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Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations

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Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations
May 19, 2023
Since having its boundaries drawn by France after the First World War, Lebanon has struggled to
define its national identity. Its population then included Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi’a
Carla E. Humud
Muslim communities of roughly comparable size, and with competing visions for the country.
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Seeking to avoid sectarian conflict, Lebanese leaders created a confessional system that allocated
Affairs
power among the country’s religious sects according to their percentage of the population. Since

then, Lebanon’s demographics and political dynamics have shifted, exacerbating tension among
groups. Sectarian divisions have stoked violence, such as during the 1975-1990 civil war, as well

as political gridlock on issues that require dividing power, such as government formation.
Lebanon today faces both economic crisis and political paralysis.
Lebanon’s divisive dynamics are intensified by external actors—including Syria and Iran—that maintain influence in
Lebanon by backing Hezbollah and its political allies. Other states, such as Saudi Arabia, have backed Sunni communities as
part of a broader effort to curtail Iran’s regional influence. The United States has sought to bolster forces that could serve as a
counterweight to Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, providing more than $3 billion in military assistance to the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) since 2006, with the aim of creating a national force strong enough to counter nonstate actors
like Hezbollah and secure the country’s borders against extremist groups operating in neighboring Syria, including those
affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Hezbollah, an armed group, political party, and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, plays a major role in
Lebanon’s relationships with its two neighbors: Syria and Israel. Despite Lebanon’s official policy of disassociation from
regional conflicts, Hezbollah forces have fought in Syria since 2013 to preserve the government of Syrian president Bashar al
Asad, and have sporadically clashed with Israeli forces along Lebanon’s southern border. Hezbollah also plays an influential
role in Lebanon’s domestic politics; it holds 13 seats in parliament and has held 1-3 cabinet seats in successive Lebanese
governments. The question of how best to marginalize Hezbollah without provoking civil conflict among Lebanese sectarian
political forces has remained a key challenge for U.S. policymakers.
Humanitarian Crisis. As of 2023, there were roughly 805,000 Syrian refugees registered with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, in addition to an existing population of nearly 175,000 Palestinian refugees living in
Lebanon. Lebanon (a country of roughly 4.3 million citizens in 2010) has the highest per capita refugee population in the
world, with refugees constituting an estimated 21.8% of the total population. The refugee influx has strained Lebanon’s
public services and host communities, and some government officials describe refugees as a threat to the country’s security.
The United States has provided more than $3 billion in humanitarian assistance in Lebanon since FY2012.
Economic Crisis. Lebanon faces what arguably is the worst economic crisis in its history—stemming from a confluence of
debt, fiscal, banking, and currency crises. The World Bank has been critical of Lebanon’s policy response, stating that,
“policy inaction is sowing the seeds of an economic and social catastrophe for Lebanon.” Analysts have warned that further
economic deterioration could trigger a security breakdown. Lebanon reached a draft agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2022 that would provide financial support to the country. However, it remains contingent on a
set of politically challenging reforms that have not been implemented.
Political Vacuum. Lebanon held parliamentary elections in May 2022, but has been unable to form a government. Acting
Prime Minister Najib Mikati currently leads a caretaker government but has no mandate to advance specific policies. The
term of Lebanon’s president Michel Aoun expired in October 2022; elections by Members of Parliament (MPs) to select his
replacement could take months or years, potentially leaving a void in the country’s executive branch. As of May 2023,
Lebanon remains without a president or a fully empowered cabinet.

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Contents
Historical Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Policy Priorities ....................................................................................................................... 4
Politics ............................................................................................................................................. 5
Lebanon’s Confessional System................................................................................................ 5
2022 Parliamentary Elections ................................................................................................... 5
2023 Presidential Elections ....................................................................................................... 6
Security ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Hezbollah .................................................................................................................................. 8
Historical Background ........................................................................................................ 8
Domestic Politics ................................................................................................................ 9
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) ................................................................ 9
Palestinian Armed Groups ....................................................................................................... 10
Refugees and Lebanese Policy ...................................................................................................... 10
Refugee Returns ................................................................................................................. 11
Economy ........................................................................................................................................ 12
Economic Crisis ...................................................................................................................... 12
Maritime Border Agreement ............................................................................................. 13
Women and Gender ....................................................................................................................... 14
U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Assistance to Lebanon ..................................................................................................... 15
Conditionality on Aid to Lebanon ..................................................................................... 17
Policy Debates and Issues for Congress ........................................................................................ 17
Regional Gas Deal ................................................................................................................... 17
Expanding Sanctions ............................................................................................................... 18
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 19

Figures
Figure 1. Lebanon at a Glance ......................................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Lebanon’s 2022 Parliament .............................................................................................. 6
Figure 3. Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Agreement ................................................................. 13

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20

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Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations

Historical Background
Prior to World War I, the territories comprising modern-day Lebanon were governed as separate
administrative regions of the Ottoman Empire. After the war, Britain and France divided the
Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces into zones of influence under the terms of the 1916 Sykes
Picot agreement. The area constituting modern-day Lebanon was granted to France, and in 1920,
French authorities announced the creation of the state of Greater Lebanon.1 To form this new
entity, French authorities combined the Maronite Christian enclave of Mount Lebanon—
semiautonomous under Ottoman rule—with the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre
and their surrounding districts. These latter districts were (with the exception of Beirut) primarily
Muslim and had been part of the Ottoman vilayet (province) of Syria.
Figure 1. Lebanon at a Glance

Sources: Created by CRS using ESRI, Google Maps, and Good Shepherd Engineering and Computing.
These administrative divisions created the boundaries of the modern Lebanese state; historians
note that “Lebanon, in the frontiers defined on 1 September 1920, had never existed before in
history.”2 The new Muslim residents of Greater Lebanon—many with long-established economic
links to the Syrian interior—opposed the move, and some called for integration with Syria as part
of a broader postwar Arab nationalist movement. Meanwhile, many Maronite Christians—some
of whom also self-identified as ethnically distinct from their Arab neighbors—sought a Christian
state under French protection. The resulting debate over Lebanese identity would shape the new
country’s politics for decades to come.
Independence. In 1943, Lebanon gained independence from France. Lebanese leaders agreed to
an informal National Pact, in which each of the country’s officially recognized religious groups

1 In 1923, the League of Nations formalized French mandate authority over the territory constituting present-day
Lebanon and Syria.
2 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 75.
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were to be represented in government in direct relation to their share of the population, based on
the 1932 census. The presidency was to be reserved for a Maronite Christian (the largest single
denomination at that time), the prime minister post for a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of
parliament for a Shi’a. Lebanon has not held a census since 1932, amid fears (largely among
Christians) that any demographic changes revealed by a new census—such as a Christian
population that was no longer the majority—would upset the political status quo.3
Civil War. In the decades that followed independence, Lebanon’s sectarian balance remained a
point of friction between communities. Christian dominance in Lebanon was challenged by a
number of events, including the influx of (primarily Sunni Muslim) Palestinian refugees as a
result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the mobilization of Lebanon’s Shi’a Muslim community—
which had been politically and economically marginalized. These and other factors would lead
the country into a civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990 and killed an estimated 150,000 people.
While the war pitted sectarian communities against one another, there was also significant
fighting within communities.
Foreign Intervention. The civil war drew in a number of external actors, including Syria, Israel,
Iran, and the United States. Syrian military forces intervened in the conflict in 1976, and
remained in Lebanon for another 29 years. Israel sent military forces into Lebanon in 1978 and
1982, and conducted several subsequent airstrikes. In 1978, the U.N. Security Council established
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from southern Lebanon, which was not complete until 2000.4 In the early 1980s, an
emerging militant group that would become Hezbollah, backed by Iran, began to contest Israel’s
military presence in heavily Shi’a southern Lebanon. The United States deployed forces to
Lebanon in 1982 as part of a multinational peacekeeping force, but withdrew its forces after the
1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. personnel.
Taif Accords. In 1989, the parties signed the Taif Accords, beginning a process that would bring
the war to a close the following year. The agreement adjusted and formalized Lebanon’s
confessional system (see “Politics,” below), further entrenching what arguably was an unstable
power dynamic between different sectarian groups at the national level. The political rifts created
by this system allowed Syria to present itself as the arbiter between rivals, and pursue its own
interests inside Lebanon in the wake of the war. The participation of Syrian troops in Operation
Desert Storm to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, as well as Syria’s engagement in peace talks with
Israel, reportedly facilitated what some analysts described as the tacit acceptance by the United
States of Syria’s continuing role in Lebanon.5 The Taif Accords also called for all Lebanese
militias to be dismantled, and most were reincorporated into the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Hezbollah refused to disarm—claiming that its militia forces were legitimately engaged in
resistance to the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon.

3 Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based research firm, estimates that Lebanon’s population is 67.6% Muslim (31.9% Sunni,
31% Shi’a) and 32.4% Christian (with Maronite Catholics being the largest Christian group, followed by Greek
Orthodox). Druze are estimated to comprise 4.5% of the population. See U.S. Department of State, “Lebanon,”
International Religious Freedom Report for 2019. The 1932 census found that Christians comprised 58% of the
population; some studies argue that the rules that determined who could be counted in the census were designed to
produce a Christian majority. See Rania Maktabi, “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?”
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1999. See also, Amos Barshad, “The World’s Most Dangerous Census,” The
Nation, October 17, 2019; “Lebanon: Census and sensibility,” The Economist, November 5, 2016.
4 UNIFIL forces remain deployed in southern Lebanon, comprising 10,596 troops drawn from 45 countries.
5 See for example, Paul E. Salem, “Superpowers and Small States: an Overview of American Lebanese Relations,”
Beirut Review, 5, 1993; Joseph Bahout, “The Unraveling of Lebanon’s Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power
Sharing,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2016.
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Hariri Assassination. In February 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri—a
prominent anti-Syria Sunni politician—was assassinated in a car bombing in downtown Beirut.6
The attack galvanized Lebanese society against the Syrian military presence in the country and
triggered a series of street protests known as the “Cedar Revolution.” Under pressure, Syria
withdrew its forces from Lebanon in the subsequent months, although Damascus continued to
influence domestic Lebanese politics. The Hariri assassination reshaped Lebanese politics into the
two major coalitions known today: March 8 and March 14, which represented pro-Syria and anti-
Syria segments of the political spectrum, respectively. In 2007 the U.N. Security Council
established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to investigate the assassination. In 2020 the
STL issued its verdict, convicting one Hezbollah operative; he remains at large.
2006 Hezbollah-Israel War. In July 2006, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers along the
border, sparking a 34-day war. The Israeli air campaign and ground operation aimed at degrading
Hezbollah resulted in widespread damage to Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure, killing roughly
1,190 Lebanese, and displacing a quarter of Lebanon’s population.7 In turn, Hezbollah launched
thousands of rockets into Israel, killing 163 Israelis.8 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701
brokered a cease-fire between the two sides and expanded the mandate of UNIFIL.
2008 Doha Agreement. In late 2006, a move by the Lebanese government to endorse the STL led
Hezbollah and its Shi’a political ally Amal to withdraw from the government, triggering an 18-
month political crisis. In May 2008, a cabinet decision to shut down Hezbollah’s private
telecommunications network—which the group reportedly viewed as critical to its ability to fight
Israel—led Hezbollah fighters to seize control of parts of Beirut. Qatar helped broker a political
settlement between rival Lebanese factions, which was signed on May 21, 2008, and became
known as the Doha Agreement.
War in Syria. In 2011, unrest broke out in neighboring Syria and refugees flooded into Lebanon.
By 2014, refugees constituted a quarter of the country’s population, straining infrastructure and
generating escalating tensions with host communities. Despite Lebanon’s official policy of
dissociation from regional conflicts, Hezbollah intervened on behalf of the Asad regime in Syria,
a key transshipment point for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Syria-based militants linked to the
Islamic State and Al Qaeda established enclaves in Lebanese border towns, prompting the United
States to accelerate the provision of equipment and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
2019 Protest Movement. In October 2019, a mass protest movement unifying disparate
sectarian, geographic, and socioeconomic sectors of Lebanese society around demands for
political and economic reform resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his
government. Loss of investor confidence (compounded by decades of economic mismanagement)
triggered a severe financial crisis—described by the World Bank as possibly among the top three
“most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century.”9 In August 2020, a
massive explosion at the port of Beirut—described as one of the largest nonnuclear explosions
ever recorded—killed over 190 people. Both events, widely attributed to negligence and
corruption on the part of multiple Lebanese administrations, re-galvanized protests against the
government, resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet.

6 For more details, see Ronen Bergman, “The Hezbollah Connection,” New York Times Magazine, February 15, 2015.
7 Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, September 5, 2007.
8 Human Rights Watch, Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War, August 2007.
9 World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: Lebanon Sinking (To the Top 3), May 31, 2021.
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U.S. Policy Priorities
U.S. policy in Lebanon over the past decade has sought to limit threats posed by Hezbollah both
within Lebanon and to Israel; bolster Lebanon’s ability to protect its borders; and build state
capacity to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees. Iranian influence in Lebanon via Hezbollah,
the potential for renewed armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, and Lebanon’s internal
political dynamics complicate the provision of U.S. assistance. As Congress reviews aid to
Lebanon, Members continue to debate the best ways to meet U.S. policy objectives:
Weakening Hezbollah and building state capacity. The United States has sought to weaken
Hezbollah without provoking a direct confrontation that could undermine Lebanon’s stability.
Both Obama and Trump Administration officials argued that Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon
could be addressed by strengthening Lebanon’s legitimate security institutions, including the
LAF.10 Members have expressed a range of views regarding U.S. security assistance to Lebanon,
with some describing the LAF as a counterweight to Hezbollah and others arguing that U.S.
policy has failed because Hezbollah continues to amass weapons and remains a powerful force
inside Lebanon.11 The Biden Administration has reaffirmed the strong U.S. partnership with the
LAF.12
Defending Lebanon’s borders. Beginning in late 2012, Lebanon faced a wave of attacks from
Syria-based groups, some of which sought to gain a foothold in Lebanon. U.S. policymakers have
sought to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces have the tools they need to defend Lebanon’s
borders against encroachment by the Islamic State and other armed nonstate groups.
Assisting Syrian refugees. The influx of over a million Syrian refugees since 2011 placed
significant pressure on Lebanese public services and host communities. The United States has
provided over $3 billion in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon since FY2012,13 much of it
designed to lessen the impact of the refugee surge on host communities.
Strengthening government institutions. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon aims to strengthen
Lebanese institutions and their capacity to provide essential public services. Slow economic
growth and high levels of public debt have limited government spending on public services, and
this gap has been filled in part by sectarian patronage networks, including some affiliated with
Hezbollah. U.S. programs to improve education, increase service provision, and foster economic
growth are intended to make communities less vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups.
Encouraging reform. While seeking to bolster the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions in
Lebanon, Trump Administration officials also criticized “decades of mismanagement, corruption,
and the repeated failure of Lebanese leaders to put aside their parochial interest and undertake
meaningful, sustained reforms,” sentiments echoed by the Biden Administration.14

10 U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson John Kirby,” March 8, 2016; U.S. Department of
State, “Background Briefing: Updating on Secretary Tillerson’s Trip to Amman, Jordan; Ankara, Turkey; Beirut,
Lebanon; Cairo, Egypt; and Kuwait City, Kuwait,” press release, February 14, 2018.
11 U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism, Lebanon and Iraq Protests; Insights, Implications, and Objectives for U.S. Policy, hearing, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., December 4, 2019, S. Hrg. 116-225 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2020).
12 U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, “United States Central Command Commander Visits Lebanon,” March 15, 2021; U.S.
Embassy in Lebanon, “U.S. Support for the LAF Highlighted by Visit of Rear Admiral Bradley,” February 12, 2021.
13 U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, “The United States Announces More Than $72 Million in Additional Humanitarian
Assistance for Lebanon,” November 9, 2022.
14 Testimony of David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations
(continued...)
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Politics
Lebanon’s Confessional System
Lebanon’s population includes Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi’a Muslim communities that are
estimated to be of roughly comparable size.15 In what is referred to as Lebanon’s confessional
system, political posts are divided among the country’s various religious groups, or
“confessions,” in proportions designed to reflect each group’s share of the population—although
no formal census has been conducted in the country since 1932. The presidency is reserved for a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister post for a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament for
a Shi’a Muslim. The 128 seats in Lebanon’s parliament are divided evenly among Christians and
Muslims, and Lebanese electoral law has traditionally allocated each seat within an electoral
district to a specific religious community. Lebanon’s confessional system—shaped by the 1943
National Pact and adjusted and formalized by the 1989 Taif Accords—was designed to encourage
consensus among the country’s sectarian communities, particularly in the wake of Lebanon’s civil
war. However, the need for cooperation between rival political blocs on major issues is widely
viewed as contributing to political gridlock.
March 8 and March 14 Political Coalitions in Flux Following 2019 Protests
Since Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Lebanese politics have been contested between
two rival political coalitions. The March 8 political coalition includes the Free Patriotic
Movement or FPM (Christian), as well as Hezbollah and the Amal Movement (both Shi'a), and
advocates close ties with Syria and Iran. The March 14 coalition traditionally has included the
Future Movement (Sunni), and the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb (both Christian), and advocates
closer ties with Saudi Arabia, France, and the United States.
A nationwide protest movement that began in 2019 led civil society groups to form new parties
challenging traditional elites—resulting in the election of an unprecedented number of self-
described opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) in 2022. Since 2019, some parties historically
linked to March 14 (Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces) also began to identify as reform
movements. The Future Movement withdrew from the 2022 elections, fracturing March 14
further and leaving Sunni candidates to run as independents, without unified political
leadership.16
2022 Parliamentary Elections
Lebanon held parliamentary elections on May 15, 2022. The elections did not result in a clear
majority for either March 8 or March 14-linked groups (see Figure 2), contributing to paralysis
on issues requiring a majority vote in parliament—including government formation and the
election of a president. Some have expressed hope that the unprecedented number of self-
described “opposition” MPs in the new parliament (known as the “Forces of Change” bloc) could

Committee, U.S. Policy in a Changing Middle East, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 2020; U.S. Embassy
in Lebanon, “Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Hale’s Statement after Meeting with Speaker Nabih Berri,”
April 14, 2021.
15 See footnote 3.
16 “Will Hariri’s Withdrawal from the political scene serve Lebanon’s opposition forces?” L’Orient Today, January 28,
2022.
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operate in unity to support reform measures. However, the group is ideologically diverse and has
shown signs of growing internal divisions.17
Figure 2. Lebanon’s 2022 Parliament

Source: Figure created by CRS based on “Elected Members of Parliament by Partisan Affiliation,” L’Orient Today,
May 17, 2022 and CRS calculations.
Notes: Adjusted to reflect the November 2022 decision by Lebanon’s Constitutional Council to void the
election of Rami Finge (Opposition) and Firas Salloum (Independent), and their replacement by Faisal Karami
(Linked to March 8) and Nasser Haidar (Independent).
Status of Government Formation
The May 2022 parliamentary elections automatically triggered the resignation of the existing
government (cabinet) of Prime Minister Najib Mikati, placing it in a caretaker capacity until a
new prime minister and cabinet could be selected. President Aoun re-appointed Mikati as Prime
Minister-designate, but the two leaders failed to agree on the composition of a new cabinet before
the expiration of Aoun's term in October 2022.18 Government formation in 2023 would require
the election of a new president and prime minister, as both officials must co-sign the decree
forming a new cabinet.
2023 Presidential Elections
On October 31, 2022, President Aoun's term expired without the election of a successor
(Lebanon's president is elected by the parliament). In the case of a vacancy in the presidency,
Lebanon's constitution delegates the functions of the president to the cabinet, but the cabinet has
remained in caretaker status since the 2022 parliamentary elections, with significantly limited
authorities.

17 “The rise and fall of the ‘club of 13,’” L’Orient Today, May 15, 2023.
18 Associated Press, “Lebanon president leaves with no replacement, crisis deepens,” October 30, 2022.
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Lebanon’s president is elected by a two-thirds vote in parliament (86 out of 128 votes); for an
electoral session to be held, a quorum of 86 MPs is required. As of May 2023, Lebanese MPs
have held eleven rounds of voting and failed to elect a president—due either to lack of quorum or
to a significant number of MPs casting blank ballots. To date, the blank votes have reportedly
been cast largely by Hezbollah and its allies in parliament (Free Patriotic Movement, or FPM, and
Amal).19 Some MPs have criticized the approach taken by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri
(Amal), arguing that the Lebanese constitution does not require a quorum of 86 MPs after the first
round of voting.20 (Article 49 of Lebanon’s constitution stipulates, “The president of the republic
shall be elected by secret ballot, with a two-thirds majority of deputies in the first round and an
absolute majority in subsequent rounds.”21) Berri has defended his decision to apply the rules of
first round of voting to each new electoral session, stating that this is his own interpretation of the
constitution.22
Because neither of Lebanon’s primary political coalitions (March 8 and March 14) typically
control the two-thirds majority in parliament that would allow them to unilaterally elect a
president, the process of electing a president forces the two rival coalitions to settle on a
consensus candidate—a process that can take months or even years. Former President Aoun’s
election in 2016 followed a 29-month political stalemate during which 45 prior attempts at
electing a president failed.23
In the absence of a clear March 8 or March 14 majority in parliament, the two coalitions would
need to seek some degree of consensus—and/or solicit support from independent and opposition
MPs—to garner the votes necessary for the selection of a president. Lebanon’s president must be
Christian, but his selection is complicated by the fact that Lebanon’s Christian parties are split
between those affiliated with March 8 (FPM and Marada), and those historically linked to March
14 (Lebanese Forces and Kataeb, both of which have self-identified as opposition parties since
the onset of protests in 2019). Because Christians make up half of the seats in parliament, a
successful Christian candidate must also win support among other sectarian groups in order to
cross the two-thirds vote threshold.
Municipal Elections Postponed
In April 2023, Parliament extended the terms of municipal councils until May 2024, effectively postponing
municipal elections that initially were scheduled for spring 2022 and later rescheduled for May 2023. In March,
caretaker Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi stated, “We don’t have the money to organize the municipal
elections.”24 The financing of municipal elections has become an issue of contention among political rivals. Some
leaders have stated that Parliament must approve the necessary funds via legislation. Others, such as the Lebanese
Forces, argue that parliament cannot hold legislative sessions in the absence of a president, and that the funds
should instead be drawn from Lebanon’s IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR).25 Both sides accuse the other of
seeking to obstruct the elections. Municipal elections are important in Lebanon, where municipalities play an
arguably outsized role in local governance, reflecting the political paralysis at the national level and the inability of
the state to provide basic services.

19 “Parliament fails to elect new president for fifth time,” L’Orient Today, November 10, 2022.
20 Ibid.
21 For a discussion of how this article historically has been applied, see: “Caught between constitution and politics: the
presidential vacuum in Lebanon,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, July 4, 2014.
22 “Rai: No solution without an international conference on Lebanon,” L’Orient Today, November 13, 2022.
23 “Lebanon: Michel Aoun elected president, ending two-year stalemate,” BBC, October 31, 2016.
24 “Lebanon’s municipal elections are more at risk than ever,” L’Orient Today, March 30, 2023.
25 “Municipal elections at the mercy of political uncertainties,” L’Orient Today, February10, 2023; “Municipal
elections: Everything is ready, except funding,” L’Orient Today, April 4, 2023.
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Security
Hezbollah
Hezbollah is an Iran-backed Lebanese Shi’a militia and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). The group has focused its attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets—including
outside the Middle East. Nevertheless, the 2023 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community also noted that, “Hizballah seeks to reduce U.S. influence in Lebanon
and the broader Middle East, and maintains the capability to target U.S. persons and interests in
the region, worldwide, and, to a lesser extent, in the United States.”26
Historical Background
Hezbollah emerged in the early 1980s during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Israel
invaded Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982, with the goal of pushing back (in 1978) or expelling
(in 1982) the leadership and fighters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—which used
Lebanon as a base to wage a guerrilla war against Israel until the PLO relocated to Tunisia in
1982.27 In 1985 Israel withdrew from Beirut and its environs to southern Lebanon—a
predominantly Shi’a area. Until 2000, Israel occupied what it described as a nine mile “security
zone” in southern Lebanon, which it said was necessary to defend northern Israel from terrorist
attacks.28 Shi’a leaders disagreed about how to respond to the Israeli occupation, and many of
those favoring a military response gradually coalesced into what would become Hezbollah.29 The
group launched attacks against Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and U.S. military and diplomatic
targets, portraying itself as the leaders of resistance to foreign military occupation.
In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon, but Hezbollah has used the
remaining Israeli presence in the Sheb’a Farms and other disputed areas in the Lebanon-Syria-
Israel tri-border region to justify its ongoing conflict with Israel—and its continued existence as
an armed militia alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces.30
2006 Hezbollah-Israel War
Hezbollah’s last major clash with Israel occurred in 2006—a 34-day war that resulted in the
deaths of approximately 1,190 Lebanese and 163 Israelis,31 and the destruction of large parts of
Lebanon's civilian infrastructure. The war began in July 2006, when Hezbollah captured two
members of the IDF along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Israel responded by carrying out air
strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, and Hezbollah countered with rocket
attacks against cities and towns in northern Israel. Israel subsequently launched a full-scale
ground operation in Lebanon with the stated goal of establishing a security zone free of

26 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 6, 2023, pp. 33.
27 According to various accounts, Israel's 1982 invasion included additional goals of countering Syrian influence in
Lebanon and helping establish an Israel-friendly Maronite government there.
28 “IDF to recognize 18-year occupation of south Lebanon as official campaign,” Times of Israel, November 4, 2020.
29 The Shi'a group Amal took a more nuanced view of the Israeli occupation, which it saw as breaking the dominance
of Palestinian militia groups operating in southern Lebanon.
30 “Shebaa farms: why Hezbollah uses Israel's occupation of a tiny strip of land to justify its arsenal,” The National,
May 6, 2019.
31 See Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2007—Lebanon,” May 23, 2007 and Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, “Israel-Hizbullah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties,” July 12, 2006.
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Hezbollah militants. Hostilities ended following the issuance of U.N. Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1701, which imposed a cease-fire.
In the years since the 2006 war, Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's
weapons buildup—including reported upgrades to the range and precision of its projectiles—and
its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds. Israeli officials also have expressed
concern that Iran is supplying Hezbollah with advanced technology and helping the group
establish infrastructure to indigenously produce rockets and missiles.32
Domestic Politics
Hezbollah has participated in elections since 1992. The group currently holds 13 seats in
Lebanon’s parliament, and is part of the March 8 political coalition. Hezbollah entered the cabinet
for the first time in 2005, and has held one to three seats in each Lebanese government formed
since then. Hezbollah’s popularity stems in part from its provision of public services. A 2022
State Department assessment noted that the delivery of public services “has been left to
subnational or non-state actors, reducing the quality, reliability, and efficiency of delivery, and
opening communities to greater influence by malign non-state and foreign actors.”33
Hezbollah has at times served as a destabilizing political force, despite its willingness to engage
in electoral politics. In 2008, Hezbollah-led fighters took over areas of Beirut after the March 14
government attempted to shut down the group's private telecommunications network—which
Hezbollah leaders described as key to the group's operations against Israel.34 Hezbollah has also
withdrawn its ministers from the cabinet to protest steps taken by the government (in 2008 when
the government sought to debate the issue of Hezbollah's weapons, and in 2011 to protest the
expected indictments of Hezbollah members for the Hariri assassination). On both occasions, the
withdrawal of Hezbollah and its political allies from the cabinet caused the government to
collapse. Hezbollah involvement has been suspected in various political assassinations—notably
that of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and more recently in the death of civil society
activist and Hezbollah critic Lokman Slim in 2021.
For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. Humud.
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
In 1978, UNIFIL deployed to the Lebanon-Israel-Syria tri-border area to confirm the withdrawal
of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and assist the Lebanese government in expanding its
authority there. Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, UNSCR 1701 expanded UNIFIL's
mandate to include assisting the Lebanese government in establishing “an area free of any armed
personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL”
between the Blue Line [a 120 km line between the two states used to confirm the Israeli
withdrawal] and the Litani River. UNIFIL describes this zone as its area of operations. UNSCR
1701 calls upon Lebanon to secure its borders and requests that UNIFIL “assist the government
of Lebanon at its request.”
On December 14, 2022, an Irish soldier serving with UNIFIL died when a convoy of two armored
vehicles carrying eight personnel to Beirut came under “small arms fire,” according to the Irish
Defense Forces. Hezbollah denied involvement in what it described as an “unintentional

32 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza, February 27, 2023.
33 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Lebanon, April 29, 2022.
34 “Row over Hezbollah phone network,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2008.
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incident.” The group subsequently handed over a man suspected in the killing to Lebanese
authorities; a Lebanese security official stated that Hezbollah was “cooperating with the
investigation.”35 While the attack occurred outside of UNIFIL’s area of operations, quarterly
reports of the U.N. Secretary General to the U.N. Security Council have documented restrictions
on the freedom of access and movement of UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon.36
For additional background on UNIFIL’s structure, mandate, and associated policy debates, see
CRS In Focus IF11915, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), by Carla E. Humud.
Palestinian Armed Groups
A range of armed groups operate in Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps, which were built
between 1948 and 1963 and house Palestinians displaced during various Arab-Israeli wars as well
as their descendants. Palestinians born in Lebanon are ineligible for Lebanese citizenship, and are
barred from owning or inheriting property.37 The U.N. has described conditions in the
overcrowded camps as “dire,” and most residents rely on UNRWA for basic services.38 The State
Department reported in 2022 that most Palestinian refugee camps operated “under the control of
joint Palestinian security forces representing multiple factions. Palestinian groups in refugee
camps operated an autonomous system of justice with little transparency to outsiders and beyond
the control of the state.”39
Palestinian militants based in Lebanon have at times fired rockets into Israel during periods of
Israeli-Palestinian tensions. In May and July 2021, Israeli military officials assessed that
Lebanon-based Palestinian groups had fired rockets into Israel. 40 On April 6, 2023, dozens of
rockets were fired from Lebanon into Israel. Some rockets were intercepted by Israeli air
defenses, while others fell inside Israel (two injuries were reported; no fatalities). Some analysts
described the strikes as “the most serious escalation between Lebanon and Israel since the 2006
war.”41 While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, an IDF spokesperson blamed
Hamas for the attack, adding that the Lebanese government is “responsible for any attack from its
territory.”42 The attacks followed Israeli-Palestinian violence at the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem,
during a period of overlap between the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and the Jewish Passover
holiday.
Refugees and Lebanese Policy
Refugees from Syria
The outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011 led to a surge of Syrian refugee arrivals in Lebanon. By
2014, Lebanon had the highest per capita refugee population in the world, with refugees equaling

35 “Investigation into UN peacekeeper death places Hezbollah in the spotlight,” L’Orient Today, December 30, 2022.
36 See, for example: Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 3 November
2022 to 20 February 2023: report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/184, March 10, 2023.
37 Law 296 (2001) prohibits persons who do “not carry a citizenship issued by a recognized state” from owning
property in Lebanon.
38 UNRWA, Where We Work, available at: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon
39 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022: Lebanon.
40 “Israel Briefly Shells Southern Lebanon After Militant Rocket Fire,” New York Times, July 20, 2021.
41 “Rockets fired from Lebanon toward Israel in major escalation,” Axios, April 6, 2023.
42 Ibid.
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one-quarter of the resident population.43 Those figures remain largely unchanged, with over
800,000 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon as of 2023.44 The U.N. estimated in 2020 that nine
of out ten Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in extreme poverty.45 Lebanese officials have been
critical of UNHCR financial assistance to refugees, arguing that such assistance incentivizes
refugees to remain in Lebanon.46
Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS). The Syria conflict displaced not only Syrian nationals,
but also an estimated 27,700 Palestinian refugees from refugee camps inside Syria. PRS are not
eligible for services provided by UNHCR, and must instead register with the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to receive continued
emergency support.
Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRL)
Palestinian refugees have been present in Lebanon for over 70 years, as a result of displacements
stemming from various Arab-Israeli wars. Like Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees and their
Lebanese-born children cannot obtain Lebanese citizenship, even though many are the third or
fourth generation to be born inside Lebanon.47 In addition, the State Department notes that
A 2010 law expanding employment rights and removing some restrictions on Palestinian
refugees was not fully implemented, and Palestinians remained barred from working in
most skilled professions, including medicine, law and engineering that require membership
in a professional association. Informal restrictions on work in other industries left many
refugees dependent upon UNRWA for education, health care and social services.48
Roughly 175,000 Palestinians currently reside in Lebanon, according to the first official
census of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, conducted in 2017.49
Refugee Returns
Since 2017, the LAF and the Directorate for General Security (DGS) have facilitated the return of
refugees to Syria. Various human rights groups questioned whether the returns were fully
voluntary, citing a coercive environment in Lebanon, with crackdowns on refugee housing, legal
permits, and rising tensions with host communities.50 Despite a September 2022 report by the
U.N. Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry stating that, “The Syrian Arab Republic is

43 UNHCR, “Syrian refugees in Lebanon surpass 1 million,” April 3, 2014.
44 Most recent data available at UNHCR, “Operational Data Portal: Syria Refugee Response,” at
https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71.
45 “Nine out of ten Syrian refugee families in Lebanon are now living in extreme poverty, UN study says,” UNHCR,
December 18, 2020.
46 “Thousands of Syrian refugees could be sent back, says Lebanese minister,” Guardian, June 15, 2019.
47 Citizenship in Lebanon is derived exclusively through the father. Thus, a child born to a Palestinian refugee mother
and a Lebanese father could obtain Lebanese citizenship. However, a Palestinian refugee father would transmit his
stateless status to his children, even if the mother was a Lebanese citizen.
48 U.S. Department of State, “2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lebanon,” March 2021.
49 “Census shows there are 174,422 Palestinians in Lebanon,” Associated Press, December 21, 2017.
50 Human Rights Watch, “Lebanon: Refugees in Border Zone at Risk,” News Release, September 20, 2017; Amnesty
International, “Lebanon: Wave of hostility exposes hollowness of claims that Syrian refugee returns are voluntary,”
June 12, 2019.
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still not a safe place to return,” 51 two convoys of refugees returned to Syria—roughly 324 in late
October52 and 350 in early November 2022.53
2023 Returns. In April, the LAF conducted multiple raids on Syrian refugee communities in
Lebanon, arresting hundreds and deporting several dozen Syrians. Unnamed security officials
stated the LAF had increased arrests of undocumented Syrians, handing them over to border
guards who then expelled them from Lebanon.54 Amnesty International criticized Lebanon for
what it described as the “unlawful deportation of Syrian refugees.”55
Economy
Economic Crisis
According to a 2021 World Bank report, Lebanon faces an economic and financial crisis “likely
to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth
century.”56 According to one source, “Some economists have described Lebanon’s financial
system as a nationally regulated Ponzi scheme, where new money is borrowed to pay existing
creditors. It works until fresh money runs out.”57
International organizations have criticized Lebanon’s political elite for the country’s ongoing
economic collapse. A study by a U.N. Special Rapporteur stated, “The collapse of the Lebanese
economy was avoidable [...]; economists and financial experts had warned about the impending
crisis since at least 2015. Such warnings were willfully ignored by the political leadership.”58 A
July 2022 World Bank report stated, “Lebanon’s macro-financial bankruptcy is with such
(relative) scale and scope that it has likely undermined the political economy of post- civil war
Lebanon.” The report added that the crisis “seems to be leading to the disintegration of this
political economy, as manifested by a collapse of the most basic public services, [and] persistent
and debilitating internal political discord.”59
A 2021 U.N. study estimated that poverty rates in Lebanon had nearly doubled from 42% in 2019
to 82% in 2021.60 Following a series of incidents in September 2022 in which armed customers
stormed banks demanding access to their accounts, Lebanon’s banks temporarily closed.61 In
October 2022, the black market exchange rate for the Lebanese pound (or lira) hit a new record
low of LL40,000 against the dollar; as of March 2023, the lira had dropped further to reach an

51 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/51/45, August 17, 2022.
52 CRS conversation with Lebanon-based U.N. agency representatives, October 27, 2022.
53 “Roughly 350 Syrian refugees repatriated in second convoy from Lebanon,” L’Orient Today, November 5, 2022.
54 “Dozens of Syrians expelled from Lebanon: security officials,” L’Orient Today, April 21, 2023.
55 Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Authorities must halt unlawful deportations of Syrian refugees,” April 24, 2023.
56 World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: Lebanon Sinking (To the Top 3), May 31, 2021.
57 “Explainer: Lebanon's financial crisis and how it happened,” Reuters, January 23, 2022; see also, World Bank Press
Release, “Lebanon’s Ponzi Finance Scheme Has Caused Unprecedented Social and Economic Pain to the Lebanese
People,” August 2, 2022.
58 U.N. Human Rights Council, Visit to Lebanon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human
rights, Olivier De Schutter, A/HRC/50/38/Add.1, April 11, 2022.
59 World Bank, Lebanon Public Finance Review: Ponzi Finance? Executive Summary, July 2022.
60 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, “Multidimensional poverty in Lebanon (2019–2021),” (2021).
61 “Bank holdups snowball in Lebanon as depositors demand their own money,” Reuters, September 17, 2022.
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unprecedented LL100,000 to the dollar. In February, the Lebanese Central Bank changed the
official exchange rate peg from LL1,507/dollar to LL15,000/dollar.62
In late February, Lebanese authorities charged Central Bank governor Riad Salame with money
laundering, embezzlement, and illicit enrichment. Several European countries—including
Switzerland, France, and Germany—have launched investigations into whether funds allegedly
embezzled from Lebanon’s central bank were laundered in Europe.63
IMF Staff Agreement and Pending Reforms
In April 2022, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Lebanon for an economic rescue
package. The draft agreement, which would disburse, in phases, loans worth $3 billion over four
years, remains subject to IMF management and Executive Board approval.64 The IMF has stated
that Lebanon needs to implement a comprehensive economic and financial reform program that
includes 1) enacting fiscal reforms, 2) restructuring the financial sector, 3) reforming state owned
enterprises, 4) strengthening governance, anti-corruption, and Anti-Money Laundering and
Countering the Financing of Terrorism frameworks, and 5) installing a credible monetary and
exchange system.65 Lebanese authorities need to implement a series of reform measures (known
as “prior actions”)—the majority of which have not been implemented to date—before the IMF
Board’s consideration of the staff-level agreement.66 It is unclear how Lebanon’s economy can be
stabilized without IMF financing and the requisite reforms (which must precede a final financing
agreement).
Maritime Border Agreement
Long-standing border disputes between
Lebanon and Israel have slowed exploration
Figure 3. Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border
of offshore gas fields in the eastern
Agreement
Mediterranean. On October 11, 2022,
Lebanon, Israel, and the United States
announced that they had reached an
agreement to settle the disputes, paving the

Source: Haaretz.

62 Kareen Chehayeb, “Lebanon sets new exchange rate, dramatically devalues pound,” Associated Press, February 1,
2023.
63 “Explainer: The probes into Lebanese central bank chief Salameh,” Reuters, February 23, 2023.
64 IMF Press Release No. 22/108, “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on Economic Policies with Lebanon for a
Four-Year Extended Fund Facility,” April 7, 2022; IMF Press Release No.22/33, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual
Mission on Lebanon,” February 11, 2022.
65 IMF Press Release No.22/33, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Mission on Lebanon,” February 11, 2022.
66 “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on Economic Policies with Lebanon for a Four-Year Extended Fund Facility,”
April 7, 2022.
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way for both countries to eventually increase offshore gas production.67
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field completely within Israel’s exclusive economic
zone (EEZ). Lebanon retains full rights to the Qana field—with the caveat that a future side
agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will settle
any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field that
falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can begin at
Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.68 U.S. officials have stated
that in the interim period, Lebanon may be able to address its energy crisis by importing natural
gas from Egypt, and electricity from Jordan—a prospect that has generated some controversy in
Congress (see “Policy Debates,” below).69
Women and Gender
Lebanon’s 2019 protest movement included, among other things, demands for expanded political
rights for women. Although some Lebanese women have held high political office (including the
Arab world’s first female ministers of defense and interior), women continue to face challenges in
matters governed by religious courts.
Personal Status Laws. Under Lebanese law, personal status issues (such as marriage, divorce,
custody, and inheritance) are governed by religious courts rather than by Lebanon’s civil code.
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights, women in
Lebanon:
...suffered discrimination under the law and in practice, including under the penal and
personal status codes. The constitution does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on
sex. In matters of marriage, child custody, inheritance, and divorce, personal status laws
provide unequal treatment across the various confessional court systems but generally
discriminate against women. All 18 recognized religious groups have their own personal
status courts responsible for handling these matters, and laws vary depending on the
religious group.70
Nationality Law. Lebanese women are unable to transmit their nationality to their children or
foreign spouses—affecting the children’s and spouses’ legal residency, as well as their access to
work, education, social services, and health care.71 Lebanon’s nationality law, issued in 1925
under the French Mandate, grants Lebanese citizenship only to children born to a Lebanese father.
A 2013 study found that 73% of stateless persons in Lebanon (excluding those of Palestinian
origin) were born to a Lebanese mother.72
Civil Marriage. Lebanon has “no formalized procedure for civil marriage or divorce,” although
the government recognizes (heterosexual) civil marriage ceremonies performed outside the
country.73 Some MPs in the “Forces of Change” bloc have called for the legalization of civil

67 “Lebanon, Israel clinch maritime border deal,” Reuters, October 11, 2022.
68 “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel, October 12, 2022.
69 Remarks by U.S. Special Envoy for Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein at a webinar hosted by the American Task
Force on Lebanon and the Middle East Institute, October 18, 2022.
70 For additional background, see “Unequal and Unprotected: Women’s Rights under Lebanese Personal Status Laws,”
Human Rights Watch, January19, 2015.
71 “Lebanon: Discriminatory Nationality Law,” Human Rights Watch, October 3, 2018.
72 Ibid.
73 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon, June 2, 2022.
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marriage in Lebanon; past legislative proposals regarding civil marriage have not passed
Parliament.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy over the past two decades has focused on bolstering forces that could serve as a
counterweight to Syrian, Iranian, and violent extremist influence in Lebanon through a variety of
military and economic assistance programs. Congress has placed several certification
requirements on U.S. assistance funds for Lebanon annually in an effort to prevent their misuse or
the transfer of U.S. equipment to Hezbollah or other designated terrorists.
U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
Lebanon typically has received over $100 million annually in both Economic Support Fund
(ESF) monies and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (see Table 1). In addition to FMF obligated
through the annual State and Foreign Ops appropriations, Lebanon has received roughly $100-
200 million in additional security assistance via the annual defense appropriations process.74
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Lebanon
current U.S. dollars in millions, by year of appropriation

FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
actual
actual
actual
actual
request
request
DA
-
7.55
-
-


ESF
112.50
78.95
112.50
112.50
112.50
112.50
FMF
105.00
105.00
120.00
180.00
150.00
150.00
IMET
2.97
2.68
3.00
1.68
3.50
3.50
INCLE
10.00
10.00
10.00
8.20
7.20
7.20
NADR
11.82
11.82
12.82
12.82
9.26
9.26
Total
242.29
216.00
258.32
315.2
282.46
282.46
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2021-FY2024).
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education
and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs.
Security Assistance
The United States has provided more than $3 billion in security assistance to the LAF since
2006.75 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been one of the primary sources of U.S. funding
for the LAF, along with the Defense Department (DOD) Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund
(CTEF). DOD has also provided the LAF with border security assistance, as authorized under
Section 1226 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016, as amended. The
State Department has stated that U.S. security assistance for Lebanon aims to “strengthen

74 CRS analysis of Defense Department notifications to Congress.
75 State Department Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Lebanon,” September 21, 2022.
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Lebanon’s sovereignty, secure its borders, counter internal threats, and disrupt terrorist
facilitation.”76 Noting the challenges posed by the presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the State
Department added that, “The U.S.-LAF partnership builds the LAF’s capacity as the sole
legitimate defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty.” The Department also noted that the LAF
“continues to comply fully with all [End-Use Monitoring] reporting and security requirements.”
Livelihood Assistance. In January 2023, U.S. officials announced the rollout of the “LAF-ISF
[Internal Security Forces] Livelihood Support Program,” which is to provide “every soldier and
police officer eligible to receive assistance under U.S. law with $100 per month for a period of
six months,”77 for a total of $72 million. The program is to be implemented by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). The funds, which were notified to Congress in January 2022,
reportedly had faced initial opposition from some Members.78
U.S. Military Presence in Lebanon. According to a U.S. Army publication, U.S. Special
Operations Forces have been deployed to Lebanon since at least 2012.79 The United States also
conducts annual bilateral military exercises with the LAF, known as Resolute Union. In a
December 2022 report to Congress, President Biden stated that, “At the request of the
Government of Lebanon, approximately 36 United States military personnel are deployed to
Lebanon to enhance the government’s counterterrorism capabilities and to support the
counterterrorism operations of Lebanese security forces.”80
Economic Assistance
The Administration’s FY2024 request for ESF funds for Lebanon states that U.S. economic
assistance “will continue to advance activities that empower and mobilize the private sector to
effectively stabilize the economy; improve food security; improve socio-economic conditions;
help prevent state collapse due to on-going economic crisis; and improve Lebanon’s access to
economical, reliable, and clean energy.”81 Specific programs include those designed to expand
and improve public services (including potable water supply systems, power generation, and
waste management). The request also states that, “Lebanon is increasingly vulnerable to malign
foreign interference, and assistance is crucial to advancing and maintaining U.S. interests and
foreign policy priorities.”
Economic assistance for Lebanon is complicated by the role that Hezbollah plays in some
government ministries as a result of the seats it holds in the cabinet (in the current caretaker
cabinet, the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of Labor are Hezbollah members). U.S.
officials have stated that the United States does not work directly with ministries whose
leadership is affiliated with Hezbollah, “nor do we generally provide assistance to the government
of Lebanon.”82 Instead, U.S. economic assistance is implemented via local partners (including

76 Ibid.
77 U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, “The United States Announces Rollout of the LAF/ ISF Livelihood Support Program in
Partnership with UNDP,” January 25, 2023.
78 “US approves new funds to help Lebanon’s ailing security agencies,” Al Arabiya, July 22, 2022.
79 Michael Foote, “Operationalizing Strategic Policy in Lebanon,” Special Warfare, vol. 25, no. 2, (April-June 2012).
80 White House, “Letter to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate regarding the War
Powers Report,” December 8, 2022.
81 FY2024 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 287.
82 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Online Event: Lebanon's Challenges: A Conversation with U.S.
Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea,” November 17, 2020.
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U.N. agencies, local nongovernmental organizations, American institutions in Lebanon, and the
private sector).
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Lebanon. In FY2022,
the United States provided over $402 million in humanitarian funding for the Lebanon response.83
The United States has provided more than $3 billion in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon since
2012.84
U.S. humanitarian assistance programs in Lebanon, implemented by groups including Mercy
Corps, the World Food Program, and UNICEF, focus on food security, primary and secondary
health care services, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) programming, child protection,
gender-based violence prevention, and mental health and psychosocial support services to
vulnerable populations.85
Conditionality on Aid to Lebanon
Annual appropriations bills establish conditions on ESF and security assistance for Lebanon.
ESF. Successive appropriations bills86 have made ESF funding for Lebanon available
notwithstanding Section 1224 of the FY2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-228),
which states that ESF funds for Lebanon may not be obligated until the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the LAF has been deployed to the Israeli-Lebanese
border and that the government of Lebanon is effectively asserting its authority in the area in
which the LAF is deployed.
FMF. Successive appropriation bills87 have stated that funding for the Lebanese Internal Security
Forces (ISF) and the LAF may not be appropriated if either body is controlled by a U.S.-
designated foreign terrorist organization. FMF assistance to the LAF may not be obligated until
the Secretary of State submits to the appropriations committees a spend plan, including actions to
be taken to ensure equipment provided to the LAF is used only for intended purposes.
Policy Debates and Issues for Congress
Regional Gas Deal
In 2021, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon finalized a deal to import natural gas from Egypt and
electricity from Jordan into Lebanon to alleviate widespread power outages. Some Members of
Congress criticized the agreement arguing that the deal would “undoubtedly enrich the Assad
regime and trigger U.S. sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.”88 U.S. officials
had previously stated that because the energy deal, expected to be funded by the World Bank,

83 USAID, “Lebanon – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #4, FY2022, September 30, 2022.
84 U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, “The United States Announces More Than $72 Million in Additional Humanitarian
Assistance for Lebanon,” November 9, 2022.
85 USAID, Lebanon—Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2023, January 20, 2023.
86 Most recently, P.L. 117-328, Division K.
87 Most recently, P.L. 117-328, Division K.
88 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, press, “Risch, McCaul Express Concern over Biden Administration’s
Engagement in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt Energy Deals,” February 1, 2022.
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“falls under the humanitarian category, no sanction waiver would be required.”89 In June 2022,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf stated that the Administration
had “made no commitments” regarding sanctions exemptions or waivers, and would make a final
determination after reviewing the finalized contracts.90
In September 2022, Lebanon’s Energy Minister affirmed that the World Bank was seeking a
number of prerequisites before financing the deal, including an increase in tariffs and the
establishment of an organizational structure for the sector’s regulatory body.91 In December 2022,
Lebanon’s Energy Minister stated that Lebanon had begun hiring for an Electricity Regulatory
Agency (ERA), thus completing the last World Bank prerequisite to unlock financing for the
agreement.92 As of early 2023, Egypt reportedly was still seeking assurances that U.S. sanctions
would be waived.93
Members may weigh the expected benefits to Syria from the deal—which reportedly include an
in-kind transfer of 8% of electricity imports and 7%-10% of the natural gas imports94—against
the expected benefits to Lebanon (up to six hours of additional electricity per day).95 Lebanon’s
state power company currently provides about 2-3 hours of electricity a day,96 triggering
widespread blackouts and prompting some U.S. adversaries to attempt to fill the gap in basic
service provision. In 2021, Hezbollah reportedly transported more than a million gallons of diesel
fuel into Lebanon.97 In September 2022, Iranian officials stated that Iran could provide Lebanon
with 600,000 tonnes of fuel to help ease power shortages.98
Expanding Sanctions
Many Members of Congress have expressed frustration with the political deadlock in Lebanon,
and have called on the Administration to expand sanctions to target Lebanese officials obstructing
reforms and/or Lebanon’s electoral process. In a December 2022 letter to Secretary of State
Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee stated, “Instead of simply waiting for political movement and
reforms, it is time for the Administration to implement a more forward leaning policy […] Given
this new phase of political deadlock and a lack of movement on necessary reforms, we strongly
urge the Administration to use its existing authorities to sanction members of Lebanon’s financial
and political elite across the political and sectarian spectrum who are engaging in corruption and
undermining the rule of law.”99 Members detailed how some Lebanese politicians have obstructed
the election of a president, stating:

89 “Egypt seeks US sanctions assurance in gas plan for Lebanon,” Al Monitor, December 14, 2021.
90 Transcript, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, “The Path Forward on U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy and
Accountability,” June 8, 2022.
91 “The Caesar Act and World Bank Terms Disrupt Egypt-Lebanon Gas Deal,” Syrian Observer, September 21, 2022.
92 “Lebanon starts hiring for power body to comply with terms for World Bank funds,” Reuters, December 9, 2022.
93 “Regional power plan for Lebanon held up over Syria sanctions - French official,” Reuters, January 31, 2023.
94 Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “The White House Is Bending the Law on Syria Sanctions,” May 12, 2022.
95 “Arab states get cold feet over Egypt-to-Lebanon gas deal,” National, February 22, 2022.
96 U.S. Policy on Lebanon: A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for NEA Ambassador Barbara Leaf,
Wilson Center, November 4, 2022.
97 “With Fuel from Iran, Hezbollah Steps In Where Lebanon Has Failed,” New York Times, September 16, 2021.
98 “Iran ready to offer Lebanon 600,000 tonnes of fuel, Al Manar TV reports,” Reuters, September 20, 2022.
99 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Press Release, “SFRC Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch Call for
Accountability of Lebanese Elite Undermining Democracy, Rule of Law,” December 16, 2022
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Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations

Hezbollah and its allies in the Amal and Free Patriotic Movement parties have prevented
the quorum that would allow the president to be selected. Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the
Lebanese Parliament and a Hezbollah ally, has facilitated these tactics by repeatedly calling
special sessions to select a president where a supermajority is needed for the first vote, only
to see pro-Hezbollah members leave parliament before a simple majority vote could take
place.” 100
A subsequent letter from the Senators to President Biden in April 2023 reiterated that, despite
recent sanctions designations on Hezbollah affiliates, “we remain discouraged by the ongoing
political deadlock, engineered by Hezbollah and its allies, like Nabih Berri.”
The Biden Administration could use existing authorities to designate additional Lebanese
officials for sanctions—for example, pursuant to E.O. 13441 (2007), “Blocking the Property of
Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions,”
originally designed to target Syrian officials interfering in Lebanese elections. To date, U.S.
sanctions related to Lebanon largely have targeted Hezbollah and its affiliates, rather than
members of Lebanon’s political class. The United States has on rare occasions designated
Lebanese politicians, including Gibran Bassil (leader of the Free Patriotic Movement) pursuant to
E.O. 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, and two
former cabinet ministers: Ali Hassan Khalil (Amal) and Youssef Fenianos (Marada Movement),
pursuant to E.O. 13224, for providing material support to Hezbollah and engaging in corruption.
Outlook
Lebanon has long served as an arena for competition among rival regional actors, particularly
Saudi Arabia and Iran—which historically have backed Lebanon's March 14 and March 8
political coalitions, respectively. In March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral
agreement to restore diplomatic ties. Iran's government subsequently announced that it would
stop arming Houthi militants in Yemen. It is unclear whether and to what extent the agreement
could also impact events in Lebanon.
Observers continue to warn about deteriorating conditions in Lebanon. In March 2023, the IMF
described the situation in Lebanon as “very dangerous”101; the same month, Assistant Secretary of
State Leaf warned that the collapse of the Lebanese state was “a real possibility,” stating that, “all
the indicators are going sharply downward, and at an accelerating speed.”102 Leaf stated that the
United States seeks to provide short-term assistance to buttress state institutions, but added that
the United States “cannot do the job of the government itself.”



100 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Press Release, “Senators Menendez, Risch Urge POTUS’ Support for
Legitimate Democratic Process in Lebanon,” April 25, 2023.
101 “IMF: Lebanon in 'very dangerous situation' with reforms stalled,” Reuters, March 23, 2023.
102 “Fireside Talk with Barbara Leaf the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State about Lebanon and the region,” May Chidiac
Foundation, March 26, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-FsDwF2sFpA.
Congressional Research Service

19
Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations


Author Information

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs



Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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Congressional Research Service
R44759 · VERSION 21 · UPDATED
20
Updated November 9, 2026 (R44759) Jump to Main Text of Report

Summary

Lebanon, the second-smallest country in the Middle East by size, has at times attracted U.S. and international attention as an arena for regional competition and conflict involving Israel and Iran. Lebanon's diverse and complex religious demographics have fueled domestic political contention and foreign military interventions. The Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Hezbollah, a powerful Lebanese militia and political party and U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, has for decades been one of the most prominent concerns of U.S. policy.

Clashes between Israel and Hezbollah since 2023 have impacted Lebanon's society and its U.S.-supported government. That government took office in 2025 after Hezbollah suffered losses in armed clashes with Israel. U.S. officials have hailed some of the Lebanese government's actions while pressing it to move more quickly and decisively to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah evidently retains some military capabilities and popular support, and it has refused to disarm as demanded by the Lebanese government.

In June 2026, Lebanon and Israel signed a U.S.-brokered Trilateral Framework in which they agreed to restore Lebanese government sovereignty "pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups … enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory" beginning in designated pilot zones. As of late October 2026, the process appears to be at something of a standstill: implementation of the Framework has not expanded beyond the initial pilot zones, and an eighth round of Lebanon-Israel talks in October 2026 ended inconclusively.

Hezbollah's refusal to disarm and its characterization of its weapons as necessary to defend Lebanon's interests against Israel raise the prospect of further civil conflict and foreign intervention in Lebanon. Lebanon's history has been marred by conflict, as it has struggled to define its national identity since its separation from Greater Syria and establishment as a French-controlled territory after the First World War. At that time, Lebanon's population included Christian and Muslim communities of roughly comparable size with competing visions for the country. Seeking to avoid sectarian conflict, Lebanese leaders created a confessional system that allocated power among the country's religious sects according to their percentages of the population. Since then, Lebanon's demographics and political dynamics have shifted, exacerbating tensions among groups. Sectarian divisions have sometimes stoked violence, such as during the 1975-1990 civil war, as well as periods of stalemate regarding government formation and action. Lebanon's divisive political dynamics have intensified with Iranian backing for Hezbollah and multiple Israeli military interventions.

Congress has, at times, helped to shape U.S. policy toward Lebanon, including through the authorization of sanctions and the appropriation of various forms of assistance. For two decades, the United States has sought to bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), providing more than $3 billion in military assistance since 2006 with the aim of creating a national force strong enough to counter nonstate actors such as Hezbollah and to secure the country's borders. The United States has sanctioned Hezbollah and its supporters, as well as other Lebanese actors (including several former Lebanese officials) engaged in activities deemed inimical to U.S. interests such as corruption and drug trafficking. Beyond sanctions and security assistance, the United States has also provided development and humanitarian assistance. Since 2019, Lebanon has undergone the worst economic crisis in its history, with a severe contraction in gross domestic product (GDP) and subsequent rise in poverty rates. Political paralysis after 2022 and recurrent conflict since 2023 have impaired economic recovery. The country's post-2025 government has undertaken some financial reforms in efforts to secure international assistance, but progress on other International Monetary Fund–sought measures has been uneven.

While U.S. officials have hailed direct Israel-Lebanon engagement, fundamental problems persist related to the sequencing and means of possibly disarming Hezbollah, which is weakened but apparently still formidable. Lebanese actors across the political spectrum, including some vociferously opposed to Hezbollah and supportive of its disarmament, have called for Israeli forces to cease operations and withdraw from the country. Those Lebanese actors charge that Israeli operations undermine the Lebanese government and bolster Hezbollah's resistance narrative. Lebanese policymakers, however, appear to have less clarity on the specific actions, if any, the Lebanese government would take to disarm Hezbollah if Israeli forces were to withdraw, particularly given apparently widespread determination to avoid the civil strife that could be triggered by militarily confronting Hezbollah.

Overview

Lebanon, the second-smallest country in the Middle East by size, has at times attracted U.S. and international attention as an arena for regional competition and conflict involving Israel and Iran. Lebanon is among the most religiously diverse countries in the Middle East, and its complex religious demographics have fueled domestic political contention and foreign military intervention (including by the United States during the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War).

Figure 1. Lebanon at-a-Glance

Area

10,230 sq. km (slightly larger than Vermont)

People

Population: ~5.3 million (2024 est.)

Religions: Muslim 69.3 (32.2% Shia, 31.2% Sunni, with smaller numbers of Alawites and Ismailis); Christian 30.5% (Maronites the largest denomination, with others including Greek Orthodox); Druze 5.5% (2023 est.)

Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $34.5 billion in current prices (2025)

GDP per capita: $5,897 in current prices (2025)

Top exports / partners: cars, gold/jewelry, scrap iron / UAE, Egypt, United States, Turkey (2024)

Unemployment rate: 11.5% (2025)

Annual inflation rate: 14.6% (2025)

GDP Growth Rate: 4.2% (2025), -6.4% (2026, projected)

In 2026, U.S. policy toward Lebanon has largely developed in response to the resumption of fighting between Israel and the Shia Islamist group Hezbollah (an Iran-backed U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO, and major political actor in Lebanon) in the context of the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict. Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah after October 2023 has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Lebanese and the displacement of hundreds of thousands, straining Lebanon's already fragile social and political institutions.1

Congress has, at times, helped to shape U.S. policy toward Lebanon, including through the authorization of sanctions and the appropriation of various forms of assistance, some with conditions attached. Some Members have followed—and made public statements about—developments in the country in 2026. Issues of active or potential congressional engagement include U.S. assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); sanctions on Hezbollah or other Lebanese actors; and Lebanese government policies, including relations with Israel, Hezbollah disarmament, and putative or proposed economic reforms.

Background: History and Political System

Lebanon's diverse population of 5.3 million people includes Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim communities of roughly comparable size.2 Political posts are divided among the country's various religious groups, or "confessions," to reflect each group's share of the population—although no formal census has been conducted in the country since 1932.3 Per the 1943 National Pact, Lebanon's unwritten governing agreement, the presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the prime minister post for a Sunni Muslim, and the Parliament speakership for a Shia Muslim.

Since its independence from France in 1943, Lebanon has been frequently wracked by upheaval, including a devastating and complex civil war from 1975 to 1990, and military interventions by Syria (which occupied parts of Lebanon from 1976 to 2005) and Israel (which invaded in 1978 and again in 1982, ultimately withdrawing from southern Lebanon in 2000). The United States deployed troops at the request of different Lebanese governments in 1958 and 1982-1984 in efforts to bring greater stability to the country.

Since 2019, when Lebanon's current economic crisis began (see "Economy" below), Lebanese politics have undergone a series of shifts. A protest movement that began in 2019 in response to tax hikes forced the resignation of the prime minister; his successor resigned following an August 2020 explosion at Beirut's port (reportedly caused by the ignition of a large volume of improperly stored ammonium nitrate) that killed over 200 people and caused massive damage. Parliamentary elections in 2022 did not result in a clear majority for any political faction, contributing to paralysis on government formation. Then-President Michel Aoun's term ended in October 2022, leaving the government in a caretaker capacity and the presidency vacant until January 2025.

2025 Presidential Election and Government Formation

After over two years of deadlock, and in the wake of the November 2024 ceasefire that halted fighting between Israel and Hezbollah (see below), Lebanon's Parliament elected LAF chief Joseph Aoun (no relation to Michel) as president in January 2025. During his leadership of the LAF from 2017 until his election as president, Aoun generally garnered commendations from U.S. officials.4 Aoun is the fourth consecutive Lebanese president to have previously served as head of the LAF. Aoun's election was seen as buttressing the influence of countries that reportedly supported him, including the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia.5

President Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam (formerly Lebanon's ambassador to the United Nations and president of the International Court of Justice) to serve as prime minister after a majority of members of Parliament endorsed Salam; Hezbollah had backed another candidate. On February 8, 2025, Prime Minister Salam formed a cabinet, the first supported by an electoral mandate since 2022. For the first time in over a decade, Hezbollah does not appear to have the ability to block government decisions, a development that may reportedly be at least partly due to U.S. insistence.6 Nevertheless, some analysts speculate that Hezbollah could retain some "influence on major security and political decisions" through ministers (including the finance minister) that are associated with Hezbollah or Amal, a Shia party that has often allied with Hezbollah.7 In March 2026, as conflict between Israel and Hezbollah resumed (below), Parliament voted to postpone national elections scheduled for May 2026 until 2028.

Hezbollah

Since its establishment in the 1980s, Hezbollah has been one of the most powerful actors in Lebanon, operating as a militia force, a political party, and a social services provider. It also remains a terrorist organization (designated as such by the United States since 1997) with transnational reach. Hezbollah involvement has been suspected in various political assassinations—notably that of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and more recently in the death of civil society activist and Hezbollah critic Lokman Slim in 2021.

Domestic politics. Hezbollah has participated in Lebanese elections since 1992; it currently holds 13 of 128 seats in Parliament.8 The group first entered the cabinet in 2005 and has held posts in each subsequent Lebanese government. Hezbollah has at times withdrawn its ministers from the cabinet to protest steps taken by the government, twice causing the government to collapse. Politically, Hezbollah appears to have lost some political influence within Lebanon since 2025, no longer having either the "blocking third" in the cabinet that it formerly used to block government decisions or its previous alliance with a prominent Maronite Christian party.9

Iranian support. Hezbollah, ideologically aligned with Iran's government, long appeared to be the strongest of the armed groups Tehran supports to bolster Iranian strategic objectives, with tens of thousands of fighters and an arsenal once estimated at over 100,000 rockets and missiles.10 The State Department's most recent Country Reports on Terrorism (released December 2024) says Iran provided Hezbollah with "most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid." Hezbollah has had relationships with and provided support to other Iran-backed groups such as the Houthis and Hamas.11 The Israeli military reportedly estimated in late March 2026 that the group had fewer than 13,000 rockets and missiles and in May 2026 that over 10,000 Hezbollah fighters had been killed since 2023.12 Iranian efforts to finance the group's rearmament have reportedly continued in 2026.13
Hezbollah-Israel Conflict The escalation of the decades-old conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2026 has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Lebanese and displacement of hundreds of thousands, mostly from the predominantly Shia south of the country, straining Lebanon's already fragile social and political institutions.14 Major combat operations largely ended in summer 2026, when Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement that envisioned the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country after the verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah. As of November 2026, progress toward implementation of the agreement has stalled. Background

Opposition to Israel is a core tenet of Hezbollah's founding ideology, and Hezbollah has regularly acted against Israel in solidarity with Palestinian militant groups in Lebanon.15 For nearly two decades, Hezbollah's stated objective was to drive the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from areas in southern Lebanon in which they operated after the 1982 Israeli invasion. In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon, but Hezbollah used the remaining Israeli presence in disputed areas in the Lebanon-Syria-Israel tri-border region to justify its ongoing violence against Israel and its existence as a non-state armed militia.16

Hezbollah has repeatedly threatened and engaged in combat with Israel, including a 34-day war in 2006 in which at least 1,200 people in Lebanon and 158 in Israel were reportedly killed.17 Following that war, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 expanded the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, created in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces after an earlier incursion into southern Lebanon and slated to cease operations at the end of 2026). UNIFIL's mandate has included assisting the Lebanese government in establishing "an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL" between the Blue Line (the UN-demarcated Israel-Lebanon border, which the two countries have not formalized) and the Litani River.18

Nevertheless, Hezbollah continued to operate in this area of southern Lebanon after 2006 amid debates over UNIFIL's effectiveness: the first Trump Administration argued that the force was "for years … overresourced given the limits on its freedom of movement and access" by Hezbollah, whereas the Biden Administration argued that UNIFIL's "most effective functions, including its liaison mechanism and patrols along the Blue Line, will provide value even as Hizballah impedes the mission's freedom of movement and restricts access, preventing full implementation of UNIFIL's mandate."19

Post-2023 Conflict and 2024 Ceasefire

In October 2023, Hezbollah began firing into Israel in stated solidarity with Hamas after Hamas led attacks on Israel.20 Hezbollah and Israeli exchanges of fire killed dozens and displaced tens of thousands in Israel and Lebanon.21 In September and October 2024, Israel's cabinet added a goal of returning evacuated Israelis living in the north to its official war objectives, which had previously focused solely on Gaza; Israeli military activities in Lebanon then escalated significantly. Israeli air operations reportedly killed most of Hezbollah's leadership, including longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah.22 Israel also orchestrated the explosion of thousands of electronic devices used by Hezbollah members and initiated ground operations in southern Lebanon, and Israeli forces destroyed many Hezbollah weapons caches and tunnel networks.23 Israeli military maneuvers and airstrikes displaced over a million people in Lebanon and left over 4,000 dead as of December 2024, according to Lebanon's health minister.24 More than 100 Israelis died during the 2023-2024 conflict.25

In November 2024, President Joe Biden announced a ceasefire agreement, including commitments from the Lebanese government to prevent Hezbollah from carrying out attacks against Israel and to deploy 10,000 LAF soldiers in southern Lebanon; a commitment from the Israeli government to halt attacks on targets in Lebanon and withdraw forces from Lebanon within 60 days; and the establishment of a multilateral mechanism to monitor ceasefire implementation.26 A reported U.S. "side letter" to Israel may have expressed U.S. support for Israeli reconnaissance flights over Lebanon and Israeli military action in response to possible ceasefire breaches.27 While Hezbollah fire largely halted after November 2024, Israeli airstrikes and other military operations in Lebanon continued in parallel with a multisided debate over ceasefire compliance, while Israeli forces continued to hold five areas across the Lebanese border.

Even as Israeli operations continued, Lebanese and Israeli military officials convened regularly with U.S., French, and UNIFIL counterparts in "pentalateral" meetings throughout 2025 to review LAF "progress on maintaining the cessation of hostilities arrangements, and the advancing of disarmament efforts."28

Lebanese officials insisted throughout 2025 that the Lebanese government would "hold the monopoly over weapons in the country."29 In August 2025, the Lebanese cabinet ordered the LAF to present a plan to bring all arms under state control by the end of the year and endorsed various U.S.-proposed objectives, including "the gradual end of the armed presence of all non-governmental entities, including Hezbollah, in all Lebanese territory."30 On January 8, 2026, the LAF announced that it had completed the first phase of its plan to bring all arms under state control by controlling all territory from the Litani to the Israeli border "with the exception of territory and positions still occupied by Israel."31 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reacted by calling LAF disarmament efforts "an encouraging beginning, but … far from sufficient" given what he characterized as Hezbollah attempts to rearm.32 UNIFIL reported in December 2025 that it had not seen evidence of Hezbollah's rearmament.33

Conflict Resumption and June 2026 Trilateral Framework

Citing the February 2026 onset of U.S and Israeli attacks on Iran as well as continued Israeli operations in Lebanon, Hezbollah restarted firing into Israel in early March 2026. In response, Israel launched a large-scale ground offensive that displaced over a million people—around 20% of the country's population—mostly from the south and other predominantly Shia areas.34 As of October 2026, Lebanon's health ministry reports over 4,300 people killed since March 2026.35

Days after Hezbollah restarted the conflict, the Lebanese government took the unprecedented step of banning Hezbollah's military activities, though the LAF chief's reported inability and/or unwillingness to enforce the decision sparked political contention both within Lebanon and between Lebanon and the United States.36 In early April, the United States and Iran agreed to a ceasefire but made contradictory public statements about its application to Lebanon. Prime Minister Netanyahu authorized direct negotiations with Lebanon days later; they began in Washington on April 14, led by the two countries' ambassadors to the United States.

In mid-June 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a memorandum of understanding which included a mutual commitment to ensure "the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon."37 Apparently wary of Iran's assertion of influence in Lebanon, the Lebanese government on June 26 signed a "Trilateral Framework" with Israel and the United States. In that agreement, Lebanon and Israel agreed to a "reciprocal, sequenced process, with clear conditions" to restore Lebanese government sovereignty "pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups … enabling the [IDF] to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory" beginning in designated pilot zones; for its part, the United States committed to "rally international partners to actively support the Government of Lebanon in rebuilding the country, repairing infrastructure, restoring the economy, and creating opportunities for prosperity."38 The first "pilot zone" operations began on July 20 in two areas that encompassed the villages of Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiya. (The IDF had occupied neither Froun nor Srifa, and the LAF was reportedly already present there39.) Some residents began returning to Zawtar al-Gharbiya on July 24, but with around 85% of the town's homes destroyed, only 16% of the town's pre-war population of around 5,000 had resettled as of early September.40

An August 2026 Israel-Lebanon meeting in Rome ended without agreement on the future of pilot zones: Lebanon pressed to expand the pilot zones to new areas, while Israel reportedly insisted on the completion of unspecified verification measures in the initial zones.41 It remains unclear who could verify Hezbollah's disarmament in the pilot zones (reportedly Britain, Italy, Switzerland, and Indonesia have been identified as potential contributors to a verification mechanism) and how they will do so amid disagreements over access to private homes.42

As of October 2026, the process appears to be at something of a standstill: implementation of the framework has not expanded beyond the two initial pilot zones, and the eighth round of talks in October ended inconclusively. U.S. and Israeli officials reportedly view Lebanese government actions as of September 2026 as "insufficient."43

Current Assessment

As of November 2026, Israeli forces have continued to conduct operations throughout southern Lebanon and have established three new fortified positions there during 2026 fighting.44 Israeli objectives in the 2026 conflict apparently included the creation of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah threats to Israel (including cross-border anti-tank fire) and the exertion of pressure on Lebanon's government and military to marginalize Hezbollah—both politically and militarily—and disrupt the group's sources of weapons and funding. To date, the Israeli buffer zone comprises around 5% of Lebanon's territory.45 Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz claimed in October 2026 that the IDF had destroyed roughly 60 villages and 23,000 homes in southern Lebanon;46 the IDF reportedly discovered weapons caches in some homes.47 Following allusions by Katz in August to the razing of southern Lebanese villages and preparations for a "long-term" IDF presence in the area, Lebanese Prime Minister Salam termed Israeli actions "systematic destruction" that violates international law. At the same time, an unnamed State Department official was quoted as saying that a permanent Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon "is not consistent with the commitments made in the framework or the long-term peace and security of both states."48

Hezbollah remains entrenched in parts of Lebanon and may be more capable in some respects than the LAF.49 It remains unclear how, if at all, the conflict has impacted the level of support for Hezbollah within the Shia community. During the 2026 conflict, a sign of Hezbollah's resilience has been its use of drones featuring fiber optic cables resistant to electronic countermeasures, which have presented security challenges for Israeli troops and areas of Israel a few miles over the border.50 In early October 2026, Lebanese authorities seized hundreds of kilograms of explosives that a Hezbollah MP said belonged to the group and detained two of the group's members while bringing charges against several more. In a November 5 joint statement, the several countries' embassies in Beirut, including the United States, encouraged "a swift, independent judicial process, free from political interference."51

Economy and Potential Reforms

Lebanon was once a relative economic success story, boasting a higher per capita gross domestic product (GDP) than any other non-oil-exporting Arab state in the Middle East as recently as 2019. That year, long periods of high government borrowing, slowing remittances from abroad, and a decline in foreign financial support culminated in a financial collapse as banks shuttered, the currency lost most of its value, and Lebanon defaulted on its foreign debt.52 A study by a UN special rapporteur stated, "The collapse of the Lebanese economy was avoidable.… [E]conomists and financial experts had warned about the impending crisis since at least 2015. Such warnings were willfully ignored by the political leadership."53

Compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, the crisis shrank nominal GDP from nearly $55 billion in 2018 to less than $20 billion in 2021, with a slight recovery in subsequent years. The government responded by reducing or eliminating subsidies on essential goods, and a lack of foreign exchange to finance imports triggered shortages of medicine, water, and fuel. According to the World Bank, the percentage of Lebanese experiencing multidimensional poverty (an index that includes non-monetary indicators such as access to clean water and electricity) increased from 42% in 2018/2019 to 73% in 2022/2023.54

The pressures associated with conflict and resulting displacement have exacerbated these conditions for many Lebanese since 2023. The World Bank estimates that GDP contracted by 7.1% in 2024, with Lebanon suffering $7.2 billion in economic losses and $6.8 billion in physical damage from conflict since October 2023.55 The economy rebounded by around 4% in 2025 but is again projected to contract by 6.4% in 2026 due to the resumption of conflict.56

Lebanon signed a staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2022 to obtain $3 billion in support in exchange for certain reforms. Parliament pursued some reforms, but efforts largely stalled after the presidency went vacant in October 2022, leaving the government in a caretaker capacity until 2025. Lebanon's current government has renewed work to obtain IMF assistance, with a focus on the following three pieces of legislation:

  • 1. Bank secrecy law. Passed by Parliament and signed by President Aoun in April 2025, this law reverses Lebanon's previously expansive bank secrecy law, which had prohibited the release of banking information (including customer account names and transactions) to government authorities.57 This law is arguably the least controversial of the IMF-mandated reforms, with 87 of 128 legislators voting in favor and 13 against.58
  • 2. Bank restructuring (or resolution) law. In August 2026, Parliament approved an amended bank restructuring law after adopting IMF-approved changes; President Aoun signed it into law in September but later filed an appeal challenging some of its provisions. The law reportedly "sets the legal framework for restructuring Lebanon's banking sector and sets up the body in charge of making it happen," namely the Higher Banking Authority.59 Disagreements between the central bank governor and the finance minister surfaced during Parliament's consideration of the amended bill.60 Both the IMF and the U.S. embassy in Beirut welcomed passage of the law.61 An October 2026 judicial ruling upheld the president's challenge, annulling part of the law and throwing its future into doubt.62
  • 3. Financial gap law. Also known as the Financial Stabilization and Deposits Recovery Law, this measure is the most important and sensitive of the potential reforms, as it determines how to apportion the tens of billions of dollars in losses among depositors, commercial banks, the central bank, and the government given the reported "'gap' between what is owed by Lebanese banks to depositors and what the Lebanese financial system can pay out."63 In December 2025, the cabinet approved a draft gap law and submitted it to Parliament, where it remains under consideration. The draft law would ensure repayment of up to $100,000 (over four years) per person to depositors who lost funds in the 2019 collapse. In a statement after a September 2026 visit to Lebanon, IMF staff wrote that the proposed gap law needs to "align … with international standards" to ensure "that the hierarchy of claims is respected and no depositors absorb losses before shareholder and junior creditors."64
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress Congressional action regarding Lebanon over the past decade has sought to counter Iranian and violent extremist influence in the country through a variety of military and economic assistance programs and related certification requirements. Some Members have also sought to expand or refine U.S. sanctions related to Lebanon with a focus on Hezbollah. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon Most U.S. bilateral assistance to Lebanon has been in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The United States has provided $3 billion in assistance to the LAF since 2006.65 Specific Trump Administration actions related to security assistance include:
  • the reported approval in March 2025 of the reallocation of $95 million in FMF from Egypt to Lebanon (announced by the Biden Administration in January 2025)66 and
  • a September 2025 Presidential Drawdown Authority package valued at $14 million, including demolition charges and other materiel to remove and dispose of unexploded ordnance.67

For years, U.S. aid for the LAF has generated debate in Congress between those who support it and those who have argued that U.S. assistance to the LAF is either insufficiently effective or risks falling into the hands of U.S. adversaries.68 Successive appropriations bills69 have stated that funding for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces and the LAF may not be appropriated if either body is controlled by a U.S.-designated FTO. FMF assistance to the LAF may not be obligated until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriations committees a spend plan, including actions to be taken to ensure that equipment provided to the LAF is used only for intended purposes. Beyond State Department–funded FMF, Section 8034 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division A of P.L. 119-75), makes available $50 million for the Secretary of Defense to assist the LAF. In the 119th Congress, H.R. 1844 would prohibit the appropriation of any funds for the LAF until the Secretary of State certifies that Hezbollah "no longer maintains any presence in Lebanon," among other conditions. In July 2025, the House voted 76-355 not to agree to an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 4016) that would have prohibited all assistance to the LAF.70

The United States has also provided assistance to Lebanon under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account (whose function appears to have been replaced during the 119th Congress by the National Security Investment Programs account).71 The Trump Administration's suspension in 2025 of most U.S. foreign assistance and the termination of some programs apparently affected the implementation of some U.S.-funded activities in Lebanon, according to 2025 media reports.72 The Trump Administration, in its FY2026 budget request, did not include country-specific funding levels. The explanatory statement accompanying the House-passed National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division B of H.R. 7006), provides for $112.5 million for assistance to Lebanon, which is roughly even with past years. Successive appropriations bills73 have made economic assistance for Lebanon available notwithstanding Section 1224 of the FY2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-228), which states that ESF funds for Lebanon may not be obligated until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the LAF has been deployed to the Israeli-Lebanese border and that the government of Lebanon is effectively asserting its authority in the area in which the LAF is deployed.

The United States has been the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in recent years: as of 2022, the United States had provided more than $3 billion in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon since 2012.74 Through January 2025, the United States had provided over $70 million in humanitarian funding for Lebanon in FY2025, implemented through nongovernmental organizations and UN bodies.75 Lebanon was not included on the list of 17 countries to which the United States committed $2 billion in humanitarian assistance in a December 2025 agreement with the United Nations.

Sanctions Though Lebanon is not subject to any state- or government-level sanctions, the United States has designated for sanctions over 300 individuals and entities in Lebanon. The vast majority are designated under Executive Order (EO) 13224 as specially designated global terrorist entities (SDGTs), generally for ties to Hezbollah. Hezbollah itself is designated as an SDGT as well as an FTO. Congress enacted additional measures in 2015 and 2018 (the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act, P.L. 114-102, and the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act, P.L. 115-272) to authorize sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions for Hezbollah. Other persons are designated under different authorities, including EO 13441, which provides for sanctions on persons determined to be undermining Lebanon's democracy or sovereignty. In January 2026, the Administration designated the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood as an FTO and SDGT.

The United States has on occasion designated Lebanese politicians and officials, including:

  • Gibran Bassil (leader of the Free Patriotic Movement), pursuant to EO 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act;
  • two former cabinet ministers (Ali Hassan Khalil of Amal and Youssef Fenianos of the Marada Movement), pursuant to EO 13224, for providing material support to Hezbollah and engaging in corruption; and
  • Former Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, pursuant to EO 13441, for corruption.

For years, some Members of Congress have called on successive Administrations to expand sanctions to target additional Lebanese officials they view as obstructing reform and/or Lebanon's electoral process. Specifically, some Members have advocated for the designation of Nabih Berri, the speaker of Parliament since 1992 and the chairman of Amal.76

In the 119th Congress, S. 842 would direct the Administration to review whether any Latin American jurisdictions meet the definition of terrorist sanctuary under Title 22, Section 2656f, of the U.S. Code with respect to Hezbollah.

Outlook

Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah since 2023 has had economic and human costs and consequences in Lebanon. The Lebanese government's tentative steps toward Hezbollah's disarmament and its attempts at financial reforms could facilitate greater political stability and economic strength in Lebanon. Reform obstacles remain, along with the risk of internal conflict and potential escalation related to U.S./Israel-Iran confrontations.

Events in Lebanon have been a factor in conflict between the United States/Israel and Iran since 2023. In turn, this U.S./Israel-Iran conflict has contributed to additional fighting in Lebanon. Lebanon's government has publicly rejected what President Aoun characterized as Iran's strategy of using Lebanon as a "bargaining chip."

Within Lebanon, the June 2026 Trilateral Framework appears subject to the same challenges that undermined the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, which was arguably fraying even before the resumption of major combat in March 2026. The most immediate obstacle remains how to sequence the potential withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory, the possible dismantlement of Hezbollah infrastructure, and prospective LAF movements into previous Hezbollah strongholds. The experience of the pilot zones since July 2026 suggests that those processes, if they move forward at all, are likely to be lengthy and difficult.

Israel has apparently sought to maintain a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah threats to Israel and to pressure Lebanon's government and military to marginalize Hezbollah politically and militarily. Continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon might impede Hezbollah's recovery; they could also fuel domestic political support for the group and its calls to resist or oppose Israel. The history of Israeli involvement in Lebanon over several decades suggests that short-term gains for Israeli security could be followed by popular domestic resistance to prolonged Israeli presence in Lebanon and/or Lebanese political decisions deemed to be driven by Israeli demands.

More fundamentally, while U.S. officials hail direct Israel-Lebanon engagement, the problem of how to bring about the disarmament of Hezbollah persists, as does the sequencing question. The Iran-backed group is weakened but apparently still maintains some capabilities and popular support and refuses to discuss disarmament until Israel's withdrawal. Lebanese actors from across the political spectrum, including some vociferously opposed to Hezbollah and supportive of its disarmament, have called for Israeli forces to cease operations and withdraw from the country.77 Those Lebanese actors charge that Israeli operations undermine the Lebanese government and bolster Hezbollah's resistance narrative. However, Lebanese policymakers appear to have less clarity when it comes to the specific actions, if any, the Lebanese government would take to disarm Hezbollah if Israeli forces were to withdraw, particularly given apparently widespread determination to avoid the civil strife that could be triggered by militarily confronting Hezbollah.

Footnotes

1.

Ramzi Kaiss, "Israeli Displacement and Killings of Civilians in Lebanon Rage On," Human Rights Watch, June 11, 2026.
2.

Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, "Lebanon" (2024 estimate, accessed August 2025).
3.

The State Department's International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 (most recent) relays an estimate from Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based research firm, that Lebanon's population was 69.3% Muslim (31.2% Sunni, 32.2% Shia), 30.5% Christian (with Maronite Catholics being the largest Christian group, followed by Greek Orthodox), and 5.5% Druze. The 1932 census found that Christians comprised 58% of the population. Some studies argue that the rules that determined who could be counted in the census were designed to produce a Christian majority. See Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1999. See also Amos Barshad, "The World's Most Dangerous Census," The Nation, October 17, 2019; and The Economist, "Lebanon: Census and Sensibility," November 5, 2016.
4.

See, for example, Joseph Haboush, "Top US Military General Meets Lebanese Army Commander, Pentagon Reaffirms Support," Al Arabiya, November 4, 2021.
5.

Sean Mathews, "US Dangles Saudi Arabia's Cash to Push Candidate for Lebanon's Presidency," Middle East Eye, January 7, 2025.

6.

Reuters, "Lebanon's Prime Minster Forms New Government After Unusual US Intervention," February 8, 2025.
7.

Hanin Ghaddar, "Lebanon's New Government May Walk a Thin Line Between Promises and Compromises," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 12, 2025; Jeanine Jalkh, "Yassin Jaber, an 'Amalite' Unlike the Others?," L'Orient Today, February 8, 2025.
8.

Timour Azhari and Laila Bassam, "What Is the Make-Up of Lebanon's New Parliament?," Reuters, May 17, 2022.
9.

Times of Israel, "Lebanon Forms First Government Since 2022; Hezbollah Won't Have 'Blocking Third' Veto," February 8, 2025; Beatrice Ferhat, "Christian Party in Lebanon Says Alliance with Hezbollah Over: What to Know," Al-Monitor, January 27, 2026.
10.

Matthew Mpoke Bigg, "What We Know About Hezbollah's Military Capability," New York Times, October 1, 2024.
11.

Farea Al-Muslimi, "Inside Hezbollah's Two-Decade Project to Shape the Houthis," New Lines, May 28, 2026; Maren Koss, "Flexible Resistance: How Hezbollah and Hamas Are Mending Ties," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 11, 2018.
12.

Feliz Solomon, "Hezbollah's Missile Arsenal Sharply Degraded, Israeli Military Says," Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2026; Yonah Jeremy Bob, "IDF Says One-Third of Hezbollah's Prewar Force Has Been Killed Since October 2023," Jerusalem Post, May 28, 2026.
13.

Laila Bassam and Maya Gebeily, "Hezbollah Readies for New Regional War with Funds from Iran, Sources Say," Reuters, October 26, 2026.
14.

Kaiss, "Israeli Displacement and Killings of Civilians in Lebanon Rage On."
15.

Wilson Center, "Doctrine of Hezbollah," October 20, 2023.
16.

Sunniva Rose, "Shebaa Farms: Why Hezbollah Uses Israel's Occupation of a Tiny Strip of Land to Justify Its Arsenal," The National, May 6, 2019.

17.

Associated Press, "One Year After War, Hezbollah Gains Strength," October 3, 2007.
18.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/RES/1701, August 11, 2006.
19.

"Statement by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Kelly Craft," S/2020/857, September 1, 2020, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2020/857; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023."
20.

Al Jazeera, "'All Scenarios Open': Hezbollah Chief in First Speech Since Israel-Gaza War," November 3, 2023.
21.

Maayan Lubell and Dan Williams, "How Hezbollah Attacks Displace 60,000 Israelis, Six Months On," Reuters, April 4, 2024.
22.

Aaron Boxerman and Lauren Leatherby, "Here Are the Hezbollah Leaders Israel Has Targeted," New York Times, October 23, 2024.
23.

Sheera Frenkel et al., "How Israel Built a Modern-Day Trojan Horse: Exploding Pagers," New York Times, September 20, 2026.
24.

Sami Halabi, "Left Unchecked, Lebanon's Displacement Crisis Could Tear the Country Apart," Al Jazeera, October 19, 2024; Nayera Abdallah, "Israeli Attacks Have Killed 4,047 People in Lebanon, Lebanese Minister Says," Reuters, December 4, 2024.
25.

Julia Frankel and Abby Sewell, "The Israel-Hezbollah War by the Numbers," Associated Press, November 27, 2024.
26.

Times of Israel, "Full Text: The Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire Agreement," November 27, 2024.
27.

Times of Israel, "Report: US 'Side Letter' to Israel Pledges to Share Intelligence on Hezbollah Activity After Ceasefire, Cooperate Against Iranian Threat," November 27, 2024.
28.

U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, "Pentalateral Members Convene for 12th Meeting; LAF Operations Ongoing in Lebanon," October 29, 2025.
29.

Naharnet, "Aoun: Decision of Arms Monopoly Has Been Taken and Won't Be Reversed," July 11, 2025.
30.

Le Monde with Agence France-Presse, "Lebanon Cabinet Holds Second Meeting on Hezbollah Disarmament," August 7, 2025.
31.

Al Jazeera, "Lebanon Army Says Phase One of Disarming Non-State Groups in South Complete," January 8, 2026.
32.

Sam Halpern and Miriam Sela-Eitam, "Lebanon Not Doing Enough to Disarm Hezbollah Despite Army's 'Operation Control,' Israel Says," Jerusalem Post, January 8, 2026.
33.

Daily Sabah, "No Proof Hezbollah Rearming in Southern Lebanon: UNIFIL," December 19, 2025.
34.

UN OCHA, "Lebanon: Flash Update #17," April 15, 2026.
35.

Christina Goldbaum et al., "Israel's Destruction of Southern Lebanon Intensified After the Cease-Fire," New York Times, October 12, 2026.
36.

Adam Chamseddine, "Lebanon's Prime Minister Mulls Sacking Army Chief over Hezbollah Disagreements," Middle East Eye, March 11, 2026.
37.

For text of the memorandum, see https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000019e-db5d-d1ed-a59f-ff5da65a0000.

38.

U.S. Department of State, "Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon," June 26, 2026.
39.

Marie Jo Sader, "In Southern Lebanon, Complex Hezbollah Disarmament and Israeli Strikes Leave Residents Desperate," Le Monde, September 2, 2026.
40.

Soubhi Amhaz, "Prefabricated Homes Arrive in Destroyed South Lebanon Town," Asharq Al-Awsat, September 25, 2026.
41.

LBCI, "LBCI Sources: Lebanon Pushes for New Pilot Zones as Talks Set to Continue September 1," August 6, 2026.
42.

Alexander Cornwell and Maya Gebeily, "UK, Italy Among States Considered to Verify Hezbollah Disarmament, Sources Say," Reuters, August 12, 2026.
43.

Rita El Jammal, "US Tells Lebanon Hezbollah Disarmament Efforts 'Not Enough,'" New Arab, September 29, 2026.
44.

Nada Homsi, "Unifil Counts Eight Fortified Bases Among 30 Israeli Military Positions in South Lebanon," The National, September 22, 2026.
45.

Hugo Bachega, "BBC Travels Inside Occupied Lebanon as Officials Say Israel Expanding Positions," BBC News, September 2, 2026.
46.

New Arab, "Israel Katz Boasts About Wiping Out More Than 60 Villages in South Lebanon," October 19, 2026.
47.

Jerusalem Post, "Watch: Hezbollah RPG, Missile Launchers Found in Civilian Home in Southern Lebanon, IDF Says," July 7, 2026.
48.

Times of Israel, "Lebanese PM Says Israel Breaching International Law as Katz Boasts of 'Destroying All Houses,'" August 13, 2026.
49.

Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni, "The Lebanese Army—The Challenge for Israel Given the Gap Between Vision and Reality," Institute for National Security Studies (Israel), March 15, 2026.
50.

Daniel Hilton and Adam Chamseddine, "The Resurrection of Hezbollah," Middle East Eye, August 5, 2026; Isabel Kershner et al., "Slyer Drones Give Hezbollah an Edge over Israel," New York Times, May 3, 2026.
51.

U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, "Friends of Lebanon Statement Affirming Support for Lebanese Sovereignty and State Monopoly on Arms," November 5, 2026.
52.

Edmund Blair, "Explainer: Lebanon's Financial Crisis and How It Happened," Reuters, January 23, 2022.

53.

UN Human Rights Council, Visit to Lebanon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Olivier De Schutter, A/HRC/50/38/Add.1, April 11, 2022.

54.

World Bank, Lebanon: Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024, May 2024.
55.

World Bank, Lebanon: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), March 2025.
56.

World Bank, "Lebanon Economic Monitor: A Conflict-Torn Economy," August 21, 2026.
57.

Ali Noureddeen, "Lifting Bank Secrecy: A Major Shift in Lebanon's Financial System," Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, July 9, 2025.
58.

Malaika Kanaaneh Tapper, "Lebanon Amends Banking Secrecy Rules in Victory for New Government," Financial Times, April 24, 2025.
59.

Stephanie Bechara, "Hacking Lebanese Politics #20: Lebanon's New Bank Resolution Law," L'Orient Today, August 20, 2025.
60.

Ali Noureddeen, "Battle over Powers in Lebanon's Bank Resolution Law," Al Modon, July 14, 2026.
61.

L'Orient Today, "IMF, US 'Welcome' Amendments to Lebanon's Banking Resolution Law," August 20, 2026.
62.

Mounir Younes, "Banking Reform: Constitutional Council Ruling Leaves Power Struggle Unresolved," L'Orient Today, October 21, 2026.
63.

Al Jazeera, "What Is Lebanon's 'Gap Law' That Attempts to End the Financial Crisis?," December 30, 2025.
64.

IMF, "IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Lebanon," press release, September 18, 2026.
65.

U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Lebanon," January 20, 2025.
66.

Agnes Helou, "US Unfreezes $95M in Military Aid to Lebanese Armed Forces," Breaking Defense, March 5, 2025. See also Department of State, "United States Announces Expanded Security Assistance to Support Lebanon's Implementation of Cessation of Hostilities," January 18, 2025 (announcing more than $117 million in "new, expanded" U.S. security assistance for the LAF and Lebanon's Internal Security Forces).
67.

Department of Defense, "Trump Administration Announces Security Assistance Package for Lebanon," September 10, 2025. The Department of Defense is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order 14347, 90 Federal Register 43893, September 5, 2025.
68.

See debate over Amendment No. 61 to H.R. 8771 (in the 118th Congress) at https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-170/issue-108/house-section/article/H4326-5.

69.

See Section 7041(e)(1), Division F, of P.L. 119-75.

70.

The House voted not to agree to similar amendments in June 2024 (103-308 on H.Amdt. 1059 to H.R. 8771) and September 2023 (120-309 on H.Amdt. 455 to H.R. 4665).
71.

U.S. Department of State, "Integrated Country Strategy: Lebanon," updated May 14, 2024.
72.

Laure Delacloche, "Explainer: Why Donald Trump's USAID Freeze Is Shaking Lebanon's Aid and Development Sector," New Arab, March 11, 2025; Zachary Davis Cuyler and Camillo Stubenberg, "What Trump's USAID Cuts to Lebanese Solar Projects Reveal About American Foreign Assistance," Century Foundation, July 14, 2025.
73.

See Section 7041(e)(3), Division F, of P.L. 119-75.
74.

U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, "The United States Announces More Than $72 Million in Additional Humanitarian Assistance for Lebanon," November 9, 2022.

75.

USAID, "Lebanon—Complex Emergency," January 13, 2025.
76.

In November 2025, Reps. Darin LaHood and Darrell Issa called for the Administration to "be prepared to use all tools available to review and sanction … those who continue to hinder democratic processes and reforms in Lebanon." Text of the letter available at https://s2.nidaalwatan.com/storage/attachments/351/LebanonLetter_209926_14ac2720f30a33e5d7781ef393f608cf.pdf.

77.

Author conversations with Lebanese officials and political stakeholders, August 2026.