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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
May May 1017, 2023 , 2023
Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 15th largest economy in the world, is bound to the Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 15th largest economy in the world, is bound to the
United States by geography and strong economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to United States by geography and strong economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to
Clare Ribando Seelke
sharing a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, Mexico is among the top U.S. trade sharing a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, Mexico is among the top U.S. trade
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
partners and a major U.S. energy supplier. Criminal violence in Mexico has imperiled U.S. partners and a major U.S. energy supplier. Criminal violence in Mexico has imperiled U.S.
American Affairs American Affairs
citizen security in parts of Mexico, and fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico has citizen security in parts of Mexico, and fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico has

contributed to surging drug overdoses in the United States. U.S.-Mexico ties, both positive and contributed to surging drug overdoses in the United States. U.S.-Mexico ties, both positive and
negative, manifest in legislative activity and interest across a wide range of issues in Congress. negative, manifest in legislative activity and interest across a wide range of issues in Congress.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, which he Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, which he
created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador has remained popular (63% approval created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador has remained popular (63% approval
rating in February 2023), likely because of his social programs, minimum wage increases, and ability to connect with voters. rating in February 2023), likely because of his social programs, minimum wage increases, and ability to connect with voters.
Critics have expressed concerns about López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government Critics have expressed concerns about López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government
institutions, and judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform civilian functions. institutions, and judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform civilian functions.
According to the International Monetary Fund, Mexico’s economy expanded 3.1% in 2022 and may expand 1.8% in 2023. According to the International Monetary Fund, Mexico’s economy expanded 3.1% in 2022 and may expand 1.8% in 2023.
Observers expect MORENA to dominate the July 2024 presidential elections even though President López Obrador is Observers expect MORENA to dominate the July 2024 presidential elections even though President López Obrador is
constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection. constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection.
U.S. Policy
U.S.-Mexico relations have grown turbulent during the López Obrador administration. Mexico has accommodated changing U.S.-Mexico relations have grown turbulent during the López Obrador administration. Mexico has accommodated changing
U.S. immigration and border security policies, negotiated a U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA), worked U.S. immigration and border security policies, negotiated a U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA), worked
with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched security cooperation under a new Bicentennial Framework. with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched security cooperation under a new Bicentennial Framework.
Nevertheless, ongoing insecurity in Mexico and illicit drug trafficking from Mexico, trade disputes, and U.S. concerns over Nevertheless, ongoing insecurity in Mexico and illicit drug trafficking from Mexico, trade disputes, and U.S. concerns over
democracy and human rights issues have caused tension. The Mexican government has pressed for increased U.S. efforts to democracy and human rights issues have caused tension. The Mexican government has pressed for increased U.S. efforts to
address drug demand and gun trafficking. Key issues of congressional interest discussed in this report include the following: address drug demand and gun trafficking. Key issues of congressional interest discussed in this report include the following:
Transnational Crime and Drug Control: Congress may continue to fund and oversee bilateral efforts to Congress may continue to fund and oversee bilateral efforts to
combat cross-border crime a under the Bicentennial Framework signed in October 2021, particularly as combat cross-border crime a under the Bicentennial Framework signed in October 2021, particularly as
“phase two” of the framework, adopted in March 2023, focuses on combating U.S.-bound fentanyl “phase two” of the framework, adopted in March 2023, focuses on combating U.S.-bound fentanyl
trafficking and Mexico-bound arms trafficking. trafficking and Mexico-bound arms trafficking.
Irregular Immigration: Congress may continue to monitor Mexico’s role in reducing irregular U.S.- Congress may continue to monitor Mexico’s role in reducing irregular U.S.-
bound migration, including migration control and humanitarian protection efforts bound migration, including migration control and humanitarian protection efforts, particularly now that pandemic-related restrictions on seeking asylum at the Southwest border have been lifted. •.
Human Rights: Members of Congress may continue to support Mexico’s efforts to address human rights Members of Congress may continue to support Mexico’s efforts to address human rights
challenges, including violence against journalists and human rights defenders, enforced disappearances, challenges, including violence against journalists and human rights defenders, enforced disappearances,
and femicide. and femicide.
Free Trade: Congress may closely monitor both countries’ adherence to the USMCA, with particular Congress may closely monitor both countries’ adherence to the USMCA, with particular
interest in labor conditions in Mexico and energy policies in Mexico that may violate the agreement. interest in labor conditions in Mexico and energy policies in Mexico that may violate the agreement.
Border Environmental Concerns. Congress may oversee attempts to resolve long-standing transboundary Congress may oversee attempts to resolve long-standing transboundary
pollution issues and water sharing on the Southwest border and may consider funding for infrastructure pollution issues and water sharing on the Southwest border and may consider funding for infrastructure
improvements to address such problems. improvements to address such problems.
Legislative Action
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has overseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound
unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, and USMCA implementation. The 118th Congress is considering the Biden The 118th Congress is considering the Biden
Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022
enacted level of $127.1 million and 30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million. Members of Congress have enacted level of $127.1 million and 30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million. Members of Congress have
introduced a introduced a wide range of proposals to address fentanyl trafficking from Mexico, range of proposals to address fentanyl trafficking from Mexico, including a House Foreign Committee-reported measure, H.R. 3205, that would prioritize working with Mexico to disrupt fentanyl supply chains and countering Chinese fentanyl operations in Mexico. On including bills that would authorize the use
of U.S. military force in Mexico (H.J.Res 18) and that would designate Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations
(e.g., H.Res. 216, S. 698), some of which have prompted strong negative reactions from the Mexican government. On
migration, legislative proposals have ranged from addressing irregular migration flows through humanitarian pathways and migration, legislative proposals have ranged from addressing irregular migration flows through humanitarian pathways and
increased access to asylum to increased access to asylum to codifying policies and procedures to limit access to asylum put in place during the Trump
Administration (H.R. 1690, H.R. 2, Title III)House-passed legislation (H.R. 2) that would limit access to asylum and direct the Administration to reestablish the Migration Protection Protocols (MPP) concluded during the Trump Administration. MPP required many migrants to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. See CRS Insight IN12159, Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to Manage Regional Migration. .
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Political and Economic Environment .............................................................................................. 3
Security Conditions and Policy Responses ............................................................................... 4
Addressing Corruption .............................................................................................................. 6
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 7
Economic and Social Conditions .............................................................................................. 8
López Obrador Government’s Economic and Energy Policies ........................................... 9
Social Conditions .............................................................................................................. 10
Foreign Policy .......................................................................................................................... 11
U.S.-Mexico Relations and Issues for Congress ........................................................................... 12
Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Assistance ................................................................. 13
Antidrug Efforts: Focus on Fentanyl Trafficking .................................................................... 15
Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions .................................................................... 17
Human Rights.......................................................................................................................... 18
Migration Management ........................................................................................................... 20
Economic and Trade Relations and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement .............................. 22
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border .............................................................................. 23
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement ...................................................................................... 2324

Energy ..................................................................................................................................... 25
Border Environmental Issues .................................................................................................. 26
International Boundary and Water Commission ............................................................... 27
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ............................................................................ 27
USMCA Implementation Act, IBWC, and Minute 328 .................................................... 28
North American Development Bank ................................................................................. 28

Water Resource Issues ............................................................................................................. 29
U.S.-Mexico Health Cooperation ............................................................................................ 30
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 32

Figures
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance .......................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Composition of Mexican Congress by Party: May 2023 ................................................. 4
Figure 3. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Homicides in Mexico ............................................ 5
Figure 4. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Frameworks ........................................................... 14
Figure 5. Extraditions: from Mexico by Administration: 2000-2022 ............................................ 18
Figure 6. Mexico: Reported Asylum Applications and Apprehensions ......................................... 21

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2020-FY2024 ................................................................. 14

Table B-1. Estimated Mérida/Bicentennial Framework Funding: FY2008-FY2022 .................... 34
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Key Justice Institutions ............................................................................................ 33
Appendix B. Mérida Initiative Funding ........................................................................................ 34

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 35


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Introduction
Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading partner with Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading partner with
which the United States has a close but complex relationship (seewhich the United States has a close but complex relationship (see Figure 1). In recent decades, . In recent decades,
bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the
countries worked together to address crime, migration, and other issues of shared concern. countries worked together to address crime, migration, and other issues of shared concern.
Disagreements on these issues have emerged on occasion, however, as exemplified by U.S. Disagreements on these issues have emerged on occasion, however, as exemplified by U.S.
concerns about fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico and Mexican government concerns about fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico and Mexican government
concerns about U.S. counterdrug actions inside Mexico and arms trafficking.1 The history of U.S. concerns about U.S. counterdrug actions inside Mexico and arms trafficking.1 The history of U.S.
military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has arguably exacerbated such tension.2 military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has arguably exacerbated such tension.2
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized crime-related violence in Mexico on Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized crime-related violence in Mexico on
U.S. security interests and about U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. It has increased oversight of U.S. security interests and about U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. It has increased oversight of
U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and may continue to do so as the two nations implement the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and may continue to do so as the two nations implement the
U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework agreement.3 Congress has continued to appropriate foreign U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework agreement.3 Congress has continued to appropriate foreign
assistance for Mexico and oversee bilateral efforts to address illegal drug flows, unauthorized assistance for Mexico and oversee bilateral efforts to address illegal drug flows, unauthorized
migration, environmental issues, and lessons learned on health and supply chain management migration, environmental issues, and lessons learned on health and supply chain management
from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Implementation of the United States-from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Implementation of the United States-
Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) and its labor commitments, Mexico’s treatment Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) and its labor commitments, Mexico’s treatment
of U.S. energy firms, and border environmental issues may also receive oversight attention. of U.S. energy firms, and border environmental issues may also receive oversight attention.
This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico, followed by This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico, followed by
overviews of selected issues of congressional interest in Mexico—security cooperation and overviews of selected issues of congressional interest in Mexico—security cooperation and
foreign aid; fentanyl trafficking, extraditions; human rights, trade; migration; energy; and border foreign aid; fentanyl trafficking, extraditions; human rights, trade; migration; energy; and border
environmental, water, and health concerns. environmental, water, and health concerns.
Background
Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929-2000, by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929-2000,
to a true multiparty democracy.4 Since the 1990s, presidential power has become more balanced to a true multiparty democracy.4 Since the 1990s, presidential power has become more balanced
with that of Mexico’s Congress and Supreme Court. Partially as a result of these new constraints with that of Mexico’s Congress and Supreme Court. Partially as a result of these new constraints
on executive power, the country’s first two presidents from the conservative National Action on executive power, the country’s first two presidents from the conservative National Action
Party (PAN)—Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)—struggled to enact Party (PAN)—Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)—struggled to enact
some of the reforms designed to address Mexico’s economic and security challenges. some of the reforms designed to address Mexico’s economic and security challenges.
The Calderón government pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security The Calderón government pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security
cooperation with the United States. Mexico extradited many drug kingpins, but some 60,000 cooperation with the United States. Mexico extradited many drug kingpins, but some 60,000
people died due to organized crime-related violence. Security challenges overshadowed the people died due to organized crime-related violence. Security challenges overshadowed the
government’s achievements, including its economic stewardship during the global financial crisis, government’s achievements, including its economic stewardship during the global financial crisis,
health care expansion and management of the H1N1 pandemic, and efforts on climate change. health care expansion and management of the H1N1 pandemic, and efforts on climate change.
In 2012, the PRI regained control of the presidency after 12 years in the opposition with a victory In 2012, the PRI regained control of the presidency after 12 years in the opposition with a victory
by Enrique Peña Nieto over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, then standing for the leftist by Enrique Peña Nieto over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, then standing for the leftist

1 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray Over Fentanyl,” 1 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray Over Fentanyl,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2023. , April 14, 2023.
2 Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., 2 Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., Mexico and the United States: the Politics of Partnership (Boulder, CO: (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013). Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013).
3 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2022. 3 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2022.
4 Emily Edmonds Poli and David A. Shirk, 4 Emily Edmonds Poli and David A. Shirk, Contemporary Mexican Politics,, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2020). Littlefield, 2020).
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Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In 2013, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms on energy, Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In 2013, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms on energy,
education, access to finance, and politics through the legislature by forming an agreement among education, access to finance, and politics through the legislature by forming an agreement among
the PRI, PAN, and PRD. The energy reform opened Mexico’s energy sector to private investment, the PRI, PAN, and PRD. The energy reform opened Mexico’s energy sector to private investment,
prompting foreign companies to pledge hundreds of billions of dollars of new investment in the prompting foreign companies to pledge hundreds of billions of dollars of new investment in the
country. During Peña Nieto’s term, Mexico continued to contend with high levels of homicides, country. During Peña Nieto’s term, Mexico continued to contend with high levels of homicides,
moderate economic growth (averaging 2% annually), and pervasive corruption and impunity. moderate economic growth (averaging 2% annually), and pervasive corruption and impunity.
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance

Sources: Created by CRS using data from CIA World Factbook (CIA), Mexico’s National Council for the Created by CRS using data from CIA World Factbook (CIA), Mexico’s National Council for the
Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico’s National Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico’s National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the Trade Data Monitor (TDM). Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
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Notes: Mexico’s 2020 census did not include ethnicity; two questions asked people whether they self-identify as Mexico’s 2020 census did not include ethnicity; two questions asked people whether they self-identify as
Indigenous language speakers (6.1% of the population) or as Afro-Mexican or Afro-descendant (2% of the Indigenous language speakers (6.1% of the population) or as Afro-Mexican or Afro-descendant (2% of the
population). See the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, population). See the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Así Se Contó México, 2021. , 2021.
Political and Economic Environment
Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, leader of the leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took Obrador, leader of the leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took
office for a six-year term in December 2018.5 President López Obrador, who created MORENA office for a six-year term in December 2018.5 President López Obrador, who created MORENA
in 2014, is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both in 2014, is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both
legislative chambers, although the size of those majorities decreased following the June 2021 legislative chambers, although the size of those majorities decreased following the June 2021
midterm elections (Seemidterm elections (See Figure 2 below). below).
President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained high (63% in February 2023) even as President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained high (63% in February 2023) even as
he struggled to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and continues to be challenged by entrenched he struggled to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and continues to be challenged by entrenched
poverty and corruption.6 Supporters of the government have generally praised its social programs poverty and corruption.6 Supporters of the government have generally praised its social programs
and minimum wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with his constituents and minimum wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with his constituents
through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Critics of the government point through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Critics of the government point
to López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions, and to López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions, and
judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform roles judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform roles
previously carried out by civilian agencies in public security, health, infrastructure, customs, and previously carried out by civilian agencies in public security, health, infrastructure, customs, and
other sectors. López Obrador has spared his priority, military-built, infrastructure projects from other sectors. López Obrador has spared his priority, military-built, infrastructure projects from
budget cuts while reducing certain other public spending. López Obrador’s administration has cut budget cuts while reducing certain other public spending. López Obrador’s administration has cut
public sector salaries and ministry budgets, especially those of autonomous institutions that he public sector salaries and ministry budgets, especially those of autonomous institutions that he
proposes to eliminate or merge into existing bureaucracies. proposes to eliminate or merge into existing bureaucracies.
As of May 2023, MORENA controlled 201 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60 of As of May 2023, MORENA controlled 201 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60 of
128 seats in the Mexican Senate (See128 seats in the Mexican Senate (See Figure 2). MORENA relies on ad hoc support from other . MORENA relies on ad hoc support from other
parties, including the PT, PES, and Green Party, to pass legislation. With these parties, the parties, including the PT, PES, and Green Party, to pass legislation. With these parties, the
MORENA-led coalition controls 275 seats in the lower chamber and 76 seats in the senate, short MORENA-led coalition controls 275 seats in the lower chamber and 76 seats in the senate, short
of the two-thirds majority needed to make constitutional amendments. In 2022, the congress of the two-thirds majority needed to make constitutional amendments. In 2022, the congress
blocked a proposed constitutional reform that would have severely limited private sector blocked a proposed constitutional reform that would have severely limited private sector
involvement in the electricity sector.7 In contrast, the congress approved MORENA-backed involvement in the electricity sector.7 In contrast, the congress approved MORENA-backed
legislation to place the National Guard, a military-led federal law enforcement body created by legislation to place the National Guard, a military-led federal law enforcement body created by
the López Obrador government, under the authority of the defense ministry in September 2022. the López Obrador government, under the authority of the defense ministry in September 2022.
Mexico’s Supreme Court declared that reform unconstitutional in April 2023.8 Domestic and Mexico’s Supreme Court declared that reform unconstitutional in April 2023.8 Domestic and
international observers international observers have criticized legislative reforms enacted in 2023 thatcriticized legislative reforms enacted in 2023 that, if ruled
constitutional by Mexico’s Supreme Court, could severely weaken the independence and capacity could severely weaken the independence and capacity
of the country’s independent electoral commission ahead of the of the country’s independent electoral commission ahead of the 2024 elections.9

5 Originally from the southern state of Tabasco, López Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005), had run 5 Originally from the southern state of Tabasco, López Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005), had run
for president in the past two elections. After his 2012 loss, he left the center-left PRD and founded MORENA. for president in the past two elections. After his 2012 loss, he left the center-left PRD and founded MORENA.
6 Carin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, March 6, 6 Carin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, March 6,
2023; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2023; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Mexico, March 2023. Hereinafter: EIU, March 2023. On , March 2023. Hereinafter: EIU, March 2023. On
corruption, see “MEXICO: Scandal at Flagship Governmental Body Deepens,” corruption, see “MEXICO: Scandal at Flagship Governmental Body Deepens,” Latin News Security & Strategic
Review
, May 2023. , May 2023.
7 Drazen Jorgic and Dave Graham, “Mexican President’s Contentious Electricity Overhaul Defeated in Congress,” 7 Drazen Jorgic and Dave Graham, “Mexican President’s Contentious Electricity Overhaul Defeated in Congress,”
Reuters, April 18, 2022. Reuters, April 18, 2022.
8 Associated Press (AP), “Mexico Court: National Guard Shift to Army Unconstitutional,” April 18, 2023. 8 Associated Press (AP), “Mexico Court: National Guard Shift to Army Unconstitutional,” April 18, 2023.
9 David Frum, “The Autocrat Next Door,” The Atlantic, February 21, 2023.
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2024 elections.9 In mid-May 2023, the Supreme Court struck down key elements of that electoral reform in a decision that prompted harsh criticism by President López Obrador.10 Figure 2. Composition of Mexican Congress by Party: May 2023

Source: Created by CRS using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and Mexican Senate. Created by CRS using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and Mexican Senate.
Notes: MORENA = National Regeneration Movement; PVEM = Green Party; PT = Worker’s Party; PAN = MORENA = National Regeneration Movement; PVEM = Green Party; PT = Worker’s Party; PAN =
National Action Party; PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; MC = Citizen’s Movement; PRD = Democratic National Action Party; PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; MC = Citizen’s Movement; PRD = Democratic
Revolutionary Party; and PES = Social Encounter Party. Revolutionary Party; and PES = Social Encounter Party.
Political attention in Mexico is focused on who will stand for MORENA in the 2024 elections, as Political attention in Mexico is focused on who will stand for MORENA in the 2024 elections, as
López Obrador is constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection, and whether the opposition, López Obrador is constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection, and whether the opposition,
which remains relatively weak and divided, will be able to select a unified candidate. As of May which remains relatively weak and divided, will be able to select a unified candidate. As of May
2023, no leading candidates for the opposition parties have emerged. Mexico City Mayor Claudia 2023, no leading candidates for the opposition parties have emerged. Mexico City Mayor Claudia
Sheinbaum and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard are among the leading contenders vying to Sheinbaum and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard are among the leading contenders vying to
stand for MORENA. stand for MORENA.
Security Conditions and Policy Responses
From 2015 to 2018, the homicide rate in Mexico surged some 71%, reaching a record 29 From 2015 to 2018, the homicide rate in Mexico surged some 71%, reaching a record 29
homicides per 100,000 people.homicides per 100,000 people.1011 Homicides in Mexico remained near those record-setting levels Homicides in Mexico remained near those record-setting levels
leading up to and during the COVID-19 pandemic but have since declined.leading up to and during the COVID-19 pandemic but have since declined.1112 High levels of High levels of
homicides have largely mirrored trends in organized crime-related violence, as criminal groups homicides have largely mirrored trends in organized crime-related violence, as criminal groups
have fought for control over illicit smuggling routes into the United States (seehave fought for control over illicit smuggling routes into the United States (see Figure 3).1213 On On
March 3, 2023, cartel gunmen kidnapped four U.S. citizens (two of whom were subsequently March 3, 2023, cartel gunmen kidnapped four U.S. citizens (two of whom were subsequently
killed) who reportedly had traveled to the city of Matamoros for medical services, prompting killed) who reportedly had traveled to the city of Matamoros for medical services, prompting
significant U.S. concern.13 By 2021, femicides (targeted killing of women) increased

10 9 David Frum, “The Autocrat Next Door,” The Atlantic, February 21, 2023. 10 Juan Pablo Spinetto, “AMLO’s Legacy Is Threatened by Mexico’s Top Court,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2023. 11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Homicide database, at https://dataunodc.un.org/ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Homicide database, at https://dataunodc.un.org/
content/Country-profile?country=Mexico. content/Country-profile?country=Mexico.
1112 Laura Y. Calderón et al., Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico: 2021 Special Report,, Justice in Mexico, Justice in Mexico,
University of San Diego, October 2021. Hereinafter Calderón et al., University of San Diego, October 2021. Hereinafter Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021. , 2021.
1213 Infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation cartel. See CRS Report Infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation cartel. See CRS Report
R41576, R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel. , by June S. Beittel.
13 Kevin Sieff et al. “Two of the Americans Kidnapped in Mexico Are Found Dead,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023.
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significant U.S. concern.14 By 2021, femicides (targeted killing of women) increased approximately 137% from 2015 levels.approximately 137% from 2015 levels.1415 Enforced disappearances,,1516 kidnappings, and other kidnappings, and other
violent crimes also have surged periodically. violent crimes also have surged periodically.
The estimated number of missing and disappeared people in Mexico now exceeds 112,000, with most of those reported since Calderón took office.17 Figure 3. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Homicides in Mexico
(2008-2022) (2008-2022)

Source: Created by CRS. Information from Lantia Intelligencia, a Mexican security firm. Created by CRS. Information from Lantia Intelligencia, a Mexican security firm.
Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have fought to satisfy U.S. drug demand Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have fought to satisfy U.S. drug demand
while also engaging in other illicit activities such as alien smuggling, fuel theft, arms trafficking, while also engaging in other illicit activities such as alien smuggling, fuel theft, arms trafficking,
and money laundering. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that some 70% of and money laundering. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that some 70% of
firearms recovered in Mexico originated in the United States.firearms recovered in Mexico originated in the United States.1618 Bulk cash smuggling continues, Bulk cash smuggling continues,
but TCOs also launder drug profits through complex schemes, some of which involve Chinese but TCOs also launder drug profits through complex schemes, some of which involve Chinese
businesses and money traders, as well as through schemes to hide illicit profits in remittance businesses and money traders, as well as through schemes to hide illicit profits in remittance
flows sent from the United States.flows sent from the United States.1719
President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on transnational criminal organizations, as President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on transnational criminal organizations, as
such an approached failed under his two predecessors. Instead, his administration’s security such an approached failed under his two predecessors. Instead, his administration’s security
strategy includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of violent crime. The strategy includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of violent crime. The
administration launched a program that provides scholarships to youth to attend university or administration launched a program that provides scholarships to youth to attend university or
complete internships. No one has evaluated the program’s effects on youth employability or complete internships. No one has evaluated the program’s effects on youth employability or
crime prevention,18 and auditors have uncovered irregularities in the program’s implementation.19

14crime 14 Kevin Sieff et al. “Two of the Americans Kidnapped in Mexico Are Found Dead,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023. 15 Woodrow Wilson Center, “Engendering Safety: Addressing Femicide in Mexico,” press release, July 15, 2022, Woodrow Wilson Center, “Engendering Safety: Addressing Femicide in Mexico,” press release, July 15, 2022,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/engendering-safety-addressing-femicide-mexico. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/engendering-safety-addressing-femicide-mexico.
1516 According to the United Nations, According to the United Nations, enforced disappearances occur when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted occur when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted
against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by
organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government.” See http://www.un.org/en/events/disappearancesday/background.shtml. acquiescence of the Government.” See http://www.un.org/en/events/disappearancesday/background.shtml.
1617 “Mexico to Launch Database of over 100,000 ‘Disappeared’ People,” Reuters, May 11, 2023. 18 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into
Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis
, GAO 21-322, February 2021. , GAO 21-322, February 2021.
1719 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat Assessment, March 2021; U.S. Department of the March 2021; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, “Treasury Announces 2022 National Illicit Finance Strategy,” May 13, 2022; Signos Vitales, Treasury, “Treasury Announces 2022 National Illicit Finance Strategy,” May 13, 2022; Signos Vitales, Euforia de las
Remesas: Ėxodo, Lavado de Dinero, y Auge Económico
, March 2023., March 2023.
18 Alán Lopez, “Jovenes Perdiendo su Futúro,” Nexos, February 17, 2020.
19 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las Irregularidades que la ASF Encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
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prevention,20 and auditors have uncovered irregularities in the program’s implementation.21 Neither López Obrador nor Mexico’s prosecutor general have devoted resources to strengthening Neither López Obrador nor Mexico’s prosecutor general have devoted resources to strengthening
the accusatorial justice system that took effect in 2016 or the independence of the National the accusatorial justice system that took effect in 2016 or the independence of the National
Prosecutor’s Office.Prosecutor’s Office.2022 The administration has sought to increase the types of crimes subject to The administration has sought to increase the types of crimes subject to
mandatory pretrial detention, contravening a goal of the reforms. Impunity for homicide remains mandatory pretrial detention, contravening a goal of the reforms. Impunity for homicide remains
above 90%, and Mexico ranks 135 out of 140 countries ranked by the World Justice Project in above 90%, and Mexico ranks 135 out of 140 countries ranked by the World Justice Project in
2022 based on the performance of its criminal justice system.2022 based on the performance of its criminal justice system.2123
In contrast to his campaign pledges, President López Obrador has expanded, not limited, the In contrast to his campaign pledges, President López Obrador has expanded, not limited, the
military’s role in public security and an array of other public sector tasks.military’s role in public security and an array of other public sector tasks.2224 In 2019, López In 2019, López
Obrador backed constitutional reforms that created a National Guard to replace the Federal Police Obrador backed constitutional reforms that created a National Guard to replace the Federal Police
(a force that had received significant U.S. equipment and training). In May 2020, López Obrador (a force that had received significant U.S. equipment and training). In May 2020, López Obrador
signed a decree to allow military involvement in public security to continue through 2025, a signed a decree to allow military involvement in public security to continue through 2025, a
policy that Mexico’s congress extended through 2028.policy that Mexico’s congress extended through 2028.2325 Although Mexico’s National Guard Although Mexico’s National Guard
(composed mostly of military police units of the army and navy) is involved in territorial control (composed mostly of military police units of the army and navy) is involved in territorial control
in high-crime areas, border and immigration enforcement, and communications interception, it in high-crime areas, border and immigration enforcement, and communications interception, it
has limited capacity to investigate crimes.has limited capacity to investigate crimes.2426 State and local police forces charged with State and local police forces charged with
investigating most crimes, including homicides, have received less federal support from the investigating most crimes, including homicides, have received less federal support from the
López Obrador government than they received under prior administrations.López Obrador government than they received under prior administrations.2527
Addressing Corruption
Corruption is an issue at all levels of government and among all political parties in Mexico. Corruption is an issue at all levels of government and among all political parties in Mexico.
While most evident at the municipal and state level, corruption and collusion between public While most evident at the municipal and state level, corruption and collusion between public
servants and crime groups occurs at the federal level, as well. In February 2023, a U.S. federal servants and crime groups occurs at the federal level, as well. In February 2023, a U.S. federal
jury convicted Genaro García Luna, public security minister during the PAN administration of jury convicted Genaro García Luna, public security minister during the PAN administration of
President Calderón, on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa President Calderón, on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa
Cartel.Cartel.2628 In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador
Cienfuegos (2012-2018) on drug and money-laundering charges surprised and angered the Cienfuegos (2012-2018) on drug and money-laundering charges surprised and angered the
Mexican government. Responding to Mexican pressure, the United States agreed to drop the case Mexican government. Responding to Mexican pressure, the United States agreed to drop the case
and allow Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, where he was exonerated. and allow Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, where he was exonerated.
President López Obrador has taken steps to combat corruption, but the key institutions to detect President López Obrador has taken steps to combat corruption, but the key institutions to detect
and address corrupt offenses—such as the new criminal justice system, the Prosecutor General’s and address corrupt offenses—such as the new criminal justice system, the Prosecutor General’s
Office, and the National Anti-corruption System—remain weak (seOffice, and the National Anti-corruption System—remain weak (see Appendix A). President . President
López Obrador has been unwilling to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations involving his López Obrador has been unwilling to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations involving his
family and allies.27 His administration’s focus on reducing government expenditures and efforts

20 Alán Lopez, “Jovenes Perdiendo su Futúro,” Nexos, February 17, 2020. 21 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las Irregularidades que la ASF Encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El Financiero,, February 21, 2021. February 21, 2021.
2022 See, for example, Justice in Mexico, See, for example, Justice in Mexico, Prosecutorial Reform in Mexico: Assessing the Progress of the National
Prosecutor’s Office,
March 16, 2021. March 16, 2021.
2123 Impunidad Cero, Impunidad Cero, Impunidad en Homicidio Doloso y Femicidio 2022, December 2022; , December 2022; WJP Rule of Law Index, 2022. , 2022.
2224 Craig Deare, Craig Deare, Militarization a la AMLO: How Bad Can It Get?, Wilson Center, September 2021. , Wilson Center, September 2021.
2325 Those reforms contradict a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in public Those reforms contradict a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in public
security violated the Mexican Constitution. security violated the Mexican Constitution.
2426 Iñigo Guevara, Iñigo Guevara, Mexico’s National Guard: When Police Are Not Enough, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico , Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico
Institute, January 2020; “Vigila Guardia Nacional 84 Hospitales de IMSS,” Institute, January 2020; “Vigila Guardia Nacional 84 Hospitales de IMSS,” Reforma, April 15, 2020. , April 15, 2020.
2527 Maureen Meyer, Maureen Meyer, Police Reform and Security Strategies in Mexico in the Context of the war on Drugs and U.S.
Support of These Efforts
, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), July 2020. , Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), July 2020.
2628 U.S. Department of Justice, “Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Convicted of Engaging U.S. Department of Justice, “Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Convicted of Engaging
in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Taking Millions in Cash Bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel,” February 21, 2023. in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Taking Millions in Cash Bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel,” February 21, 2023.
27 See, for example, Andrés Bello, “Why Allegations About His Son Could Hurt Mexico’s President,” Economist,
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family and allies.29 His administration’s focus on reducing government expenditures and efforts to to punish tax evaders have won praise from some citizens. Nevertheless, observers worry that punish tax evaders have won praise from some citizens. Nevertheless, observers worry that
cuts in public sector salaries have made officials more susceptible to bribes and that tax-related cuts in public sector salaries have made officials more susceptible to bribes and that tax-related
“anti-corruption” probes have sometimes been used to intimidate government opponents.“anti-corruption” probes have sometimes been used to intimidate government opponents.2830
Human Rights
Criminal groups, sometimes in collusion with state actors, have continued to commit serious Criminal groups, sometimes in collusion with state actors, have continued to commit serious
human rights violations against civilians in Mexico.human rights violations against civilians in Mexico.2931 The vast majority of those abuses have The vast majority of those abuses have
gone unpunished, whether they were prosecuted in the military or civilian justice systems. Under gone unpunished, whether they were prosecuted in the military or civilian justice systems. Under
Mexico’s new justice system, judges have Mexico’s new justice system, judges have had to let many defendants go free, even if they may
have been guilty, due to police misconduct in gathering evidence.30released defendants due to a lack of evidence or a lack of admissible evidence.32 The government continues to The government continues to
receive criticism for not protecting journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and other receive criticism for not protecting journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and other
vulnerable groups from abuses, as well as for its expansion of military involvement in public vulnerable groups from abuses, as well as for its expansion of military involvement in public
security despite abuses committed by security forces.security despite abuses committed by security forces.3133 Reports have documented the López Reports have documented the López
Obrador government’s improper use of military-purchased spyware to surveil public officials, Obrador government’s improper use of military-purchased spyware to surveil public officials,
civil society leaders, and others.civil society leaders, and others.3234
For years, human rights groups and the U.S. State Department’s For years, human rights groups and the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices
have chronicled cases of Mexican security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial have chronicled cases of Mexican security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial
killings, torture, and “enforced disappearances.”killings, torture, and “enforced disappearances.”3335 The unresolved case of 43 missing students The unresolved case of 43 missing students
who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, in September 2014—which allegedly involved the local who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, in September 2014—which allegedly involved the local
police and federal authorities—galvanized global protests. Experts from the Inter-American police and federal authorities—galvanized global protests. Experts from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights disproved much of the attorney general’s investigation, and in Commission on Human Rights disproved much of the attorney general’s investigation, and in
2018, a federal judge dismissed that investigation as biased. President López Obrador established 2018, a federal judge dismissed that investigation as biased. President López Obrador established
a truth commission, and Prosecutor General Gertz Manero created a special prosecutor’s office to a truth commission, and Prosecutor General Gertz Manero created a special prosecutor’s office to
focus on the case. As of May 2023, authorities have arrested more than 80 suspects for crimes focus on the case. As of May 2023, authorities have arrested more than 80 suspects for crimes
related to the case but prosecutors have yet to secure any convictions.related to the case but prosecutors have yet to secure any convictions.3436
Among the human rights challenges facing Mexico, President López Obrador has prioritized Among the human rights challenges facing Mexico, President López Obrador has prioritized
addressing enforced disappearances.addressing enforced disappearances.3537 His administration has met regularly with families of the His administration has met regularly with families of the
missing, launched an online portal for reporting missing persons, registered thousands of missing, launched an online portal for reporting missing persons, registered thousands of
clandestine graves, and increased the budget for Mexico’s national search commission. The clandestine graves, and increased the budget for Mexico’s national search commission. The
government has sought international assistance to identify tens of thousands of bodies that have government has sought international assistance to identify tens of thousands of bodies that have
been exhumed. Still, in November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances been exhumed. Still, in November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances

February 19, 2022.
28 29 See, for example, Andrés Bello, “Why Allegations About His Son Could Hurt Mexico’s President,” Economist, February 19, 2022. 30 Economist, “AMLO Uses His Anti-Corruption Drive to Gain Power and Scare Critics,” November 30, 2019. , “AMLO Uses His Anti-Corruption Drive to Gain Power and Scare Critics,” November 30, 2019.
2931 See U.S. Department of State, See U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, March 2023. Hereinafter , March 2023. Hereinafter
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report, March 2023. , March 2023.
3032 World Justice Project, World Justice Project, Almanac: Achievements and Challenges of the New Criminal Justice System, October 25, , October 25,
2019, at https://worldjusticeproject.mx/almanaque-enpol16/. 2019, at https://worldjusticeproject.mx/almanaque-enpol16/.
3133 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2023: Mexico, at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/
mexico; Maria Abi-Habib and Galia García Palafox, “Deadly Attack Exposes Growing Threat in Mexico: The mexico; Maria Abi-Habib and Galia García Palafox, “Deadly Attack Exposes Growing Threat in Mexico: The
Military,” Military,” New York Times, April 7, 2023. , April 7, 2023.
3234 Natalie Kitroeff and Ronen Bergman, “How Mexico Became the Biggest User of the World’s Most Notorious Spy Natalie Kitroeff and Ronen Bergman, “How Mexico Became the Biggest User of the World’s Most Notorious Spy
Tool,” Tool,” New York Times, April 18, 2023. , April 18, 2023.
3335 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report, March 2023. , March 2023.
3436 For recent updates, see National Security Archive, “Ayotzinapa Investigations,” at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/special- For recent updates, see National Security Archive, “Ayotzinapa Investigations,” at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/special-
exhibit/ayotzinapa-investigations. exhibit/ayotzinapa-investigations.
3537 CRS In Focus IF11669, CRS In Focus IF11669, Mexico: Addressing Missing and Disappeared Persons. .
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criticized the “structural impunity” that continues for perpetrators of disappearances and the criticized the “structural impunity” that continues for perpetrators of disappearances and the
involvement of public officials from all levels of government in such crimes.involvement of public officials from all levels of government in such crimes.3638
Human rights organizations have urged the López Obrador administration to fully enact the Human rights organizations have urged the López Obrador administration to fully enact the
country’s 2017 law against torture, investigate and punish cases of torture, and take steps to country’s 2017 law against torture, investigate and punish cases of torture, and take steps to
ensure that state agents do not commit acts of torture. After an April 2019 review of Mexico, the ensure that state agents do not commit acts of torture. After an April 2019 review of Mexico, the
U.N. Committee Against Torture welcomed the passage of the 2017 law but stated that torture by U.N. Committee Against Torture welcomed the passage of the 2017 law but stated that torture by
state agents occurred in a “generalized manner” and found torture to be “endemic” in detention state agents occurred in a “generalized manner” and found torture to be “endemic” in detention
centers.centers.3739 López Obrador has spoken out against torture, but his government has yet to develop a López Obrador has spoken out against torture, but his government has yet to develop a
system to track statistics on torture cases as required by the 2017 law. system to track statistics on torture cases as required by the 2017 law.
Analysts maintain that efforts to protect journalists, human rights defenders, and migrants remain Analysts maintain that efforts to protect journalists, human rights defenders, and migrants remain
insufficient and, in some cases, have worsened under López Obrador.insufficient and, in some cases, have worsened under López Obrador.3840 Some 157 journalists and Some 157 journalists and
media workers have been killed in Mexico since 2000, including 7 in 2021 and at least 12 in media workers have been killed in Mexico since 2000, including 7 in 2021 and at least 12 in
2022.2022.3941 Mexico ranks among the top 10 countries globally with the highest rates of unsolved Mexico ranks among the top 10 countries globally with the highest rates of unsolved
journalist murders as a percentage of population, according to the nongovernmental Committee to journalist murders as a percentage of population, according to the nongovernmental Committee to
Protect Journalists’ Protect Journalists’ 2022 Global Impunity Index. .
Mexico is also a dangerous country for human rights defenders. In 2022, an estimated 45 human Mexico is also a dangerous country for human rights defenders. In 2022, an estimated 45 human
rights defenders were killed.rights defenders were killed.4042 As politicians discredited some human rights groups and As politicians discredited some human rights groups and
questioned their sources of funding, police periodically used excessive force against human rights questioned their sources of funding, police periodically used excessive force against human rights
defenders protesting against femicide and other issues.defenders protesting against femicide and other issues.4143 The López Obrador government has The López Obrador government has
neither strengthened the mechanism intended to protect human rights defenders and journalists neither strengthened the mechanism intended to protect human rights defenders and journalists
nor ensured an adequate budget for prosecutors charged with investigating those crimes. nor ensured an adequate budget for prosecutors charged with investigating those crimes.
Migrants in Mexico are vulnerable to abuse by criminal groups and corrupt officials, including Migrants in Mexico are vulnerable to abuse by criminal groups and corrupt officials, including
human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. In January 2021, U.S.-trained state police human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. In January 2021, U.S.-trained state police
reportedly killed 18 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.reportedly killed 18 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.4244
Economic and Social Conditions
Beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open Beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open
market economy that has entered into free trade agreements with 50 countries.market economy that has entered into free trade agreements with 50 countries.4345 The transition The transition
accelerated after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994. accelerated after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994.
Since NAFTA, Mexico has increasingly become an export-oriented economy, with the value of Since NAFTA, Mexico has increasingly become an export-oriented economy, with the value of
exports equaling 41% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, up from 12% of GDP exports equaling 41% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, up from 12% of GDP

36 38 “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021. , November 29, 2021.
3739 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee Against Torture Reviews the Report of U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee Against Torture Reviews the Report of
Mexico,” April 26, 2019. Mexico,” April 26, 2019.
3840 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Mexico.
3941 Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinados en México,” accessed Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinados en México,” accessed on May 3, 2023, May 3, 2023, availablea at https://articulo19.org/ at https://articulo19.org/
periodistasasesinados/. periodistasasesinados/.
4042 Frontline Defenders, Frontline Defenders, Global Analysis 2022, April 2023. , April 2023.
4143 Ibid. Ibid.
4244 Parker Asmann, “US-Trained Police Implicated in Mexico Migrant Massacre,” Parker Asmann, “US-Trained Police Implicated in Mexico Migrant Massacre,” InSight Crime, February 3, 2021. , February 3, 2021.
4345 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-
investment-climate-statements/mexico/. investment-climate-statements/mexico/.
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in 1993. in 1993.4446 Mexico remains a U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States are Mexico remains a U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States are
vehicles and auto parts, automatic data processing machines, and electrical machinery.vehicles and auto parts, automatic data processing machines, and electrical machinery.4547
From 2010 to 2019, Mexico recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 2.7%, but its From 2010 to 2019, Mexico recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 2.7%, but its
economy contracted 8.0% in 2020.economy contracted 8.0% in 2020.4648 Although the global pandemic was the principle cause for Although the global pandemic was the principle cause for
the 2020 contraction, Mexico’s economy also shrank by 0.2% in 2019. Increased U.S. demand for the 2020 contraction, Mexico’s economy also shrank by 0.2% in 2019. Increased U.S. demand for
goods and services, higher vaccination rates, and the reopening of businesses powered an goods and services, higher vaccination rates, and the reopening of businesses powered an
economic rebound of 4.7% in 2021.economic rebound of 4.7% in 2021.4749 Nevertheless, concerns about tightening monetary policy, Nevertheless, concerns about tightening monetary policy,
inflation and a reduction in U.S. growth projections led to 3.1% growth in 2022 and a 2023 inflation and a reduction in U.S. growth projections led to 3.1% growth in 2022 and a 2023
growth forecast of 1.8%.growth forecast of 1.8%.4850
Mexico’s future growth projections are mixed. According to the Organisation for Economic Mexico’s future growth projections are mixed. According to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial exclusion, a lack of competitiveness, Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial exclusion, a lack of competitiveness,
employment in the informal sector, corruption, and low female participation in the workplace are employment in the informal sector, corruption, and low female participation in the workplace are
impediments to Mexico’s medium-term economic performance.impediments to Mexico’s medium-term economic performance.4951 Lingering pandemic-related Lingering pandemic-related
effects, energy sector reforms that discourage foreign investment, and new challenges related to effects, energy sector reforms that discourage foreign investment, and new challenges related to
technological innovation and climate change also could hinder long-term growth.technological innovation and climate change also could hinder long-term growth.5052 Experts have Experts have
posited that Mexico’s traditional economic assets—plentiful natural resources, a relatively young posited that Mexico’s traditional economic assets—plentiful natural resources, a relatively young
labor force, and proximity and preferential access to markets in the United States—strategically labor force, and proximity and preferential access to markets in the United States—strategically
position it to take advantage of potential nearshoring opportunities as policymakers from the position it to take advantage of potential nearshoring opportunities as policymakers from the
United States and other countries seek to establish supply chains away from Chinese markets.United States and other countries seek to establish supply chains away from Chinese markets.5153
Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico remains Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico remains
heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly 76.8% of Mexico’s exports heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly 76.8% of Mexico’s exports
in 2022 were U.S.-bound) and as a source of remittances, tourism revenues, and investment.in 2022 were U.S.-bound) and as a source of remittances, tourism revenues, and investment.5254
Remittances reached a record of nearly $58.5 billion in 2022.Remittances reached a record of nearly $58.5 billion in 2022.5355 U.S. foreign direct investment in U.S. foreign direct investment in
Mexico stood at $110.7 billion in 2021; the United States remains Mexico’s top source of foreign Mexico stood at $110.7 billion in 2021; the United States remains Mexico’s top source of foreign
direct investment.direct investment.5456
López Obrador Government’s Economic and Energy Policies
President López Obrador promised to govern austerely and bolster economic growth, but a lack President López Obrador promised to govern austerely and bolster economic growth, but a lack
of public investment hurt Mexico’s pre-pandemic growth rate and the government’s limited fiscal of public investment hurt Mexico’s pre-pandemic growth rate and the government’s limited fiscal
response to the pandemic worsened its economic impact on Mexico.response to the pandemic worsened its economic impact on Mexico.5557 López Obrador worked López Obrador worked

44with the Trump Administration to renegotiate the USMCA, which updated and modernized the 46 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed February 14, 2022. World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed February 14, 2022.
4547 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the United States, All Commodities, November, 2021,” accessed February Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the United States, All Commodities, November, 2021,” accessed February
14, 2022. 14, 2022.
4648 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF DataMapper: Real GDP Growth,” accessed April 27, 2023. International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF DataMapper: Real GDP Growth,” accessed April 27, 2023.
4749 IMF, IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021. , Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.
Hereinafter: IMF, 2021. Hereinafter: IMF, 2021.
4850 EIU, March 2023. EIU, March 2023.
4951 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico, February , February
2022. 2022.
5052 IMF, 2021. IMF, 2021.
5153 Daniel Zega, Alessandra Ortiz, “Mexico at the Cusp of Recovery,” Deloitte Insights, December 10, 2021. Daniel Zega, Alessandra Ortiz, “Mexico at the Cusp of Recovery,” Deloitte Insights, December 10, 2021.
5254 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the World, All Commodities,” accessed May 3, 2023. Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the World, All Commodities,” accessed May 3, 2023.
5355 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed April 27, 2023. Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed April 27, 2023.
5456 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/
dici0722.pdf; U.S. Department of State, dici0722.pdf; U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statement: Mexico. .
5557 IMF, 2021. IMF, 2021.
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with the Trump Administration to renegotiate the USMCA, which updated and modernized the
NAFTA agreement, assuaging some investor concerns about López Obrador’s economic policies. NAFTA agreement, assuaging some investor concerns about López Obrador’s economic policies.
However, his government’s energy policies have prompted international concerns, legal However, his government’s energy policies have prompted international concerns, legal
challenges, and USMCA consultations that could result in a dispute settlement panel if U.S. and challenges, and USMCA consultations that could result in a dispute settlement panel if U.S. and
Canadian concerns are not adequately resolved (See Canadian concerns are not adequately resolved (See “Energy” section).section).5658 Mexico’s congress also Mexico’s congress also
passed mining reforms to shorten concessions for foreign companies invested in the sector and to passed mining reforms to shorten concessions for foreign companies invested in the sector and to
require a percentage of revenues be shared with local communities.require a percentage of revenues be shared with local communities.5759
Reduced spending on public administration and several tax settlements with large companies Reduced spending on public administration and several tax settlements with large companies
since October 2019 have allowed the López Obrador government to devote significant resources since October 2019 have allowed the López Obrador government to devote significant resources
to social programs and major infrastructure projects without adding to public debt.to social programs and major infrastructure projects without adding to public debt.5860 Many of Many of
those infrastructure projects have proven costly for the country. Upon assuming the presidency, those infrastructure projects have proven costly for the country. Upon assuming the presidency,
López Obrador paid $1.8 billion to cancel the construction of a new airport outside of Mexico López Obrador paid $1.8 billion to cancel the construction of a new airport outside of Mexico
City, opting to build in a different location at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.City, opting to build in a different location at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.5961 His government His government
has continued to construct the Maya Train, a $9.7 billion railroad line to promote tourism in five has continued to construct the Maya Train, a $9.7 billion railroad line to promote tourism in five
southeastern states, despite criticism that it would damage the environment and opposition from southeastern states, despite criticism that it would damage the environment and opposition from
indigenous groups in the area.indigenous groups in the area.6062 The government devoted $8 billion to build the The government devoted $8 billion to build the Dos Bocas coal- coal-
powered refinery in Tabasco, but cost overruns, worker strikes, and operational setbacks have powered refinery in Tabasco, but cost overruns, worker strikes, and operational setbacks have
derailed the project’s budget and timeline.derailed the project’s budget and timeline.6163
Social Conditions
Mexico has long had relatively high poverty rates for its level of economic development, a Mexico has long had relatively high poverty rates for its level of economic development, a
problem exacerbated by the pandemic. Experts estimate nearly 10 million Mexicans fell into problem exacerbated by the pandemic. Experts estimate nearly 10 million Mexicans fell into
poverty in 2020, widening the poverty rate to 43.9%.poverty in 2020, widening the poverty rate to 43.9%.6264 Traditionally, poverty has been most acute Traditionally, poverty has been most acute
among those in southern Mexico’s rural regions, indigenous populations, and those employed in among those in southern Mexico’s rural regions, indigenous populations, and those employed in
subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector.subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector.6365 Despite predictions to the contrary, poor and Despite predictions to the contrary, poor and
working class households received continued remittances sent from family members abroad, even working class households received continued remittances sent from family members abroad, even
during the pandemic. Remittances to Mexico rose 27% from 2020 to 2021.during the pandemic. Remittances to Mexico rose 27% from 2020 to 2021.6466
Mexico also has experienced high levels of income inequality. According to the Mexico also has experienced high levels of income inequality. According to the 2022 World
Inequality Report
, 57% of Mexico’s wealth was concentrated in 10% of the population, a figure , 57% of Mexico’s wealth was concentrated in 10% of the population, a figure

56that has stayed between 55% and 60% over the past century. Inequality has historically been due, 58 In April 2022, the Mexican congress rejected a constitutional reform that would have dismantled the 2013 reforms In April 2022, the Mexican congress rejected a constitutional reform that would have dismantled the 2013 reforms
with respect to the electricity sector; however, Mexico’s Supreme Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of with respect to the electricity sector; however, Mexico’s Supreme Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of
regulatory reforms enacted in 2021 that favor the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) over private companies. regulatory reforms enacted in 2021 that favor the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) over private companies.
ECPA, “Lingering Uncertainty in Mexico’s Energy Sector,” May 3, 2022; Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder, ECPA, “Lingering Uncertainty in Mexico’s Energy Sector,” May 3, 2022; Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder,
“Exclusive: US Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023. “Exclusive: US Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
5759 Associated Press, “Mexico Passes Mine Reform, 17 Other Bills in Frenzied Rush,” April 29, 2023. Associated Press, “Mexico Passes Mine Reform, 17 Other Bills in Frenzied Rush,” April 29, 2023.
5860 Javier Martínez, Leonardo Núñez, “Análisis del Paquete Económico 2022: El Presupuesto de un Solo Hombre,” Javier Martínez, Leonardo Núñez, “Análisis del Paquete Económico 2022: El Presupuesto de un Solo Hombre,”
Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción, September 13, 2021; OECD, Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción, September 13, 2021; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, May 2021. , May 2021.
5961 Sonia Corona, “El Nuevo Aeropuerto de México, a Punto del Despegue,” Sonia Corona, “El Nuevo Aeropuerto de México, a Punto del Despegue,” El País, February 12, 2022. , February 12, 2022.
6062 “El Tren Maya de López Obrador Arranca el Año Con Tropiezos y Dudas,” “El Tren Maya de López Obrador Arranca el Año Con Tropiezos y Dudas,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2022. , February 4, 2022.
6163 Amy Stillman, Lucia Kassai, Max de Haldevang, “Mexico’s Crown-Jewel Oil Refinery Is $3.6 Billion Over Amy Stillman, Lucia Kassai, Max de Haldevang, “Mexico’s Crown-Jewel Oil Refinery Is $3.6 Billion Over
Budget,” Budget,” Bloomberg News, January 21, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “Trabajadores de la Refinería de Dos Bocas Chocan , January 21, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “Trabajadores de la Refinería de Dos Bocas Chocan
Con la Policía en Su Segundo Día de Paro,” Con la Policía en Su Segundo Día de Paro,” El País, October 13, 2021. , October 13, 2021.
6264 Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Informe de la Política de
Desarrollo Social 2020
, February 9, 2021. , February 9, 2021.
6365 This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and is This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and is
available in Spanish at https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza-2018.aspx. available in Spanish at https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza-2018.aspx.
6466 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022. Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022.
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that has stayed between 55% and 60% over the past century. Inequality has historically been due,
in part, to the country’s regressive tax system, oligopolies that dominate particular industries, a in part, to the country’s regressive tax system, oligopolies that dominate particular industries, a
relatively low minimum wage, and a lack of targeting in some social programs.relatively low minimum wage, and a lack of targeting in some social programs.6567
Economists have asserted that reducing the untaxed and unregulated informal sector, in which Economists have asserted that reducing the untaxed and unregulated informal sector, in which
workers lack job protections and benefits, is crucial for addressing poverty, while also expanding workers lack job protections and benefits, is crucial for addressing poverty, while also expanding
Mexico’s low tax base. Under the Peña Nieto administration, a financial sector reform aimed to Mexico’s low tax base. Under the Peña Nieto administration, a financial sector reform aimed to
increase access to credit for small and medium size businesses (SMEs), which employ a majority increase access to credit for small and medium size businesses (SMEs), which employ a majority
of Mexican workers. A fiscal reform also sought to incentivize SMEs’ participation in the formal of Mexican workers. A fiscal reform also sought to incentivize SMEs’ participation in the formal
economy. Barriers to formalization remain, however, including complex and sometimes costly economy. Barriers to formalization remain, however, including complex and sometimes costly
state and local regulations.state and local regulations.6668
López Obrador has improved many Mexicans’ socioeconomic conditions amid the deepest López Obrador has improved many Mexicans’ socioeconomic conditions amid the deepest
recession in decades by increasing pensions for the elderly and raising the minimum wage several recession in decades by increasing pensions for the elderly and raising the minimum wage several
times. His program to provide monthly payments to youth aged 18-29 to attend school or times. His program to provide monthly payments to youth aged 18-29 to attend school or
complete internships has enrolled over 300,000 individuals, despite reported administrative and complete internships has enrolled over 300,000 individuals, despite reported administrative and
financial irregularities.financial irregularities.6769 However, he has ended However, he has ended Prospera, Mexico’s largest social program, , Mexico’s largest social program,
which had won international praise for targeting those most in need.which had won international praise for targeting those most in need.6870 The government also The government also
maintained a fiscally conservative approach during the pandemic, providing less budgetary maintained a fiscally conservative approach during the pandemic, providing less budgetary
support to its population than some other countries in the region.support to its population than some other countries in the region.6971
Health experts have criticized the López Obrador government’s failure to coordinate “a coherent Health experts have criticized the López Obrador government’s failure to coordinate “a coherent
and unified national response” to the COVID-19 pandemic, which killed roughly 333,188 and unified national response” to the COVID-19 pandemic, which killed roughly 333,188
Mexicans through April 2023.Mexicans through April 2023.7072 Throughout the pandemic, President López Obrador downplayed Throughout the pandemic, President López Obrador downplayed
the threat posed by COVID-19 and flouted public health guidelines. His administration’s budget the threat posed by COVID-19 and flouted public health guidelines. His administration’s budget
cuts reduced public health system personnel, testing availability, and hospital capacity; they likely cuts reduced public health system personnel, testing availability, and hospital capacity; they likely
contributed to excess deaths from other causes such as heart disease and diabetes left untreated as contributed to excess deaths from other causes such as heart disease and diabetes left untreated as
hospitals focused on pandemic response.hospitals focused on pandemic response.7173
Foreign Policy
In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best
foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. He has rarely traveled outside the country since foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. He has rarely traveled outside the country since
assuming office. He met in Washington, DC, with President Trump in July 2020 and with assuming office. He met in Washington, DC, with President Trump in July 2020 and with
President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders
Summit in November 2021. Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has Summit in November 2021. Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has
represented Mexico in global fora. represented Mexico in global fora.

65 Under López Obradror, Mexico has returned to its historic noninterventionist and independent approach to foreign policy. Mexico has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and proposed the creation of a high-level caucus for peace in Ukraine within the United Nations. 67 Gerardo Esquivel Hernandez, Gerardo Esquivel Hernandez, Concentration of Economic and Political Power, Oxfam Mexico, 2015. , Oxfam Mexico, 2015.
6668 Jorge Alvarez and Cian Ruane, Jorge Alvarez and Cian Ruane, Informality and Aggregate Productivity: the Case of Mexico, IMF Country Report, , IMF Country Report,
November 2019; OECD, November 2019; OECD, Economic Surveys: Mexico, February 2022. , February 2022.
6769 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las irregularidades que la ASF encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las irregularidades que la ASF encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
Financiero
, February 21, 2022. , February 21, 2022.
6870 Stephen Kidd, “The Demise of Mexico’s Prospera Programme: a Tragedy Foretold,” Stephen Kidd, “The Demise of Mexico’s Prospera Programme: a Tragedy Foretold,” Development Pathways, June 2, , June 2,
2019. 2019.
6971 IMF, IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021. , Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.
7072 UCSF Institute for Global Health Sciences, UCSF Institute for Global Health Sciences, Mexico’s Response to COVID-19: a Case Study, April 2021; Johns , April 2021; Johns
Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center. Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center.
7173 Lina Sofía Palacio-Mejía et. al., “Leading Causes of Excess Mortality in Mexico During the COVID-19 Pandemic Lina Sofía Palacio-Mejía et. al., “Leading Causes of Excess Mortality in Mexico During the COVID-19 Pandemic
2020–2021: A Death Certificates Study in a Middle-Income Country,” 2020–2021: A Death Certificates Study in a Middle-Income Country,” The Lancet, Vol. 13, 100303, September 2022. , Vol. 13, 100303, September 2022.
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Under López Obradror, Mexico has returned to its historic noninterventionist and independent
approach to foreign policy. Mexico has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
and proposed the creation of a high-level caucus for peace in Ukraine within the United Nations.
The current administration reversed Mexico’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as Interim President of The current administration reversed Mexico’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as Interim President of
Venezuela but then hosted Norway-led negotiations between officials representing Nicolás Venezuela but then hosted Norway-led negotiations between officials representing Nicolás
Maduro and the political opposition in 2021. The López Obrador government established closer Maduro and the political opposition in 2021. The López Obrador government established closer
relations with Cuba, granted temporary asylum to ousted Bolivian President Evo Morales, relations with Cuba, granted temporary asylum to ousted Bolivian President Evo Morales,
abstained from OAS resolutions condemning the Daniel Ortega regime in Nicaragua, and abstained from OAS resolutions condemning the Daniel Ortega regime in Nicaragua, and
defended impeached Peruvian President Pedro Castillo. defended impeached Peruvian President Pedro Castillo.
Despite these developments, Mexico continues to participate in multilateral institutions and Despite these developments, Mexico continues to participate in multilateral institutions and
support development in Central America. In addition to working within trade fora, such as the support development in Central America. In addition to working within trade fora, such as the
Pacific Alliance, Mexico continues to promote its exports and seek new trade partners.Pacific Alliance, Mexico continues to promote its exports and seek new trade partners.7274 The The
López Obrador administration shares the view of prior Mexican governments that the best way to López Obrador administration shares the view of prior Mexican governments that the best way to
stop illegal immigration from the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, stop illegal immigration from the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras) is to address the lack of opportunity and insecurity in that region. In December and Honduras) is to address the lack of opportunity and insecurity in that region. In December
2021, the United States and Mexico jointly announced 2021, the United States and Mexico jointly announced Sembrando Oportunidades, a new effort to , a new effort to
coordinate development projects in the Northern Triangle.coordinate development projects in the Northern Triangle.7375
U.S.-Mexico Relations and Issues for Congress
Mexican-U.S. relations generally have grown closer over the past two decades. A range of Mexican-U.S. relations generally have grown closer over the past two decades. A range of
bilateral mechanisms and institutions have helped the Mexican and U.S. federal governments—as bilateral mechanisms and institutions have helped the Mexican and U.S. federal governments—as
well as stakeholders in border states, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—find well as stakeholders in border states, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—find
common ground on difficult issues. U.S.-Mexico relations have nevertheless grown turbulent common ground on difficult issues. U.S.-Mexico relations have nevertheless grown turbulent
during the López Obrador administration, reaching a low point in recent months over U.S. during the López Obrador administration, reaching a low point in recent months over U.S.
criticisms of López Obrador’s public statements and policy reversals, antidrug investigations and criticisms of López Obrador’s public statements and policy reversals, antidrug investigations and
indictments, and proposals for addressing fentanyl trafficking from Mexico—a key congressional indictments, and proposals for addressing fentanyl trafficking from Mexico—a key congressional
concern. President López Obrador has strongly objected to some U.S. antidrug operations in concern. President López Obrador has strongly objected to some U.S. antidrug operations in
Mexico, U.S. support of democracy and human rights groups critical of his government, and Mexico, U.S. support of democracy and human rights groups critical of his government, and
legislative proposals introduced in the 118th Congress, particularly those that would authorize the legislative proposals introduced in the 118th Congress, particularly those that would authorize the
use of U.S. military force in Mexico and designate Mexican TCOs as terrorist groups.use of U.S. military force in Mexico and designate Mexican TCOs as terrorist groups.7476
Presidents Biden and López Obrador met in July 2022 and pledged to address inflation, promote Presidents Biden and López Obrador met in July 2022 and pledged to address inflation, promote
renewable energy, modernize border infrastructure, bolster efforts against fentanyl and arms renewable energy, modernize border infrastructure, bolster efforts against fentanyl and arms
trafficking, and address the root causes of irregular migration.trafficking, and address the root causes of irregular migration.7577 A High-Level Economic A High-Level Economic
Dialogue occurred in September 2022, a High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD) convened in Dialogue occurred in September 2022, a High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD) convened in
October 2022, and a second North American Leaders Summit (NALS) with Presidents Biden and October 2022, and a second North American Leaders Summit (NALS) with Presidents Biden and
López Obrador and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took place in January 2023 in López Obrador and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took place in January 2023 in
Mexico City. While the NALS advanced priorities on inclusivity, the environment, Mexico City. While the NALS advanced priorities on inclusivity, the environment,

72competitiveness, migration, health, and regional security, the summit did not address ongoing trade disputes or result in new initiatives to address irregular migration or fentanyl trafficking.78 74 CRS Report R43748, CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by M. Angeles , by M. Angeles
Villarreal. Villarreal.
7375 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S.-Mexico Joint Statement on Sembrando Oportunidades,” U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S.-Mexico Joint Statement on Sembrando Oportunidades,”
December 1, 2021. December 1, 2021.
7476 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray over Fentanyl,” Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray over Fentanyl,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2023; , April 14, 2023;
Associated Press, “Mexican President Complains U.S. Is Funding Opposition,” May 3, 2023. Associated Press, “Mexican President Complains U.S. Is Funding Opposition,” May 3, 2023.
7577 White House, “President Biden and President López Obrador Joint Statement,” July 12, 2022. White House, “President Biden and President López Obrador Joint Statement,” July 12, 2022.
78 CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th Congress, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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competitiveness, migration, health, and regional security, the summit did not address ongoing
trade disputes or result in new initiatives to address irregular migration or fentanyl trafficking.76
Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Assistance77Assistance79
Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Close cooperation resumed in sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Close cooperation resumed in
2007, when then-President George W. Bush requested, and Congress appropriated, increased 2007, when then-President George W. Bush requested, and Congress appropriated, increased
counterdrug assistance for Mexico. Although initial U.S. funding for what ultimately would be counterdrug assistance for Mexico. Although initial U.S. funding for what ultimately would be
known as the “Mérida Initiative” focused heavily on training and equipping Mexican security known as the “Mérida Initiative” focused heavily on training and equipping Mexican security
forces, Congress shifted the emphasis of bilateral efforts over time to strengthening Mexican forces, Congress shifted the emphasis of bilateral efforts over time to strengthening Mexican
institutions under four broad pillars (institutions under four broad pillars (See Figure 4). Until FY2016, Congress withheld some U.S. Until FY2016, Congress withheld some U.S.
security assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative until certain human rights withholding security assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative until certain human rights withholding
requirements were met (seerequirements were met (see “Human Rights,below). In compliance with Leahy Law vetting below). In compliance with Leahy Law vetting
requirements (22 U.S.C. §2378d),requirements (22 U.S.C. §2378d),7880 U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for
potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment. potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment.
Congress has funded and overseen the Mérida Initiative, which has accounted for the majority of Congress has funded and overseen the Mérida Initiative, which has accounted for the majority of
U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico since FY2008. Congress maintained level funding for the U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico since FY2008. Congress maintained level funding for the
Mérida Initiative even as the Trump Administration requested less support (SeMérida Initiative even as the Trump Administration requested less support (See Table 1 for recent for recent
U.S. assistance to Mexico aU.S. assistance to Mexico and Table B-1 for Mérida Initiative funding). Nevertheless, elevated for Mérida Initiative funding). Nevertheless, elevated
organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States have organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States have
led many to question the Mérida Initiative’s efficacy.led many to question the Mérida Initiative’s efficacy.7981
U.S. security cooperation with Mexico has diminished since López Obrador took office in 2018. U.S. security cooperation with Mexico has diminished since López Obrador took office in 2018.
López Obrador campaigned against Mexico’s military-led “war” on TCOs and his predecessors’ López Obrador campaigned against Mexico’s military-led “war” on TCOs and his predecessors’
strategy of focusing on cartel leaders rather than broader cartel-related crime. He criticized the strategy of focusing on cartel leaders rather than broader cartel-related crime. He criticized the
Mérida Initiative for failing to stem drug-related violence. Cooperation deteriorated further after Mérida Initiative for failing to stem drug-related violence. Cooperation deteriorated further after
the October 2020 U.S. arrest of retired defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos on drug trafficking-the October 2020 U.S. arrest of retired defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos on drug trafficking-
related charges. By November 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice had dropped all charges related charges. By November 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice had dropped all charges
against Cienfuegos and released him to Mexico, where the López Obrador government published against Cienfuegos and released him to Mexico, where the López Obrador government published
the U.S evidence against Cienfuegos, declined to prosecute him, and called the U.S. evidence the U.S evidence against Cienfuegos, declined to prosecute him, and called the U.S. evidence
“fabricated.”“fabricated.”8082 Meanwhile, the Mexican Congress enacted legislation to limit U.S. law Meanwhile, the Mexican Congress enacted legislation to limit U.S. law
enforcement operations and intelligence sharing. The López Obrador government also paused the enforcement operations and intelligence sharing. The López Obrador government also paused the
issuance of visas for U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, slowed extraditions, issuance of visas for U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, slowed extraditions,
and declared the Mérida Initiative “dead.”and declared the Mérida Initiative “dead.”81

76 CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th Congress, by M. Angeles
Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke.
7783 On January 31, 2022, after months of negotiations, the U.S. and Mexican governments published an action plan for implementing the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe Communities. Launched at the October 2021 HLSD, the framework is a replacement for the Mérida Initiative. The framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (see Figure 4) that Congress could influence, particularly through the appropriations process. At 79 See also CRS In Focus IF10578, See also CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial
Framework
, by Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Clare Ribando Seelke.
7880 See CRS In Focus IF10575, See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber. , by Michael A. Weber.
7981 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, ,
December 2020. December 2020.
8082 Emilia López Pérez, “AMLO Respalda Exoneración a Cienfuegos: ‘Le Fabricaron Cargos in EU’, dice,” Emilia López Pérez, “AMLO Respalda Exoneración a Cienfuegos: ‘Le Fabricaron Cargos in EU’, dice,” El
Financiero
, January 15, 2021. , January 15, 2021.
8183 Mary Beth Sheridan and Nick Miroff, “They call him the Eagle: How the U.S. Lost a key Ally in Mexico as Fentanyl Mary Beth Sheridan and Nick Miroff, “They call him the Eagle: How the U.S. Lost a key Ally in Mexico as Fentanyl
Took off,” Took off,” Washington Post, December 12, 2022; Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Declares $3 Billion , December 12, 2022; Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Declares $3 Billion
U.S. Security Deal ‘Dead,’ Seeks Revamp,” U.S. Security Deal ‘Dead,’ Seeks Revamp,” Washington Post, July 29, 2021. , July 29, 2021.
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On January 31, 2022, after months of negotiations, the U.S. and Mexican governments published
an action plan for implementing the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public
Heath, and Safe Communities. Launched at the October 2021 HLSD, the framework is a
replacement for the Mérida Initiative. The framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (see
Figure 4) that Congress could influence, particularly through the appropriations process. At
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations meetings in March and April 2023, U.S. and Mexican officials announced phase two of the meetings in March and April 2023, U.S. and Mexican officials announced phase two of the
Bicentennial Framework, an effort focused on addressing fentanyl and arms trafficking.Bicentennial Framework, an effort focused on addressing fentanyl and arms trafficking.8284
Figure 4. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Frameworks

Source: U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State.
Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign
assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 enacted level of $127.1 million and assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 enacted level of $127.1 million and
30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million (s30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million (see Table 1). The explanatory statement . The explanatory statement
accompanying the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328) did not specify a total accompanying the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328) did not specify a total
funding amount for Mexico, The explanatory statement did direct the State Department to funding amount for Mexico, The explanatory statement did direct the State Department to
continue focusing assistance on helping Mexico protect human rights, prosecute cases of human continue focusing assistance on helping Mexico protect human rights, prosecute cases of human
rights abuses, improve its forensics capabilities, train justice sector operators, and combat rights abuses, improve its forensics capabilities, train justice sector operators, and combat
synthetic opioids. The explanatory statement includes reporting directives related to Western synthetic opioids. The explanatory statement includes reporting directives related to Western
Hemisphere drug control efforts, migration and refugee assistance, and updating reports required Hemisphere drug control efforts, migration and refugee assistance, and updating reports required
in H.Rept. 117-84. Additional reporting requirements relate to the Bicentennial Framework, in H.Rept. 117-84. Additional reporting requirements relate to the Bicentennial Framework,
human rights progress by the Mexican government, U.S. training of Mexican migration units, and human rights progress by the Mexican government, U.S. training of Mexican migration units, and
the resilience of North American supply chains, among other requirements. the resilience of North American supply chains, among other requirements.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2020-FY2024
(appropriations in millions of current dollars) (appropriations in millions of current dollars)
FY2023
FY2024
Foreign Assistance Account
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
(request)
(request)
Development Assistance (DA) Development Assistance (DA)
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
4.0 4.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
Economic Support Fund (ESF) Economic Support Fund (ESF)
50.0 50.0
50.0 50.0
56.8 56.8
75.0 75.0
60.7 60.7

82 International Narcotics Control and Law 100.0 100.0 64.0 64.0 48.0 Enforcement (INCLE) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 5.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 84 White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Launch of Phase II of the Bicentennial White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Launch of Phase II of the Bicentennial
Framework for Security,” March 10, 2023. Framework for Security,” March 10, 2023.
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FY2023
FY2024
Foreign Assistance Account
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
(request)
(request)
International International Narcotics Control and Law
100.0
100.0
64.0
64.0
48.0
Enforcement (INCLE)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
5.0
6.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
International Military Education and Training Military Education and Training
1.8 1.8
1.8 1.8
1.2 1.2
1.6 1.6
1.7 1.7
(IMET) (IMET)
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
1.2 1.2
1,2 1,2
1.2 1.2
1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0
and Related Programs (NADR) and Related Programs (NADR)
Total
158.0
159.0
127.1
141.6
111.4
Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2024. , FY2019-FY2024.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is not providing assistance through Mérida accounts, nor is The Department of Defense (DOD) is not providing assistance through Mérida accounts, nor is
the agency mentioned in the Bicentennial Framework. However, DOD implements International the agency mentioned in the Bicentennial Framework. However, DOD implements International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.2 million in FY2022, and Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.2 million in FY2022, and
support training programs for the Mexican military, including courses in the United States. DOD support training programs for the Mexican military, including courses in the United States. DOD
also provides additional training, equipping, and other logistical support to Mexico that also provides additional training, equipping, and other logistical support to Mexico that
complements the Mérida Initiative through its own authorities including, but not limited to, complements the Mérida Initiative through its own authorities including, but not limited to,
Section 333 Building Partner Capacity and Section 284 Counter-drug and Activities to Counter Section 333 Building Partner Capacity and Section 284 Counter-drug and Activities to Counter
Transnational Organized Crime (both authorized under Title 10 of the Transnational Organized Crime (both authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code).).8385 Through 22 Through 22
U.S.C. §2416, Congress requires an annual report on Foreign Military Training by DOD and the U.S.C. §2416, Congress requires an annual report on Foreign Military Training by DOD and the
State Department; the agencies submitted the most recent version of that report to relevant State Department; the agencies submitted the most recent version of that report to relevant
committees in March 2022. committees in March 2022.
According Northern Command officials, current bilateral goals focus on “improving regional According Northern Command officials, current bilateral goals focus on “improving regional
security, strengthening military ties with regional partners, and expanding force interoperability security, strengthening military ties with regional partners, and expanding force interoperability
through the Defense Strategic Framework and the Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable.”through the Defense Strategic Framework and the Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable.”8486
Congress may seek to influence how the Biden Administration balances U.S. foreign assistance Congress may seek to influence how the Biden Administration balances U.S. foreign assistance
priorities in Mexico; monitor the efficacy of U.S.-funded efforts; and recommend ways to priorities in Mexico; monitor the efficacy of U.S.-funded efforts; and recommend ways to
respond to challenges posed by evolving criminal activities and changes in Mexico’s policies. respond to challenges posed by evolving criminal activities and changes in Mexico’s policies.
Antidrug Efforts: Focus on Fentanyl Trafficking
Given the ongoing epidemic of fentanyl-related overdoses in the United States, fentanyl control Given the ongoing epidemic of fentanyl-related overdoses in the United States, fentanyl control
has become a top U.S. priority in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Some observers have questioned has become a top U.S. priority in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Some observers have questioned
the efficacy of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation since Mexico emerged as the leading source of the efficacy of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation since Mexico emerged as the leading source of
U.S.-bound fentanyl.U.S.-bound fentanyl.8587 At present, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl is produced clandestinely in At present, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl is produced clandestinely in
Mexico, using chemical inputs (i.e., precursors) from the People’s Republic of China.Mexico, using chemical inputs (i.e., precursors) from the People’s Republic of China.8688 This This
represents a significant shift in fentanyl production and trafficking trends since 2019, prior to represents a significant shift in fentanyl production and trafficking trends since 2019, prior to

83which China was the primary source of U.S.-bound illicit fentanyl. TCOs—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—appear to be largely responsible for the procurement of precursors from Asia (via maritime and air ports of entry).89 TCOs also manufacture wholesale volumes of low-purity illicit fentanyl in Mexico and control the cross- 85 See ForeignAssistance.gov, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” at https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/mexico/, See ForeignAssistance.gov, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” at https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/mexico/,
accessed February 23, 2022. accessed February 23, 2022.
8486 CRS electronic correspondence with U.S. Northern Command officials, February 22, 2022. CRS electronic correspondence with U.S. Northern Command officials, February 22, 2022.
8587 See for example, Earl Anthony Wayne, “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Doubling Down Against Fentanyl, See for example, Earl Anthony Wayne, “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Doubling Down Against Fentanyl,
Arms Trafficking, Exploitation of Migrants and Illicit Money,” Wilson Center, opinion, November 4, 2022. Arms Trafficking, Exploitation of Migrants and Illicit Money,” Wilson Center, opinion, November 4, 2022.
8688 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical
Control
, March 2023, According to the State Department, approximately 96% of all fentanyl seized by U.S. Customs , March 2023, According to the State Department, approximately 96% of all fentanyl seized by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) agency in FY2022 originated in Mexico (p. 73). Hereinafter: and Border Protection (CBP) agency in FY2022 originated in Mexico (p. 73). Hereinafter: INCSR, 2023. , 2023.
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which China was the primary source of U.S.-bound illicit fentanyl. TCOs—particularly the
Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—appear to be largely responsible for
the procurement of precursors from Asia (via maritime and air ports of entry).87 TCOs also
manufacture wholesale volumes of low-purity illicit fentanyl in Mexico and control the cross-
89 RAND Corporation, Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking: Final Report, February 2022, pp. 8-9. Congressional Research Service 15 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations border trafficking of fentanyl into the United States. Domestically, U.S.-based TCO affiliates border trafficking of fentanyl into the United States. Domestically, U.S.-based TCO affiliates
distribute illicit fentanyl at the retail level. distribute illicit fentanyl at the retail level.
As part of the Bicentennial Framework, the U.S. and Mexican governments committed to As part of the Bicentennial Framework, the U.S. and Mexican governments committed to
establishing working-level mechanisms to coordinate on synthetic drugs and precursor establishing working-level mechanisms to coordinate on synthetic drugs and precursor
chemicals.chemicals.8890 In 2022, Mexico expanded its nascent “chemical watch list” for dual-use In 2022, Mexico expanded its nascent “chemical watch list” for dual-use
precursors—a move that may spur opportunities for enhanced regional information sharing and precursors—a move that may spur opportunities for enhanced regional information sharing and
regulatory action targeting fentanyl precursors.regulatory action targeting fentanyl precursors.8991 Joint actions in 2022 included financial Joint actions in 2022 included financial
sanctions targeting Mexican fentanyl traffickers, the development of a joint action plan to combat sanctions targeting Mexican fentanyl traffickers, the development of a joint action plan to combat
synthetic opioids, and increased U.S. efforts to help Mexican military agencies create records of synthetic opioids, and increased U.S. efforts to help Mexican military agencies create records of
fentanyl and precursor seizures to submit to a central database.fentanyl and precursor seizures to submit to a central database.9092 The Mexican military leads The Mexican military leads
customs operations at all land, air, and sea ports of entry.customs operations at all land, air, and sea ports of entry.9193
At the Mexico City NALS in January 2023, President López Obrador appeared to recognize At the Mexico City NALS in January 2023, President López Obrador appeared to recognize
concerns about fentanyl production in Mexico and pledged to take increased actions to interdict concerns about fentanyl production in Mexico and pledged to take increased actions to interdict
precursor chemicals and destroy fentanyl labs.precursor chemicals and destroy fentanyl labs.9294 With the U.S. and Canadian leaders, President With the U.S. and Canadian leaders, President
López Obrador pledged to share information on chemicals used in illicit fentanyl production as a López Obrador pledged to share information on chemicals used in illicit fentanyl production as a
key summit deliverable; some criticized the leaders for not announcing any other significant new key summit deliverable; some criticized the leaders for not announcing any other significant new
actions.actions.9395 A notable development in the lead up to the NALS was Mexico’s capture of Ovidio A notable development in the lead up to the NALS was Mexico’s capture of Ovidio
Guzmán, son of imprisoned Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán (former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel), Guzmán, son of imprisoned Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán (former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel),
on January 4.on January 4.9496 Ovidio Guzmán is one of the most wanted criminals in the United States for his Ovidio Guzmán is one of the most wanted criminals in the United States for his
role in trafficking fentanyl and other drugs. Since the Mexico City NALS, President López role in trafficking fentanyl and other drugs. Since the Mexico City NALS, President López
Obrador appears to have reversed some antidrug commitments made at the summit.Obrador appears to have reversed some antidrug commitments made at the summit.9597
Tension between the U.S. DEA and the Mexican government Tension between the U.S. DEA and the Mexican government, as well as ongoing corruption in as well as ongoing corruption in
Mexico, exemplified by the U.S. conviction of former Public Security Minister García Luna on Mexico, exemplified by the U.S. conviction of former Public Security Minister García Luna on
drug trafficking chargesdrug trafficking charges, —remain obstacles to cooperation.98 In 2021, after the two governments had agreed to target companies involved in diverting precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl, the DEA identified 50 Mexican companies to Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Despite U.S. officials’ suspicions, the FIU declined to seize all but one businesses’ accounts.99 President López Obador also has criticized U.S. intelligence-gathering activities that likely led to the April 2023 U.S. indictments of 28 individuals, including several of El Chapo Guzmán’s sons, for fentanyl trafficking.100 These developments could hinder efforts that have 90remain obstacles to cooperation.96 Proposed U.S. responses to the recent
killings of U.S. citizens in Mexico and Mexico’s limited efforts against fentanyl, including using
U.S. military force against the cartels or designating the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations,

87 RAND Corporation, Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking: Final Report, February 2022, pp. 8-9.
88 White House, White House, Joint Statement: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue, October 8, 2021. , October 8, 2021.
8991 See for example, “Mexico Launches Online Platform for Dual-Use Precursors,” Associated Press, November 23, See for example, “Mexico Launches Online Platform for Dual-Use Precursors,” Associated Press, November 23,
2022. 2022.
9092 INCSR, 2023, pp. 15, 73-75. , 2023, pp. 15, 73-75.
9193 See for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Fentanyl-Trafficking La Nueva See for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Fentanyl-Trafficking La Nueva
Familia Michoacana and its Leaders,” November 17, 2022, See also U.S. Department of State, Familia Michoacana and its Leaders,” November 17, 2022, See also U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control
, March 2022, pp. 54-55. , March 2022, pp. 54-55.
9294 White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Trudeau, and President López Obrador in Joint Press White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Trudeau, and President López Obrador in Joint Press
Conference,” January 10, 2023. Hereinafter: White House, January 2023. Conference,” January 10, 2023. Hereinafter: White House, January 2023.
9395 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023. White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023.
9496 Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Captures Son of El Chapo, Alleged Fentanyl Trafficker, Ahead of Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Captures Son of El Chapo, Alleged Fentanyl Trafficker, Ahead of
Biden Visit,” Biden Visit,” Washington Post, January 5, 2023. , January 5, 2023.
9597 “Mexico asks China for Help on Fentanyl, Slams US Critics,” Reuters, April 5, 2023. “Mexico asks China for Help on Fentanyl, Slams US Critics,” Reuters, April 5, 2023.
9698 Gavin Voss, “García Luna Convicted, But Corruption Concerns Endure in U.S.-Mexico Partnership,” February 22, Gavin Voss, “García Luna Convicted, But Corruption Concerns Endure in U.S.-Mexico Partnership,” February 22,
2023. 2023.
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link to page 22 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

have prompted new tension with the Mexican government.97 President López Obador also has
criticized U.S. intelligence-gathering activities that likely led to the April 2023 U.S. indictments
of 28 individuals, including several of El Chapo Guzmán’s sons, for fentanyl trafficking.98 These
developments could hinder efforts that have accelerated thus far in 2023 as phase two of the
Bicentennial Framework has focused bilateral efforts on combating fentanyl (and arms trafficking
from the United States to Mexico).9999 Michael O’Boyle, “A U.S.-Mexico Crackdown on Drugs has Stalled Even as Fentanyl Deaths Rise,” Bloomberg, May 15, 2023. 100 Associated Press, “Mexico President Slams U.S. ‘Spying’ After Traffickers Charged,” April 17, 2023. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 22 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations accelerated thus far in 2023 as phase two of the Bicentennial Framework has focused bilateral efforts on combating fentanyl (and arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico).101 Legislative Initiatives. Members of Congress have introduced a range of proposals to address fentanyl trafficking from Mexico, including a House Foreign Committee-reported measure, H.R. 3205, that would work with Mexico to disrupt fentanyl supply chains and counter Chinese fentanyl operations in Mexico. Whereas that bill calls for U.S.-Mexican cooperation, others—including bills that would authorize the use of U.S. military force in Mexico (H.J.Res. 18) and that would designate Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (e.g., H.Res. 216, S. 698)—have prompted strong negative reactions from the Mexican government.
Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions
Congress has expressed concerns about friction in U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. During the Congress has expressed concerns about friction in U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. During the
118th Congress, oversight attention may focus on the Bicentennial Framework’s progress in 118th Congress, oversight attention may focus on the Bicentennial Framework’s progress in
restarting bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The framework’s action plan envisions a joint restarting bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The framework’s action plan envisions a joint
objective of building on past cooperation to investigate and prosecute corrupt actors through the objective of building on past cooperation to investigate and prosecute corrupt actors through the
disruption of criminal financial networks, as well as increasing cooperation in extradition disruption of criminal financial networks, as well as increasing cooperation in extradition
matters.matters.100102 However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all criminal matters, especially However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all criminal matters, especially
those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of friction between the countries.those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of friction between the countries.101103
During the Calderón government (2006-2012), Mexico extradited an average of 98 people per During the Calderón government (2006-2012), Mexico extradited an average of 98 people per
year to the United States, a significant increase over the prior administration. When President year to the United States, a significant increase over the prior administration. When President
Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 but rose to an administration high of 76 in Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 but rose to an administration high of 76 in
2016 (se2016 (see Figure 5). In January 2017, Mexico’s decision to extradite Joaquín “El Chapo” . In January 2017, Mexico’s decision to extradite Joaquín “El Chapo”
Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the DEA’s top global targets, was a high point in Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the DEA’s top global targets, was a high point in
bilateral cooperation that was praised by many Members of Congress. Extraditions remained bilateral cooperation that was praised by many Members of Congress. Extraditions remained
relatively level during the first two years of the López Obrador government, relatively level during the first two years of the López Obrador government, before hitting a 20-
year low in 2022.

97 Mary Beth Sheridan, “As Fentanyl Crisis Grows, U.S.-Mexico Divide Deepens,” Washington Post, April 29, 2023.
98 Associated Press, “Mexico President Slams U.S. ‘Spying’ After Traffickers Charged,” April 17, 2023.
99fell in 2021, and rose again in 2022 to 81.104 While some extraditions have increased, DEA Administrator Anne Milgram asserted that Mexico extradited 24 drug-related defendants in 2022 and that more than 232 such defendants were awaiting extradition as of February 2023.105 101 White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Implementation of the U.S.-Mexico White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Implementation of the U.S.-Mexico
Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” April 13, 2023. Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” April 13, 2023.
100102 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Summary of the Action Plan for U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Summary of the Action Plan for U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for
Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” January 31, 2022. Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” January 31, 2022.
101103 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution,
January 24, 2022. January 24, 2022.
104 Email from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, May 10, 2023. 105 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Countering Illicit Fentanyl Trafficking, hearing, February 15, 2023, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/countering-illicit-fentanyl-trafficking. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 5. Extraditions: from Mexico by Administration: 2000-2022

Source: CRS based on data from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State. CRS based on data from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State.
Human Rights102Rights106
The U.S. Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico The U.S. Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico
through conditions on appropriations, support for human rights programming, oversight hearings, through conditions on appropriations, support for human rights programming, oversight hearings,
and letters to, and visits with, successive U.S. and Mexican administrations. Recent attention has and letters to, and visits with, successive U.S. and Mexican administrations. Recent attention has
focused on violence against journalists in Mexico.focused on violence against journalists in Mexico.103107 Congress has continued to monitor Congress has continued to monitor
adherence to the Leahy vetting requirements that must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act adherence to the Leahy vetting requirements that must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA) of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2378d), which pertains to State Department aid, and 10 (FAA) of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2378d), which pertains to State Department aid, and 10
U.S.C. §2249e, which guides DOD funding. DOD suspended assistance to a brigade based in U.S.C. §2249e, which guides DOD funding. DOD suspended assistance to a brigade based in
Tlatlaya, Mexico, due to concerns about the brigade’s potential involvement in extrajudicial Tlatlaya, Mexico, due to concerns about the brigade’s potential involvement in extrajudicial
killings but has also worked with Mexico to rehabilitate units once suspended from receiving U.S. killings but has also worked with Mexico to rehabilitate units once suspended from receiving U.S.
assistance.assistance.104108 Congressional concerns about labor conditions in Mexico and the government’s Congressional concerns about labor conditions in Mexico and the government’s
ability to implement USMCA commitments prompted the inclusion of $210 million in funds for ability to implement USMCA commitments prompted the inclusion of $210 million in funds for
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) technical assistance the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) technical assistance
programs in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113).programs in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113).105

102109 106 See also: CRS Report R45199, See also: CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief; CRS In Focus IF11669, ; CRS In Focus IF11669, Mexico:
Addressing Missing and Disappeared Persons
. .
103107 Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine and Rubio Urge State Department to Address Ongoing Violence Against Journalists in Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine and Rubio Urge State Department to Address Ongoing Violence Against Journalists in
Mexico,” February 8, 2022. Mexico,” February 8, 2022.
104108 Michael Evans, Michael Evans, US: Mexico Mass Graves Raise “Alarming Questions” About Government “Complicity” in
September 2014 Cartel Killings
, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 515, May 2015;, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 515, May 2015; Col. Col.
Andrew M. Leonard, “Leahy Law Diplomacy: Human Rights Vetting and Foreign Policy,” Andrew M. Leonard, “Leahy Law Diplomacy: Human Rights Vetting and Foreign Policy,” FAOA Journal of
International Affairs
, 2019. , 2019.
105109 The purpose of the funding is for ILAB to administer technical assistance grants to support worker-focused capacity The purpose of the funding is for ILAB to administer technical assistance grants to support worker-focused capacity
building and efforts to reduce workplace discrimination, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, child exploitation
and other efforts related to implementation of Mexico’s labor commitments.(continued...)
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link to page 18 link to page 18 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress made conditional 15% of U.S. assistance to the Mexican From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress made conditional 15% of U.S. assistance to the Mexican
military and police until the State Department sent a report to appropriators verifying that Mexico military and police until the State Department sent a report to appropriators verifying that Mexico
was taking steps to comply with certain human rights standards. In FY2014, Mexico lost $5.5 was taking steps to comply with certain human rights standards. In FY2014, Mexico lost $5.5
million in funding due to human rights concerns.million in funding due to human rights concerns.106110 For FY2016-FY2021, human rights reporting For FY2016-FY2021, human rights reporting
requirements applied to FMF rather than to Mérida Initiative accounts. In recent years, human requirements applied to FMF rather than to Mérida Initiative accounts. In recent years, human
rights reporting requirements have been in explanatory statements rather than the legislation. The rights reporting requirements have been in explanatory statements rather than the legislation. The
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-explanatory statement accompanying the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-
328) requires a report on human rights progress in Mexico, but the reporting directive is not tied 328) requires a report on human rights progress in Mexico, but the reporting directive is not tied
to any conditions on assistance provided to Mexico.to any conditions on assistance provided to Mexico.107111 The State Department reportedly has not The State Department reportedly has not
sent human rights reports to Congress since FY2017, as the agency maintains it is not legally sent human rights reports to Congress since FY2017, as the agency maintains it is not legally
obligated to do so.obligated to do so.108112
U.S. assistance to Mexico has supported the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its judicial U.S. assistance to Mexico has supported the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its judicial
system and improve human rights conditions in the country.system and improve human rights conditions in the country.109113 Congress has provided funding to Congress has provided funding to
support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and
accusatorial system that aims to strengthen due process and human rights protections for victims accusatorial system that aims to strengthen due process and human rights protections for victims
and the accused.and the accused.110114 U.S. officials have issued statements on specific human rights concerns, U.S. officials have issued statements on specific human rights concerns,
including a 2022 tweet by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing concern about violence including a 2022 tweet by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing concern about violence
against journalists and a 2023 State Department spokesperson statement supporting “respect for against journalists and a 2023 State Department spokesperson statement supporting “respect for
judicial independence” and an “independent electoral system.”judicial independence” and an “independent electoral system.”111115 Protecting human rights and Protecting human rights and
“vulnerable populations” is included under the first pillar of the Bicentennial Framework (see “vulnerable populations” is included under the first pillar of the Bicentennial Framework (see
Figure 4). The State Department engages with human rights and freedom of expression . The State Department engages with human rights and freedom of expression
organizations in Mexico and ensures U.S. training programs for justice sector actors have units on organizations in Mexico and ensures U.S. training programs for justice sector actors have units on
human rights. human rights.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides technical assistance to the The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides technical assistance to the
Mexican federal and state governments as well as complementary support to think tanks and civil Mexican federal and state governments as well as complementary support to think tanks and civil
society organizations on human rights issues.society organizations on human rights issues.112116 USAID’s human rights programming includes a USAID’s human rights programming includes a
new $24 million initiative to support national and state implementation of laws against torture and new $24 million initiative to support national and state implementation of laws against torture and
enforced disappearances and to provide forensic assistance to address unidentified remains. Other enforced disappearances and to provide forensic assistance to address unidentified remains. Other
ongoing initiatives seek to better protect journalists and human rights defenders, as well as to ongoing initiatives seek to better protect journalists and human rights defenders, as well as to
address enforced disappearances, femicides, and torture in selected states. In December 2020, address enforced disappearances, femicides, and torture in selected states. In December 2020,
USAID published its five-year strategy for Mexico, which integrates these efforts into a broader USAID published its five-year strategy for Mexico, which integrates these efforts into a broader

106 building and efforts to reduce workplace discrimination, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, child exploitation and other efforts related to implementation of Mexico’s labor commitments. 110 As a result of the State Department’s decision not to submit a report for Mexico, some $5 million in FY2014 As a result of the State Department’s decision not to submit a report for Mexico, some $5 million in FY2014
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was reprogrammed by the State Department International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was reprogrammed by the State Department
to Peru. Mexico lost close to $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well. to Peru. Mexico lost close to $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well.
107111 The explanatory statement can be found at https://www.congress.gov/117/cprt/HPRT50348/CPRT- The explanatory statement can be found at https://www.congress.gov/117/cprt/HPRT50348/CPRT-
117HPRT50348.pdf. 117HPRT50348.pdf.
108112 CRS interview with State Department official, March 20, 2020. CRS interview with State Department official, March 20, 2020.
109113 For an overview, see GAO, For an overview, see GAO, U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State and USAID Allocated over $700 Million to Support
Criminal Justice, Border Security, and Related Efforts from Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018
, GAO 19-647, September , GAO 19-647, September
10, 2019. 10, 2019.
110114 While DOJ has supported reform efforts at the federal level, USAID programs have been at the state level since While DOJ has supported reform efforts at the federal level, USAID programs have been at the state level since
2016. See USAID, “Mexico: Rule of Law,” September 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/rule-of-law. 2016. See USAID, “Mexico: Rule of Law,” September 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/rule-of-law.
111115 Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken), “The high number of journalists killed in Mexico this year and the Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken), “The high number of journalists killed in Mexico this year and the
ongoing threats they face are concerning. I join those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican ongoing threats they face are concerning. I join those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican
journalists,” Twitter, February 22, 2022, 8:47 p.m. U.S. Department of State, “Protests Against Electoral Overhaul in journalists,” Twitter, February 22, 2022, 8:47 p.m. U.S. Department of State, “Protests Against Electoral Overhaul in
Mexico,” press statement, February 23, 2023.Mexico,” press statement, February 23, 2023.
112116 USAID, “Mexico: Human Rights,” December 2022. USAID, “Mexico: Human Rights,” December 2022.
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link to page 25 link to page 25 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

strategy to help state and local governments committed to addressing impunity and violence. strategy to help state and local governments committed to addressing impunity and violence.113117
USAID continues to support organizations that have received criticism for their anti-corruption USAID continues to support organizations that have received criticism for their anti-corruption
and human rights advocacy from President López Obrador and his party.and human rights advocacy from President López Obrador and his party.114118
Congress is likely to continue monitoring human rights conditions in Mexico, including Congress is likely to continue monitoring human rights conditions in Mexico, including
compliance with reporting requirements included in the explanatory statement to the FY2023 compliance with reporting requirements included in the explanatory statement to the FY2023
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328) and commitments to improve labor conditions Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328) and commitments to improve labor conditions
made under USMCA.made under USMCA.115119 Some Members of Congress have written letters to U.S. and Mexican Some Members of Congress have written letters to U.S. and Mexican
officials regarding human rights concerns, including allegations of extrajudicial killings by officials regarding human rights concerns, including allegations of extrajudicial killings by
security forces, violence against journalists, and abuses of migrants. security forces, violence against journalists, and abuses of migrants.
Congress may monitor how the López Obrador administration moves to punish past human rights Congress may monitor how the López Obrador administration moves to punish past human rights
abusers; how Mexico’s National Guard, along with other security and judicial actors, is or is not abusers; how Mexico’s National Guard, along with other security and judicial actors, is or is not
respecting human rights; what mechanisms exist to address allegations of abuse and wrongdoing respecting human rights; what mechanisms exist to address allegations of abuse and wrongdoing
by such actors; and the adequacy of victims’ assistance. Congress also may question how the by such actors; and the adequacy of victims’ assistance. Congress also may question how the
State Department and USAID can provide support to emerging human rights priorities, as well as State Department and USAID can provide support to emerging human rights priorities, as well as
the effects of ILAB technical assistance programs on labor conditions in Mexico. the effects of ILAB technical assistance programs on labor conditions in Mexico.
Migration Management
Migration issues continue to be a high priority for U.S. policy and Congress, particularly as U.S. Migration issues continue to be a high priority for U.S. policy and Congress, particularly as U.S.
Customs and Border Protection encounters record levels of irregular migrants on the Southwest Customs and Border Protection encounters record levels of irregular migrants on the Southwest
border. Since a 2019 U.S.-Mexico migration agreement, and particularly since the March 2020 border. Since a 2019 U.S.-Mexico migration agreement, and particularly since the March 2020
U.S. launch of so-called Title 42 expulsions, Mexico has accepted U.S. policies that have shifted U.S. launch of so-called Title 42 expulsions, Mexico has accepted U.S. policies that have shifted
some of the burden of handling migrants from the United States to Mexico.some of the burden of handling migrants from the United States to Mexico.116120 The López Obrador The López Obrador
administration has worked jointly with U.S. officials to help arrest 7,000 human smugglers since administration has worked jointly with U.S. officials to help arrest 7,000 human smugglers since
mid-2022 and to invest in development projects aimed at addressing the root causes of migration mid-2022 and to invest in development projects aimed at addressing the root causes of migration
from northern Central America.from northern Central America.117121 Asylum applications and apprehensions have risen Asylum applications and apprehensions have risen
significantly in Mexico; both Mexico’s cash-strapped Commission for Refugee Assistance significantly in Mexico; both Mexico’s cash-strapped Commission for Refugee Assistance
(COMAR) and overcrowded shelter system have struggled to respond, even with U.S. assistance (COMAR) and overcrowded shelter system have struggled to respond, even with U.S. assistance
(s(see Figure 6).118122 In March 2023, 38 migrants perished because Mexican officials failed to unlock In March 2023, 38 migrants perished because Mexican officials failed to unlock

113 117 USAID, USAID, Mexico: Country Development Cooperation Strategy, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/cdcs. , available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/cdcs.
114118 Rafael Bernal. “Mexican President Calls on U.S. to Stop Funding Groups Critical of his Administration,” Rafael Bernal. “Mexican President Calls on U.S. to Stop Funding Groups Critical of his Administration,” The Hill, ,
February 21, 2022. February 21, 2022.
115119 The explanatory statement asserts, The explanatory statement asserts,
Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the
Committees on Appropriations on the extent to which the Government of Mexico is: (1) credibly Committees on Appropriations on the extent to which the Government of Mexico is: (1) credibly
investigating and prosecuting violations of human rights in civilian courts; (2) enforcing investigating and prosecuting violations of human rights in civilian courts; (2) enforcing
prohibitions against torture and the use of testimony obtained through torture; and (3) searching for prohibitions against torture and the use of testimony obtained through torture; and (3) searching for
victims of forced disappearances and credibly investigating and prosecuting those responsible for victims of forced disappearances and credibly investigating and prosecuting those responsible for
such crimes. Prior to the submission of such report, the State Department shall consult with United such crimes. Prior to the submission of such report, the State Department shall consult with United
States and Mexican human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting the elements detailed States and Mexican human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting the elements detailed
in this paragraph. in this paragraph.
116120 In response to the pandemic, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) largely suspended asylum processing at In response to the pandemic, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) largely suspended asylum processing at
the U.S.-Mexico border in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) public health order the U.S.-Mexico border in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) public health order
(referred to as (referred to as Title 42) that restricted the entry of foreign nationals without proper travel documents to prevent the ) that restricted the entry of foreign nationals without proper travel documents to prevent the
spread of disease. For additional background on Title 42, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, spread of disease. For additional background on Title 42, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related
Restrictions on Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations
, by Kelsey Y. , by Kelsey Y.
Santamaria. Santamaria.
117121 White House, January 2023. White House, January 2023.
118122 CRS In Focus IF10215, CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Ramon Miro. , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Ramon Miro.
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a migrant detention facility during a fire. Authorities charged Mexico’s National Migration a migrant detention facility during a fire. Authorities charged Mexico’s National Migration
Institute’s director for involvement in the crime; he remains in his position.Institute’s director for involvement in the crime; he remains in his position.119123
Figure 6. Mexico: Reported Asylum Applications and Apprehensions
(2013-2023) (2013-2023)

Source: CRS, based on data from Mexico’s Commission for Refugee Assistance and Secretary of the Interior. CRS, based on data from Mexico’s Commission for Refugee Assistance and Secretary of the Interior.
On October 12, 2022, Mexico agreed to accept an unspecified number of U.S.-bound Venezuelan On October 12, 2022, Mexico agreed to accept an unspecified number of U.S.-bound Venezuelan
migrants who do not apply to come to the United States legally through a new Venezuela parole migrants who do not apply to come to the United States legally through a new Venezuela parole
program and are expelled at the U.S. border under Title 42.program and are expelled at the U.S. border under Title 42.120124 In exchange, the Department of In exchange, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) made available additional H-2B visas for temporary nonagricultural Homeland Security (DHS) made available additional H-2B visas for temporary nonagricultural
workers. Historically, the majority of H-2B visas have been issued to Mexican nationals. On workers. Historically, the majority of H-2B visas have been issued to Mexican nationals. On
January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of the Venezuela parole program to Haitians, January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of the Venezuela parole program to Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Cubans.Nicaraguans, and Cubans.121125 As part of that agreement, Mexico agreed to receive up to 30,000 As part of that agreement, Mexico agreed to receive up to 30,000
expelled migrants from those three countries per month who are encountered irregularly instead expelled migrants from those three countries per month who are encountered irregularly instead
of through the parole process, a number that U.S. officials assert could increase.of through the parole process, a number that U.S. officials assert could increase.122126
President Biden thanked Mexico for this cooperation during his remarks at NALS, but the summit President Biden thanked Mexico for this cooperation during his remarks at NALS, but the summit
did not address detailed migration policies.did not address detailed migration policies.123127 The summit did produce an expansion of U.S.- The summit did produce an expansion of U.S.-

119 123 Juan Montes, “Mexico’s Immigration Chief Indicted over Detention Center Fire,” Juan Montes, “Mexico’s Immigration Chief Indicted over Detention Center Fire,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2023. , May 1, 2023.
120124 The new parole program allows Venezuelans who have a U.S. sponsor to apply for immigration parole and fly The new parole program allows Venezuelans who have a U.S. sponsor to apply for immigration parole and fly
directly into the United States. CRS Insight IN12040, directly into the United States. CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by , by
Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke. For Mexico’s approach, see Government of Mexico, Interior-Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke. For Mexico’s approach, see Government of Mexico, Interior-
Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Is Coordinating with the U.S. a New Approach to Orderly, Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Is Coordinating with the U.S. a New Approach to Orderly,
Safe, Regular and Humane Migration in the Region,” October 12, 2022. Safe, Regular and Humane Migration in the Region,” October 12, 2022.
121125 DHS, “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans and Eliminates Cap for DHS, “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans and Eliminates Cap for
Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022. Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.
122126 Government of Mexico, Interior-Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Welcomes the Government of Mexico, Interior-Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Welcomes the
Announcement of new U.S. Actions to Achieve Orderly, Safe, Regular, and Humane Migration,” January 5, 2023; Announcement of new U.S. Actions to Achieve Orderly, Safe, Regular, and Humane Migration,” January 5, 2023;
White House, “Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” January 9, 2023. White House, “Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” January 9, 2023.
123127 For more information, see CRS Insight IN12084, For more information, see CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th
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Mexico efforts to address the root causes of migration to a trilateral action plan, as well as the Mexico efforts to address the root causes of migration to a trilateral action plan, as well as the
creation of a virtual platform to allow migrants to access legal pathways to migration. creation of a virtual platform to allow migrants to access legal pathways to migration.
In In preparation foradvance of the May 11, 2023, ending of Title 42, the United States, Mexico, and other the May 11, 2023, ending of Title 42, the United States, Mexico, and other
regional partners regional partners have ramped up cooperation on migration management, countering alien ramped up cooperation on migration management, countering alien
smuggling and disinformation, and related efforts.smuggling and disinformation, and related efforts.124128 The Biden Administration deployed 1,500 The Biden Administration deployed 1,500
National Guardadditional troops to the border in anticipation of a troops to the border in anticipation of a post-Title 42 migration surge in arrivals.
migration surge. Mexico has pledged to continue receiving rapid deportations of certain non-Mexican nationals Mexico has pledged to continue receiving rapid deportations of certain non-Mexican nationals
who have to date been expelled under Title 42who have to date been expelled under Title 42.125 and has deployed its National Guard.129 Mexican border cities, some of which have high Mexican border cities, some of which have high
rates of violent crime, have been sheltering tens of thousands of migrants. Some migrants have rates of violent crime, have been sheltering tens of thousands of migrants. Some migrants have
experienced precarious living situations and attacks by criminal groups.experienced precarious living situations and attacks by criminal groups.126130 Human rights groups Human rights groups
are concerned about how the end of Title 42 will affect conditions for migrants in Mexico.are concerned about how the end of Title 42 will affect conditions for migrants in Mexico.127131
U.S. funds appropriated under the Mérida Initiative have supported Mexico’s immigration control U.S. funds appropriated under the Mérida Initiative have supported Mexico’s immigration control
efforts and global funds provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance program to efforts and global funds provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance program to
improve asylum processing, shelters, and assistance to migrants in Mexico. Congress is improve asylum processing, shelters, and assistance to migrants in Mexico. Congress is
considering legislation, foreign assistance, and restrictions on U.S. assistance that could affect considering legislation, foreign assistance, and restrictions on U.S. assistance that could affect
those efforts, as well as overseeing the adequacy of existing foreign policy efforts to manage those efforts, as well as overseeing the adequacy of existing foreign policy efforts to manage
regional migration. regional migration.
Legislative Initiatives. On May 11, 2023, the House passed H.R. 2, which incorporated legislation reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (H.R. 1690) as Title III. Among other measures, H.R. 2 would direct the Administration to seek to reestablish migration agreements with Mexico similar to the Migration Protection Protocols concluded during the Trump Administration. Economic and Trade Relations and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement128Agreement132
The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that deepened The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that deepened
significantly through the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) significantly through the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in 1994. NAFTA removed virtually all tariff and nontariff trade and investment barriers among in 1994. NAFTA removed virtually all tariff and nontariff trade and investment barriers among
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and provided a rules-based mechanism to govern North the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and provided a rules-based mechanism to govern North
American trade. It also made permanent Mexico’s unilateral market opening measures of the late American trade. It also made permanent Mexico’s unilateral market opening measures of the late
1980s and early 1990s. Most economic studies concluded the net economic effect of NAFTA on 1980s and early 1990s. Most economic studies concluded the net economic effect of NAFTA on
the United States and Mexico was small but positive, though there were adjustment costs to some the United States and Mexico was small but positive, though there were adjustment costs to some
sectors in both countries. In July 2020, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) sectors in both countries. In July 2020, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
replaced NAFTA. While maintaining most of the market opening measures of NAFTA, USMCA
updated and modernized the agreement in some areas but scaled back certain provisions.129
Recent U.S. Administrations have worked with Mexico to coordinate economic issues. The
Obama Administration worked with Mexico to balance border security while facilitating
legitimate trade and travel, promoting competitiveness, and pursuing greater energy integration
through a cabinet-level High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) chaired by then-Vice President
Biden. The High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council helped align regulatory principles.

Congress, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke; and White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the , by M. Angeles Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke; and White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the
2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023. 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023.
124128 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Announces Sweeping New Actions to Manage Regional U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Announces Sweeping New Actions to Manage Regional
Migration,” April 27, 2023. Migration,” April 27, 2023.
125129 White House, “Mexico and United States Strengthen Joint Humanitarian Plan on Migration,” May 2, 2023. White House, “Mexico and United States Strengthen Joint Humanitarian Plan on Migration,” May 2, 2023.
126130 Doctors Without Borders, “Pushed Back, Beaten and Exposed: Stories from the US-Mexico Border,” March 29, Doctors Without Borders, “Pushed Back, Beaten and Exposed: Stories from the US-Mexico Border,” March 29,
2022. 2022.
127131 WOLA, “U.S. And Mexico Must End Policies That Expose Migrants to Death and Danger,” March 29, 2023. WOLA, “U.S. And Mexico Must End Policies That Expose Migrants to Death and Danger,” March 29, 2023.
128132 This section is drawn from CRS Report RL32934, This section is drawn from CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications
, by M. Angeles Villarreal. , by M. Angeles Villarreal.
129 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M.
Angeles Villarreal.
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Congressional Research Service 22 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations replaced NAFTA. While maintaining most of the market opening measures of NAFTA, USMCA updated and modernized the agreement in some areas but scaled back certain provisions.133 Recent U.S. Administrations have worked with Mexico to coordinate economic issues. The Obama Administration worked with Mexico to balance border security while facilitating legitimate trade and travel, promoting competitiveness, and pursuing greater energy integration through a cabinet-level High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) chaired by then-Vice President Biden. The High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council helped align regulatory principles. Trilateral (with Canada) cooperation occurred under the aegis of the North American Leadership Trilateral (with Canada) cooperation occurred under the aegis of the North American Leadership
Summits (NALS). Summits (NALS).
Under the Trump Administration, neither the HLED nor the NALS took place. However, the Under the Trump Administration, neither the HLED nor the NALS took place. However, the
Executive Steering Committee (ESC), which guided efforts along the border during the Obama Executive Steering Committee (ESC), which guided efforts along the border during the Obama
Administration, expanded to focus on boosting competitiveness. The U.S.-Mexico CEO Dialogue Administration, expanded to focus on boosting competitiveness. The U.S.-Mexico CEO Dialogue
also continued to convene biannual meetings and issue recommendations for both governments. also continued to convene biannual meetings and issue recommendations for both governments.
As previously mentioned, the Biden Administration has restarted both the HLED and the NALS. As previously mentioned, the Biden Administration has restarted both the HLED and the NALS.
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border
Congress has long expressed concerns about delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.- Congress has long expressed concerns about delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.-
Mexico border. The majority of U.S.-Mexico trade passes through a port of entry along the Mexico border. The majority of U.S.-Mexico trade passes through a port of entry along the
southwestern border, often more than once, due to the increasing integration of manufacturing southwestern border, often more than once, due to the increasing integration of manufacturing
processes in the United States and Mexico. Past bilateral efforts have contributed to reductions in processes in the United States and Mexico. Past bilateral efforts have contributed to reductions in
wait times at some points of entry, but infrastructure and staffing issues remain on both the U.S. wait times at some points of entry, but infrastructure and staffing issues remain on both the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border. While Congress has enacted (P.L. 114-279) legislation to allow and Mexican sides of the border. While Congress has enacted (P.L. 114-279) legislation to allow
public-private partnerships to address some border infrastructure issues, staffing issues remain public-private partnerships to address some border infrastructure issues, staffing issues remain
challenging. challenging.
In May 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing the In May 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing the
U.S.-Mexico border.U.S.-Mexico border.130134 A Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral ESC has met since then, most A Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral ESC has met since then, most
recently in December 2022, to develop binational action plans and oversee implementation of recently in December 2022, to develop binational action plans and oversee implementation of
those plans.those plans.131135 The ESC sets goals within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure The ESC sets goals within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure
development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for
cargo preclearance, improving cross-border commerce and ties, and bolstering information cargo preclearance, improving cross-border commerce and ties, and bolstering information
sharing among law enforcement agencies. sharing among law enforcement agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic posed several challenge for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials that The COVID-19 pandemic posed several challenge for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials that
Congress has examined via oversight hearings. Officials initially struggled to maintain the Congress has examined via oversight hearings. Officials initially struggled to maintain the
integrity of supply chains for industries deemed essential during the pandemic while protecting integrity of supply chains for industries deemed essential during the pandemic while protecting
the health of workers employed in those sectors. More recently, concerns over the smuggling of the health of workers employed in those sectors. More recently, concerns over the smuggling of
fentanyl through U.S. ports of entry have led to enhanced screening of commercial and passenger fentanyl through U.S. ports of entry have led to enhanced screening of commercial and passenger
vehicles entering from Mexico and have sped the deployment of advanced imaging technologies vehicles entering from Mexico and have sped the deployment of advanced imaging technologies
used for cargo inspections. Congress may monitor how the Biden Administration balances trade used for cargo inspections. Congress may monitor how the Biden Administration balances trade
and infrastructure issues with other priorities along the U.S.-Mexico border. and infrastructure issues with other priorities along the U.S.-Mexico border.
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement132
Congress played a key role in modifying, considering, and approving implementing legislation
for the USMCA, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. Congress is actively overseeing the
USMCA’s implementation and USMCA-related trade disputes. In May 2017, the Trump
Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and
Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion

130 133 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 134 White House, “Declaration by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United White House, “Declaration by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As mentioned, Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As mentioned,
U.S.-Mexico security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative.
131135 The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) coordinates efforts with Mexico in three areas: infrastructure, secure The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) coordinates efforts with Mexico in three areas: infrastructure, secure
flows, and law enforcement/security. See U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering flows, and law enforcement/security. See U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering
Committee of the 21st Century Border Management Process, December 1, 2022. Committee of the 21st Century Border Management Process, December 1, 2022.
132 This section is drawn from the summary of CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA)
, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
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Congressional Research Service 23 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement136 Congress played a key role in modifying, considering, and approving implementing legislation for the USMCA, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. Congress is actively overseeing the USMCA’s implementation and USMCA-related trade disputes. In May 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and were concluded on September 30, Authority (TPA). Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and were concluded on September 30,
2018. USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The House Democratic leadership 2018. USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The House Democratic leadership
recommended modifications to USMCA (on labor, the environment, and dispute settlement, recommended modifications to USMCA (on labor, the environment, and dispute settlement,
among other topics) that led to changes to the agreement and a subsequent negotiation with among other topics) that led to changes to the agreement and a subsequent negotiation with
Mexico and Canada on a USMCA protocol of amendment on December 10, 2019. The House Mexico and Canada on a USMCA protocol of amendment on December 10, 2019. The House
approved USMCA implementing legislation in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in approved USMCA implementing legislation in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in
January 2020 (P.L. 116-113). January 2020 (P.L. 116-113).
On April 24, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative notified Congress that Canada and Mexico had On April 24, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative notified Congress that Canada and Mexico had
taken the legal and regulatory steps necessary to implement the USCMA and that the agreement taken the legal and regulatory steps necessary to implement the USCMA and that the agreement
would enter into force on July 1, 2020. would enter into force on July 1, 2020.
USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s free-trade USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s free-trade
provisions and other measures, but it makes notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute provisions and other measures, but it makes notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute
settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property right (IPR) settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property right (IPR)
protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment and addresses protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment and addresses
new trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption, and currency new trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption, and currency
misalignment. Key issues for Congress in the debate surrounding USMCA included workers’ misalignment. Key issues for Congress in the debate surrounding USMCA included workers’
rights protection in Mexico, IPR provisions and access to medicine, the enforceability of labor rights protection in Mexico, IPR provisions and access to medicine, the enforceability of labor
and environmental provisions, and the constitutional authority of Congress over international and environmental provisions, and the constitutional authority of Congress over international
trade and its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement. trade and its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement.
Congress included $180 million over four years in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. Congress included $180 million over four years in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L.
116-113) for technical assistance projects related to the agreement and $30 million to pay for 116-113) for technical assistance projects related to the agreement and $30 million to pay for
labor attachés and other staff to monitor Mexico’s USMCA compliance.labor attachés and other staff to monitor Mexico’s USMCA compliance.133137 The goals of recent The goals of recent
assistance have been to ensure enforcement of Mexican labor laws and legitimate collective assistance have been to ensure enforcement of Mexican labor laws and legitimate collective
bargaining rights; increase measures to mitigate COVID-19 among workers; and address child bargaining rights; increase measures to mitigate COVID-19 among workers; and address child
labor and forced labor in Mexico’s supply chains, including in agriculture.labor and forced labor in Mexico’s supply chains, including in agriculture.134138 Some Members of Some Members of
Congress have praised two recent votes by Mexican workers in favor of establishing independent Congress have praised two recent votes by Mexican workers in favor of establishing independent
unions at their automotive plants as steps toward improving workers’ rights and representation.unions at their automotive plants as steps toward improving workers’ rights and representation.135139
Now that USMCA is in the implementation phase, Congress may wish to consider various issues Now that USMCA is in the implementation phase, Congress may wish to consider various issues
regarding the agreement. These issues include how the new importing requirements under regarding the agreement. These issues include how the new importing requirements under
USMCA are being phased in; whether the new rules of origin for the motor vehicle industry are USMCA are being phased in; whether the new rules of origin for the motor vehicle industry are
being implemented as planned; how the more stringent requirements are affecting the North being implemented as planned; how the more stringent requirements are affecting the North
American motor vehicle industry; how well Mexico is implementing labor law reforms to provide American motor vehicle industry; how well Mexico is implementing labor law reforms to provide
more workers’ rights protection; how well the new labor enforcement measures are working; and more workers’ rights protection; how well the new labor enforcement measures are working; and
the extent to which USMCA’s updated dispute resolution procedures are improving 136 This section is drawn from the summary of CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal. 137 the
enforcement of the agreement’s provisions, among other issues.
Selected CRS Products on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs
CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Vil arreal

133 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Labor Rights and the United States-Mexico- U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Labor Rights and the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca. Canada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca.
134138 U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Announces $20 Million in New Grants to Support USMCA U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Announces $20 Million in New Grants to Support USMCA
Implementation, Bringing the 2020 Total to Nearly $50 Million,” News Release, December 16, 2020. Implementation, Bringing the 2020 Total to Nearly $50 Million,” News Release, December 16, 2020.
135 139 Associated Press, “Mexico Sees 2nd Major Win for Independent Unions,” March 1, 2022. Associated Press, “Mexico Sees 2nd Major Win for Independent Unions,” March 1, 2022.
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the extent to which USMCA’s updated dispute resolution procedures are improving the enforcement of the agreement’s provisions, among other issues. Selected CRS Products on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Vil arreal CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal CRS In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Vil arreal CRS In Focus IF12082, CRS In Focus IF12082, USMCA: Motor Vehicle Rules of Origin, by Liana Wong and M. Angeles Vil arreal , by Liana Wong and M. Angeles Vil arreal
Energy
Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the future of energy production in Mexico, as it is Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the future of energy production in Mexico, as it is
important for Mexico’s economic growth and for the U.S. energy sector. Mexico has considerable important for Mexico’s economic growth and for the U.S. energy sector. Mexico has considerable
oil and gas resources, but its state oil company (Pemex), has struggled to counter declining oil and gas resources, but its state oil company (Pemex), has struggled to counter declining
production and postponed needed investments due to fiscal challenges. Many Members of production and postponed needed investments due to fiscal challenges. Many Members of
Congress praised Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms on energy that opened up oil, electricity, Congress praised Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms on energy that opened up oil, electricity,
gas, transmission, production, and sales to private and foreign investment while keeping gas, transmission, production, and sales to private and foreign investment while keeping
ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state control. Members of Congress have expressed ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state control. Members of Congress have expressed
serious concerns about the López Obrador administration’s treatment of U.S. energy companies serious concerns about the López Obrador administration’s treatment of U.S. energy companies
and measures it has taken to favor the state-owned electrical utility and Pemex. Members of and measures it has taken to favor the state-owned electrical utility and Pemex. Members of
Congress demonstrated bipartisan support for the 2022 U.S. request for consultations with Congress demonstrated bipartisan support for the 2022 U.S. request for consultations with
Mexico over potential violations of the USMCA.Mexico over potential violations of the USMCA.136140 Should those consultations not lead to an Should those consultations not lead to an
agreement, the U.S. and Canada could request a dispute settlement panel; the panel could result in agreement, the U.S. and Canada could request a dispute settlement panel; the panel could result in
retaliatory tariffs on Mexico.retaliatory tariffs on Mexico.137141
The 2013 reforms created opportunities for U.S. businesses in exploration, pipeline construction The 2013 reforms created opportunities for U.S. businesses in exploration, pipeline construction
and ownership, natural gas production, and commercial gasoline sales. Although the reforms did and ownership, natural gas production, and commercial gasoline sales. Although the reforms did
not privatize Pemex, they did expose the company to competition and hastened its entrance into not privatize Pemex, they did expose the company to competition and hastened its entrance into
joint ventures. Because of the reforms, Mexico received more than $160 billion in promised joint ventures. Because of the reforms, Mexico received more than $160 billion in promised
investment.investment.138142 Many experts argued at that time that deepened energy cooperation with Mexico Many experts argued at that time that deepened energy cooperation with Mexico
could give North America an industrial advantage.could give North America an industrial advantage.139143
Despite their promise, the energy sector reforms failed to reverse production declines or to Despite their promise, the energy sector reforms failed to reverse production declines or to
address structural problems within Pemex. While proponents still predict the reforms will bring address structural problems within Pemex. While proponents still predict the reforms will bring
long-term benefits to Mexico, opponents within the López Obrador government have sought to long-term benefits to Mexico, opponents within the López Obrador government have sought to
curtail private involvement in the sector.curtail private involvement in the sector.140144
In light of concerns about the López Obrador government’s counterreform policies, the United In light of concerns about the López Obrador government’s counterreform policies, the United
States sought to cement Mexico’s energy reforms through the NAFTA renegotiations. NAFTA States sought to cement Mexico’s energy reforms through the NAFTA renegotiations. NAFTA
included some reservations for investment in Mexico’s energy sector. USMCA reinforces included some reservations for investment in Mexico’s energy sector. USMCA reinforces
Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms and the current legal framework for private energy projects
in Mexico. It includes investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms similar to those that existed
in NAFTA for the oil and gas, infrastructure, and other energy sectors, even as those mechanisms

136 140 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “What They Are Saying: United States Requests Consultations Office of the United States Trade Representative, “What They Are Saying: United States Requests Consultations
Under the USMCA over Mexico’s Energy Policies on Behalf of U.S. Stakeholders,” July 20, 2022. Under the USMCA over Mexico’s Energy Policies on Behalf of U.S. Stakeholders,” July 20, 2022.
137141 Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder, “Exclusive: U.S. Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder, “Exclusive: U.S. Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of
Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023. Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
138142 Duncan Wood and John Padilla, Duncan Wood and John Padilla, Mexico’s new Hydrocarbons Model: a Critical Assessment Four Years Later,
Wilson Center & IPD Latin America, April 2018. Wilson Center & IPD Latin America, April 2018.
139143 Earl Anthony Wayne and David Shedd, Earl Anthony Wayne and David Shedd, Assuring Energy Security with a Modern NAFTA, Wilson Center Mexico , Wilson Center Mexico
Institute, May 9, 2018. Institute, May 9, 2018.
140144 Duncan Wood et al., Duncan Wood et al., Changing the Guard in Mexico: AMLO’s Opportunities and Challenges, July 2018. , July 2018.
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Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms and the current legal framework for private energy projects in Mexico. It includes investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms similar to those that existed in NAFTA for the oil and gas, infrastructure, and other energy sectors, even as those mechanisms were limited for other sectors.145were limited for other sectors.141 In addition, the free trade agreement maintains tariff-free exports In addition, the free trade agreement maintains tariff-free exports
of U.S. natural gas to Mexico, which have increased significantly since the 2013 reforms.of U.S. natural gas to Mexico, which have increased significantly since the 2013 reforms.142146
Over time, López Obrador’s energy policies have concerned energy investors and U.S. companies Over time, López Obrador’s energy policies have concerned energy investors and U.S. companies
with large parts of their supply chains in Mexico. The government’s decisions to halt new with large parts of their supply chains in Mexico. The government’s decisions to halt new
auctions in the oil and gas sector, as well as in wind and solar energy projects, stunned investors auctions in the oil and gas sector, as well as in wind and solar energy projects, stunned investors
and put hundreds of existing projects in limbo.and put hundreds of existing projects in limbo.143147 Private sector actors lobbied for adjustments in Private sector actors lobbied for adjustments in
the proposed electricity reform that would enable Mexico to keep its Paris climate agreement the proposed electricity reform that would enable Mexico to keep its Paris climate agreement
pledges and respect private investment while still strengthening the CFE.pledges and respect private investment while still strengthening the CFE.144148 They have filed They have filed
numerous legal challenges to the 2021 enacted reforms. numerous legal challenges to the 2021 enacted reforms.
Opportunities exist for continued U.S.-Mexico energy cooperation in the energy sector, but the Opportunities exist for continued U.S.-Mexico energy cooperation in the energy sector, but the
future of those efforts may depend on the outcome of López Obrador’s reforms. The Biden future of those efforts may depend on the outcome of López Obrador’s reforms. The Biden
Administration has engaged Mexico in high-level meetings to express concerns over the Administration has engaged Mexico in high-level meetings to express concerns over the
electricity reform and others, citing concerns that they could hinder U.S.-Mexico cooperation on electricity reform and others, citing concerns that they could hinder U.S.-Mexico cooperation on
clean energy initiatives and violate the USMCA.clean energy initiatives and violate the USMCA.145149 Bilateral efforts to accelerate Mexican action Bilateral efforts to accelerate Mexican action
on renewable energy development and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could on renewable energy development and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could
continue through a newly created U.S.-Mexico Climate and Clean Energy Working Group.continue through a newly created U.S.-Mexico Climate and Clean Energy Working Group.146150
In addition to monitoring López Obrador’s proposed energy reform as it pertains to USMCA, In addition to monitoring López Obrador’s proposed energy reform as it pertains to USMCA,
congressional oversight may involve broader issues related to the fairness of policies adopted by congressional oversight may involve broader issues related to the fairness of policies adopted by
the López Obrador government toward foreign energy companies and investors. the López Obrador government toward foreign energy companies and investors.
Border Environmental Issues147Issues151
The transboundary flow of raw sewage and industrial wastewater has been a focus of bilateral The transboundary flow of raw sewage and industrial wastewater has been a focus of bilateral
environmental dialogue since at least the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. Wastewater, trash, environmental dialogue since at least the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. Wastewater, trash,
and sediment flowing into the United States from Mexico have caused health and environmental and sediment flowing into the United States from Mexico have caused health and environmental
problems in the border region. Wastewater collection and treatment system capacity has not kept problems in the border region. Wastewater collection and treatment system capacity has not kept
pace with the region’s rapid population growth. In addition, the aging of existing wastewater pace with the region’s rapid population growth. In addition, the aging of existing wastewater
infrastructure has led to increased maintenance issues, such as pipeline ruptures. To address infrastructure has led to increased maintenance issues, such as pipeline ruptures. To address
border sanitation, Congress has appropriated funds for the International Boundary and Water border sanitation, Congress has appropriated funds for the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North American Commission (IBWC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North American
Development Bank (NADB) to construct or finance wastewater infrastructure on both sides of the Development Bank (NADB) to construct or finance wastewater infrastructure on both sides of the
border. Transboundary flows have continued to require bilateral cooperation, despite the border. Transboundary flows have continued to require bilateral cooperation, despite the
construction of several sanitation facilities on both sides of the border. construction of several sanitation facilities on both sides of the border.

141 145 CRS In Focus IF11167, CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal. , by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal.
142146 “USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade,” “USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade,” S & P Global Market Intelligence, December , December
10, 2019. 10, 2019.
143147 Kate Linthicum, “For Mexico’s President, the Future Isn’t Renewable Energy—It’s Coal,” Kate Linthicum, “For Mexico’s President, the Future Isn’t Renewable Energy—It’s Coal,” Los Angeles Times, April , April
12, 2021. 12, 2021.
144148 Dave Graham, “Analysis: Hints of Compromise Emerge over Mexico’s Contentious Power Bill,” Reuters, February Dave Graham, “Analysis: Hints of Compromise Emerge over Mexico’s Contentious Power Bill,” Reuters, February
15, 2022. 15, 2022.
145149 U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm on Travel to Mexico U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm on Travel to Mexico
City, Mexico,” press release, January 21, 2021, City, Mexico,” press release, January 21, 2021,
146 150 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, “Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Visits Mexico City,” U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, “Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Visits Mexico City,”
press release, February 9, 2022. press release, February 9, 2022.
147151 Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy, authored this section. Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy, authored this section.
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International Boundary and Water Commission
The IBWC, consisting of U.S. and Mexico sections, implements boundary and water treaties The IBWC, consisting of U.S. and Mexico sections, implements boundary and water treaties
between the United States and Mexico.between the United States and Mexico.148152 IBWC’s activities are conducted through Minutes, IBWC’s activities are conducted through Minutes,
which have the force of law when both the U.S. and Mexican governments provide written which have the force of law when both the U.S. and Mexican governments provide written
approval through their respective sections of the IBWC. To address the issue of transboundary approval through their respective sections of the IBWC. To address the issue of transboundary
effluent flows, the IBWC has taken actions under numerous Minutes.effluent flows, the IBWC has taken actions under numerous Minutes.149153 Under this authority, Under this authority,
IBWC has constructed and currently operates three wastewater treatment plants, two of which IBWC has constructed and currently operates three wastewater treatment plants, two of which
treat Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. These two wastewater treatment plants treat Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. These two wastewater treatment plants
are the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Ysidro, CA, and the Nogales are the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Ysidro, CA, and the Nogales
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nogales, AZ. Further, IBWC operates the Nuevo Laredo Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nogales, AZ. Further, IBWC operates the Nuevo Laredo
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.
Congress appropriates funds to the IBWC for construction activities through State Department Congress appropriates funds to the IBWC for construction activities through State Department
appropriations. The State Department’s FY2023 budget requested $41.8 million in construction appropriations. The State Department’s FY2023 budget requested $41.8 million in construction
funds for a range of projects, including rehabilitating IBWC wastewater infrastructure in Nogales, funds for a range of projects, including rehabilitating IBWC wastewater infrastructure in Nogales,
AZ.AZ.150 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), includes an appropriation of The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), includes an appropriation of
$53.0 million for IBWC construction, roughly $2 million above enacted FY2022 IBWC $53.0 million for IBWC construction, roughly $2 million above enacted FY2022 IBWC
construction appropriations.construction appropriations.
The State Department’s FY2024 budget requested $40.0 million in construction funds. In recent years, congressional appropriators have shown interest in oversight regarding In recent years, congressional appropriators have shown interest in oversight regarding
transboundary sewage flows. The joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations transboundary sewage flows. The joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), requires the IBWC to submit to the appropriations committees an Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), requires the IBWC to submit to the appropriations committees an
operating plan for FY2023, including plans for new and ongoing construction projects.operating plan for FY2023, including plans for new and ongoing construction projects. The
FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) included a requirement for the Secretary
of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant federal agencies, to submit a report to
the appropriations committee on the implementation of the interagency plan developed pursuant
to the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), within 90 days of enactment.
P.L. 116-94 directed the Secretary of State, as well as other relevant federal agencies, to develop a
plan to address the impacts of toxic transboundary flows on U.S. communities.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Congress annually provides funding to EPA for high priority water and wastewater infrastructure Congress annually provides funding to EPA for high priority water and wastewater infrastructure
projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. In 1997, EPA and NADB entered into an agreement, projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. In 1997, EPA and NADB entered into an agreement,
under which EPA contributes much of its annual border infrastructure appropriation to NADB for under which EPA contributes much of its annual border infrastructure appropriation to NADB for
grants to construct water infrastructure on both sides of the border. For FY2023, Congress grants to construct water infrastructure on both sides of the border. For FY2023, Congress
provided $36.4 million for the Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP) through an EPA provided $36.4 million for the Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP) through an EPA
account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328). EPA in turn provides these account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328). EPA in turn provides these

148funds to two programs: (1) the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAP) and (2) the Border Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF).154 The PDAP and BEIF programs are intended to identify and fund drinking water quality and/or wastewater management infrastructure projects. 152 In 1882, the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) as a temporary In 1882, the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) as a temporary
boundary-setting body. See 1882 Boundary Convention, Article 3. The United States and Mexico reestablished the IBC boundary-setting body. See 1882 Boundary Convention, Article 3. The United States and Mexico reestablished the IBC
in 1889 and made it permanent in 1900. See Convention Between the United States of America and the United States in 1889 and made it permanent in 1900. See Convention Between the United States of America and the United States
of Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the Two Governments, Known as of Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the Two Governments, Known as
the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. Treaty Between the United States of the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. Treaty Between the United States of
America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-
Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf. The 1944 Treaty, Article 3, Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf. The 1944 Treaty, Article 3,
states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems. states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems.
149153 These Minutes can be found at https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes_ByProject.html. These Minutes can be found at https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes_ByProject.html.
150 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs
, Washington, DC, March 28, 2023, p. 57, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FY-2023-
Congressional-Budget-Justification_Final_508comp.pdf154 Project funds are divided between EPA Region 6 (for projects in New Mexico, Texas, Chihuahua, Nueva Leon, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas) and EPA Region 9 (for projects in Arizona, California, Baja California, and Sonora). .
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funds to two programs: (1) the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAP) and (2) the
Border Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF).151 The PDAP and BEIF programs are intended
to identify and fund drinking water quality and/or wastewater management infrastructure projects.
Project sponsors can apply jointly to the PDAP/BEIF program through NADB, which screens for Project sponsors can apply jointly to the PDAP/BEIF program through NADB, which screens for
initial eligibility and prioritizes projects using EPA’s ranking methodologies.initial eligibility and prioritizes projects using EPA’s ranking methodologies.152155
The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) included a supplemental appropriation of $300 The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) included a supplemental appropriation of $300
million for EPA to support high-priority wastewater facilities, after consultation with the million for EPA to support high-priority wastewater facilities, after consultation with the
appropriate border commission. The act directs EPA to carry out design, construction, operation, appropriate border commission. The act directs EPA to carry out design, construction, operation,
and maintenance activities of high-priority treatment works in the Tijuana River Valley to treat and maintenance activities of high-priority treatment works in the Tijuana River Valley to treat
wastewater flows originating in Mexico. Section 7069 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, wastewater flows originating in Mexico. Section 7069 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2023, authorizes EPA to transfer funds provided by P.L. 116-113 to the IBWC to construct, own, 2023, authorizes EPA to transfer funds provided by P.L. 116-113 to the IBWC to construct, own,
and/or operate treatment works to (1) address transboundary pollution and inadequacies or and/or operate treatment works to (1) address transboundary pollution and inadequacies or
breakdown of existing treatment works in Mexico, and (2) provide treatment of flows, including breakdown of existing treatment works in Mexico, and (2) provide treatment of flows, including
the operations and maintenance of new treatment works. the operations and maintenance of new treatment works.
USMCA Implementation Act, IBWC, and Minute 328
In July 2022, the U.S. and Mexican sections of the IBWC agreed to Minute 328, “Sanitation In July 2022, the U.S. and Mexican sections of the IBWC agreed to Minute 328, “Sanitation
Infrastructure Projects in San Diego, California – Tijuana, Baja California for Immediate Infrastructure Projects in San Diego, California – Tijuana, Baja California for Immediate
Implementation and for Future Development.”Implementation and for Future Development.”153156 Minute 328 identifies specific projects to be Minute 328 identifies specific projects to be
constructed in San Diego and Tijuana, and the financial commitments of each country to these constructed in San Diego and Tijuana, and the financial commitments of each country to these
projects. These funds are dedicated to expanding the capacity of the South Bay International projects. These funds are dedicated to expanding the capacity of the South Bay International
Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Diego County; rehabilitating pumping plants, pump stations, Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Diego County; rehabilitating pumping plants, pump stations,
and pipelines in Mexico, as well as constructing a new wastewater treatment plant in Mexico. and pipelines in Mexico, as well as constructing a new wastewater treatment plant in Mexico.
North American Development Bank
In 1993, the United States and Mexico adopted an agreement to establish the Border Environment In 1993, the United States and Mexico adopted an agreement to establish the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the NADB to provide financial assistance for a range of Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the NADB to provide financial assistance for a range of
environmental infrastructure projects in the border region.environmental infrastructure projects in the border region.154157 The agreement noted the need for The agreement noted the need for
environmental infrastructure, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, and environmental infrastructure, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, and
municipal solid waste. The BECC was authorized to help border states and communities municipal solid waste. The BECC was authorized to help border states and communities
coordinate, design, and mobilize financing for environmental infrastructure projects, and to coordinate, design, and mobilize financing for environmental infrastructure projects, and to
certify projects for financing. The NADB evaluates the financial feasibility of BECC-certified certify projects for financing. The NADB evaluates the financial feasibility of BECC-certified
projects and provides financing as appropriate. In 1993, Congress authorized U.S. participation in projects and provides financing as appropriate. In 1993, Congress authorized U.S. participation in
the BECC and NADB in legislation implementing the NAFTA (P.L. 103-182). In 2004, P.L. 108-the BECC and NADB in legislation implementing the NAFTA (P.L. 103-182). In 2004, P.L. 108-
215 authorized several operational reforms to the NADB. In 2017, BECC and NADB were 215 authorized several operational reforms to the NADB. In 2017, BECC and NADB were
integrated into a single institution.integrated into a single institution.155

151 Project funds are divided between EPA Region 6 (for projects in New Mexico, Texas, Chihuahua, Nueva Leon,
Coahuila, and Tamaulipas) and EPA Region 9 (for projects in Arizona, California, Baja California, and Sonora).
152158 The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), Title VIII, Subtitle C, called for U.S. NADB board members to urge NADB to prioritize financing environmental infrastructure projects (over road or commercial projects), streamline project certification and financing procedures, and develop project performance measures. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), Division O, Title VI, authorized the U.S. Treasury to contribute up to $1.02 billion for U.S. 155 Project application documents can be found at https://www.nadb.org/infrastructure-financing/grants/border- Project application documents can be found at https://www.nadb.org/infrastructure-financing/grants/border-
environment-infrastructure-fund-beif-pdap. environment-infrastructure-fund-beif-pdap.
153156 IBWC, “Minute 328,” https://ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min328.pdf. IBWC, “Minute 328,” https://ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min328.pdf.
154157 The amended agreement can be found at North American Development Bank (NADB) website “Agreement The amended agreement can be found at North American Development Bank (NADB) website “Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States
Concerning the Establishment of a North American Development Bank” at https://www.nadb.org/uploads/content/files/Concerning the Establishment of a North American Development Bank” at https://www.nadb.org/uploads/content/files/
Policies/Charter_Eng.pdf. Policies/Charter_Eng.pdf.
155158 NADB, “NADB and BECC Merge,” press release, November 7, 2017, https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-and-becc- NADB, “NADB and BECC Merge,” press release, November 7, 2017, https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-and-becc-
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The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), Title VIII, Subtitle C, called for U.S. NADB
board members to urge NADB to prioritize financing environmental infrastructure projects (over
road or commercial projects), streamline project certification and financing procedures, and
develop project performance measures. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-
260), Division O, Title VI, authorized the U.S. Treasury to contribute up to $1.02 billion for U.S.
shares of NADB capital stock. The 2021 NADB annual report stated that, as of July 2022, the shares of NADB capital stock. The 2021 NADB annual report stated that, as of July 2022, the
United States has provided $225 million in paid-in capital to the NADB and that Mexico intended United States has provided $225 million in paid-in capital to the NADB and that Mexico intended
to provide matching payments.to provide matching payments.156159
Water Resource Issues157Issues160
The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. These The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. These
shared rivers have long presented complex issues leading to cooperation and conflict in the U.S.-shared rivers have long presented complex issues leading to cooperation and conflict in the U.S.-
Mexico border region and between the United States and Mexico. Mexico border region and between the United States and Mexico.
The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944 and other binational agreements guide how the two The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944 and other binational agreements guide how the two
governments share the flows of these rivers.governments share the flows of these rivers.158161 The binational IBWC administers these The binational IBWC administers these
agreements and includes a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S. agreements and includes a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S.
Department of State. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing river-Department of State. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing river-
related disputes between the United States and Mexico. related disputes between the United States and Mexico.
Under the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, the United States is required to provide Mexico Under the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, the United States is required to provide Mexico
annually with 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.annually with 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.159162 U.S. deliveries to Mexico in the U.S. deliveries to Mexico in the
Rio Grande basin near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez occur annually under a 1906 binational convention, Rio Grande basin near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez occur annually under a 1906 binational convention,
whereas Mexico’s deliveries downstream of Fort Quitman, TX, are established in the U.S.-whereas Mexico’s deliveries downstream of Fort Quitman, TX, are established in the U.S.-
Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. The 1944 treaty typically requires Mexico to deliver to the United Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. The 1944 treaty typically requires Mexico to deliver to the United
States a minimum amount during a five-year cycle. States a minimum amount during a five-year cycle.
Developments in the Colorado River Basin. The United States continues to meet its Colorado The United States continues to meet its Colorado
River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944.
Recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River have focused on how to manage the Colorado Recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River have focused on how to manage the Colorado
River’s water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to restore and River’s water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to restore and
protect riverine ecosystems. The most recent minute governing Colorado River basin operations, protect riverine ecosystems. The most recent minute governing Colorado River basin operations,
Minute 323 (signed in September 2017), is a set of binational measures that provides for Minute 323 (signed in September 2017), is a set of binational measures that provides for
cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat. cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat.
Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S. Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S.
portion of the basin, including delivery reductions under drought contingency plans authorized by portion of the basin, including delivery reductions under drought contingency plans authorized by
Congress in April 2019.Congress in April 2019.160163 In addition, Minute 323 designates a “Mexican Water Reserve” In addition, Minute 323 designates a “Mexican Water Reserve”

merge.
156through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake’s elevation.164 For the Colorado River Basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 323 implementation and water management associated with potential shortage conditions and any 159 Paid-in capital consists of funds contributed by the two governments to NADB. NADB, consists of funds contributed by the two governments to NADB. NADB, North American
Development Bank 2021 Annual Report
, June 30, 2022, p. 41. , June 30, 2022, p. 41.
157160 This section is drawn from CRS Report R45430, This section is drawn from CRS Report R45430, Sharing the Colorado River and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and
Conflict with Mexico
, by Nicole T. Carter, Stephen P. Mulligan, and Charles V. Stern. , by Nicole T. Carter, Stephen P. Mulligan, and Charles V. Stern.
158161 Another example of a water resource related treaty provision is Article IV of the 1970 Treaty to Resolve Pending Another example of a water resource related treaty provision is Article IV of the 1970 Treaty to Resolve Pending
Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mexico, Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mexico,
signed November 23, 1970. signed November 23, 1970.
159162 Under the treaty, the United States must supply an additional 200,000 acre-feet when surplus is declared. During Under the treaty, the United States must supply an additional 200,000 acre-feet when surplus is declared. During
drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. uses. drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. uses.
160163 Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin were enacted in April 2019 in P.L. 116- Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin were enacted in April 2019 in P.L. 116-
14. For more information, see CRS Report R45546, 14. For more information, see CRS Report R45546, Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought,
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through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed
deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake’s elevation.161 For theand the Federal Role, by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh. 164 Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used by the United States for determining shortage conditions and associated water delivery cutbacks for the Lower Colorado Colorado
River Basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 323
implementation and water management associated with potential shortage conditions and any
River Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada. Congressional Research Service 29 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations additional proposed delivery reductions in response to ongoing drought.additional proposed delivery reductions in response to ongoing drought.162165 Congress also may be Congress also may be
interested in the upcoming 2026 expiration of Minute 323 and the negotiation of any extensions interested in the upcoming 2026 expiration of Minute 323 and the negotiation of any extensions
or replacement agreements in the interim. or replacement agreements in the interim.
Developments in the Rio Grande Basin. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met
its Rio Grande delivery obligations of 1,750,000 acre-feet within the five-year cycle established its Rio Grande delivery obligations of 1,750,000 acre-feet within the five-year cycle established
by the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, most recently during the five-year cycle from 2010 to by the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, most recently during the five-year cycle from 2010 to
2015.2015.163166 Mexico avoided ending the October 2015 to October 2020 cycle with a water delivery Mexico avoided ending the October 2015 to October 2020 cycle with a water delivery
deficit by transferring to the United States Mexican water stored at binational IBWC dams. A deficit by transferring to the United States Mexican water stored at binational IBWC dams. A
minute concluded in October 2020, Minute 325, provided that a shortfall would be avoided minute concluded in October 2020, Minute 325, provided that a shortfall would be avoided
through the transfer of water stored at two IBWC dams from Mexican to U.S. ownership. Minute through the transfer of water stored at two IBWC dams from Mexican to U.S. ownership. Minute
325 resulted in the transfer of ownership of 144,728 acre-feet of water.325 resulted in the transfer of ownership of 144,728 acre-feet of water.164167
Minute 325 also allowed for negotiation of an agreement for potential temporary use of U.S. Minute 325 also allowed for negotiation of an agreement for potential temporary use of U.S.
water for minimum municipal needs in Mexico below the Amistad Dam. In addition, Minute 325 water for minimum municipal needs in Mexico below the Amistad Dam. In addition, Minute 325
indicated that two Rio Grande working groups would be established as part of the efforts to reach indicated that two Rio Grande working groups would be established as part of the efforts to reach
a goal of developing a minute on increased reliability and predictability of Rio Grande deliveries a goal of developing a minute on increased reliability and predictability of Rio Grande deliveries
to water users in the United States and Mexico by December 2023. To date, Congress has been to water users in the United States and Mexico by December 2023. To date, Congress has been
primarily involved in conducting oversight through reporting requirements for the U.S. primarily involved in conducting oversight through reporting requirements for the U.S.
Department of State, such as those included in P.L. 116-6 (S.Rept. 115-282). Pursuant to the Department of State, such as those included in P.L. 116-6 (S.Rept. 115-282). Pursuant to the
various reporting requirements, reports have been delivered to various committees of Congress. various reporting requirements, reports have been delivered to various committees of Congress.
During the current five-year cycle (October 2020-October 2025), Mexico’s deliveries were During the current five-year cycle (October 2020-October 2025), Mexico’s deliveries were
among the lowest observed for the first 22 months of a cycle. Deliveries increased in August and among the lowest observed for the first 22 months of a cycle. Deliveries increased in August and
September 2022 and then flattened out through March 2023. Mexico has another 2½ years to September 2022 and then flattened out through March 2023. Mexico has another 2½ years to
meet the 5-year delivery obligation. meet the 5-year delivery obligation.
U.S.-Mexico Health Cooperation
As with neighboring Canada, robust trade, migration, and an extensive shared border have made As with neighboring Canada, robust trade, migration, and an extensive shared border have made
public health cooperation a critical part of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship.public health cooperation a critical part of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship.165168 Collaboration Collaboration
on health matters has been strong for more than two decades, particularly since the Anthrax on health matters has been strong for more than two decades, particularly since the Anthrax
release in 2001 when Mexico became part of the Global Health Security Agenda and later on in release in 2001 when Mexico became part of the Global Health Security Agenda and later on in

and the Federal Role, by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh.
161 Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used by the United States for determining shortage conditions and associated
water delivery cutbacks for the Lower Colorado River Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada.
162response to the outbreaks of SARS-CoV (2002-2004). In response, both countries collaborated on the development of an electronic early warning surveillance system for infectious diseases. Building on lessons learned from the H1N1 (2009) Influenza pandemic, Mexico, Canada, and the United States launched the 2012 North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza (NAPAPI). The 2012 NAPAPI created a flexible platform to prevent, prepare, and respond to any potential or actual health security threat to North America through the North American Health Security Working Group (NAHSWG). Since its creation, the NAHSWG has hosted multiple tabletop exercises on emergency communications and deployments of medical countermeasures, 165 For example, in January 2023 six of the seven Colorado River basin states submitted a proposal to the Department For example, in January 2023 six of the seven Colorado River basin states submitted a proposal to the Department
of the Interior that recommends conserving Colorado River waters by assessing evaporative losses on deliveries to of the Interior that recommends conserving Colorado River waters by assessing evaporative losses on deliveries to
Lower Colorado River basin states and Mexico. See Letter from Colorado River Basin State Representatives of Lower Colorado River basin states and Mexico. See Letter from Colorado River Basin State Representatives of
Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming to Tanya Trujillo, Assistant Secretary, Water & Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming to Tanya Trujillo, Assistant Secretary, Water &
Science, U.S. Department of the Interior, January 31, 2023. Science, U.S. Department of the Interior, January 31, 2023.
163166 Mexico made up for those shortfalls in subsequent five-year cycles, as authorized under the U.S.-Mexico Water Mexico made up for those shortfalls in subsequent five-year cycles, as authorized under the U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty of 1944. Treaty of 1944.
164167 Amount of the transfer is described in Letter from Jayne Harkins, Commissioner, U.S. IBWC, to Greg Abbott, Amount of the transfer is described in Letter from Jayne Harkins, Commissioner, U.S. IBWC, to Greg Abbott,
Governor of Texas, November 3, 2020. Governor of Texas, November 3, 2020.
165168 This paragraph draws from Andrew I. Rudman and Duncan Wood, This paragraph draws from Andrew I. Rudman and Duncan Wood, Pandemics and Beyond: The Potential for U.S.-
Mexican Cooperation in Public Health
, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, March 2020. , Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, March 2020.
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response to the outbreaks of SARS-CoV (2002-2004). In response, both countries collaborated on
the development of an electronic early warning surveillance system for infectious diseases.
Building on lessons learned from the H1N1 (2009) Influenza pandemic, Mexico, Canada, and the
United States launched the 2012 North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza
(NAPAPI). The 2012 NAPAPI created a flexible platform to prevent, prepare, and respond to any
potential or actual health security threat to North America through the North American Health
Security Working Group (NAHSWG). Since its creation, the NAHSWG has hosted multiple
tabletop exercises on emergency communications and deployments of medical countermeasures,
medical personnel, and laboratory samples.166medical personnel, and laboratory samples.169 The NAHSWG is led by the U.S. Department of The NAHSWG is led by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and has U.S. government representation from several HHS Health and Human Services (HHS) and has U.S. government representation from several HHS
offices, such as the CDC, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National offices, such as the CDC, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and from other agencies (such as DHS and the State Department). In Institutes of Health (NIH) and from other agencies (such as DHS and the State Department). In
addition to this trilateral collaboration, Mexico is one of five countries that has a permanent HHS addition to this trilateral collaboration, Mexico is one of five countries that has a permanent HHS
health attaché representing the Office of the Secretary, overseeing the work of HHS agencies health attaché representing the Office of the Secretary, overseeing the work of HHS agencies
operating within the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and leading health diplomacy efforts. operating within the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and leading health diplomacy efforts.
Response to COVID-19. In January 2020, the NAHSWG convened to respond to COVID-19. In January 2020, the NAHSWG convened to respond to COVID-19.
The group enabled the sharing of best practices on issues such as epidemiological surveillance, The group enabled the sharing of best practices on issues such as epidemiological surveillance,
laboratory diagnostics regulation, testing policies, supply chains, workers’ safety, COVID-19 laboratory diagnostics regulation, testing policies, supply chains, workers’ safety, COVID-19
variants, and vaccine confidence. Through the HHS health attaché, Mexico received funding variants, and vaccine confidence. Through the HHS health attaché, Mexico received funding
support to strengthen the COVID-19 response in the areas of epidemiological and laboratory support to strengthen the COVID-19 response in the areas of epidemiological and laboratory
surveillance, risk communication, and research. HHS also supported Mexico with diagnostics test surveillance, risk communication, and research. HHS also supported Mexico with diagnostics test
kits, facilitated the acquisition of ventilators, hosted bilateral dialogues on vaccine and kits, facilitated the acquisition of ventilators, hosted bilateral dialogues on vaccine and
therapeutics development, and provided expertise on vaccine deployment matters. Mexico therapeutics development, and provided expertise on vaccine deployment matters. Mexico
received nearly 17 million vaccine doses from the U.S. government.received nearly 17 million vaccine doses from the U.S. government.167170
Border Health Coordination. The U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission was created in July The U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission was created in July
2000 with the signing of an agreement by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of the 2000 with the signing of an agreement by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of the
United States and the Secretary of Health of México to provide international leadership to United States and the Secretary of Health of México to provide international leadership to
improve health and quality of life along the U.S.-Mexico border.improve health and quality of life along the U.S.-Mexico border.168171 Under the Biden Under the Biden
Administration’s HHS leadership, the U.S. section of the commission is tasked with conducting Administration’s HHS leadership, the U.S. section of the commission is tasked with conducting
health needs assessments and serving as a key advisory body on border health matters to the HHS health needs assessments and serving as a key advisory body on border health matters to the HHS
Secretary in alignment with larger bilateral collaboration frameworks and with its public law Secretary in alignment with larger bilateral collaboration frameworks and with its public law
mandate. Since 2018, the U.S. section has provided funding and technical advice through the mandate. Since 2018, the U.S. section has provided funding and technical advice through the
CDC’s Binational Border Infection Disease Surveillance (BIDS) program, which in turn funds CDC’s Binational Border Infection Disease Surveillance (BIDS) program, which in turn funds
the four U.S. states on the U.S.-Mexico border to improve the detection, reporting, and prevention the four U.S. states on the U.S.-Mexico border to improve the detection, reporting, and prevention
of infectious diseases of binational importance. of infectious diseases of binational importance.
The NAHSWG and the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission reviewed lessons learned from The NAHSWG and the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission reviewed lessons learned from
COVID-19 at the federal and border level, as called for during the 2021 North American Leaders’ COVID-19 at the federal and border level, as called for during the 2021 North American Leaders’
Summit.Summit.169172 While some transborder communities (e.g., San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja While some transborder communities (e.g., San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja

166California) used existing mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic responses, others (e.g., El Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua) struggled to do so.173 Limited federal support from underfunded border health entities and disjointed national travel restrictions and vaccine policies 169 CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022. CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022.
167170 Ibid. Ibid.
168171 HHS, “U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission,” at https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/oga/about-oga/what-we- HHS, “U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission,” at https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/oga/about-oga/what-we-
do/international-relations-division/americas/border-health-commission/index.html. do/international-relations-division/americas/border-health-commission/index.html.
169172 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2021 North American Leaders’ Summit,” November 18, 2021. White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2021 North American Leaders’ Summit,” November 18, 2021.
That review reportedly examined emergency communications; joint outbreak investigation; laboratory capacity; That review reportedly examined emergency communications; joint outbreak investigation; laboratory capacity;
development of and access to medical countermeasures; supply chains; health systems capacity and interoperability; development of and access to medical countermeasures; supply chains; health systems capacity and interoperability;
and workers’ protections. and workers’ protections.
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California) used existing mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic responses, others (e.g., El
Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua) struggled to do so.170 Limited federal support from
underfunded border health entities and disjointed national travel restrictions and vaccine policies
173 Barbara Jiménez and Justine Kozo, “The Development of a Collaborative Binational Strategy to Support the San Diego-Tijuana Transborder Community During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Front Public Health, vol. 10, July 2022; Martha Pskowski and Lauren Villagran, “'Too Many People Died for Us to Walk Away’: Renewed U.S., Mexico Cooperation Vital to Saving Lives in Next Pandemic,” El Paso Times, March 24, 2022. Congressional Research Service 31 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations added to the challenges faced by local officials in binational communities.added to the challenges faced by local officials in binational communities.171174 At the 2023 NALS, At the 2023 NALS,
a key deliverable included revising the 2021 NAPAPI to better respond to health threats.a key deliverable included revising the 2021 NAPAPI to better respond to health threats.172175
Outlook
U.S.-Mexico relations are likely to be tested in 2023 by ongoing tension in security and energy U.S.-Mexico relations are likely to be tested in 2023 by ongoing tension in security and energy
relations and by U.S. concerns over human rights, the weakening of Mexico’s democratic relations and by U.S. concerns over human rights, the weakening of Mexico’s democratic
institutions, and the military’s growing role in Mexico’s economy and society. Most experts institutions, and the military’s growing role in Mexico’s economy and society. Most experts
maintain the best way for both countries to address these challenges is to continue working maintain the best way for both countries to address these challenges is to continue working
together and with Canada to ensure the best possible outcomes for North America. A series of together and with Canada to ensure the best possible outcomes for North America. A series of
high-level meetings in 2022 and thus far in 2023 have kept dialogue open between the Biden and high-level meetings in 2022 and thus far in 2023 have kept dialogue open between the Biden and
López Obrador administrations. Nevertheless, tough U.S. congressional criticism of Mexico’s López Obrador administrations. Nevertheless, tough U.S. congressional criticism of Mexico’s
inability to address fentanyl trafficking and Mexican criticism of U.S. intervention and violations inability to address fentanyl trafficking and Mexican criticism of U.S. intervention and violations
of Mexican sovereignty have caused renewed tension. In addition, bilateral cooperation may of Mexican sovereignty have caused renewed tension. In addition, bilateral cooperation may
falter as both countries convene presidential elections in 2024. Congress is likely to maintain falter as both countries convene presidential elections in 2024. Congress is likely to maintain
significant interest in Mexico, with trade, security, drug policy, migration, health, and significant interest in Mexico, with trade, security, drug policy, migration, health, and
environmental issues as probable areas of funding and oversight efforts. environmental issues as probable areas of funding and oversight efforts.

170 Barbara Jiménez and Justine Kozo, “The Development of a Collaborative Binational Strategy to Support the San
Diego-Tijuana Transborder Community During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Front Public Health, vol. 10, July 2022;
Martha Pskowski and Lauren Villagran, “'Too Many People Died for Us to Walk Away’: Renewed U.S., Mexico
Cooperation Vital to Saving Lives in Next Pandemic,” El Paso Times, March 24, 2022.
171 174 Ibid. Ibid.
172175 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023. White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023.
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Appendix A. Key Justice Institutions
Key Institutions for Strengthening the Rule of Law
New Criminal Justice System. By the mid-2000s, most Mexican legal experts had concluded that reforming By the mid-2000s, most Mexican legal experts had concluded that reforming
Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system was crucial for combating criminality and strengthening the Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system was crucial for combating criminality and strengthening the
rule of law. In June 2008, Mexico implemented constitutional reforms mandating that by 2016, trial procedures at rule of law. In June 2008, Mexico implemented constitutional reforms mandating that by 2016, trial procedures at
the federal and state levels had to move from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a the federal and state levels had to move from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a
judge to an adversarial public trial system, with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. These changes judge to an adversarial public trial system, with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. These changes
aimed to create a new, more transparent, impartial, and efficient criminal justice system. aimed to create a new, more transparent, impartial, and efficient criminal justice system.
Under then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico technically met the June 2016 deadline for adopting the new Under then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico technically met the June 2016 deadline for adopting the new
system, with states that received technical assistance from the United States showing, on average, better results system, with states that received technical assistance from the United States showing, on average, better results
than others. Nevertheless, problems in implementation occurred and public opinion turned against the system, as than others. Nevertheless, problems in implementation occurred and public opinion turned against the system, as
judges released criminals due to flawed police investigations or weak cases presented by prosecutors. According judges released criminals due to flawed police investigations or weak cases presented by prosecutors. According
to the World Justice Project, the new system has produced better courtroom infrastructure, more capable judges, to the World Justice Project, the new system has produced better courtroom infrastructure, more capable judges,
and faster case resolution than the old system, but more training for police and prosecutors is needed. and faster case resolution than the old system, but more training for police and prosecutors is needed.
President López Obrador has not dedicated significant resources to strengthening the justice system. His President López Obrador has not dedicated significant resources to strengthening the justice system. His
administration administration attempted to implement some reforms, includingpassed a 2019 constitutional reform mandating mandatory pretrial detention for mandatory pretrial detention for moremany crimes, crimes,
which which would have contradictedruns counter to the new system’s goals. the new system’s goals. Mexico’s Supreme Court struck down those reforms.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ordered Mexico to reform this pretrial detention system, but the government has not complied. Building an Independent Prosecutor General’s Office. Analysts who study Mexico’s legal system have long Analysts who study Mexico’s legal system have long
highlighted the inefficiency of the attorney general’s office (known as the PGR). The PGR struggled with limited highlighted the inefficiency of the attorney general’s office (known as the PGR). The PGR struggled with limited
resources, corruption, and a lack of political wil to resolve high-profile cases, including those involving corruption resources, corruption, and a lack of political wil to resolve high-profile cases, including those involving corruption
or human rights abuses. Many civil society groups that pushed for the new criminal justice system also lobbied the or human rights abuses. Many civil society groups that pushed for the new criminal justice system also lobbied the
Mexican Congress to create an independent prosecutor’s office. Amid petitions from civil society organizations, Mexican Congress to create an independent prosecutor’s office. Amid petitions from civil society organizations,
Mexico’s senate was to appoint an independent individual to lead the new prosecutor general’s office for a nine-Mexico’s senate was to appoint an independent individual to lead the new prosecutor general’s office for a nine-
year term under 2014 constitutional reforms. year term under 2014 constitutional reforms.
President López Obrador downplayed the importance of the new office during his campaign, but Mexico’s President López Obrador downplayed the importance of the new office during his campaign, but Mexico’s
Congress established the office, now known as the Prosecutor General’s Office (FGR), after López Obrador’s Congress established the office, now known as the Prosecutor General’s Office (FGR), after López Obrador’s
inauguration. In January 2019, Mexico’s senate named Dr. Alejandro Gertz Manero, a close associate and former inauguration. In January 2019, Mexico’s senate named Dr. Alejandro Gertz Manero, a close associate and former
security adviser to López Obrador, as prosecutor general. Gertz Manero directed prosecutors to focus on security adviser to López Obrador, as prosecutor general. Gertz Manero directed prosecutors to focus on
emblematic cases, but few have progressed. Critics maintain Gertz Manergo has been slow to implement the emblematic cases, but few have progressed. Critics maintain Gertz Manergo has been slow to implement the
reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress to strengthen the FGR. reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress to strengthen the FGR.
National Anti-corruption System. In July 2016, Mexico’s Congress approved legislation that contained several In July 2016, Mexico’s Congress approved legislation that contained several
proposals put forth by civil society to ful y implement the National Anti-corruption System (NAS) created by a proposals put forth by civil society to ful y implement the National Anti-corruption System (NAS) created by a
2015 constitutional reform. The legislation gave the NAS investigative and prosecutorial powers and a civilian 2015 constitutional reform. The legislation gave the NAS investigative and prosecutorial powers and a civilian
board of directors; increased administrative and criminal penalties for corruption; and required three declarations board of directors; increased administrative and criminal penalties for corruption; and required three declarations
(taxes, assets, and conflicts of interest) from public officials and contractors. Under the Peña Nieto government, (taxes, assets, and conflicts of interest) from public officials and contractors. Under the Peña Nieto government,
federal implementation of the NAS lagged and state-level implementation varied. federal implementation of the NAS lagged and state-level implementation varied.
In February 2019, Prosecutor General Gertz Manero named a special anti-corruption prosecutor, who received a In February 2019, Prosecutor General Gertz Manero named a special anti-corruption prosecutor, who received a
significant budget for 2020 and 2021 amid generalized budget cuts for the institution. Cases involving corruption in significant budget for 2020 and 2021 amid generalized budget cuts for the institution. Cases involving corruption in
the social development ministry and corrupt payments from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to the the social development ministry and corrupt payments from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to the
head of head of Petróleos de México (Pemex) during the Peña Nieto administration are moving forward. However, some 500 during the Peña Nieto administration are moving forward. However, some 500
reports of corruption referred to the FGR by the Ministry of Public Administration in the current administration reports of corruption referred to the FGR by the Ministry of Public Administration in the current administration
have yet to be presented before a judge. In January 2022, the López Obrador administration proposed to have yet to be presented before a judge. In January 2022, the López Obrador administration proposed to
eliminate NAS’s technical support arm charged with evaluating the country’s anti-corruption activities as part of a eliminate NAS’s technical support arm charged with evaluating the country’s anti-corruption activities as part of a
larger consolidation strategy to reduce public spending. larger consolidation strategy to reduce public spending.
Sources: Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final
Countdown to Implementation
, Justice in Mexico, October 2015; World Justice Project México, , Justice in Mexico, October 2015; World Justice Project México, Mexico’s New
Criminal Justice System: Substantial Progress and Persistent Challenges
, June 2018; “AMLO Asegura que Respetará , June 2018; “AMLO Asegura que Respetará
Decisión de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa por Defraudación Fiscal,” Decisión de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa por Defraudación Fiscal,” El Economista, October 26, 2021; Arturo Angel, , October 26, 2021; Arturo Angel,
“Gertz en Tres Años con FGR: Despidos, Opacidad e Incumpliendo Plazos de su Propia Ley,” “Gertz en Tres Años con FGR: Despidos, Opacidad e Incumpliendo Plazos de su Propia Ley,” Animal Político,
January 27, 2022; and Jorge Monroy, Pedro Vil a y Caña y Alberto Morales, “Va AMLO por Fusionar 16 órganos January 27, 2022; and Jorge Monroy, Pedro Vil a y Caña y Alberto Morales, “Va AMLO por Fusionar 16 órganos
en Dependencias,” en Dependencias,” El Universal, January 28, 2022, January 28, 2022; Stephanie Brewer, “International Ruling Finds Mexico’s Legal Framework on Detentions Violates Human Rights,” WOLA, February 23, 2023..

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link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix B. Mérida Initiative Funding
Table B-1. Estimated Mérida/Bicentennial Framework Funding: FY2008-FY2022
(in millions of dollars) (in millions of dollars)
Account
ESF
INCLE
FMF
Total
FY2008 FY2008
20.0 20.0
263.5 263.5
116.5 116.5
400.0
FY2009 FY2009
15.0 15.0
406.0 406.0
39.0 39.0
460.0
FY2010 FY2010
9.0 9.0
365.0 365.0
265.2 265.2
639.2
FY2011 FY2011
18.0 18.0
117.0 117.0
8.0 8.0
143.0
FY2012 FY2012
33.3 33.3
248.5 248.5
Not app. Not app.
281.8
FY2013 FY2013
32.1 32.1
190.1 190.1
Not app. Not app.
222.2
FY2014 FY2014
35.0 35.0
143.1 143.1
Not app. Not app.
178.1
FY2015 FY2015
33.6 33.6
110.0 110.0
Not app. Not app.
143.6
FY2016 FY2016
39.0 39.0
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
139.0
FY2017 FY2017
40. 40.9a
90.0 90.0
Not app. Not app.
130.9
FY2018 FY2018
39. 39.0b
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
139.0
FY2019 FY2019
39. 39.0c
110.0 110.0
Not app. Not app.
149.0
FY2020 FY2020
33. 33.0d
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
133.0
FY2021 FY2021
50.0 50.0
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
150.0
FY2022 FY2022
50. 50.0e
64.0 64.0
Not. app. Not. app.
114.0
Total
486.9 486.9
2,543.2 2,543.2
428.7 428.7
3,458.8 3,458.8
FY2023 req. FY2023 req.
75.0 75.0
64.0 64.0
Not. app. Not. app.
139.0 139.0
FY2024 req. FY2024 req.
60.7 60.7
64.0 64.0
Not. app. Not. app.
124.7
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, November 3, 2016; U.S. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, November 3, 2016; U.S.
Department of State, November 18, 2016; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 117-103; U.S. Department of State, Department of State, November 18, 2016; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 117-103; U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2022; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94;
Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; and Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103. Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; and Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; FMF = ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; FMF =
Foreign Military Financing. FY2008-FY2010 included supplemental funding. Foreign Military Financing. FY2008-FY2010 included supplemental funding.
a. For FY2017, Mérida programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) a. For FY2017, Mérida programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
were funded through the Development Assistance account rather than ESF. were funded through the Development Assistance account rather than ESF.
b. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs. b. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
c. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs. c. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
d. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $13 mil ion wil be used to support non-d. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $13 mil ion wil be used to support non-
Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #71, December Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #71, December
16, 2020. 16, 2020.
e. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $18 mil ion wil be used to support non- e. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $18 mil ion wil be used to support non-
Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #193, July 18, Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #193, July 18,
2022. 2022.
f. f.
A portion of the funds appropriated wil support programs related to clean energy and sustainable A portion of the funds appropriated wil support programs related to clean energy and sustainable
landscapes. landscapes.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations


Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs


Acknowledgments
This report contains significant contributions from Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; This report contains significant contributions from Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy;
Stephen P. Mulligan, Legislative Attorney; Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; and Stephen P. Mulligan, Legislative Attorney; Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; and
Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy. Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy.

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