Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from July 18, 2023 to August 10, 2023

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Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S.
~~July 18~~August 10, 2023 , 2023
Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment, as Turkey U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment, as Turkey
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
also faces deep-seated economic problems and continues to recover from disastrous February also faces deep-seated economic problems and continues to recover from disastrous February
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
2023 earthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey 2023 earthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey

highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral relations. Ongoing disagreements stem from highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral relations. Ongoing disagreements stem from
Clayton Thomas
U.S. support for Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S. support for Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400 U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
surface-to-air defense system. Congressional action has included holds and conditions on U.S. surface-to-air defense system. Congressional action has included holds and conditions on U.S.

arms sales to Turkey, as well as support for certain sanctions against Turkey. Nevertheless, U.S. arms sales to Turkey, as well as support for certain sanctions against Turkey. Nevertheless, U.S.
and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s

membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
At the same time, Turkey apparently seeks to reduce its dependence on the West, as it and other “midsize powers” such as At the same time, Turkey apparently seeks to reduce its dependence on the West, as it and other “midsize powers” such as
Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition. Turkey’s desire for greater Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition. Turkey’s desire for greater
strategic autonomy may partly explain its willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, though the two countries retain strategic autonomy may partly explain its willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, though the two countries retain
significant differences on Ukraine and other issues. One analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security problems significant differences on Ukraine and other issues. One analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security problems
around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and the Caucasus—require it to deal with around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and the Caucasus—require it to deal with
Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help from the West. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help from the West. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on its leaders’ willingness to risk breaks in traditional ties with Western powers while building other global partly on its leaders’ willingness to risk breaks in traditional ties with Western powers while building other global
relationships. relationships.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for
bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. Under President Joe bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. Under President Joe
Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters. In a June 2023 Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters. In a June 2023
CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one
in which we can have a constructive relationship with them.” While Turkey’s deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for in which we can have a constructive relationship with them.” While Turkey’s deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for
U.S. concern, its emergence as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasionU.S. concern, its emergence as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion —including with regard to the shipment of grain to global markets—has arguably increased has arguably increased
Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations also have improved due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations also have improved due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s
defense; its limitation of Russian naval access to and from the Black Sea; and its moves toward rapprochement with Israel, defense; its limitation of Russian naval access to and from the Black Sea; and its moves toward rapprochement with Israel,
some Arab states, and Armenia. some Arab states, and Armenia.
Citing the importance of NATO strength and interoperability, President Biden has voiced support for sales that would revamp Citing the importance of NATO strength and interoperability, President Biden has voiced support for sales that would revamp
Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly
provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment
and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey
might approve of Sweden joining NATO, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Turkey agreed to Finland’s NATO might approve of Sweden joining NATO, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Turkey agreed to Finland’s NATO
membership in March 2023, but has conditioned approval for Sweden on it taking actions against individuals and groups that membership in March 2023, but has conditioned approval for Sweden on it taking actions against individuals and groups that
Turkey deems to be terrorists. In July 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to send the NATO accession Turkey deems to be terrorists. In July 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to send the NATO accession
protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,” but the process could extend protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,” but the process could extend
into the fall and potentially depend on additional action from Sweden, along with assurances of congressional support for the into the fall and potentially depend on additional action from Sweden, along with assurances of congressional support for the
F-16 sale. F-16 sale.
Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1)
the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian
Kurds linked to the PKK, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and Kurds linked to the PKK, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq. northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
Domestically, many observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of President Erdogan. Despite major Domestically, many observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of President Erdogan. Despite major
inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An
official international observer mission stated that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,” official international observer mission stated that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,”
government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an “unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an “unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process
and how it related to past Turkish elections.and how it related to past Turkish elections.
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Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and (Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with
Greece and Cyprus). Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved
U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in
January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale, January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale,
plus associated equipment and munitions (see plus associated equipment and munitions (see “Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views”
below). In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey below). In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey
is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive
relationship with them.”4 relationship with them.”4
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey. Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being. policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure 1 for a map and key facts and figures for a map and key facts and figures
about Turkey. about Turkey.

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023. Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and 2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023. Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for 3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 1, 2023. Relations, June 1, 2023.
4 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01. 4 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01.
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Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022) 22.1% (2022)
Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $ $~~36,786~~39,463
Real GDP growth: ~~2.7~~3.3% %
Inflation: ~~38.2~~47.8% (as of % (as of ~~June~~July 2023) 2023)
Unemployment: ~~11.0~~10.6% %
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 4. 4.48% %
Public debt as % of GDP: ~~36.2~~32.8% %
Current account deficit as % of GDP: ~~4.8~~5.4% %
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023 Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023
projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;
Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical ; and Turkish Statistical
Institute. Institute.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming ) has ruled Turkey since becoming
prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
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institutions. Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected institutions. Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected
roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5
After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential
election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of
governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018 governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018
presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation
surfaced after the referendum and the elections.6 In a controversial ruling during the referendum, surfaced after the referendum and the elections.6 In a controversial ruling during the referendum,
Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) decided not to enforce the normal Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) decided not to enforce the normal
requirement that only properly stamped ballots could be counted, leading some observers to requirement that only properly stamped ballots could be counted, leading some observers to
question the outcome’s legitimacy.7 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the question the outcome’s legitimacy.7 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the
military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly
because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish
acronym MHP). acronym MHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.8 Some leading opposition governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.8 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.9 suppress dissent and consolidate power.9
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts
include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and
Syria.10 Syria.10
February 2023 Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000 damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000
people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living
situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response
involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings, involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings,
observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to
help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.11 U.S. officials have provided or help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.11 U.S. officials have provided or
announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in humanitarian announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in humanitarian

5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two 5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
6 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 6 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). (published June 25, 2018).
7 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan’s Russian Victory,” 7 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan’s Russian Victory,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023. , May 29, 2023.
8 State Department, 8 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission, , Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022. , October 6, 2022.
9 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” 9 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” , July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. , April 7, 2021.
10 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 10 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022. 18, 2022.
11 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” 11 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” Al-Monitor, March , March
20, 2023. 20, 2023.
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assistance.12 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be assistance.12 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be
around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—
international pledges of assistance international pledges of assistance ~~as of~~at a March 2023 March 2023 donors conference totaled nearly $7.5 billion.13 totaled nearly $7.5 billion.13
The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy. The 10 southern Turkish The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy. The 10 southern Turkish
provinces most directly affected account for about 10% of Turkey’s GDP and 15% of its provinces most directly affected account for about 10% of Turkey’s GDP and 15% of its
population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.14 population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.14
Analysts have speculated about the extent of the Erdogan government’s responsibility for the Analysts have speculated about the extent of the Erdogan government’s responsibility for the
damage and hardship stemming from the earthquakes,15 with some drawing comparisons to a damage and hardship stemming from the earthquakes,15 with some drawing comparisons to a
major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey that killed approximately 18,000 and prompted major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey that killed approximately 18,000 and prompted
legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.16 Some media accounts and opposition legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.16 Some media accounts and opposition
politicians have alleged that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, government officials and politicians have alleged that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, government officials and
contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction codes, at least partly contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction codes, at least partly
contributing to the scope of destruction and fatalities.17 Erdogan has denounced criticism aimed at contributing to the scope of destruction and fatalities.17 Erdogan has denounced criticism aimed at
him or the government as fomenting disunity,18 and Turkey’s justice ministry has ordered him or the government as fomenting disunity,18 and Turkey’s justice ministry has ordered
prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal violations for prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal violations for
substandard work.19 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s initial substandard work.19 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s initial
response,20 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.21response,20 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.21 He has announced a He has announced a
government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000 government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000
in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a
quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave
the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.22 the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.22
~~Major Economic Challenges and Options~~
~~Ongoing financial problems in Turkey have considerably worsened over the past two years, with~~
~~major inflation occurring in parallel with accelerated depreciation of Turkey’s currency, the lira.~~
~~After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was just over~~In July 2023, the Erdogan-led AKP proposed a draft law that would partly fund reconstruction via corporate tax increases.23

12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support 12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support
Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023. Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.
13 13 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/, March 2023, at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/
uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey,
Syria earthquake victims.” Syria earthquake victims.”
14 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” 14 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Reuters, February 13, 2023; , February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” New
York Times, February 13, 2023. , February 13, 2023.
15 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” 15 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” , February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023. , February 10, 2023.
16 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” 16 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Associated
Press, February 10, 2023. s, February 10, 2023.
17 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al., 17 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al.,
“Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” “Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” New York Times, February 24, 2023. , February 24, 2023.
18 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.” 18 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.”
19 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” 19 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” New York Times, February 12, , February 12,
2023. 2023.
20 Ibid. 20 Ibid.
21 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” 21 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” New York Times, February 12, 2023. , February 12, 2023.
22 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” 22 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 , March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5
billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.” billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
23 “Turkey to raise corporate tax to fund earthquake rebuilding-draft law,” Reuters, July 5, 2023. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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link to page link to page ~~19 link to page 19~~20 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

~~38% in June 2023, while some unofficial estimates in early 2023 have remained at over 100%.23~~
Major Economic Challenges and Options Ongoing financial problems in Turkey have considerably worsened over the past two years, with major inflation occurring in parallel with accelerated depreciation of Turkey’s currency, the lira. After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was just over 47.8% in July 2023. Some unofficial estimates in early 2023 said that inflation was actually over 100%.24 The spike in inflation could be linked to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key The spike in inflation could be linked to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key
interest rate from September 2021 to March 2023—moving it down from 19% to 8.5%. interest rate from September 2021 to March 2023—moving it down from 19% to 8.5%.
Additional inflationary pressure may have come from external events such as Russia’s war on Additional inflationary pressure may have come from external events such as Russia’s war on
Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.2425 The lira has The lira has
been trending downward for more than a decadebeen trending downward for more than a decade ~~(see Error! Reference source not found.), with i~~
ts, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy. decline probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.25
26 It has lost more than 80% of its value against the dollar since 2018, with much of the decrease It has lost more than 80% of its value against the dollar since 2018, with much of the decrease
coming after the major rate cuts began in 2021.coming after the major rate cuts began in 2021.2627
President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic theory that higher President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic theory that higher
interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the currency. In interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the currency. In
replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan established replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan established
greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan argued that greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan argued that
lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.2728 Erdogan also criticized high Erdogan also criticized high
interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap between rich and interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap between rich and
poor.poor.2829 He has insisted that Turkey will not turn to international financial institutions such as the He has insisted that Turkey will not turn to international financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, after Turkey in 2013 paid off loans that—in International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, after Turkey in 2013 paid off loans that—in
the aggregate—had been outstanding for 52 years.the aggregate—had been outstanding for 52 years.2930
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax
cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and expenses, along with protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and
borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.3031 Turkey also has sought currency swaps and loans Turkey also has sought currency swaps and loans
from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (see from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (see “Turkey-Russia
~~Economic and Energy Cooperation”~~ ~~below).31 Additionally, Russia has reportedly deferred to~~
~~2024 at least some of Turkey’s payments for natural gas imports.32~~
~~In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection (discussed below), the lira’s value has declined~~
~~further. Turkey’s central bank revealed that as of the week of May 19, official statistics listed its~~

23 24 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal, ,
April 26, 2023. April 26, 2023.
2425 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April , April
28, 2022. 28, 2022.
2526 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. , April 25, 2022.
2627 Rumeysa Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” Rumeysa Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2023. , June 18, 2023.
2728 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta , December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. , December 11, 2021.
2829 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s , June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021. Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
2930 “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013. , May 14, 2013.
3031 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” East Institute, February 13, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters, ,
April 23, 2023. April 23, 2023.
~~31 “Erdogan says Gulf states sent cash in relief for Turkey,” Reuters, May 25, 2023; Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia~~
~~drops $5 billion in Turkey’s central bank to help its struggling economy,” CNBC, March 6, 2023; M. Murat Kubilay,~~
~~“As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute,~~
~~November 7, 2022.~~
~~32 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023.~~
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Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 20 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Economic and Energy Cooperation” below).32 Additionally, Russia has reportedly deferred to 2024 at least some of Turkey’s payments for natural gas imports.33 In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection (discussed below), the lira’s value has declined further. Turkey’s central bank revealed that as of the week of May 19, official statistics listed its net foreign exchange reserves as negative for the first time in 21 years.net foreign exchange reserves as negative for the first time in 21 years.3334 Thus, with a balance-of- Thus, with a balance-of-
payments crisis possible, Turkish economic policymakers appear to face the following important payments crisis possible, Turkish economic policymakers appear to face the following important
choices: choices:
• • Whether to raise interest rates or maintain them at relatively low levels. A A
more orthodox monetary policy course with higher interest rates might reduce more orthodox monetary policy course with higher interest rates might reduce
inflation and attract more foreign capital via international financial markets, but inflation and attract more foreign capital via international financial markets, but
slow economic growth and exports. Alternatively, Turkish officials could keep slow economic growth and exports. Alternatively, Turkish officials could keep
interest rates low, and use capital controls that limit or restrict the ability of interest rates low, and use capital controls that limit or restrict the ability of
investors to withdraw investments. Capital controls, however, can deter investors to withdraw investments. Capital controls, however, can deter
investment in the long-run. During the May 2023 election campaign, Erdogan investment in the long-run. During the May 2023 election campaign, Erdogan
took some measures aimed at preventing capital flight and providing relief to took some measures aimed at preventing capital flight and providing relief to
Turkish consumers and businesses from the effects of inflation.Turkish consumers and businesses from the effects of inflation.3435 Turkey’s Turkey’s
modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 3633% may give it some space to increase % may give it some space to increase
government spending in efforts to relieve inflation, though this flexibility could government spending in efforts to relieve inflation, though this flexibility could
be limited by Erdogan’s relief measures to date and the estimated $104 billion be limited by Erdogan’s relief measures to date and the estimated $104 billion
cost Turkey faces from the earthquake crisis. cost Turkey faces from the earthquake crisis.
• • Whether to continue central bank interventions to strengthen the Turkish
lira, or allow the lira to depreciate. With Turkey’s foreign currency reserves With Turkey’s foreign currency reserves
~~mostly~~greatly depleted depleted as of May, the government’s past strategy of selling reserves to bolster the , the government’s past strategy of selling reserves to bolster the
lira’s value appears less viable. The government could try to support the lira lira’s value appears less viable. The government could try to support the lira
through alternative means, such as additional currency swaps or ad hoc financial through alternative means, such as additional currency swaps or ad hoc financial
arrangements with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and/or other authoritarian regimes. arrangements with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and/or other authoritarian regimes.
One report suggests, however, that Gulf states might balk at bailouts for Turkey One report suggests, however, that Gulf states might balk at bailouts for Turkey
without some policy changes to reduce risks of default, and that Russia’s own without some policy changes to reduce risks of default, and that Russia’s own
financial concerns probably limit its willingness to help.financial concerns probably limit its willingness to help.3536 Absent central bank Absent central bank
intervention, the lira intervention, the lira ~~is likely to~~could depreciate further, which could boost exports and depreciate further, which could boost exports and
tourism, but might drive domestic consumers to withdraw from the Turkish tourism, but might drive domestic consumers to withdraw from the Turkish
banking system. banking system.
Prospects for Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy, which has been relatively resilient to date Prospects for Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy, which has been relatively resilient to date
and is anchored by its customs union with the EU, could remain favorable if Turkey can resolve and is anchored by its customs union with the EU, could remain favorable if Turkey can resolve
its financial crisis quickly.its financial crisis quickly.3637 In June, Erdogan named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP figure In June, Erdogan named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP figure
and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister. In previous leadership roles under and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister. In previous leadership roles under
Erdogan (including as finance minister from 2009 to 2015), Simsek generally supported a more Erdogan (including as finance minister from 2009 to 2015), Simsek generally supported a more
orthodox approach to monetary policy, and his appointment could increase international market orthodox approach to monetary policy, and his appointment could increase international market
~~confidence in Turkey if Erdogan gives Simsek flexibility to act.37 Some observers assert that if~~
~~Erdogan permits a change of course, it will be mixed or gradual rather than fully returning Turkey~~
~~to orthodox practice on interest rates. Erdogan might seek to avoid austerity measures that could~~
~~increase unemployment and create liquidity problems for businesses in advance of Turkish~~
~~municipal elections scheduled for March 2024.38~~

33 32 “Erdogan says Gulf states sent cash in relief for Turkey,” Reuters, May 25, 2023; Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia drops $5 billion in Turkey’s central bank to help its struggling economy,” CNBC, March 6, 2023; M. Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute, November 7, 2022. 33 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023. 34 “Turkey central bank’s net forex reserves negative for first time since 2002,” “Turkey central bank’s net forex reserves negative for first time since 2002,” Reuters, May 26, 2023. , May 26, 2023.
3435 “Analysis: Turkish lira’s long decline a symbol of strife,” “Analysis: Turkish lira’s long decline a symbol of strife,” Reuters, May 28, 2023. , May 28, 2023.
3536 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy,” Ragip Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy,” Middle East Eye, June 1, 2023. , June 1, 2023.
3637 Alan Beattie, “Erdoğan’s monetary misadventures are pushing Turkey off course,” Alan Beattie, “Erdoğan’s monetary misadventures are pushing Turkey off course,” Financial Times, May 25, 2023. , May 25, 2023.
~~37 Ezgi Akin, “Meet Turkey’s Mehmet Simsek: Erdogan’s last best hope for economic recovery,” Al-Monitor, June 3,~~
~~2023.~~
~~38 “Exclusive: Turkey’s new cabinet almost certain to include Simsek,” Reuters, May 31, 2023; Soylu, “Turkey:~~
~~Erdogan’s tough options on the economy.”~~
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Congressional Research Service 6 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations confidence in Turkey if Erdogan gives Simsek flexibility to act.38 Some observers assert that if Erdogan permits a change of course, it will be mixed or gradual rather than fully returning Turkey to orthodox practice on interest rates. Erdogan might seek to avoid austerity measures that could increase unemployment and create liquidity problems for businesses in advance of Turkish municipal elections scheduled for March 2024.39 U.S.-Turkey Economic Cooperation40 Turkey’s economy—the 19th-largest in the world—is attractive to many U.S. companies for trade and investment. The two countries have various bilateral agreements to promote economic cooperation, though no free trade agreement. Total bilateral trade volume for 2022 (per data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and U.S. Census Bureau) was $42 bil ion, up from $33 bil ion in 2021, and the countries have set a goal to increase trade volume to $100 bil ion. U.S.-Turkey economic ties only account for a small fraction of U.S. international trade and investment. Turkey has a far closer economic relationship with the EU (with which it has had a customs union on manufactured goods since 1995). Turkish foreign policy tensions with the United States and other NATO allies, discussed elsewhere in this report, may complicate efforts to expand trade ties. In 2021, for merchandise trade, the United States comprised 6.5% of Turkey’s exports and 4.8% of its imports (per WTO data). For purposes of comparison, in the same year the EU bloc comprised 41.9% of Turkey’s exports and 31.5% of its imports. From 2003 to 2021, EU countries provided more than 50% of Turkey’s foreign direct investment, with the United States supplying 8.1%.41
In a sign that Simsek and a new central bank governor may be following a gradual approach on In a sign that Simsek and a new central bank governor may be following a gradual approach on
interest rates in an effort to avoid losing Erdogan’s support, the central bank raised rates from interest rates in an effort to avoid losing Erdogan’s support, the central bank raised rates from
8.5% to 15% in 8.5% to 15% in ~~late June.39 After the increase~~June, and then to 17.5% in July.42 After the increases, the rate remained more than , the rate remained more than 2030% less than % less than
inflation. The central bank also appears to have stopped selling reserves to backstop the lira’s inflation. The central bank also appears to have stopped selling reserves to backstop the lira’s
value,value,43 and the currency’s exchange rate has depreciated from around 20 per dollar at Erdogan’s and the currency’s exchange rate has depreciated from around 20 per dollar at Erdogan’s
reelection in May to around reelection in May to around ~~26 in mid-July.40~~27 as of early August. Turkish officials also are continuing efforts to bolster trade and foreign direct investment. Erdogan reached a reported $50 billion in agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in July, and Turkey has signed deals with multiple Arab Gulf states to sell armed drones.44 38 Ezgi Akin, “Meet Turkey’s Mehmet Simsek: Erdogan’s last best hope for economic recovery,” Al-Monitor, June 3, 2023. 39 “Exclusive: Turkey’s new cabinet almost certain to include Simsek,” Reuters, May 31, 2023; Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy.” 40 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. For information on issues of U.S.-Turkey interest regarding energy, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 41 Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, “FDI in Türkiye,” available at https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/whyturkey/pages/fdi-in-turkey.aspx. 42 Natasha Turak, “Turkey’s central bank hikes interest rate to 15% in dramatic U-turn to fight inflation,” CNBC, June 22, 2023. 43 Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” 44 Andrew England and Adam Samson, “UAE and Turkey sign multibillion-dollar agreements,” Financial Times, July 19, 2023; Paul Iddon, “How Saudi Arabia and UAE learned to stop worrying and love Turkey’s Bayraktar drones,” Business Insider, August 6, 2023. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 37 link to page 37 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations
May 2023 Elections: Another Term for Erdogan
Background
On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of
Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled
speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties
led by the generally pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalistic Good (led by the generally pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalistic Good (IYI) )
Party (seeParty (see Appendix B for profiles of selected party leaders).for profiles of selected party leaders).4145 Despite Erdogan’s potential Despite Erdogan’s potential
vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited
opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial
rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the
media.media.4246
Three main alliances contested the election: Three main alliances contested the election:
• • People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller , which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller
parties. parties.
• • Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and
four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures. four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures.
• • Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the , which includes a few small parties alongside the
Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP
arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP) arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP)
to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional
Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name. Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name.
In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu ( In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (kuhl-utch-
dahr-oh-loo) as its joint presidential candidate.) as its joint presidential candidate.4347 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner, Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner,
Good Party leader Meral Aksener (Good Party leader Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after ), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after
two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor
Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to
Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been
undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other

~~39 Natasha Turak, “Turkey’s central bank hikes interest rate to 15% in dramatic U-turn to fight inflation,” CNBC, June~~
~~22, 2023.~~
~~40 Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?”~~
41opposition figures charge is politically motivated.48 While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.49 45 See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” Reuters, May 11, 2023. , May 11, 2023.
4246 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard , May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard
to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023. , March 18, 2023.
4347 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, se For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp
contrast,” contrast,” Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided , May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided
opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man , March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man
who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” James in Turkey, January 10, 2023. , January 10, 2023.
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~~opposition figures charge is politically motivated.44 While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal~~
~~coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in~~
~~the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.45~~48 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15, 2022. 49 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Politico Europe, April 28, 2023. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 13 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations
Results and Electoral Process
In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell just short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell just short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim
outright victory in the presidential race, leading Kilicdaroglu by 4% as they prepared for Turkey’s outright victory in the presidential race, leading Kilicdaroglu by 4% as they prepared for Turkey’s
first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. About 87% of registered voters turned out to first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. About 87% of registered voters turned out to
vote. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from vote. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from
344 seats out of 600 to 323 (se344 seats out of 600 to 323 (see Figure 2). While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February . While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February
earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his first-round electoral earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his first-round electoral
performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.4650 Aggregate pre-election polling anticipated Aggregate pre-election polling anticipated
a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.4751
Erdogan prevailed in the run-off against Kilicdaroglu by a margin of 52%-48%, winning a new Erdogan prevailed in the run-off against Kilicdaroglu by a margin of 52%-48%, winning a new
five-year term. Voter turnout in the run-off was around 84%. Under Turkey’s constitution, five-year term. Voter turnout in the run-off was around 84%. Under Turkey’s constitution,
Erdogan might be entitled to run for one additional term if three-fifths of parliament’s members Erdogan might be entitled to run for one additional term if three-fifths of parliament’s members
vote to schedule early elections.vote to schedule early elections.4852 Erdogan could seek to revise or remove presidential term limits Erdogan could seek to revise or remove presidential term limits
via constitutional amendment. via constitutional amendment.
Figure 2. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Results
(out of 600 total seats) (out of 600 total seats)

Source: YSK. YSK.

~~44 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15,~~
~~2022.~~
~~45 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Politico Europe,~~
~~April 28, 2023.~~
46Note: The various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them won parliamentary seats. Observers for Turkey’s elections included representatives from domestic political parties and civil society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). These observers monitored polling station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.53 The 50 Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey’s election as it heads toward a runoff,” Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey’s election as it heads toward a runoff,” NPR, May 15, 2023; Amberin , May 15, 2023; Amberin
Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Al-Monitor, May 15, 2023. , May 15, 2023.
4751 See https://600vekil.com/mayis-2023-secim-ongorusu, accessed on June 2, 2023. See https://600vekil.com/mayis-2023-secim-ongorusu, accessed on June 2, 2023.
4852 Article 116 of Turkey’s constitution. Unofficial English translation available at Article 116 of Turkey’s constitution. Unofficial English translation available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. 53 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023, and Presidential Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023,” at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy (continued...) Congressional Research Service 9 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en.~~
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Note: The various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them
~~won parliamentary seats.~~
~~Observers for Turkey’s elections included representatives from domestic political parties and civil~~
~~society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe~~
~~(OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). These observers~~
~~monitored polling station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.49 The~~
OSCE-PACE international election observation mission said the following in preliminary OSCE-PACE international election observation mission said the following in preliminary
findings and conclusions it released a day after the May 28 run-off: findings and conclusions it released a day after the May 28 run-off:
The run-off presidential election held on 28 May offered voters a choice between genuine The run-off presidential election held on 28 May offered voters a choice between genuine
political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, as in the first round, political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, as in the first round,
biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage
to the incumbent. The election administration technically managed the election efficiently, to the incumbent. The election administration technically managed the election efficiently,
but its lack of transparency and communication largely persisted. While the absence of but its lack of transparency and communication largely persisted. While the absence of
regulation of several aspects of the second round did not provide legal certainty, positively, regulation of several aspects of the second round did not provide legal certainty, positively,
the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) issued multiple regulations to remedy some of these the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) issued multiple regulations to remedy some of these
legal gaps. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign legal gaps. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign
freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both
contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some
opposition parties undermined the process. In an environment with restrictions on freedom opposition parties undermined the process. In an environment with restrictions on freedom
of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and
impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make
an informed choice. Election day was generally calm and well-administered. However, an informed choice. Election day was generally calm and well-administered. However,
instances of deficient implementation ofinstances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote certain procedures, particularly during the vote
count, were noted.count, were noted.5054
Other domestic and international commentators have expressed varying views about the conduct Other domestic and international commentators have expressed varying views about the conduct
of Turkey’s elections. Many have echoed the OSCE-PACE mission’s assessment that Erdogan’s of Turkey’s elections. Many have echoed the OSCE-PACE mission’s assessment that Erdogan’s
control over state resources and institutions gave him an unfair advantage during the campaign.control over state resources and institutions gave him an unfair advantage during the campaign.5155
Despite the high turnout for both electoral rounds, some analysts challenged whether the electoral Despite the high turnout for both electoral rounds, some analysts challenged whether the electoral
process could be characterized as free.process could be characterized as free.5256 Although Kilicdaroglu said the election period was the Although Kilicdaroglu said the election period was the
most unfair in Turkish history, the opposition did not argue that various irregularities alleged by most unfair in Turkish history, the opposition did not argue that various irregularities alleged by
some sources would have changed the results.some sources would have changed the results.5357
Assessment and Implications
After the elections, analysts have sought to explain the outcome and President Erdogan’s abiding After the elections, analysts have sought to explain the outcome and President Erdogan’s abiding
popular appeal. Many have concluded that key nationalistic and religious voter blocs maintain a popular appeal. Many have concluded that key nationalistic and religious voter blocs maintain a
level of ideological devotion or personal attachment to Erdogan—partly based on patronage level of ideological devotion or personal attachment to Erdogan—partly based on patronage
networks or actions he has taken on their behalf—that appear to outweigh economic concerns networks or actions he has taken on their behalf—that appear to outweigh economic concerns

~~49 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023, and Presidential~~
~~Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023,” at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy~~
they might have.58 Large numbers of these voters may have been hesitant to empower an opposition with legacy ties to Turkey’s pre-Erdogan secular elite leadership, especially after Kilicdaroglu openly partnered with the Kurdish-led HDP.59 Some observers argue that Erdogan also may have benefitted from perceptions that he is more capable of acting swiftly to address and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for
International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023. International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023.
5054 OSCE, OSCE, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Republic of Türkiye – Presidential Election, Second
Round, 28 May 2023 (published May 29, 2023). (published May 29, 2023).
5155 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president,” “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president,” Economist, May 28, 2023; Fatma Tanis, “Erdogan , May 28, 2023; Fatma Tanis, “Erdogan
cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” NPR, May 28, 2023. , May 28, 2023.
5256 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” Foreign
Affairs, May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” , May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023. , May 31, 2023.
5357 Sources reporting alleged irregularities include Turkey recap, “Forever & All Reis,” June 1, 2023; “Turkey Sources reporting alleged irregularities include Turkey recap, “Forever & All Reis,” June 1, 2023; “Turkey
opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023. , May 17, 2023.
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~~they might have.54 Large numbers of these voters may have been hesitant to empower an~~
~~opposition with legacy ties to Turkey’s pre-Erdogan secular elite leadership, especially after~~
~~Kilicdaroglu openly partnered with the Kurdish-led HDP.55 Some observers argue that Erdogan~~
~~also may have benefitted from perceptions that he is more capable of acting swiftly to address~~
58 Michael Werz, “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy,” Center for American Progress, May 31, 2023; Adam Samson, “The patronage network behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid for third decade in power,” Financial Times, May 27, 2023. 59 Alan Makovsky, “Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, May 30, 2023. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations voters’ material concerns—bypassing bureaucratic obstacles or political divisions—than his voters’ material concerns—bypassing bureaucratic obstacles or political divisions—than his
election rivals would have been.election rivals would have been.5660 It is unclear to what extent Erdogan’s resilience shares features It is unclear to what extent Erdogan’s resilience shares features
with that of authoritarian-leaning incumbents in other countries, or stems from socioeconomic with that of authoritarian-leaning incumbents in other countries, or stems from socioeconomic
factors unique to Turkey. factors unique to Turkey.
Erdogan’s reelection and continued parliamentary majority will likely have implications in the Erdogan’s reelection and continued parliamentary majority will likely have implications in the
following areas. following areas.
Economy. As discussed above, Erdogan’s government has taken some initial post-election As discussed above, Erdogan’s government has taken some initial post-election
measures to address Turkey’s ongoing currency and inflation crisis, given Turkey’s largely measures to address Turkey’s ongoing currency and inflation crisis, given Turkey’s largely
depleted foreign exchange reservesdepleted foreign exchange reserves at the time of his reelection. .
Domestic politics. While the 2023 presidential election was Erdogan’s most difficult to date, and While the 2023 presidential election was Erdogan’s most difficult to date, and
he won a smaller parliamentary majority than in 2018, he does not appear inclined to change his he won a smaller parliamentary majority than in 2018, he does not appear inclined to change his
general approach to domestic governance, rule of law, and human rights. As he prepares to general approach to domestic governance, rule of law, and human rights. As he prepares to
preside over the Turkish republic’s 100th anniversary in October 2023 and lead the AKP’s March preside over the Turkish republic’s 100th anniversary in October 2023 and lead the AKP’s March
2024 municipal election campaign, Erdogan may return to points he emphasized during his 2024 municipal election campaign, Erdogan may return to points he emphasized during his
reelection campaign that trumpet his accomplishments at home and abroad, and seek to paint his reelection campaign that trumpet his accomplishments at home and abroad, and seek to paint his
domestic rivals as sympathetic to Kurdish militants and LGBTQ causes. Some observers worry domestic rivals as sympathetic to Kurdish militants and LGBTQ causes. Some observers worry
that the inclusion of Islamists from two small parties in Erdogan’s People’s Alliance could push that the inclusion of Islamists from two small parties in Erdogan’s People’s Alliance could push
social policy in a more religiously conservative direction.social policy in a more religiously conservative direction.5761 However, Erdogan’s majority does However, Erdogan’s majority does
not depend on these parties, and he may have options to ally with a number of other parties, not depend on these parties, and he may have options to ally with a number of other parties,
including some from the opposition.including some from the opposition.5862
The opposition faces a number of questions about its future. It had failed to unseat Erdogan The opposition faces a number of questions about its future. It had failed to unseat Erdogan
before and after Kilicdaroglu became CHP leader in 2010, but many observers had expressed that before and after Kilicdaroglu became CHP leader in 2010, but many observers had expressed that
Turkey’s economic woes and the February earthquakes made Erdogan uniquely vulnerable in Turkey’s economic woes and the February earthquakes made Erdogan uniquely vulnerable in
2023.2023.5963 In this context, it is unclear whether Kilicdaroglu can maintain his leadership position, In this context, it is unclear whether Kilicdaroglu can maintain his leadership position,
and whether the CHP will continue its current partnerships and its common cause with the HDP. and whether the CHP will continue its current partnerships and its common cause with the HDP.
Some observers assess that Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could be Erdogan’s most formidable long-Some observers assess that Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could be Erdogan’s most formidable long-
term opponent, but his status could depend on whether he can successfully appeal his criminal term opponent, but his status could depend on whether he can successfully appeal his criminal
conviction and win reelection in 2024.conviction and win reelection in 2024.6064
U.S. relations and foreign policy. Erdogan appears inclined to pursue a largely transactional Erdogan appears inclined to pursue a largely transactional
foreign policy course that hedges between the United States, Russia, and other international foreign policy course that hedges between the United States, Russia, and other international
actors, in continuity with his past efforts to pursue greater autonomy for Turkey within an actors, in continuity with his past efforts to pursue greater autonomy for Turkey within an

~~54 Michael Werz, “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy,” Center for American~~
~~Progress, May 31, 2023; Adam Samson, “The patronage network behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid for third decade~~
~~in power,” Financial Times, May 27, 2023.~~
~~55 Alan Makovsky, “Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff,” Arab Gulf~~
~~States Institute in Washington, May 30, 2023.~~
~~56 See, for example, Tol.~~
~~57 See, for example, Kamuran Samar and Joshua Askew, “What Erdoğan'~~increasingly multipolar global system (discussed further below). During the 2023 election campaign, Kilicdaroglu pledged to move in a more pro-Western direction,65 prompting Erdogan to say, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”66 Also during the campaign, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to topple him,67 apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a New York Times 60 See, for example, Tol. 61 See, for example, Kamuran Samar and Joshua Askew, “What Erdoğan’s re-election means for Turkey and the West,” s re-election means for Turkey and the West,”
Euronews, May 28, 2023. , May 28, 2023.
5862 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan has MPs to play with after strong parliamentary showing,” Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan has MPs to play with after strong parliamentary showing,” Middle East
Eye, May 26, 2023. , May 26, 2023.
5963 See, for example, Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why did Kilicdaroglu lose?” See, for example, Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why did Kilicdaroglu lose?” Middle East Eye, May 31, 2023. , May 31, 2023.
6064 Nadeen Ebrahim, “Erdogan intent on taking back Istanbul after presidential victory,” Nadeen Ebrahim, “Erdogan intent on taking back Istanbul after presidential victory,” CNN, May 31, 2023. , May 31, 2023.
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~~increasingly multipolar global system (discussed further below). During the 2023 election~~
~~campaign, Kilicdaroglu pledged to move in a more pro-Western direction,61 prompting Erdogan~~
~~to say, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”62 Also~~
~~during the campaign, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to~~
topple him,63 apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a New York Times
65 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2023. 66 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 13, 2023. 67 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters, May 13, 2023. Congressional Research Service 11 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations interview during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via interview during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via
the electoral process.the electoral process.6468 When asked about his campaign comments regarding President Biden in a When asked about his campaign comments regarding President Biden in a
May 19 CNN interview, Erdogan insisted that he would continue to work with Biden if May 19 CNN interview, Erdogan insisted that he would continue to work with Biden if
reelected.reelected.6569 President Biden called Erdogan the day after his reelection to congratulate him, and President Biden called Erdogan the day after his reelection to congratulate him, and
they “expressed their shared commitment to continue working together as close partners to they “expressed their shared commitment to continue working together as close partners to
deepen cooperation between our countries and people.”deepen cooperation between our countries and people.”6670 Given Turkey’s ongoing economic Given Turkey’s ongoing economic
concerns, one analyst has remarked, “Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may concerns, one analyst has remarked, “Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may
impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-
Western resentments.”Western resentments.”6771
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect some change to this orientation within the past with the United States and other countries reflect some change to this orientation within the past
decade, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more decade, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more
multipolar global system. James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after President multipolar global system. James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after President
Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational
decision, given not only their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the decision, given not only their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the
standpoint of their experiences.”standpoint of their experiences.”68
72 Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. surface-to-air defense system. Turkey and other “midsize powers” such as Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition, thus partly explaining their tendency to hedge between the United States and other great powers.73 Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—
with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia/Azerbaijan. Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia/Azerbaijan.
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these

~~61 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, May 9, 2023.~~
~~62 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 13, 2023.~~
~~63 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters, May 13, 2023.~~
64actors and maintain its leverage with them.74 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks in those relationships while building other global relationships. For example, Turkey appears 68 New York Times editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
6569 Transcript of CNN interview, May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-19/segment/02. Transcript of CNN interview, May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-19/segment/02.
6670 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Erdogan of Türkiye,” May 29, 2023. White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Erdogan of Türkiye,” May 29, 2023.
6771 Makovsky. Makovsky.
6872 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.
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~~actors and maintain its leverage with them.69 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend~~
~~partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and~~
~~economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks~~
~~in those relationships while building other global relationships. For example, Turkey appears~~
73 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Prince Tests Nonaligned Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2023. 74 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 18 link to page 34 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations largely aligned with the United States and other NATO allies on their expressed priorities of largely aligned with the United States and other NATO allies on their expressed priorities of
assisting in Ukraine’s defense, and also continues to value NATO security guarantees (as assisting in Ukraine’s defense, and also continues to value NATO security guarantees (as
discussed below). Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security discussed below). Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security
problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and
the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help
from the West.from the West.7075
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. The State Department’s West. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.7176 Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas
in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the
stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO.
In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO
sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces
command in Izmir (secommand in Izmir (see Figure 3). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through . Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through
the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—sethe Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—see Figure A-1).
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a
general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.7277 In more recent or In more recent or
ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.7378
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially
expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be
connected with concerns about Turkey.connected with concerns about Turkey.7479 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey
expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the
United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation

~~69 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;~~
~~Stephen J. Flanagan et al.,~~ ~~Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the~~
~~U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.~~
70in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”80 75 Rich Outzen et al., “Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023. Rich Outzen et al., “Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023.
7176 State Department, State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022. , May 13, 2022.
7277 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, , Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
7378 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” 2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
7479 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph , September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019. , January 14, 2019.
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~~in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,~~
~~Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”75~~80 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/. Congressional Research Service 13 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations
Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011. outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate. All locations are approximate.
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the
West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense. West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense.
Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine
and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.7681 Turkey continues to rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,82 but it may gradually reduce this dependence as it begins deliveries from a domestic offshore field in the Black Sea and increases liquefied natural gas imports from other countries.83 81 ~~Turkey continues to~~

~~75 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and~~
~~Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs~~
~~Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,~~
~~the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-~~
~~challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.~~
76 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. , October 11, 2022.
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~~rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,77 but it may gradually reduce this~~
~~dependence as it begins deliveries from a domestic offshore field in the Black Sea and increases~~
~~liquefied natural gas imports from other countries.78~~82 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023. 83 “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters; Rafiq Latta, “Turkey Pivots Away from Russia, Towards LNG,” Energy Intelligence Group, June 1, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed
below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries.parallel with other NATO countries.7984 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the
Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including
Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,8085 Turkey has supplied Ukraine Turkey has supplied Ukraine
with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant
ambush-resistant (MRAP) ambush-resistant (MRAP) ~~vehicles81~~vehicles86—as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s —as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate
the conflict (discussed below). the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.8287 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.denied that any such transfers have occurred.8388
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.8489 In 2017, a In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their

~~77 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023.~~
~~78 “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters; Rafiq Latta, “Turkey Pivots~~
~~Away from Russia, Towards LNG,” Energy Intelligence Group, June 1, 2023.~~
79respective defense industries.90 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.91 In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.92 Turkish expertise with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing 84 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
8085 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023. Availability,” February 20, 2023.
8186 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August , August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” 22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx, ,
November 21, 2022. November 21, 2022.
8287 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, ,
January 10, 2023. January 10, 2023.
8388 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January , January
14, 2023. 14, 2023.
8489 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. , by Cory Welt.
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~~respective defense industries.85 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer~~
~~cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.86~~
~~In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion~~
~~of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.87 Turkish expertise~~
~~with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing~~
~~aerospace engines and missiles.88~~90 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. 91 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. 92 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations aerospace engines and missiles.93 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,8994 and some reports have suggested that the and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.9095 Additionally, Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.9196
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that partly Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that partly
alleviated global supply concerns.alleviated global supply concerns.9297 Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. sent Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. sent
representatives to a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect representatives to a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect
ships to prevent weapons smuggling.ships to prevent weapons smuggling.9398 The arrangement lapsed in July 2023, and The arrangement lapsed in July 2023, and ~~it is unclear if it~~
~~might resume or if Turkey might help facilitate Ukrainian and/or Russian exports in alternative~~
~~ways.~~ Russia has demanded the lifting of Western sanctions that impede Russian fertilizer exports before it would return to the deal.99 Turkish officials are engaging in efforts to revive the arrangement, and Erdogan has said that Western countries bear significant responsibility for its resolution.100 Turkish leaders have dismissed a potential alternative—a proposal by Ukraine to ship its grain to world markets via Romanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish waters—as “far fetched” and likely to endanger security.101 Also in July 2023, Turkey allowed five previously captured Ukrainian military officers to Also in July 2023, Turkey allowed five previously captured Ukrainian military officers to
return to Ukraine, triggering protests from Russia. Russian officials claim that under a Turkish-return to Ukraine, triggering protests from Russia. Russian officials claim that under a Turkish-
brokered prisoner exchange deal, Turkey had agreed not to return the Ukrainians until the end of brokered prisoner exchange deal, Turkey had agreed not to return the Ukrainians until the end of
the Russia-Ukraine war. the Russia-Ukraine war.
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia.cooperation with Russia.94102 The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against
Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.

~~85 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.~~
~~86 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,~~
~~“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.~~
~~87 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”~~
8893 Ibid. Ibid.
8994 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, , February 4,
2022. 2022.
9095 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s , May 10, 2022. The TB2’s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, , November 7,
2022. 2022.
9196 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022. , October 3, 2022.
9297 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” Associated Press,, July 22, July 22,
2022. 2022.
9398 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
9499 For background on Russian demands, see “Explainer: Have Western sanctions on Russia impacted its fertiliser exports?” Reuters, May 11, 2023. 100 Ezgi Akin, “Erdogan: Revival of Russia-Ukraine grain deal hinges on West,” Al-Monitor, August 8, 2023. 101 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey's Fidan says no solution without Russia to grain deal impasse,” Al-Monitor, July 21, 2023. 102 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December , December
10, 2022. 10, 2022.
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In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.cooperation across economic sectors.95103 In April 2023, they participated in an event to begin In April 2023, they participated in an event to begin
operations at Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (at Akkuyu on its Mediterranean coast), which operations at Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (at Akkuyu on its Mediterranean coast), which
was built by Russian state-owned company Rosatom. The plant is scheduled to start domestic was built by Russian state-owned company Rosatom. The plant is scheduled to start domestic
electricity production in 2025.electricity production in 2025.96104 Several months before operations began at Akkuyu, Rosatom had Several months before operations began at Akkuyu, Rosatom had
reportedly wired up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary involved in the project, possibly in part reportedly wired up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary involved in the project, possibly in part
to help Turkey maintain foreign exchange reserves during its currency crisis.to help Turkey maintain foreign exchange reserves during its currency crisis.97105
Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions
against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey
and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money
flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish
financial institutions: financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in
agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic
activities. activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports
to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and
sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow.... sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put
themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and
correspondent relationships. correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions
related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian
military-industrial complex.military-industrial complex.98106
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.transactions and services with Russian businesses.99107 In February 2023, Turkey’s then Foreign In February 2023, Turkey’s then Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or
technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed
information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to
bypass Western sanctions.bypass Western sanctions.~~100~~108 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on
sanctioned goods transiting its territory to Russia.sanctioned goods transiting its territory to Russia.~~101~~109 In April 2023, the Department of the In April 2023, the Department of the

95103 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5, , August 5,
2022. 2022.
96104 “Putin hails Turkey ties as first Turkish nuclear plant inaugurated,” “Putin hails Turkey ties as first Turkish nuclear plant inaugurated,” Reuters, April 27, 2023. , April 27, 2023.
97105 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East
Eye, July 30, 2022. , July 30, 2022.
98106 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid
Moscow’s War Effort,” Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out , February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out
Illicit Trade with Moscow,” Illicit Trade with Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023. , February 5, 2023.
99107 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023. , February 4, 2023.
~~100~~108 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.” Availability.”
~~101~~109 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023. , March 10, 2023.
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Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting
Russia or Russian entities.Russia or Russian entities.~~102~~110
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing members. requires the unanimous agreement of existing members.
The Turkish objections centered on claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored The Turkish objections centered on claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored
sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the
Fethullah Gulen Fethullah Gulen ~~movement103~~movement111 (which the government has blamed for involvement in the 2016 (which the government has blamed for involvement in the 2016
failed coup) and the PKK.failed coup) and the PKK.~~104~~112 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist
group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.~~105~~113 Turkey removed its objections Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the 2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.against the PKK.~~106~~114
After the accession process began for Sweden and Finland, Turkey continued to press them to After the accession process began for Sweden and Finland, Turkey continued to press them to
extradite people that Turkey considers to be terrorists, though Turkish officials said they were extradite people that Turkey considers to be terrorists, though Turkish officials said they were
more concerned about terrorism-related activities in Sweden than in Finland. Under the June 2022 more concerned about terrorism-related activities in Sweden than in Finland. Under the June 2022
trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or
extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.~~107~~115
Various sources, including Sweden’s prime minister, have indicated that neither Sweden nor Various sources, including Sweden’s prime minister, have indicated that neither Sweden nor
Finland would be inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic Finland would be inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic
judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.~~108~~116

~~102~~110 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the
World,” April 12, 2023. World,” April 12, 2023.
~~103~~111 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~104~~112 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, , May 17,
2022. 2022.
~~105~~113 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2021, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak , Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. , Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
~~106~~114 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat- Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
memo.pdf. memo.pdf.
~~107~~115 Ibid. Ibid.
~~108~~116 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben , January 10, 2023; Ben
Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022. , October 28, 2022.
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link to page link to page 2427 link to page link to page 2427 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

In line with Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament In line with Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament
approved Finland’s NATO application in March 2023.approved Finland’s NATO application in March 2023.~~109~~117 Finland formally joined the alliance in Finland formally joined the alliance in
April. April.
Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of ~~July~~August, with Turkey and Hungary the , with Turkey and Hungary the
only alliance members not to have approved it. During a May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary of only alliance members not to have approved it. During a May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary of
State Antony Blinken said that the accession process has moved rapidly in historic terms, and that State Antony Blinken said that the accession process has moved rapidly in historic terms, and that
Turkey “has rightly focused attention on some of its security concerns that both Sweden and Turkey “has rightly focused attention on some of its security concerns that both Sweden and
Finland have taken remarkable steps to address, important ones.... From the perspective of the Finland have taken remarkable steps to address, important ones.... From the perspective of the
United States, the time is now to finalize Sweden’s accession.”United States, the time is now to finalize Sweden’s accession.”~~110~~118 Blinken also said that while the Blinken also said that while the
Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with
Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are (seeSweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are (see “Possible F-16 Sale and
Congressional Views” below).low).~~111~~119
After new Swedish anti-terrorism legislation came into effect in June, and two court rulings that After new Swedish anti-terrorism legislation came into effect in June, and two court rulings that
anticipate some extradition to Turkey,anticipate some extradition to Turkey,~~112~~120 President Erdogan agreed on July 10 to send the NATO President Erdogan agreed on July 10 to send the NATO
accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure
ratification.”ratification.”~~113~~121 President Biden and other U.S. officials welcomed Erdogan’s commitment. President Biden and other U.S. officials welcomed Erdogan’s commitment.
Erdogan later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not consider Swedish accession until Erdogan later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not consider Swedish accession until
October (after its summer recess), and that he expected Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it October (after its summer recess), and that he expected Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it
will take to implement the 2022 trilateral memorandum before sending the accession protocol to will take to implement the 2022 trilateral memorandum before sending the accession protocol to
parliament.parliament.~~114~~122 Based on statements from Erdogan and other reports, Turkey might also seek the Based on statements from Erdogan and other reports, Turkey might also seek the
following before its parliament considers Sweden’s NATO application: following before its parliament considers Sweden’s NATO application:
• At least some assurance of congressional approval of the potential F-16 sale. • At least some assurance of congressional approval of the potential F-16 sale.~~115~~123
• The lifting of some implicit arms trade restrictions by NATO countries.• The lifting of some implicit arms trade restrictions by NATO countries.~~116~~124
• Increased support among EU countries to expand Turkey’s customs union with • Increased support among EU countries to expand Turkey’s customs union with
the EU and provide Turkish citizens with visa-free travel to EU countries. the EU and provide Turkish citizens with visa-free travel to EU countries.~~117~~
~~Syria118~~125 Syria126
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.~~119~~127 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved

~~109~~117 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023. , March 30, 2023.
~~110~~118 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press
Availability.” Availability.”
~~111~~119 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press
Availability.” Availability.”
~~112~~120 “With NATO membership in mind, Sweden hands over Turkish man convicted of drug offenses at home,” “With NATO membership in mind, Sweden hands over Turkish man convicted of drug offenses at home,”
Associated Press, June 12, 2023; “NATO applicant Sweden jails Kurdish man for attempting to finance PKK , June 12, 2023; “NATO applicant Sweden jails Kurdish man for attempting to finance PKK
militants,” militants,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2023. , July 6, 2023.
~~113~~121 NATO, “Press statement following the meeting between Türkiye, Sweden, and the NATO Secretary General,” July NATO, “Press statement following the meeting between Türkiye, Sweden, and the NATO Secretary General,” July
10, 2023. 10, 2023.
~~114~~122 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters, July 12, 2023. , July 12, 2023.
~~115~~123 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Turkey’s F-16s in doubt after Erdogan says no Sweden vote before October,” Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Turkey’s F-16s in doubt after Erdogan says no Sweden vote before October,” Al-Monitor, ,
July 12, 2023. July 12, 2023.
~~116~~124 “Exclusive: Canada unfreezes talks with Turkey on export controls after NATO move,” “Exclusive: Canada unfreezes talks with Turkey on export controls after NATO move,” Reuters, July 13, 2023. , July 13, 2023.
~~117~~125 Ibid. Ibid.
~~118~~126 See CRS Report RL33487, See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. , coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
~~119~~127 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. , August 4, 2017.
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link to page link to page 3325 link to page link to page 2122 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based. U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.~~120~~128 The The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.~~121~~129 Turkey has set Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure ~~A-2~~).
4). 128 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria), see footnote 113. 129 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. Congressional Research Service 20 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Figure 4. Syria Conflict Map Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held
a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.~~122~~130 Turkey is seeking Turkey is seeking
Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of some of the approximately four million Syrian Syrian
refugees living in Turkey.refugees living in Turkey.131 Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.~~123~~132 It is unclear It is unclear
whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the
SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question
about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson said in January about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson said in January
2023 that U.S. officials have advised allies against normalizing or upgrading relations with the 2023 that U.S. officials have advised allies against normalizing or upgrading relations with the
Asad regime.Asad regime.~~124~~
~~U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues~~
~~How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects~~
~~Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,~~
~~Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and~~
~~other munitions to maintain military strength.125~~

~~120 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and~~
~~YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK~~
~~affiliates in Syria), see footnote 105.~~
~~121 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019.~~
~~122 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023.~~
~~123 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022.~~
~~124 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.~~
~~125 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany~~
~~(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).~~
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133 130 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023. 131 For background on the refugees, see, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. 132 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. 133 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service 21 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations In 2023, Turkish forces have undertaken drone and artillery strikes against targets they deem to be part of or affiliated with the PKK in Syria and Iraq.134 These strikes highlight persistent challenges that Turkey, various Kurdish groups, other militias, the United States, Russia, Iran, and the Asad regime face in tensions associated with: • control over key border areas of northern Syria and Iraq, • the nature of the SDF and its continuing partnership with the United States against the Islamic State, • the potential for negative spillover effects into Turkey, and • efforts toward lasting political outcomes relevant to the humanitarian needs and human rights of affected populations. U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.135 Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,
U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds
Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,delivered in 2019,~~126~~136 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.~~127~~137 In explaining the U.S. decision to In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.~~128~~138 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to
Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the 400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the
~~system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to~~
~~have CAATSA sanctions removed.~~
~~An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on~~
~~major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The~~
~~executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.129 Such a~~
~~disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978~~
~~embargo over Cyprus.130~~
~~Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views~~
~~Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)~~
~~In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16~~
~~fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.131~~
~~President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20~~
~~meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation~~
~~and notification process with Congress.132 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72~~

~~126~~ 134 Amberin Zaman, “US, Russia mum as Turkey escalates attacks against Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq,” Al-Monitor, July 31, 2023. 135 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 136 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, , December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later. second system to come later.
~~127~~137 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition
of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions. Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
~~128~~138 Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
~~129 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~130 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,~~
~~August 12, 2020.~~
~~131 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted~~
~~November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.~~
~~132 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego~~
~~(continued...)~~
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Congressional Research Service 22 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.139 Such a disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.140 Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues) In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.141 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and notification process with Congress.142 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and
structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.~~133~~143
After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and
military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the
Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey
has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic
location remains important for the alliance.location remains important for the alliance.~~134~~144 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the Turkey partners in a number of ways with the
United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic
and Mediterranean Sea regions.and Mediterranean Sea regions.~~135~~145
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022
letter,letter,~~136~~146 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an
important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”~~137~~147 While acknowledging that any sale While acknowledging that any sale
would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that
~~there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well~~
~~as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate~~
~~U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”138~~
~~The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a~~
~~more advanced fighter,139 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.140~~
~~According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is~~
~~four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.141 Other~~
~~countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan,~~
~~Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.142~~
~~Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of~~

139 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 140 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020. 141 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html. 142 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For , November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~133~~143 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22- See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-
06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf. 06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.
~~134~~144 State Department, State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. .
~~135~~145 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu,
“Turkey,” “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time , pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time
since 2006,” since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne , July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne
Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022. Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
~~136~~146 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/ Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf. 20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
~~137~~147 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022. , April 6, 2022.
~~138 Ibid.~~
~~139 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,~~
~~2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working~~
~~with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot~~
~~domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United~~
~~States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to~~
~~extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts~~
~~modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022.~~
~~140 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~News, January 18, 2023.~~
~~141 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.~~
~~142 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November~~
~~22, 2021.~~
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~~link to page 28~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~148 aircraft.143~~Congressional Research Service 23 link to page 31 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”148 The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a more advanced fighter,149 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.150 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.151 Other countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.152 Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of 148 aircraft.153 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to
start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs. start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs.
If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider
purchasing Western European alternatives.purchasing Western European alternatives.~~144~~154 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter
Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,~~145~~155 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany
would approve such a sale.would approve such a sale.~~146~~156 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a
non-F-16 platform.non-F-16 platform.~~147~~157 Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the
congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin
defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.~~148~~158 Previously, Congress received Previously, Congress received
notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar) notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar)
proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.~~149~~159 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and
encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military
~~aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for~~
~~Turkey states~~
~~If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,~~
~~Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in~~
~~areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.150~~
~~At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-~~
~~Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President~~
~~Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as~~
~~well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.151 However,~~
~~SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has~~
~~termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”152~~
~~In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,~~
~~Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean~~
~~Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional~~
~~attention.153 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after~~
~~Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a~~

~~143 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.~~
~~144 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023.~~
~~145~~ 148 Ibid. 149 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022. 150 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense News, January 18, 2023. 151 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023. 152 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021. 153 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A. 154 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023. 155 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye, ,
January 20, 2023. January 20, 2023.
~~146~~156 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” ‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023. , January 29, 2023.
~~147~~157 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.” Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
~~148~~158 See footno See footnote ~~170.~~
~~149~~180. 159 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May 61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May
24, 2019 (84 24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC
Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074, 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074,
September 2, 2021 (86 September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021). 73075, December 23, 2021).
~~150 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.~~
~~151 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022.~~
~~152 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/~~
~~status/1600519759493304321.~~
~~153 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,”~~ ~~Greece and Turkey in Conflict and~~
~~Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek~~
~~Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022.~~
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~~May 2022 joint session of Congress.154~~Congressional Research Service 24 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for Turkey states If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization, Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.160 At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.161 However, SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”162 In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria, Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional attention.163 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a May 2022 joint session of Congress.164 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.
117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R. 117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.
7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement 7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another
NATO ally’s airspace.”NATO ally’s airspace.”~~155~~165
While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions somewhat subsided in early 2023 when Erdogan While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions somewhat subsided in early 2023 when Erdogan
and Mitsotakis renewed contacts in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek and Mitsotakis renewed contacts in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek
post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.~~156~~166 At the July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania, the At the July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania, the
two leaders met and agreed to build on this momentum with a high-level bilateral meeting in two leaders met and agreed to build on this momentum with a high-level bilateral meeting in
Greece this fall. Greece this fall.
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2017,2017,~~157~~167 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.countries.~~158~~168 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations 160 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. 161 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022. 162 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/status/1600519759493304321. 163 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022. 164 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts. 165 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf. 166 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023. 167 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017. 168 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 35 link to page 36 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations~~
with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.~~159~~169
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).below).~~160~~170
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing ~~Issues161~~Issues171
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-32
andand Figure A-43 for maps of some of the areas in dispute). for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece, internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.~~162~~172 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot ~~In 1983, Turkish Cypriot~~

~~154 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.~~
~~Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the~~
~~context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.~~
~~155 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-~~
~~RCP117-70-JES.pdf.~~
~~156 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023.~~
~~157 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V~~
~~Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.~~
~~158 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30,~~
~~2022.~~
~~159 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~160 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.~~
~~161 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~162 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot~~
~~soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between~~
~~(continued...)~~
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leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim
to be legally invalid. to be legally invalid.
Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of
Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.~~163~~173 U.S. officials have U.S. officials have
explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as
part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.~~164~~174 In the March 2022 congressional hearing In the March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass
logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.~~165~~175 After After
Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer was Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer was
maintaining a balanced approach in the Aegean,maintaining a balanced approach in the Aegean,~~166~~176 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement
saying that there has been no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ saying that there has been no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’
col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.~~167~~
~~Congressional Notification Process~~
~~Informal Notification and Review~~
~~In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden~~
~~Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter~~
~~aircraft to Turkey.168 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported~~
~~that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales~~
~~for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these~~
~~reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16~~
~~Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total~~
~~value of $20 billion.169~~
~~After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee~~
~~(HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major~~
~~defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS~~
~~or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State~~
~~Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.170 This time~~

177 169 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. 170 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. 171 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. 172 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February , February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
~~163~~173 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,” Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022. , August 19, 2022.
~~164~~174 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,” July 18, 2022. Minister,” July 18, 2022.
~~165~~175 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.” U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
~~166~~176 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. , October 21, 2022.
~~167~~177 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/ Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928. 1582273449145212928.
~~168 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~169 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden~~
~~Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to~~
~~Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023.~~
~~170 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO~~
~~(continued...)~~
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Congressional Research Service 26 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Congressional Notification Process Informal Notification and Review In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey.178 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16 Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion.179 After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.180 This time period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review” period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review”
process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the
proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.~~171~~181 Under provisions of the Under provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed
with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece) with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece)
after formal notification.after formal notification.~~172~~182
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
depend at least to some degree on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and depend at least to some degree on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and
Finland.Finland.~~173~~183 With Turkey already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus With Turkey already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus
has turned to Turkey’s approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal has turned to Turkey’s approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal
notifications of possible aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the notifications of possible aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the New York Times cited Chairman cited Chairman
Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey.
Regarding the F-16 sale, he said Regarding the F-16 sale, he said
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and
~~against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human~~
~~rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and~~
~~begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.174~~
~~In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on~~
~~objections he had against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey~~
~~does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.175~~
~~The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece~~
~~come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.~~
~~regional involvement (as mentioned above).176 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s~~
~~for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure~~
~~Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.177~~
~~One journalist has argued~~
~~A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-~~
~~generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-~~

178 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.” 179 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023. 180 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or
upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and
defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all
other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively. other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
~~171~~181 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~172~~182 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and , by Paul K. Kerr and
Liana W. Rosen. Liana W. Rosen.
173 See footnote Error! Bookmark not defined..183 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking M
~~ember~~Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only
consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod,
“Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, ,
February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at
~~https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.~~
~~174 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al.,~~
~~“Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023.~~
~~175 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=~~
~~105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.~~
~~176 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~177 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,~~
~~“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”~~
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https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. Congressional Research Service 27 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.184 In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he had against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.185 The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S. regional involvement (as mentioned above).186 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.187 One journalist has argued A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a 16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.~~178~~188
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, then Turkish Foreign Minister In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, then Turkish Foreign Minister
Cavusoglu called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.Cavusoglu called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.~~179~~189
Developments After Turkey’s May 2023 Elections
Following the end of Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle, congressional committee leaders’ Following the end of Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle, congressional committee leaders’
concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. In April 2023, these concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. In April 2023, these
leaders apparently acquiesced to the Administration providing formal notification of a possible leaders apparently acquiesced to the Administration providing formal notification of a possible
sale of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-sale of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-
16s (on certain information sharing and flight safety issues).16s (on certain information sharing and flight safety issues).~~180~~190 A few days before President A few days before President
Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he
and the other three Members who oversee major possible arms sales (SFRC Chairman Menendez and the other three Members who oversee major possible arms sales (SFRC Chairman Menendez
and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks) “will approve the and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks) “will approve the
transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for
Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”~~181~~191 McCaul also said, McCaul also said,
“We’ve been assured that after the [Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will “We’ve been assured that after the [Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will
~~be recognized as a NATO ally.”182 As of June, these four Members have reportedly expressed~~
~~support for the Administration to provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35~~
~~sale to Greece.183~~
~~After Erdogan’s victory in May, President Biden said that Erdogan “wants to work on something~~
~~on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”184 Chairman~~
~~Menendez has said that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some Members of~~
~~Congress,185 but is only “part of the equation” for him.186 He suggested in May that if Turkey~~
~~approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other~~
~~neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and various indications~~
~~that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”187~~

~~178~~ 184 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al., “Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023. 185 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906. 186 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. 187 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” 188 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,” Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023. , January 16, 2023.
~~179~~189 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January , January
17, 2023. 17, 2023.
~~180~~190 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023; “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023; “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to
Turkey,” Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023. , April 22, 2023.
~~181~~191 Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — —even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023. Congressional Research Service 28 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations be recognized as a NATO ally.”192 As of June, these four Members have reportedly expressed support for the Administration to provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35 sale to Greece.193 After Erdogan’s victory in May, President Biden said that Erdogan “wants to work on something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”194 Chairman Menendez has said that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some Members of Congress,195 but is only “part of the equation” for him.196 He suggested in May that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and various indications that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”197 ~~even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023.~~
~~182 Gould et al.~~
~~183 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023.~~
~~184 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023.~~
~~185 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February~~
~~2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if~~
~~accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks~~
~~Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter~~
~~from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.~~
~~186 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023.~~
~~187 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the~~
~~matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al.~~
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After Erdogan agreed in July to send Sweden’s accession protocol to Turkey’s parliament and After Erdogan agreed in July to send Sweden’s accession protocol to Turkey’s parliament and
work toward its ratification, National Security Advisor Sullivan said that the Administration work toward its ratification, National Security Advisor Sullivan said that the Administration
would move forward with the F-16 sale in consultation with Congress.would move forward with the F-16 sale in consultation with Congress.~~188~~198 Menendez called for Menendez called for
additional assurances from the Administration to enhance Greece’s security in the region before additional assurances from the Administration to enhance Greece’s security in the region before
approving the sale.approving the sale.~~189~~199 While stopping short of expressing assent to the sale, Risch, McCaul, and While stopping short of expressing assent to the sale, Risch, McCaul, and
Meeks voiced general optimism on a path forward, with Meeks saying that Turkey cannot resume Meeks voiced general optimism on a path forward, with Meeks saying that Turkey cannot resume
its violations of Greek airspace.its violations of Greek airspace.~~190~~200 Erdogan said on July 12 that Turkish F-16s have never been Erdogan said on July 12 that Turkish F-16s have never been
used against Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”used against Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”~~191~~201
The Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, The Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns,
and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale. and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale.

~~188 Nazlan Ertan, “US to advance Turkey's F-16 sales as Sweden's NATO bid moves forward,” Al-Monitor, July 11,~~
~~2023.~~
~~189~~192 Gould et al. 193 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023. 194 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023. 195 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. 196 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023. 197 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al. 198 Nazlan Ertan, “US to advance Turkey’s F-16 sales as Sweden’s NATO bid moves forward,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2023. 199 David Sivak, “Bob Menendez says there ‘may be a pathway’ for sale of F-16s to Turkey,” David Sivak, “Bob Menendez says there ‘may be a pathway’ for sale of F-16s to Turkey,” Washington Examiner, ,
July 11, 2023. July 11, 2023.
~~190~~200 Joe Gould, “F-16s for Turkey aren’t a done deal until these lawmakers say it’s OK,” Joe Gould, “F-16s for Turkey aren’t a done deal until these lawmakers say it’s OK,” Politico, July 11, 2023. On July , July 11, 2023. On July
8, six Representatives sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that any U.S.-Turkey sales agreement for F-16s 8, six Representatives sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that any U.S.-Turkey sales agreement for F-16s
include “mechanisms that provide for the pause, delay, or snapback of the transfer of American weapons to Turkey if it include “mechanisms that provide for the pause, delay, or snapback of the transfer of American weapons to Turkey if it
resumes its destabilizing actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that threaten or undermine U.S. national security resumes its destabilizing actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that threaten or undermine U.S. national security
interests or NATO security architecture.” Text of letter available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-interests or NATO security architecture.” Text of letter available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-
subsites/pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/07.08.23-letter-to-secretary-blinken-on-turkey-f-16-sale-subsites/pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/07.08.23-letter-to-secretary-blinken-on-turkey-f-16-sale-
snapback-mechanisms.pdf. snapback-mechanisms.pdf.
~~191~~201 “Erdogan claims F-16s have not been used against Greece, no plans to do so,” “Erdogan claims F-16s have not been used against Greece, no plans to do so,” Kathimerini, July 12, 2023. , July 12, 2023.
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Appendix A. Maps
Figure A-1. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022. , March 2022.

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Figure A-2. ~~Syria Conflict Map~~

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~~Figure A-3.~~ Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/. sovereignty-16-maps/.

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Figure A-43. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. , with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid. claim to be legally invalid.
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Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party
Leaders
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President of Turkey and Leader/Co-Founder of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(pronounced (pronounced air-doe-wan) )
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul. secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office, Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP

won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister. election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. He won another won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. He won another
presidential term in May 2023. Many observers assess that he seeks to consolidate presidential term in May 2023. Many observers assess that he seeks to consolidate
power and to avoid the reopening of corruption cases that could implicate him and power and to avoid the reopening of corruption cases that could implicate him and
close family members or associates. close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
((kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority
with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP,
which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish
nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and
social democratic constituencies. social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara, After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara. root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has faced criticism for the CHP’s Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has faced criticism for the CHP’s
failure to make electoral gains at the national level, especial y as Erdogan’s opponent in failure to make electoral gains at the national level, especial y as Erdogan’s opponent in
the 2023 presidential race. The CHP made notable gains—particularly in Istanbul and the 2023 presidential race. The CHP made notable gains—particularly in Istanbul and
Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.
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Devlet Bahceli—Leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
((bah-cheh-lee) )
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997 leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007. was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017 Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018. constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
Congressional Research Service 33 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (IYI) Party
((awk-sheh-nar) )
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan. alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker. 2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections. presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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