Organization of American States: In Brief
May 2, 2023
Updated May 21, 2025
(R47230)
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Summary
The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional multilateral organization that The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional multilateral organization that
comprises comprises
all34 of the 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States
.
Peter J. Meyer
It was established in 1948 as a forum in which the nations of the hemisphere could engage one
Specialist in Latin
; Nicaragua withdrew from the organization in 2023. The OAS was established in 1948 as a forum for Western Hemisphere countries to engage one another and address issues of mutual concern. Today, the another and address issues of mutual concern. Today, the
OASorganization concentrates on four broad concentrates on four broad
American and Canadian
objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development,
Affairs
and regional security cooperation. With and regional security cooperation. With
an approved budget of $145.2 million in 2023budget expenditures totaling $167.0 million in 2024, the OAS, the
organization carries out various activities to advance these goals, often providing policy guidance carries out various activities to advance these goals, often providing policy guidance
and technical assistance to member states.and technical assistance to member states.
The OAS has occasionally struggled to fulfill its mandate due to political and financial challenges. Over the past two The OAS has occasionally struggled to fulfill its mandate due to political and financial challenges. Over the past two
decades, increased ideological polarization among member states has made it more difficult to establish a common decades, increased ideological polarization among member states has made it more difficult to establish a common
hemispheric agenda. In addition, member states have repeatedly assigned new responsibilities to the OAS without providing hemispheric agenda. In addition, member states have repeatedly assigned new responsibilities to the OAS without providing
commensurate increases in funding. Consequently, the organization is sometimes unable to establish consensus on regional commensurate increases in funding. Consequently, the organization is sometimes unable to establish consensus on regional
challenges or dedicate sufficient resources to address them effectively. challenges or dedicate sufficient resources to address them effectively.
Albert Ramdin, who is scheduled to take office as the next OAS Secretary General on May 30, 2025, has emphasized the importance of finding common ground among member states.
The United States hosts the OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, and is the largest financial contributor to the organization, The United States hosts the OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, and is the largest financial contributor to the organization,
providing an estimated $providing an estimated $
53.260.4 million in million in
FY2023FY2024. Historically, the U.S. government has sought to use the OAS to advance . Historically, the U.S. government has sought to use the OAS to advance
economic, political, and security objectives in the Western Hemisphere. OAS actions frequently reflected U.S. policy during economic, political, and security objectives in the Western Hemisphere. OAS actions frequently reflected U.S. policy during
the the
20th20th century, particularly during the early Cold War period and the 1990s. This trend has changed to a certain extent over century, particularly during the early Cold War period and the 1990s. This trend has changed to a certain extent over
the past the past
2025 years, as years, as
member states’the policy preferences of the United States and other member states have diverged on certain issues.
Congress has helped policy preferences on certain issues have diverged from those of the United States. Nevertheless, even as the United States’ ability to influence decisions at the OAS has declined, the organization’s goals and day-to-day activities have remained generally consistent with U.S. objectives in the hemisphere.
The 117th Congress continued to shape U.S. policy toward the OAS through its legislative and oversight activities. shape U.S. policy toward the OAS through its legislative and oversight activities.
The For example, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2023 (P.L. 117-3282024 (P.L. 118-47, Division F) appropriated funding for U.S. assessed contributions to international ) appropriated funding for U.S. assessed contributions to international
organizations, including the OAS, and designated at least $organizations, including the OAS, and designated at least $
1015.0 million in voluntary contributions to support OAS .0 million in voluntary contributions to support OAS
human rights and democracy promotion activitiesefforts to protect human rights, strengthen democracy, and combat human trafficking. The legislation also directed the State Department to use the voice and vote of the . The legislation also directed the State Department to use the voice and vote of the
United States to United States to
advance a series ofimplement various budgetary and budgetary and
administrativemanagement reforms at the OAS and to prioritize OAS activities related to democracy and human rights. The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (P.L. 119-4), signed into law on March 15, 2025, funds U.S. contributions to the OAS at the same rate, and under the same conditions and authority, as FY2024.
The 119th Congress may examine the Trump Administration's approach to the OAS and may influence U.S. engagement with the organization through the FY2026 appropriations process or other legislation. As of May 8, 2025, the OAS reported that the Trump Administration had terminated U.S. funding for at least 22 OAS programs. Pursuant to Executive Order 14199, issued on February 4, 2025, the Secretary of State is to conduct a review of the OAS and all other international organizations of which the United States is a member to determine if they are "contrary to the interests of the United States" and whether they can "be reformed." Within 180 days (i.e., by August 2025), the Secretary is to provide recommendations regarding whether to withdraw from such organizations. The Trump Administration's preliminary FY2026 budget proposal does not specifically mention the OAS but recommends pausing most assessed contributions and all voluntary contributions to international organizations. In addition to assessing legislative options, the Senate could consider President Trump's nomination of Leandro Rizzuto to be the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS (PN26-41).
Introduction
reforms at the organization, building on the OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41). Additionally, the Senate confirmed Francisco Mora to be the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS (PN953) in December 2022—16 months after President Biden nominated him for the position.
The 118th Congress is now considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget request, which includes $42.6 million for the U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS and $8.0 million in voluntary contributions for OAS-managed democracy promotion and economic development programs in the hemisphere. Moving forward, Congress may examine how the Administration is implementing the OAS Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-343), which called for a formal mechanism to allow Members of Congress and national legislators from other OAS member states to participate in OAS activities. Congress also may consider legislative initiatives to influence U.S. policy toward the OAS or U.S. ratification of various inter-American treaties.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
History and Purpose ........................................................................................................................ 2
Institutional Governance ................................................................................................................. 4
General Assembly ..................................................................................................................... 4
Permanent Council .................................................................................................................... 4
General Secretariat .................................................................................................................... 4
Funding ............................................................................................................................................ 5
U.S. Contributions ..................................................................................................................... 5
Budget Constraints .................................................................................................................... 7
Activities ......................................................................................................................................... 8
Democracy Promotion .............................................................................................................. 8
Human Rights Protection .......................................................................................................... 9
Economic and Social Development ........................................................................................ 10
Regional Security Cooperation ................................................................................................ 11
Looking Ahead: Issues for Congress ............................................................................................. 12
Tables
Table 1. Organization of American States Budget: Calendar Years 2020-2023 .............................. 5
Table 2. U.S. Funding for the OAS: FY2021-FY2024 .................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 13
Congressional Research Service
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Introduction
The United States helped create the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 as a The United States helped create the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 as a
multilateral forum in which the multilateral forum in which the
nationscountries of the Western Hemisphere could engage one another and of the Western Hemisphere could engage one another and
address issues of mutual concern. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of address issues of mutual concern. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of
the OAS charter, allowing for U.S. membership in the organization.the OAS charter, allowing for U.S. membership in the organization.
11 Congress authorizes and Congress authorizes and
appropriates funding for the OAS, and the executive branch represents and shapes U.S. policy appropriates funding for the OAS, and the executive branch represents and shapes U.S. policy
through the State Department and the U.S. Mission to the OAS in Washington, DC.through the State Department and the U.S. Mission to the OAS in Washington, DC.
Historically, OAS decisions often have reflected U.S. policy, as other member states have sought Historically, OAS decisions often have reflected U.S. policy, as other member states have sought
to maintain close relations with the dominant economic and political power in the hemisphere. to maintain close relations with the dominant economic and political power in the hemisphere.
This was especially true during the early Cold War period, when the United States was able to This was especially true during the early Cold War period, when the United States was able to
secure OAS support for many of its anti-communist policies.secure OAS support for many of its anti-communist policies.
22 OAS decisions again aligned OAS decisions again aligned
closely with U.S. policy in the 1990sclosely with U.S. policy in the 1990s
, following the end of the Cold War following the end of the Cold War
, due to a broad political due to a broad political
consensus among member states in support of initiatives intended to strengthen democratic consensus among member states in support of initiatives intended to strengthen democratic
governance and liberalize markets.governance and liberalize markets.
33 Over the past two decades, Over the past two decades,
however, the United Statesthe United States
’ ' ability to shape outcomes in the Western Hemisphere has declined as countries throughout the ability to shape outcomes in the Western Hemisphere has declined as countries throughout the
region have elected ideologically diverse leaders whose domestic and foreign policies have region have elected ideologically diverse leaders whose domestic and foreign policies have
sometimes diverged from U.S. policy preferences.diverged from U.S. policy preferences.
4 Nevertheless, the core priorities of the OAS remain broadly consistent with U.S. objectives in the hemisphere (see “Activities”).4
Congressional debate regarding the OAS has focused on how to ensure the organization fulfills its
Congressional debate regarding the OAS has focused on how to ensure the organization fulfills its
mandate to promote democracy, protect human rights, advance economic and social development, mandate to promote democracy, protect human rights, advance economic and social development,
and foster security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Congress has designated funding to and foster security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Congress has designated funding to
support such OAS activities in annual appropriations measures support such OAS activities in annual appropriations measures
(see “U.S. Contributions”) and has and has
enacted two legislative measures over the past enacted two legislative measures over the past
decade12 years intended to strengthen the organization. intended to strengthen the organization.
The OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41) sought to foster various financial The OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41) sought to foster various financial
and administrative reforms at the OAS to enable the organization to concentrate on its core and administrative reforms at the OAS to enable the organization to concentrate on its core
competencies and carry out its mission more effectivelycompetencies and carry out its mission more effectively
(see “Budget Constraints”). The OAS . The OAS
Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-343) called for a formal mechanism to allow Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-343) called for a formal mechanism to allow
Members of Congress and national legislators from other OAS member states to participate in Members of Congress and national legislators from other OAS member states to participate in
OAS activities. It also directed the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for supporting OAS OAS activities. It also directed the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for supporting OAS
anti-corruption and human rights promotion efforts.anti-corruption and human rights promotion efforts.
At times, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the OAS is falling short, At times, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the OAS is falling short,
particularly in its efforts to promote democracy and human rights. These Members have called on particularly in its efforts to promote democracy and human rights. These Members have called on
the organization to respond more forcefully to authoritarian actions in countries such as the organization to respond more forcefully to authoritarian actions in countries such as
Venezuela and Nicaragua and occasionally have sought to compel stronger action by threatening Venezuela and Nicaragua and occasionally have sought to compel stronger action by threatening
to suspend funding for the organization.to suspend funding for the organization.
55 Some Members also have criticized certain OAS actions that they argue are outside the organization' Some Members also have criticized certain OAS actions 1 The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) in August 1950. The text of the charter is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html.
2 George Meek, “U.S. Influence in the Organization of American States,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3 (August 1975), pp. 311-325.
3 Carolyn M. Shaw, “Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American States,” Latin American Politics
and Society, vol. 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 59-92.
4 Russell Crandall, “The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 83-95; and Inter-American Dialogue, The Case for Renewed Cooperation
in a Troubled Hemisphere, April 2022, pp. 26-27.
5 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Advancing U.S. Interests Through the Organization of American States, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2018; and
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Organization of American States: In Brief
that they argue are outside the organization’s mandate. In 2018, for example, a group of Senators s mandate. In 2018, for example, a group of Senators
asserted that two OAS-affiliated bodiesasserted that two OAS-affiliated bodies
’' statements in favor of legalized abortion contravened a statements in favor of legalized abortion contravened a
long-standing legislative provision that prohibits long-standing legislative provision that prohibits
U.S. funds from being used to funds from being used to
“"lobby for or against lobby for or against
abortion”abortion," and called for the State Department to withhold some funding. and called for the State Department to withhold some funding.
6 The 6 The first Trump Trump
Administration subsequently reduced the FY2019 U.S. contribution to the OAS by $210,000, Administration subsequently reduced the FY2019 U.S. contribution to the OAS by $210,000,
which it determined to be the U.S. which it determined to be the U.S.
“"proportional share of possible OAS costs in question.proportional share of possible OAS costs in question.
”7
"7
The second Trump Administration has called for a review of U.S. participation in the OAS and all other international organizations and has terminated some funding for the organization. The 119th Congress may assess the current state of the OAS, the Trump Administration's policy approach, and whether and how to shape U.S. engagement with the organization.
This report briefly discusses the history and governance of the OAS, examines the organizationThis report briefly discusses the history and governance of the OAS, examines the organization
’s 's funding and activities, and raises potential legislative and oversight activities related to the OAS funding and activities, and raises potential legislative and oversight activities related to the OAS
that Congress could considerthat Congress could consider
in the 118th Congress. .
History and Purpose8
Purpose8
Multilateral relations among the countries of the Western Hemisphere date back to the Multilateral relations among the countries of the Western Hemisphere date back to the
International Conference of American States, held in Washington, DC, from October 1889 to International Conference of American States, held in Washington, DC, from October 1889 to
April 1890. This conference was the first in a series of periodic meetings to establish norms and April 1890. This conference was the first in a series of periodic meetings to establish norms and
institutions to govern hemispheric relations and promote cooperation. The participating countries institutions to govern hemispheric relations and promote cooperation. The participating countries
agreed to establish the International Union of American Republics, headquartered in Washington, agreed to establish the International Union of American Republics, headquartered in Washington,
DC, which was renamed the Pan American Union in 1910. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt DC, which was renamed the Pan American Union in 1910. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt
announced a announced a
“"Good NeighborGood Neighbor
”" policy, which sought to emphasize hemispheric cooperation and policy, which sought to emphasize hemispheric cooperation and
trade and to distance the United States from its trade and to distance the United States from its
earlierrepeated military interventions in the region military interventions in the region
. during the 19th and early 20th centuries.9 The The
policy shift paved the way for the adoption of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, policy shift paved the way for the adoption of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
which which
formally recognized the equality of states and the principle of nonintervention in one recognized the equality of states and the principle of nonintervention in one
another’another's affairs.s affairs.
910 Close cooperation during World War II further strengthened hemispheric ties, Close cooperation during World War II further strengthened hemispheric ties,
which were reinforced with the adoption of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which were reinforced with the adoption of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty)—a collective security pact—in 1947.(Rio Treaty)—a collective security pact—in 1947.
10
11
In 1948, the United States and 20 other countries signed the OAS charter, which reconstituted the In 1948, the United States and 20 other countries signed the OAS charter, which reconstituted the
Pan American Union as the OAS and placed many of the hemispherePan American Union as the OAS and placed many of the hemisphere
’'s institutions and s institutions and
agreements (collectively known as the agreements (collectively known as the
inter-American system) under the organization) under the organization
’'s umbrella. s umbrella.
According to the OAS charter, as amended, the purposes of the organization areAccording to the OAS charter, as amended, the purposes of the organization are
To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle
of nonintervention;
Josh Rogin, “House Panel Votes to Defund the OAS,” Foreign Policy, July 20, 2011. 6 Letter from James Lankford, U.S. Senator, et al. to Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, December 21, 2018. For more on the legislative provision, the Siljander amendment to the FY1982 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act (P.L. 97-121; 95 Stat. 1657), see CRS Report R41360, Abortion and Family Planning-
Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance Law and Policy, by Luisa Blanchfield.
7 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Department Press Briefing,” March 26, 2019. 8 Information in this section is drawn from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Relations: A Collection of Documents, Legislation, Descriptions of
Inter-American Organizations, and Other Material Pertaining to Inter-American Affairs, Joint Committee Print, Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, S.Prt. 100-168 (Washington: GPO, 1989); and OAS, “Our History,” at http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp.
9 The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in June 1934. The text of the treaty is available at https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-40.html.
10 The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Rio Treaty in December 1947. The text of the treaty is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html.
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Organization of American States: In Brief
of nonintervention;
To prevent possible causes of difficulties and ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that To prevent possible causes of difficulties and ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that
may arise among member states;may arise among member states;
To provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression;To provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression;
To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among
them;them;
To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development;To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development;
To eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full
To eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic democratic
development of the peoples of the hemisphere; anddevelopment of the peoples of the hemisphere; and
To achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to To achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to
devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of member devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of member
states.states.
11
12
Over the decades, OAS membership gradually expanded to incorporate newly independent Over the decades, OAS membership gradually expanded to incorporate newly independent
Caribbean Caribbean
nationscountries and Canada. It now includes and Canada. It now includes
all34 of the 35 independent countries of the Western 35 independent countries of the Western
Hemisphere. Hemisphere. Nicaragua, which was a founding member of the OAS, denounced the OAS Charter in November 2021, initiating a two-year withdrawal process that resulted in Nicaragua's departure from the organization in November 2023.13 Government participation and representation in the OAS have Government participation and representation in the OAS have
also varied over time. For varied over time. For
example, Cuba has not participated in the OAS since 1962 (seeexample, Cuba has not participated in the OAS since 1962 (see
text box) and Nicaragua stopped participating in April 2022.12 text box, "Cuba and the Organization of American States"). Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro
initiated a two-yearbegan the process process
to leaveto withdraw from the OAS in April 2017, but the the OAS in April 2017, but the
then-opposition-controlled National Assembly, which OAS opposition-controlled National Assembly, which OAS
member states recognized as the legitimate government of Venezuela, halted the withdrawal in member states recognized as the legitimate government of Venezuela, halted the withdrawal in
February 2019 and appointed a representative to the OAS in April 2019. That representative February 2019 and appointed a representative to the OAS in April 2019. That representative
departed the OAS in January 2023, after departed the OAS in January 2023, after
theVenezuela's opposition dissolved the interim government. opposition dissolved the interim government.
Venezuela has not participated in the OAS since then.
Cuba and the Organization of American States
Cuba and the Inter-American System
Cuba was one of the founding members of the Organization of American States (OAS), and—as a signatory to the Cuba was one of the founding members of the Organization of American States (OAS), and—as a signatory to the
OAS charter—it remains a member. It has not participated in the organization since 1962, however, due to a OAS charter—it remains a member. It has not participated in the organization since 1962, however, due to a
decision at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to suspend Cuba for its decision at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to suspend Cuba for its
adherence to Marxism-Leninism and alignment with the communist bloc. The resolution to exclude Cuba was adherence to Marxism-Leninism and alignment with the communist bloc. The resolution to exclude Cuba was
controversial when it was adopted, and the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system has remained a controversial when it was adopted, and the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system has remained a
frequent source of contention among the countries of the hemisphere ever since.frequent source of contention among the countries of the hemisphere ever since.
Latin American and Caribbean governments repeatedly have pushed to include Cuba in hemispheric forums. At Latin American and Caribbean governments repeatedly have pushed to include Cuba in hemispheric forums. At
the 2009 OAS General Assembly, member states adopted a measure to repeal the 1962 resolution that suspended the 2009 OAS General Assembly, member states adopted a measure to repeal the 1962 resolution that suspended
Cuba from participation in the OAS. The measure stated that CubaCuba from participation in the OAS. The measure stated that Cuba
’'s eventual participation in the OAS s eventual participation in the OAS
“"will be will be
the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the
practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS,practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS,
”" which include representative democracy and respect for human which include representative democracy and respect for human
rights. Although the Cuban government declared the repeal a rights. Although the Cuban government declared the repeal a
“"major victory,major victory,
”" it also stated that it had no interest it also stated that it had no interest
in participating in the OAS. In 2015, then-Cuban President Raúl Castro attended the Seventh Summit of the Americas—a meeting of the Western Hemisphere’s heads of government—in Panama. Although the Summits of the Americas are not officially part of the OAS, the OAS serves as the technical secretariat for the summit process. Panama invited Cuba to attend the summit after every country in the hemisphere—with the exceptions of the United States and Canada—voiced support for Cuba’s inclusion during the Sixth Summit of the Americas in 2012. Cuba’s foreign minister also attended the Eighth Summit of the Americas in Peru in 2018. The Biden Administration chose to exclude Cuba (along with Venezuela and Nicaragua) from the Ninth Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles in June 2022. Several leaders in the region opposed that decision, and some of them chose not to attend the summit in response. in participating in the OAS.
Sources: OAS, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ser. C/II.8, January 22-31, 1962; OAS, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ser. C/II.8, January 22-31, 1962;
OAS, Resolution on Cuba, AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), June 3, 2009; and Voice of America, OAS, Resolution on Cuba, AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), June 3, 2009; and Voice of America,
“"Cuba Says No to Cuba Says No to
OAS Membership,OAS Membership,
”" June 4, 2009.
Institutional Governance
June 4, 2009.
11 Charter of the OAS, Chapter 1, Article 2. 12 The Nicaraguan government denounced the OAS charter in November 2021—initiating a two-year withdrawal process—after the OAS General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that Nicaragua’s 2021 elections had no democratic legitimacy.
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Institutional Governance
Three primary bodies are responsible for setting and carrying out the agenda of the OAS: the Three primary bodies are responsible for setting and carrying out the agenda of the OAS: the
General Assembly, the Permanent Council, and the General Secretariat. The OAS also includes General Assembly, the Permanent Council, and the General Secretariat. The OAS also includes
other councils, committees, and institutional organs that implement portions of its mandate with other councils, committees, and institutional organs that implement portions of its mandate with
varying levels of autonomy. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights varying levels of autonomy. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), composed of seven independent commissioners, and the Inter-American Court of (IACHR), composed of seven independent commissioners, and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, composed of seven independent judges, are the OAS bodies charged with Human Rights, composed of seven independent judges, are the OAS bodies charged with
promoting and protecting human rights (see promoting and protecting human rights (see
"“Human Rights Protection”). ").
General Assembly
The General Assembly is the principal policymaking organ of the OAS. It meets annually to The General Assembly is the principal policymaking organ of the OAS. It meets annually to
debate issues, approve the organizationdebate issues, approve the organization
’'s budget, and set policies to govern the other OAS s budget, and set policies to govern the other OAS
bodies.bodies.
1314 The General Assembly comprises the delegations of each participating member state The General Assembly comprises the delegations of each participating member state
(often led by foreign ministers), , and each state has a single vote. The body is empowered to adopt most decisions with the and each state has a single vote. The body is empowered to adopt most decisions with the
affirmative votes of an absolute majority of member states; however, some decisions—including affirmative votes of an absolute majority of member states; however, some decisions—including
adoption of the agenda and approval of budgetary matters—require the affirmative votes of two-adoption of the agenda and approval of budgetary matters—require the affirmative votes of two-
thirds of member states. The OAS General Assembly convened for its 52nd regular session in Lima, Peru, in October 2022.14 The General Assembly’s next regular session is scheduledthirds of member states. The 55th regular session of the OAS General Assembly is to be to be
held at OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, on June 21-23, 2023. held in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, from June 25 to June 27, 2025.15
Permanent Council
The Permanent Council The Permanent Council
conducts the day-to-day governance of the OAS and meets regularly throughout the year at the organization’s headquarters.15meets regularly at OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, and conducts the organization's day-to-day business.16 Among other activities, the Permanent Among other activities, the Permanent
Council works to maintain friendly relations among member states, assists in the peaceful Council works to maintain friendly relations among member states, assists in the peaceful
settlement of disputes, carries out decisions assigned to it by the General Assembly, regulates the settlement of disputes, carries out decisions assigned to it by the General Assembly, regulates the
General Secretariat when the General Assembly is not in session, receives reports from the General Secretariat when the General Assembly is not in session, receives reports from the
various bodies of the inter-American system, and submits recommendations to the General various bodies of the inter-American system, and submits recommendations to the General
Assembly. Additionally, the Permanent Council is empowered to undertake diplomatic initiatives Assembly. Additionally, the Permanent Council is empowered to undertake diplomatic initiatives
in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of government in a member state. Each member state in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of government in a member state. Each member state
appoints one representative to the Permanent Councilappoints one representative to the Permanent Council
(including the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS), and each member state has a single vote. , and each member state has a single vote.
Most decisions require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of member states.Most decisions require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of member states.
General Secretariat
The General Secretariat, directed by the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary GeneralThe General Secretariat, directed by the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General
, is the permanent bureaucracy and consisting of approximately 1,100 staff, is charged with implementing policies set by the General Assembly and charged with implementing policies set by the General Assembly and
the Permanent Council.the Permanent Council.
17 The General Assembly elects the Secretary General and the Assistant The General Assembly elects the Secretary General and the Assistant
Secretary General to serve five-year terms with the possibility of one reelection. According to the Secretary General to serve five-year terms with the possibility of one reelection. According to the
OAS charter, the Secretary General serves as the organizationOAS charter, the Secretary General serves as the organization
’'s legal representative and is s legal representative and is
13 A special session of the General Assembly can be convoked by a two-thirds vote of the Permanent Council. 14 The resolutions and declarations adopted at the 52nd regular session of the General Assembly are available at https://www.oas.org/en/council/AG/regular/52RGA/documents.asp.
15 The Headquarters Agreement Between the Organization of American States and the Government of the United States of America is available at http://www.oas.org/legal/english/docs/bilateralagree/us/sedeusa.htm.
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allowed to participate in all OAS meetings but does not have a vote. The Secretary General also is allowed to participate in all OAS meetings but does not have a vote. The Secretary General also is
empowered to establish offices and hire personnel to implement OAS mandates.
The current Secretary General is Luis Almagro, a career diplomat and former foreign minister from Uruguay. He first took office in 2015 and won reelection to a second five-year term in 2020. Secretary General Almagro has focused primarily on democracy and human rights concerns during his tenure, frequently condemning the authoritarian actions of the Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, and Cuban governments. His outspoken leadership style has won praise from consecutive U.S. Administrations, but some member states argue Almagro has focused too narrowly on contentious issues, leaving the OAS weaker and more divided.16 Some member states and OAS officials also have questioned Almagro’s personal conduct and criticized his handling of a series of personnel matters (see discussion under “Budget Constraints”).
Funding
The OAS budget is expected to total $145.2 million in 2023 (seeempowered to establish offices and hire personnel to implement OAS mandates. In March 2025, a special session of the General Assembly elected Albert Ramdin—the foreign minister of Suriname and a former OAS Assistant Secretary General (2005-2015)—by acclamation to be Secretary General for 2025-2030. He is scheduled to take office on May 30, 2025, replacing current Secretary General Luis Almagro (2015-2025).18
Funding
OAS expenditures totaled $167.0 million in 2024 (see Table 1). The largest portion of . The largest portion of
the budget is the Regular Fund, which covers the organizationthe budget is the Regular Fund, which covers the organization
’'s day-to-day operating expenses. s day-to-day operating expenses.
The Regular Fund is financed through the assessed contributions, or membership dues, of OAS The Regular Fund is financed through the assessed contributions, or membership dues, of OAS
member states. member states.
Quota assessmentsThese contributions are calculated based on each member state are calculated based on each member state
’'s gross national s gross national
income, with adjustments for debt burden and low per capita income. The United States is income, with adjustments for debt burden and low per capita income. The United States is
responsible for the largest responsible for the largest
quotaassessed contribution, equivalent to 49.99% of the Regular Fund in , equivalent to 49.99% of the Regular Fund in
2023.2025.19 The OAS The OAS
also collects Specific Fundsalso collects Specific Funds
, or —voluntary contributions from member statesvoluntary contributions from member states
, permanent observers, and other and other
international donors that are directed to specific projects or programs.international donors that are directed to specific projects or programs.
Table 1. Organization of American States Budget: Calendar Years 2020-2023
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
2020 (executed) 2021 (executed) 2022 (approved) 2023 (approved)
Regular Fund
82.3
76.4
81.0
82.8
Specific Funds
50.4
54.7
54.3
55.0
Indirect Cost Recovery
6.0
6.7
7.2
7.4
Total
138.7
137.8
142.5
145.2
Source: OAS, Approved Program Budget of the Organization of American States, 2023, Approved by the General Assembly, 52 Regular Session, October 2022, AG/Res.2985 (LII-O/22), p. 52. Notes: Dol ar20
According to the Audit Committee of the OAS, for over a decade, annual OAS budgets have "fallen significantly short of covering both programmatic and administrative requirements."21 The Audit Committee notes that member states "have made efforts to incrementally increase funding, streamline mandates, and address aging infrastructure."22 Nevertheless, the Audit Committee argues that the OAS remains financially vulnerable due to the organization's dependence on the prompt payments of member states' assessed contributions and its heavy reliance on a few key member states and donors.
Table 1. Organization of American States Budget: Calendar Years 2023-2025
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
2023 (executed)
|
2024 (executed)
|
2025 (approved)
|
|
Regular Fund
|
81.8
|
88.7
|
92.0
|
Specific Fundsa
68.8
|
71.4
|
NA
|
Indirect Cost Recoveryb
7.3
|
6.9
|
7.7
|
|
Total
|
157.9
|
167.0
|
NA
|
Sources: OAS, Proposed Program-Budget 2026, p. 19; OAS, Report to the Permanent Council: Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31 2024 and 2023, p. 29; and OAS, Report to the Permanent Council: Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2023 and 2022, p. 29.
Notes: Dollar figures may not sum to total due to rounding figures may not sum to total due to rounding
. NA = not available.
a. FY2025 Specific Funds data are not yet available since Specific Funds are financed through individual donor agreements and do not align with the OAS budget cycle.
b. A percentage (7%) of all contributions to Specific A percentage (7%) of all contributions to Specific
Funds is directed to the Indirect Cost Recovery account to defray indirect costs incurred by the General Funds is directed to the Indirect Cost Recovery account to defray indirect costs incurred by the General
Secretariat in administering Specific Fund projects. Secretariat in administering Specific Fund projects.
U.S. Contributions
The United States The United States
ishas been the top financial contributor to the OAS, providing an estimated the top financial contributor to the OAS, providing an estimated
$53.2$60.4 million in assessed and voluntary funding in million in assessed and voluntary funding in
FY2023 (seeFY2024 (see Table 2).1723 U.S. assessed contributions generally have been provided through the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations legislation. Congress typically has appropriated a lump sum to the CIO account each fiscal year, and the executive branch has allocated funding to specific organizations, including the OAS, based on assessment levels and U.S. policy priorities. The estimated FY2025 U.S. assessment to the OAS is $46.4 million.24
Table 2. U.S. Funding for the OAS: FY2023-FY2025
(allocations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2023 (estimate)
|
FY2024 (estimate)
|
FY2025 (estimate)
|
|
Assessed Contribution
|
43.2
|
45.4
|
46.4
|
|
Voluntary Contributions
|
10.0
|
15.0
|
15.0
|
|
Total
|
53.2
|
60.4
|
61.4
|
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2025, April 2024, pp. 75, 207, and 229; U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, committee print on P.L. 118-47, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Comm. Print 55-008 (Washington: GPO, 2024), pp. 1174, 1177, and 1179; H.Rept. 118-146, p. 90; and P.L. 118-83.
Note: The U.S. fiscal year is from October 1 to September 30, whereas the OAS fiscal year is from January 1 to December 31; as a result, U.S. and OAS annual funding data may not align or be comparable.
The United States also has provided U.S. assessed
16 See, for example, Ronald Sanders, Ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda to the United States, “What Will Almagro Prioritize in His Second OAS Term?,” Latin America Advisor, April 3, 2020. 17 After the United States, the largest member state contributors to the OAS in 2021 were Brazil ($17.9 million), Canada ($17.7 million), Mexico ($7.1 million), Argentina ($2.2 million), and Colombia ($2.1 million). The largest nonmember donors were Germany ($5.0 million), the European Union ($2.8 million), Sweden ($1.8 million), and Switzerland ($1.4 million). OAS, “Contributions to OAS Funds by Donor,” January 1, 2021-December 31, 2021.
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contributions generally are provided through the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations legislation.18 Congress usually appropriates a lump sum to the CIO account each fiscal year, and the executive branch allocates funding to specific organizations, including the OAS, based on assessment levels and U.S. policy priorities. The estimated FY2023 U.S. assessment to the OAS is $43.2 million. For FY2024, the Biden Administration has requested $42.6 million for the OAS through the CIO account.19
The United States also provides voluntary contributions to the OAS through various accounts in voluntary contributions to the OAS through various accounts in
annual SFOPS bills. For FY2023, voluntary contributions appropriated by Congress include $5.0 million through the Economic Support Fund account for “the autonomous promotion and protection of human rights” and $5.0 million through the International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account for the OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy, which funds electoral observation missions and other democracy promotion efforts.20 For FY2024, the Biden Administration has requested $8.0 million in IO&P funds for the OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy ($5.0 million) and OAS-managed economic development programs ($3.0 million).21
annual SFOPS bills. For FY2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division F), Congress appropriated $6.5 million through the Economic Support Fund account for OAS human rights activities, $6.0 million through the International Organizations and Programs account for OAS democracy strengthening activities, and $2.5 million through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account for OAS efforts intended to combat human trafficking.25 P.L. 118-47 also directed the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS to "use the voice and vote of the United States" to implement various budgetary and management reforms at the OAS and to prioritize OAS activities related to democracy and human rights.26 The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (P.L. 119-4), funds U.S. contributions to the OAS at the same rate, and under the same conditions and authority, as FY2024.
U.S. agencies may obligate additional funding to the OAS for specific programs or activities over U.S. agencies may obligate additional funding to the OAS for specific programs or activities over
the course of each fiscal year. In the course of each fiscal year. In
FY2021FY2023, for example, U.S. agencies obligated , for example, U.S. agencies obligated
$24.2about $20 million to million to
the OAS—in addition the funds listed the OAS—in addition the funds listed
inin Table 2—to implement various foreign assistance to implement various foreign assistance
projects, including regional drug control and demand reduction programming, anti-gang activities in Haiti, and anti-corruption efforts in El Salvador.22
Table 2. U.S. Funding for the OAS: FY2021-FY2024
(allocations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
(actual)
(actual)
(estimate)
(request)
Assessed Contribution
48.7
46.0
43.2
42.6
Voluntary
5.0
9.5
10.0
8.0
Contributions
Total
53.7
55.5
53.2
50.6
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2023 and
FY2024, and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20, 2022), pp. S9291, S9293. Note: The U.S. fiscal year is from October 1 to September 30, whereas the OAS fiscal year is from January 1 to December 31; as a result, U.S. and OAS annual funding data may not align or be comparable.
18 The Contributions to International Organizations account, funded through the Department of State, provides U.S. assessed contributions to over 40 regional and international organizations, including the OAS, the United Nations system, and NATO, among others.
19 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 1: Department of State Diplomatic
Engagement, Fiscal Year 2024, April 2023, p. 456.
20 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20, 2022), pp. S9291, S9293.
21 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, Fiscal Year 2024, p. 220.
22 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, Fiscal Year
2021, Section 4(b) of the United Nations Participation Act, 22 USC 287b(b), September 6, 2022.
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Budget Constraints
The OAS has faced persistent budget shortfalls as member states have increased the organization’s responsibilities without providing commensurate increases in funding. Although the OAS carried out a comprehensive mandate review in 2015, identifying 82 priorities, member states have since assigned the organization more than 970 additional mandates, including 150 in 2021 alone.23 The OAS budget for 2023 is 3.4% higher than it was in 2015 (not adjusted for inflation), leaving basic programmatic and administrative requirements unfunded.24 This structural imbalance was exacerbated by the economic impact of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which resulted in some member states not paying their assessed contributions in a timely manner. To continue covering daily expenses, the organization has cut personnel, delayed maintenance expenditures, and borrowed from its Treasury Fund repeatedly.25 Some analysts contend that the organization’s recurring budgetary challenges have created a vicious cycle in which the OAS is “unable to invest in the human and institutional capital necessary to meet its mandate, and therefore unable to demonstrate its true importance and potential” to member states, leading to further hollowing out of the organization.26
Concerns about the OAS’s management and budget led Congress to enact the OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41). The legislation directed the U.S. Secretary of State to formulate a multiyear strategy toward the adoption of reforms at the OAS to prioritize the organization’s core functions, implement a results-based budgeting process and transparent human resources practices, and alter the organization’s quota structure to ensure no member state is responsible for more than 50% of the organization’s assessed contributions.
Since then, the OAS has adopted a strategic plan, which includes lines of action to advance each of the organization’s four core objectives, and a new quota methodology, which incrementally reduced the percentage of assessed contributions paid by the United States from 59.47% in 2020 to 49.99% in 2023.27 With regard to human resources practices, in 2022, the OAS Administrative Tribunal ruled against Secretary General Almagro and criticized the roles played by the OAS Ombudsperson and Office of Inspector General in two personnel decisions. Almagro also faced an external ethics investigation into his relationship with an OAS employee and unilaterally extended the Ombudsperson’s contract by four years, preempting the OAS General Assembly’s decision to implement a competitive selection process for the position.28
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), directed the Secretary of State to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS to use the voice and vote of the United States to advance several additional budgetary and administrative reforms at the organization. 23 OAS Audit Committee, Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2021
and 2020, Report to the Permanent Council, JAE/Doc.5222, June 15, 2022, p. 3.
24 Ibid; OAS, Proposed Program-Budget of the Organization of American States, 2017, April 11, 2016, p. 9; and OAS, Approved Program Budget of the Organization of American States, 2023, Approved by the General Assembly, 52 Regular Session, October 2022, AG/Res.2985 (LII-O/22), p. 52.
25 OAS Audit Committee, Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2021
and 2020, Report to the Permanent Council, JAE/Doc.5222, June 15, 2022.
26 Ben Raderstorf and Michael Shifter, Rebuilding Hemispheric Consensus: A Reform Agenda for the Organization of
American States, Inter-American Dialogue, February 2018, p. 16.
27 OAS, Amendments to the Methodology for Calculating the Scale of Quota Assessments to Finance the Regular Fund
of the OAS 2019-2023, CP/RES. 1103 (2168/18) rev.1, July 17, 2018.
28 Joshua Goodman, “Org. of American States Boss Slammed Over Watchdog’s Removal,” Associated Press, October 24, 2022; Associated Press, “U.S. Supports Calls for External Ethics Probe into OAS Chief,” November 5, 2022; and Associated Press, “Probe Faults OAS Boss for Work Romance, Finds No Misconduct,” April 18, 2023.
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These reforms include changes intended to increase contributions from other member states and donors, prevent programmatic and organizational redundancies, and ensure the OAS Office of the Inspector General is able to carry out its responsibilities in accordance with U.S. best practices. The act required the Secretary of State to submit a report on actions taken or planned to be taken to advance such reforms prior to obligating funds for the U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS.29
Activities
The Strategic Vision of the OAS, adopted by the General Assembly in 2014, states that the four core pillars of the organization’s mission are strengthening democracy, promoting and protecting human rights, advancing integral development, and fostering multidimensional security.30 These pillars are broadly consistent with the Biden Administration’s approach to the hemisphere.31
Democracy Promotion
Democracy promotion has been a top priority of the OAS, especially since the 1980s, when many countries in the region began to transition from authoritarian rule to civilian governance. Member states approved a series of instruments designed to support democratic governance, culminating in the 2001 adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which asserts that the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.32 The OAS has sought to uphold these commitments through numerous activities, including support for, and observation of, elections; technical assistance and other programs to foster institutional development and good governance; and the coordination of collective action when democratic institutions are threatened.
Many experts agree that OAS electoral observation missions have played an important role in the legitimization of electoral processes and long-term institution building throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.33 Nevertheless, some missions have generated controversy. For example, several academics called into question the statistical analysis that partially underpinned an OAS report documenting irregularities in Bolivia’s 2019 presidential election.34 The U.S. State Department reiterated many of the OAS observation mission’s findings, however, in a report to Congress required by the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103).35 In 2022, eight member states invited the OAS to observe their
29 P.L. 117-328 §7071. 30 OAS, Strategic Vision of the Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2814 (XLIV-O/14), June 4, 2014. 31 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, pp. 40-41. 32 OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
33 See, for example, Lisa Vasciannie, “The Organization of American States: Evolution of Election Observation in the Inter-American System 1962-2017,” Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2018), pp. 89-112; and Ferran Martínez i Coma, Alessandro Nai, and Pippa Norris, Democratic Diffusion: How
Regional Organizations Strengthen Electoral Integrity, University of Sidney and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Executive Report, 2016.
34 See, for example, Jack R. Williams and John Curiel, Analysis of the 2019 Bolivia Election, 2020; and Nicolás Idrobo, Dorothy Kronick, and Francisco Rodríguez, Do Shifts in Late-Counted Votes Signal Fraud? Evidence From Bolivia, 2020.
35 Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Congressional
Record, vol. 168, no. 42—book IV (March 9, 2022), p. H3006. Also see OAS, Electoral Integrity Analysis, General
Elections in the Plurinational State of Bolivia: October 20, 2019, Final Report, December 4, 2019; and European
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elections. To date in 2023, the organization has deployed electoral observation missions to Antigua and Barbuda, Ecuador, and Paraguay, and has been invited to observe Guatemala’s June 2023 presidential election.36
The OAS also has established special political missions to assist member states with sensitive matters. In Colombia, the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process provides verification and advisory support regarding peace accord implementation in the most conflict-affected areas of the country. The Honduran and Salvadoran governments sought assistance from the OAS in combatting corruption but, in controversial moves, ended their respective agreements with the organization in January 2020 and June 2021, as OAS-backed prosecutors were in the process of investigating high-level government officials.37
Although OAS election observation and technical assistance missions generally enjoy widespread support among member states, there is less consensus regarding how to respond to democratic backsliding in the region. Many member states adhere to the principal of nonintervention, which is enshrined in the OAS charter, and are unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of another member state unless there is an abrupt democratic breakdown resembling a coup d'état.38 For example, the IACHR documented and raised concerns about the erosion of Venezuela’s democratic institutions for more than a decade before Secretary General Almagro invoked Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to initiate a collective assessment of the situation in 2016. The majority of member states remained reluctant to act until 2017, when they formally recognized there had been an “unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order” in Venezuela.39 Since then, member states have adopted resolutions declaring Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s 2018 reelection illegitimate and urging member states to adopt diplomatic, political, and economic measures to facilitate the restoration of democracy in Venezuela.40 OAS member states also recognized an appointee of the former opposition-controlled National Assembly as Venezuela’s Permanent Representative to the OAS in 2019, but that representative departed the OAS in January 2023 and some member states have sought to recognize Maduro’s 2017 decision to withdraw Venezuela from the OAS.41
Human Rights Protection
During the initial decades following the IACHR’s 1959 creation, the commission’s documentation of human rights violations brought international attention to the abuses of repressive regimes. Although the human rights situation in the hemisphere has improved
Union, Election Expert Mission, Bolivia 2019: Final Report, November 19, 2020.
36 OAS, Secretariat for Political Affairs, Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation, “Electoral Observation Missions and Recommendations Database,” at https://www.oas.org/eomdatabase/default.aspx?lang=en. 37 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11211, Corruption in Honduras: End of the Mission to Support the Fight
Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).
38 Article 19 of the OAS charter states, “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.”
39 OAS, Resolution on the Recent Events in Venezuela, CP/RES. 1078 (2108/17), April 3, 2017. 40 See, for example, OAS, Resolution on the Situation in Venezuela, CP/RES. 1117 (2200/19), January 10, 2019; and OAS, Resolution on the Situation in Venezuela, CP/RES. 1124 (2217/19) rev. 2, April 9, 2019.
41 See, for example, Delegation of Antigua and Barbuda et al., Withdrawal of the Acceptance of a Permanent
Representrative to the OAS Designated by the National Assembly of Venezuela of January 2019, draft resolution, October 3, 2022.
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considerably with the spread of democracy, the IACHR continues to receive several thousand allegations of human rights violations annually.42 The IACHR investigates alleged human rights abuses, issues requests to governments to adopt “precautionary measures” to protect individuals or groups at risk of suffering abuses, and observes and reports on the general human rights situations in OAS member states. Over the past decade, special independent teams of experts established by the IACHR have conducted in-depth investigations into high-profile and politically sensitive human rights issues, such as the 2014 disappearance of 43 students from Ayotzinapa, Mexico; repression during the 2018 social protests in Nicaragua; and violence surrounding Bolivia’s 2019 elections. The IACHR also has created 13 rapporteurships to draw attention to certain human rights issues, such as freedom of expression, and to groups that are particularly at risk of human rights violations.43
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, installed in San José, Costa Rica, in 1979, is a judicial institution charged with interpreting and applying the hemisphere’s human rights conventions.44 It considers cases submitted by the IACHR to determine whether OAS member states are responsible for human rights violations and, if so, the measures to be adopted to redress the consequences of such violations. The court also provides advisory opinions to member states and other OAS bodies, and it orders member states to adopt “provisional measures” to protect the rights of individuals or groups at urgent risk of suffering irreparable harm. Currently, 20 OAS member states accept the court’s jurisdiction; the United States does not.45
The IACHR and the Inter-American Court are widely considered to be among the most effective parts of the OAS. In the view of one expert, these bodies play a “pivotal role of condemnation and early warning in response to situations that undermine the consolidation of democracy and rule of law” in the hemisphere and “protect the rights of individuals when they are not duly guaranteed at the domestic level.”46 However, some analysts and member states have criticized the IACHR and the court for weighing in on issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion, which they argue are outside the bodies’ mandates under inter-American treaties.47
Economic and Social Development
The OAS greatly expanded its economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological programs in the 1960s, coinciding with President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress to promote
42 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “Statistics,” at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html.
43 The 13 thematic rapporteurships focus on freedom of expression; economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights; memory, truth, and justice; and the rights of Indigenous peoples; women; migrants; children; human rights defenders; persons deprived of liberty; Afro-descendants; lesbian, gay, trans, bisexual, and intersex persons; older persons; and persons with disabilities.
44 The hemisphere’s human rights conventions are available at https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp.
45 The United States has not ratified any of the inter-American human rights conventions. The United States is subject to the jurisdiction of the IACHR under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted in 1948 alongside the OAS charter), but the U.S. government argues that the declaration does not create legally binding obligations.
46 Ariel E. Dulitzky, “Twenty Reflections on the Process of Reflection,” Aportes: Magazine of the Due Process of Law
Foundation, vol. 5, no. 16 (June 2012), p. 11.
47 Alfonso Aguilar, testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Advancing U.S. Interests Through the Organization of American States, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2018; and Gobierno de Guatemala, “Presidente Giammattei Rechaza Presiones de Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de la OEA,” June 28, 2022.
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development in Latin America. Although the region has made considerable strides in terms of economic growth and social inclusion, poverty and inequality levels remain high in many countries and the OAS continues to support development efforts today. The Secretariat for Integral Development provides a wide array of training and capacity-building support to member states regarding economic, human, and sustainable development. It also fosters policy dialogue and serves as a clearinghouse for best practices. In 2020, for example, the OAS launched an online portal to compile research, host virtual forums, and solicit ideas to help member states respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19 pandemic. The OAS has approved $1.8 million in seed funding through its Development Cooperation Fund to support national and multinational projects focused on “Inclusive Resilience for an Effective Recovery” between 2021 and 2024.48
Some analysts assert that the accumulation of development programs at the OAS has stretched the organization’s mandate and resources while undermining its efficiency. They contend the OAS should transfer such programs to other institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, so it can focus more clearly on the remaining portions of its mission.49 Conversely, some member states—particularly small Caribbean countries—argue the OAS has placed too much emphasis on democracy and human rights issues and should reprioritize development efforts.50
Regional Security Cooperation
The OAS has dedicated greater attention to hemispheric security issues over the past two decades as member states have become more concerned about transnational threats. In 2005, the OAS created the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security in an attempt to address security issues in a more comprehensive manner and better coordinate member states’ efforts. The Secretariat supports a wide variety of activities, including efforts to reduce gang violence, prevent human trafficking, and remove land mines. The OAS also supports regional coordination on cybersecurity and counterterrorism efforts through the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE). In 2021, CICTE assisted Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, and Jamaica with the development of cybersecurity policies and strategies; trained more than 100 public and private sector representatives from Caribbean Community countries on major event security; and continued to implement a project to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in eight beneficiary countries; among other actions.51
OAS member states coordinate anti-drug efforts through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). CICAD assists OAS member states in strengthening their anti-drug policies by developing and recommending legislation, providing technical assistance and specialized training, and conducting assessments. In December 2020, after a year-long process led by the United States, CICAD adopted a new Hemispheric Drug Strategy and a Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs for 2021-2025. Among other changes, the updated plan of action calls for
48 OAS, “Development Cooperation Fund,” at https://www.oas.org/ext/en/development/cooperanet/Development-Cooperation-Fund.
49 Ben Raderstorf and Michael Shifter, Rebuilding Hemispheric Consensus: A Reform Agenda for the Organization of
American States, Inter-American Dialogue, February 2018, pp. 15-16.
50 See, for example, Anton Edmunds, Ambassador of St. Lucia to the United States, remarks during a virtual Center for Strategic and International Studies event on “A New Agenda for the Hemisphere: Perspectives from Ambassadors,” August 16, 2021.
51 Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, 2021 Annual Report of the Inter-American Committee Against
Terrorism (CICTE) to the Fifty-Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, CICTE/doc.5/22 rev. 1, July 27, 2022.
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member states to strengthen national measures to address the threat of fentanyl-related substances and nonmedical synthetic opioids.52
Looking Ahead: Issues for Congress
The countries of the Western Hemisphere are contending with numerous challenges, including democratic backsliding, difficult socioeconomic conditions, and transnational crime.53 As the preeminent multilateral forum in the hemisphere, the OAS is well placed to facilitate regional cooperation on such issues, though it must overcome political differences among member states and internal financial constraints. Members of Congress may seek to influence OAS actions and U.S. policy toward the organization through a variety of oversight and legislative activities.
Oversight. Over the past decade, Congress has enacted the OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41) and the OAS Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-343), which were intended to strengthen the OAS and increase congressional involvement in the organization. Congress may oversee how the Biden Administration is complying with the directives included in those measures and the extent to which the OAS is adopting Congress’s recommended reforms. Congress also may conduct oversight over other U.S. policies in the Western Hemisphere and consider the extent to which OAS actions align with U.S. objectives.
Appropriations. Congress may examine the President’s FY2024 funding request for the OAS as part of the SFOPS appropriations process. Appropriations legislation may include funding for the U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS and other international organizations as well as voluntary contributions to support particular OAS activities or objectives. Congress also could consider tying a portion of the funds appropriated for the OAS to certain Administration or OAS actions.
Other Legislation. In addition to appropriating funding for the OAS, Congress may consider other legislative measures intended to strengthen the organization or support OAS objectives. For example, the Upholding the Inter-American Democratic Charter Act of 2022 (S. 4285, 117th Congress) would have directed the Secretary of State to develop and implement a multi-year strategy to uphold and strengthen the Inter-American Democratic Charter, including through diplomatic engagement at the OAS.
Advice and Consent. The Senate could shape U.S. policy toward the OAS by considering various inter-American treaties that the United States has negotiated at the organization but has not ratified. For example, the American Convention on Human Rights (Treaty Doc. 95-21), the hemisphere’s primary human rights treaty, has been awaiting the advice and consent of the Senate since 1978, and the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (Treaty Doc. 105-49) has been awaiting the advice and consent of the Senate since 1998.
52 Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commissionprojects, such as anti-migrant smuggling efforts in Colombia, a national identification card program in Haiti, and regional counterdrug programming.27
Trump Administration Funding Decisions and Reviews
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14169, pausing U.S. foreign assistance for 90 days "pending reviews of such programs for programmatic efficiency and consistency with United States foreign policy."28 U.S. agencies directed the OAS to suspend implementation of 47 projects funded through U.S. voluntary contributions.29 According to the OAS, as of May 8, 2025, U.S. agencies had lifted suspensions on 18 programs, terminated 22 programs, and had yet to make determinations on the remaining 7 programs.30 The terminated programs include a mix of development and security assistance activities, including regional anti-drug programming and a counterterrorism information sharing initiative launched with U.S. support during the first Trump Administration.31
Executive Order 14199, issued on February 4, 2025, directs the Secretary of State to conduct a review of the OAS and all other international organizations of which the United States is a member and all conventions and treaties to which the United States is a party to determine if they are "contrary to the interests of the United States" and whether they can "be reformed."32 Within 180 days (i.e., by August 2025), the Secretary is to provide recommendations regarding whether to withdraw from such organizations and agreements.
To date, the Trump Administration has not released a detailed FY2026 budget request. A preliminary discretionary budget request, published on May 2, 2025, recommends pausing "most assessed and all voluntary contributions" to international organizations.33 The request appears to include $264.4 million for such contributions (an 87% decrease compared with FY2025 enacted levels); it is unclear whether the OAS would be among the organizations funded.34 The preliminary budget outline also requests funding for a new "America First Opportunity Fund" that the Administration asserts could be used to provide an unspecified amount of funding for international organizations, among other national security priorities.
Activities
The Strategic Vision of the OAS, adopted by the General Assembly in 2014, states that the four core pillars of the organization's mission are strengthening democracy, promoting and protecting human rights, advancing integral development, and fostering multidimensional security.35 In his election speech, Secretary General-elect Ramdin asserted that these goals "exist in unison" and that "without one the other cannot be fully attained."36 He also emphasized the importance of sustainable development efforts and the need to find common ground among member states. This marked a potential shift in priorities and approach from outgoing Secretary General Almagro, who focused primarily on democracy and human rights concerns and frequently spoke out about contentious issues during his tenure.
In March 2025, the U.S. Mission to the OAS urged Secretary General-elect Ramdin to continue to prioritize the defense of democracy, including by pushing for stronger action against repressive regimes, advocating for transparent electoral processes, and defending freedom of expression. The U.S. Mission to the OAS also urged Ramdin to strengthen regional cooperation, particularly "to end illegal migration."37 In May 2025 congressional testimony, Secretary of State Rubio asserted that the OAS should take on a greater role in resolving the crisis in Haiti, potentially including through the deployment of a multinational security mission.38 Ongoing OAS activities are described below.
Democracy Promotion
Democracy promotion has been a top priority of the OAS, especially since the 1980s, when many countries in the region began to transition from authoritarian rule to civilian governance. Member states approved a series of instruments designed to support democratic governance, culminating in the 2001 adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which asserts that the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.39 The OAS has sought to uphold these commitments through support for, and observation of, elections; technical assistance and other programs to foster institutional development and good governance; and the coordination of collective action when democratic institutions are threatened.
Some scholars have found that OAS electoral observation missions play an important role in the legitimization of electoral processes and long-term institution building throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.40 In 2023 and early 2024, for example, the OAS arguably helped ensure a democratic transfer of power in Guatemala through its observation and diplomatic efforts.41 Nevertheless, analysts have sometimes questioned the findings of particular OAS electoral observation missions, contributing to controversy around some disputed electoral processes.42 In 2024, nine member states—including the United States—invited the OAS to observe their elections.43
There is a lack of consensus among member states regarding how to respond to democratic backsliding in some countries in the region. Many member states adhere to the principal of nonintervention, which is enshrined in the OAS charter, and are largely unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of another member state unless there is an abrupt democratic breakdown.44 Consequently, the OAS General Assembly and Permanent Council arguably have been slow to respond to situations where elected leaders establish authoritarian governments through the gradual elimination of checks and balances and consolidation of power, as occurred in Venezuela and Nicaragua. Even in cases when member states have been unable or unwilling to act, however, the IACHR and other OAS institutions have often played important roles documenting democratic erosion.45
Human Rights Protection
During the initial decades following the IACHR's 1959 creation, the commission's documentation of human rights violations brought international attention to the abuses of repressive regimes. Although the human rights situation in the hemisphere improved considerably with the spread of democracy, the IACHR has received more than 2,000 allegations of human rights violations each year over the past decade.46 The IACHR investigates alleged human rights abuses, issues requests to governments to adopt "precautionary measures" to protect individuals or groups at risk of suffering abuses, and observes and reports on the general human rights situations in OAS member states. Occasionally, the IACHR has established special independent teams of experts to conduct in-depth investigations into some high-profile and politically sensitive human rights issues.47 The IACHR also has created 13 rapporteurships to draw attention to certain human rights issues, such as freedom of expression, and to groups that it deems particularly at risk of human rights violations.48 In June 2025, the General Assembly is expected to elect three new IACHR commissioners for the 2026 to 2029 term. The Trump Administration has put forward the candidacy of Rosa María Payá, a Cuban human rights and democracy advocate.49
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, installed in San José, Costa Rica, in 1979, is a judicial institution charged with interpreting and applying the hemisphere's human rights conventions.50 It considers cases submitted by the IACHR to determine whether OAS member states are responsible for human rights violations and, if so, the measures to be adopted to redress the consequences of such violations. The court also provides advisory opinions to member states and other OAS bodies, and it orders member states to adopt "provisional measures" to protect the rights of individuals or groups at urgent risk of suffering irreparable harm. Currently, 19 OAS member states accept the court's jurisdiction; the United States does not.51
Human rights advocates generally have praised the work of the IACHR and the Inter-American Court and have sought to defend the independence of both institutions to ensure they are able to carry out their mandates without political interference. Some member states have sought to curtail that independence, however, in apparent efforts to avoid criticism and/or perceived intrusions on their sovereignty.52 Some analysts and member states also have criticized the IACHR and the court for weighing in on issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion, which they argue are outside the institutions' mandates.53
Economic and Social Development
The OAS began to place greater emphasis on economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological programs during the 1960s, coinciding with President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress to promote development in Latin America. Although the region has made considerable strides in terms of economic growth and social inclusion, poverty and inequality levels remain high in many countries and the OAS continues to support development efforts today. The Secretariat for Integral Development provides an array of training and capacity-building support to member states regarding economic, human, and sustainable development. It also fosters policy dialogue and serves as a clearinghouse for best practices. In addition to those activities, the OAS Development Cooperation Fund provides seed funding to support national and multinational development projects. During its 2021-2024 programming cycle, this fund allocated a total of $1.8 million to activities in 15 countries focused on responding to, and long-term recovery from, the COVID-19 pandemic.54
Some analysts have asserted that the accumulation of development programs at the OAS has stretched the organization's mandate and resources while undermining its efficiency. They contend the OAS should transfer such programs to other institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, so it can focus more clearly on the remaining portions of its mission.55 Conversely, some officials from member states—particularly Caribbean countries—argue the OAS has placed too much emphasis on democracy and human rights issues and should reprioritize development efforts.56 As noted above, Secretary General-elect Ramdin, who is to be the first OAS Secretary General from the Caribbean, has highlighted the importance of the organization's development activities.
Regional Security Cooperation
The OAS has dedicated greater attention to hemispheric security issues over the past two decades as member states have become more concerned about transnational threats. In 2005, the OAS created the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security in an attempt to address security issues in a more comprehensive manner and better coordinate member states' efforts. The Secretariat supports a wide variety of activities, including efforts to reduce gang violence, prevent human trafficking, and remove land mines. The OAS also supports regional coordination on cybersecurity and counterterrorism efforts through the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE). In 2024, CICTE reportedly provided technical assistance to a variety of member states to help them develop national cybersecurity strategies, update biosecurity legal frameworks, and establish strategic trade controls, among other activities.57
OAS member states coordinate anti-drug efforts through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). CICAD assists OAS member states in strengthening their anti-drug policies by developing and recommending legislation, providing technical assistance and specialized training, and conducting assessments. CICAD is currently developing its 2026-2030 Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs. The previous plan of action, adopted in 2020, called for member states to strengthen national measures to address the threat of fentanyl-related substances and non-medical synthetic opioids.58
Issues for Congress
Countries throughout the Western Hemisphere are contending with challenges, including the erosion of democratic institutions and the expansion of transnational crime. As the preeminent multilateral forum in the hemisphere, the OAS is well placed to facilitate regional cooperation on such issues, though political differences among member states and internal financial constraints may pose challenges. Members of Congress may seek to influence OAS actions and U.S. policy toward the organization through a variety of oversight and legislative activities.
Oversight. Over the past 12 years, Congress has enacted the OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41) and the OAS Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-343), which were intended to strengthen the OAS and increase congressional involvement in the organization. Congress also has directed the State Department to support certain OAS reforms in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation (e.g., §7045(j) of P.L. 118-47). Congress may monitor how the Trump Administration is complying with the directives included in those measures and the extent to which the OAS is adopting Congress's recommended reforms. Congress also may conduct oversight of the Trump Administration's approach to the OAS, and to what extent, if any, its actions—including funding terminations—have affected the OAS and/or U.S. influence within the organization.
Appropriations. Congress may assess U.S. funding for the OAS during the FY2026 appropriations process. As noted previously, the Trump Administration's preliminary budget proposal recommends pausing most assessed contributions and all voluntary contributions to international organizations while requesting some flexible funding that could potentially support such organizations. During the appropriations process, Congress may consider whether to specifically designate funding for the U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS and/or voluntary contributions to support particular OAS activities or objectives. Alternatively, Congress could consider appropriating a lump sum for international organizations, through existing or new funding accounts, and leave allocation decisions to the Administration.
Other Legislation. Congress also may consider other legislative measures to help shape U.S. policy toward the OAS. For example, as part of a potential foreign relations authorization measure, Congress could direct the State Department to pursue particular objectives at the OAS. Congress also could establish reporting requirements or other mechanisms to support congressional oversight of the Administration's policy approach.
Advice and Consent. The Senate could shape U.S. policy toward the OAS using its right to provide advice and consent on nominations and ratification of treaties. The Senate could consider President Trump's nomination of Leandro Rizzuto to be the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS (PN26-41). The U.S. Permanent Representative leads the U.S. Mission to the OAS, which serves as the central coordination point between the U.S. government and the OAS, interacting with other offices in the State Department, interagency partners, OAS member states, and other inter-American organizations.59 The Senate also could consider various inter-American treaties that the United States has negotiated at the organization but has not ratified.60 Additionally, the Senate may monitor the State Department's review of international organizations and agreements pursuant to Executive Order 14199, and assess any potential Trump Administration decisions to withdraw from Senate-approved inter-American organizations or treaties.61
Footnotes
| 1.
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The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) in August 1950. The text of the charter is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html.
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| 2.
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George Meek, "U.S. Influence in the Organization of American States," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3 (August 1975), pp. 311-325.
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| 3.
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Carolyn M. Shaw, "Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American States," Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 59-92.
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| 4.
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Russell Crandall, "The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America," Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 83-95; and Inter-American Dialogue, The Case for Renewed Cooperation in a Troubled Hemisphere, April 2022, pp. 26-27.
|
| 5.
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See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Advancing U.S. Interests Through the Organization of American States, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2018; and Josh Rogin, "House Panel Votes to Defund the OAS," Foreign Policy, July 20, 2011.
|
| 6.
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Letter from James Lankford, U.S. Senator, et al. to Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, December 21, 2018. For more on the legislative provision, the Siljander amendment to the FY1982 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act (P.L. 97-121; 95 Stat. 1657), see CRS Report R41360, Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance Law and Policy, by Luisa Blanchfield.
|
| 7.
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U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "Department Press Briefing," March 26, 2019.
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| 8.
|
Information in this section is drawn from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Relations: A Collection of Documents, Legislation, Descriptions of Inter-American Organizations, and Other Material Pertaining to Inter-American Affairs, Joint Committee Print, Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, S.Prt. 100-168 (Washington: GPO, 1989); and OAS, "Our History," http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp.
|
| 9.
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See CRS Report R42738, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2023, by Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis.
|
| 10.
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The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in June 1934. The text of the treaty is available at https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-40.html.
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| 11.
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The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Rio Treaty in December 1947. The text of the treaty is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html.
|
| 12.
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Charter of the OAS, Chapter 1, Article 2.
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| 13.
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Nicaragua denounced the OAS Charter after the OAS General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that Nicaragua's 2021 elections had no democratic legitimacy.
|
| 14.
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A special session of the General Assembly can be convoked by a two-thirds vote of the Permanent Council.
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| 15.
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OAS, Place, Date and Theme of the Fifty-Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, CP/RES. 1279 (2539/25), March 19, 2025.
|
| 16.
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The Headquarters Agreement Between the Organization of American States and the Government of the United States of America is available at http://www.oas.org/legal/english/docs/bilateralagree/us/sedeusa.htm.
|
| 17.
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OAS, "Organizational Structure," April 30, 2025, https://www.oas.org/opdbweb/default.aspx?Lang=En.
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| 18.
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Another special session of the General Assembly, held on May 5, 2025, elected Laura Gil of Colombia to be the next Assistant Secretary General, as of July 17, 2025.
|
| 19.
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OAS, Program-Budget of the Organization for 2025, AG/RES. 1 (LV-E/24), November 1, 2024, p. 31.
|
| 20.
|
For more information on permanent observers to the OAS, see OAS, "Permanent Observers," https://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/perm_observers/countries.asp.
|
| 21.
|
OAS Audit Committee, Report to the Permanent Council, Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, JAE/doc.55/25, p. 10.
|
| 22.
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OAS Audit Committee, Report to the Permanent Council, p. 10.
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| 23.
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After the United States, the largest member state contributors to the OAS in 2024 were Canada ($22.5 million), Brazil ($11.6 million), Mexico ($8.6 million), and Argentina ($7.3 million). The largest nonmember donors were Japan ($8.2 million), Spain ($4.6 million), and the European Union ($3.8 million). OAS, "Contributions to OAS Funds by Donor, From January 01, 2024 to December 31, 2024, https://www.oas.org/saf/DFAMS/2024/12/SF_TABLE_CONTOAS_20241231_EN.pdf.
|
| 24.
|
U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 1: Department of State Diplomatic Engagement, Fiscal Year 2025, April 2024, p. 457.
|
| 25.
|
U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, committee print on P.L. 118-47, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Comm. Print 55-008 (Washington: GPO, 2024), pp. 1174, 1177, and 1179; H.Rept. 118-146, p. 90.
|
| 26.
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P.L. 118-47, §7045(j).
|
| 27.
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U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, Fiscal Year 2023, July 18, 2024.
|
| 28.
|
Executive Order 14169 of January 20, 2025, "Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid," 90 Federal Register 8619, January 30, 2025.
|
| 29.
|
OAS, Special Measures to Sustain OAS Operations and Human Resources in Response to the Executive Order on the Foreign Aid Realignment of the United States, CP/RES. 1277 (2535/25), March 5, 2025; and OAS, Status of Programs Financed With Specific Funds, CP/CAAP/INF. 528/25, May 13, 2025.
|
| 30.
|
OAS, Status of Programs Financed With Specific Funds, CP/CAAP/INF. 528/25, May 13, 2025.
|
| 31.
|
OAS, "PPA Status Overview: Lifts, Terminations, and Ongoing Suspensions," April 30, 2025; and OAS, "OAS to Develop Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism to Facilitate Immediate Exchange of Information on Terrorist Threats," October 3, 2019.
|
| 32.
|
Executive Order 14199 of February 4, 2025, "Withdrawing the United States From and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations," 90 Federal Register 9275, February 10, 2025.
|
33.
|
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The President's FY 2026 Discretionary Budget Request, p. 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-resources/budget/the-presidents-fy-2026-discretionary-budget-request/ (hereinafter OMB, FY2026 Discretionary Budget Request).
| 34.
|
CRS analysis of OMB, FY2026 Discretionary Budget Request, pp. 1-2; Division F of P.L. 118-47, and P.L. 119-4.
|
| 35.
|
OAS, Strategic Vision of the Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2814 (XLIV-O/14), June 4, 2014.
|
| 36.
|
OAS, Remarks by H. E. Albert Ramdin Upon His Election as Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Delivered at the Fifty-Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, AG/INF. 5 (LVI-E/25), March 18, 2025.
|
| 37.
|
U.S. Mission to the OAS, "Senior Bureau Michael Kozak's Remarks at the OAS Secretary General Elections," March 18, 2025.
|
| 38.
|
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Review of the FY26 State Department Budget Request, 119th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2025. For additional information on Haiti, see CRS Insight IN12331, Haiti in Crisis: What Role for a Multinational Security Support Mission?, by Karla I. Rios.
|
| 39.
|
OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
|
| 40.
|
See, for example, Lisa Vasciannie, "The Organization of American States: Evolution of Election Observation in the Inter-American System 1962-2017," Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2018), pp. 89-112; and Ferran Martínez i Coma, Alessandro Nai, and Pippa Norris, Democratic Diffusion: How Regional Organizations Strengthen Electoral Integrity, University of Sydney and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Executive Report, 2016.
|
| 41.
|
See, for example, Rubén M. Perina, "The OAS and a Veiled Coup Attempt in Guatemala," Global Americans, September 21, 2023; and Sir Ronald Sanders, "From Crisis to Democracy: OAS Shines in Guatemala's Political Transition," Caribbean News Global, January 18, 2024.
|
| 42.
|
See, for example, Anatoly Kurmanaev and María Silvia Trigo, "A Closer Look at Bolivia's Election Muddies Tampering Claims," New York Times, June 7, 2020.
|
| 43.
|
OAS, Secretariat for Political Affairs, Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation, "Electoral Observation Missions and Recommendations Database," accessed May 12, 2025, https://www.oas.org/eomdatabase/default.aspx?lang=en.
|
| 44.
|
Article 19 of the OAS charter states, "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements."
|
| 45.
|
For example, the annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) each include a chapter (Chapter IV since 1998) on human rights situations deemed to merit special attention. See IACHR, "Annual Reports," https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/IA.asp.
|
| 46.
|
IACHR, "Statistics," accessed May 12, 2025, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html.
|
| 47.
|
In February 2025, for example, the IACHR launched such a group to investigate the 2016 assassination of Berta Cáceres, a prominent Indigenous leader and human rights defender in Honduras. IACHR, "IACHR Launches Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts for the Case of Berta Cáceres in Honduras," February 14, 2025.
|
| 48.
|
The 13 thematic rapporteurships focus on freedom of expression; economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights; memory, truth, and justice; and the rights of Indigenous peoples; women; migrants; children; human rights defenders; persons deprived of liberty; Afro-descendants; lesbian, gay, trans, bisexual, and intersex persons; older persons; and persons with disabilities.
|
| 49.
|
IACHR commissioners serve in their personal capacities and do not represent governments. U.S. Department of State, "Announcement of Candidate to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights," March 26, 2025.
|
| 50.
|
For the text of the conventions, see IACHR, "Basic Documents in the Inter-American System," https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp.
|
| 51.
|
The United States has not ratified any of the inter-American human rights conventions. The United States is subject to the jurisdiction of the IACHR under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted in 1948 alongside the OAS charter), but the U.S. government argues that the declaration does not create legally binding obligations.
|
| 52.
|
See, for example, José Miguel Vivanco and Tamara Taraciuk Broner, "Why a Human Rights Icon Needs Its Independence," Americas Quarterly, September 2, 2020.
|
| 53.
|
See, for example, Alfonso Aguilar, testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Advancing U.S. Interests Through the Organization of American States, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2018; and Gobierno de Guatemala, "Presidente Giammattei Rechaza Presiones de Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de la OEA," June 28, 2022.
|
| 54.
|
OAS Audit Committee, Report to the Permanent Council, pp. 26-27.
|
| 55.
|
See, for example, Ben Raderstorf and Michael Shifter, Rebuilding Hemispheric Consensus: A Reform Agenda for the Organization of American States, Inter-American Dialogue, February 2018, pp. 15-16. For more on the Inter-American Development Bank, see CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
|
| 56.
|
See, for example, Anton Edmunds, Ambassador of St. Lucia to the United States, remarks during a virtual Center for Strategic and International Studies event on "A New Agenda for the Hemisphere: Perspectives from Ambassadors," August 16, 2021.
|
| 57.
|
OAS, 2024 Draft Annual Report of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to the Fifth-Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, CP/doc.6083/25, March 27, 2025, pp. 3-13.
|
58.
|
CICAD, ,
Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs 2021-2025, ,
CICAD/doc.2533/20, December 10, 2020, p. 8.
53 For more information, see CRS Insight IN12092, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues for the 118th Congress.
Congressional Research Service
12
Organization of American States: In Brief
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R47230 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
13 CICAD/doc.2533/20, December 10, 2020, p. 8.
| 59.
|
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 154 U.S. Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States (WHA/USOAS), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/01FAM/01FAM0150.html.
|
| 60.
|
For example, the American Convention on Human Rights (Treaty Doc. 95-21), the hemisphere's primary human rights treaty, has been awaiting the advice and consent of the Senate since 1978, and the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (Treaty Doc. 105-49) has been awaiting the advice and consent of the Senate since 1998.
|
| 61.
|
For analysis of executive and legislative powers related to international treaties, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by Steve P. Mulligan.
|