
the Administration requested $51.4 million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund the Administration requested $51.4 million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund
intended to support migration management throughout the hemisphere and $18.0 million to intended to support migration management throughout the hemisphere and $18.0 million to
implement commitments made at the 2022 Summit of the Americas.11 implement commitments made at the 2022 Summit of the Americas.11
The Administration requested $309.5 million (12.5% of the total) for the region through the
The Administration requested $309.5 million (12.5% of the total) for the region through the
Global Health Programs (GHP) account. This amount included $190.0 million requested for the account. This amount included $190.0 million requested for the
State Department subaccount, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. It also included $119.5 State Department subaccount, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. It also included $119.5
million requested for USAID to combat malaria; support maternal and child health, nutrition, and million requested for USAID to combat malaria; support maternal and child health, nutrition, and
family planning programs; and advance global health security activities intended to prevent, family planning programs; and advance global health security activities intended to prevent,
detect, and respond to disease outbreaks. Compared with the FY2022 allocation for the region, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks. Compared with the FY2022 allocation for the region,
the Administration proposed a $1.3 million (0.7%) reduction in funding for the State Department-the Administration proposed a $1.3 million (0.7%) reduction in funding for the State Department-
managed subaccount and a $28.0 million (30.6%) increase in funding for the USAID-managed managed subaccount and a $28.0 million (30.6%) increase in funding for the USAID-managed
subaccount. The Administration requested the additional USAID-managed funds primarily to subaccount. The Administration requested the additional USAID-managed funds primarily to
expand reproductive health programming in Haiti and Guatemala and to implement global health expand reproductive health programming in Haiti and Guatemala and to implement global health
security programming throughout the hemisphere. security programming throughout the hemisphere.
The remaining $658.3 million (26.6%) of the Administration’s FY2024 budget proposal for Latin
The remaining $658.3 million (26.6%) of the Administration’s FY2024 budget proposal for Latin
America and the Caribbean was requested for security assistance programs, including the America and the Caribbean was requested for security assistance programs, including the
following: following:
• $536.5 million requested through the
• $536.5 million requested through the
International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement
efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. The efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. The
Administration proposed a $5.3 million (1.0%) reduction in INCLE funding for Administration proposed a $5.3 million (1.0%) reduction in INCLE funding for
10 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
10 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
R40482, R40482,
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component
Accounts, by Cory R. Gill and Emily M. McCabe. , by Cory R. Gill and Emily M. McCabe.
11 For information on summit commitments, see CRS Insight IN11934,
11 For information on summit commitments, see CRS Insight IN11934,
2022 Summit of the Americas, by Peter J. , by Peter J.
Meyer. Meyer.
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the region compared with the FY2022 allocation, with reductions in aid to
the region compared with the FY2022 allocation, with reductions in aid to
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru largely offset by increases in aid for Central Colombia, Mexico, and Peru largely offset by increases in aid for Central
America and Haiti. America and Haiti.
• $32.1 million requested through the
• $32.1 million requested through the
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the account to help countries in the
region carry out humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional region carry out humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional
weapons stockpile management, develop strategic trade controls and border weapons stockpile management, develop strategic trade controls and border
security measures, and enhance their counterterrorism capacities. The security measures, and enhance their counterterrorism capacities. The
Administration’s FY2024 NADR funding request for the region was the same as Administration’s FY2024 NADR funding request for the region was the same as
the FY2022 allocation. the FY2022 allocation.
• $16.2 million requested through the
• $16.2 million requested through the
International Military Education and
Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military and account to train Latin American and Caribbean military and
civilian security personnel. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the civilian security personnel. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the
Administration requested $4.9 million (42.9%) more in IMET funding, spreading Administration requested $4.9 million (42.9%) more in IMET funding, spreading
the additional aid among countries throughout the hemisphere. the additional aid among countries throughout the hemisphere.
• $73.5 million requested through the
• $73.5 million requested through the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account account
to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region.
to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region.
Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration proposed $5.0 million Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration proposed $5.0 million
(6.3%) less in FMF funding for the region, with less aid to Peru, Costa Rica, and (6.3%) less in FMF funding for the region, with less aid to Peru, Costa Rica, and
Colombia partially offset by more funding for regional programs. Colombia partially offset by more funding for regional programs.
Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2021
FY2022
FY2024
% Change:
(actual)
(actual)
(request)
FY22-FY24
Development Assistance
Development Assistance
490.6
490.6
656.5
656.5
970.7
970.7
+47.9%
+47.9%
Economic Support Fund
Economic Support Fund
480.
480.
7a
501.
501.
4b
532.1
532.1
+6.1%
+6.1%
Global Health Programs (USAID)
Global Health Programs (USAID)
55.5
55.5
91.5
91.5
119.5
119.5
+30.6%
+30.6%
Global Health Programs (State)
Global Health Programs (State)
195.0
195.0
191.3
191.3
190.0
190.0
-0.7%
-0.7%
International Narcotics Control and Law
International Narcotics Control and Law
553.0
553.0
541.8
541.8
536.5
536.5
-1.0%
-1.0%
Enforcement
Enforcement
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
31.0
31.0
32.1
32.1
32.1
32.1
—
—
Demining, and Related Programs
Demining, and Related Programs
International Military Education and
International Military Education and
13.8
13.8
11.3
11.3
16.2
16.2
+42.9%
+42.9%
Training
Training
Foreign Military Financing
Foreign Military Financing
76.9
76.9
78.5
78.5
73.5
73.5
-6.3%
-6.3%
Total
1,896.5a
2,104.4b
2,470.7
+17.4%
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State
, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2023, May 2022; and U.S. Department of State,, May 2022; and U.S. Department of State,
Congressional
Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year
2024, April 2023. , April 2023.
Notes: FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly available. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. USAID FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly available. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. USAID
= U.S. Agency for International Development. = U.S. Agency for International Development.
a. Sum includes $97.2 a. Sum includes $97.2
mil ionmillion of supplemental assistance appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of of supplemental assistance appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of
2021 (P.L. 117-2).
2021 (P.L. 117-2).
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b. Sum includes $64.0
b. Sum includes $64.0
mil ionmillion of supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental of supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
Major Country and Regional Initiatives
Although the Biden Administration requested an overall increase in State Department- and Although the Biden Administration requested an overall increase in State Department- and
USAID-managed assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024, some countries and USAID-managed assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024, some countries and
regional programs would see larger increases than others and some would see cuts if Congress regional programs would see larger increases than others and some would see cuts if Congress
adopted the Administration’s budget proposal (adopted the Administration’s budget proposal (
seesee Table 2). Some of the Administration’s top Some of the Administration’s top
funding priorities in the region are discussed below. funding priorities in the region are discussed below.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative..
Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial
security cooperation, law enforcement capacity-building, border and port security, justice sector security cooperation, law enforcement capacity-building, border and port security, justice sector
reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.12 The Administration requested $64.5 reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.12 The Administration requested $64.5
million for the CBSI in FY2024, $15.5 million (19.4%) less than the FY2022 allocation. million for the CBSI in FY2024, $15.5 million (19.4%) less than the FY2022 allocation.
Central America. Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America . Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America
to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of
unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived at the U.S. border in unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived at the U.S. border in
2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one Administration to another. The 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one Administration to another. The
Biden Administration developed a U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Biden Administration developed a U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in
Central America intended to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic Central America intended to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic
growth in the subregion.13 The Biden Administration also has allocated increased humanitarian growth in the subregion.13 The Biden Administration also has allocated increased humanitarian
assistance to Central America intended to stabilize populations with acute needs, in line with its assistance to Central America intended to stabilize populations with acute needs, in line with its
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (see text box, “U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (see text box, “U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to
Central America,” below).14 Central America,” below).14
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Central America
Since 2020, a series of tropical storms and the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to sharp increases in food
Since 2020, a series of tropical storms and the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to sharp increases in food
insecurity and other humanitarian challenges in Central America. The Biden Administration has sought to address insecurity and other humanitarian challenges in Central America. The Biden Administration has sought to address
these challenges and stabilize populations in Central America as part of its broader these challenges and stabilize populations in Central America as part of its broader
Col aborativeCollaborative Migration Migration
Management Strategy. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department allocated $272.2 Management Strategy. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department allocated $272.2
mil ionmillion of humanitarian assistance to support vulnerable populations in Central America and Mexico in FY2021 and of humanitarian assistance to support vulnerable populations in Central America and Mexico in FY2021 and
$289.0 $289.0
mil ionmillion for such purposes in FY2022. FY2023 allocations are not yet available. These assistance funds, for such purposes in FY2022. FY2023 allocations are not yet available. These assistance funds,
which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not
included in the country or regional totals found inincluded in the country or regional totals found in
Table 1, Table 2 or thor th
e Appendix of this report. of this report.
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional : U.S. Agency for International Development, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional
Response,” fact sheets, at https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/el-salvador/El-Salvador-Guatemala-Response,” fact sheets, at https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/el-salvador/El-Salvador-Guatemala-
Honduras-Regional-Response-Archive. Honduras-Regional-Response-Archive.
For FY2024, the Administration requested $945.8 million to continue implementation of the U.S.
For FY2024, the Administration requested $945.8 million to continue implementation of the U.S.
Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America—$240.9 million Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America—$240.9 million
12 For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789,
12 For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789,
Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, by Karla I. Rios. , by Karla I. Rios.
13 White House,
13 White House,
U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, July 2021, at , July 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf. For more information on U.S. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf. For more information on U.S.
policy toward Central America, see CRS In Focus IF11151, policy toward Central America, see CRS In Focus IF11151,
Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S.
Policy, by Peter J. Meyer. , by Peter J. Meyer.
14 White House,
14 White House,
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, July 2021, p. 7, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-, July 2021, p. 7, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf. content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.
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(34.2%) more than the FY2022 allocation.15 The Central America request included $124.8 million
(34.2%) more than the FY2022 allocation.15 The Central America request included $124.8 million
for El Salvador; $164.5 million for Guatemala; $136.5 million for Honduras; and a combined for El Salvador; $164.5 million for Guatemala; $136.5 million for Honduras; and a combined
$17.1 million for the other four countries of the isthmus. It also included $341.3 million for $17.1 million for the other four countries of the isthmus. It also included $341.3 million for
CARSI and $161.7 million for other State Department- and USAID-managed regional programs CARSI and $161.7 million for other State Department- and USAID-managed regional programs
in Central America.in Central America.
Colombia. Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the . Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the
FY2000 launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program. The focus of U.S. assistance FY2000 launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program. The focus of U.S. assistance
efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal conflict efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal conflict
and Colombian government priorities.16 For FY2024, the Administration requested $444.0 million and Colombian government priorities.16 For FY2024, the Administration requested $444.0 million
for Colombia to support ongoing counternarcotics efforts, peace accord implementation, for Colombia to support ongoing counternarcotics efforts, peace accord implementation,
Venezuelan migrant integration, and forest conservation. The Administration requested $46.3 Venezuelan migrant integration, and forest conservation. The Administration requested $46.3
million (9.4%) less than the FY2022 allocation for Colombia, including a $29.0 million reduction million (9.4%) less than the FY2022 allocation for Colombia, including a $29.0 million reduction
in INCLE aid due, in part, to the Colombian government’s shift away from coca eradication. in INCLE aid due, in part, to the Colombian government’s shift away from coca eradication.
Haiti. The United States has provided Haiti significant aid intended to support the country’s . The United States has provided Haiti significant aid intended to support the country’s
recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability, with a particular spike in recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability, with a particular spike in
assistance in the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake. Since the 2021 assassination of assistance in the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake. Since the 2021 assassination of
President Moïse, Haiti has been mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises.17 President Moïse, Haiti has been mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises.17
The Biden Administration’s FY2024 request included $291.5 million to help Haiti restore The Biden Administration’s FY2024 request included $291.5 million to help Haiti restore
democratic institutions; improve security conditions; and address health, economic, and democratic institutions; improve security conditions; and address health, economic, and
environmental challenges. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration proposed environmental challenges. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration proposed
$54.0 million (22.8%) more for Haiti. With the additional funds, U.S. agencies would seek to $54.0 million (22.8%) more for Haiti. With the additional funds, U.S. agencies would seek to
strengthen the police and combat gang influence, address the drivers of irregular migration and strengthen the police and combat gang influence, address the drivers of irregular migration and
support returnees’ reintegration, and support credible elections, among other activities. support returnees’ reintegration, and support credible elections, among other activities.
Haiti and the Global Fragility Act
In April 2022, the Biden Administration designated Haiti as a priority country for the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-
In April 2022, the Biden Administration designated Haiti as a priority country for the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-
94 , Division J, Title V), intended to stabilize conflict-affected areas. The Administration released a 10-year plan for 94 , Division J, Title V), intended to stabilize conflict-affected areas. The Administration released a 10-year plan for
Haiti, as mandated by the act, in March 2023. Haiti is eligible to receive assistance through three funds authorized Haiti, as mandated by the act, in March 2023. Haiti is eligible to receive assistance through three funds authorized
by the act: the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund, and the Multi-Donor Global by the act: the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund, and the Multi-Donor Global
Fragility Fund. Of the PSF funds appropriated in FY2021, the Administration allocated $15.0 Fragility Fund. Of the PSF funds appropriated in FY2021, the Administration allocated $15.0
mil ionmillion to Haiti. These to Haiti. These
assistance funds are not included in the country or regional totals found inassistance funds are not included in the country or regional totals found in
Table 1 oror Table 2 of this report. of this report.
Note: For additional information, see CRS Report R47394, For additional information, see CRS Report R47394,
Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy. .
Mexico. Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status,
but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the
Mérida Initiative in FY2008. Bilateral security cooperation efforts have shifted along with the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. Bilateral security cooperation efforts have shifted along with the
priorities of U.S. and Mexican administrations and now are guided by the U.S.-Mexico priorities of U.S. and Mexican administrations and now are guided by the U.S.-Mexico
Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe Communities, launched in October Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe Communities, launched in October
2021.18 For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested $111.4 million to support Mexican 2021.18 For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested $111.4 million to support Mexican
15 These figures are based on amounts allocated to, and requested for, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
15 These figures are based on amounts allocated to, and requested for, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and State Department- and USAID-managed Central America regional programs. The Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and State Department- and USAID-managed Central America regional programs. The
Administration states that it requested $978.8 million for Central America in FY2024; that sum includes nearly $33.0 Administration states that it requested $978.8 million for Central America in FY2024; that sum includes nearly $33.0
million of centrally managed funds. million of centrally managed funds.
16 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Insight IN12180,
16 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Insight IN12180,
Colombia: Issues for the 118th
Congress and CRS Report R47426, and CRS Report R47426,
U.S.-Colombia Security Relations: Future Prospects in Brief, by June S. Beittel. , by June S. Beittel.
17 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report R47394,
17 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report R47394,
Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S.
Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Karla I. Rios. , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Karla I. Rios.
18 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917,
18 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917,
Mexico: Background and U.S.
(continued...) (continued...)
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efforts to strengthen the rule of law, combat transnational crime, and reduce greenhouse gas
efforts to strengthen the rule of law, combat transnational crime, and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from the energy and agriculture sectors. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the emissions from the energy and agriculture sectors. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the
Administration proposed $15.7 million (12.4%) less in aid for Mexico, reflecting a proposed Administration proposed $15.7 million (12.4%) less in aid for Mexico, reflecting a proposed
$16.0 million cut in INCLE aid for the country. $16.0 million cut in INCLE aid for the country.
Venezuela. The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for . The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for
two decades and has increased such assistance over the past five years in response to the two decades and has increased such assistance over the past five years in response to the
increasingly authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided increasingly authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided
humanitarian support for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the text box, humanitarian support for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the text box,
“U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis,” below).19 The Biden “U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis,” below).19 The Biden
Administration requested $54.0 million for FY2024 to support democratic actors, human rights Administration requested $54.0 million for FY2024 to support democratic actors, human rights
advocates, and other civil society organizations; strengthen small businesses; and reduce maternal advocates, and other civil society organizations; strengthen small businesses; and reduce maternal
and child mortality in Venezuela. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration and child mortality in Venezuela. Compared with the FY2022 allocation, the Administration
proposed $5.4 million (11.1%) more in assistance for Venezuela. proposed $5.4 million (11.1%) more in assistance for Venezuela.
U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 7.7
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 7.7
mil ionmillion Venezuelan migrants and Venezuelan migrants and
refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis since 2015. Of these, approximately 6.5 refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis since 2015. Of these, approximately 6.5
mil ionmillion are residing in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From FY2017 through the first nine months of are residing in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From FY2017 through the first nine months of
FY2023, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department committed nearly $2.5 FY2023, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department committed nearly $2.5
bil ionbillion of humanitarian assistance—including $140.4 of humanitarian assistance—including $140.4
mil ionmillion in FY2023—to help countries in the region respond to in FY2023—to help countries in the region respond to
Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain in Venezuela. Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain in Venezuela.
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil have been among the top recipients. These assistance funds, which U.S. Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil have been among the top recipients. These assistance funds, which U.S.
agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not included in agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not included in
the country or regional totals found inthe country or regional totals found in
Table 1, Table 2, or or
thethe Appendix of this report. of this report.
Sources: R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, “Refugees and R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, “Refugees and
Migrants from Venezuela,” September 5, 2023; and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Venezuela Migrants from Venezuela,” September 5, 2023; and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Venezuela
Regional Crisis—Complex Emergency,” fact sheets, at https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/venezuela/Regional Crisis—Complex Emergency,” fact sheets, at https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/venezuela/
venezuela-regional-crisis-archive. venezuela-regional-crisis-archive.
Table 2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program:
FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request
(thousands of current U.S. dollars)
(thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2021
FY2022
FY2024
% Change: FY22-
(actualactual)a
(actualactual)b
(request)
FY24
Argentina
Argentina
700
700
632
632
800
800
+26.6%
+26.6%
Bahamas
Bahamas
200
200
210
210
250
250
+19.0%
+19.0%
Belize
Belize
1,250
1,250
245
245
250
250
+2.0%
+2.0%
Bolivia
Bolivia
4,000
4,000
0
0
0
0
—
—
Brazil
Brazil
27,950
27,950
29,781
29,781
42,000
42,000
+41.0%
+41.0%
Chile
Chile
455
455
434
434
650
650
+49.8%
+49.8%
Colombia
Colombia
478,192
478,192
490,337
490,337
444,025
444,025
-9.4%
-9.4%
Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10578, , and CRS In Focus IF10578,
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the
Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Clare Ribando Seelke.
19 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841,
19 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841,
Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
FY2021
FY2022
FY2024
% Change: FY22-
(actualactual)a
(actualactual)b
(request)
FY24
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
9,225
9,225
8,183
8,183
600
600
-92.7%
-92.7%
Cuba
Cuba
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
—
—
Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic
35,155
35,155
46,460
46,460
46,545
46,545
+0.2%
+0.2%
Ecuador
Ecuador
28,750
28,750
45,554
45,554
48,600
48,600
+6.7%
+6.7%
El Salvador
El Salvador
80790
80790
98,652
98,652
124,800
124,800
+26.5%
+26.5%
Guatemala
Guatemala
103,849
103,849
137,442
137,442
164,502
164,502
+19.7%
+19.7%
Guyana
Guyana
200
200
190
190
250
250
+31.6%
+31.6%
Haiti
Haiti
204,377
204,377
237,428
237,428
291,455
291,455
+22.8%
+22.8%
Honduras
Honduras
79,902
79,902
117,878
117,878
136,450
136,450
+15.8%
+15.8%
Jamaica
Jamaica
24,446
24,446
24,300
24,300
11,750
11,750
-51.6%
-51.6%
Mexico
Mexico
158,910
158,910
127,107
127,107
111,400
111,400
-12.4%
-12.4%
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
12,592
12,592
16,960
16,960
15,000
15,000
-11.6%
-11.6%
Panama
Panama
14,019
14,019
12,507
12,507
1,225
1,225
-90.2%
-90.2%
Paraguay
Paraguay
9,600
9,600
4,343
4,343
4,500
4,500
+3.6%
+3.6%
Peru
Peru
98,885
98,885
109,134
109,134
107,635
107,635
-1.4%
-1.4%
Suriname
Suriname
200
200
162
162
250
250
+54.3%
+54.3%
Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago
2,999
2,999
1,735
1,735
350
350
-79.8%
-79.8%
Uruguay
Uruguay
900
900
347
347
400
400
+15.3%
+15.3%
Venezuela
Venezuela
38,000
38,000
48,600
48,600
54,000
54,000
+11.1%
+11.1%
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean
7,700
7,700
24,621
24,621
24,000
24,000
-2.5%
-2.5%
USAID Caribbean Development
USAID Caribbean Development
15,800
15,800
15,438
15,438
17,000
17,000
+10.1%
+10.1%
USAID Central America Regional
USAID Central America Regional
5,000
5,000
35,000
35,000
85,178
85,178
+143.4%
+143.4%
USAID South America Regional
USAID South America Regional
15,000
15,000
27,000
27,000
55,400
55,400
+105.2%
+105.2%
USAID Latin America and
USAID Latin America and
45,540
45,540
38,697
38,697
41,678
41,678
+7.7%
+7.7%
Caribbean Regional
Caribbean Regional
State Central America Regional
State Central America Regional
—
—
278,000
278,000
417,800
417,800
+50.3%
+50.3%
State Western Hemisphere
State Western Hemisphere
366,909
366,909
102,044
102,044
201,910
201,910
+97.9%
+97.9%
Regional
Regional
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative]
[74,800]
[80,000]
[64,500]
[-19.4%]
Total
Total
1,896,495495a
2,104,421b
2,470,653
+17.4%
Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2023, May 2022; and U.S. Department of State, , May 2022; and U.S. Department of State,
Congressional
Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year
2024, April 2023. , April 2023.
Notes: FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly available. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. FY2021 FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly available. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. FY2021
and FY2022 totals each include $5 and FY2022 totals each include $5
mil ionmillion appropriated as voluntary contributions to the Organization of appropriated as voluntary contributions to the Organization of
American States. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department regional programs American States. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department regional programs
fund region-wide initiatives, including the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, as well as activities that cross fund region-wide initiatives, including the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the vast majority of U.S. borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the vast majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. Prior to FY2022, activities funded through assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. Prior to FY2022, activities funded through
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the State Central America Regional program were funded under the State Western Hemisphere Regional
the State Central America Regional program were funded under the State Western Hemisphere Regional
program. program.
a. FY2021 sums include some supplemental assistance appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 a. FY2021 sums include some supplemental assistance appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
(P.L. 117-2).
(P.L. 117-2).
b. FY2022 sums include some supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
b. FY2022 sums include some supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
Inter-American Foundation
In addition to State Department- and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden In addition to State Department- and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden
Administration requested $52.0 million for the IAF for FY2024 (seeAdministration requested $52.0 million for the IAF for FY2024 (see
Table 3). . The IAF is an The IAF is an
independent U.S. government agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (22 independent U.S. government agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (22
U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for grassroots development efforts U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for grassroots development efforts
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the agency after conducting a in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the agency after conducting a
comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region and determining that comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region and determining that
programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted significant social and civic programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted significant social and civic
change.20 The IAF is active in 27 countries, including several countries where USAID no longer change.20 The IAF is active in 27 countries, including several countries where USAID no longer
has field missions.21 The Administration’s FY2024 request included funding for the IAF to has field missions.21 The Administration’s FY2024 request included funding for the IAF to
continue supporting local efforts to address the root causes of Central American migration, continue supporting local efforts to address the root causes of Central American migration,
integrate displaced Venezuelans and Nicaraguans into host communities, promote inclusive integrate displaced Venezuelans and Nicaraguans into host communities, promote inclusive
economic growth, reduce food insecurity, foster civic engagement, mitigate chronic violence, economic growth, reduce food insecurity, foster civic engagement, mitigate chronic violence,
provide alternatives to the illicit drug trade, build resilience to natural disasters, and manage provide alternatives to the illicit drug trade, build resilience to natural disasters, and manage
natural resources sustainably.natural resources sustainably.
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation Appropriations: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
% Change
(actual)
(actual)
(enacted)
(request)
FY23-FY24
38.0
38.0
42.0
42.0
47.0
47.0
52.0
52.0
+10.6%
+10.6%
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State
, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2023, May 2022; and U.S. Department of State,, May 2022; and U.S. Department of State,
Congressional
Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year
2024, April 2023. , April 2023.
Emergency Supplemental Request22
In addition to the foreign assistance requested for Latin America and the Caribbean discussed In addition to the foreign assistance requested for Latin America and the Caribbean discussed
above, the White House sent an emergency supplemental funding request to Congress in August above, the White House sent an emergency supplemental funding request to Congress in August
20 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
20 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, ,
Report on H.R.14580 to
Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World to
Achieve Development Within a Framework of Democratic, Economic, Social, and Political Institutions, and for Other
Purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57. , 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57.
21 Inter-American Foundation (IAF), “Where We Work,” at https://www.iaf.gov/where-we-work/.
21 Inter-American Foundation (IAF), “Where We Work,” at https://www.iaf.gov/where-we-work/.
22 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from White House, Executive Office of the 22 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from White House, Executive Office of the
President, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter Regarding Critical Funding Needs for FY 2024,” August 10, President, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter Regarding Critical Funding Needs for FY 2024,” August 10,
2023, pp. 56-58, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Final-Supplemental-Funding-Request-2023, pp. 56-58, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Final-Supplemental-Funding-Request-
Letter-and-Technical-Materials.pdf. Letter-and-Technical-Materials.pdf.
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2023 that included $782.0 million of foreign assistance intended to address irregular migration in
2023 that included $782.0 million of foreign assistance intended to address irregular migration in
the region.23 the region.23
The Administration requested $532.0 million of the supplemental funds for Latin America and the
The Administration requested $532.0 million of the supplemental funds for Latin America and the
Caribbean through the Caribbean through the
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account, intended to address account, intended to address
the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The
Administration’s supplemental request adds to a base FY2024 budget proposal that included $3.9 Administration’s supplemental request adds to a base FY2024 budget proposal that included $3.9
billion in global MRA funds, including an anticipated allocation of $398.0 million of Overseas billion in global MRA funds, including an anticipated allocation of $398.0 million of Overseas
Assistance funding for the Western Hemisphere.24 The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Assistance funding for the Western Hemisphere.24 The State Department’s Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration administers the MRA account, often channeling such assistance through Refugees, and Migration administers the MRA account, often channeling such assistance through
international organizations, such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International international organizations, such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International
Organization for Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Organization for Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
According to the supplemental request, the funds would be used to help forcibly displaced
According to the supplemental request, the funds would be used to help forcibly displaced
migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean resettle in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean resettle in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Ecuador, among other countries. Funds also would seek to support partner countries’ migrant Ecuador, among other countries. Funds also would seek to support partner countries’ migrant
regularization and integration programs and strengthen their protection screening and migration regularization and integration programs and strengthen their protection screening and migration
management capacities. In an attempt to reduce irregular migration flows and undermine migrant management capacities. In an attempt to reduce irregular migration flows and undermine migrant
smuggling groups, some supplemental MRA funding would be used to establish Safe Mobility smuggling groups, some supplemental MRA funding would be used to establish Safe Mobility
Offices—centers to be located throughout the region to screen and vet potential candidates for Offices—centers to be located throughout the region to screen and vet potential candidates for
refugee resettlement or other legal pathways to the United States, Canada, Spain, or other refugee resettlement or other legal pathways to the United States, Canada, Spain, or other
countries.25 countries.25
The Administration’s FY2024 supplemental request also included $250.0 million of
The Administration’s FY2024 supplemental request also included $250.0 million of
ESF to to
address irregular migration within Latin America and the Caribbean. Of that total, $150.0 million address irregular migration within Latin America and the Caribbean. Of that total, $150.0 million
would support migrant integration efforts in the region; $50.0 million would support foreign would support migrant integration efforts in the region; $50.0 million would support foreign
governments’ repatriation operations for individuals deemed ineligible for humanitarian governments’ repatriation operations for individuals deemed ineligible for humanitarian
protection; and $50 million “would be used to incentivize sustained cooperation from partner protection; and $50 million “would be used to incentivize sustained cooperation from partner
countries hosting Safe Mobility Offices.”26 countries hosting Safe Mobility Offices.”26
Legislative Developments
Both houses of Congress have begun consideringAs of early October 2023, Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2024 SFOPS appropriations. The House FY2024 SFOPS appropriations. The House
Appropriations Committee reported its FY2024 SFOPS bill (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) on July Appropriations Committee reported its FY2024 SFOPS bill (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) on July
17, 2023, and the 17, 2023, and the
bill was passed by the House on September 28, 2023. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a separate SFOPS bill (S. Senate Appropriations Committee reported a separate SFOPS bill (S.
2438/S.Rept. 2438/S.Rept.
118-71) on July 20, 2023. Congress has not taken further action on either bill. It passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 118-15) on September 30, 2022, that largely funds foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2023 level until November 17, 2023.
Congress may draw from H.R. 4665 and S. 2438 as it considers appropriations for the remainder of the fiscal year. Neither measure would specify comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country, leaving some allocations to be determined by executive118-71) on July 20, 2023. Neither measure would specify comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country, leaving some allocations to be determined by executive agencies in consultation with Congress. Nevertheless, the measures would include funding directives (see Table 4) and/or restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region. Both measures were reported before the Biden Administration sent its emergency supplemental funding request to Congress in August.
23 The emergency supplemental request also included $26.0 million under the State Department’s Diplomatic Programs
23 The emergency supplemental request also included $26.0 million under the State Department’s Diplomatic Programs
account to advance and oversee U.S. migration management initiatives throughout the region. account to advance and oversee U.S. migration management initiatives throughout the region.
24 U.S. Department of State,
24 U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024, ,
April 2023, pp. 342-345. April 2023, pp. 342-345.
25 Initial Safe Mobility Offices are to be established in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. For more information,
25 Initial Safe Mobility Offices are to be established in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. For more information,
see https://movilidadsegura.org/en/. see https://movilidadsegura.org/en/.
26 White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter Regarding Critical
26 White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter Regarding Critical
Funding Needs for FY2024,” August 10, 2023, pp. 58. Funding Needs for FY2024,” August 10, 2023, pp. 58.
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agencies in consultation with Congress. Nevertheless, the measures would include funding directives (see Table 4) and/or restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region.
Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives:
FY2024 Appropriations Legislation
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
H.R. 4665 and
S. 2438 and
(actualactual)a
(enacted)
(request)
H.Rept. 118-
S.Rept. 118-
146
71
Caribbean Basin
Caribbean Basin
80.0
80.0
82.0
82.0
64.5
64.5
97.5
97.5
82.0
82.0
Security
Security
Initiative Initiative
Central
Central
704.
704.
9b
NA
NA
945.
945.
8b
NA
NA
NA
NA
America
America
Colombia
Colombia
490.3
490.3
487.4
487.4
444.0
444.0
NA
NA
487.4
487.4
Haiti
Haiti
237.4
237.4
NA
NA
291.5
291.5
NA
NA
NA
NA
Inter-American
Inter-American
42.0
42.0
47.0
47.0
52.0
52.0
22.5
22.5
52.0
52.0
Foundation
Foundation
Mexico
Mexico
127.1
127.1
NA
NA
111.4
111.4
NA
NA
NA
NA
Venezuela
Venezuela
48.6
48.6
50.0
50.0
54.0
54.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024, April 2023; P.L. 117-328; H.R. 4665; H.Rept. 118-146; S. , April 2023; P.L. 117-328; H.R. 4665; H.Rept. 118-146; S.
2438; and S.Rept. 118-71. 2438; and S.Rept. 118-71.
Notes: Final FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly available. NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation Final FY2023 allocations are not yet publicly available. NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation
totals are not specified in the bil or report. totals are not specified in the bil or report.
a. FY2022 figures include supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental a. FY2022 figures include supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
b. These Central America figures are based on amounts allocated to, and requested for, Belize, Costa Rica, El
b. These Central America figures are based on amounts allocated to, and requested for, Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and State Department- and USAID-managed Central
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and State Department- and USAID-managed Central
America regional programs. The Administration states that it allocated $938.4 America regional programs. The Administration states that it allocated $938.4
mil ionmillion to Central America in to Central America in
FY2022; that sum includes $211.4 FY2022; that sum includes $211.4
mil ionmillion of humanitarian assistance and $22.1 of humanitarian assistance and $22.1
mil ionmillion from centrally from centrally
managed funds. The Administration states that it is requesting $978.8 managed funds. The Administration states that it is requesting $978.8
mil ionmillion for Central America in for Central America in
FY2024; that sum includes nearly $33.0 FY2024; that sum includes nearly $33.0
mil ionmillion of centrally managed funds. of centrally managed funds.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Both H.R. 4665 and S. 2438 would provide more funding . Both H.R. 4665 and S. 2438 would provide more funding
for the CBSI than the Administration requested. H.R. 4665 would provide “not less than” $97.5 for the CBSI than the Administration requested. H.R. 4665 would provide “not less than” $97.5
million for the CBSI and would direct that funding made available for the initiative above the million for the CBSI and would direct that funding made available for the initiative above the
FY2023 level “shall be prioritized for countries within the transit zones of illicit drug shipments FY2023 level “shall be prioritized for countries within the transit zones of illicit drug shipments
toward the United States, that have increased interdiction of illicit drugs, and [that] are most toward the United States, that have increased interdiction of illicit drugs, and [that] are most
directly impacted by the crisis in Haiti.” H.Rept. 118-146 would further direct that CBSI funds be directly impacted by the crisis in Haiti.” H.Rept. 118-146 would further direct that CBSI funds be
used to provide equipment that Caribbean partners need to combat drug trafficking and used to provide equipment that Caribbean partners need to combat drug trafficking and
transnational crime. In addition, the report would call on the Secretary of State to consider using transnational crime. In addition, the report would call on the Secretary of State to consider using
the authority granted under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. §2321j) to the authority granted under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. §2321j) to
transfer excess defense articles to meet such needs. S. 2438 would provide “not less than” $82.0 transfer excess defense articles to meet such needs. S. 2438 would provide “not less than” $82.0
million for the CBSI. million for the CBSI.
Central America. Neither measure would stipulate an overall assistance level for Central . Neither measure would stipulate an overall assistance level for Central
America. However, H.Rept. 118-146 would designate $211.7 million of INCLE funds for the America. However, H.Rept. 118-146 would designate $211.7 million of INCLE funds for the
region, including $37.5 million for Costa Rica, and $15.0 million of DA for democracy programs region, including $37.5 million for Costa Rica, and $15.0 million of DA for democracy programs
in Nicaragua. The report also would allocate $8.5 million of FMF to Costa Rica. H.R. 4665 in Nicaragua. The report also would allocate $8.5 million of FMF to Costa Rica. H.R. 4665
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would require the State Department to withhold 50% of assistance for the central governments of would require the State Department to withhold 50% of assistance for the central governments of
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the
Northern Triangle countries) until the Secretary countries) until the Secretary
certifies that those governments are cooperating with the United States to counter transnational certifies that those governments are cooperating with the United States to counter transnational
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crime and repatriate migrants; taking steps to stem mass migration, combat financial crimes, and crime and repatriate migrants; taking steps to stem mass migration, combat financial crimes, and
improve the rule of law; and improving business and investment conditions. The bill would improve the rule of law; and improving business and investment conditions. The bill would
provide more exceptions to the withholding requirement than legislation in prior years, including provide more exceptions to the withholding requirement than legislation in prior years, including
for security assistance to combat transnational crime and protect national borders. for security assistance to combat transnational crime and protect national borders.
S. 2438 would provide $100.0 million for locally led development programs in the Northern
S. 2438 would provide $100.0 million for locally led development programs in the Northern
Triangle; $70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America; $61.5 Triangle; $70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America; $61.5
million for anti-corruption entities and activities in Central America; and $15.0 million for million for anti-corruption entities and activities in Central America; and $15.0 million for
democracy programs in Nicaragua. The bill would prohibit FMF for the Northern Triangle democracy programs in Nicaragua. The bill would prohibit FMF for the Northern Triangle
countries countries
and would would
and require the State Department to withhold 60% of ESF and international require the State Department to withhold 60% of ESF and international
security assistance (e.g., INCLE, NADR, IMET) to support the central governments of those security assistance (e.g., INCLE, NADR, IMET) to support the central governments of those
countries until the Secretary of State certifies that those governments have met a series of countries until the Secretary of State certifies that those governments have met a series of
conditions related to corruption, human rights, migration, and other congressional concerns. The conditions related to corruption, human rights, migration, and other congressional concerns. The
bill’s exceptions to the withholding requirement and reprogramming directives would be similar bill’s exceptions to the withholding requirement and reprogramming directives would be similar
to those in other SFOPS measures enacted in recent years. to those in other SFOPS measures enacted in recent years.
Colombia. The FY2024 SFOPS measures reported in the House and Senate diverge significantly . The FY2024 SFOPS measures reported in the House and Senate diverge significantly
on Colombia. H.R. 4665 would not designate a funding level for Colombia and would prohibit on Colombia. H.R. 4665 would not designate a funding level for Colombia and would prohibit
the use of any assistance for reparation payments or subsidies outlined in Colombia’s 2016 peace the use of any assistance for reparation payments or subsidies outlined in Colombia’s 2016 peace
accord or alternative development projects on properties where illegal substances are grown, accord or alternative development projects on properties where illegal substances are grown,
produced, imported, or distributed. H.Rept. 118-146 asserts that the “Committee defers produced, imported, or distributed. H.Rept. 118-146 asserts that the “Committee defers
consideration of funding for Colombia,” due to concerns about the current Colombian consideration of funding for Colombia,” due to concerns about the current Colombian
government, but “will continue to review events and policies as the appropriations process moves government, but “will continue to review events and policies as the appropriations process moves
forward.” forward.”
S. 2438 would provide $487.4 million for Colombia—$43.4 million more than the Administration
S. 2438 would provide $487.4 million for Colombia—$43.4 million more than the Administration
requested for FY2024. The bill would designate “not less than” $40.0 million of the total aid to requested for FY2024. The bill would designate “not less than” $40.0 million of the total aid to
support activities intended to improve rural security in municipalities with high levels of illicit support activities intended to improve rural security in municipalities with high levels of illicit
activities, including coca production. Similar to prior SFOPS measures, S. 2438 would require the activities, including coca production. Similar to prior SFOPS measures, S. 2438 would require the
State Department to withhold 20% of INCLE aid to Colombia until the Secretary of State certifies State Department to withhold 20% of INCLE aid to Colombia until the Secretary of State certifies
that the Colombian government is implementing certain counternarcotics policies and to withhold that the Colombian government is implementing certain counternarcotics policies and to withhold
20% of FMF and 5% of INCLE to Colombia until the Secretary certifies that the Colombian 20% of FMF and 5% of INCLE to Colombia until the Secretary certifies that the Colombian
government has met certain human rights conditions. Prior to obligating any funds, S.Rept. 118-government has met certain human rights conditions. Prior to obligating any funds, S.Rept. 118-
71 would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the USAID Administrator, to submit 71 would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the USAID Administrator, to submit
a report to the Appropriations Committees on the Colombian government’s counternarcotics a report to the Appropriations Committees on the Colombian government’s counternarcotics
strategy and how U.S. assistance would support both implementation of that strategy and U.S. strategy and how U.S. assistance would support both implementation of that strategy and U.S.
national interests. national interests.
Haiti. Although neither measure would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti, Although neither measure would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti,
both measures include some funding directives. H.Rept. 118-146 would direct that “not less than” both measures include some funding directives. H.Rept. 118-146 would direct that “not less than”
$20.0 million of ESF be made available to establish maternal and neonatal care hospital units $20.0 million of ESF be made available to establish maternal and neonatal care hospital units
within 10 kilometers of the Haiti-Dominican Republic border. S.Rept. 118-71 would designate within 10 kilometers of the Haiti-Dominican Republic border. S.Rept. 118-71 would designate
$20.0 million to support rural medical care, $8.5 million for reforestation efforts, and “not less $20.0 million to support rural medical care, $8.5 million for reforestation efforts, and “not less
than” $5.0 million to help meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. than” $5.0 million to help meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners.
The report also recommends “not less than” the FY2023 allocation for law enforcement programs The report also recommends “not less than” the FY2023 allocation for law enforcement programs
for Haiti. for Haiti.
Both bills would require the State Department to withhold aid to the Haitian government until
Both bills would require the State Department to withhold aid to the Haitian government until
certain conditions have been met. Prior to the release of funds, H.R. 4665 would require the certain conditions have been met. Prior to the release of funds, H.R. 4665 would require the
Secretary to certify that Haiti has held credible elections and that it is in the national interest of Secretary to certify that Haiti has held credible elections and that it is in the national interest of
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
the United States to provide assistance. S. 2438 would require the Secretary to certify that a new the United States to provide assistance. S. 2438 would require the Secretary to certify that a new
democratically elected government has taken office or a broadly representative transitional democratically elected government has taken office or a broadly representative transitional
government is in place and that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide government is in place and that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
assistance. Both bills would include exceptions to the withholding requirement for democracy assistance. Both bills would include exceptions to the withholding requirement for democracy
and health programs, disaster relief and recovery, and anti-gang police and justice sector and health programs, disaster relief and recovery, and anti-gang police and justice sector
activities. activities.
Inter-American Foundation. Whereas S. 2438 would fully fund the Administration’s $52.0 . Whereas S. 2438 would fully fund the Administration’s $52.0
million request for the IAF, H.R. 4665 would provide $22.5 million for the agency. H.Rept. 118-million request for the IAF, H.R. 4665 would provide $22.5 million for the agency. H.Rept. 118-
146 would encourage USAID to coordinate its local civil society investments with the IAF and 146 would encourage USAID to coordinate its local civil society investments with the IAF and
would encourage the IAF to increase its focus on the Caribbean and Latin American countries would encourage the IAF to increase its focus on the Caribbean and Latin American countries
where USAID has less of a presence. where USAID has less of a presence.
Mexico. Neither S. 2438 nor H.R. 4665 would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Neither S. 2438 nor H.R. 4665 would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for
Mexico; however, both measures would place conditions on certain types of assistance. H.R. Mexico; however, both measures would place conditions on certain types of assistance. H.R.
4665 would require the State Department to withhold 15% of international security assistance 4665 would require the State Department to withhold 15% of international security assistance
(e.g., INCLE, NADR, IMET, FMF) for Mexico until the Secretary certifies that the Mexican (e.g., INCLE, NADR, IMET, FMF) for Mexico until the Secretary certifies that the Mexican
government has taken steps to reduce the amount of fentanyl arriving at the United States-Mexico government has taken steps to reduce the amount of fentanyl arriving at the United States-Mexico
border and to dismantle transnational criminal organizations. The billborder and to dismantle transnational criminal organizations. The bill
also would require the Secretary of State to report to selected congressional committees within 30 days of enactment—and prior to the initial obligation of ESF assistance—how such assistance would address the movement of fentanyl and other opioids from Mexico to the United States, as amended by the House prior to passage (H.Amdt. 466), also would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of ESF assistance for Mexico. H.Rept. 118-146 . H.Rept. 118-146
would direct the State Department and USAID to prioritize assistance activities in Mexico that would direct the State Department and USAID to prioritize assistance activities in Mexico that
strengthen the capacity of Mexican judicial and security institutions to combat crime, especially strengthen the capacity of Mexican judicial and security institutions to combat crime, especially
crime associated with fentanyl and other narcotics trafficking. crime associated with fentanyl and other narcotics trafficking.
S. 2438 would prohibit the obligation of INCLE assistance for the Mexican government until the
S. 2438 would prohibit the obligation of INCLE assistance for the Mexican government until the
Secretary of State submits a report to the Committees on Appropriations assessing the extent to Secretary of State submits a report to the Committees on Appropriations assessing the extent to
which during the past two years the Mexican government has supported joint counternarcotics which during the past two years the Mexican government has supported joint counternarcotics
operations, intelligence sharing with U.S. counterparts, efforts to degrade transnational criminal operations, intelligence sharing with U.S. counterparts, efforts to degrade transnational criminal
organizations in Mexico, and the extradition of criminals sought by the United States. S.Rept. organizations in Mexico, and the extradition of criminals sought by the United States. S.Rept.
118-71 would require the Secretary to submit a second report to the Committees on 118-71 would require the Secretary to submit a second report to the Committees on
Appropriations prior to the obligation of INCLE funds, assessing the extent to which the Mexican Appropriations prior to the obligation of INCLE funds, assessing the extent to which the Mexican
government is addressing certain human rights issues and the extent to which U.S. assistance has government is addressing certain human rights issues and the extent to which U.S. assistance has
supported those objectives. supported those objectives.
In addition to any assistance provided for Mexico, S. 2438 would provide “not less than” $125.0
In addition to any assistance provided for Mexico, S. 2438 would provide “not less than” $125.0
million for programs to counter the flow of fentanyl, fentanyl precursors, and other synthetic million for programs to counter the flow of fentanyl, fentanyl precursors, and other synthetic
drugs and their precursor materials from the People’s Republic of China to the United States, drugs and their precursor materials from the People’s Republic of China to the United States,
including through other countries and across the United States-Mexico border. including through other countries and across the United States-Mexico border.
Venezuela. H.R. 4665 and S. 2438 each would designate $50.0 million of ESF for democracy . H.R. 4665 and S. 2438 each would designate $50.0 million of ESF for democracy
programs in Venezuela and would direct U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other programs in Venezuela and would direct U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other
Latin American and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees. H.R. 4665 Latin American and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees. H.R. 4665
also would require the State Department to withhold 50% of funds for election-related activities also would require the State Department to withhold 50% of funds for election-related activities
until the Secretary of State certifies that such elections allow for participation from the until the Secretary of State certifies that such elections allow for participation from the
Venezuelan diaspora and are open to credible international observation. Neither bill would Venezuelan diaspora and are open to credible international observation. Neither bill would
specifically fund the Administration’s $4.0 million GHP request for Venezuela. specifically fund the Administration’s $4.0 million GHP request for Venezuela.
Options for Congress
The COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of development gains in Latin America and The COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of development gains in Latin America and
the Caribbean, and many countries have yet to fully recover. This deterioration in living the Caribbean, and many countries have yet to fully recover. This deterioration in living
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conditions has contributed to increased political instability and irregular migration throughout the conditions has contributed to increased political instability and irregular migration throughout the
Western Hemisphere. The Biden Administration asserted in its National Security Strategy that Western Hemisphere. The Biden Administration asserted in its National Security Strategy that
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
there is a “direct link between the region’s prosperity and security and that of our own.”27 there is a “direct link between the region’s prosperity and security and that of our own.”27
Congressional decisions regarding foreign assistance appropriations will help determine how the Congressional decisions regarding foreign assistance appropriations will help determine how the
United States responds to challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean and the relative United States responds to challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean and the relative
prioritization of U.S. objectives in the region. Congress also could help guide U.S. foreign prioritization of U.S. objectives in the region. Congress also could help guide U.S. foreign
assistance policy in the region by enacting authorization legislation or using its various oversight assistance policy in the region by enacting authorization legislation or using its various oversight
mechanisms. mechanisms.
Appropriations. Eyeing the Eyeing the
start of the fiscal year on October 1expiration of P.L. 118-15 on November 17, 2023, Members may conclude , 2023, Members may conclude
action on FY2024 SFOPS appropriations, pass action on FY2024 SFOPS appropriations, pass
aanother short-term continuing resolution to maintain short-term continuing resolution to maintain
FY2023—or alternative—funding levels until a long-term agreement can be reached, enact a FY2023—or alternative—funding levels until a long-term agreement can be reached, enact a
long-term continuing resolution for the full fiscal year, or take no action. Such actions also could long-term continuing resolution for the full fiscal year, or take no action. Such actions also could
include consideration of the Administration’s emergency supplemental appropriations request. A include consideration of the Administration’s emergency supplemental appropriations request. A
final FY2024 SFOPS bill would allow Congress to alter foreign assistance funding priorities, final FY2024 SFOPS bill would allow Congress to alter foreign assistance funding priorities,
directives, and reporting requirements for Latin America and the Caribbean to reflect changes in directives, and reporting requirements for Latin America and the Caribbean to reflect changes in
the region and in U.S. policy over the past year. It also would provide clarity to U.S. agencies on the region and in U.S. policy over the past year. It also would provide clarity to U.S. agencies on
funding levels as they plan and implement activities. funding levels as they plan and implement activities.
A continuing resolutionContinuing resolutions would be less likely would be less likely
to modify funding levels or policy toward the region but could keep existing programs running in to modify funding levels or policy toward the region but could keep existing programs running in
the absence of congressional agreement on potential changes. the absence of congressional agreement on potential changes.
Authorizations. In addition to appropriating assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean, In addition to appropriating assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Congress could shape longer-term U.S. foreign assistance policy toward the region with Congress could shape longer-term U.S. foreign assistance policy toward the region with
authorization legislation. Although Congress has not enacted a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization legislation. Although Congress has not enacted a comprehensive foreign assistance
authorization since 1985 (P.L. 99-83), it occasionally has authorized specific aid programs or authorization since 1985 (P.L. 99-83), it occasionally has authorized specific aid programs or
initiatives or has passed legislation mandating government strategies or establishing sectoral initiatives or has passed legislation mandating government strategies or establishing sectoral
priorities. In the 118th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported the priorities. In the 118th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act (S. 841), which would authorize $82.0 Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act (S. 841), which would authorize $82.0
million to be appropriated for the CBSI annually in FY2023 through FY2027 and would establish million to be appropriated for the CBSI annually in FY2023 through FY2027 and would establish
specific objectives, priorities, and reporting requirements for the initiative; a similar measure specific objectives, priorities, and reporting requirements for the initiative; a similar measure
(H.R. 1802) has been introduced in the House. Another bill reported by the Senate Foreign (H.R. 1802) has been introduced in the House. Another bill reported by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the United States Legal Gold and Mining Partnership Act (S. 797), would Relations Committee, the United States Legal Gold and Mining Partnership Act (S. 797), would
direct the Secretary of State to develop a multiyear strategy to combat illicit gold mining in the direct the Secretary of State to develop a multiyear strategy to combat illicit gold mining in the
Western Hemisphere and would authorize $10.0 million to be appropriated to the State Western Hemisphere and would authorize $10.0 million to be appropriated to the State
Department to implement the strategy. Other measures introduced in the first session of the 118th Department to implement the strategy. Other measures introduced in the first session of the 118th
Congress (e.g. H.R. 3194 and H.R. 3599) would authorize funding and/or certain foreign Congress (e.g. H.R. 3194 and H.R. 3599) would authorize funding and/or certain foreign
assistance activities in Central America. assistance activities in Central America.
Oversight. Beyond legislation, Congress could consider whether or not to exercise increased Beyond legislation, Congress could consider whether or not to exercise increased
oversight of U.S. assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean and of the executive oversight of U.S. assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean and of the executive
branch agencies that administer those programs. The 118th Congress has held hearings on the branch agencies that administer those programs. The 118th Congress has held hearings on the
Biden Administration’s FY2024 SFOPS budget request for Latin America and the Caribbean as Biden Administration’s FY2024 SFOPS budget request for Latin America and the Caribbean as
well as U.S. policy toward particular countries, such as Colombia and Haiti. If Congress chooses well as U.S. policy toward particular countries, such as Colombia and Haiti. If Congress chooses
to pursue increased oversight of U.S. assistance policies, committees could hold additional to pursue increased oversight of U.S. assistance policies, committees could hold additional
hearings and Members could conduct factfinding missions to the region to assess major U.S. hearings and Members could conduct factfinding missions to the region to assess major U.S.
initiatives, such as the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central initiatives, such as the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central
America; the CBSI; and the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and America; the CBSI; and the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and
Safe Communities. Such efforts could examine the extent to which those initiatives are meeting Safe Communities. Such efforts could examine the extent to which those initiatives are meeting
their stated objectives and what changes, if any, could make them more effective. their stated objectives and what changes, if any, could make them more effective.
27 White House,
27 White House,
National Security Strategy, October 2022, p. 40. , October 2022, p. 40.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean by Account and by Country or
Regional Program: FY2022 Actual and FY2024
Request
Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Actual
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-
DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET
FMF
Total
Argentina
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
0.6
0.6
Bahamas
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Belize
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Brazil
Brazil
25.0
25.0
—
—
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
29.8
29.8
Chile
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Colombia
Colombia
80.0 147
80.0 147
.0a
9.0
9.0
2.9
2.9
189.0
189.0
21.0
21.0
1.5
1.5
40.0
40.0
490.3
490.3
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
0.7
7.5
7.5
8.2
8.2
Cuba
Cuba
—
—
20.0
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
20.0
Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic
21.7
21.7
3.3.0a
—
—
21.3
21.3
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
46.5
46.5
Ecuador
Ecuador
27.0
27.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
13.3
13.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
5.0
5.0
45.6
45.6
El Salvador
El Salvador
84.0
84.0
—
—
4.0
4.0
10.3
10.3
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
98.7
98.7
Guatemala
Guatemala
85.5
85.5
20.
20.
0a
19.0
19.0
12.6
12.6
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
137.4
137.4
Guyana
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Haiti
Haiti
59.0
59.0
20.
20.
5a
24.5
24.5
103.1
103.1
30.3
30.3
—
—
0.1
0.1
—
—
237.4
237.4
Honduras
Honduras
95.0
95.0
10.
10.
0a
5.0
5.0
7.5
7.5
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
117.9
117.9
Jamaica
Jamaica
6.5
6.5
—
—
4.0
4.0
13.2
13.2
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
24.3
24.3
Mexico
Mexico
4.0
4.0
56.8
56.8
—
—
—
—
64.0
64.0
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
—
—
127.1
127.1
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
15.0
15.0
—
—
—
—
2.0
2.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
17.0
17.0
Panama
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
—
11.3
11.3
—
—
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
—
—
12.5
12.5
Paraguay
Paraguay
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
4.3
4.3
Peru
Peru
45.7
45.7
—
—
6.0
6.0
2.0
2.0
47.8
47.8
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.6
6.0
6.0
109.1
109.1
Suriname
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago
—
—
—
—
—
—
1.4
1.4
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
1.7
1.7
Uruguay
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Venezuela
Venezuela
—
—
40.0
40.0
5.0
5.0
3.6
3.6
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
48.6
48.6
Barbados and
Barbados and
14.3
14.3
10.
10.
0a
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
24.6
24.6
Eastern Caribbean
Eastern Caribbean
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GHP-
GHP-
DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET
FMF
Total
USAID Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
8.9
8.9
6.5
6.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.4
15.4
DevelopmentbDevelopmentb
USAID Central
USAID Central
33.0
33.0
2.0
2.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
35.0
35.0
AmericabAmericab
USAID South
USAID South
27.0
27.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
27.0
27.0
AmericabAmericab
USAID Latin
USAID Latin
21.0
21.0
6.7
6.7
11.0
11.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
38.7
38.7
America and
America and
CaribbeanbCaribbeanb
State Central
State Central
—
—
111.0
111.0
—
—
—
—
155.0
155.0
2.0
2.0
—
—
10.0
10.0
278.0
278.0
America
America
State Western
State Western
—
—
43.0
43.0
—
—
0.2
0.2
42.4
42.4
6.5
6.5
—
—
10.0
10.0
102.0
102.0
HemispherebHemisphereb
[Caribbean Basin
[——
] [35.0]
[——
]
[——
]
[35.0]
[——
]
[——
] [10.0]
[80.0]
Security Initiative]b
Total
Total
656.5 501.
656.5 501.
4a
91.5
91.5
191.3
191.3
541.8
541.8
32.1
32.1
11.3
11.3
78.5 2,104.
78.5 2,104.
4a
Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024, April 2023; and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by , April 2023; and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by
Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to H.R. Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to H.R.
2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022,” 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022,”
Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 42—Book IV (March 9, 2022), , vol. 168, no. 42—Book IV (March 9, 2022),
p. H3007. p. H3007.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support
Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education
and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development. International Development.
a. ESF figures for noted countries include a combined $64.0 a. ESF figures for noted countries include a combined $64.0
mil ionmillion of supplemental assistance appropriated in of supplemental assistance appropriated in
the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). ESF total includes $5.0
the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). ESF total includes $5.0
mil ionmillion appropriated as a voluntary contribution to the Organization of American States. appropriated as a voluntary contribution to the Organization of American States.
b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program. Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-
DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
0.8
0.8
Bahamas
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Belize
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Brazil
Brazil
35.0
35.0
—
—
6.0
6.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
1.0
1.0
—
—
42.0
42.0
Chile
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
0.7
—
—
0.7
0.7
Colombia
Colombia
103.0
103.0
122.0
122.0
9.0
9.0
—
—
160.0
160.0
10.0
10.0
2.0
2.0
38.0
38.0
444.0
444.0
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
GHP-
GHP-
DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
0.6
0.6
Cuba
Cuba
—
—
20.0
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
20.0
Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic
21.9
21.9
—
—
4.0
4.0
20.0
20.0
—
—
—
—
0.7
0.7
—
—
46.5
46.5
Ecuador
Ecuador
27.0
27.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
15.0
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.6
5.0
5.0
48.6
48.6
El Salvador
El Salvador
119.0
119.0
—
—
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
124.8
124.8
Guatemala
Guatemala
138.7
138.7
—
—
25.0
25.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
164.5
164.5
Guyana
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Haiti
Haiti
113.2
113.2
—
—
33.0
33.0
100.0
100.0
45.0
45.0
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
291.5
291.5
Honduras
Honduras
129.7
129.7
—
—
6.0
6.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
136.5
136.5
Jamaica
Jamaica
6.0
6.0
—
—
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
11.8
11.8
Mexico
Mexico
—
—
60.7
60.7
—
—
—
—
48.0
48.0
1.0
1.0
1.7
1.7
—
—
111.4
111.4
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
15.0
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
15.0
Panama
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
—
—
1.2
1.2
Paraguay
Paraguay
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
4.5
4.5
Peru
Peru
55.0
55.0
—
—
8.5
8.5
—
—
41.3
41.3
2.0
2.0
0.8
0.8
—
—
107.6
107.6
Suriname
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Uruguay
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Venezuela
Venezuela
—
—
50.0
50.0
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
54.0
54.0
Barbados and Eastern
Barbados and Eastern
20.5
20.5
—
—
2.5
2.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
1.0
1.0
—
—
24.0
24.0
Caribbean
Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
17.0
17.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
17.0
17.0
DevelopmentaDevelopmenta
USAID Central
USAID Central
85.2
85.2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
85.2
85.2
AmericaaAmericaa
USAID South
USAID South
55.4
55.4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
55.4
55.4
AmericaaAmericaa
USAID Latin America
USAID Latin America
25.2
25.2
5.0
5.0
11.5
11.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
41.7
41.7
and
and
CaribbeanaCaribbeana
State Central
State Central
—
—
167.5
167.5
—
—
43.6
43.6
191.2
191.2
5.0
5.0
—
—
10.5
10.5
417.8
417.8
AmericaaAmericaa
State Western
State Western
—
—
106.9
106.9
—
—
26.4
26.4
36.0
36.0
12.6
12.6
—
—
20.0
20.0
201.9
201.9
HemisphereaHemispherea
[Caribbean Basin
[——
] [28.0]
[——
]
[——
]
[29.0]
[——
]
[——
]
[7.5]
[64.5]
Security Initiative]a
Total
Total
90.7
90.7
532.1
532.1
119.5
119.5
190.0
190.0
536.5
536.5
32.1
32.1
16.2
16.2
73.5 2,470.7
73.5 2,470.7
Source: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024, April 2023. , April 2023.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support
Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education
and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development. International Development.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program. Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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