Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023
May 24June 6, 2023 , 2023
ElectionsElection Results, and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment
U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment
Specialist in Middle
Specialist in Middle
and with Turkey in economic distress and
and with Turkey in economic distress and
facing challenges after disastrous earthquakes onstill recovering from disastrous February 2023
Eastern Affairs
Eastern Affairs
February 6, 2023earthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey—. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey—
including
including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a
Russian S-400
Clayton Thomas
Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral
relations.
Specialist in Middle
Specialist in Middle
relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds on U.S. arms sales. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds on U.S. arms sales.
Eastern Affairs
Eastern Affairs
Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of continued cooperation and
Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of continued cooperation and
Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
ObserversMany observers voice voice
concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Major
inflation and the February earthquakes’ aftermath led to speculation that Erdogan and his electoral alliance might be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections that took place on May 14, 2023. In the elections, pro-Erdogan parties retained a majority of seats in parliament, though with a smaller margin than before. Erdogan led the presidential race but fell short of the 50% mark required for a first-round win. He will therefore compete in a May 28 run-off against opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu, with the direction of some domestic and foreign policies potentially at stakeDespite
his potential political vulnerability from major inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An official international observer mission stated that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,” government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an “unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process and how it related to past Turkish elections. Because Turkey’s foreign exchange reserves are largely depleted, Erdogan’s new government might face significant decisions addressing Turkey’s ongoing financial crisis. .
U.S. relations and F-16s. Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation
on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasionmediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion
has —including its brokering of a grain export corridor—has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S.
policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships
with and arms exports to other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power; and openness to rapprochement with with and arms exports to other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power; and openness to rapprochement with
Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16
fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly provided informal fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly provided informal
notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions.
Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey might agree to have Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey might agree to have
Sweden join NATO Sweden join NATO
alongside Finlandbefore the alliance’s July 11-12, 2023 summit, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and executive branch action , and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and executive branch action
regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in
the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Turkey’s foreign policy approach. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain
their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and ArmeniaSyria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia
-/Azerbaijan. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing Azerbaijan. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing
Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships. Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships.
Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, and Greece. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey
faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-
Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and
energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these
dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey
has become an important mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. Turkey approved Finland’s approved Finland’s
NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned final approval for Sweden on it taking action against people that NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned final approval for Sweden on it taking action against people that
Turkey considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Turkey considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and
Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece, but tensions have somewhat Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece, but tensions have somewhat
subsided in early 2023 after Greece provided some post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey. subsided in early 2023 after Greece provided some post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.
Syria: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further
during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the
Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 ElectionsElection Results, and U.S. Relations
Contents
Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations ......................................................................... 1
Domestic Issues ............................................................................................................................... 12
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule ......................................................................... 12
February Earthquakes and Their Implications .......................................................................... 23
Major Economic Challenges and Options ................................................................................. 4 May 2023 Elections: Another Term for Erdogan .................... 3
May 2023 Elections .................................................. 7
Background ................................................................. 5
Background: Issues, Parties, Candidates, and Process ........................................................ 5
May 14 First Round: Erdogan’s Presidential Lead and Parliamentary Victory .................. 6
May 28 Presidential Run-off and Key Issues 7 Results and Electoral Process ............................................................................................. 9
Turkish Foreign Policy8 Assessment and Implications ............................................................................................ 10
Turkish Foreign Policy ....................... 11
General Assessment ............................................................................................ 11
General Assessment ..................................................... 11
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President? ............................................................ 11
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence ...................................................... 12
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 1314
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts .................................. 1315
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation .......................................................... 1516
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland ................................................................. 1617
Syria ........................................................................................................................................ 1819
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues ..................................................................................................... 1920
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, U.S. Sanctions, and
Congressional Holds ............................................................................................................ 1920
Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views.......................................................................... 2021
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues) ................................................................ 2021
Congressional Notification Process .................................................................................. 2325
Figures
Figure 1. Turkish 2023 First Round Presidential Election Preliminary Results Turkey at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 72
Figure 2. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Preliminary ResultsCurrency Value .............................................. 8
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance ...................................................... 5 Figure 3. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Results ................................................ 26
Figure A-2.................. 9 Figure 4. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey .................................................... 14
27
Figure A-31. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits ........................................................... 28
Figure A-42. Syria Conflict Map ..................................................................................................... 29
Figure A-53. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute .................................................................................. 30
Figure A-64. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean ...................................................... 31
Appendixes
Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures .................................................................................................................... 26..... 28
Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party Leaders .............................................................. 32
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33
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306 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 ElectionsElection Results, and U.S. Relations
Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and (Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with
Greece and Cyprus). Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved
U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in
January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale, January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale,
plus associated equipment and munitions (see plus associated equipment and munitions (see
“Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views” below).below).
In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive relationship with them”.4
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being. policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368,
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368,
Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and for a map and key facts and
figures figures
about Turkey. about Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential
1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023. Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023. Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, Relations,
August 24, 2022June 1, 2023.
4 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01. .
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Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance
Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. % of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022) Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $36,786 Real GDP growth: 2.7% Inflation: 39.6% (as of May 2023) Unemployment: 11.0% Budget deficit as % of GDP: 4.4% Public debt as % of GDP: 36.2% Current account deficit as % of GDP: 4.8%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023 projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical Institute.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
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Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations
institutions. , and U.S. Relations
system of governance, which he cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.4 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5
The AKP won the largest share of votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).
After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.6 In a controversial ruling during the referendum, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) decided not to enforce the normal requirement that only properly stamped ballots could be counted, leading some observers to question the outcome’s legitimacy.7 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish acronym MHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.
68 Some leading opposition Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.suppress dissent and consolidate power.
79
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts
include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.
810
February Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000 damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000
people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living
situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response
involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings, involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings,
observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to
help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.
911 U.S. officials have provided or U.S. officials have provided or
announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in urgent humanitarian announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in urgent humanitarian
assistance.10 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be
4
5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
6 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, (published June 22, 2017); OSCE,
International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). (published June 25, 2018).
5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
67 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan’s Russian Victory,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023. 8 State Department, State Department,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission, , Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022. , October 6, 2022.
79 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” , July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,”
BBC News, April 7, 2021. , April 7, 2021.
810 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022. 18, 2022.
911 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,”
Al-Monitor, March , March
20, 2023.
10 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023. 20, 2023.
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assistance.12 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—
international pledges of assistance international pledges of assistance
to date totalas of March 2023 totaled nearly $7.5 billion. nearly $7.5 billion.
1113
The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy
The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy
, particularly in the midst of the country’s elections (discussed below). The 10 southern Turkish provinces most directly affected . The 10 southern Turkish provinces most directly affected
account for about 10% of Turkey’s account for about 10% of Turkey’s
gross domestic productGDP and 15% of its population, and host and 15% of its population, and host
thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.
1214
Analysts have speculated about
Analysts have speculated about
how the crisis will affect support for President Erdogan and his government.13 A the extent of the Erdogan government’s responsibility for the damage and hardship stemming from the earthquakes,15 with some drawing comparisons to a major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey
that killed approximately 18,000killed approximately 18,000
, prompting and prompted legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.
14 However, some16 Some media media
accounts and opposition politicians accounts and opposition politicians
allegehave alleged that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes,
government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction
codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of
damagedestruction and fatalities. and fatalities.
1517 Erdogan has denounced Erdogan has denounced
criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,
1618 and Turkey’s justice ministry and Turkey’s justice ministry
has ordered prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal has ordered prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal
violations for substandard work.violations for substandard work.
1719 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s
initial response,initial response,
1820 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size. while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.
1921 He has announced a He has announced a
government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000 government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000
in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a
quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave
the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.
2022
Major Economic Challenges
and Options Ongoing Ongoing
economicfinancial problems in Turkey problems in Turkey
have considerably worsened considerably worsened
in 2022 as its currency, the lira, depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021. After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was around 44% in April 2023,21 while some unofficial estimates have remained at over 100%.22 Many analysts
11over the past two years, with major inflation occurring in parallel with accelerated depreciation of Turkey’s currency, the lira. After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was just under
12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.
13 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, , March 2023,
available at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for content/uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for
Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.” Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
1214 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,”
Reuters, February 13, 2023; , February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,”
New
York Times, February 13, 2023. , February 13, 2023.
1315 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,”
Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” , February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,”
Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023. , February 10, 2023.
1416 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,”
Associated
Press, February 10, 2023. s, February 10, 2023.
1517 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al., Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al.,
“Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” “Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,”
New York Times, February 24, 2023. , February 24, 2023.
1618 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.” Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.”
1719 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,”
New York Times, February 12, , February 12,
2023. 2023.
1820 Ibid. Ibid.
1921 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,”
New York Times, February 12, 2023. , February 12, 2023.
2022 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,”
Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 , March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5
billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
21 “Turkish inflation slows to 44% ahead of landmark election,” Reuters, May 3, 2023. 22 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2023.
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19 link to page 19 link to page 30 9
Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 ElectionsElection Results, and U.S. Relations
link the spike in inflation 40% in May 2023,23 while some unofficial estimates in early 2023 have remained at over 100%.24 The spike in inflation could be linked to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key interest rate to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key interest rate
since September 2021since September 2021
, with additional—moving it down from 19% to 8.5%. Additional inflationary pressure inflationary pressure
possibly comingmay have come from external events from external events
such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major
economies.economies.
2325 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade
(see Figure 2), with its decline , with its decline
probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.
24 26 It has lost 80% of its value against the dollar since 2018, with much of the decrease coming after the major rate cuts began in 2021.27
Figure 2. Turkish Currency Value
(from 2013 to May 2023)
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.
2528 Erdogan also Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.between rich and poor.
2629 He has insisted that Turkey will not turn to international financial
23 “Turkey inflation dips to 39.6% on relief from free gas,” Reuters, June 5, 2023. 24 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2023.
25 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022.
26 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. 27 “Ahead of a critical election Turkey’s economy is running on borrowed time,” Economist, March 26, 2023. 28 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. 29 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
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institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, after Turkey in 2013 paid off loans that—in the aggregate—had been outstanding for 52 years.30
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax
cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with expenses, along with
protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.
2731 Turkey also has sought Turkey also has sought
currency swaps currency swaps
and loans from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflowsfrom some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows
that contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see (see
“Turkey-Russia Economic and
Energy Cooperation” below).28
Costs of ongoing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from the earthquake crisis, along with disruptions to agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity, will likely strain Turkey’s economy further.29 With the overall cost estimated to approach $104 billion, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicts some drag on economic growth.30 Turkey’s Energy Cooperation” below).32 Additionally, Russia has reportedly deferred to 2024 at least some of Turkey’s payments for natural gas imports.33
In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection (discussed below), the lira’s value has declined further. Turkey’s central bank revealed that as of the week of May 19, official statistics listed its net foreign exchange reserves as negative for the first time in 21 years.34 Thus, with a balance-of-payments crisis possible, Turkish economic policymakers appear to face the following important choices:
• Whether to raise interest rates or maintain them at relatively low levels. A
more orthodox monetary policy course with higher interest rates might reduce inflation and attract more foreign capital via international financial markets, but slow economic growth and exports. Alternatively, Turkish officials could keep interest rates low, and use capital controls that limit or restrict the ability of investors to withdraw investments. Capital controls, however, can deter investment in the long-run. During the May 2023 election campaign, Erdogan took some measures aimed at preventing capital flight and providing relief to Turkish consumers and businesses from the effects of inflation.35 Turkey’s modest debt-to-GDP ratio modest debt-to-GDP ratio
of around of around
37% (see Figure A-1) may permit36% may give it some space to it some space to
boost fiscalincrease government spending in spending in
responseefforts to relieve inflation, though this flexibility could be limited by Erdogan’s promises of relief to date and the estimated $104 billion cost Turkey faces from the earthquake crisis.
• Whether to continue central bank interventions to strengthen the Turkish
lira, or allow the lira to depreciate. With Turkey’s foreign currency reserves mostly depleted, the government’s past strategy of selling reserves to bolster the lira’s value appears less viable. The government could try to support the lira through alternative means, such as additional currency swaps or ad hoc financial arrangements with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and/or other authoritarian regimes. One report suggests, however, that Gulf states might balk at bailouts for Turkey without some policy changes to reduce risks of default, and that Russia’s own
30 “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013. 31 to the crisis. One analyst has said that financial assistance from international development banks will be necessary but limited because of the Turkish government’s poor relations with the West.31
23 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022.
24 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. 25 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. 26 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
27 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023East Institute, February 13, 2023
.
28 Laura Pitel, “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022; M. ; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters, April 23, 2023.
32 “Erdogan says Gulf states sent cash in relief for Turkey,” Reuters, May 25, 2023; Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia drops $5 billion in Turkey’s central bank to help its struggling economy,” CNBC, March 6, 2023; M. Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East
Institute, Institute,
November 7, 2022.
33 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023. 34 “Turkey central bank’s net forex reserves negative for first time since 2002,” Reuters, May 26, 2023. 35 “Analysis: Turkish lira’s long decline a symbol of strife,” Reuters, May 28, 2023.
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29 Mustafa Sonmez, “Massive earthquake cost to deepen Turkey’s economic woes,” Al-Monitor, February 11, 2023; Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.” 30 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report, generated May 3, 2023 (based on April 11, 2023 forecasts). 31 Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs.”
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May 2023 Elections
Background: Issues, Parties, Candidates, and Process
On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties led by the CHP and the Good (Iyi) Party (see Appendix B for profiles of selected party leaders).32 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the media.33
Questions that may persist as elections move to a May 28 presidential run-off (discussed further below) include whether free and fair elections could take place or Erdogan might cede power in the event of an electoral defeat.34 The Economist Intelligence Unit assessed that a close contest could lead to “divisive court challenges” and “political instability.”35
The opposition coalition agreed on a joint platform focused on returning Turkey to the parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting executive power.36 Opposition figures also have criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to a range of foreign and domestic policy issues—including other subjects pertaining to democracy and rule of law in Turkey—and promised to make changes (see also “Foreign Policy Changes
Under a Different President?”).37 In its platform, the opposition has hinted at more orthodox economic policies, saying that it would reduce inflation and impose no responsibilities on the Central Bank other than ensuring price and financial stability.38
This year’s parliamentary election took place under changes enacted in 2022 to Turkey’s electoral law. As in the previous election in 2018, Turkey’s 600 parliamentary seats were assigned to party lists under a proportional system for each of Turkey’s 87 electoral districts. However, the 2022 amendment lowered the threshold for entering parliament. Under the modified law, parties that win seats can join parliament so long as they receive at least 7% of the national vote or belong to a larger electoral alliance that does so.39 The previous threshold was 10%. Three main alliances contested the election:
32 See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” Reuters, May 11, 2023. 33 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023. 34 “How free and fair will Turkey’s election be?” Economist, May 12, 2023; Soner Cagaptay (editor and co-author), Turkey’s Pivotal 2023 Elections: Issues, Potential Outcomes, and What Comes After, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 19, 2023; Andrew Wilks, “Would Turkey’s Erdogan accept an election loss after recent comments?” Al-Monitor, May 3, 2023.
35 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report. 36 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023)”; Text of Agreement for a
Strengthened Parliamentary System, February 28, 2022.
37 “A more democratic Turkey is within grasp, says Kemal Kilicdaroglu,” Economist, May 5, 2023; Nektaria Stamouli, “Turkey’s anti-Erdoğan opposition vows a reset on EU and NATO,” Politico Europe, March 15, 2023. 38 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).” 39 Kayahan Cantekin, “Turkey: Parliament Passes Law Amending Election Laws and Lowering Electoral Threshold,” Law Library of Congress, April 24, 2022.
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• People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller
parties.
• Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and
four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures.
• Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the
Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP) , and U.S. Relations
financial concerns probably limit its willingness to help.36 Absent central bank intervention, the lira is likely to depreciate further, which could boost exports and tourism, but might drive domestic consumers to withdraw from the Turkish banking system.
Prospects for Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy, which has been relatively resilient to date and is anchored by its customs union with the EU, could remain favorable if Turkey can resolve its financial crisis quickly.37 In early June, Erdogan named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP figure and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister. In previous leadership roles under Erdogan (including as finance minister from 2009 to 2015), Simsek generally supported a more orthodox approach to monetary policy, and his appointment could increase international market confidence in Turkey if Erdogan gives Simsek flexibility to act.38 Some observers assert that if Erdogan permits a change of course, it will be mixed or gradual rather than fully returning Turkey to orthodox practice on interest rates. Erdogan might seek to avoid austerity measures that could increase unemployment and create liquidity problems for businesses in advance of Turkish municipal elections scheduled for March 2024.39
May 2023 Elections: Another Term for Erdogan
Background
On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties led by the generally pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalistic Good (IYI) Party (see Appendix B for profiles of selected party leaders).40 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the media.41
Three main alliances contested the election:
• People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller
parties.
• Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and
four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures.
• Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the
Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP)
36 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy,” Middle East Eye, June 1, 2023. 37 Alan Beattie, “Erdoğan’s monetary misadventures are pushing Turkey off course,” Financial Times, May 25, 2023. 38 Ezgi Akin, “Meet Turkey’s Mehmet Simsek: Erdogan’s last best hope for economic recovery,” Al-Monitor, June 3, 2023.
39 “Exclusive: Turkey’s new cabinet almost certain to include Simsek,” Reuters, May 31, 2023; Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy.” 40 See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” Reuters, May 11, 2023. 41 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023.
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to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional
Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name. Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name.
In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader
In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader
Kemal Kilicdaroglu ( (
kuhl-utch-
dahr-oh-loo) as its joint presidential candidate.) as its joint presidential candidate.
4042 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner, Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner,
Good Party leader Meral Aksener (Good Party leader Meral Aksener (
awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after ), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after
two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor
Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to
Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been
undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other
opposition figures charge is politically motivated.opposition figures charge is politically motivated.
4143 While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal
coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in
the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.
42
Two third-party presidential candidates appeared on the ballot alongside Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu:
• Muharrem Ince, who was the CHP’s presidential candidate in the previous 2018
election. Early polls estimated that Ince might get 5% of the vote or more before his prospects faded. He ultimately announced his withdrawal on May 11.43
• Sinan Ogan, an ultra-nationalist candidate who had previously served in
parliament for the MHP.
May 14 First Round: Erdogan’s Presidential Lead and Parliamentary Victory
In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell a half-percentage point short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim outright victory in the presidential race, garnering 49.5% of the vote. Kilicdaroglu received 44.9%, and Ogan appeared to outperform most pre-election polls by getting 5.2% (see Figure 1), with Ince receiving the remaining 0.4%. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance also retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from 344 seats to 323 seats (see Figure
2).
4044
Results and Electoral Process
In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell just short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim outright victory in the presidential race, leading Kilicdaroglu by 4% as they prepared for Turkey’s first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. About 87% of registered voters turned out to vote. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from 344 seats out of 600 to 323 (see Figure 3). While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his first round electoral performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.45 Aggregate pre-election polling anticipated a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.46
Erdogan prevailed in the run-off against Kilicdaroglu by a margin of 52%-48%, winning a new five-year term. Voter turnout in the run-off was around 84%. Under Turkey’s constitution, Erdogan might be entitled to run for one additional term if three-fifths of parliament’s members vote to schedule early elections.47 Erdogan could seek to revise or remove presidential term limits via constitutional amendment.
42 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, se For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, se
e Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp
contrast,” contrast,”
Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided , May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided
opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,”
Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man , March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man
who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” who’s never beaten Erdoğan,”
James in Turkey, January 10, 2023. , January 10, 2023.
4143 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,”
New York Times, December 15, , December 15,
2022. 2022.
4244 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,”
Politico Europe, ,
April 28, 2023. April 28, 2023.
43 “Turkish candidate Muharrem Ince drops out of presidential race,” Agence France Presse, May 11, 2023.
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Turkey now plans to conduct its first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. Erdogan’s presidential victories in both 2014 and 2018 came in the initial round.44 While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his first round electoral performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.45 Erdogan’s lead over Kilicdaroglu and continued majority in parliament confounded aggregate pre-election polling that anticipated a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.46 Despite some contentious rhetoric on election night, with Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu supporters accusing each other of announcing misleading information,47 both camps accepted the outcome in preparation for the run-off.
Figure 1. Turkish 2023 First Round Presidential Election Preliminary Results
(comparison with past two elections)
Source: New York Times. Note: A candidate is required to get more than 50% of the vote in the first round to prevent a run-off election.
44 Prior to the 2014 election, the president of Turkey was elected by parliamentary vote rather than popular election. 45 Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey'45 Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey’s election as it heads toward a runoff,” s election as it heads toward a runoff,”
NPR, May 15, 2023; Amberin , May 15, 2023; Amberin
Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,”
Al-Monitor, May 15, 2023. , May 15, 2023.
46 46
600vekil.com, accessed on May 13, 2023. 47 Ben Hubbard and Gulsin Harman, “In Turkey Vote, Erdogan Fails to Get Majority,” New York Times, May 15, 2023See https://600vekil.com/mayis-2023-secim-ongorusu, accessed on June 2, 2023. 47 Article 116 of Turkey’s constitution. Unofficial English translation available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. .
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Figure 23. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Preliminary Results
Source: Daily Sabah (based on underlying preliminary results from Anadolu Agency). Notes: Figures include vote percentages and numbers for each alliance, as well as the number of seats won. The Results
(out of 600 total seats)
Source: YSK. Note: The various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them won various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them won
parliamentary seats. parliamentary seats.
Observers for Turkey’s elections
Observers for Turkey’s elections
includeincluded representatives from domestic political parties and civil representatives from domestic political parties and civil
society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and (OSCE) and
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of EuropeParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE). These observers . These observers
monitormonitored polling polling
station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.48 The station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.48 The
OSCEOSCE-PACE international international
election observation mission election observation mission
(IEOM) said the following in preliminary findings and conclusions said the following in preliminary findings and conclusions
it released a day after the May 14 elections:
In the 14 May general elections, held in the wake of devastating earthquakes, voters had a choice between genuine political alternatives and voter participation was high, but the incumbent president and the ruling parties enjoyed an unjustified advantage, including through biased media coverage. The continued restrictions on fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression hindered the participation of some opposition politicians and parties, civil society and independent media in the election process. Nonetheless, the campaign itself was competitive and largely free for most contestants but characterized by intense polarization, and marred by harsh rhetoric, instances of misuse of administrative resources, and the pressure and intimidation faced by one opposition party. The election administration technically managed elections efficiently, but there was a lack of transparency and communication, as well as concerns over its independence. Measures designed to facilitate registration and voting for earthquake-affected citizens were limited, placing an additional burden on the voters to exercise their voting rights. Election day was generally well-organized and assessed positively by IEOM observers, however, instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during voting and counting were noted.49
One journalist added, “Fears of wide-scale fraud have proved empty so far, though there are multiple complaints pending, and there was little if any violence at the polls where a record
48 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023,” available at it released a day after the May 28 run-off:
The run-off presidential election held on 28 May offered voters a choice between genuine political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, as in the first round, biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent. The election administration technically managed the election efficiently, but its lack of transparency and communication largely persisted. While the absence of regulation of several aspects of the second round did not provide legal certainty, positively, the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) issued multiple regulations to remedy some of these legal gaps. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some opposition parties undermined the process. In an environment with restrictions on freedom of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make an informed choice. Election day was generally calm and well-administered. However, instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote count, were noted.49
48 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023, and Presidential Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023,” at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud
possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023. possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023.
49 OSCE, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Republic of Türkiye – Presidential Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023 (published May 2949 OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Republic of Türkiye – General Elections, 14 May 2023:
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (published May 15, 2023). , 2023).
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Other domestic and international commentators have expressed varying views about the conduct of Turkey’s elections. Many have echoed the OSCE-PACE mission’s assessment that Erdogan’s control over state resources and institutions gave him an unfair advantage during the campaign.50 Despite the high turnout for both electoral rounds, some analysts challenged whether the electoral process could be characterized as free.51 Although Kilicdaroglu said the election period was the most unfair in Turkish history, the opposition did not argue that various irregularities alleged by some sources would have changed the results.52
Assessment and Implications
After the elections, analysts have sought to explain the outcome and President Erdogan’s abiding popular appeal. Many have concluded that key nationalistic and religious voter blocs maintain a level of ideological devotion or personal attachment to Erdogan—partly based on patronage networks or actions he has taken on their behalf—that appear to outweigh economic concerns they might have.53 Large numbers of these voters may have been hesitant to empower an opposition with legacy ties to Turkey’s pre-Erdogan secular elite leadership, especially after Kilicdaroglu openly partnered with the Kurdish-led HDP.54 Some observers argue that Erdogan also may have benefitted from perceptions that he is more capable of acting swiftly to address voters’ material concerns—bypassing bureaucratic obstacles or political divisions—than his election rivals would have been.55 It is unclear to what extent Erdogan’s resilience shares features with that of authoritarian-leaning incumbents in other countries, or stems from socioeconomic factors unique to Turkey.
Erdogan’s reelection and continued parliamentary majority will likely have implications in the following areas.
Economy. As discussed above, Erdogan’s government might feel compelled to address Turkey’s ongoing currency and inflation crisis, given Turkey’s largely depleted foreign exchange reserves.
Domestic politics. While the 2023 presidential election was Erdogan’s most difficult to date, and he won a smaller parliamentary majority than in 2018, he does not appear inclined to change his general approach to domestic governance, rule of law, and human rights. As he prepares to preside over the Turkish republic’s 100th anniversary in October 2023 and lead the AKP’s March 2024 municipal election campaign, Erdogan may return to points he emphasized during his reelection campaign that trumpet his accomplishments at home and abroad, and seek to paint his domestic rivals as sympathetic to Kurdish militants and LGBTQ causes. Some observers worry that the inclusion of Islamists from two small parties in Erdogan’s People’s Alliance could push social policy in a more religiously conservative direction.56 However, Erdogan’s majority does
50 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president,” Economist, May 28, 2023; Fatma Tanis, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” NPR, May 28, 2023.
51 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023.
52 Sources reporting alleged irregularities include Turkey recap, “Forever & All Reis,” June 1, 2023; “Turkey opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023.
53 Michael Werz, “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy,” Center for American Progress, May 31, 2023; Adam Samson, “The patronage network behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid for third decade in power,” Financial Times, May 27, 2023.
54 Alan Makovsky, “Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, May 30, 2023.
55 See, for example, Tol. 56 See, for example, Kamuran Samar and Joshua Askew, “What Erdoğan's re-election means for Turkey and the West,” Euronews, May 28, 2023.
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not depend on these parties, and he may have options to ally with a number of other parties, including some from the opposition.57
The opposition faces a number of questions about its future. It had failed to unseat Erdogan before and after Kilicdaroglu became CHP leader in 2010, but many observers had expressed that Turkey’s economic woes and the February earthquakes made Erdogan uniquely vulnerable in 2023.58 In this context, it is unclear whether Kilicdaroglu can maintain his leadership position, and whether the CHP will continue its current partnerships and its common cause with the HDP. Some observers assess that Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could be Erdogan’s most formidable long-term opponent, but his status could depend on whether he can successfully appeal his criminal conviction and win reelection in 2024.59
U.S. relations and foreign policy. Erdogan appears inclined to pursue a largely transactional foreign policy course that hedges between the United States, Russia, and other international actors, in continuity with his past efforts to pursue greater autonomy for Turkey within an increasingly multipolar global system (discussed further below). During the 2023 election campaign, Kilicdaroglu pledged to move in a more pro-Western direction,60 prompting Erdogan to say, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”61 Also during the campaign, and U.S. Relations
portion of voters—88%—cast their ballots.”50 On May 17, opposition officials said that they had raised complaints over possible irregularities regarding 2,269 ballot boxes nationwide for the presidential election and 4,825 for the parliamentary vote, but acknowledged that any corrections would be unlikely to change election outcomes.51
May 28 Presidential Run-off and Key Issues
Many observers view Erdogan’s May 14 lead and parliamentary victory as signs that he may have an advantage over Kilicdaroglu in a run-off.52 Major themes could carry over from the initial campaign. As mentioned above, Kilicdaroglu has argued that problems in Turkey have arisen under Erdogan on the economy, democracy, and human rights, and that the opposition has plans to fix them. Erdogan has trumpeted various accomplishments at home and abroad during his 20-year-rule—including with respect to Turkey’s defense and energy industries—and has criticized the opposition by saying that it has sided with terrorists and LGBT causes.53
The following factors could affect the run-off outcome on May 28.
Nationalistic voters, particularly those who voted for Ogan in the first round. Some analysts have argued that the Kurdish-led HDP’s support for Kilicdaroglu could hurt his chances with some nationalistic voters.54 Ogan has endorsed Erdogan for the run-off, but a key party leader from the alliance that supported Ogan has endorsed Kilicdaroglu. Observers speculate regarding the overall impact of these endorsements, and whether Kilicdaroglu’s efforts to attract nationalist support could dampen HDP voter enthusiasm for him.55
Economic issues and market swings, including how voters assess Turkey’s continuing inflation and potential balance-of-payments problems alongside populist measures from Erdogan—including some announced in April and May—to help households.56 With polls before the May 14 elections having predicted a strong opposition performance, Turkey’s stock market and currency strengthened, and then fell in value after election results proved the forecasts to be largely inaccurate.57
Role of United States and Russia. In an run-off that may closely focus on the preferences of nationalistic voters, Turkish public attitudes regarding U.S. and Russian influences—and their importance—on Turkish policy and politics could play a role. While major changes in Turkey’s
50 Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff.” 51 “Turkey opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023. 52 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan in a strong position ahead of presidential runoff,” Middle East Eye, May 15, 2023; Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Erdoğan poll lead prompts soul-searching for Turkey’s opposition,” Financial Times, May 15, 2023.
53 Jared Malsin, “Turkish Vote Heightens Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2023; “In Turkey vote, Erdogan defies forecasts of demise,” Reuters, May 15, 2023.
54 Halil Karaveli, “Turkey’s Opposition Can’t Win Without the Working Class,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2023. 55 “Turkey anti-immigrant party leader backs Erdogan’s challenger in runoff,” Reuters, May 24, 2023. 56 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkey Elections: Currency fears grow ahead of presidential runoff,” Al-Monitor, May 23, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “For the Winner in Turkey, One Prize Is an Economy at the Edge of Crisis,” New York Times, May 23, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters, April 23, 2023; Elcin Poyrazlar, “Erdoğan gives public workers 45 percent pay rise in Turkey’s tight election race,” Politico Europe, May 9, 2023.
57 “Turkey’s market rout deepens after Erdogan's strong election showing,” Reuters, May 16, 2023; Ayla Jean Yackley and Adam Samson, “Erdoğan holds upper hand as Turkish election goes to run-off,” Financial Times, May 15, 2023.
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foreign policy direction may be unlikely (see further discussion below), Kilicdaroglu’s statements hint that he might favor moving in a more pro-Western direction than Erdogan has taken.58
In the days before the May 14 election, Kilicdaroglu pledged to re-emphasize Turkey’s NATO membership and its efforts to join the European Union,59 and claimed to have “concrete evidence” that Russian actors were responsible for “deep fake” online content criticizing the opposition.60 Amid official Russian denials of involvement in Turkish elections, Erdogan criticized Kilicdaroglu for attacks against Russia, and said, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”61 An unnamed Turkish opposition figure was cited on May 12 as complaining that Russia has helped Erdogan maintain financial stability amid Turkey’s economic crisis, pointing to media reports suggesting that Russia may have given Erdogan access to billions of dollars via some funds transfers and by deferring Turkey’s obligation to pay for Russian energy imports to 2024.62
On May 13, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to topple him,, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to topple him,
63 62 apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a
New York Times interview during interview during
the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via the electoral the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via the electoral
process.64 That same day, a State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not take sides in elections, and is only interested “in the democratic process, which should be both free and fair.”65 After the first round of voting, the State Department principal deputy spokesperson said that U.S. officials are continuing to monitor Turkey’s ongoing electoral process, adding:
But broadly we congratulate the people of Türkiye for peacefully expressing their will at the ballot box, and also congratulate the newly elected parliament. We’ll continue to work together with whatever government is chosen by the Turkish people to deepen our cooperation and ... shared priorities.66
Divided government? Since popular elections for president began in 2014, Turkey has not experienced divided rule. If the president’s party coalition does not control parliament after the elections, parliament could check the president in various ways if a majority of members seeks to do so. The president has broad powers to appoint cabinet ministers and act in the absence of parliamentary initiative, but relies on parliament’s approval in certain matters such as budgeting, international treaty ratification, and foreign military deployments.67
It is unclear how voters might view the prospect of a Kilicdaroglu presidency alongside a pro-Erdogan parliamentary majority. Erdogan and his supporters warn that stalemate between the two branches of government could resemble past periods in Turkish history (such as during the 1990s)
58 “A more democratic Turkey is within grasp, says Kemal Kilicdaroglu,” Economist. 59process.63 When asked about his campaign comments regarding President Biden in a May 19 CNN interview, Erdogan insisted that he would continue to work with Biden if reelected.64 President Biden called Erdogan the day after his reelection to congratulate him, and they “expressed their shared commitment to continue working together as close partners to deepen cooperation between our countries and people.”65 Given Turkey’s ongoing economic concerns, one analyst has remarked, “Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-Western resentments.”66
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
57 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan has MPs to play with after strong parliamentary showing,” Middle East Eye, May 26, 2023.
58 See, for example, Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why did Kilicdaroglu lose?” Middle East Eye, May 31, 2023. 59 Nadeen Ebrahim, “Erdogan intent on taking back Istanbul after presidential victory,” CNN, May 31, 2023. 60 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,” Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,”
Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 2023, May 9, 2023
60 “Erdogan rival says has evidence of Russia's online campaign ahead of Turkey election,” Reuters, May 12, 2023. .
61 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” 61 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,”
Hurriyet Daily News, May 13, 2023. , May 13, 2023.
62 62
Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023. 63 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,”
Reuters, May 13, 2023. , May 13, 2023.
6463 New York Times editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
65 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters. 66 State Department Press Briefing, May 15, 2023. 67 Unofficial English translation of Turkish constitution available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. See also Alan Makovsky, Erdoğan’s Proposal for an Empowered Presidency, Center for American Progress, March 22, 201764 Transcript of CNN interview, May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-19/segment/02. 65 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Erdogan of Türkiye,” May 29, 2023. 66 Makovsky. .
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with the United States and other countries reflect some change to this orientation within the past decade, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after President Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational decision, given not only their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the standpoint of their experiences.”67
, and U.S. Relations
in which fractious parliamentary coalitions may have contributed to socioeconomic challenges and ideological tensions.68
Procedural questions or disputes. Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) administers elections. It also investigates and rules on all irregularities, complaints, and objections.69 Past YSK decisions favoring Erdogan’s position that attracted controversy were (1) its 2017 ruling not to enforce the normal requirement that only sealed ballots could be counted in that year’s constitutional referendum, and (2) its 2019 ruling to repeat that year’s Istanbul mayoral election (the AKP candidate lost the second election by a larger margin than the first).70 Additionally, the 2022 amendment to Turkey’s electoral law changed the selection process for judges who will preside over the provincial and district-level electoral boards that supervise voting, replacing a seniority system with a lottery. Critics have charged that the change may increase the chances of greater politicization of these boards.71
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—
with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and ArmeniaSyria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia
-/Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan.
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.actors and maintain its leverage with them.
7268 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and
economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks
in those relationships while building other global relationships. in those relationships while building other global relationships.
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?
In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from
68 Andrew England, “Enduring pulling power of Erdoğan deflates opposition hopes,” Financial Times, May 15, 2023. 69 YSK website available at https://www.ysk.gov.tr/en/supreme-election-council/1841. 70 “Five new members and new chair to be elected to Supreme Electoral Council,” Bianet, January 5, 2023. 71 Kayahan Cantekin, “Turkey: Parliament Passes Law Amending Election Laws and Lowering Electoral Threshold,” Law Library of Congress, April 24, 2022; Suzan Fraser, “Turkish parliament approves contentious election law changes,” Associated Press, March 31, 2022.
72 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
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Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.73 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern: Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence), Greece and Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its regional and global consequences).
However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems, (2) giving greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions.
Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the United States and European countries.74 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition might become more passive on foreign policy.For example, Turkey appears largely aligned with the United States and other NATO allies on their expressed priorities of assisting in Ukraine’s defense, and also continues to value NATO security guarantees (as discussed below). Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help from the West.69
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. The State Department’s West. The State Department’s
Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.
7570 Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas
in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the
stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO.
In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO
sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces
command in Izmir (secommand in Izmir (se
e Figure A-24). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea . Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea
through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—
seesee Figure A-31).
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a
73 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” 74 Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 14, 2022.
7567 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.
68 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
69 Rich Outzen et al., “Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023. 70 State Department, State Department,
Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022. , May 13, 2022.
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general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.
general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.
7671 In more recent or In more recent or
ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.
7772
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially
expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be
connected with concerns about Turkey.connected with concerns about Turkey.
7873 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey
expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the
United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation
in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,
Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”
79
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense. Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.80
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in parallel with other NATO countries.81 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including74
7671 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,”
The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, , Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
7772 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” 2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,”
Business Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
7873 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,”
Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph , September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,”
The
Drive, January 14, 2019. , January 14, 2019.
7974 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,
the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022,
available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-
challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/. challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
80 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. 81 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
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Figure 4. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey
Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets since 2011. Note: All locations are approximate.
Russia Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense. Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.75 Turkey continues to rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,76 but it may gradually reduce this dependence as it begins deliveries from a domestic offshore field in the Black Sea and increases liquefied natural gas imports from other countries.77
75 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. 76 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023. 77 “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters; Rafiq Latta, “Turkey Pivots Away From Russia, Towards LNG,” Energy Intelligence Group, June 1, 2023.
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Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in parallel with other NATO countries.78 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including , and U.S. Relations
Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,
8279 Turkey has supplied Ukraine Turkey has supplied Ukraine
with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant
ambush-resistant (MRAP) ambush-resistant (MRAP)
vehicles83vehicles80—as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s —as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate
the conflict (discussed below). the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.
8481 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.denied that any such transfers have occurred.
8582
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.
8683 In 2017, a In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
respective defense industries.respective defense industries.
8784 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer
cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.
8885 In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.
8986 Turkish expertise Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing
aerospace engines and missiles.90 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,91 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.92 Additionally, Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.93
82
78 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
79 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023. Availability,” February 20, 2023.
8380 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,”
Defense News, August , August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” 22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,”
Oryx, ,
November 21, 2022. November 21, 2022.
8481 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,”
Foreign Policy, ,
January 10, 2023. January 10, 2023.
8582 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,”
Middle East Eye, January , January
14, 2023. 14, 2023.
8683 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008,
Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. , by Cory Welt.
8784 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,”
Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. , May 1, 2017.
8885 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,”
Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, , October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
8986 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
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aerospace engines and missiles.87 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,88 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.89 Additionally, Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.90 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 90 Ibid. 91 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, 2022.
92 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2022.
93 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022.
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Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly
alleviate global supply concerns.alleviate global supply concerns.
9491 Under the deal, which Under the deal, which
President Erdogan said on May 17 has has been extended until July 2023,been extended until July 2023,
95 92 Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a
joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent
weapons smuggling.weapons smuggling.
9693 President Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts. President Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.
9794
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia.cooperation with Russia.
These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.9895 The Turkish government has not The Turkish government has not
joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.
In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.cooperation across economic sectors.
99 Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian military-industrial complex.100
9496 In April 2023, they participated in an event to begin operations at Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (at Akkuyu on its Mediterranean coast), which was built by Russian state-owned company Rosatom. The plant is scheduled to start domestic electricity production in 2025.97 Several months before the event, Rosatom had reportedly wired up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary involved in the project, possibly in part to help Turkey maintain foreign exchange reserves during its ongoing currency crisis.98
87 Ibid. 88 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, 2022.
89 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2022.
90 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes Navy International, October 3, 2022.
91 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,”
Associated Press,,
July 22, July 22,
2022. 2022.
9592 “Erdogan says Black Sea grain deal extended for two months,” “Erdogan says Black Sea grain deal extended for two months,”
Reuters, May 17, 2023. , May 17, 2023.
9693 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
9794 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November
15, 2022. 15, 2022.
9895 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,”
New York Times, December , December
10, 2022. 10, 2022.
9996 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,”
Agence France Presse, August 5, , August 5,
2022. 2022.
100 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid (continued...)97 “Putin hails Turkey ties as first Turkish nuclear plant inaugurated,” Reuters, April 27, 2023. 98 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East Eye, July 30, 2022.
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Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian military-industrial complex.99
Some, and U.S. Relations
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.transactions and services with Russian businesses.
101 Turkish100 In February 2023, Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu
has denied that Turkish businesses denied that Turkish businesses
arewere exporting electronic or technological products with exporting electronic or technological products with
potential defense applications to Russia, but potential defense applications to Russia, but
has publicly welcomed information sharing with publicly welcomed information sharing with
U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to bypass Western U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to bypass Western
sanctions.sanctions.
102101 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods
transiting its territory to Russia.transiting its territory to Russia.
103102 In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions
on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.
104103
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing members. requires the unanimous agreement of existing members.
The Turkish objections centered
The Turkish objections centered
aroundon claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or
harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations,
namely the Fethullah Gulen movement105namely the
99 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out Illicit Trade With Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023.
100 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023. 101 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.”
102 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023. 103 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the World,” April 12, 2023.
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Fethullah Gulen movement104 (which the government has blamed for involvement in (which the government has blamed for involvement in
the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.
106105 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a
terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.
107106 Turkey removed its objections Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the 2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.against the PKK.
108
Since then, Turkey has continued to press Sweden and Finland to 107
After the accession process began for Sweden and Finland, Turkey continued to press them to extradite people that Turkey extradite people that Turkey
considers to be terroristsconsiders to be terrorists
, though Turkish officials said they were more concerned about terrorism-related activities in Sweden than in Finland. Under the June 2022 trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland . Under the June 2022 trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland
agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or
extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.108 Various sources, including Sweden’s prime minister, have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland would be inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.109
In line with Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament approved Finland’s NATO application in March 2023.110 Finland formally joined the alliance in April.
Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of early June, with Turkey and Hungary the only alliance members not to have approved it. A new Swedish anti-terrorism law came into effect on June 1, 2023.111 While serving as presidential spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin (now Turkey’s intelligence chief) anticipated that with the new law Sweden could start taking “more decisive, concrete, and fruitful steps to address our security concerns” under this legislation, adding, “we’ll see how fast they can move.”112 It is unclear whether and when Turkish approval of Sweden’s NATO membership might proceed, and if Turkey’s leadership might demand specific additional Swedish actions. In March, President Erdogan said that Turkey had requested that Sweden extradite approximately 120 terror suspects, but in May an unnamed senior Swedish official was
104extradition requests in various ways, but did
Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out Illicit Trade With Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023.
101 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023. 102 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.”
103 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023. 104 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the World,” April 12, 2023.
105 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444,
Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
106105 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”
Al-Monitor, May 17, , May 17,
2022. 2022.
107106 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department,
Country
Reports on Terrorism 20202021, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak , Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Barfi,
Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. , Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
108107 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat- Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
memo.pdf. memo.pdf.
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not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.109 Sweden’s prime minister and other sources have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.110 In January 2023, Turkish presidential adviser Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey would only be in a position to agree to Sweden’s accession after it passed new anti-terror laws, a process he estimated would take about six months.111 Erdogan then called on Sweden and Finland to extradite “around 130” people.112
In January 2023, the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that congressional approval of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see “Congressional Notification
Process” below) would be tied to Turkish approval of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession.113 Several Senators from both parties, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland.114 In March, Erdogan hosted Finnish President Sauli Niinisto in Turkey and expressed his support for Finland’s accession, and then Turkey’s parliament approved it later in the month,115 paving the way for Finland’s formal accession in April.
Although Turkey’s parliament has ratified accession protocols for Finland, it has not done so for Sweden as of mid-May. (To date, Hungary also has not approved Swedish accession.) Sweden’s parliament passed new anti-terrorism legislation in May 2023, which will take effect in early June.116 Anticipating the legislation’s likely passage, Turkish presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin said that when it comes into effect, Sweden could start taking “more decisive, concrete, and fruitful steps to address our security concerns,” adding, “we’ll see how fast they can move.”117 It is unclear (1) whether and when Turkish ratification might proceed after that, (2) if Turkey’s leadership after its elections might demand further Swedish actions, and (3) whether a potential future Turkish parliament would act in line with the Turkish president’s wishes.118108 Ibid. 109 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just Security, October 28, 2022.
110 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023. 111 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Jared Malsin, “Sweden’s NATO Membership Hinges on Extraditing Unknown People,” Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2023.
112 Filiz Kinik Oz, “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Turkish presidential spokesperson,” Anadolu Agency, March 26, 2023.
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cited as saying that Sweden “has neither received a list of names from Turkey, nor is it aware of who the individuals might be, making Erdogan’s demands impossible to meet.”113
When congratulating Erdogan on his reelection in late May, President Biden said that he wanted a “deal with Sweden,” and anticipated additional discussions on the subject of its NATO accession.114 Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg have both stated hopes for
109 Ibid. 110 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022.
111 “Turkey ‘Not in a Position’ to Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,” Agence France Presse, January 14, 2023. 112 “Sweden, Finland must send up to 130 ‘terrorists’ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,” Reuters, January 16, 2023.
113 Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Wall
Street Journal, January 13, 2023.
114 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. In August 2022, Senate Treaty Document 117-3 approved ratification by a 95-1 vote.
115 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023. 116 “Swedes tighten terror laws, likely to help NATO membership,” Associated Press, May 3, 2023. 117 Filiz Kinik Oz, “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Turkish presidential spokesperson,” Anadolu
Agency, March 26, 2023.
118 Article 87 of Turkey’s constitution gives the Turkish parliament (or Grand National Assembly) the authority to ratify international treaties. Unofficial English translation available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en.
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Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO membership—thus placing both Sweden and Finland within NATO—by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12 summit in Lithuania.119
Syria120Defense Lloyd Austin both have expressed hope that Turkey will agree to Sweden joining NATO by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12 summit in Lithuania.115 During his May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary Blinken said that the accession process has moved rapidly in historic terms, and that Turkey “has rightly focused attention on some of its security concerns that both Sweden and Finland have taken remarkable steps to address, important ones.... From the perspective of the United States, the time is now to finalize Sweden’s accession.”116 Secretary General Stoltenberg and some officials from other NATO countries have echoed Blinken in supporting the “fastest possible accession” of Sweden into the alliance.117 Blinken also said that while the Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are (see “Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views” below).118
Syria119
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.
121120 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved
during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based. U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.
122121 The The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.123 Turkey has set up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army (SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-4).
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.124 Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.125 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson has said that U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to normalize or upgrade relations with the Asad regime.126
119 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Joint Press Conference with Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson in Stockholm, Sweden,” April 19, 2023; “Stoltenberg sees progress in Sweden’s NATO bid, talks to resume in March,” Reuters, February 23, 2023.
120
113 Rasmussen and Malsin. 114 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023. 115 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press Availability,” May 30, 2023; Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Joint Press Conference with Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson in Stockholm, Sweden,” April 19, 2023.
116 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press Availability.”
117 Matthew Lee and Lorne Cook, “NATO presses Turkey to approve Sweden’s membership, eyes Ukraine security plan as summit looms,” Associated Press, June 1, 2023.
118 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press Availability.”
119 See CRS Report RL33487, See CRS Report RL33487,
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. , coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
121120 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” Making,”
War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. , August 4, 2017.
122121 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and
YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK
affiliates in Syria), see footnoaffiliates in Syria), see footno
te 107.
123 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. 124 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023. 125 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. 126 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
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106.
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against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.122 Turkey has set up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army (SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-2).
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.123 Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.124 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson said in January 2023 that U.S. officials have advised allies against normalizing or upgrading relations with the Asad regime.125
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,
Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.other munitions to maintain military strength.
127126
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,
U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds
Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,delivered in 2019,
128127 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.
129128 In explaining the U.S. decision to In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.130 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.131 Such a disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.132
127
122 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. 123 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023. 124 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. 125 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. 126 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
128127 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,”
Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, , December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later. second system to come later.
129128 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Archived CRS Insight IN11557,
Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition
of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions. Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
130 Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
131 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 132 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020.
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detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.129 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.130 Such a disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.131
Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.
133132 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.and notification process with Congress.
134133 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72
Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and
structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.
135134
After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and
After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and
military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the
Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey
has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic
location remains important for the alliance.location remains important for the alliance.
136135 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the Turkey partners in a number of ways with the
United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic
and Mediterranean Sea regions.and Mediterranean Sea regions.
137
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,138 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”139 While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”140
133136
129 Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
130 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 131 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020.
132 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,”
Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted , June 23, 2021 (posted
November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html. November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
134133 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,”
Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego , October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,”
Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For , November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, background information, see CRS Report RL31675,
Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
135134 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22- See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-
06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf. 06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.
136135 State Department, State Department,
Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. .
137136 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu,
“Turkey,” “Turkey,”
The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time , pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time
since 2006,” since 2006,”
Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne , July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne
Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022. Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
138 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
139 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022.
140 Ibid.
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Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,137 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”138 While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”139
The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter,more advanced fighter,
141140 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog. though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.
142141 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is
four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.
143142 Other Other
countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan,
Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.
144143 Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of
148 aircraft.148 aircraft.
145144 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to
start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs. start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs.
If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider
If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider
purchasing Western European alternatives.purchasing Western European alternatives.
146145 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter
Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,
147146 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany
would approve such a sale.would approve such a sale.
148147 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a
non-F-16 platform.non-F-16 platform.
149148 Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the
congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin
defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.
150149 Previously, Congress received Previously, Congress received
notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar) notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar)
proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.151 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for Turkey states
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization, Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.152
141
137 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
138 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022.
139 Ibid. 140 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,”
Defense News, March 9, , March 9,
2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working 2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working
with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot
domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United
States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to
extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,”
Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts , November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts
modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,”
Aviacionline, June 3, 2022. , June 3, 2022.
142141 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,”
Defense
News, January 18, 2023. , January 18, 2023.
143142 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023. Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
144143 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?”
Politics Today, November , November
22, 2021. 22, 2021.
145144 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A. Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.
146145 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,”
Forbes, February 6, 2023. , February 6, 2023.
147146 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,”
Middle East Eye, ,
January 20, 2023. January 20, 2023.
148147 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” ‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?”
EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023. , January 29, 2023.
149148 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.” Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
150149 See footno See footno
te 172.
151 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register 61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May 24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074, September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021).
152 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.
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proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.150 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for Turkey states
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization, Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.151
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.
153152 However, However,
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has
termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”
154153
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional
attention.attention.
155154 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after
Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a
May 2022 joint session of Congress.May 2022 joint session of Congress.
156155 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.
117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R. 117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.
7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement 7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another
NATO ally’s airspace.”NATO ally’s airspace.”
157156 While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions have somewhat While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions have somewhat
subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts in the context of positive subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts in the context of positive
diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.
158157
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2017,2017,
159158 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.160 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.161 Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box below).162
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing Issues163
153
150 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register 61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May 24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074, September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021).
151 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. 152 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,”
Reuters, June 30, 2022. , June 30, 2022.
154153 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/ Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/
status/1600519759493304321. status/1600519759493304321.
155154 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,”
Greece and Turkey in Conflict and
Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek , New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek
Relations in Light of Ukraine,” Relations in Light of Ukraine,”
War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022. , June 8, 2022.
156155 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the
context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts. context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.
157156 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS- Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-
RCP117-70-JES.pdf. RCP117-70-JES.pdf.
158157 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,”
Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023. , March 22, 2023.
159158 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V
Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017. Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.
160 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022.
161 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 162 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. 163 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
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countries.159 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.160 Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box below).161
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing Issues162
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see
Figure A-53
andand
Figure A-64 for maps of some of the areas in dispute). for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece, internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.
164163 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot In 1983, Turkish Cypriot
leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim
to be legally invalid. to be legally invalid.
Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of
Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.
165164 U.S. officials have U.S. officials have
explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as
part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
166165 In the March 2022 congressional hearing In the March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass
logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.
167166 After After
Turkish Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer
maintainswas maintaining a balanced a balanced
approach in the Aegean,approach in the Aegean,
168167 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been
no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are
focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.
169
Congressional Notification Process
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey.170 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16
164168
159 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022.
160 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 161 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. 162 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 163 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between
50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,”
Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February , February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
165164 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,” Military,”
New York Times, August 19, 2022. , August 19, 2022.
166165 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,” July 18, 2022. Minister,” July 18, 2022.
167166 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.” U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
168167 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,”
Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. , October 21, 2022.
169168 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/ Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928. 1582273449145212928.
170 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.”
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Congressional Notification Process
Informal Notification and Review
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey.169 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16 Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total
value of $20 billion.value of $20 billion.
171170
After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee
After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee
(HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major (HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major
defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS
or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State
Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.
172171 This time This time
period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review” period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review”
process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the
proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.
173172 Under provisions of the Under provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed
with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece) with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece)
after formal notification.after formal notification.
174173
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
depend depend
at least to some degree on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and Finland.on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and Finland.
175174 With Turkey With Turkey
already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus has turned to Turkey’s already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus has turned to Turkey’s
approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal notifications of possible approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal notifications of possible
aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the
New York Times cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming
the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Regarding the F-16 sale, the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Regarding the F-16 sale,
he said
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.176
In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he has against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.177
The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S. regional involvement (as mentioned above).178 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s
171he said
169 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.”
170 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,”
Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden , January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden
Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to
Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,”
New York Times, January 14, 2023. , January 14, 2023.
172171 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675,
Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO , by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO
allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or
upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and
defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all
other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively. other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
173172 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675,
Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
174173 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533,
Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and , by Paul K. Kerr and
Liana W. Rosen. Liana W. Rosen.
175174 See footnote 118. Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
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President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.175
In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he had against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.176
The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S. regional involvement (as mentioned above).177 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s See footnote 113 and footnote 114.
176 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al., “Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023. 177 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.
178 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
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for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure
Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.
179178 One journalist has arguedOne journalist has argued
:
A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-
16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a 16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.
180179
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.
181
As Turkey approaches its May 28 presidential run-off election, congressional committee leaders’ concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale appear to endure. At some point, the Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale. In April 2023, the Administration formally notified180
Developments After Turkey’s May 2023 Elections
Following the end of Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle, congressional committee leaders’ concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. In April 2023, these leaders apparently acquiesced to the Administration providing formal notification of a possible sale a possible sale
of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-16s of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-16s
(on certain information sharing and flight safety issueson certain information sharing and flight safety issues
.182 Despite apparent congressional acquiescence to the avionics sale, SFRC Chairman Menendez said afterward that he continues to oppose the sale of F-16s to Turkey.183
179).181 A few days before President Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he and the other three Members who oversee major possible arms sales (SFRC Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks) “will approve the transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”182 McCaul also said,
175 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al., “Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023. 176 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.
177 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 178 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong, Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,
“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”
180179 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,” Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023. , January 16, 2023.
181180 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,”
Al-Monitor, January , January
17, 2023. 17, 2023.
182181 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023
.
183; “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,” “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,”
Kathimerini, April 22, 2023. , April 22, 2023.
182 Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023.
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“We’ve been assured that after the [Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will be recognized as a NATO ally.”183 As of early June, these four Members have reportedly expressed support for the Administration to provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35 sale to Greece.184
After Erdogan’s victory in late May, President Biden said that Erdogan “wants to work on something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”185 With the Administration calling for Sweden to join NATO by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12 summit in Lithuania, Chairman Menendez has said that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some Members of Congress,186 but is only “part of the equation” for him.187 He has suggested that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and various indications that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”188 HFAC Ranking Member Meeks may be roughly aligned with Menendez, based on his late May statement that he wants Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO accession and take additional actions, including with regard to Greece.189
The Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale.
183 Gould et al. 184 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023. 185 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023. 186 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
187 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023. 188 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al. 189 Gould et al.
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Appendix A. Maps
Figure A-1, and U.S. Relations
Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance
Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. % of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022) Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $36,176 Real GDP growth: 2.8% Inflation: 43.7% (as of April 2023) Unemployment: 10.4% Budget deficit as % of GDP: 3.8% Public debt as % of GDP: 37.0% Current account deficit as % of GDP: 4.4% International currency reserves: $128.3 bil ion
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023 projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical Institute.
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Figure A-2. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey
Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets since 2011. Note: All locations are approximate.
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Figure A-3. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits
Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022. , March 2022.
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Figure A-42. Syria Conflict Map
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Figure A-53. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute
Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/. sovereignty-16-maps/.
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Figure A-64. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean
Source: Main map created by Main map created by
The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. , with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid. claim to be legally invalid.
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Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party
Leaders
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President of Turkey and Leader/Co-Founder of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(pronounced (pronounced
air-doe-wan) )
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious
imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul. secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office, Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP
won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister. election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018.
He won another presidential term in May 2023. Many observers Many observers
assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of corruption assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of corruption
cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates. cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
((
kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority
with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP,
which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish
nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and
social democratic constituencies. social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara, After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has
since faced criticism for the faced criticism for the
CHP’s failure to make electoral gains at the national levelCHP’s failure to make electoral gains at the national level
, especial y as Erdogan’s opponent in the 2023 presidential race. The CHP made notable . The CHP made notable
gains—particularly in Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.gains—particularly in Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.
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Devlet Bahceli—Leader of the Nationalist ActionMovement Party (MHP) ((
bah-cheh-lee) )
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997 leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007. was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
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Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (IyiIYI) Party
((
awk-sheh-nar) )
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan. alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from
2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections. presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.
Author Information
Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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