Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft

Changes from June 8, 2023 to September 5, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16
~~June 8~~September 5, 2023 , 2023
Aircraft
Jim Zanotti
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye), and has Administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye), and has
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
engaged Congress on the issue. According to January 2023 media reports citing unnamed U.S. engaged Congress on the issue. According to January 2023 media reports citing unnamed U.S.

officials, the Administration informally notified Congress of its intent to sell 40 new F-16s in the officials, the Administration informally notified Congress of its intent to sell 40 new F-16s in the
Clayton Thomas
Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and Viper upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters, Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and Viper upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters,
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion. Since along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion. Since
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, U.S.-Turkey cooperation Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, U.S.-Turkey cooperation

on some issues and differences on others have shaped the two countries’ relationship. Some on some issues and differences on others have shaped the two countries’ relationship. Some
Members of Congress who have input on a proposed F-16 sale to Turkey have indicated that they Members of Congress who have input on a proposed F-16 sale to Turkey have indicated that they
~~Patrick Parrish~~
expect certain actions from Turkey before they will consider supporting the transaction. expect certain actions from Turkey before they will consider supporting the transaction.
~~National Defense Fellow~~

Congressional legislation and oversight have shaped U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for Congressional legislation and oversight have shaped U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for

decades, and Turkey has relied consistently on U.S. imports for complex platforms such as decades, and Turkey has relied consistently on U.S. imports for complex platforms such as
aircraft and helicopters. A number of previously proposed U.S. arms transactions with Turkey aircraft and helicopters. A number of previously proposed U.S. arms transactions with Turkey
(such as for armed drones, air defense systems, and F-16 information sharing and safety upgrades) either have stalled or faced (such as for armed drones, air defense systems, and F-16 information sharing and safety upgrades) either have stalled or faced
reported congressional holds—perhaps stemming partly from bilateral differences on technology sharing, and partly from reported congressional holds—perhaps stemming partly from bilateral differences on technology sharing, and partly from
tensions over Russia and Syria. In April 2023, the Administration formally notified a possible sale of F-16 information tensions over Russia and Syria. In April 2023, the Administration formally notified a possible sale of F-16 information
sharing and safety upgrades. sharing and safety upgrades.
Turkish air capabilities after S-400 controversy. A U.S. F-16 sale to Turkey would likely extend the service life of much A U.S. F-16 sale to Turkey would likely extend the service life of much
of Turkey’s fleet—and ensure its continued interoperability within NATO—while Turkey tries to acquire or design a stealth of Turkey’s fleet—and ensure its continued interoperability within NATO—while Turkey tries to acquire or design a stealth
fighter. The United States was planning to sell up to 100 F-35s to Turkey until its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 fighter. The United States was planning to sell up to 100 F-35s to Turkey until its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system led to a U.S. cancellation of the F-35 transfers. The F-16V could be an interim solution for surface-to-air defense system led to a U.S. cancellation of the F-35 transfers. The F-16V could be an interim solution for
Turkey, though it lacks the stealth features of the F-35 and may be subject to production backlogs of three years or more. Turkey, though it lacks the stealth features of the F-35 and may be subject to production backlogs of three years or more.
NATO security considerations and the Swedish accession process. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s
potential to boost NATO militarily amid a European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in an F-potential to boost NATO militarily amid a European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in an F-
16 transaction. Turkey’s has NATO’s second-largest military and the world’s third-largest F-16 fleet, hosts important allied 16 transaction. Turkey’s has NATO’s second-largest military and the world’s third-largest F-16 fleet, hosts important allied
assets and personnel, and partners in other ways within the alliance, including by contributing to missions that aid Baltic and assets and personnel, and partners in other ways within the alliance, including by contributing to missions that aid Baltic and
Mediterranean security. At the same time, several Members of Congress have argued that Turkish delays in approving NATO Mediterranean security. At the same time, several Members of Congress have argued that Turkish delays in approving NATO
accession for Sweden and Finland have threatened alliance unity in countering Russia. While Turkey approved Finland’s accession for Sweden and Finland have threatened alliance unity in countering Russia. While Turkey approved Finland’s
NATO membership in March 2023, its approval of Sweden’s accession may be necessary before many Members of Congress NATO membership in March 2023, its approval of Sweden’s accession may be necessary before many Members of Congress
would consider backing an F-16 sale.would consider backing an F-16 sale.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged in July to take steps—perhaps contingent on additional promises or actions from Sweden—toward Turkish parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession protocol. Congressional review process and other key issues. The Administration may consider whether and when to move forward The Administration may consider whether and when to move forward
with a formal notification of a proposed F-16 sale to Turkey, possibly in the face of enduring congressional concerns. Within with a formal notification of a proposed F-16 sale to Turkey, possibly in the face of enduring congressional concerns. Within
15 days after formal notification, Congress could block the sale via a joint resolution of disapproval under the Arms Export 15 days after formal notification, Congress could block the sale via a joint resolution of disapproval under the Arms Export
Control Act. Congress also can take action at any time, up to the point of final delivery, via the regular legislative process. Control Act. Congress also can take action at any time, up to the point of final delivery, via the regular legislative process.
Some factors that could affect congressional review of a possible F-16 sale—beyond the NATO-related issues described Some factors that could affect congressional review of a possible F-16 sale—beyond the NATO-related issues described
above—include Turkey’s rivalry with NATO ally Greece, Turkey’s role in Syria, and the potential for questions about above—include Turkey’s rivalry with NATO ally Greece, Turkey’s role in Syria, and the potential for questions about
Turkish domestic governance to undermine NATO decisionmaking. Reportedly, the Administration informally notified a Turkish domestic governance to undermine NATO decisionmaking. Reportedly, the Administration informally notified a
possible sale of up to 40 F-35s to Greece at the same time as the Turkey/F-16 informal notification. For the FY2023 National possible sale of up to 40 F-35s to Greece at the same time as the Turkey/F-16 informal notification. For the FY2023 National
Defense Authorization Act, the House voted to condition potential F-16 transfers to Turkey on steps discouraging overflights Defense Authorization Act, the House voted to condition potential F-16 transfers to Turkey on steps discouraging overflights
of Greek territory (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900), but the final version (P.L. 117-263) did not include the condition. of Greek territory (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900), but the final version (P.L. 117-263) did not include the condition.
Turkish alternatives to F-16s? If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials might consider Western European If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials might consider Western European
alternatives such as Eurofighter Typhoons. However, Turkey may face the following challenges to a Typhoon sale: hesitancy alternatives such as Eurofighter Typhoons. However, Turkey may face the following challenges to a Typhoon sale: hesitancy
from consortium partner Germany, higher per unit costs, difficulties in transitioning its air force away from its U.S.-origin from consortium partner Germany, higher per unit costs, difficulties in transitioning its air force away from its U.S.-origin
fleet, and/or potential congressional notification requirements (if it includes U.S.-origin components). Obstacles to both U.S. fleet, and/or potential congressional notification requirements (if it includes U.S.-origin components). Obstacles to both U.S.
and European options could lead Turkey to confront a capability gap in fighter aircraft. A 2022 State Department strategy and European options could lead Turkey to confront a capability gap in fighter aircraft. A 2022 State Department strategy
document argued that “Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China” to fill such capability gaps in national defense. document argued that “Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China” to fill such capability gaps in national defense.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft

Overview of the Possible F-16 Sale
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden
Administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye), and has Administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye), and has
engaged Congress on the issue: engaged Congress on the issue:
the Biden administration strongly supports the package to both upgrade the existing F-16s the Biden administration strongly supports the package to both upgrade the existing F-16s
and to provide new ones to Türkiye, because as a [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to provide new ones to Türkiye, because as a [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
NATO Ally and partner, it is in our national interest and the security interest of the Alliance NATO Ally and partner, it is in our national interest and the security interest of the Alliance
that Türkiye continue to be able to operate that Türkiye continue to be able to operate
at the higher standards of NATO to make at the higher standards of NATO to make
Figure 1. F-16 Block 70/72 Viper
sure that we have full interoperability. sure that we have full interoperability.
On this particular matter, I can’t offer you On this particular matter, I can’t offer you
an assessment or get into the process until an assessment or get into the process until
after we formally notify our Congress, but after we formally notify our Congress, but
it’s something that we’re working on and it’s something that we’re working on and
we’ve made very clear to Congress our we’ve made very clear to Congress our
strong strong
support support
for for
the the
F-16 F-16
modernization. We have longstanding modernization. We have longstanding
defense and security ties, and as the defense and security ties, and as the
President has said – as President Biden President has said – as President Biden
has said – Turkish NATO interoperability has said – Turkish NATO interoperability

remains a priority for us.... remains a priority for us....
Source: Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin.
With regard to the F-16s, I can’t give you a timeline on formal notification. What I can tell With regard to the F-16s, I can’t give you a timeline on formal notification. What I can tell
you is I have already been actively engaged in speaking to Congress about the you is I have already been actively engaged in speaking to Congress about the
administration’s strong support for the F-16 package, the upgrade, modernization package.1 administration’s strong support for the F-16 package, the upgrade, modernization package.1
According to January 2023 media reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the Administration According to January 2023 media reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the Administration
informally notified Congress (seeinformally notified Congress (see “Congressional Review Process and Options” below) of its elow) of its
intent to sell 40 new F-16s of the advanced Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and Viper intent to sell 40 new F-16s of the advanced Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and Viper
upgrade packages for 79 existing F-16s (seeupgrade packages for 79 existing F-16s (see Figure 1), along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 , along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800
bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion.2 Reportedly at the same time, the bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion.2 Reportedly at the same time, the
Administration also informally notified Congress of a possible sale of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Administration also informally notified Congress of a possible sale of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters to Greece, another NATO ally and a historical Turkish rival (seFighters to Greece, another NATO ally and a historical Turkish rival (see “Greece and Cyprus”
below).3 below).3
The F-16 proposal takes place within a context of complicated U.S.-Turkey relations, and at a The F-16 proposal takes place within a context of complicated U.S.-Turkey relations, and at a
time when a number of U.S. allies and traditional partners are evaluating their strategic options in time when a number of U.S. allies and traditional partners are evaluating their strategic options in
an era of global great-power competition.4 Since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the United States an era of global great-power competition.4 Since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the United States
and Turkey have cooperated closely on some issues and differed sharply on others.5 A March and Turkey have cooperated closely on some issues and differed sharply on others.5 A March

1 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press 1 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023. Availability,” February 20, 2023.
2 Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Biden Administration Faces Resistance to Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey,” 2 Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Biden Administration Faces Resistance to Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey,” New
York Times, January 13, 2023; Begun Donmez Ersoz, “US Weighs Turkey, Greece Jet Sales amid NATO Expansion,” , January 13, 2023; Begun Donmez Ersoz, “US Weighs Turkey, Greece Jet Sales amid NATO Expansion,”
Voice of America, January 27, 2023; “Biden to ask US Congress to approve F-16 sale to Türkiye,” , January 27, 2023; “Biden to ask US Congress to approve F-16 sale to Türkiye,” Daily Sabah, ,
January 13, 2023. January 13, 2023.
3 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” 3 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023. , January 13, 2023.
4 See White House, 4 See White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. 2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
5 CRS In Focus IF10487, 5 CRS In Focus IF10487, Turkey (Türkiye)-U.S. Relations: Timeline and Brief Historical Context, by Jim Zanotti and , by Jim Zanotti and
Clayton Thomas. Clayton Thomas.
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2023 2023 Wall Street Journal article identified Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates article identified Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and India as “midsize powers” seeking “advantages as the U.S.-led world order is (UAE), and India as “midsize powers” seeking “advantages as the U.S.-led world order is
challenged” by China and Russia.6 James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after challenged” by China and Russia.6 James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s (last name pronounced Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s (last name pronounced air-doe-wan) May 2023 ) May 2023
reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational decision, given not only reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational decision, given not only
their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the standpoint of their their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the standpoint of their
experiences.”7 U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that mutual cooperation on regional security experiences.”7 U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that mutual cooperation on regional security
matters remains important to both countries.8 In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security matters remains important to both countries.8 In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in
which we can have a constructive relationship with them.”9 which we can have a constructive relationship with them.”9
After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s strategic significance for NATO amid an After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s strategic significance for NATO amid an
evolving European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in moving evolving European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in moving
forward with an F-16 transaction. In March 2022, an Administration official reportedly wrote to forward with an F-16 transaction. In March 2022, an Administration official reportedly wrote to
some Members of Congress to assert “compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability some Members of Congress to assert “compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability
interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported
by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”10 by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”10
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about a possible F-16 sale since the reported Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about a possible F-16 sale since the reported
informal notification. Their support for the sale might depend on Turkish approval of NATO informal notification. Their support for the sale might depend on Turkish approval of NATO
accession for Sweden, and perhaps other issues as well (seeaccession for Sweden, and perhaps other issues as well (see “Congressional Views” below). From low). From
a process standpoint, after a period of informal, confidential Administration-Congress a process standpoint, after a period of informal, confidential Administration-Congress
consultations, the Administration could submit formal notification to start a 15-day congressional consultations, the Administration could submit formal notification to start a 15-day congressional
review period (seereview period (see “Congressional Review Process and Options” below). elow).
Turkey had previously expected to acquire up to 100 F-35s during this decade, but U.S. officials Turkey had previously expected to acquire up to 100 F-35s during this decade, but U.S. officials
removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 after it acquired a Russian S-400 surface-to-air removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 after it acquired a Russian S-400 surface-to-air
defense system (seedefense system (see “Turkish S-400 Acquisition and U.S. Responses” below).11 The F-16V is low).11 The F-16V is
marketed as an advanced fourth-generation fighter, and thus could present an interim solution for marketed as an advanced fourth-generation fighter, and thus could present an interim solution for
Turkey, though the aircraft lacks the stealth characteristics of the F-35 and may be subject to Turkey, though the aircraft lacks the stealth characteristics of the F-35 and may be subject to
possible production backlogs (see text box below). Turkey reportedly requested the F-16V sale in possible production backlogs (see text box below). Turkey reportedly requested the F-16V sale in
October 2021,12 and in March 2023 its embassy in Washington, DC reportedly told October 2021,12 and in March 2023 its embassy in Washington, DC reportedly told Newsweek: :
Türkiye’s continued interoperability with NATO is of utmost importance, not only for Türkiye’s continued interoperability with NATO is of utmost importance, not only for
Türkiye, but also for NATO’s continued deterrence at its southern flank.... The U.S. has Türkiye, but also for NATO’s continued deterrence at its southern flank.... The U.S. has
been Türkiye’s number one partner in defense industry. We still count on our close been Türkiye’s number one partner in defense industry. We still count on our close
cooperation with the U.S. defense industry in order to maintain our military capabilities. cooperation with the U.S. defense industry in order to maintain our military capabilities.

6 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Prince Tests Nonaligned Policy,” 6 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Prince Tests Nonaligned Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2023. , March 15, 2023.
7 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at 7 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.
8 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and 8 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023. Briefing, January 18, 2023.
9 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01. 9 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01.
10 Then Acting [since confirmed] Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in 10 Then Acting [since confirmed] Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in
Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, , April 6,
2022. 2022.
11 CRS Report R41368, 11 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, and , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, and
CRS Report RL30563, CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by John R. Hoehn. , by John R. Hoehn.
12 Grant Rumley and Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s F-16 Request May Not Stave Off the Inevitable,” Washington 12 Grant Rumley and Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s F-16 Request May Not Stave Off the Inevitable,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2021. Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2021.
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We expect members of Congress to look beyond short-term political aspirations and not We expect members of Congress to look beyond short-term political aspirations and not
put preconditions to the sale of military equipment to Türkiye.13 put preconditions to the sale of military equipment to Türkiye.13
The Possible Sale and Turkey’s Airpower Needs
A U.S. sale of F-16s to Turkey would likely modernize and extend the service life of much of Turkey’s fighter A U.S. sale of F-16s to Turkey would likely modernize and extend the service life of much of Turkey’s fighter
fleet—and ensure its continued NATO interoperability—while Turkey tries to acquire or design a stealth fleet—and ensure its continued NATO interoperability—while Turkey tries to acquire or design a stealth
fighter.14 The F-16V is available for export in ful -scale production or as an upgrade kit. It offers systems fighter.14 The F-16V is available for export in ful -scale production or as an upgrade kit. It offers systems
integration improvements that provide an increased capability and reliability for targeting potential enemy integration improvements that provide an increased capability and reliability for targeting potential enemy
aircraft.15 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16V also includes modern systems like the APG-83 active aircraft.15 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16V also includes modern systems like the APG-83 active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, an improved electronic warfare suite, and new cockpit software and electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, an improved electronic warfare suite, and new cockpit software and
hardware to provide enhanced battlespace awareness to the pilot.16 These systems allow a pilot to identify and hardware to provide enhanced battlespace awareness to the pilot.16 These systems allow a pilot to identify and
engage more targets, an increase in lethality relative to previous F-16 variants.17 engage more targets, an increase in lethality relative to previous F-16 variants.17
Should the U.S. and Turkish officials reach agreement on a sale, delivery of new F-16s could face a production Should the U.S. and Turkish officials reach agreement on a sale, delivery of new F-16s could face a production
backlog.18 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenvil e, South Carolina plant is four backlog.18 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenvil e, South Carolina plant is four
aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.19 Other countries receiving aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.19 Other countries receiving
or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain,
Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.20 Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.20 Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria,
Lockheed anticipates having a backlog of 148 aircraft.21 Based on current production rates, it could take three Lockheed anticipates having a backlog of 148 aircraft.21 Based on current production rates, it could take three
years or more for Turkey to start receiving new F-16Vs. years or more for Turkey to start receiving new F-16Vs.
Turkey is apparently seeking to develop technology for an indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft in partnership Turkey is apparently seeking to develop technology for an indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft in partnership
with companies such as BAE Systems, Rol s-Royce, and/or General Electric. The program is dubbed the National with companies such as BAE Systems, Rol s-Royce, and/or General Electric. The program is dubbed the National
Combat Aircraft (Turkish acronym MMU, also known as TF-X), but the Turkish Air Force does not expect to Combat Aircraft (Turkish acronym MMU, also known as TF-X), but the Turkish Air Force does not expect to
integrate the aircraft into its regular operations until the early 2030s or later.22 integrate the aircraft into its regular operations until the early 2030s or later.22
Background
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales and the Role of Congress
Overview
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. interests in part because it affects How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. interests in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers as well as its role in NATO (seeTurkey’s partnerships with major powers as well as its role in NATO (see “Turkey’s Role in
NATO” below). Since the Cold War, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as low). Since the Cold War, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as

13 Tom O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine,” 13 Tom O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine,” Newsweek, March , March
7, 2023. 7, 2023.
14 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” 14 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, , March 9,
2022.2022.
15 Staff Sgt. Sarah M. McClanahan, “AESA Radar Launches F-16 into Next Generation of Airpower,” 15 Staff Sgt. Sarah M. McClanahan, “AESA Radar Launches F-16 into Next Generation of Airpower,” United States
Air Force, June 23, 2022. , June 23, 2022.
16 F-16 Block 70/72 Product Card, Lockheed Martin, at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed- 16 F-16 Block 70/72 Product Card, Lockheed Martin, at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-
martin/aero/documents/F-16/Jan20_Product%20Card%20F-16%20Block%207072%20media.pdf. martin/aero/documents/F-16/Jan20_Product%20Card%20F-16%20Block%207072%20media.pdf.
17 McClanahan, “AESA Radar Launches F-16 into Next Generation of Airpower.” 17 McClanahan, “AESA Radar Launches F-16 into Next Generation of Airpower.”
18 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” 18 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense
News, January 18, 2023. , January 18, 2023.
19 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023. 19 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
20 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” 20 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, , November 22,
2021. 2021.
21 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A. 21 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.
22 Gastón Dubois, “TF-X/MMU: Turkey’s future fifth-generation fighter is taking shape,” 22 Gastón Dubois, “TF-X/MMU: Turkey’s future fifth-generation fighter is taking shape,” Aviacionline, January 8, , January 8,
2023; Thomas Newdick, “Our First Look at Turkey’s Stealthy New Fighter,” 2023; Thomas Newdick, “Our First Look at Turkey’s Stealthy New Fighter,” The War Zone, November 23, 2022; , November 23, 2022;
Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.” Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft

aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength and NATO aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength and NATO
interoperability.23 interoperability.23
Congressional legislation and oversight have shaped U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for Congressional legislation and oversight have shaped U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for
decades. Congress placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, following the 1974 decades. Congress placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, following the 1974
Cyprus conflict in which Turkey used U.S.-origin weapons against Greek and Greek Cypriot Cyprus conflict in which Turkey used U.S.-origin weapons against Greek and Greek Cypriot
forces. In those military operations, Turkey took control of slightly more than one-third of the forces. In those military operations, Turkey took control of slightly more than one-third of the
island on behalf of Turkish Cypriots.24 Since the embargo, Turkey has focused more on island on behalf of Turkish Cypriots.24 Since the embargo, Turkey has focused more on
developing its defense industry (seedeveloping its defense industry (see Figure 2), and as part of that goal, one objective of Turkish , and as part of that goal, one objective of Turkish
arms purchases from the United States and other foreign suppliers has been to acquire technology arms purchases from the United States and other foreign suppliers has been to acquire technology
for future indigenous defense production.25 for future indigenous defense production.25
Over the past 15 years, some arms transfers Over the past 15 years, some arms transfers
Figure 2. Arms Imports as a Share of
or export licenses Turkey has requested or or export licenses Turkey has requested or
Turkish Military Spending
otherwise sought from the United States otherwise sought from the United States
either have been stalled, or reportedly faced either have been stalled, or reportedly faced
congressional “holds” over tensions related congressional “holds” over tensions related
to Russia and Syria.26 Examples include to Russia and Syria.26 Examples include
• • MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator
armed drones. Turkey reportedly Turkey reportedly
requested these drones in the late requested these drones in the late
2000s, but supposedly some 2000s, but supposedly some
Members of Congress opposed their Members of Congress opposed their
transfer at a time when very few transfer at a time when very few
U.S. allies were receiving armed U.S. allies were receiving armed
drones.27 Turkey’s inability to drones.27 Turkey’s inability to
acquire U.S.-origin drones likely acquire U.S.-origin drones likely
reinforced the motivation for reinforced the motivation for
Turkey’s successful domestic Turkey’s successful domestic

development of the Bayraktar TB2 development of the Bayraktar TB2
Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stratfor, based on information from the
drone.28 drone.28
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
• •
(SIPRI) Arms Traders Database, with some text (SIPRI) Arms Traders Database, with some text
Patriot surface-to-air defense
modifications by CRS. modifications by CRS.
system. Turkey and the United Turkey and the United
Note: Turkey signed the S-400 purchase agreement Turkey signed the S-400 purchase agreement
States reportedly consulted States reportedly consulted
in 2017, and took delivery in 2019. in 2017, and took delivery in 2019.
frequently between 2009 and 2018 frequently between 2009 and 2018
on a possible U.S. sale of Patriot systems to Turkey. Turkish officials apparently on a possible U.S. sale of Patriot systems to Turkey. Turkish officials apparently

23 See, for example, Appendix D of CRS Report R41368, 23 See, for example, Appendix D of CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, version , version
dated November 9, 2020, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41368/72. Turkey also has procurement dated November 9, 2020, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41368/72. Turkey also has procurement
and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and
reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
24 Jody Brumage, “The Turkish Arms Embargo – Part I” and “The Turkish Arms Embargo – Part II,” Robert C. Byrd 24 Jody Brumage, “The Turkish Arms Embargo – Part I” and “The Turkish Arms Embargo – Part II,” Robert C. Byrd
Center for Congressional History and Education, December 1 and 15, 2015. Center for Congressional History and Education, December 1 and 15, 2015.
25 Appendix B of CRS Report R41368, 25 Appendix B of CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. .
26 See, for example, Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two 26 See, for example, Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two
years,” years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020. , August 12, 2020.
27 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey goes all in on drones,” 27 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey goes all in on drones,” Al-Monitor, December 28, 2015; Tolga Tanis, “US defense equipment , December 28, 2015; Tolga Tanis, “US defense equipment
transfer to Turkey still on hold amid discord on regional issues,” transfer to Turkey still on hold amid discord on regional issues,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 9, 2015; Burak Bekdil, , October 9, 2015; Burak Bekdil,
“Turkey mulls unarmed Reaper drones from US,” “Turkey mulls unarmed Reaper drones from US,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 4, 2014. , March 4, 2014.
28 Rich Outzen, 28 Rich Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection, Washington Institute for , Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, July 2021. Near East Policy, July 2021.
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sought greater technology sharing than what U.S. officials were offering, and sought greater technology sharing than what U.S. officials were offering, and
then made a preliminary choice of a Chinese system in 2013 before reversing then made a preliminary choice of a Chinese system in 2013 before reversing
course and later selecting the Russian S-400.29 course and later selecting the Russian S-400.29
• • F-16 modernization: information sharing and flight safety. In February 2019, In February 2019,
Turkey submitted a Letter of Request for Link 16 Multifunctional Information Turkey submitted a Letter of Request for Link 16 Multifunctional Information
Distribution Systems (MIDS) and Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance Distribution Systems (MIDS) and Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance
Systems for 199 F-16 aircraft. According to a Turkish official, procuring Link 16 Systems for 199 F-16 aircraft. According to a Turkish official, procuring Link 16
MIDS would be a main factor in enhancing Turkey’s NATO interoperability.30 In MIDS would be a main factor in enhancing Turkey’s NATO interoperability.30 In
April 2023, the Administration formally notified Congress of a possible sale of April 2023, the Administration formally notified Congress of a possible sale of
avionics that would apparently include these systems.31 avionics that would apparently include these systems.31
Turkish S-400 Acquisition and U.S. Responses
After Turkey acquired its S-400 system from Russia in July 2019, the Trump Administration After Turkey acquired its S-400 system from Russia in July 2019, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 program. In announcing the removal, Defense Department removed Turkey from the F-35 program. In announcing the removal, Defense Department
officials cited concerns about possible Russian use of the S-400 to collect intelligence on F-35 officials cited concerns about possible Russian use of the S-400 to collect intelligence on F-35
stealth capabilities.32 In December 2020, the Trump Administration also imposed sanctions on stealth capabilities.32 In December 2020, the Trump Administration also imposed sanctions on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency (and associated individuals) under the Countering Turkey’s defense procurement agency (and associated individuals) under the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), which targets countries America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), which targets countries
that make significant arms purchases from Russia.33 In December 2019, Congress enacted the that make significant arms purchases from Russia.33 In December 2019, Congress enacted the
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92), which includes a provision FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92), which includes a provision
(Section 1245) prohibiting the Defense Department from transferring F-35s to Turkey unless (Section 1245) prohibiting the Defense Department from transferring F-35s to Turkey unless
Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish officials have reportedly placed the S-400 in a Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish officials have reportedly placed the S-400 in a
storage facility rather than activating it and risking additional U.S. retaliatory measures.34 storage facility rather than activating it and risking additional U.S. retaliatory measures.34
Turkey’s Role in NATO
Since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, its engagement with allies (including the United States) on a Since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, its engagement with allies (including the United States) on a
number of security challenges in its geographic vicinity has featured cooperation on many of number of security challenges in its geographic vicinity has featured cooperation on many of

29 Jim Townsend and Rachel Ellehuus, “The Tale of Turkey and the Patriots,” 29 Jim Townsend and Rachel Ellehuus, “The Tale of Turkey and the Patriots,” War on the Rocks, July 22, 2019. , July 22, 2019.
30 The information in the first two sentences of this bullet comes from CRS correspondence with a Turkish official, 30 The information in the first two sentences of this bullet comes from CRS correspondence with a Turkish official,
March 1, 2023. Per this same correspondence, other requests or contracts that are lagging behind Turkey’s delivery March 1, 2023. Per this same correspondence, other requests or contracts that are lagging behind Turkey’s delivery
schedule include various air-to-surface (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), air-to-air (Sidewinder and Advanced Medium schedule include various air-to-surface (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), air-to-air (Sidewinder and Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles), and naval (Harpoon missiles, Phalanx, Sea Rolling Airframe Missile) weapons systems. Range Air-to-Air Missiles), and naval (Harpoon missiles, Phalanx, Sea Rolling Airframe Missile) weapons systems.
31 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023; 31 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023. CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023.
32 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy 32 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. For additional information on the S-Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. For additional information on the S-
400 issue, see CRS Report R41368, 400 issue, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. Negotiations are reportedly . Negotiations are reportedly
ongoing between U.S. and Turkish officials on the status of F-35s technically owned by Turkey but based in the United ongoing between U.S. and Turkish officials on the status of F-35s technically owned by Turkey but based in the United
States, and an initial $1.4 billion Turkish payment. States, and an initial $1.4 billion Turkish payment.
33 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, 33 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition
of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions. Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
34 Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey put Russian S-400 missiles in a storage facility to avoid further clashes with the US,” 34 Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey put Russian S-400 missiles in a storage facility to avoid further clashes with the US,”
Nordic Monitor, December 8, 2022. , December 8, 2022.
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them, and disagreement on others.35 Moreover, some specific actions Turkey has taken within the them, and disagreement on others.35 Moreover, some specific actions Turkey has taken within the
alliance, as described below, have had implications for NATO’s strength and cohesion. alliance, as described below, have had implications for NATO’s strength and cohesion.
Certain tangible benefits flow to Turkey’s NATO allies due to its membership in the organization Certain tangible benefits flow to Turkey’s NATO allies due to its membership in the organization
and its defense capabilities. According to the State Department’s and its defense capabilities. According to the State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy
(ICS) for Turkey, its sizable military and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the (ICS) for Turkey, its sizable military and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.36 Turkey has NATO’s second-largest military alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.36 Turkey has NATO’s second-largest military
and the world’s third-largest F-16 fleet,37 hosts allied military assets and personnel (seand the world’s third-largest F-16 fleet,37 hosts allied military assets and personnel (see Figure 3)
in a location near several conflict areas in the Middle East and elsewhere, and partners in other in a location near several conflict areas in the Middle East and elsewhere, and partners in other
ways with the United States and other allies—including in a number of NATO missions.38 ways with the United States and other allies—including in a number of NATO missions.38
Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS. Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS.

35 See CRS Report R41368, 35 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10487, , and CRS In Focus IF10487, Turkey
(Türkiye)-U.S. Relations: Timeline and Brief Historical Context, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Also, Can , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Also, Can
Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, ed., Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, ed.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 92-101. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 92-101.
36 State Department, 36 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022. , May 13, 2022.
37 “Turkey and NATO,” 37 “Turkey and NATO,” Strategic Comments, International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 25, comment 36, , International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 25, comment 36,
December 2019; Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” December 2019; Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February , February
6, 2023. 6, 2023.
38 State Department, 38 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations ; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations
Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105. Kalev Stoicescu and Hille , pp. 103-105. Kalev Stoicescu and Hille
Hanso, Hanso, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and Difficult Ally, International Centre for Defence and , International Centre for Defence and
Security (Estonia), January 2022; Nicholas Fiorenza and Dylan Lehrke, “Turkey leads NATO VJTF in 2021,” Security (Estonia), January 2022; Nicholas Fiorenza and Dylan Lehrke, “Turkey leads NATO VJTF in 2021,” Janes
Defence Weekly, January 6, 2021. , January 6, 2021.
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Note: All locations are approximate. All locations are approximate.
For example, Turkish F-16s have occasionally participated in NATO Baltic Air Policing For example, Turkish F-16s have occasionally participated in NATO Baltic Air Policing
missions,39 and in April 2022 a Turkish E-7T early warning aircraft “acted as the airborne missions,39 and in April 2022 a Turkish E-7T early warning aircraft “acted as the airborne
command and control post for fighter activities above the Baltic Sea Region during NATO’s command and control post for fighter activities above the Baltic Sea Region during NATO’s
multinational exercise Ramstein Alloy,” which included Sweden and Finland as partner nations.40 multinational exercise Ramstein Alloy,” which included Sweden and Finland as partner nations.40
Turkish F-16s also Turkish F-16s also ~~are scheduled to participate~~participated in NATO’s major Air Defender 23 exercise in June in NATO’s major Air Defender 23 exercise in June
2023.41 Additionally, Turkey regularly contributes aircraft and naval vessels to NATO’s Operation 2023.41 Additionally, Turkey regularly contributes aircraft and naval vessels to NATO’s Operation
Sea Guardian, an ongoing maritime security mission in the Mediterranean Sea.42 Sea Guardian, an ongoing maritime security mission in the Mediterranean Sea.42
Nevertheless, some of Turkey’s actions under President Erdogan’s rule have arguably undermined Nevertheless, some of Turkey’s actions under President Erdogan’s rule have arguably undermined
NATO’s strength and unity. In a few cases, Turkish stances have delayed the alliance from NATO’s strength and unity. In a few cases, Turkish stances have delayed the alliance from
achieving the unanimity needed to act. For example, in 2020 Turkey prolonged the approval of a achieving the unanimity needed to act. For example, in 2020 Turkey prolonged the approval of a
new NATO defense plan for Poland and the Baltic states because it was trying to get other new NATO defense plan for Poland and the Baltic states because it was trying to get other
alliance members to designate its Syrian Kurdish adversaries (known as the People’s Protection alliance members to designate its Syrian Kurdish adversaries (known as the People’s Protection
Units, or the Kurdish acronym YPG) as a terrorist group.43 Turkey ultimately gave up on these Units, or the Kurdish acronym YPG) as a terrorist group.43 Turkey ultimately gave up on these
efforts and agreed to the new plan.44 Similar concerns state by Turkish officials regarding Kurdish efforts and agreed to the new plan.44 Similar concerns state by Turkish officials regarding Kurdish
militant groups have played a major role in Turkish delays in approving NATO membership for militant groups have played a major role in Turkish delays in approving NATO membership for
Sweden and Finland (an issue discussed further below). President Erdogan said in May 2022, Sweden and Finland (an issue discussed further below). President Erdogan said in May 2022,
“The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the respect that is shown to our “The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the respect that is shown to our
sensitivities.”45 sensitivities.”45
Additionally, Erdogan has consolidated substantial domestic control over Turkey during his time Additionally, Erdogan has consolidated substantial domestic control over Turkey during his time
as prime minister and president.46 This heightened degree of control has prompted some as prime minister and president.46 This heightened degree of control has prompted some
observers to express concern that a Turkey more accountable to a leader’s personal agenda or observers to express concern that a Turkey more accountable to a leader’s personal agenda or
ideology than its democratic institutions could weaken NATO decisionmaking and contributions ideology than its democratic institutions could weaken NATO decisionmaking and contributions
to regional stability.47 to regional stability.47

39 Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time since 2006,” 39 Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, , July 7,
2021. 2021.
40 NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein 40 NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein
Alloy,” April 14, 2022. Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
41 German Bundeswehr, “Air Defender 23,” at https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/air-41 German Bundeswehr, “Air Defender 23,” at https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/air-
defender-23. defender-23.
42 NATO, “Operation Sea Guardian,” May 17, 2021; “NATO’s operation Sea Guardian conducts first patrols in Eastern 42 NATO, “Operation Sea Guardian,” May 17, 2021; “NATO’s operation Sea Guardian conducts first patrols in Eastern
Mediterranean for 2023,” February 28, 2023. Infographics showing specific deployments over time available at Mediterranean for 2023,” February 28, 2023. Infographics showing specific deployments over time available at
https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/infographics. https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/infographics.
43 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” 43 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” Reuters, July 2, 2020. The YPG, which has , July 2, 2020. The YPG, which has
partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition in Syria under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition in Syria under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF), has links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization (SDF), has links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization
that has fought an on-and-off insurgency with Turkish government forces since the 1980s). Sources citing links that has fought an on-and-off insurgency with Turkish government forces since the 1980s). Sources citing links
between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2021, ,
Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group,
February 18, 2022; Barak Barfi, February 18, 2022; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April , Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April
2016. 2016.
44 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” 44 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” Reuters. .
45 Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” 45 Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” Washington Post, May 19, 2022. See , May 19, 2022. See
also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” Economist, May 30, 2022. , May 30, 2022.
46 CRS Report R41368, 46 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. .
47 Jason Blessing et al., editors, 47 Jason Blessing et al., editors, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond. Washington, DC: Foreign . Washington, DC: Foreign
Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 2021. Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 2021.
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Congressional Review Process and Options
For a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major defense For a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major defense
equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the executive branch takes a equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the executive branch takes a
number of customary and official steps to facilitate congressional review.48 First, the State number of customary and official steps to facilitate congressional review.48 First, the State
Department usually provides informal notification of the proposed FMS or DCS to the Senate Department usually provides informal notification of the proposed FMS or DCS to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). Then, a Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). Then, a
proposed FMS or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most proposed FMS or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most
cases, the State Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal cases, the State Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal
notification. This time period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential notification. This time period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential
“tiered review” process. If a Member of Congress places a hold on the proposed transaction, “tiered review” process. If a Member of Congress places a hold on the proposed transaction,
formal notification usually does not proceed, though holds are not legally binding.49 formal notification usually does not proceed, though holds are not legally binding.49
Under Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, as Under Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, as
amended), the executive branch can proceed with a notified FMS or DCS to NATO countries amended), the executive branch can proceed with a notified FMS or DCS to NATO countries
(such as Turkey and Greece) 15 days after formal notification,50 subject to possible congressional (such as Turkey and Greece) 15 days after formal notification,50 subject to possible congressional
action as described below. action as described below.
Joint resolution of disapproval. During the 15-day period after formal notification, Congress During the 15-day period after formal notification, Congress
may enact a joint resolutionmay enact a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed transaction; the AECA contains procedures prohibiting the proposed transaction; the AECA contains procedures
for expedited congressional consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval. The President can for expedited congressional consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval. The President can
veto a resolution of disapproval, subject to congressional override by two-thirds majorities of veto a resolution of disapproval, subject to congressional override by two-thirds majorities of
both houses.51 both houses.51
To date, Congress has not successfully blocked any proposed arms sales via joint resolutions of To date, Congress has not successfully blocked any proposed arms sales via joint resolutions of
disapproval. However, in some cases substantial congressional opposition has led the executive disapproval. However, in some cases substantial congressional opposition has led the executive
branch to withdraw or alter sales.52 branch to withdraw or alter sales.52
Other legislation. The process for any given arms sale can last for months or years. After the The process for any given arms sale can last for months or years. After the
prescribed AECA review period has passed, Congress can also use the regular legislative process prescribed AECA review period has passed, Congress can also use the regular legislative process
to act at any time—up to the point of final delivery—to block, condition, or otherwise influence a to act at any time—up to the point of final delivery—to block, condition, or otherwise influence a
sale.53 One example of legislation to block an arms transfer was the FY2020 NDAA provision sale.53 One example of legislation to block an arms transfer was the FY2020 NDAA provision
(mentioned above) restricting F-35 transfers to Turkey while it possesses the S-400. (mentioned above) restricting F-35 transfers to Turkey while it possesses the S-400.
Emergency Arms Sales Authorities Available to the President
Other provisions in Section 36 of the AECA allow the President to waive congressional review requirements and Other provisions in Section 36 of the AECA allow the President to waive congressional review requirements and
immediately sell arms if the President certifies to Congress that “an emergency exists which requires such sale in immediately sell arms if the President certifies to Congress that “an emergency exists which requires such sale in

48 CRS Report RL31675, 48 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO allies , by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO allies
(and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading
of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense
services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all other services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all other
countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively. countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
49 CRS Report RL31675, 49 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
50 For most non-NATO countries (other than Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand, for which the 50 For most non-NATO countries (other than Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand, for which the
duration is also 15 days), the duration is 30 days after formal notification. duration is also 15 days), the duration is 30 days after formal notification.
51 CRS Report RL31675, 51 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process. .
52 For case studies of situations in which congressional action (via the AECA expedited process or other legislative 52 For case studies of situations in which congressional action (via the AECA expedited process or other legislative
channels) resulted in changes to proposed arms sales, see Archived CRS Report R46580, channels) resulted in changes to proposed arms sales, see Archived CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military
Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. , coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
53 CRS In Focus IF11533, 53 CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. , by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W.
Rosen. Rosen.
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the national security interests of the United States.”54 In 2019, the Trump Administration cited those authorities in the national security interests of the United States.”54 In 2019, the Trump Administration cited those authorities in
notifying Congress of immediate FMSs and DCSs to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan because of stated security notifying Congress of immediate FMSs and DCSs to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan because of stated security
concerns for U.S. partners relating to Iran and Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.55 At a hearing to examine the sales, concerns for U.S. partners relating to Iran and Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.55 At a hearing to examine the sales,
testimony from a State Department official suggested that Senator Menendez (then serving as SFRC Ranking testimony from a State Department official suggested that Senator Menendez (then serving as SFRC Ranking
Member) had placed a hold on the sales some months prior to the Administration’s invocation of emergency Member) had placed a hold on the sales some months prior to the Administration’s invocation of emergency
authority.56 Although the sales proceeded, the Senate and House later passed three joint resolutions of authority.56 Although the sales proceeded, the Senate and House later passed three joint resolutions of
disapproval (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37, and S.J.Res. 38); President Trump vetoed them all.57 To date, Biden disapproval (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37, and S.J.Res. 38); President Trump vetoed them all.57 To date, Biden
Administration officials have not publicly indicated whether they might consider invoking emergency authorities in Administration officials have not publicly indicated whether they might consider invoking emergency authorities in
an F-16 case for Turkey. an F-16 case for Turkey.
Congressional Views
Initial Reactions to a Proposed Sale Some Members of Congress with input in approving the possible F-16 sale to Turkey have Some Members of Congress with input in approving the possible F-16 sale to Turkey have
indicated that they expect certain actions or policy changes from Turkey before they will consider indicated that they expect certain actions or policy changes from Turkey before they will consider
supporting the transaction (sesupporting the transaction (see “Key Issues for Congress” below). Within a context of strong elow). Within a context of strong
congressional support for Swedish and Finnish NATO accession,58 a bipartisan group of 29 congressional support for Swedish and Finnish NATO accession,58 a bipartisan group of 29
Senators argued in a February 2023 letter to President Biden that Turkish delay on the issue has Senators argued in a February 2023 letter to President Biden that Turkish delay on the issue has
threatened alliance unity in countering Russia. The group, led by Senate NATO Observer Group threatened alliance unity in countering Russia. The group, led by Senate NATO Observer Group
Co-Chairs Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis, suggested that they might consider supporting the F-Co-Chairs Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis, suggested that they might consider supporting the F-
16 sale only if Turkey approves accession for both Sweden and Finland.59 Following a March 16 sale only if Turkey approves accession for both Sweden and Finland.59 Following a March
2023 meeting in Washington, DC with high-level Turkish officials and U.S. Ambassador to 2023 meeting in Washington, DC with high-level Turkish officials and U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey Jeff Flake, Senators Shaheen and Tillis reiterated the “serious global security Turkey Jeff Flake, Senators Shaheen and Tillis reiterated the “serious global security
implications” of expeditious Turkish approval of Swedish and Finnish accession.60 In line with implications” of expeditious Turkish approval of Swedish and Finnish accession.60 In line with
Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament approved Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament approved
Finland’s application to join NATO later that month.61 Finland formally joined the alliance in Finland’s application to join NATO later that month.61 Finland formally joined the alliance in
April. April.
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Chairman Michael SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Chairman Michael
McCaul and Ranking Member Gregory Meeks, comprise the four committee leaders or “four McCaul and Ranking Member Gregory Meeks, comprise the four committee leaders or “four
corners” who can reportedly place holds (though, as mentioned earlier, the holds are not legally corners” who can reportedly place holds (though, as mentioned earlier, the holds are not legally
binding) on arms sales during the informal notification process.62 binding) on arms sales during the informal notification process.62
~~Chairman Menendez was cited in January 2023 as supporting the F-35 sale to Greece.63 At the~~
~~same time, he was quoted as saying the following in strong opposition to the F-16 sale to Turkey:~~

54 For more information, including past invocations of the emergency authorities, see CRS Report R44984, 54 For more information, including past invocations of the emergency authorities, see CRS Report R44984, Arms Sales
in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy, coordinated by Clayton Thomas. , coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
55 Arms Sales Notification; Congressional Record, vol. 165, no. 93 (Senate – June 4, 2019), pp. S3203-S3209. 55 Arms Sales Notification; Congressional Record, vol. 165, no. 93 (Senate – June 4, 2019), pp. S3203-S3209.
56 CQ Congressional Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Emergency Arms Sales,” June 56 CQ Congressional Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Emergency Arms Sales,” June
12, 2019. 12, 2019.
57 United States Senate, Vetoes by President Donald J. Trump, at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/ 57 United States Senate, Vetoes by President Donald J. Trump, at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/
TrumpDJ.htm. TrumpDJ.htm.
58 CRS Insight IN11949, 58 CRS Insight IN11949, NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s Accession Faces Delay, by Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin, , by Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin,
and Andrew S. Bowen. Senate Treaty Document 117-3 approved ratifying the accession protocols in August 2022 by a and Andrew S. Bowen. Senate Treaty Document 117-3 approved ratifying the accession protocols in August 2022 by a
95-1 vote. 95-1 vote.
59 February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden, text available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/ 59 February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden, text available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
60 Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, “Shaheen, Tillis Issue Joint Statement Following Meeting with Turkish Officials & U.S. 60 Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, “Shaheen, Tillis Issue Joint Statement Following Meeting with Turkish Officials & U.S.
Ambassador to Türkiye,” March 15, 2023. Ambassador to Türkiye,” March 15, 2023.
61 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” 61 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023. , March 30, 2023.
62 Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years62 Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years.”
~~63 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition~~.” .”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

9 9

Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft

Chairman Menendez was cited in January 2023 as supporting the F-35 sale to Greece.63 At the same time, he was quoted as saying the following in strong opposition to the F-16 sale to Turkey: President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and
against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human
rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and
begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.64 begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.64
In statements to In statements to Newsweek in early March, Menendez reiterated these points, called on Turkey to in early March, Menendez reiterated these points, called on Turkey to
change course on its policies regarding airspace tensions with Greece and the Sweden/Finland change course on its policies regarding airspace tensions with Greece and the Sweden/Finland
NATO accession issue, and warned Turkey against any further Russian arms purchases—urging it NATO accession issue, and warned Turkey against any further Russian arms purchases—urging it
to fully reject military cooperation with Russia.65 Later, in a March SFRC hearing featuring to fully reject military cooperation with Russia.65 Later, in a March SFRC hearing featuring
Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he had against various Turkish Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he had against various Turkish
foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey did not deserve to receive F-16s unless it foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey did not deserve to receive F-16s unless it
addresses some of the issues he mentioned.66 Despite apparent congressional acquiescence to the addresses some of the issues he mentioned.66 Despite apparent congressional acquiescence to the
Administration’s plan (mentioned above) to move forward on a proposed F-16 avionics sale to Administration’s plan (mentioned above) to move forward on a proposed F-16 avionics sale to
Turkey that would enhance its NATO interoperability, SFRC Chairman Menendez said in April—Turkey that would enhance its NATO interoperability, SFRC Chairman Menendez said in April—
after formal notification to Congress of the avionics sale—that he continued to oppose the sale of after formal notification to Congress of the avionics sale—that he continued to oppose the sale of
F-16s to Turkey.67 F-16s to Turkey.67
Ranking Member Risch has said that Turkey has made a “better case” for receiving the F-16 than Ranking Member Risch has said that Turkey has made a “better case” for receiving the F-16 than
the F-35 because they use F-16s “to guard the eastern flank of NATO.” He also warned that “if the F-35 because they use F-16s “to guard the eastern flank of NATO.” He also warned that “if
they’re not playing ball with the rest of NATO on Sweden and Finland, why in the world do we they’re not playing ball with the rest of NATO on Sweden and Finland, why in the world do we
want them as part of the club?”68 want them as part of the club?”68
Other Members of Congress have expressed varying views on a possible F-16 sale to Turkey. In 2022, at least two indicated support or openness to a sale and suggested that U.S. national interests were connected to maintaining bilateral defense cooperation with Turkey.69 In contrast, 34 Representatives sent a letter to President Biden on July 8, 2022, strongly opposing a sale and noting that it could potentially reward President Erdogan for “ignoring Turkey’s alliance commitments to the United States and NATO and the vast human rights abuses his regime continues to commit at home and abroad.”70 In July 2022, the House passed a version of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) with a provision (Section 1271) that would have conditioned F-16-related transfers on a presidential certification sharing U.S. steps taken to prevent “repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.” Before passing the bill, the House voted 244-179 to add Section 1271, with then-HFAC Chairman 63 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” 64 Ibid. 65 O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine.” 66 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906. 67 “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023. 68 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023. 69 House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member (then Chairman) Adam Smith, quoted in Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4, 2022; Sen. Lindsey Graham, quoted in Olafimihan Oshin, “Graham visits Turkey, says he will ‘do all in my power’ to close F-16s sale,” The Hill, July 3, 2022. 70 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/pallone-evo.house.gov/files/20220705%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Sales%20Final.pdf. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft Meeks voting in favor and then-Ranking Member McCaul against.71 The final James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, enacted in December 2022) excluded this condition. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the act said, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”72 Developments After Erdogan’s Reelection As Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle has ended, congressional committee leaders’ concerns As Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle has ended, congressional committee leaders’ concerns
regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. A few days before President regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. A few days before President
Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he and the Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he and the
other three committee leaders “will approve the transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s other three committee leaders “will approve the transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s
membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes
and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”6973 McCaul also said, “We’ve been assured that after the McCaul also said, “We’ve been assured that after the
[Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will be recognized as a NATO ally.”[Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will be recognized as a NATO ally.”7074
As of early June, these four Members have reportedly expressed support for the Administration to As of early June, these four Members have reportedly expressed support for the Administration to
provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35 sale to Greece.provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35 sale to Greece.71
75 Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of August, with Turkey and Hungary the only alliance members not to have approved it. After President Erdogan’s reelection, President Biden said in late May that Erdogan “wants to After President Erdogan’s reelection, President Biden said in late May that Erdogan “wants to
work on something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that work on something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that
~~done.”72 (As of early June, Hungary also has not approved Swedish accession.)~~done.”76 Secretary Blinken Secretary Blinken
said a few days later that while the Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s said a few days later that while the Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s
proposed F-16 sale to Turkey proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are.77 President Erdogan agreed in July to send the NATO accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,”78 but later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not consider Swedish accession until October (after its summer recess). Erdogan also said that he expected Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it will take to implement a June 2022 trilateral memorandum—aimed at strengthening legal measures and policies (including extradition) against Kurdish militants and others that Turkey deems terrorists—before sending the accession protocol to parliament.79 71 Roll call for Amendment No. 399 to H.R. 7900, at https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2022/roll339.xml. 72 Explanatory Material Statement Submitted by Mr. Smith of Washington, Chair of the House Committee on Armed Services, on H.Res. 1512, James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023; Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 191 (House – December 8, 2022), p. H9499. 73~~with Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are.73~~

~~64 Ibid.~~
~~65 O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine.”~~
~~66 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=~~
~~105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.~~
~~67 “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023.~~
~~68 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,”~~
Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023.
69 Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — even if Erdoğan wins,” Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023. , May 25, 2023.
7074 Gould et al. Gould et al.
7175 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023. , June 1, 2023.
7276 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023. White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023.
7377 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press
Availability,” May 30, 2023. Availability,” May 30, 2023.
78 NATO, “Press statement following the meeting between Türkiye, Sweden, and the NATO Secretary General,” July 10, 2023. 79 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters, July 12, 2023. Text of Trilateral Memorandum at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-memo.pdf. Congressional Research Service 11~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft

~~With the Administration calling for Sweden to join NATO by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12~~
~~summit in Lithuania, SFRC Chairman Menendez has said~~SFRC Chairman Menendez said in May that Sweden might be the “whole that Sweden might be the “whole
equation” for some Members of Congress,equation” for some Members of Congress,7480 but is only “part of the equation” for him. but is only “part of the equation” for him.~~75 He has~~
81 He suggested that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward suggested that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward
Greece and perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive Greece and perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive
commitments and various indications that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at commitments and various indications that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at
~~least for me.”76 HFAC Ranking Member Meeks may be roughly aligned with Menendez, based~~
~~on his late May statement that he wants Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO accession and take~~
~~additional actions, including with regard to Greece.77~~
least for me.”82 In July, after Erdogan pledged to take steps toward Turkish parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession protocol, Menendez called for additional assurances from the Administration to enhance Greece’s security in the region before approving the sale.83 Risch, McCaul, and Meeks voiced general optimism on a path forward, but stopped short of expressing assent to the sale, with Meeks saying that Turkey cannot resume its violations of Greek airspace.84 Shortly thereafter, Erdogan said that Turkish F-16s have never been used against Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”85 If the tiered review process for the possible F-16 sale persists amid congressional committee If the tiered review process for the possible F-16 sale persists amid congressional committee
leaders’ concerns, the Administration may consider whether, when, and how (1) to address any leaders’ concerns, the Administration may consider whether, when, and how (1) to address any
continuing concerns, and/or (2) to move forward with a formal notification of the sale. Chairman continuing concerns, and/or (2) to move forward with a formal notification of the sale. Chairman
Menendez has said that Secretary Blinken has “assured him he will respect his hold.”Menendez has said that Secretary Blinken has “assured him he will respect his hold.”78
~~Other Members of Congress have expressed varying views on a possible F-16 sale to Turkey. In~~
~~2022, at least two indicated support or openness to a sale and suggested that U.S. national~~
~~interests were connected to maintaining bilateral defense cooperation with Turkey.79 In contrast,~~
~~34 Representatives sent a letter to President Biden on July 8, 2022, strongly opposing a sale and~~
~~noting that it could potentially reward President Erdogan for “ignoring Turkey’s alliance~~
~~commitments to the United States and NATO and the vast human rights abuses his regime~~
~~continues to commit at home and abroad.”80~~
~~In July 2022, the House passed a version of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) with a provision~~
~~(Section 1271) that would have conditioned F-16-related transfers on a presidential certification~~
~~sharing U.S. steps taken to prevent “repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.”~~
~~Before passing the bill, the House voted 244-179 to add Section 1271, with then-HFAC Chairman~~
~~Meeks voting in favor and then-Ranking Member McCaul against.81 The final James M. Inhofe~~
~~National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, enacted in December~~
~~2022) excluded this condition. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the act said, “We~~

7486 Key Issues for Congress Several additional issues could have implications for the congressional review process on the possible sale, and vice versa. Brief summaries of each issue and its relevance for the process are set forth below; for more detailed discussion, see, CRS Report R44000, Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations; and CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, both by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Russia-Ukraine War Background. While Turkey’s cooperation with Russia on some issues has presented challenges for U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense has helped address those 80 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February
2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if
accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks
Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter , February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter
from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
7581 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023. , May 30, 2023.
7682 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the
matter,” matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al. , May 31, 2023; Gould et al.
~~77 Gould et al.~~
~~78 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters.~~
~~79 House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member (then Chairman) Adam Smith, quoted in Harris, “Congress~~
~~signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation”; Sen. Lindsey Graham, quoted in Olafimihan Oshin,~~
~~“Graham visits Turkey, says he will ‘do all in my power’ to close F-16s sale,” The Hill, July 3, 2022.~~
~~80 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/pallone-evo.house.gov/files/~~
~~20220705%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Sales%20Final.pdf.~~
~~81 Roll call for Amendment No. 399 to H.R. 7900, at https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2022/roll339.xml.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft~~

~~believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized~~
~~territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”82~~
~~Key Issues for Congress~~
~~Several additional issues could have implications for the congressional review process on the~~
~~possible sale, and vice versa. Brief summaries of each issue and its relevance for the process are~~
~~set forth below; for more detailed discussion, see, CRS Report R44000,~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major~~
~~Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations; and CRS Report R41368,~~ ~~Turkey~~
~~(Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, both by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~Russia-Ukraine War~~
Background. While Turkey’s cooperation with Russia on some issues has presented challenges
~~for U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense has helped address those~~
~~challenges to some extent.83 Regarding the effect of the Russia-Ukraine war on Turkey’s strategic~~
~~calculations, one analyst has written~~83 David Sivak, “Bob Menendez says there ‘may be a pathway’ for sale of F-16s to Turkey,” Washington Examiner, July 11, 2023. 84 Joe Gould, “F-16s for Turkey aren’t a done deal until these lawmakers say it’s OK,” Politico, July 11, 2023. On July 8, six Representatives sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that any U.S.-Turkey sales agreement for F-16s include “mechanisms that provide for the pause, delay, or snapback of the transfer of American weapons to Turkey if it resumes its destabilizing actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that threaten or undermine U.S. national security interests or NATO security architecture.” Text of letter available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/07.08.23-letter-to-secretary-blinken-on-turkey-f-16-sale-snapback-mechanisms.pdf. 85 “Erdogan claims F-16s have not been used against Greece, no plans to do so,” Kathimerini, July 12, 2023. 86 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters. Congressional Research Service 12 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft challenges to some extent.87 Regarding the effect of the Russia-Ukraine war on Turkey’s strategic calculations, one analyst has written:
Russian geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey closer to the geopolitical West, but Russian geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey closer to the geopolitical West, but
it is doubtful that this process will make the geopolitical West as indispensable for Turkey it is doubtful that this process will make the geopolitical West as indispensable for Turkey
as it was during the Cold War, or function as a geo-political anchor in the way it did then.as it was during the Cold War, or function as a geo-political anchor in the way it did then.8488
U.S. officials have voiced appreciation for many Turkish actions. These include denouncing U.S. officials have voiced appreciation for many Turkish actions. These include denouncing
Russia’s invasion, supplying Ukraine with military equipment, closing the Bosphorus (alt. Russia’s invasion, supplying Ukraine with military equipment, closing the Bosphorus (alt.
Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits to belligerent warships, helping broker Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits to belligerent warships, helping broker ~~a Black Sea corridor for~~
~~Ukrainian grain exports~~efforts to export Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea, and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe., and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe.8589
At the same time, Turkey’s policies regarding economic and energy cooperation with Russia have At the same time, Turkey’s policies regarding economic and energy cooperation with Russia have
apparently generated some U.S. concerns.apparently generated some U.S. concerns.90 Instead of imposing sanctions on Russia like the Instead of imposing sanctions on Russia like the
United States, other NATO allies, and the European Union (EU), Turkey has instead boosted United States, other NATO allies, and the European Union (EU), Turkey has instead boosted
trade with Russia in some areas.trade with Russia in some areas.8691 In early 2023, U.S. officials warned counterparts in Turkey In early 2023, U.S. officials warned counterparts in Turkey
(and some non-NATO countries) about possible penalties for businesses that supply Russia’s (and some non-NATO countries) about possible penalties for businesses that supply Russia’s
defense industry in contravention of U.S. sanctions or export controls.defense industry in contravention of U.S. sanctions or export controls.8792 Turkey’s then Turkey’s then -Foreign Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or
technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed
information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses would not use information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses would not use

~~82 Explanatory Material Statement Submitted by Mr. Smith of Washington, Chair of the House Committee on Armed~~
~~Services, on H.Res. 1512, James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023; Congressional~~
~~Record, vol. 168, no. 191 (House – December 8, 2022), p. H9499.~~
83Turkey to bypass Western sanctions.93 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods from transiting its territory to Russia.94 In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.95 Relevance for congressional review process. As mentioned in the introduction to this report, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO in countering Russia may partly explain the Administration’s support for an F-16 transaction and Congress could possibly consider it in assessing a proposed sale. Turkey’s procurement decisions and future plans for the S-400, along with its mediation efforts and other interactions with Russia and Ukraine, may affect how U.S. officials and lawmakers gauge Turkey’s Western alignment and pursue options to encourage it—including with regard to F-16s. 87 February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden, text available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/ February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden, text available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf; O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf; O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for
Ukraine.” Ukraine.”
8488 Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” SWP
Comment (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), May 20, 2022. (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), May 20, 2022.
8589 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.” For open source reporting about possible Turkish military supplies to Ukraine, see Stijn Mitzer and Joost Availability.” For open source reporting about possible Turkish military supplies to Ukraine, see Stijn Mitzer and Joost
Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx, November 21, 2022. , November 21, 2022.
8690 See, for example, Jared Malsin, “Ghost Fleet Helps Russia Evade Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2023. 91 Soner Cagaptay, “Unpacking Turkey’s Non-Binary Ukraine War Policy,” Hoover Institution, March 7, 2023. Soner Cagaptay, “Unpacking Turkey’s Non-Binary Ukraine War Policy,” Hoover Institution, March 7, 2023.
8792 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023; Jared Malsin, “Russia’s Ukraine War Effort Fueled Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023; Jared Malsin, “Russia’s Ukraine War Effort Fueled
by Turkish Exports,” by Turkish Exports,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Partners to Weed Out Illicit , February 3, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Partners to Weed Out Illicit
Trade with Russia,” Trade with Russia,” New York Times, February 4, 2023. , February 4, 2023.
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~~Turkey to bypass Western sanctions.88 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs~~
~~on sanctioned goods from transiting its territory to Russia.89 In April 2023, the Department of the~~
~~Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting~~
~~Russia or Russian entities.90~~
Relevance for congressional review process. As mentioned in the introduction to this report,
~~Turkey’s potential to boost NATO in countering Russia may partly explain the Administration’s~~
~~support for an F-16 transaction and Congress could possibly consider it in assessing a proposed~~
~~sale. Turkey’s procurement decisions and future plans for the S-400, along with its mediation~~
~~efforts and other interactions with Russia and Ukraine, may affect how U.S. officials and~~
~~lawmakers gauge Turkey’s Western alignment and pursue options to encourage it—including with~~
~~regard to F-16s.~~
93 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.” 94 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023. 95 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the World,” April 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 12 link to page 12 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft Sweden: NATO Accession
Background. As noted above, some Members of Congress have expressed strong support for As noted above, some Members of Congress have expressed strong support for
Swedish NATO accession, and some Members argue that Turkish delays on the issue have Swedish NATO accession, and some Members argue that Turkish delays on the issue have
threatened alliance unity in countering Russia.threatened alliance unity in countering Russia.~~91 Turkish officials do not appear fully satisfied~~
~~with the steps Sweden has taken to date—per a~~96 Before approving Swedish accession, Turkey has sought to have Sweden take additional steps, per the June 2022 trilateral memorandum mentioned above. ~~June 2022 trilateral memorandum—to strengthen~~
~~legal measures and policies (including extradition) against Kurdish militants and others that~~
~~Turkey deems terrorists.92~~
Relevance for congressional review process. Congressional leaders have signaled reluctance to Congressional leaders have signaled reluctance to
consider approving an F-16 sale to Turkey unless its parliament ratifies the NATO accession consider approving an F-16 sale to Turkey unless its parliament ratifies the NATO accession
protocols for Sweden, though Turkish officials have opposed any U.S. resort to the accession protocols for Sweden, though Turkish officials have opposed any U.S. resort to the accession
issue as a precondition.issue as a precondition.~~93 A~~97 President Erdogan’s July pledge to take steps toward Turkish parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession protocol came after new Swedish anti-terrorism new Swedish anti-terrorism ~~law came into~~legislation took effect effect ~~on June 1, 2023, and~~
~~Swedish officials reportedly plan to begin prosecuting legal cases under the new legislation in~~
~~June.94 It is unclear whether and when Turkish approval of Sweden’s NATO membership might~~
~~proceed, and if Turkey’s leadership might demand specific additional Swedish actions. In March,~~
~~President Erdogan said that Turkey had requested that Sweden extradite approximately 120 terror~~
~~suspects, but in May an unnamed senior Swedish official was cited as saying that Sweden “has~~
~~neither received a list of names from Turkey, nor is it aware of who the individuals might be,~~
~~making Erdogan’s demands impossible to meet.”95 With Erdogan possibly less concerned about~~
~~domestic political pressures following his May reelection, some analysts have expressed cautious~~

~~88 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~89 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023.~~
~~90 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the~~
~~World,” April 12, 2023.~~
~~91 See footnote 59 and footnote 60.~~
~~92 CNN interview transcript, “Erdogan: We have no Problems with our Relationship with Russia; Turkey Heads to~~
~~Polls May 28 for Presidential Runoff,” May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-~~
~~19/segment/02. Text of Trilateral Memorandum at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/~~
~~220628-trilat-memo.pdf.~~
93in June, and two court rulings anticipated some extradition to Turkey.98 President Biden and other U.S. officials welcomed Erdogan’s commitment. As mentioned above, Erdogan has said that he expects Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it will take to implement the 2022 trilateral memorandum before sending the accession protocol to parliament.99 Based on statements from Erdogan and other reports, Turkey might also seek the following before its parliament considers Sweden’s NATO application: • At least some assurance of congressional approval of the potential F-16 sale.100 • The lifting of some implicit arms trade restrictions by NATO countries.101 • Increased support among EU countries to expand Turkey’s customs union with the EU and provide Turkish citizens with visa-free travel to EU countries.102 Greece and Cyprus Background. Congress also could consider long-standing bilateral tensions between Turkey and Greece in assessing a potential arms sale. Specific considerations might include how a potential sale could affect the balance of military power between Turkey and Greece (see text box), as well as Turkey’s role in various bilateral disputes—including over the ethnically divided island of Cyprus. Turkish and Greek Defense Capabilities and the U.S. Role Historically, the United States has frequently linked military assistance provided to Turkey and Greece in a way that maintains a careful balance between its two NATO allies.103 Airpower plays a role in this balance, as do 96 See footnote 59 and footnote 60. 97 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability”; “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Kalin,” Availability”; “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Kalin,” TRT World, March 26, 2023. , March 26, 2023.
~~94 Nazlan Ertan, “Turkey inches toward ratifying Sweden’s NATO bid,” Al-Monitor, June 5, 2023.~~
~~95 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Jared Malsin, “Sweden’s NATO Membership Hinges on Extraditing Unknown People,”~~
Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2023.
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~~optimism about prospects for Turkey approving Sweden’s accession before the July 11-12 NATO~~
~~summit.96~~
~~During a May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary Blinken said that the accession process has moved~~
~~rapidly in historic terms, and that Turkey “has rightly focused attention on some of its security~~
~~concerns that both Sweden and Finland have taken remarkable steps to address, important ones....~~
~~From the perspective of the United States, the time is now to finalize Sweden’s accession.”97~~
~~Secretary General Stoltenberg and some officials from other NATO countries have echoed~~
~~Blinken in supporting the “fastest possible accession” of Sweden into the alliance.98~~
~~Greece and Cyprus~~
Background. Congress also could consider long-standing bilateral tensions between Turkey and
~~Greece in assessing a potential arms sale. Specific considerations might include how a potential~~
~~sale could affect the balance of military power between Turkey and Greece (see text box), as well~~
~~as Turkey’s role in various bilateral disputes—including over the ethnically divided island of~~
~~Cyprus.~~
~~Turkish and Greek Defense Capabilities and the U.S. Role~~
~~Historically, the United States has frequently linked military assistance provided to Turkey and Greece in a way~~
~~that maintains a careful balance between its two NATO allies.99 Airpower plays a role in this balance, as do~~
98 “With NATO membership in mind, Sweden hands over Turkish man convicted of drug offenses at home,” Associated Press, June 12, 2023; “NATO applicant Sweden jails Kurdish man for attempting to finance PKK militants,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2023. 99 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters. 100 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Turkey’s F-16s in doubt after Erdogan says no Sweden vote before October,” Al-Monitor, July 12, 2023. 101 “Exclusive: Canada unfreezes talks with Turkey on export controls after NATO move,” Reuters, July 13, 2023. 102 Ibid. 103 Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, p. 99. For background, CRS Report 90-29, Greece and Turkey: The Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid, by Ellen Laipson, revised December 26, 1989, is available to Members and staff upon request. Congressional Research Service 14 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft additional factors like the countries’ respective naval and land-based military capabilities, manpower and population additional factors like the countries’ respective naval and land-based military capabilities, manpower and population
resources, economic and social capital, defense industries, and international relationships.resources, economic and social capital, defense industries, and international relationships.~~100~~104
Turkey’s air force has approximately 232 F-16s in service in Block 30, Block 40, Block 50, and Block 50+ Turkey’s air force has approximately 232 F-16s in service in Block 30, Block 40, Block 50, and Block 50+
configuration, which account for the majority of its 262 in-service fighter aircraft.configuration, which account for the majority of its 262 in-service fighter aircraft.~~101~~105 First acquired in 1987, most of First acquired in 1987, most of
Turkey’s F-16s have undergone several upgrades since initial procurement.Turkey’s F-16s have undergone several upgrades since initial procurement.~~102~~106 The most recent upgrade, The most recent upgrade,
completed in 2009, gave Turkey’s F-16s capabilities similar to current U.S. F-16s. completed in 2009, gave Turkey’s F-16s capabilities similar to current U.S. F-16s.
Greece has approximately 154 F-16s in service in Block 30, Block 50, and Block 52+ configuration, which account Greece has approximately 154 F-16s in service in Block 30, Block 50, and Block 52+ configuration, which account
for the majority of its 221 in-service fighter aircraft.for the majority of its 221 in-service fighter aircraft.~~103~~107 In 2017, the Trump Administration formally notified In 2017, the Trump Administration formally notified
Congress of the possible sale of up to 123 Viper upgrade kits to Greece,Congress of the possible sale of up to 123 Viper upgrade kits to Greece,~~104~~108 with the United States and Greece with the United States and Greece
eventually agreeing to a reported total of 83—enabling upgrades to the majority of Greece’s aging F-16 fleet at a eventually agreeing to a reported total of 83—enabling upgrades to the majority of Greece’s aging F-16 fleet at a
cost of roughly $1.5 bil ion. The first two F-16Vs were delivered in September 2022, with all upgrades scheduled cost of roughly $1.5 bil ion. The first two F-16Vs were delivered in September 2022, with all upgrades scheduled

~~96 Ertan.~~
~~97 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~98 Matthew Lee and Lorne Cook, “NATO presses Turkey to approve Sweden’s membership, eyes Ukraine security plan~~
~~as summit looms,” Associated Press, June 1, 2023.~~
~~99 Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, p. 99. For background, CRS Report 90-29,~~ ~~Greece and Turkey: The~~
~~Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid, by Ellen Laipson, revised December 26, 1989, is available to Members and staff upon~~
~~request.~~
~~100 Alexander Gale, “Greece vs Turkey: The Military Balance in the Aegean,” Greek Reporter, November 26, 2022.~~
~~101 “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at~~
~~https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.~~
~~102 Gareth Jennings, “Turkey Unveils Domestic AESA Radar for Manned, Unmanned Combat Aircraft,”~~ ~~Janes Defence~~
~~Weekly, November 10, 2022.~~
~~103 “Greece – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, February 4, 2022 (posted March 3, 2023); “Greece” at~~
~~https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article5.html.~~
~~104 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece - Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V~~
~~Configuration,” Transmittal No: 17-54, October 17, 2017.~~
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~~to be complete by late 2027.105~~to be complete by late 2027.109 Additionally, Greece has begun accepting delivery from France of 24 Rafale F-3R Additionally, Greece has begun accepting delivery from France of 24 Rafale F-3R
fighters, the last of which are due to be delivered in 2024.fighters, the last of which are due to be delivered in 2024.~~106~~110
While airpower comparisons between Turkey and Greece involve many factors (e.g., training, sustainment, While airpower comparisons between Turkey and Greece involve many factors (e.g., training, sustainment,
logistics), one journalist has written that a potential Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing logistics), one journalist has written that a potential Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing
procurement of Rafales and the F-16 upgrades—“wil give the Hellenic [Greek] Air Force a technological edge procurement of Rafales and the F-16 upgrades—“wil give the Hellenic [Greek] Air Force a technological edge
over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That wil remain the case even if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.”over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That wil remain the case even if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.”~~107~~111
In May 2022, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis appeared to imply concern about U.S.-Turkey arms In May 2022, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis appeared to imply concern about U.S.-Turkey arms
transactions—such as a potential F-16 sale—while addressing a May 2022 joint session of Congress;transactions—such as a potential F-16 sale—while addressing a May 2022 joint session of Congress;~~108~~112
subsequently President Erdogan temporarily suspended contact with him. While long-standing Turkey-Greece subsequently President Erdogan temporarily suspended contact with him. While long-standing Turkey-Greece
disputes persist,disputes persist,~~109~~113 tensions have somewhat subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts tensions have somewhat subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts
in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek disaster relief assistance to Turkey after Turkey in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek disaster relief assistance to Turkey after Turkey
experienced major earthquakes on February 6, 2023.experienced major earthquakes on February 6, 2023.~~110~~114
Amid these potential airpower developments and ongoing Turkey-Greece disputes, various other aspects of U.S.-Amid these potential airpower developments and ongoing Turkey-Greece disputes, various other aspects of U.S.-
Greece military cooperation (including basing, materiel transshipment, and defense transactions) have expanded.Greece military cooperation (including basing, materiel transshipment, and defense transactions) have expanded.~~111~~115
In this context, and fol owing the United States’s removal of a decades-long arms embargo that it had imposed on In this context, and fol owing the United States’s removal of a decades-long arms embargo that it had imposed on
the Republic of Cyprus,the Republic of Cyprus,~~112~~116 Turkish officials have claimed that the U.S. approach to the region appears 104 Alexander Gale, “Greece vs Turkey: The Military Balance in the Aegean,” Greek Reporter, November 26, 2022. 105 “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html. 106 Gareth Jennings, “Turkey Unveils Domestic AESA Radar for Manned, Unmanned Combat Aircraft,” Janes Defence Weekly, November 10, 2022. 107 “Greece – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, February 4, 2022 (posted March 3, 2023); “Greece” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article5.html. 108 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece - Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V Configuration,” Transmittal No: 17-54, October 17, 2017. 109 ~~Turkish officials have claimed that the U.S. approach to the region appears~~
~~imbalanced.113 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake has denied any shift in U.S. security posture, explaining that~~
~~col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.114~~
Relevance for congressional review process. After Greek officials voiced concerns about
~~Turkish actions in the Aegean Sea region, some Members of Congress supported the provision~~
~~during the FY2023 NDAA process that sought to place conditions on F-16 transactions with~~
~~Turkey (as discussed above).115 This issue could affect congressional deliberations going forward,~~
~~depending on the tenor of future U.S.-Turkey-Greece interactions and the respective outcomes of~~
~~upcoming scheduled elections in Turkey and Greece. At a March 2023 HFAC hearing, Secretary~~
~~Blinken responded to a question about potential threats to Greece from Turkey by reiterating his~~
~~view that an F-16 sale to Turkey is important for NATO. He then said that the Administration is~~
~~working to defuse any tensions between NATO allies like Turkey and Greece so that “they do not~~
~~engage in either actions or rhetoric that would inflame the situation.”116~~

~~105~~ Nicholas Paphitis, “Greece gets first 2 upgraded F-16s out of a total 83,” Nicholas Paphitis, “Greece gets first 2 upgraded F-16s out of a total 83,” Associated Press, September 12, 2022. , September 12, 2022.
~~106~~110 Paul Iddon, “Even if Turkey Gets Modernized F-16s, Greece Will Still Have a Technological Edge in Airpower,” Paul Iddon, “Even if Turkey Gets Modernized F-16s, Greece Will Still Have a Technological Edge in Airpower,”
Forbes, July 2, 2022. , July 2, 2022.
~~107~~111 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,” Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023. , January 16, 2023.
~~108~~112 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022. Congress,” May 17, 2022.
~~109~~113 CRS Report R41368, CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. .
~~110~~114 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023. , March 22, 2023.
~~111~~115 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.
~~112~~116 State Department, “Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2023,” State Department, “Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2023,”
September 16, 2022. September 16, 2022.
~~113 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January~~
~~17, 2023; “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.~~
~~114 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/~~
~~1582273449145212928.~~
~~115 See, for example, the November 14, 2022 letter from 22 Representatives to leadership of the Senate Armed Services~~
~~Committee and House Armed Services Committee, text available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/~~
~~pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/11.14.22-rep.-pappas-fy23-ndaa-conference-letter-on-turkey-f-16-sale-~~
~~provision.pdf.~~
~~116 HFAC Hearing, March 23, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558913042?0&deliveryId=~~
~~105435727&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7696303.~~
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Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 10 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft imbalanced.117 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake has denied any shift in U.S. security posture, explaining that col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.118 Relevance for congressional review process. After Greek officials voiced concerns about Turkish actions in the Aegean Sea region, some Members of Congress supported the provision during the FY2023 NDAA process that sought to place conditions on F-16 transactions with Turkey (as discussed above).119 This issue could affect congressional deliberations going forward, depending on the tenor of future U.S.-Turkey-Greece interactions and the respective outcomes of upcoming scheduled elections in Turkey and Greece. At a March 2023 HFAC hearing, Secretary Blinken responded to a question about potential threats to Greece from Turkey by reiterating his view that an F-16 sale to Turkey is important for NATO. He then said that the Administration is working to defuse any tensions between NATO allies like Turkey and Greece so that “they do not engage in either actions or rhetoric that would inflame the situation.”120 Syria
Background. Another factor for Congress could be Turkey’s policies and military operations in Another factor for Congress could be Turkey’s policies and military operations in
northern Syria. Amid the compartmentalized disputes arising during the Syrian civil war among northern Syria. Amid the compartmentalized disputes arising during the Syrian civil war among
external actors, a major U.S.-Turkey point of contention has been U.S. support for the Syrian external actors, a major U.S.-Turkey point of contention has been U.S. support for the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the Kurdish YPG. The SDF helped end the Islamic State’s Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the Kurdish YPG. The SDF helped end the Islamic State’s
territorial control over parts of northeast Syria, but the YPG has links to the Kurdistan Workers’ territorial control over parts of northeast Syria, but the YPG has links to the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (Kurdish acronym PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that has clashed with Party (Kurdish acronym PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that has clashed with
Turkish authorities for decades.Turkish authorities for decades.~~117~~121
Relevance for congressional review process. If Turkey were to launch a new military ground If Turkey were to launch a new military ground
operation in Syria or use F-16s against the SDF/YPG or civilians in Syria or Iraq, such a operation in Syria or use F-16s against the SDF/YPG or civilians in Syria or Iraq, such a
development could affect Administration and congressional sentiment toward Turkey and the development could affect Administration and congressional sentiment toward Turkey and the
proposed F-16 sale.proposed F-16 sale.~~118~~122 A previous Turkish-led incursion into northern Syria in 2019 generated A previous Turkish-led incursion into northern Syria in 2019 generated
negative congressional responses. In June 2022, the four SFRC-HFAC leaders (Menendez, Risch, negative congressional responses. In June 2022, the four SFRC-HFAC leaders (Menendez, Risch,
McCaul, and Meeks) urged the Turkish government and its allied Syrian militias to refrain from McCaul, and Meeks) urged the Turkish government and its allied Syrian militias to refrain from
any military operation so that the focus could remain on ensuring the “enduring defeat” of the any military operation so that the focus could remain on ensuring the “enduring defeat” of the
Islamic State and avoiding “further humanitarian disaster.”Islamic State and avoiding “further humanitarian disaster.”~~119~~123 HFAC’s McCaul and Meeks issued HFAC’s McCaul and Meeks issued
a similar joint statement in December after a November bombing in Istanbul triggered some a similar joint statement in December after a November bombing in Istanbul triggered some
Turkish military responses in Syria and public discussion of a possible ground operation.Turkish military responses in Syria and public discussion of a possible ground operation.~~120~~
~~Turkish Domestic Issues~~
Background. Domestic developments in Turkey are another consideration for Congress. Many
~~U.S. lawmakers have alleged that “gross violation of human rights and democratic backsliding”~~
~~have occurred under Erdogan’s rule.121~~
Relevance for congressional review process. Assessments of Turkish domestic issues could
~~factor into congressional positions on a potential F-16 sale.~~
~~Alternatives to F-16s?~~
~~Turkish officials have hinted that if they are unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials~~
~~have hinted that they might consider using Western European alternatives, following the example~~
~~of several U.S. partners in the Middle East.122 One member of Turkey’s presidential commission~~
~~on national security and foreign policy stated in March, “Diversification both in brands and~~
~~supplier sources is the only method to avoid future political noise of interest groups. Defense~~
~~dependency to a single country often makes a country vulnerable to foreign political pressure.”123~~

~~117 See footnote 43.~~
~~118~~124 117 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January 17, 2023; “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. 118 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/1582273449145212928. 119 See, for example, the November 14, 2022 letter from 22 Representatives to leadership of the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee, text available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/11.14.22-rep.-pappas-fy23-ndaa-conference-letter-on-turkey-f-16-sale-provision.pdf. 120 HFAC Hearing, March 23, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558913042?0&deliveryId=105435727&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7696303. 121 See footnote 43. 122 Bryant Harris, “Senators want to block Turkey F-16 sale until NATO expansion succeeds,” Bryant Harris, “Senators want to block Turkey F-16 sale until NATO expansion succeeds,” Defense News, February , February
2, 2023; Ersoz, “F-16 Deal Contingent on Turkey’s Support for NATO Expansion, Syria.” 2, 2023; Ersoz, “F-16 Deal Contingent on Turkey’s Support for NATO Expansion, Syria.”
~~119~~123 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “McCaul, Meeks, Risch, Menendez Statement on Threatened Turkish Incursion House Foreign Affairs Committee, “McCaul, Meeks, Risch, Menendez Statement on Threatened Turkish Incursion
into Northern Syria,” June 15, 2022. into Northern Syria,” June 15, 2022.
~~120~~124 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “McCaul, Meeks Statement on Situation in Northern Syria,” December 3, 2022. House Foreign Affairs Committee, “McCaul, Meeks Statement on Situation in Northern Syria,” December 3, 2022.
~~121 See, for example, February 26, 2021 letter from 177 Representatives to Secretary of State Blinken, text available at~~
~~https://moulton.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Turkey%20Letter%20-%20FINAL.pdf.~~
~~122 Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force.”~~
~~123 Cagri Erhan, quoted in O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine.”~~
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~~Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s.124~~ Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 11 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft Turkish Domestic Issues Background. Domestic developments in Turkey are another consideration for Congress. Many U.S. lawmakers have alleged that “gross violation of human rights and democratic backsliding” have occurred under Erdogan’s rule.125 Relevance for congressional review process. Assessments of Turkish domestic issues could factor into congressional positions on a potential F-16 sale. Alternatives to F-16s? Turkish officials have hinted that if they are unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider using Western European alternatives, following the example of several U.S. partners in the Middle East.126 One member of Turkey’s presidential commission on national security and foreign policy stated in March, “Diversification both in brands and supplier sources is the only method to avoid future political noise of interest groups. Defense dependency to a single country often makes a country vulnerable to foreign political pressure.”127 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s.128 The The
following issues could complicate such acquisitions: following issues could complicate such acquisitions:
• • Uncertainty of approval from Germany or other consortium partners.
Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom—the Typhoon consortium Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom—the Typhoon consortium
partners—would need to agree on selling the aircraft to Turkey, and Germany has partners—would need to agree on selling the aircraft to Turkey, and Germany has
reportedly blocked the export of some materials to the Turkish arms industry.reportedly blocked the export of some materials to the Turkish arms industry.~~125~~129
• • Cost and logistical issues. Open sources estimate that Typhoon per unit costs Open sources estimate that Typhoon per unit costs
could be approximately twice those of F-16Vs, could be approximately twice those of F-16Vs,~~126~~130 and one consortium executive and one consortium executive
has hinted at potential production delays “because the industry has adapted to the has hinted at potential production delays “because the industry has adapted to the
very low demand signal that was there for many years.”very low demand signal that was there for many years.”~~127~~131
• • Transition challenges. Turkey’s air force could face difficulties and a lengthy Turkey’s air force could face difficulties and a lengthy
transition period adjusting to a non-F-16 platform. transition period adjusting to a non-F-16 platform.~~128~~132
• • Possible congressional notification requirement. European weapons transfers European weapons transfers
to Turkey would be subject to the congressional review process described above to Turkey would be subject to the congressional review process described above
if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin defense articles meeting the if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin defense articles meeting the
specified notification threshold.specified notification threshold.~~129~~133 Previously, Congress received notification in Previously, Congress received notification in
connection with some non-NATO countries’ proposed purchases of U.S. connection with some non-NATO countries’ proposed purchases of U.S.
~~equipment for Typhoons, namely Link 16 MIDS and various munitions (Saudi~~
~~Arabia),130 and SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods (Kuwait and Qatar).131~~
~~If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and encounters obstacles to procuring European alternatives, its~~
~~next steps toward preserving its military aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would~~
~~be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for Turkey states~~
~~If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,~~
~~Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in~~
~~areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.132~~
~~While serving as President Erdogan’s spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin (now serving as Turkey’s~~
~~intelligence chief) said in February 2023 that if the United States does not sell F-16s to Turkey,~~
~~Turkey will follow a similar pathway with fighter aircraft that it took in developing key domestic~~
~~components for its globally recognized drone industry, “and the US defense companies will be on~~
~~the losing end in all of this.”133 However, a prominent Turkish defense analyst has written that~~

~~124~~ 125 See, for example, February 26, 2021 letter from 177 Representatives to Secretary of State Blinken, text available at https://moulton.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Turkey%20Letter%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 126 Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force.” 127 Cagri Erhan, quoted in O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine.” 128 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye, ,
January 20, 2023. January 20, 2023.
~~125~~129 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” ‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023. , January 29, 2023.
~~126~~130 Valius Venckunas, “Top 10 most expensive fighter jets in 2021,” Valius Venckunas, “Top 10 most expensive fighter jets in 2021,” Aerotime Hub, March 29, 2021. , March 29, 2021.
~~127~~131 Sakshi Tiwari, “Airbus Stares at ‘Death’ of Eurofighter Typhoons While Lockheed Martin Walks Away with Sakshi Tiwari, “Airbus Stares at ‘Death’ of Eurofighter Typhoons While Lockheed Martin Walks Away with
Monstrous European Deals,” Monstrous European Deals,” EurAsian Times, February 21, 2023. , February 21, 2023.
~~128~~132 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.” Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
~~129 See footnote 48.~~
130 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
~~61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May~~
~~24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021.~~
~~131 DDTC Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC~~
~~Transmittal 20-074, September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021).~~
~~132 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.~~
~~133 Seda Sevencan, “US defense companies on ‘losing end’ if F-16 sale to Türkiye blocked,” Anadolu Agency, February~~
~~(continued...)~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft~~

133 See footnote 48. Congressional Research Service 17 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft equipment for Typhoons, namely Link 16 MIDS and various munitions (Saudi Arabia),134 and SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods (Kuwait and Qatar).135 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and encounters obstacles to procuring European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for Turkey states If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization, Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.136 While serving as President Erdogan’s spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin (now serving as Turkey’s intelligence chief) said in February 2023 that if the United States does not sell F-16s to Turkey, Turkey will follow a similar pathway with fighter aircraft that it took in developing key domestic components for its globally recognized drone industry, “and the US defense companies will be on the losing end in all of this.”137 However, a prominent Turkish defense analyst has written that Turkey’s defense industry “cannot extend its performance in drone warfare to each and every Turkey’s defense industry “cannot extend its performance in drone warfare to each and every
aspect of military planning,” and still relies on NATO allies for complex systems and platforms aspect of military planning,” and still relies on NATO allies for complex systems and platforms
such as fifth-generation aircraft.such as fifth-generation aircraft.~~134~~138
Some Arguments for and Against Approving a
Possible F-16 Sale
CRS has surveyed arguments and potential arguments by proponents and opponents of a possible CRS has surveyed arguments and potential arguments by proponents and opponents of a possible
F-16 sale to Turkey, and has summarized them below. The arguments presented are illustrative, F-16 sale to Turkey, and has summarized them below. The arguments presented are illustrative,
not exhaustive. CRS neither endorses nor opposes any of these arguments nor does CRS support not exhaustive. CRS neither endorses nor opposes any of these arguments nor does CRS support
or oppose any other position regarding the issues discussed in the report. or oppose any other position regarding the issues discussed in the report.
In Favor of a Sale
Against a Sale
Weighing the importance of bolstering NATO against U.S.-Turkey policy differences
Turkey’s ability to help NATO and other countries— Turkey’s ability to help NATO and other countries—
An F-16 sale to Turkey wil not change its An F-16 sale to Turkey wil not change its
including Ukraine—counter Russian threats and including Ukraine—counter Russian threats and
demonstrated inclination to hedge between NATO demonstrated inclination to hedge between NATO
geopolitical ambitions makes an F-16 sale important to geopolitical ambitions makes an F-16 sale important to
allies and Russia, or to counter Russia in Ukraine and allies and Russia, or to counter Russia in Ukraine and
keep Turkey firmly aligned with NATO allies on this keep Turkey firmly aligned with NATO allies on this
other places important to Turkey’s own security other places important to Turkey’s own security
priority. priority.
interests. interests.
U.S.-Turkey divergences on Russia and other issues U.S.-Turkey divergences on Russia and other issues
NATO allies should be held to a higher standard in NATO allies should be held to a higher standard in
should not disrupt efforts to strengthen NATO defense preserving alliance strength and unity. Thus, Turkey’s should not disrupt efforts to strengthen NATO defense preserving alliance strength and unity. Thus, Turkey’s
134 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register 61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May 24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021. 135 DDTC Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074, September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021). 136 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. 137 Seda Sevencan, “US defense companies on ‘losing end’ if F-16 sale to Türkiye blocked,” Anadolu Agency, February 2, 2023. For background on the establishment of Turkey’s drone industry, see Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection. For discussion of possible Turkish domestic efforts to upgrade some of its F-16s, see Boyko Nikolov, “Here’s how Turkey will upgrade F-16 Block 30, 40, and 50 to Block 70,” BulgarianMilitary.com, March 27, 2023; Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022. 138 Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, p. 96. Congressional Research Service 18 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft In Favor of a Sale Against a Sale capabilities and deterrence via Turkey’s air fleet. Other capabilities and deterrence via Turkey’s air fleet. Other
differences with U.S. policy on Russia, Sweden’s NATO differences with U.S. policy on Russia, Sweden’s NATO
major U.S. arms purchasers near Turkey (such as Israel, accession, and Greece/Cyprus should be less tolerable major U.S. arms purchasers near Turkey (such as Israel, accession, and Greece/Cyprus should be less tolerable
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) also have Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) also have
to the United States than its tensions with non-NATO to the United States than its tensions with non-NATO
some notable divergences with U.S. policy on Russia. some notable divergences with U.S. policy on Russia.
partners. Moreover, the downside from any potential partners. Moreover, the downside from any potential
Having Turkey as a partner might remain important to Having Turkey as a partner might remain important to
Turkish use of F-16Vs to harm other U.S. partners (e.g., Turkish use of F-16Vs to harm other U.S. partners (e.g.,
U.S. interests even if Turkey is not ful y aligned with U.S. interests even if Turkey is not ful y aligned with
Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, or the SDF/YPG) Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, or the SDF/YPG)
U.S. priorities. U.S. priorities.
arguably outweighs any advantage Turkey might provide arguably outweighs any advantage Turkey might provide
to NATO with an upgraded F-16 fleet. to NATO with an upgraded F-16 fleet.
Relationship of an F-16 sale to the Sweden NATO accession issue
Approving a sale now could induce Turkey to support Approving a sale now could induce Turkey to support
Approving a sale before Turkish approval of Sweden Approving a sale before Turkish approval of Sweden
NATO membership for Sweden, a key U.S. policy goal. joining NATO could cede U.S. leverage on the issue. NATO membership for Sweden, a key U.S. policy goal. joining NATO could cede U.S. leverage on the issue.
Turkish parliamentary approval of NATO accession for Turkish parliamentary approval of NATO accession for
Approving a sale after Turkey agrees to Swedish Approving a sale after Turkey agrees to Swedish
Sweden would signal Turkey’s support for alliance Sweden would signal Turkey’s support for alliance
accession would encourage NATO countries to extract accession would encourage NATO countries to extract
strength and unity, and thus should remove any strength and unity, and thus should remove any
concessions in the service of their own agendas by concessions in the service of their own agendas by
remaining reservations to a sale in Congress and the remaining reservations to a sale in Congress and the
temporarily delaying important, otherwise unanimously temporarily delaying important, otherwise unanimously
Administration. Administration.
or near-unanimously supported actions. or near-unanimously supported actions.
Balance of power between Turkey and Greece
With Greece receiving upgrades to its F-16 fleet and With Greece receiving upgrades to its F-16 fleet and
Because Turkey’s military, population, and economy are Because Turkey’s military, population, and economy are
potentially receiving F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, potentially receiving F-35 Joint Strike Fighters,
significantly larger than Greece, and Turkey maintains significantly larger than Greece, and Turkey maintains
upgrading Turkey’s F-16 fleet is important. It would upgrading Turkey’s F-16 fleet is important. It would
various military advantages over Greece, some Greek various military advantages over Greece, some Greek
show U.S. sensitivity to maintaining a reasonable show U.S. sensitivity to maintaining a reasonable
airpower advantages arguably help maintain regional airpower advantages arguably help maintain regional

~~2, 2023. For background on the establishment of Turkey’s drone industry, see Outzen,~~ ~~Deals, Drones, and National~~
~~Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection. For discussion of possible Turkish domestic efforts to upgrade some~~
~~of its F-16s, see Boyko Nikolov, “Here’s how Turkey will upgrade F-16 Block 30, 40, and 50 to Block 70,”~~
BulgarianMilitary.com, March 27, 2023; Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to extend life of Turkish F-16
~~jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts modernizing its F-16 with~~
~~indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022.~~
~~134 Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, p. 96.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

18

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft~~

~~In Favor of a Sale~~
~~Against a Sale~~
balance of power, and thus reduce the potential for (1) balance of power, and thus reduce the potential for (1)
balance, and thus should not compel an upgrade to balance, and thus should not compel an upgrade to
Turkey-Greece conflict or (2) the alienation of a Turkey-Greece conflict or (2) the alienation of a
Turkey’s F-16 fleet. The United States should reward Turkey’s F-16 fleet. The United States should reward
Turkish ally that arguably provides unique strategic Turkish ally that arguably provides unique strategic
Greece for the level of cooperation it has shown by Greece for the level of cooperation it has shown by
advantages to NATO in terms of its manpower, overall advantages to NATO in terms of its manpower, overall
inviting additional NATO use of its bases and inviting additional NATO use of its bases and
military capabilities, influence with Muslim-majority military capabilities, influence with Muslim-majority
territory—including to bolster Ukraine and Eastern territory—including to bolster Ukraine and Eastern
countries, and control of the straits between the countries, and control of the straits between the
Europe. Europe.
Mediterranean and Black Seas. Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Weighing security interests and democratic values
Turkey’s geopolitical importance gives it outsized value Turkey’s geopolitical importance gives it outsized value
Under President Erdogan, Turkey has become Under President Erdogan, Turkey has become
for advancing critical U.S. interests in the surrounding for advancing critical U.S. interests in the surrounding
increasingly authoritarian, making it a less stable and increasingly authoritarian, making it a less stable and
region. Advancing those interests sometimes region. Advancing those interests sometimes
reliable partner. reliable partner.
necessitates close U.S. ties with countries struggling to necessitates close U.S. ties with countries struggling to
Until Turkey takes steps to strengthen its democratic Until Turkey takes steps to strengthen its democratic
maintain the rule of law. maintain the rule of law.
institutions and civil liberties, the United States should institutions and civil liberties, the United States should
The United States would have more influence— The United States would have more influence—
not sell advanced weaponry to a country whose not sell advanced weaponry to a country whose
including on democratic values—by bolstering ties with including on democratic values—by bolstering ties with
leadership falls short in embodying ideals found in leadership falls short in embodying ideals found in
Turkey via an F-16 sale than by reducing those ties. Turkey via an F-16 sale than by reducing those ties.
NATO’s founding treaty. NATO’s founding treaty.
Impact of continued U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation
Selling and upgrading F-16s would preserve an Selling and upgrading F-16s would preserve an
Upgrading Turkey’s fleet of F-16s deepens U.S. Upgrading Turkey’s fleet of F-16s deepens U.S.
important node of U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation. important node of U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation.
commitments to Turkey, giving leverage to a partner commitments to Turkey, giving leverage to a partner
Extending Turkey’s reliance on the United States for Extending Turkey’s reliance on the United States for
whose interests increasingly diverge from America’s. whose interests increasingly diverge from America’s.
airpower decades into the future could be beneficial in airpower decades into the future could be beneficial in
Turkey’s existing F-16s did not prevent it from Turkey’s existing F-16s did not prevent it from
encouraging broader ties and establishing U.S. leverage encouraging broader ties and establishing U.S. leverage
purchasing significant Russian military materiel (the S- purchasing significant Russian military materiel (the S-
with Turkey. with Turkey.
400), deepening economic ties with Russia, and 400), deepening economic ties with Russia, and
Selling F-16s would reinforce to Turkey that the U.S. Selling F-16s would reinforce to Turkey that the U.S.
previously exploring Chinese arms purchases. previously exploring Chinese arms purchases.
executive branch and Congress remain open to major executive branch and Congress remain open to major
Lockheed already anticipates orders to build 148 new Lockheed already anticipates orders to build 148 new
defense industrial cooperation, thus deterring Turkey defense industrial cooperation, thus deterring Turkey
F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft. Thus, a Turkish sale is not F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft. Thus, a Turkish sale is not
from pursuing Russian or Chinese alternatives. from pursuing Russian or Chinese alternatives.
critical for either the production line or the U.S. critical for either the production line or the U.S.
Selling F-16s to Turkey could contribute bil ions of Selling F-16s to Turkey could contribute bil ions of
military industrial base. military industrial base.
dol ars to the military industrial base and extend the life dol ars to the military industrial base and extend the life
Congressional Research Service 19 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft In Favor of a Sale Against a Sale of the Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70/72 production of the Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70/72 production
line in South Carolina. line in South Carolina.
Urgency of bolstering interoperability and safety/deconfliction measures
Turkey’s current F-16s are aging and require upgrades Turkey’s current F-16s are aging and require upgrades
Turkey was on track to upgrade its air force’s Turkey was on track to upgrade its air force’s
to increase interoperability with NATO allies and boost interoperability and safety/deconfliction measures with to increase interoperability with NATO allies and boost interoperability and safety/deconfliction measures with
safety/deconfliction measures for training and safety/deconfliction measures for training and
the F-35 program, and U.S. officials and lawmakers the F-35 program, and U.S. officials and lawmakers
operations (both among its domestic aircraft and with operations (both among its domestic aircraft and with
warned that a Russian S-400 acquisition would lead to warned that a Russian S-400 acquisition would lead to
its NATO partners—such as Greece—in multilateral its NATO partners—such as Greece—in multilateral
removal from the program and U.S. sanctions. To justify removal from the program and U.S. sanctions. To justify
contexts). Now that Turkey is no longer in line to contexts). Now that Turkey is no longer in line to
U.S. help in bolstering its air capabilities, Turkey should U.S. help in bolstering its air capabilities, Turkey should
receive F-35s, it should at least receive modernized F- receive F-35s, it should at least receive modernized F-
reduce friction with U.S. policies, including by reversing reduce friction with U.S. policies, including by reversing
16s with an extended service life. 16s with an extended service life.
course on the S-400. course on the S-400.
Other potential Turkish fighter aircraft options (including from Russia or China)
Quick U.S. approval of a sale should take place because Quick U.S. approval of a sale should take place because
Any pressure Turkey perceives regarding actions Any pressure Turkey perceives regarding actions
Turkey has a number of options for purchasing fighter Turkey has a number of options for purchasing fighter
affecting a sale or its timing stems from Turkey’s past affecting a sale or its timing stems from Turkey’s past
aircraft. U.S. unwil ingness to sell F-16s to Turkey, or a aircraft. U.S. unwil ingness to sell F-16s to Turkey, or a
actions, which have limited its options. Turkish pursuit actions, which have limited its options. Turkish pursuit
prolonged review process, could motivate Turkey to prolonged review process, could motivate Turkey to
of Russian or Chinese fighters would conflict with of Russian or Chinese fighters would conflict with
consider deals with foreign suppliers, possibly including consider deals with foreign suppliers, possibly including
Turkey’s declared priority to maintain NATO Turkey’s declared priority to maintain NATO
Russia or China. Russia or China.
interoperability. interoperability.
Viability of a Western alternative to the F-16
The Eurofighter Typhoon is not a realistic alternative The Eurofighter Typhoon is not a realistic alternative
The United States does not need to sell additional F- The United States does not need to sell additional F-
for Turkey, given that it would stil be subject to the for Turkey, given that it would stil be subject to the
16s or upgrade kits to Turkey, as Turkey is reportedly 16s or upgrade kits to Turkey, as Turkey is reportedly
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft~~

~~In Favor of a Sale~~
~~Against a Sale~~
approval of European countries like Germany—and approval of European countries like Germany—and
in discussions to purchase Typhoons. Typhoons have in discussions to purchase Typhoons. Typhoons have
perhaps Congress—as well as the significant financial perhaps Congress—as well as the significant financial
been viable fleet supplements for several countries that been viable fleet supplements for several countries that
and logistical challenges of switching to a new airframe. and logistical challenges of switching to a new airframe.
also fly U.S. fighters, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, also fly U.S. fighters, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Oman. Qatar, and Oman.
Perspectives on congressional action
New F-16s might not be delivered for at least three New F-16s might not be delivered for at least three
Tiered review and the AECA process are designed to Tiered review and the AECA process are designed to
years, based on the current production rate and years, based on the current production rate and
empower Congress, and it should not shrink from empower Congress, and it should not shrink from
backlog. In that light, Congress should not shrink from backlog. In that light, Congress should not shrink from
blocking or disapproving this potential sale in 2023 blocking or disapproving this potential sale in 2023
approving a sale in 2023 when there is sufficient reason approving a sale in 2023 when there is sufficient reason
when there is sufficient reason to do so. Blocking the when there is sufficient reason to do so. Blocking the
to do so. Approving the sale would not prevent a future sale would not prevent a future Administration from to do so. Approving the sale would not prevent a future sale would not prevent a future Administration from
Congress or Administration from stopping or altering Congress or Administration from stopping or altering
initiating a similar sale if Turkey aligns itself more initiating a similar sale if Turkey aligns itself more
the sale in response to Turkish actions against U.S. the sale in response to Turkish actions against U.S.
closely with U.S. priorities. closely with U.S. priorities.
interests. interests.
Possible Questions for Biden Administration
As Members of Congress evaluate their stances on a possible F-16 sale to Turkey, they could seek As Members of Congress evaluate their stances on a possible F-16 sale to Turkey, they could seek
further information from the Administration by posing questions such as those set forth below. further information from the Administration by posing questions such as those set forth below.
• What are the most compelling reasons for and against an F-16 sale to Turkey? • What are the most compelling reasons for and against an F-16 sale to Turkey?
• How would a sale advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Russia-• How would a sale advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Russia-
Ukraine war? How would it strengthen Turkey’s capacity to bolster NATO’s Ukraine war? How would it strengthen Turkey’s capacity to bolster NATO’s
capabilities and deterrence? capabilities and deterrence?
• What are the likely consequences if the United States decides not to sell F-16s to • What are the likely consequences if the United States decides not to sell F-16s to
Turkey, in terms of Turkey’s fleet safety and NATO interoperability, defense Turkey, in terms of Turkey’s fleet safety and NATO interoperability, defense
procurement options, and broader strategic and foreign policy alignment with the procurement options, and broader strategic and foreign policy alignment with the
United States and NATO or Russia? United States and NATO or Russia?
Congressional Research Service 20 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft • What actions by the Administration—or other developments—might encourage • What actions by the Administration—or other developments—might encourage
or discourage Turkey to approve NATO membership for Sweden or discourage Turkey to approve NATO membership for Sweden~~, and what is~~? What factors may increase or decrease the the
~~likelihood of Sweden joining the alliance by the July 11-12 NATO summit~~likelihood of Turkey and its parliament approving Swedish accession in the coming weeks or months? ?
• If Turkey’s parliament agrees to have Sweden join NATO, would that affect the • If Turkey’s parliament agrees to have Sweden join NATO, would that affect the
Administration’s timing on formally notifying a possible sale to Turkey? Administration’s timing on formally notifying a possible sale to Turkey?
• How do other NATO allies view a potential F-16 sale to Turkey? How might a • How do other NATO allies view a potential F-16 sale to Turkey? How might a
potential sale, or decision not to sell, impact alliance unity and cohesion? potential sale, or decision not to sell, impact alliance unity and cohesion?
• What criteria would the Administration use when deciding whether to proceed • What criteria would the Administration use when deciding whether to proceed
with a proposed F-16 sale despite a congressional hold? with a proposed F-16 sale despite a congressional hold?
• How might Turkey use F-16s in opposition to U.S. interests? What kind of • How might Turkey use F-16s in opposition to U.S. interests? What kind of
safeguards or commitments are in place or could be taken to prevent Turkey from safeguards or commitments are in place or could be taken to prevent Turkey from
using F-16s against other U.S. allies or partners such as Greece, the Republic of using F-16s against other U.S. allies or partners such as Greece, the Republic of
Cyprus, and the SDF/YPG? Cyprus, and the SDF/YPG?
• What are the most important considerations for U.S. officials in assessing the • What are the most important considerations for U.S. officials in assessing the
Turkey-Greece balance of power and taking actions that might affect it? How Turkey-Greece balance of power and taking actions that might affect it? How
should these considerations affect the timing of next steps—including formal should these considerations affect the timing of next steps—including formal
congressional notification—for possible F-16 and F-35 sales, respectively, for congressional notification—for possible F-16 and F-35 sales, respectively, for
Turkey and Greece? Turkey and Greece?
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft~~

• What can the Administration and other actors do to encourage Turkey to move • What can the Administration and other actors do to encourage Turkey to move
closer to the West and further from Russia, including on energy and economic closer to the West and further from Russia, including on energy and economic
cooperation, and on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export controls? cooperation, and on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export controls?
• Are there any circumstances, short of Turkey returning or transferring its Russian • Are there any circumstances, short of Turkey returning or transferring its Russian
S-400 system, under which an Administration might seek to work with Congress S-400 system, under which an Administration might seek to work with Congress
to sell F-35s to Turkey and lift or waive CAATSA sanctions? to sell F-35s to Turkey and lift or waive CAATSA sanctions?
• Does the Administration plan to require Turkish leaders to take any actions • Does the Administration plan to require Turkish leaders to take any actions
regarding domestic governance or human rights—and if so, what type—as regarding domestic governance or human rights—and if so, what type—as
conditions of an F-16 sale? conditions of an F-16 sale?
• What geopolitical implications would result from one or more countries—either • What geopolitical implications would result from one or more countries—either
within or outside of NATO—supplanting the United States as Turkey’s primary within or outside of NATO—supplanting the United States as Turkey’s primary
fighter aircraft supplier? fighter aircraft supplier?
• Would a Turkish purchase of Eurofighter Typhoons include U.S.-origin • Would a Turkish purchase of Eurofighter Typhoons include U.S.-origin
equipment? If so, what kind, and would it be subject to AECA-mandated equipment? If so, what kind, and would it be subject to AECA-mandated
congressional notification? congressional notification?
• Is Turkey capable of partnering with other countries to expedite the indigenous • Is Turkey capable of partnering with other countries to expedite the indigenous
development of an advanced fighter, given that it developed its own armed drone development of an advanced fighter, given that it developed its own armed drone
capability over the past decade? If so, what other countries would be Turkey’s capability over the past decade? If so, what other countries would be Turkey’s
most likely industrial partners? most likely industrial partners?
• If an F-16 sale proceeds, what is the delivery timeline—both for new F-16Vs and • If an F-16 sale proceeds, what is the delivery timeline—both for new F-16Vs and
for upgrades? What developments, including those involving foreign customers, for upgrades? What developments, including those involving foreign customers,
could potentially hasten or slow expected deliveries? could potentially hasten or slow expected deliveries?
• Might Turkish domestic contractors be involved in any aspects of co-production, • Might Turkish domestic contractors be involved in any aspects of co-production,
installation, or sustainment, and if so, under what circumstances and to what installation, or sustainment, and if so, under what circumstances and to what
extent? extent?
Congressional Research Service 21 Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
~~Patrick Parrish~~Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
~~National Defense Fellow~~

~~Clayton Thomas~~

~~Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft~~

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Acknowledgments Patrick Parrish, former National Defense Fellow, was a co-author of the original version of this report.
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