Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Changes from June 21, 2023 to December 4, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
~~June 21, 2023~~
December 4, 2023 Over two years after the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, U.S. policymakers are still grappling with the reality of the group’s autocratic rule and the negative consequences that rule has had for Clayton Thomas many Afghans and U.S. policy interests. In 2021, U.S. and international forces withdrew from In 2021, U.S. and international forces withdrew from Specialist in Middle Afghanistan after nearly two decades Afghanistan after nearly two decades of
~~operations,~~ and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that Eastern Affairs formerly ruled the country formerly ruled the country
~~Clayton Thomas~~
from 1996 to 2001, retook power. The United States does not from 1996 to 2001, retook power. The United States does not recognize the Taliban or any other recognize the Taliban or any other
~~Specialist in Middle~~
entity as the government of Afghanistan and reports there are entity as the government of Afghanistan and reports there are no U.S. diplomatic or military personnel in the country~~no U.S. diplomatic or military~~
~~Eastern Affairs~~
~~personnel in the country. The Taliban’s rule appears to have had negative effects for many~~

~~Afghans, as well as a number of U.S. policy interests~~. .

The Taliban government is dominated by officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime The Taliban government is dominated by officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime
loyalists. Signs of dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines have emergedloyalists. Signs of dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines have emerged on occasion, though the Taliban have a history of , though the Taliban have a history of
effectively managing internal disputes. Some Afghans have sought to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the effectively managing internal disputes. Some Afghans have sought to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the
Taliban in nonviolent demonstrations, which the Taliban have sometimes violently dispersed, but the Taliban do not appear Taliban in nonviolent demonstrations, which the Taliban have sometimes violently dispersed, but the Taliban do not appear
to face effective political opposition. Other Afghans have to face effective political opposition. Other Afghans have ~~taken up arms against the Taliban, claiming~~claimed guerilla-style attacks guerilla-style attacks
against against ~~Taliban forces and calling~~the Taliban and called for international assistance. The regional Islamic State affiliate has conducted attacks for international assistance. The regional Islamic State affiliate has conducted attacks
against Taliban forces, Afghan civilians, and international targets alikeagainst Taliban forces, Afghan civilians, and international targets alike.
~~Some~~ , but no group since 2021 has mounted a serious threat to the Taliban’s hold on power. Members of Congress have focused on Members of Congress have focused on ~~a number of impacts~~multiple aspects of the Taliban’s renewed rule of the Taliban’s renewed rule onand implications for U.S. interests: U.S. interests:
• • Counterterrorism. The Taliban takeover has had different impacts on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, The Taliban takeover has had different impacts on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda,
historic Taliban adversaries and partners, respectively. With no U.S. military forces based in Afghanistan historic Taliban adversaries and partners, respectively. With no U.S. military forces based in Afghanistan
or neighboring states, the United States is pursuing an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach. or neighboring states, the United States is pursuing an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach.
• • Women and Girls. Taliban actions have been Taliban actions have been severely detrimental for the status of women and girls in detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, Afghanistan,
a longtime U.S. policy a longtime U.S. policy ~~concern~~focus, with girls prohibited from attending school above the primary level and , with girls prohibited from attending school above the primary level and
women’s roles drastically curtailed, including an April 2023 decision to ban women from working for the women’s roles drastically curtailed, including an April 2023 decision to ban women from working for the
United Nations in Afghanistan. United Nations in Afghanistan.
• • Relocating U.S. Partners. Some Members of Congress have closely followed ongoing U.S. efforts to Some Members of Congress have closely followed ongoing U.S. efforts to
relocate relocate ~~remaining U.S. citizens, as well as the~~ tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts
and seek to leave the country. and seek to leave the country.
Some Members have also expressed concern about dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover, Some Members have also expressed concern about dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover,
Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both
preexisting (such as natural disasters and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international preexisting (such as natural disasters and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international
development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). In response, the development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). In response, the
United States has provided over $2 billion in humanitarian and development assistance since August 2021 and the Biden United States has provided over $2 billion in humanitarian and development assistance since August 2021 and the Biden
Administration has issued general licenses authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions. The Administration has issued general licenses authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions. The
Administration also established a Switzerland-based “Afghan Fund” to hold and potentially disburse some of Afghanistan’s Administration also established a Switzerland-based “Afghan Fund” to hold and potentially disburse some of Afghanistan’s
central bank assets to support the Afghan economy; the Fund has not, as of central bank assets to support the Afghan economy; the Fund has not, as of ~~June~~November 2023, made any disbursements. 2023, made any disbursements.
Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the
creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor
dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Going forward, Congress may consider further reporting dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Going forward, Congress may consider further reporting
requirements, resources, or investigative efforts related to various U.S. interests as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s requirements, resources, or investigative efforts related to various U.S. interests as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s
budget request and defense authorization measures and examines lessons learned in Afghanistan. Future reports from the budget request and defense authorization measures and examines lessons learned in Afghanistan. Future reports from the
congressionally created Afghanistan War Commission and other bodies may offer congressionally created Afghanistan War Commission and other bodies may offer ~~lessons~~insights for legislators. for legislators.
Congressional action could be influenced or constrained by Congressional action could be influenced or constrained by ~~a lack of reliable information about events in Afghanistan and the~~
the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Perhaps more challengingly, the Biden Administration and many in historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Perhaps more challengingly, the Biden Administration and many in
~~Congress~~Congress have stated that they seek to ameliorate humanitarian and economic conditions in Afghanistan, but without taking any action that boosts seek to ameliorate humanitarian and economic conditions in Afghanistan, but without taking any action that boosts
the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicated given the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicated given
the Taliban’s evident aversion to the Taliban’s evident aversion to ~~make~~making compromises in response to international pressure and its apparent willingness to compromises in response to international pressure and its apparent willingness to
accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering in Afghanistan as the price of that accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering in Afghanistan as the price of that ~~uncompromising~~unyielding stance. stance.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy

Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on developments in Afghanistan and This report provides background information and analysis on developments in Afghanistan and
implications for U.S. policy, including implications for U.S. policy, including
• the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human • the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country; rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
• regional dynamics; and • regional dynamics; and
• the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country. • the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has
influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central
bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the
Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule. Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.
Background: Taliban Takeover
The chapter of Afghan history that ended The chapter of Afghan history that ended ~~in 2021~~with the Taliban’s 2021 return to power arguably began in 2001, when the United arguably began in 2001, when the United
States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against
Al Qaeda and the Al Qaeda and the ~~Afghan~~ Taliban government that harbored it. In the subsequent 20 years, the Taliban government that harbored it. In the subsequent 20 years, the
United States suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the United States suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the
rising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction and rising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction and
security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the
Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven
improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the
world’s poorest and most corrupt countries. world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.
At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the
result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment
of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance. of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance.
President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level
since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the
February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 U.S. officials committed to continue to provide financial February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 U.S. officials committed to continue to provide financial
support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban, support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban,
while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.2 while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.2
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained
territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade

1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29,
2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021,
and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the
United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement. 02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
2 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, 2 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, A Pathway for
Peace in Afghanistan: Examining the Findings and Recommendations of the Afghanistan Study Group, hearing, 117th , hearing, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., February 19, 2021, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg43713/pdf/CHRG-Cong., 1st sess., February 19, 2021, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg43713/pdf/CHRG-
117hhrg43713.pdf. 117hhrg43713.pdf.
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insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep
internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption. internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption.
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart
Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide
swaths of the country. While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from swaths of the country. While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from
government forces in some areas, others were taken with minimal fighting.3 The Taliban captured government forces in some areas, others were taken with minimal fighting.3 The Taliban captured
their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and
its security forces accelerated. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was its security forces accelerated. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was
characterized by electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan characterized by electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan
military forces, fled the country on August 15. Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same military forces, fled the country on August 15. Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same
day, taking effective control of the country. day, taking effective control of the country.
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The
Taliban refer to their Taliban refer to their autocratic government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-
2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (sharia) but, according to one ) but, according to one
group of experts, “remain remarkably ambiguous when it comes to the type of Islamic state they group of experts, “remain remarkably ambiguous when it comes to the type of Islamic state they
want to form in Afghanistan.”4 want to form in Afghanistan.”4
Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone
strike, holds supreme power as the group’s strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances . He has made few reported public appearances
and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available.5 Despite Taliban promises to and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available.5 Despite Taliban promises to
form an inclusive government,6 nearly all members of the government are former officials from form an inclusive government,6 nearly all members of the government are former officials from
the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns
(Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are
from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S.
and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S.
Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to
the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) that conducted numerous attacks against U.S. and other Terrorist Organization (FTO) that conducted numerous attacks against U.S. and other
international targets in Afghanistan. international targets in Afghanistan.
Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along
various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes, various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes,
governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based
~~decision-making.7 Points of tension reportedly have existed between members of the group’s~~

3 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” 3 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15, , August 15,
2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” 2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times, ,
August 18, 2021. August 18, 2021.
4 M. Bashir Mobasher et al., 4 M. Bashir Mobasher et al., The Constitution and Laws of the Taliban, 1994-2001: Hints from the Past and Options
for the Future, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, December 14, 2022. , Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, December 14, 2022.
See also William Maley, “Taliban rule and anti-constitutionalism,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, August 23, 2023. 5 “Taliban supreme leader addresses major gathering in Kabul,” 5 “Taliban supreme leader addresses major gathering in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, July 1, 2022. In May 2023, Akhundzada , July 1, 2022. In May 2023, Akhundzada
~~reportedly~~ met with Qatar’s prime minister in Kandahar, the first known meeting between Akhundzada and a foreign met with Qatar’s prime minister in Kandahar, the first known meeting between Akhundzada and a foreign
leader. Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: Qatar prime minister, Taliban chief hold secret Afghan talks,” leader. Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: Qatar prime minister, Taliban chief hold secret Afghan talks,” Reuters, May 31, , May 31,
2023. 2023.
6 “Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” 6 “Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August, 17, 2021, at , August, 17, 2021, at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/transcript-of-talibans-first-press-conference-in-kabul. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/transcript-of-talibans-first-press-conference-in-kabul.
~~7 Andrew Watkins, “The Taliban one year on,” CTC Sentinel, August 2022.~~
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decision-making.7 Points of tension reportedly have existed between members of the group’s political wing and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the most credit political wing and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the most credit
for the group’s victory;8 between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who for the group’s victory;8 between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who
~~are~~may be struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;9 and between those with different ideological struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;9 and between those with different ideological
perspectives (including on education for girls; see below).10 In a February 2023 speech, Haqqani perspectives (including on education for girls; see below).10 In a February 2023 speech, Haqqani
criticized “power monopolization” within the Taliban, prompting other Taliban figures to state criticized “power monopolization” within the Taliban, prompting other Taliban figures to state
that criticisms should be voiced privately.11 Some of these divisions are mirrored by an that criticisms should be voiced privately.11 Some of these divisions are mirrored by an
increasingly significant geographic divide between the Taliban’s political leadership in Kabul and increasingly significant geographic divide between the Taliban’s political leadership in Kabul and
the clerical establishment in Kandahar (where the emir is based and to which the Taliban have the clerical establishment in Kandahar (where the emir is based and to which the Taliban have
reportedly relocated some senior officials).12 reportedly relocated some senior officials).12
The Taliban and ~~Drug Production~~
~~The~~Narcotics Over the course of the group’s three decades of existence, the Taliban have at times accommodated, actively facilitated, or efficiently repressed Taliban have at times accommodated, actively facilitated, or efficiently repressed ~~drug~~narcotics production and production and
trafficking in territory under their control, sometimes pursuing contradictory policies trafficking in territory under their control, sometimes pursuing contradictory policies ~~simultaneously~~ in different in different
geographic areas or with respect to various aspects of the drug trade. In 2000, when they were previously in geographic areas or with respect to various aspects of the drug trade. In 2000, when they were previously in
power, the Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation, nearly eliminating cultivation in Taliban-control ed areas at a power, the Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation, nearly eliminating cultivation in Taliban-control ed areas at a
time when Afghanistan was the world’s largest producer of opium.13 time when Afghanistan was the world’s largest producer of opium.13 ~~That ban came to an end with the Taliban’s~~
~~fall in 2001, and~~When the Taliban were removed from power after the September 11, 2001, attacks, that ban came to an end, and lucrative opium production reportedly opium production reportedly ~~rebounded immediately.~~quickly rebounded.14 The Taliban’s insurgency became entwined The Taliban’s insurgency became entwined
with the booming opium economy, with the financial and political benefits of that trade evidently trumping the with the booming opium economy, with the financial and political benefits of that trade evidently trumping the
group’s ideological opposition to opium production.group’s ideological opposition to opium production. 15 In April 2022, after the Taliban had returned to power, In April 2022, after the Taliban had returned to power,
Akhundzada issued a decree again banning opium poppy cultivation. In June 2023, David Mansfield, a prominent Akhundzada issued a decree again banning opium poppy cultivation. In June 2023, David Mansfield, a prominent
researcher, estimated that despite “widespread skepticism” the ban had been effectively implemented, with poppy researcher, estimated that despite “widespread skepticism” the ban had been effectively implemented, with poppy
cultivation reduced by a “truly unprecedented” amount.cultivation reduced by a “truly unprecedented” amount.1416 A subsequent tweet from the U.S. Special A subsequent tweet from the U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan stated, “Reports that the Taliban have implemented policies to significantly Representative for Afghanistan stated, “Reports that the Taliban have implemented policies to significantly
~~decrease opium poppy production this year are credible and important.”15 The economic impact is likely to be~~
~~uneven but considerable, with the potential for increased emigration for those least able to cope with the ban and~~
~~its effects.16~~
~~Current and Potential Opposition~~
~~While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did~~
~~not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as a lack of support for the former~~
~~government.17 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the~~
~~Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated~~

decrease opium poppy production this year are credible and important.”17 In subsequent analysis, Mansfield estimated that poppy cultivation had decreased by over 85 percent in 2023.18 In September 2023, President Biden again named Afghanistan as a major drug producing and transiting country (as it has been for over three decades) but removed it from the list of countries determined to have “failed 7 Andrew Watkins, “What’s next for the Taliban’s leadership amid rising dissent?” U.S Institute of Peace, April 11, 2023. 8 “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” 8 “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” ANI,
February 15, 2022. February 15, 2022.
9 Sabawoon Samim, “New lives in the city: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul,” 9 Sabawoon Samim, “New lives in the city: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul,” Afghanistan Analysts
Network, February 2, 2023. , February 2, 2023.
10 10 ~~Andrew Watkins, “One year later: Taliban reprise repressive rule, but struggle to build a state,” United States~~
~~Institute of Peace, August 17, 2022.~~
Hassan Abbas, “The internal splits that threaten the Taliban’s rule,” Chatham House, July 28, 2023. 11 Ayaz Gul, “Top Taliban official’s public criticism reignite internal rift speculation,” 11 Ayaz Gul, “Top Taliban official’s public criticism reignite internal rift speculation,” Voice of America, February 13, , February 13,
2023. 2023.
12 Pamela Constable, “Taliban moving senior officials to Kandahar. Will it mean a harder line?” 12 Pamela Constable, “Taliban moving senior officials to Kandahar. Will it mean a harder line?” Washington Post, June , June
4, 2023. 4, 2023.
13 Martin Jelsma, “Learning lessons from the Taliban opium ban,” 13 Martin Jelsma, “Learning lessons from the Taliban opium ban,” International Journal of Drug Policy,, March 1, March 1,
2005. 2005.
14 14 UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003. 15 Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009. 16 David Mansfield, “Truly unprecedented: the Taliban drugs ban v2.0,” Alcis, June 6, 2023. David Mansfield, “Truly unprecedented: the Taliban drugs ban v2.0,” Alcis, June 6, 2023.
1517 U.S. Special Representative Thomas West (@US4AfghanPeace), Twitter post, June 7, 2023, 11:57 AM, at U.S. Special Representative Thomas West (@US4AfghanPeace), Twitter post, June 7, 2023, 11:57 AM, at
https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1666474423040262145. https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1666474423040262145.
~~16 Mansfield, op. cit.; William Byrd, “The Taliban’s successful opium ban is bad for Afghans and the world,” United~~
~~States Institute of Peace, June 8, 2023.~~
~~17 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,~~
~~“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.~~
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~~nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.18 The Taliban have~~
~~often violently dispersed these protests, and have sought to stifle dissenting voices, including with~~
~~the March 2023 arrest of prominent education activist Matiullah Wesa.19 In December 2022, the~~
~~U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan said, “There is no significant~~
~~visible political opposition to the Taliban inside Afghanistan,” and exiled officials associated with~~
~~the former government “are fragmented and their statements have decreasing resonance for the~~
~~population inside Afghanistan.”20~~
~~The Taliban face~~ 18 David Mansfield, “Whistling in the wind: The inevitable return of poppy cultivation to Afghanistan,” Alcis, September 29, 2023. Congressional Research Service 3 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy demonstrably” because of “progress made within [Afghanistan] over the past year in reducing the cultivation of opium poppy and production of il icit narcotics.”19 Policy experts assert that the economic impact of the ban is likely to be uneven but considerable, with the potential for increased emigration for those least able to cope with the ban and its effects.20 One observer has speculated that those repercussions wil eventually compel the Taliban to reverse course and permit narcotics production.21 Mansfield assessed in November 2023 that the Taliban are again prohibiting opium poppy cultivation for the 2023/2024 poppy season, though skyrocketing opium prices “wil undoubtedly increase the incentives to grow poppy, particularly given the continued deterioration of the Afghan economy and absence of viable alternatives for farmers,” perhaps leading to violent resistance to the Taliban.22 Current and Potential Opposition While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as a lack of support for the former government.23 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.24 The Taliban have often violently dispersed these protests, and have sought to stifle dissenting voices, including with the September 2023 detention of two women’s rights activists and their families.25 Whatever the level of initial support, the Taliban government’s position appears secure; U.N. sanctions monitors reported in June 2023 that the Taliban are “unchecked by any meaningful political opposition.”26 The Taliban face some armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the National armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the National
Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF leaders Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF leaders
have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based
representation.representation.2127 They have not won explicit public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps They have not won explicit public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps
due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional
powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia
and Iran. The NRF has claimed and Iran. The NRF has claimed ~~numerous~~ attacks against Taliban fighters, mostly in and around attacks against Taliban fighters, mostly in and around
~~the central province of Panjshir, but it is difficult to assess the veracity of such claims, which the~~
~~Taliban dismiss as “propaganda.”22~~ the central 19 White House, Memorandum on Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2024, Presidential Determination No. 2023-12, September 15, 2023. 20 Mansfield, “Whistling in the Wind,”; William Byrd, “The Taliban’s successful opium ban is bad for Afghans and the world,” United States Institute of Peace, June 8, 2023. 21 Orzala Nemat, “Why the Taliban’s opium ban will probably fail,” Chatham House, July 28, 2023. 22 David Mansfield, “Uncharted territory: Does the Taliban’s new edict signal a crackdown on the drugs trade is looming?” Alcis, November 2, 2023. 23 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid, “Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021. 24 “The Taliban use stun guns, fire hoses and gunfire to break up Afghan women protesting beauty salon ban,” Associated Press, July 20, 2023; Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022. 25 “Taliban disperses Afghan women’s march for ‘work and freedom,’” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2022; UN OCHR, “Taliban must immediately release women human rights defenders, say UN experts,” October 31, 2023. 26 U.N. Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability, and security of Afghanistan, S/2023/370, released June 2023. 27 Thomas Harding, “Young lion of Panshir fights Afghanistan’s ‘epic prison,’” National, April 27, 2023; Ali Maisam Nazary, “What the Taliban really fear,” Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy province of Panjshir, where the Taliban has been accused of reprisal attacks against civilians.28 Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military
capabilities or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten capabilities or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten
the Taliban’s position.the Taliban’s position.2329
An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic
State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has
opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused
nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global
caliphate.caliphate.30 ISKP has launched multiple attacks against Taliban targets, killing several senior ISKP has launched multiple attacks against Taliban targets, killing several senior
officials (including provincial governors in March 2023 and June 2023). In addition, ISKP has officials (including provincial governors in March 2023 and June 2023). In addition, ISKP has
claimed attacks against Afghan civilians (mostly targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the claimed attacks against Afghan civilians (mostly targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the
Hazaras) and a number of externally-oriented operations, including cross border rocket attacks Hazaras) and a number of externally-oriented operations, including cross border rocket attacks
against Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, attacks against the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul, against Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, attacks against the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul,
and an assault on a Kabul hotel frequented by Chinese nationals.and an assault on a Kabul hotel frequented by Chinese nationals.~~24 U.N. sanctions monitors assess~~

~~18 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022.~~
~~19 “Taliban disperses Afghan women’s march for ‘work and freedom,’” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2022; Ali Latifi, “Arrest~~
~~of leading education activist leaves Afghans confused and worried,” New Humanitarian, April 12, 2023.~~
~~20 UNAMA, “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for~~
~~Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva,” December 20, 2022.~~
~~21 Ali Maisam Nazary, “What the Taliban really fear,” Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2022.~~
~~22 Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022.~~
2331 Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers. Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors. Pakistan.32 The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani leaders.33 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021. However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power is posing challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory has arguably given a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i 28 “Afghanistan: Taliban’s cruel attacks in Panjshir province amount to war crime of collective punishment – new report,” Amnesty International, June 8, 2023. 29 Rubin, op. cit.; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan in 2023; Taliban internal power struggles and militancy,” Rubin, op. cit.; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan in 2023; Taliban internal power struggles and militancy,”
Brookings Institution, February 3, 2023; Jacob Zenn, “National Resistance Front (NRF) fails to foment unrest against Brookings Institution, February 3, 2023; Jacob Zenn, “National Resistance Front (NRF) fails to foment unrest against
the Taliban,” Jamestown Foundation, March 31, 2023. the Taliban,” Jamestown Foundation, March 31, 2023.
2430 Borhan Osman, “ISKP’s battle for minds: What are its main messages and who do they attract?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 12, 2016. 31 Hazaras comprise 10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have Hazaras comprise 10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have
demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule, demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule,
particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands
in central Afghanistan in fall 2021. While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the in central Afghanistan in fall 2021. While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the
Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted
Hazaras. Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Hazaras. Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, , May 27,
2022.Sudha Ramachandran, “ISKP attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” 2022.Sudha Ramachandran, “ISKP attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 31, , August 31,
2022. 2022.
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~~the group’s attacks are intended “to portray the Taliban as incapable of providing security” and~~
~~“to undermine the relationship between the Taliban and neighboring countries.”25~~
~~Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors~~
~~Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has~~
~~throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers.~~
~~Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.~~
Pakistan.26 The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
~~which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for~~
~~decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its~~
~~subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph~~
~~for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from~~
~~Pakistani leaders.27 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban~~
~~government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.~~
~~However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for~~
~~Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory has arguably given a morale and perhaps material boost to~~
~~Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i~~
~~Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated FTO).28~~32 For more, see CRS Report R47565, Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. 33 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated FTO).34 TTP attacks against Pakistani security TTP attacks against Pakistani security
forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek the forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek the
Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires.Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires.2935 The TTP has resumed attacks against The TTP has resumed attacks against
Pakistani targets, including a January 2023 attack (claimed by a TTP faction) that targeted police Pakistani targets, including a January 2023 attack (claimed by a TTP faction) that targeted police
officers and killed over 100. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the officers and killed over 100. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the
presence of over 1 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically presence of over 1 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically
tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government
forces forces have intermittently clashedintermittently clashed ~~in 2022.30~~.36 In November 2023, Pakistan’s caretaker government abruptly ordered unregistered Afghan refugees to leave Pakistan, displacing hundreds of thousands and escalating tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan.37
Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule
but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for
Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who
speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Disputes over water speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Disputes over water
rights and refugees persist, along with sporadic border clashes.rights and refugees persist, along with sporadic border clashes.3138
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central AsianAfghanistan’s Central Asian neighborsneighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the planned governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the planned

~~25 U.N. Security Council,~~ ~~Thirty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted~~
~~pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and entities~~,
~~S/2023/95, December 30, 2022.~~
~~26 For more, see CRS Report R47565, Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.~~
~~27 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani,~~
~~“Pakistan’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021.~~
28Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had official engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered shelter to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front, a consequence both of Tajikistan’s own struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.39 China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some congressional attention since the Taliban takeover. China, which played a relatively limited role in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and other limitations.40 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”41 In September 2023, China named a new ambassador to Kabul, becoming the first nation to appoint a new envoy to Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover; the following 34 Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan after the Taliban’s Afghanistan takeover,” Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan after the Taliban’s Afghanistan takeover,” CTC
Sentinel, vol. 16, no. 5 (May 2023). , vol. 16, no. 5 (May 2023).
2935 “Islamist militants present fresh challenge to Pakistan,” “Islamist militants present fresh challenge to Pakistan,” Reuters, January 31, 2023. , January 31, 2023.
3036 Rubin, op. cit. Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, Rubin, op. cit. Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary,
but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British
Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017. Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
3137 Asfandyar Mir, “In major rift, Pakistan ramps up pressure on Taliban,” U.S. Institute of Peace, November 16, 2023. 38 Christian Hoj Hansen and Halimullah Kousary, “Can Iran get along with the Taliban?” Christian Hoj Hansen and Halimullah Kousary, “Can Iran get along with the Taliban?” War on the Rocks, June 7, , June 7,
2022; “What caused deadly Afghan-Iran border clashes? What happens next?” 2022; “What caused deadly Afghan-Iran border clashes? What happens next?” Al Jazeera, May 30, 2023. , May 30, 2023.
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~~Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had official~~
~~engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered~~
~~shelter to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front, a consequence both of Tajikistan’s own~~
~~struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest~~
~~ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.32~~
China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some
~~congressional attention since the Taliban takeover. China, which played a relatively limited role in~~
~~Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan~~
~~(particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban~~
~~takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and~~
~~other limitations.33 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has~~
~~signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May~~
~~2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”34~~
~~In May 2023, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China agreed to extend China’s Belt and Road Initiative~~
~~(BRI) to Afghanistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.35~~39 Abubakar Siddique, “Hostilities grow between Taliban and Tajikistan amid border closure, truck seizures,” Gandhara, May 19, 2022; Rubin, op. cit. 40 Jiayi Zhou et al., “Treading lightly: China’s footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan,” SIPRI, November 2022. 41 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy month, Taliban representatives visited Beijing for the third Belt and Road Forum and expressed an intention to formally join China’s Belt and Road Initiative.42
U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power
Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has
created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in
Afghanistan, and has forced the United States to pursue an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism Afghanistan, and has forced the United States to pursue an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism
approach that lacks a local partner. Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has approach that lacks a local partner. Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has
been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken numerous been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken numerous
actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many
Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens
and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains
ongoingongoing ~~as of June 2023~~. .
Counterterrorism
Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have
related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most significant of these related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most significant of these
terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently. terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently.
Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has clashed with the Taliban, as Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has clashed with the Taliban, as
mentioned above. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched mentioned above. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched
airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban
cooperation.cooperation.3643 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10
million million ~~each~~ for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible
for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people, for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people,
including over 30 U.S. servicemembers.including over 30 U.S. servicemembers.3744 In April 2023, the White House announced that the Taliban had killed the leader of the ISKP cell responsible for the airport attack.45 According to various assessments, ISKP strategy is changing in light of Taliban pressure. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Eric Kurilla estimated in March 2023 congressional testimony that ISKP could be capable of conducting “an external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months.”46 According to one expert, while ISKP has been weakened in Afghanistan by Taliban pressure, the group is “expanding its external operations capacity,” as evidenced by its growing media presence and planned or actual attacks in 42 “China becomes first to name new Afghan ambassador under Taliban,” Reuters, September 13, 2023; Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Taliban’s economic dreams.” Diplomat, October 19, 2023. 43 ~~In April 2023, the White House announced that the~~

~~32 Abubakar Siddique, “Hostilities grow between Taliban and Tajikistan amid border closure, truck seizures,”~~
Gandhara, May 19, 2022; Rubin, op. cit.
~~33 Jiayi Zhou et al., “Treading lightly: China’s footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan,” SIPRI, November 2022.~~
~~34 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022.~~
~~35 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Afghanistan joins China’s infrastructure plan as Beijing pushes interests,” Axios, May~~
~~9, 2023.~~
36 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020. Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
3744 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022. Taliban and Pakistani officials reported Gafari’s killing in June 2023; U.N. sanctions monitors in July 2023 conveyed the assessment of one unnamed member state that Ghafari had been killed but said the report “remains to be confirmed.” Ayaz Gul, “UN awaits confirmation of killing of IS-Khorasan chief in Afghanistan,” VOA, July 28, 2023. 45 Karoun Demirjian and Eric Schmitt, “Taliban kill head of ISIS cell that bombed Kabul airport,” New York Times, April 25, 2023. 46 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2024 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7691155 ~~U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022~~. .
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~~Taliban had killed the leader of the ISKP cell responsible for the airport attack.38 U.S. Central~~
~~Command (CENTCOM) commander General Eric Kurilla estimated in March 2023~~
~~congressional testimony that ISKP could be capable of conducting “an external operation against~~
~~U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months.”39~~neighboring countries and further afield (including in Pakistan, India, Turkey, and Germany).47 That aligns with the reported assessment of one unnamed U.S. official, who said in September 2023 that ISKP members “are increasingly moving to neighboring countries to evade the Taliban.”48 ISKP attempts to “become a truly regional organization” could pose considerable challenges to U.S. partners and interests.49
While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda, While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda,
the July 2022 U.S. killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable the July 2022 U.S. killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable
attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.4050 Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism
pressure, those ties have persisted for decades. The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in pressure, those ties have persisted for decades. The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in
Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties
remain unclear; neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda officially acknowledged Zawahiri’s death.remain unclear; neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda officially acknowledged Zawahiri’s death.4151
U.N. sanctions monitors reported in June 2023 that Al Qaeda “maintains a low profile” in U.N. sanctions monitors reported in June 2023 that Al Qaeda “maintains a low profile” in
Afghanistan and that the importance of the group’s Afghanistan-based leadership had declinedAfghanistan and that the importance of the group’s Afghanistan-based leadership had declined~~.42~~
, but that AQ members had “received appointments and advisory roles in the Taliban security and administrative structures.”52 A July 2023 report from other U.N. sanctions monitors assessed that Al Qaeda is “in a reorganization phase, establishing new training centers” in eastern Afghanistan.53 U.S. officials reportedly characterized that assessment as “wildly out of whack” to reporters in September 2023, saying that Al Qaeda “is at its historical nadir in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its revival is unlikely.”54 From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain
the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a
military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what
U.S. officials have described as an “over-the-horizon” approach.U.S. officials have described as an “over-the-horizon” approach.4355 With the Taliban in control of With the Taliban in control of
Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the
continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. In March 2023 continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. In March 2023
testimony, testimony, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said of U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said of U.S.
counterterrorism capabilities in Afghanistan: counterterrorism capabilities in Afghanistan:
It’s not what it was. Nothing’s going to replace having troops and Afghan security forces It’s not what it was. Nothing’s going to replace having troops and Afghan security forces
and the amount of infrastructure we had. That’s not going to get replaced. We do have the and the amount of infrastructure we had. That’s not going to get replaced. We do have the
capability to see into Afghanistan with a variety of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and capability to see into Afghanistan with a variety of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
~~reconnaissance] assets and to determine any threats to the homeland. If we pick those up,~~
~~we have the ability to strike at great distance.~~
~~The Biden Administration has cited the Zawahiri strike as a demonstration of U.S. over-the-~~
~~horizon capabilities.44 Some Members of Congress have criticized the approach, with one calling~~
~~it a “farce.”45~~

~~38 Karoun Demirjian and Eric Schmitt, “Taliban kill head of ISIS cell that bombed Kabul airport,” New York Times,~~
~~April 25, 2023.~~
~~39 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,~~ ~~To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central~~
~~Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2024~~
~~and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., transcript at~~
~~http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7691155.~~
40 47 Aaron Zelin, “ISKP goes global: External operations from Afghanistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 11, 2023. See also Alexander Palmer and Mackenzie Holtz, “The Islamic State threat in Pakistan: Trends and scenarios,” CSIS, August 3, 2023. 48 Natasha Bertrand and Katie Bo Lillis, “New US intelligence suggests al Qaeda unlikely to revive in Afghanistan, but officials warn ISIS threat remains,” CNN, September 8, 2023. 49 Amira Jadoon et al., “The enduring duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s survival under Afghanistan’s new rulers,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, Issue 8, August 2023. 50 CRS Insight IN11976, CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. , by Clayton Thomas.
4151 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested that some elements of the Taliban might not have supported or National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested that some elements of the Taliban might not have supported or
even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly leading to tensions within the Taliban. “The National even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly leading to tensions within the Taliban. “The National
Security Advisor’s very busy week,” Security Advisor’s very busy week,” NPR, August 4, 2022. , August 4, 2022.
4252 U.N. Security Council, S/2023/370. 53 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Security Council, ~~Fourteenth~~Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution ~~2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a~~
~~threat to the peace, stability, and security of Afghanistan,~~ ~~S/2023/370, released June 2023.~~
432610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2023/549, released July 2023. 54 Bertrand and Lillis, “New US intelligence suggests al Qaeda unlikely to revive in Afghanistan”. 55 See, for example, White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, April 14, 2021. See, for example, White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, April 14, 2021.
~~44 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022.~~
~~45 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee,~~ ~~U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the~~
~~Greater Middle East and Africa, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st, sess., March, transcript at~~
~~http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7697085.~~
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~~Afghan Women and Girls46~~ Congressional Research Service 8 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy reconnaissance] assets and to determine any threats to the homeland. If we pick those up, we have the ability to strike at great distance. The Biden Administration has cited the Zawahiri strike as a demonstration of U.S. over-the-horizon capabilities.56 Some Members of Congress have criticized the approach, with one calling it a “farce.”57 Afghan Women and Girls58
The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a
different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active
participants in many parts of Afghan societyparticipants in many parts of Afghan society;, with protections for protections for ~~them were~~women enshrined in the country’s enshrined in the country’s
2004 constitution. Though the Taliban takeover reduced the high levels of violence that 2004 constitution. Though the Taliban takeover reduced the high levels of violence that
characterized the conflict, a development characterized the conflict, a development apparently particularly welcomed by women in rural particularly welcomed by women in rural areas, the Taliban have introduced draconic restrictions on women and girls, making~~areas, the~~
~~Taliban’s return to power has made~~ Afghanistan “the most repressive country in the world Afghanistan “the most repressive country in the world
regarding women’s rights,” according to the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in regarding women’s rights,” according to the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA).Afghanistan (UNAMA).4759
Upon taking power, the Taliban closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of Upon taking power, the Taliban closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of
the former Afghan government, and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and the former Afghan government, and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The
ministry monitors the implementation of Taliban edicts that seek to impose new restrictions on ministry monitors the implementation of Taliban edicts that seek to impose new restrictions on
Afghan women.Afghan women.4860 Those edicts include a December 2021 prohibition on women driving long Those edicts include a December 2021 prohibition on women driving long
distances or flying without a male guardian, a May 2022 decree mandating punishments for the distances or flying without a male guardian, a May 2022 decree mandating punishments for the
male relatives of women who do not wear a male relatives of women who do not wear a hijab that fully covers their bodies, and a November that fully covers their bodies, and a November
2022 decision to ban women from public parks and bath houses.2022 decision to ban women from public parks and bath houses.4961 According to a report from According to a report from
U.N. experts, U.N. experts,
In their totality, the edicts significantly limit women’s and girls’ ability to engage in In their totality, the edicts significantly limit women’s and girls’ ability to engage in
society, have access to basic services, and to earn a living. Women have described the society, have access to basic services, and to earn a living. Women have described the
continual announcement of restrictions as ‘day by day, the walls close in,’ feeling continual announcement of restrictions as ‘day by day, the walls close in,’ feeling
‘suffocated,’ and the cumulative effect leaving them ‘without hope.’‘suffocated,’ and the cumulative effect leaving them ‘without hope.’5062
Additionally, media sources report that divorce is becoming more difficult to obtain, even in cases Additionally, media sources report that divorce is becoming more difficult to obtain, even in cases
of abuse, and that some Afghan women fear that their divorces from abusive husbands may be of abuse, and that some Afghan women fear that their divorces from abusive husbands may be
nullified.nullified.5163
Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for
Afghan girls; per the Afghan girls; per the ~~U.N.~~United Nations, “Afghanistan is the only country in the world where women 56 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022. 57 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st, sess., March, transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7697085. 58~~, “Afghanistan is the only country in the world where women and girls’~~
~~access to education is suspended.”52 Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’~~
~~secondary schools, effectively shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover,~~
~~would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022.53 However, on March 23,~~
~~2022, with some girls already present in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and~~
~~announced that secondary schools for girls would remain closed, shocking many observers.54 The~~
~~United States and many other countries condemned the decision, and in October 2022, the State~~
~~Department announced visa restrictions on several Taliban figures responsible for the repression~~

46 See CRS In Focus IF11646, See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas. , by Clayton Thomas.
4759 Christina Goldbaum, “Loss piles on loss for Afghan women,” Christina Goldbaum, “Loss piles on loss for Afghan women,” New York Times, March 8, 2023; UNAMA, “The UN , March 8, 2023; UNAMA, “The UN
in Afghanistan calls for an immediate end to draconian restrictions on the rights of women and girls by the de facto in Afghanistan calls for an immediate end to draconian restrictions on the rights of women and girls by the de facto
authorities,” March 8, 2023. authorities,” March 8, 2023.
4860 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Afghanistan and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, A/HRC/53/21, June 15, 2023. , A/HRC/53/21, June 15, 2023.
4961 Belquis Ahmadi, “Taliban escalate new abuses against Afghan women, girls,” USIP, October 27, 2022. Belquis Ahmadi, “Taliban escalate new abuses against Afghan women, girls,” USIP, October 27, 2022.
5062 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, op. cit. , op. cit.
5163 “Afghan women who were divorced under prior government fear for their status,” “Afghan women who were divorced under prior government fear for their status,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023. , March 7, 2023.
~~52 UN, “Afghan girls and women made focus of International Education Day: UNESCO,” January 19, 2023.~~
~~53 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022.~~
~~54 Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~of women and girls in Afghanistan.55 One~~ Congressional Research Service 9 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy and girls’ access to education is suspended.”64 Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’ secondary schools, effectively shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022.65 However, on March 23, 2022, with some girls already present in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that secondary schools for girls would remain closed, shocking many observers.66 One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of
hardline clerics within the grouphardline clerics within the group ~~and Akhundzada.56 Other Taliban figures, including both~~
~~Baradar and the Haqqanis,~~.67 Other Taliban figures reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate
their own daughters abroad).their own daughters abroad).5768 The United States and many other countries condemned the Taliban’s education edict, and in October 2022, the State Department announced visa restrictions on several Taliban figures responsible for the repression of women and girls in Afghanistan.69 In December 2022, the Taliban In December 2022, the Taliban ~~also suspended~~broadened prohibitions by suspending women from women from
attending university.attending university.5870 The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative
leaders, and the unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves, leaders, and the unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves,
suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.71
The impact of Taliban restrictions on girls’ The impact of Taliban restrictions on girls’ and women’s education has been considerable: U.N. experts stated education has been considerable: U.N. experts stated
in June 2023 that “reports of depression and suicide are widespread, especially among adolescent in June 2023 that “reports of depression and suicide are widespread, especially among adolescent
girls prevented from pursuing education.”girls prevented from pursuing education.”5972 Some Afghan women have reportedly continued to Some Afghan women have reportedly continued to
provide informal education to girls in private “secret schools,” and secondary schools for girls provide informal education to girls in private “secret schools,” and secondary schools for girls
have remained open in some areas (largely in the north, where less conservative views on girls’ have remained open in some areas (largely in the north, where less conservative views on girls’
education prevail).education prevail).6073 Some Afghan women and girls have also Some Afghan women and girls have also reportedly attempted to continue their studies attempted to continue their studies
online, though those efforts are impeded by technological and infrastructure challenges.online, though those efforts are impeded by technological and infrastructure challenges.~~61 Some~~
~~girls’ schools have continued to face attacks under Taliban rule, notably a September 2022 suicide~~
~~bombing in Kabul and June 2023 reported poisoning in northern Afghanistan.62~~
74 Beyond education, the Taliban have also severely restricted women’s access to employment. In Beyond education, the Taliban have also severely restricted women’s access to employment. In
December 2022, the Taliban banned women from working for national and international NGOs, December 2022, the Taliban banned women from working for national and international NGOs,
threatening to suspend the licenses of NGOs that do not comply. U.N. Security Council members threatening to suspend the licenses of NGOs that do not comply. U.N. Security Council members
said the decision “would have a significant and immediate impact for humanitarian operations in said the decision “would have a significant and immediate impact for humanitarian operations in
country, including those of the country, including those of the ~~UN.”63 Many implementing partners halted their work after the~~
~~announcement of these restrictions, but some have since reportedly resumed some operations~~
~~after reaching “acceptable workarounds” with local authorities.64~~U.N.”75 While interruptions to While interruptions to
~~humanitarian operations have negative implications for many of the 28 million Afghans in need~~
~~of assistance, women and girls have been disproportionately affected. Afghan women face more~~
~~barriers to health care services, experience higher levels of unemployment, and adopt negative~~

~~55 U.S. Department of State, “Announcement of Visa Restriction in Response to the Repression of Women and Girls in~~
~~Afghanistan,” October 11, 2022.~~
56humanitarian operations have 64 UN, “Afghan girls and women made focus of International Education Day: UNESCO,” January 19, 2023. 65 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022. 66 Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022. 67 Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,” Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 29, 2022. , March 29, 2022.
5768 Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership
divisions,” divisions,” Guardian, March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes , March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes
starting to change from within?” starting to change from within?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 7, 2022. , February 7, 2022.
~~58 Diaa Hadid, “‘The Taliban took our last hope’: College education is banned for women in Afghanistan,” NPR,~~
~~December 20, 2022.~~
~~59 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, op. cit.~~
6069 U.S. Department of State, “Announcement of Visa Restriction in Response to the Repression of Women and Girls in Afghanistan,” October 11, 2022. 70 Diaa Hadid, “‘The Taliban took our last hope’: College education is banned for women in Afghanistan,” NPR, December 20, 2022. 71 Andrew Watkins, “What’s next for the Taliban’s leadership amid rising dissent,” U.S. Institute of Peace, April 11, 2023. 72 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan. 73 Allie Weintraub et al., “Afghan girls and women defy Taliban by continuing studies in secret schools,” Allie Weintraub et al., “Afghan girls and women defy Taliban by continuing studies in secret schools,” ABC
News,, March 8, 2023;March 8, 2023; “Afghanistan: Six provinces keep schools open for girls despite nationwide ban,” “Afghanistan: Six provinces keep schools open for girls despite nationwide ban,” Amu TV, ,
January 1, 2023. January 1, 2023.
~~61;~~74 Ruchi Kumar, “The Taliban ended college for women. Here’s how Afghan women are defying the ban,” NPR, Ruchi Kumar, “The Taliban ended college for women. Here’s how Afghan women are defying the ban,” NPR,
February 24, 2023; Charlotte Greenfield and Muhammad Yunus Yawar, “Afghan girls struggle with poor internet as February 24, 2023; Charlotte Greenfield and Muhammad Yunus Yawar, “Afghan girls struggle with poor internet as
they turn to online classes,” Reuters, March 27, 2023. they turn to online classes,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
~~62 “Afghan women protest school attack as Taliban cracks down,” Al Jazeera, October 3, 2022; Ahmad Mukhtar,~~
~~“Afghanistan school girls ‘poisoned’ in 2 separate attacks, officials say, as Taliban vows to find perpetrators,”~~ ~~CBS~~
~~News, June 5, 2023.~~
~~63 U.N., “Security Council Press Statement on Afghanistan,” SC/15165, December 27, 2022.~~
~~64 Ali Latifi, “After the Taliban ban on women NGO work, local and foreign aid groups take different approaches,”~~
New Humanitarian, March 2, 2023; SIGAR, “Quarterly Report,” April 30, 2023.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~coping mechanisms (such as reducing food consumption and selling belongings for food) at~~
~~higher rates than men. Families may also be increasing the early and forced marriage of girls.65~~
~~In April 2023, the Taliban further banned women from working for the U.N.; the U.N. then~~
75 U.N., “Security Council Press Statement on Afghanistan,” SC/15165, December 27, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy negative implications for many of the 28 million Afghans in need of assistance, women and girls have been disproportionately affected. Afghan women face more barriers to health care services, experience higher levels of unemployment, and are more vulnerable to harmful coping practices (such as reducing food consumption and selling belongings for food) at higher rates than men. Some observers also maintain that desperate conditions in the country have contributed to increases in early and forced marriage of girls.76 Many implementing partners halted their work after the announcement of these restrictions, but some have since reportedly resumed some operations after reaching “acceptable workarounds” with local authorities.77 The International Labor Organization asserts that women’s employment fell by 25% between 2021 and 2022 (compared to a 7% drop for men), with women increasingly pushed into home-based economic activities, “given the systematic exclusion of women from public life.”78 In April 2023, the Taliban banned women from working for the United Nations in Afghanistan; the United Nations then instructed all Afghan staff to not report to the office while it considered how to respond, an order instructed all Afghan staff to not report to the office while it considered how to respond, an order
that the U.N. reportedly dropped in early May.that the U.N. reportedly dropped in early May.6679 Women are permitted to work in Women are permitted to work in ~~healthcare~~health care (for (for
other women and girls) but face Taliban monitoring and interference.other women and girls) but face Taliban monitoring and interference.~~67 Other~~80 Some women have women have
reportedly attempted to circumvent Taliban attempted to circumvent Taliban ~~restrictions on working by operating online.68~~employment restrictions by operating online.81 One notable sector where women had continued to work was beauty salons; those were forcibly closed by the Taliban in July 2023.82
Ongoing Relocations of U.S. Citizens and Certain Afghans
The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021, triggered the mass evacuation of tens of The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021, triggered the mass evacuation of tens of
thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and
Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S. Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S.
officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including
5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US
history.”history.”6983 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the Biden Administration has said that Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the Biden Administration has said that
it has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 950 U.S. it has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 950 U.S.
citizens (as of April 2023) and 600 lawful permanent residents (as of August 2022).citizens (as of April 2023) and 600 lawful permanent residents (as of August 2022).70
~~U.S. officials have characterized their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens~~
~~and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country as an “enduring mission.”71 According~~
~~to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has~~
~~fluctuated amid continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens~~
~~come forward to ask for assistance to leave.72 On March 23, 2023, Secretary of State Antony~~
~~Blinken said there were “about 175” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, of which 44 were “ready to~~
~~leave, and we are working to effectuate their departure.”73 Additionally, the State Department~~
~~reported that as of March 2023, over 150,000 Afghan SIV applicants whose applications were~~
~~undergoing processing remained in Afghanistan.74~~

~~65 “Afghanistan Inter-Agency Rapid Gender Analysis, November 2022,” Gender in Humanitarian Action Working~~
~~Group in Afghanistan, December 22, 2022.~~
6684 76 “Afghanistan Inter-Agency Rapid Gender Analysis, November 2022,” Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group in Afghanistan, December 22, 2022. 77 Ali Latifi, “After the Taliban ban on women NGO work, local and foreign aid groups take different approaches,” New Humanitarian, March 2, 2023; SIGAR, “Quarterly Report,” April 30, 2023. 78 “Employment in Afghanistan in 2022: A rapid impact assessment,” International Labor Organization, March 2023. 79 Irwin Loy, “UN drops stay-home orders for Afghan staff over Taliban women ban,” Irwin Loy, “UN drops stay-home orders for Afghan staff over Taliban women ban,” New Humanitarian, May 10, , May 10,
2023. 2023.
6780 “Afghan women, banned from working, can’t provide for their children,” “Afghan women, banned from working, can’t provide for their children,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2023. , March 3, 2023.
6881 U.N. U.N. ~~OHCHR~~Human Rights Office, , Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/HRC/52/84, February 9, 2023. , A/HRC/52/84, February 9, 2023.
6982 Christina Goldbaum, “Taliban shut beauty salons, one of Afghan women’s last public spaces,” New York Times, July 25, 2023. 83 Statement of General Mark A. Milley, 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in U.S. Congress, Senate Statement of General Mark A. Milley, 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Conclusion of Military Operations in Afghanistan and
Plans for Future Counterterrorism Operations, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., at https://www.armed-, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf. services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
7084 Some of those evacuated U.S. citizens reportedly traveled to Afghanistan after August 2021. U.S. Department of Some of those evacuated U.S. citizens reportedly traveled to Afghanistan after August 2021. U.S. Department of
State, “Department Press Briefing—August 15, 2022,” at https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-State, “Department Press Briefing—August 15, 2022,” at https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-
august-15-2022/; White House, “U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” April 6, 2023; Andrew Desiderio et al., “800 august-15-2022/; White House, “U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” April 6, 2023; Andrew Desiderio et al., “800
Americans evacuated from Afghanistan since Taliban takeover,” Americans evacuated from Afghanistan since Taliban takeover,” Politico, August 14, 2022. , August 14, 2022.
~~71 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan, August 30, 2021.~~
~~72 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—April 12, 2022.”~~
~~73 U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, on~~ ~~The State of American Diplomacy in 2023: Growing Conflicts,~~
~~Budget Challenges, and Great Power Competition, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023, at~~
~~https://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7696303.~~
~~74 U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, “Relocation and resettlement outcomes of Afghan Special~~
~~Immigrant Visa holders,” June 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy~~

Congressional Research Service 11 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy U.S. officials have characterized their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country as an “enduring mission.”85 According to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has fluctuated amid continued relocations, U.S. citizens who have returned to Afghanistan, and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens come forward to ask for assistance to leave.86 On March 23, 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said there were “about 175” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, of which 44 were “ready to leave, and we are working to effectuate their departure.”87 Additionally, the State Department reported that as of March 2023, over 150,000 Afghan SIV applicants whose applications were undergoing processing remained in Afghanistan.88 Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The
Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to ~~various accounts, the~~
~~Taliban~~UNAMA, have carried out reprisals against figures aligned with the former government, including have carried out reprisals against figures aligned with the former government, including
hundreds of killings.hundreds of killings.7589
The Taliban have at times reportedly interfered with relocation flights, including by demanding The Taliban have at times reportedly interfered with relocation flights, including by demanding
seats for Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money, but in general appear to seats for Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money, but in general appear to
have not significantly impeded the departure of Afghans.have not significantly impeded the departure of Afghans.7690 The United States has reportedly paid, The United States has reportedly paid,
through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to Qatar for individuals to leave through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to Qatar for individuals to leave
Afghanistan.Afghanistan.~~77 Impediments to relocations from Afghanistan include logistical issues at Kabul’s~~
~~international airport and issues with Afghans obtaining travel documentation.~~91
Economic Contraction and Humanitarian Crisis
The Taliban’s return to power and resulting economic contraction have exacerbated one of the The Taliban’s return to power and resulting economic contraction have exacerbated one of the
worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most
aid-dependent countries. aid-dependent countries. Economic indicators recovered somewhat after 2022, but the economy remains fragile and weak, leaving tens of millions of Afghans considered to be in need of humanitarian assistance. The Taliban government’s ability to divert or misuse some of that humanitarian assistance, and allegations that it has done so, raise difficult questions for policymakers.92 A number of U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international A number of U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international
development assistance, development assistance, ~~longstanding~~long-standing U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the
U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, appear relevant to the economic breakdown that U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, appear relevant to the economic breakdown that
underlies the humanitarian crisis. underlies the humanitarian crisis.
~~The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the~~
~~former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as~~
~~80% of total public expenditures.78 Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s~~
~~August 2021 takeover, leading the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) to contract by over~~
~~20% in 2021.79 In 2022, however, the Afghan economy reached “a fragile low-level equilibrium,”~~
~~contracting by 3.6%, with “the Taliban’s economic management…~~Economic Conditions. The year after the Taliban takeover, after Afghanistan’s economy contracted by over 20%, the economy reached “a low equilibrium,” contracting by 3.6% in 2022, 85 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan, August 30, 2021. 86 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—April 12, 2022.” 87 U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, on The State of American Diplomacy in 2023: Growing Conflicts, Budget Challenges, and Great Power Competition, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023, at https://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7696303. 88 U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, “Relocation and resettlement outcomes of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa holders,” June 2023. 89 UNAMA, “A barrier to securing peace: Human rights violations against former government officials and former armed force members in Afghanistan,” August 2023. 90 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021; Akmal Dawi, “US continues relocating Afghans even under Taliban rule,” VOA, April 4, 2023. 91 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 8, 2022. 92 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” July 30, 2023. Congressional Research Service 12 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy with “the Taliban’s economic management … more effective than expected,” more effective than expected,”
per the United Nations per the United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.8093 A year later, the World Bank reports that the economy “now appears vulnerable” and that the aforementioned equilibrium has “come at the cost of possibly exhausting all coping strategies and household resources.”94 The U.N. The U.N.
Development Program (UNDP) projects slight GDP growth for 2023 (1.3%) and 2024 (0.4%).Development Program (UNDP) projects slight GDP growth for 2023 (1.3%) and 2024 (0.4%).81
95 That growth is likely to be outstripped by That growth is likely to be outstripped by ~~population increase (around 2%)~~an estimated 2% population increase, leading estimated per , leading estimated per
capita GDP to decline from $359 in 2022 to $345 in 2024capita GDP to decline from $359 in 2022 to $345 in 2024.
~~Those estimates assume a stable level of international support, including from the United Nations,~~
~~which requested $4.6 billion for Afghanistan for 2023, the largest ever annual~~ , one of the lowest in the world.96 Humanitarian Crisis. The economic contraction has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Put plainly, Afghanistan’s economy cannot support most of the country’s population. As of October 2023, the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) projects that 15.3 million Afghans were food-insecure in mid-2023 (with 4 million people acutely malnourished) and that 29.2 million people (two-thirds of Afghanistan’s population) would require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2023.97 Many international actors have reduced their support for development programs in Afghanistan and focus only on humanitarian assistance, “leaving the population trapped in a cycle of repeated, protracted crises.”98 International and U.S. Assistance The United Nations requested $4.6 billion for the 2023 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), the largest ever annual humanitarian appeal for a single appeal for a single
country.country.8299 In May 2023, the appeal was revised In May 2023, the appeal was revised downward to $3.2 billion for 2023 due to “the changing operating environment,” including the bans on women working for NGOs and the United Nations (see below).100 International support for Afghanistan includes cash shipments; U.N. humanitarian assistance in 2022, for example, provided $1.85 billion in cash for humanitarian operations.101 According to a U.N. Info Sheet, the cash is placed in U.N. accounts at a private bank, distributed directly to U.N. entities and some humanitarian partner organizations, and is “carefully monitored, audited, inspected and vetted in strict accordance with the U.N. financial rules and processes.”102 According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the United States has provided over $2.1 billion in assistance for Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, 93 World Bank, Afghanistan: Overview, updated October 3, 2023~~to $3.2 billion for 2023 due to “the changing~~

~~75 Barbara Marcolini et al., “The Taliban promised them amnesty. Then they executed them,” New York Times, April~~
~~12, 2022; Abubakar Siddique, “‘Afghanistan is hell’: Supporters of late Afghan general claim Taliban killings,~~
~~persecution,” Gandhara, November 2, 2022.~~
~~76 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan~~
~~for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021; Akmal Dawi, “US continues relocating Afghans even under~~
~~Taliban rule,” VOA, April 4, 2023.~~
~~77 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee~~
~~Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 8, 2022.~~
~~78 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” January 30, 2023, pp. 69-71.~~
~~79 U.N. Development Program, Afghanistan: Socio-economic Outlook 2023, April 2023.~~
~~80 Ibid~~.; UNAMA, “Briefing by Special Representative Roza Otunbayeva to the Security Council,” December 20, 2022, .; UNAMA, “Briefing by Special Representative Roza Otunbayeva to the Security Council,” December 20, 2022,
at https://unama.unmissions.org/briefing-special-representative-roza-otunbayeva-security-council. at https://unama.unmissions.org/briefing-special-representative-roza-otunbayeva-security-council.
~~81 Afghanistan: Socio-economic Outlook 2023.~~
~~82 U.N. OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Afghanistan, March 2023; “Taliban restrictions on women’s rights~~
~~deepen Afghanistan’s crisis,” International Crisis Group, February 23, 2023.~~
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~~operating environment,” including the bans on women working for NGOs and the U.N.83~~
~~International support includes cash payments; the U.N. delivered $1.85 billion in cash into~~
~~Afghanistan in 2022 for humanitarian operations.84~~
~~The economic contraction has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in~~
~~Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19~~
~~pandemic. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in February~~
~~2023 that humanitarian partners provided 26~~94 World Bank, Afghanistan: Overview. 95 U.N. Development Program, Afghanistan: Socio-economic Outlook 2023, April 18, 2023. 96 Ibid. 97 “WFP Afghanistan Situation Report,” World Food Program, October 19, 2023. 98 Becky Roby in “Afghanistan’s two years of humanitarian crisis under the Taliban,” U.S. Institute of Peace, September 19, 2023. 99 U.N. OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Afghanistan, March 2023; “Taliban restrictions on women’s rights deepen Afghanistan’s crisis,” International Crisis Group, February 23, 2023. 100 U.N. OCHA, “Afghanistan: Humanitarian response plan 2023 response overview (1 January – 30 April 2023),” June 18, 2023. 101 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, April 4, 2023. 102 UNAMA, “Cash shipments to the UN in Afghanistan – Info sheet,” January 9, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy making it the largest international donor.103 The Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget request proposes $143 million for health, education, and other forms of bilateral assistance in Afghanistan (in addition to other U.S. humanitarian assistance).104 As of November 2023, the U.N. appeal of $3.2 billion for the 2023 Afghanistan HRP 2023 was 34.7% funded.105 In an October 31, 2023, joint statement, the United States, seven other countries, and the European Union highlighted that “humanitarian aid levels are dropping while needs are not.”106 The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in August 2023 that humanitarian organizations provided 20.1 million Afghans with at least one form of .1 million Afghans with at least one form of
~~assistance in 2022, and that “the outlook remains grim” given projected droughts and higher~~
~~commodity prices.85 As of May 2023, the World Food Program projected that 15.3 million~~
~~Afghans would be food-insecure in mid-2023 and that 28 million people (two-thirds of~~
~~Afghanistan’s population) would require some form of assistance this year.86~~
~~U.S. Policy~~
~~The United States has provided over $2.1 billion in assistance for Afghanistan since the Taliban~~
~~takeover, making it the largest international donor.87 The Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget~~
~~request proposes $143 million for health, education, and other forms of bilateral assistance in~~
~~Afghanistan (on top of any emergency humanitarian assistance). The lack of a U.S. diplomatic~~
~~presence in Afghanistan may complicate or constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S.~~
~~funding. In March 2023, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike McCaul directed the~~
~~Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to assess, among other issues,~~
~~the extent to which U.S. foreign assistance funds have been diverted to the Taliban in the form of~~
~~taxes or fees.88~~
~~Beyond assistance, the two U.S. policy areas that appear to have the greatest~~assistance in the first six months of 2023, a lower figure than in past years due to “limited resources” that left tens of millions with “reduced rations” or no food aid.107 The WFP announced in September 2023 that a “massive funding shortfall” would force the organization to “choose between the hungry and the starving” and drop another 2 million Afghans from food assistance.108 Foreign Assistance Diversion In 2023, observers and policymakers, including some Members of Congress, have paid increasing attention to the issue of aid diversion. In March 2023, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike McCaul directed SIGAR to assess, among other issues, the extent to which U.S. foreign assistance funds have been diverted to the Taliban in the form of taxes or fees.109 A May 2023 U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assessed that the “Taliban appear to view the U.N. system as yet another revenue stream, one which their movement will seek to monopolize and centralize control over” and that the group is “pushing for ever-increasing degrees of credit and control over the delivery of aid.”110 Special Inspector General John Sopko, in introducing the July 2023 SIGAR report which relayed the USIP assessment, said “it is no longer a question of whether the Taliban are diverting assistance from our programs to help the Afghan people, but rather how much they are diverting.”111 That description is consistent with some media accounts indicating that the Taliban are “attempting to divert aid to their members through bullying, threats of legal action and even violence,” per a National Public Radio (NPR) report.112 In September 2023, U.S. Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs Robert Wood told the U.N. Security Council that the “Taliban have created an increasingly difficult operating environment” for humanitarian organizations and that “Any interference in or diversion of humanitarian aid is totally 103 See SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” October 30, 2023. 104 U.S. Department of State, FY2024 International Affairs Budget. 105 U.N. OCHA, Afghanistan 2023, accessed November 8, 2023. Available at https://fts.unocha.org/countries/1/summary/2023. 106 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Afghanistan,” October 31, 2023. 107 U.N. OCHA, “Afghanistan: Humanitarian response plan 2023 Response Overview,” August 27, 2023. 108 World Food Programme, “WFP in Afghanistan forced to drop 10 million people from lifesaving assistance, deepening despair and worry for Afghans,” September 5, 2023. 109 Letter from Rep. Michael T. McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, March 13, 2023, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/HFAC-SIGAR-Afghanistan-Request3.pdf. 110 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” July 30, 2023. 111 Ibid 112 Ruchi Kumar, “Charities say Taliban intimidation diverts aid to Taliban members and causes,” NPR, June 23, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy unacceptable.”113 Wood also called on the international community to “rally together and increase pledges and support to the humanitarian response” in Afghanistan. One observer, Ashley Jackson, has highlighted the differences between diversion (as defined as the theft and redirection of aid to anyone but the intended beneficiaries) from broader corruption and from the indirect benefits that a governing entity like the Taliban inevitably gains from the provision of aid to the populace over which it rules.114 Jackson wrote in a September 2023 report, Aid diversion happens everywhere, and it tends to happen a lot in places like Afghanistan. The protracted reliance on humanitarian assistance in chronic conflicts and as a response to pariah states such as the IEA [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] tends to skew incentives, perpetuating corruption and diversion – especially where aid forms a major part of the economy. However, that is no excuse not to do what one can to prevent it and address the most severe harm this does to Afghans.115 Jackson further described U.N. cash shipments as a “recipe for diversion” while calling for greater international engagement with the Taliban. U.S. Policy: Sanctions and Afghan Central Bank Reserves Two U.S. policy areas that have relevance to the relevance to the
economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s
central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999)
remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in
Afghanistan.Afghanistan.89116 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued
several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of
assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions.assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions.90
117 Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions, private sector firms, or Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions, private sector firms, or
other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by not engaging in the country rather than risk violation of other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by not engaging in the country rather than risk violation of
U.S. sanctions.U.S. sanctions.91118
The Biden Administration’s hold on the U.S.-based assets of the Afghan central bank (DAB) has The Biden Administration’s hold on the U.S.-based assets of the Afghan central bank (DAB) has
also drawn scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from also drawn scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from

~~83 U.N. OCHA, “Afghanistan: Humanitarian response plan 2023 response overview (1 January – 30 April 2023),” June~~
~~18, 2023.~~
~~84 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, April 4, 2023.~~
~~85 U.N. OCHA, “Humanitarian Response Plan 2022,” February 6, 2023.~~
~~86 “WFP Afghanistan Situation Report,” World Food Program, May 24, 2023.~~
~~87 See SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 30, 2023.~~
~~88 Letter from Rep. Michael T. McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to John F. Sopko, Special~~
~~Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, March 13, 2023, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-~~
~~content/uploads/2023/03/HFAC-SIGAR-Afghanistan-Request3.pdf.~~
89accessing the funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on those assets, which total around $7 billion.119 On February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it would “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.120 In September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an 113 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing on Afghanistan,” September 26, 2023. 114 Ashley Jackson, “Aid diversion in Afghanistan: Is it time for a candid conversation?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 2023. 115 Ibid. 116 “Economic causes of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis,” Human Rights Watch, August 4, 2022. “Economic causes of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis,” Human Rights Watch, August 4, 2022.
90117 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Issues Additional General Licenses and Guidance in Support of See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Issues Additional General Licenses and Guidance in Support of
Humanitarian Assistance and Other Support to Afghanistan,” press release, December 22, 2021. Humanitarian Assistance and Other Support to Afghanistan,” press release, December 22, 2021.
91118 David Ainsworth, “Sanctions and banks make it a struggle to get money into Afghanistan,” David Ainsworth, “Sanctions and banks make it a struggle to get money into Afghanistan,” Devex, January 17, , January 17, ~~2022.~~
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~~accessing the funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release~~
~~the hold on those assets, which total around $7 billion.92 On February 11, 2022, the Biden~~
~~Administration announced that it would “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ...~~
~~for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11,~~
~~2001, attacks.93 In September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an~~
2022; Zach Theiler, “How vague money-laundering and counter-terror rules slow aid,” New Humanitarian, May 23, 2023. 119 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves. 120 Executive Order 14064, “Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan,” 87 Federal Register 8391, February 15, 2022, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-15/pdf/2022-03346.pdf . Congressional Research Service 15 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy “Afghan Fund” (based in Switzerland) to “make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to “Afghan Fund” (based in Switzerland) to “make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to
help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy.”help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy.”94121 The fund’s four member Board of The fund’s four member Board of
Trustees met for the first time in November 2022.Trustees met for the first time in November 2022.95122 It has not, as of It has not, as of ~~June~~November 2023, made any disbursements. ~~2023, made any~~
~~disbursements. In early 2023, USAID reported to SIGAR that it had undertaken a third-party~~
~~assessment of the DAB and its anti-money laundering/countering terrorist financing controls but~~
~~that “the results were not finalized as of mid-April 2023.”96~~
Congressional Action and Outlook
The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny. U.S. public attention The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny. U.S. public attention
appears to have since decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of congressional appears to have since decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of congressional
engagement as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple engagement as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple
with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.97123
Congressional oversight of Afghanistan has been robust. Congressional committees held at least Congressional oversight of Afghanistan has been robust. Congressional committees held at least
ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.98124 Senate Senate
Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in
February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee then-ranking member produced an February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee then-ranking member produced an
interim report on the withdrawal in August 2022.interim report on the withdrawal in August 2022.99125 In addition, Congress established the In addition, Congress established the
Afghanistan War Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense Afghanistan War Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense
Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series
of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within

~~92 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves.~~
~~93 Executive Order 14064, “Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of~~
~~Afghanistan,” 87 Federal Register 8391, February 15, 2022, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-~~
~~15/pdf/2022-03346.pdf .~~
94three years. Per its website as of December 2023, the Commission “plans to formally convene in early 2023.”126 In the 118th Congress, two House committees have sought further information from the Administration related to the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan and related contingency plans.127 One of them, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), said in its February 2023 Authorization and Oversight Plan that it will “comprehensively review policy, decision-making, planning, and execution related to the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan,” as well as 121 U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of
Afghanistan,” September 14, 2022. See also SIGAR Quarterly Report, October 30, 2022, pp. 112-115. Afghanistan,” September 14, 2022. See also SIGAR Quarterly Report, October 30, 2022, pp. 112-115.
95122 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Readout of Fund for the Afghan People Board Meeting,” November 21, 2022. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Readout of Fund for the Afghan People Board Meeting,” November 21, 2022.
~~96 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 30, 2023.~~
97123 Google Trends, “Afghanistan,” “8/31/2021– Google Trends, “Afghanistan,” “8/31/2021–~~6/8~~11/22/2023,” accessed /2023,” accessed ~~June 8~~November 22, 2023. , 2023.
98124 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with
Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed
Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House
Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie);
Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee
(October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5, (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5,
2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International
Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee
(October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former
U.S. officials). U.S. officials).
99125 Left Behind: A Brief Assessment of the Biden Administration’s Strategic Failures during the Afghanistan Evacuation, ,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Report, February 2022;United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Report, February 2022; House Republican Interim
Report: A “Strategic Failure:” Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal, Congressman Michael , Congressman Michael
McCaul, August 14, 2022. McCaul, August 14, 2022.
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~three years. Per its website as of early June 2023, the Commission “plans to formally convene in~~
~~early 2023.”100~~
~~In the 118th Congress, two House committees have sought further information from the~~
~~Administration related to the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan and related contingency~~
~~plans.101 One of them, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), said in its February 2023~~
~~Authorization and Oversight Plan that it will “comprehensively review policy, decision-making,~~
~~planning, and execution related to the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan,” as well as~~
~~“examine U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.”102 Three House panels (HFAC, the House Committee~~
~~on Oversight and Accountability, and the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on~~
~~Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence)~~ 126 Afghanistan War Commission site, at https://www.afghanistanwarcommission.org/. 127 February 17, 2023 letters from Chairman James Comer et al. to White House National Security Affairs Director Sullivan, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas, USAID Administrator Power, Secretary of Defense Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley; June 8, 2023 letter from Chairman Michael McCaul to Secretary of State Blinken. Congressional Research Service 16 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy “examine U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.”128 Several House panels have held Afghanistan-focused hearings in have held Afghanistan-focused hearings in
the 118th Congress.the 118th Congress.~~103~~129
In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider ~~a number of~~various options. options.
• Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may affect • Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may affect
Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the
ability of Afghan girls to attend school in particular, to inform congressional ability of Afghan girls to attend school in particular, to inform congressional
consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2024 consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2024
appropriations; appropriations;
• Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration • Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration
about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in
Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation, Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation,
including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and
Administration plans to overcome those obstacles; Administration plans to overcome those obstacles;
• Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the designated • Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the designated
entities/individuals, the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, entities/individuals, the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly,
including by requiring reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the including by requiring reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the
Government Accountability Office, to assess whether they are achieving their Government Accountability Office, to assess whether they are achieving their
intended objectives; and intended objectives; and
• Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S. • Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts, congressional efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts, congressional
authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight mechanisms (including authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight mechanisms (including
those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners, such as those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners, such as
Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department of Defense (and Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department of Defense (and
the federally funded research and development center with whom the Department the federally funded research and development center with whom the Department
contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are due to be submitted contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are due to be submitted
within approximately one and two years, respectively. within approximately one and two years, respectively.

~~100 Afghanistan War Commission site, at https://www.afghanistanwarcommission.org/.~~
~~101 February 17, 2023 letters from Chairman James Comer et al. to White House National Security Affairs Director~~
~~Sullivan, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas, USAID Administrator Power,~~
~~Secretary of Defense Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley; June 8, 2023 letter from Chairman Michael~~
~~McCaul to Secretary of State Blinken.~~
~~102~~ Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, could be influenced or constrained by a number of factors, including • a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S. diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on journalists; and • the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically difficult, possibly on both sides. 128 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Authorization and Oversight Plan, 118th Congress, adopted February 8, 2023. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Authorization and Oversight Plan, 118th Congress, adopted February 8, 2023.
~~103~~129 U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, During and After the Fall of Kabul: Examining the
Administration’s Emergency Evacuation from Afghanistan, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 2023; U.S. , hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 2023; U.S.
Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, on Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, on The
Homeland Security Cost of the Biden Administration’s Catastrophic Withdrawal from Afghanistan, hearing, 118th , hearing, 118th
Cong., 1st sess., April 18, 2023; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, on Cong., 1st sess., April 18, 2023; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, on The Biden
Administration’s Disastrous Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Part I: Review by the Inspectors General, hearing, 118th , hearing, 118th
Cong., 1st sess., April 19, 2023Cong., 1st sess., April 19, 2023.
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, could be influenced or constrained by~~
~~a number of factors, including~~
~~• a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.~~
~~diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on~~
~~journalists; and~~
~~• the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make~~
~~cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically~~
~~difficult.~~; U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability, A Failure to Plan: Examining the Biden Administration’s Preparation for the Afghanistan Withdrawal, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2023; U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Examining the Biden Administration’s Afghanistan Policy since the U.S. Withdrawal, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2023; U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability, Go-to-Zero: Joe Biden’s Withdrawal Order and the Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2023. Congressional Research Service 17 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be
difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding
actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to
stave off mass casualties, it is unlikely to sustainably improve economic conditions. Financial stave off mass casualties, it is unlikely to sustainably improve economic conditions. Financial
assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but
comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering
Administration budget requests, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options, Administration budget requests, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options,
including conditions on U.S. assistance. including conditions on U.S. assistance.
The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since
returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues
to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to
form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling
for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In
response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright
these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not
be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.~~104~~130

Author Information

Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

~~104 See, for example, Marvin Weinbaum, “America can’t change the Taliban,” National Interest, August 15, 2022;~~
~~Madiha Afzal, “Afghanistan’s crises require a clear statement of U.S. policy,” Lawfare, March 26, 2023; Belquis~~
~~Ahmadi et al., “U.N. conference highlights global unity but limited leverage over the Taliban,” United states Institute~~
~~of Peace, May 4, 2023.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy~~

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130 See, for example, Marvin Weinbaum, “America can’t change the Taliban,” National Interest, August 15, 2022; Madiha Afzal, “Afghanistan’s crises require a clear statement of U.S. policy,” Lawfare, March 26, 2023; Belquis Ahmadi et al., “U.N. conference highlights global unity but limited leverage over the Taliban,” United states Institute of Peace, May 4, 2023. Congressional Research Service R45122 · VERSION 62 · UPDATED 18 ~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~R45122 · VERSION 59 · UPDATED~~
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