Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance
~~April 12~~October 23, 2023 , 2023
with International Obligations
Paul K. Kerr
Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to
Specialist in Specialist in
to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation ~~of its~~
Nonproliferation Nonproliferation
of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-construction of a heavy-

water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards
agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has

implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about,
the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran
concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s
Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated.
The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July
20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to
reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so. reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear
program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions
concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of
Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s “final assessment on the resolution” of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s “final assessment on the resolution” of
the outstanding issues. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions adopted in June 2020, and June and November 2022 call on the outstanding issues. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions adopted in June 2020, and June and November 2022 call on
Iran to satisfy more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. But these resolutions do Iran to satisfy more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. But these resolutions do
not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the
IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant. IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Introduction
Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires
nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in
1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine 1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine
nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of
Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the
council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns
about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and
describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.
For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint , by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report
R43333, R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. , by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman.
Background
Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear
weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main
source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride
gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can
produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and
highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear
weapons. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched uranium weapons. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched uranium
in quantity. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a in quantity. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a
uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several chemical compounds, compounds,
including uranium hexafluoride. Tehranincluding uranium hexafluoride. Tehran ~~claims that it wants~~’s stated goal is to produce LEU for to produce LEU for ~~its~~the government’s current and current and
~~future power reactors.~~
future power reactors. Iran is producing enriched uranium in commercial and pilot enrichment facilities at Natanz, as well as Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility. Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern. Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern.
Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the
production of medical isotopes, production of medical isotopes, itthe reactor was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel
would have contained plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in would have contained plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in
nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called
“reprocessing.” Iran has “reprocessing.” Iran has ~~said that it will not engage in~~repeatedly stated its intention to refrain from reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France, Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”), Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”),
Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperableTehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable~~. Iran~~ and has also begun to fulfill a has also begun to fulfill a
JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a ~~design agreed to by the~~
~~P5+1 so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to~~
~~export the spent fuel from this reactor and all other nuclear reactors.~~

1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.the United States.
Article II of the NPT requires all other states-parties to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons. 2 2 The Text of the Agreement Between Iran and the Agency for The Application of Safeguards in Connection with the
Treaty on The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/214, December 13, 1974. , INFCIRC/214, December 13, 1974.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
1 1

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

P5+1-agreed design; this design is meant to prevent Iran from using the reactor to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to export the spent fuel from this reactor and all other nuclear reactors. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions
regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Iran and the agency subsequently resolved most of these regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Iran and the agency subsequently resolved most of these
questions, which had contributed to suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons questions, which had contributed to suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.4 Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEA board June program.4 Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEA board June
2, 2008, that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions 2, 2008, that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions
regarding “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”5 The IAEA agency did not regarding “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”5 The IAEA agency did not
make any substantive progress on these matters for some timemake any substantive progress on these matters for some time (see below). .
Tehran has disputed the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns Tehran has disputed the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns
and maintains that and maintains that itIran has not done any work on nuclear weapons.6 Iran also expressed concern to has not done any work on nuclear weapons.6 Iran also expressed concern to
the IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to the IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to
sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.”sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.”7 The The
IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its willingness to discuss IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its willingness to discuss
with Iran with Iran
modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in
the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive
information related to its conventional military activities.information related to its conventional military activities.78
Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested
information.information.89
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is
essential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all essential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all
outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012 outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012
and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of all and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of all
outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”~~9 However, during~~10 During an October 2013 an October 2013
meeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to meeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to
resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013,
~~describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA~~
~~agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful~~
~~nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not~~
~~already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information~~

describing a 3 The text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf. 3 The text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
4 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran President Ali Akbar Salehi explained in a 2009 interview that Tehran “decided to 4 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran President Ali Akbar Salehi explained in a 2009 interview that Tehran “decided to
solve these problems within the context of our [safeguards] commitments and not accept anything beyond our legal solve these problems within the context of our [safeguards] commitments and not accept anything beyond our legal
obligations,” adding that there had previously been “debates about the decreasing of the level of our cooperation” with obligations,” adding that there had previously been “debates about the decreasing of the level of our cooperation” with
the IAEA. (“Interview: Dr. Salehi on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” published in the IAEA. (“Interview: Dr. Salehi on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” published in Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 9, , Vol. 9,
Nos. 1-2, Fall 2009-Winter 2010, p. 1. Nos. 1-2, Fall 2009-Winter 2010, p. 1.
5 5 Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008. , IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008.
6 See, for example, 6 See, for example, Communication Dated 7 January 2016 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Final Assessment on Past and
Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016. , INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016.
7 7 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008. GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008.
8 8 GOV/2008/38. 9 See, for example, See, for example, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012.
910 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations
with Tehran, and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues with Tehran, and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues
is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme.”programme.”
~~Congressional Research Service~~
(Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012). Congressional Research Service 2 2

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

“Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information about ~~about~~ several of the outstanding issues.several of the outstanding issues. ~~Iran~~ The government later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to
the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on
high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport
and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.” and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.”
Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.1011
Pursuant to the Pursuant to the July 2015 JCPOA, Iran completed a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA “Roadmap for JCPOA, Iran completed a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA “Roadmap for
Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA Director General Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA Director General
Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of
Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Iran, to make Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Iran, to make
an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”11
12 According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors, “[a]ll the According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors, “[a]ll the
activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule.”activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule.”12
13 The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the agency’s “final The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the agency’s “final
assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues. assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues.
In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, ~~that notes~~noting Iran’s cooperation Iran’s cooperation
with the road map and with the road map and ~~“further notes~~ stating “that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the
“outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”“outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”~~13 Since the~~14 The IAEA has verified that Iran IAEA has verified that Iran
has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effecthas taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, and the board is no longer focused the board is no longer focused
on Iran’s compliance with on Iran’s compliance with either past Security Council resolutions past Security Council resolutions ~~and past issues concerning Iran’s~~
or the government’s IAEA safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA
implementation “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the implementation “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the
Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to
undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the
full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.”
The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to
the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the
full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of
Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds
to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or
safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting
provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General
to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel
to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and
also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at
~~any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of~~
~~concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments.~~
~~Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s~~
~~investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its~~

10 11 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015.
1112 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear
Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. , by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman.
1213 Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, GOV/2015/68, , GOV/2015/68,
December 2, 2015. December 2, 2015.
1314 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Implementation and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran
in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015. , GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
3 3

link to page link to page 1513 link to page 27 link to page 32 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran applied additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Tehran also began implementing the additional protocol to the government’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, as well as the modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements for that agreement (see “Iran and the IAEA”) ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its~~
~~IAEA safeguards agreement.14 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.~~
~~Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, required Iran to comply with these~~
~~provisions, as well as to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of~~
~~delivering nuclear weapons.” Resolution 1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified~~
~~Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements. (See “Potential Noncompliance After September 2005.”)~~
~~Iran did not take any of these steps prior to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some~~
~~aspects of its nuclear program since the government began implementing the November 2013~~
~~Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013~~
~~agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some information to the agency required by the~~
~~modified Code 3.1.~~
~~The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action~~
~~Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran applied additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program~~
~~and heavy-water reactor program, as well as began implementing its additional protocol and the~~
~~modified Code 3.1~~. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, . On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016,
all of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N. all of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, composes the current legal Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, composes the current legal
framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.15 The IAEA reports findings of its inspection and framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.15 The IAEA reports findings of its inspection and
monitoring activitiesmonitoring activities ~~and~~; the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties’ the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties’
implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations are national decisions. implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations are national decisions.
Until July 2019, all official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the Until July 2019, all official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the
IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Iran had fulfilled its JCPOA and IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Iran had fulfilled its JCPOA and
related Resolution 2231 requirements.16related Resolution 2231 requirements.16 17
Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding
JCPOA-mandated limits; JCPOA-mandated limits; ~~the government~~Iran has since increased the number of activities that violate has since increased the number of activities that violate

~~14 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water.~~
JCOPA restrictions (see Appendix A). According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, enriched uranium stockpile, enriched uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D) activities, as well as centrifuge installation. 15 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” January 15 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” January
16, 2016. 16, 2016.
For a list of IAEA reports beginning in July 2019, see Appendix D. 16 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1 16 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1
began implementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue was resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts began implementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue was resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts
of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 (of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 (Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department ofDepartment of State, April State, April
2017). For more information, see CRS Report R43333, 2017). For more information, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit and CRS Report and CRS Report
RL34544, RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have noted , by Paul K. Kerr. Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have noted
that Iran has on several occasions exceeded the JCPOA-required limit. Tehran since February 23, 2021, has neither that Iran has on several occasions exceeded the JCPOA-required limit. Tehran since February 23, 2021, has neither
informed the IAEA about Iran’s inventory of heavy water nor allowed the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water informed the IAEA about Iran’s inventory of heavy water nor allowed the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water
production. production.
17 According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and
development using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceeded the number permitted by development using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceeded the number permitted by
the JCPOA (the JCPOA (Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; 2019; ~~GOV/2019/32)~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2019/32, August 30, 2019. In a June 11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott . In a June 11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott
stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued
a similar public finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17, 2019, press conference a similar public finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17, 2019, press conference
that “Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at that “Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at
the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019). the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019).
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
4

~~link to page 30~~ 4 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

~~JCOPA restrictions (see Appendix D).18 According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of installed~~
~~centrifuges, enriched uranium stockpile, enriched uranium u-235 concentration, and number of~~
~~enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-~~
~~prohibited research and development (R&D) activities, as well as centrifuge installation.19~~
In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as
grounds for reducing grounds for reducing ~~the government~~Iran’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to ’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to
the agreement.the agreement.2017 According to that paragraph, According to that paragraph,
Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions
specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part. to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
~~However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known~~
~~as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and~~
~~announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute~~
~~resolution mechanism.21 The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for~~
~~Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, who oversees the mechanism’s process.22~~
~~There is no public evidence that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With~~

~~18 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on the following sources: GOV/2019/32;~~ ~~Verification and~~
~~Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),~~ ~~Report~~
~~by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in~~
~~Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9,~~
July 8, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic ~~Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council~~
~~Resolution 2231 (2015),~~ ~~Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019;~~ ~~Verification and~~
~~Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of~~ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report
~~by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic~~
~~Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations~~
~~Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020;~~ ~~Verification~~
~~and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)~~,
Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General,
GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021;
~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United~~ ~~Nations Security Council Resolution~~
~~2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic~~
~~Republic of Iran in Light of United~~ Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General,
GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/51, November 17, 2021;
~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution~~
~~2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/4, March 3, 2022;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic~~
~~Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2022/24, May 30, 2022;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations~~
~~Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/39, September 7, 2022;~~
~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution~~
~~2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/62, November 10, 2022; and~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in~~
~~the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the~~
~~Director General, GOV/2023/8, February 28, 2023.~~
~~19 See also “IAEA Chief Sounds Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Financial Times, May 26, 2021.~~
~~20 See also~~ ~~Communication Dated 29 January 2021~~Iran has also cited JCPOA Paragraph 36 as grounds for ending all JCPOA-mandated transparency measures beyond the government’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.18 Paragraph 36 states that “[i]f Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution.” Iran could treat a commission failure to resolve the issue as “grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.” However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism (DRM).19 A January 14, 2020, E3 letter to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, who oversees the mechanism’s process, referred “a matter concerning the implementation of Iran’s [JCPOA] commitments ... to the Joint Commission for resolution through” the DRM.20 There is no public evidence that any government has taken action under the mechanism. A September 13, 2023, E3 statement explains that, since invoking the DRM, the governments have “strived in good faith to resolve the issues arising from Iran’s non-compliance” both via the DRM and “beyond.”21 The E3 “will continue consultations, alongside international partners, on how best to address increasing doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” the statement adds.22 On July 3, 2020, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell received a letter from Iran’s Foreign Minister similarly referring Iran’s concerns regarding the E3’s JCPOA implementation issues to the joint commission.23 But an E3 November 2020 statement explains that those governments “do not accept the argument that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance” with the JCPOA. “Iran has never triggered” the DRM, according to the statement, which adds that Tehran “has no legal grounds to cease implementing” the JCPOA provisions.24 Nevertheless, according to the U.S. government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran may cease performing commitments in whole or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions.”25 17 See also Communication Dated 29 January 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021. 18 Communication Dated from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Agency, INFCIRC/, INFCIRC/~~953, February 2, 2021.~~
211131, September 14, 2023. 19 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020. “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020.
2220 “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020. of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~regard to Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that~~
~~those governments “remain committed to working with all JCPOA participants to find a~~
~~diplomatic way forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the~~
~~JCPOA. The E3 did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.23~~
~~The E3 November 2020 statement explains that those governments “do not accept the argument~~
~~that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never~~
~~triggered” the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease~~
~~implementing the provisions of the agreement.”24 Nevertheless, according to the U.S.~~
~~government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran may cease performing commitments in whole~~
~~or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions.”25~~
21 “E3 Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on the JCPOA - September 2023,” September 13, 2023. 22 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020. 23 “JCPOA: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” July 3, 2020. 24 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020. 25 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January 31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst. Congressional Research Service 5 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA had A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA had
continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions ~~described in Section T of the JCPOA,~~
~~which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.26 A November 10, 2022~~which apply to certain nuclear weapons-related activities and are described in Section T of the JCPOA.26 A September 4, 2023, report , report
from Grossi, however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake from Grossi, however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake ~~the~~these verification and verification and
monitoring activities monitoring activities ~~concerning Section T~~ since his February 2021 report.27 since his February 2021 report.27
The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for ~~agency~~IAEA inspectors to gain access to Iranian inspectors to gain access to Iranian
sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the
IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent
with” the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns.with” the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns.
~~IAEA reports have not mentioned any agency requests for JCPOA-related access to any Iranian~~
~~military facilities. But the IAEA has a number of methods other than inspections, such as~~
~~analyzing open-source information and receiving intelligence briefings from governments, to~~
~~monitor Iranian compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April~~
~~2018 State Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and~~
~~nonproliferation agreements,~~ An April 2018 State Department report explains IAEA monitoring of Iran’s JCPOA compliance:
[t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards- [t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-
relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding
weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,
Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained
in the JCPOA.28 in the JCPOA.28
The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s compliance with the government’s obligations pursuant to The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s compliance with the government’s obligations pursuant to
Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.

~~23 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020.~~
~~24 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,” January 14, 2020.~~
~~25 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January~~
~~31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst.~~
~~26 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~27 GOV/2023/8.~~
IAEA reports have not explicitly mentioned any agency requests for JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military facilities. But the IAEA has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-source information and receiving intelligence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the level of cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the JCPOA.”29 However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, as of February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures” described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.30 On February 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding … whereby the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to three months, as set out in a technical annex.”31 During a press conference that day, Grossi 26 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021. 27 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/39, September 4, 2023. 28 Department of State, April 2018. The August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015, 28 Department of State, April 2018. The August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015,
IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues” concerning the IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues” concerning the
possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program,
does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its
previous assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program, or where it has concerns regarding previous assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program, or where it has concerns regarding
the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 2019). , 2019).
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~According to Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the~~
~~level of cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the~~
~~JCPOA.”29 However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government,~~
~~as of February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency~~
~~measures” described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.30 On February~~
~~21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding … whereby~~
~~the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to~~
~~three months, as set out in a technical annex.”31 During a press conference that day, Grossi~~
~~explained that this arrangement “is~~ 29 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020. 30 GOV/2021/10. The letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA use of modern safeguards technologies in Iran; the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium enrichment, uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access “pursuant to provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of Tehran’s implementation of JCPOA-mandated “voluntary measures.” 31 GOV/2021/10. Congressional Research Service 6 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations explained that this arrangement was “not a replacement for what we used to have” under the not a replacement for what we used to have” under the
Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that allows us to continue to give the world Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that allows us to continue to give the world
assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”32 assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”32
According to a subsequent report from Grossi, this agreement is meant “to enable the Agency to According to a subsequent report from Grossi, this agreement is meant “to enable the Agency to
recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge.”33 recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge.”33
Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without
limitation.”34 According to a December 1, 2021, letter to the IAEA, Iran has not scaled back limitation.”34 According to a December 1, 2021, letter to the IAEA, Iran has not scaled back
monitoring and inspections related to Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement; monitoring and inspections related to Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement; the IAEA has not contradicted~~IAEA~~
~~reports do not contradict~~ Iran’s claims.35 Iran’s Iran’s claims.35 Iran’s then-Ambassador to the United Nations, Majid Takht Ambassador to the United Nations, Majid Takht
Ravanchi, asserted in a June 30, 2022, statement to the U.N. Security Council that “as soon as Ravanchi, asserted in a June 30, 2022, statement to the U.N. Security Council that “as soon as
other [JCPOA] parties fulfill all of their obligations in a complete, effective, and verifiable other [JCPOA] parties fulfill all of their obligations in a complete, effective, and verifiable
manner, manner, ~~Iran~~Tehran will immediately reverse all of its steps” that violate the agreement.36 will immediately reverse all of its steps” that violate the agreement.36
Iranian officials have since expressed the government’s willingness to resume implementing all of the government’s JCPOA obligations.37 The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24, 2021, that the parties agreed to extend the above- The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24, 2021, that the parties agreed to extend the above-
described arrangement until June 24, 2021.described arrangement until June 24, 2021.3738 A May 30, 2022, report from Grossi expresses the A May 30, 2022, report from Grossi expresses the
agency’s agency’s
understanding that surveillance data from all Agency cameras installed for activities in understanding that surveillance data from all Agency cameras installed for activities in
relation to the JCPOA, as well as its on-line enrichment monitors, electronic seals or relation to the JCPOA, as well as its on-line enrichment monitors, electronic seals or

~~29 GOV/2020/51.~~
~~30 GOV/2021/10. The letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code 3.1~~
~~of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA use of modern safeguards technologies in Iran;~~
~~the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium enrichment,~~
~~uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access “pursuant to~~
~~provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of Tehran’s implementation of JCPOA-~~
~~mandated “voluntary measures.”~~
~~31 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~32 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021,~~
~~https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU.~~
~~33 GOV/2021/28.~~
installed measurement devices, will continue to be stored and made available to the Agency if and when Iran resumes implementation of Tehran’s JCPOA commitments.39 However, Iran is no longer recording such data (see below). 32 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU. 33 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021. 34 GOV/2021/10. 34 GOV/2021/10.
35 35 Communication Dated 1 December 2021 From the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, ,
INFCIRC/967, December 3, 2021. A March 2022 Iran statement to the IAEA Board of Governors reiterated this INFCIRC/967, December 3, 2021. A March 2022 Iran statement to the IAEA Board of Governors reiterated this
commitment (“IAEA Envoy: Iran to Continue Fulfillment of Undertakings Based on CSA,” Fars News Agency, March commitment (“IAEA Envoy: Iran to Continue Fulfillment of Undertakings Based on CSA,” Fars News Agency, March
10, 2022). 10, 2022).
Similarly, Mohammad Ghorbanpour, Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, told the UN General Assembly in October 2023 that “Iran remains fully committed to the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA.” (Statement by Mr. Mohammad Ghorbanpour, Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Before the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, October 6, 2023). 36 Statement by H.E. Mr. Majid Takht Ravanchi, then- ~~36 Statement by H.E. Mr. Majid Takht Ravanchi~~ Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of
IranIran, to the United Nations Before the United Nations Security Council on “non-proliferation: Implementation of to the United Nations Before the United Nations Security Council on “non-proliferation: Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” June 30, 2022. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz ” June 30, 2022. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz
Kamalvandi made a similar statement on September 8, 2022Kamalvandi made a similar statement on September 8, 2022. (“Iran Rejects IAEA’s Politically-Motivated Report, Says (“Iran Rejects IAEA’s Politically-Motivated Report, Says
Peaceful N. Program Fully Transparent,” Peaceful N. Program Fully Transparent,” Fars News Agency, September 8, 2022, September 8, 2022.)
~~37 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran~~
~~Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 24, 2021; “Envoy~~
~~Confirms Iran Nuclear Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” Islamic Republic News Agency, June 1, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~installed measurement devices, will continue to be stored and made available to the Agency~~
~~if and when Iran resumes implementation~~
~~of Tehran’s JCPOA commitments.38 However, Iran is no longer recording such data (see below).~~
). 37 “Interview with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi,” CNN: Fareed Zakaria GPS, September 24, 2023; “Iran FM Says Return of All to JCPOA 'Not so out of Reach,” BBC Monitoring Newsfile citing Iranian Students’ News Agency, September 23, 2023; “Iran Says It Is Committed to Resolving Nuclear Dispute Through Diplomacy,” Reuters, August 14, 2023. 38 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 24, 2021; “Envoy Confirms Iran Nuclear Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” Islamic Republic News Agency, June 1, 2021. 39 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/24, May 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 7 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations In late August 2021, the agency requested that Iran provide access to “all relevant locations” in In late August 2021, the agency requested that Iran provide access to “all relevant locations” in
Iran “in order to service the equipment and replace the storage media.”Iran “in order to service the equipment and replace the storage media.”3940 The IAEA also requested The IAEA also requested
that Tehran permit agency inspectors to “verify the status” of four surveillance cameras that Iran that Tehran permit agency inspectors to “verify the status” of four surveillance cameras that Iran
had removed from its TESA Karaj complex centrifuge component manufacturing workshop.had removed from its TESA Karaj complex centrifuge component manufacturing workshop.4041
Iranian officials have explained that the government removed the cameras following a June 23, Iranian officials have explained that the government removed the cameras following a June 23,
2021, “terrorist attack in which ... the agency’s equipment was destroyed and damaged.”2021, “terrorist attack in which ... the agency’s equipment was destroyed and damaged.”4142
Director General Grossi later explained that, as a result of this incident, “some of our equipment Director General Grossi later explained that, as a result of this incident, “some of our equipment
was affected,” adding that “we need to restore our monitoring capacities there.”was affected,” adding that “we need to restore our monitoring capacities there.”4243 The IAEA and The IAEA and
Iran reached an agreement on September 12, 2021, that, according to an IAEA-Iran joint Iran reached an agreement on September 12, 2021, that, according to an IAEA-Iran joint
statement, permits agency inspectors to “service the identified equipment and replace their statement, permits agency inspectors to “service the identified equipment and replace their
storage media.”storage media.”4344
Iran did not fully comply with this agreement, according to the IAEA. Iran permitted agency Iran did not fully comply with this agreement, according to the IAEA. Iran permitted agency
inspectors from September 20-22 to “service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance inspectors from September 20-22 to “service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance
equipment and to replace storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran,” according to a equipment and to replace storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran,” according to a
November 17, 2021, report from Grossi, which adds that Iran denied the inspectors access to the November 17, 2021, report from Grossi, which adds that Iran denied the inspectors access to the
Karaj workshop.Karaj workshop.4445 Iranian Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi asserted in a September 27, 2021, Iranian Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi asserted in a September 27, 2021,
statement that statement that
[d]uring the discussions in Tehran as well as in Vienna, it was clearly indicated that since [d]uring the discussions in Tehran as well as in Vienna, it was clearly indicated that since
that Tessa Karaj Complex is still under security and judicial investigations, the equipment that Tessa Karaj Complex is still under security and judicial investigations, the equipment
related to this Complex are not included for servicing.related to this Complex are not included for servicing.4546
Grossi’s November 17 report contradicts Gharibabadi’s claim, explaining that the September Grossi’s November 17 report contradicts Gharibabadi’s claim, explaining that the September
agreement “did not in any way exclude certain locations and equipment.”agreement “did not in any way exclude certain locations and equipment.”~~46 In any case, the~~47 The IAEA IAEA
installed replacement cameras in the Karaj workshop by the “end of December 2021,” pursuant to installed replacement cameras in the Karaj workshop by the “end of December 2021,” pursuant to
aa subsequent bilateral agreement with Iran. bilateral agreement with Iran.4748 The next month, the IAEA removed the cameras from this The next month, the IAEA removed the cameras from this
workshop and installed cameras in another facility that is performing the work previously workshop and installed cameras in another facility that is performing the work previously
conducted at the Karaj workshop.conducted at the Karaj workshop.4849
The IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments The IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments
has diminished since February 23, 2021has diminished since February 23, 2021~~; a November 10, 2022, report from Grossi explains that~~

~~38 GOV/2022/24.~~
~~39 Ibid.~~
~~40 GOV/2021/39.~~
41. In response to an Iranian request following a June 8, 2022, IAEA Board of Governors resolution concerning outstanding issues related to Tehran’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement, the agency removed “all of its equipment previously 40 Ibid. 41 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021. 42 GOV/2021/39; “Iran Urges JCPOA Parties to Prove Their Genuine Intention to Full Implementation of GOV/2021/39; “Iran Urges JCPOA Parties to Prove Their Genuine Intention to Full Implementation of
Commitments,” November 26, 2021. Available at https://irangov.ir/detail/374677. Commitments,” November 26, 2021. Available at https://irangov.ir/detail/374677.
4243 Stephanie Cooke, “Interview: IAEA’s Grossi on Aukus, Iran and COP26,” Stephanie Cooke, “Interview: IAEA’s Grossi on Aukus, Iran and COP26,” Energy Intelligence, October 8, 2021. , October 8, 2021.
4344“Joint Statement by the Vice-President and the Head of Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran “Joint Statement by the Vice-President and the Head of Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” September 12, 2021. and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” September 12, 2021.
~~44 GOV/2021/51.~~
4545 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/51, November 17, 2021. 46 “Ambassador Gharibabadi’s Comments on the IAEA DG Sep 26 Report on Cameras,” September 27, 2021. “Ambassador Gharibabadi’s Comments on the IAEA DG Sep 26 Report on Cameras,” September 27, 2021.
4647 GOV/2021/51. GOV/2021/51.
~~47 GOV/2022/4~~48 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/4, March 3, 2022; “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December ; “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December
15, 2021. 15, 2021.
4849 GOV/2022/24. GOV/2022/24.
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~~the agency’s JCPOA-related “verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected~~
~~as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under~~
~~the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.”49 Grossi’s February 28, 2023, report states that~~
~~Tehran’s reduced compliance “has seriously affected the Agency’s verification and monitoring in~~
~~relation to the JCPOA.”50~~
~~Subsequent Iranian actions further impeded the agency’s ability to regain this continuity of~~
~~knowledge. In response to an Iranian request following a June 8, 2022, IAEA Board of Governors~~
~~resolution concerning outstanding issues related to Tehran’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards~~
~~agreement, the agency removed “all of its equipment previously installed in Iran for surveillance~~
~~and monitoring under the JCPOA.”51 Since June 10, 2022, “no data has since been recorded for~~
~~verification and monitoring.”52 Mohammad Eslami, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of~~
~~Iran, stated on July 25 that Tehran will keep the cameras “switched off until the nuclear deal is~~
~~fully restored.”53~~
~~The IAEA would face a complex verification task, should Iran and the P5+1 resume full JCPOA~~
~~implementation. The agency would need to “re-establish an understanding” of Iran’s JCPOA-~~
~~related activities since February 21, 2021, Grossi’s February 2023 report explains, adding that the~~
~~IAEA “would need to confirm the integrity, comprehensiveness and accuracy of the data recorded~~
~~by its surveillance equipment” between February 21, 2021, and June 8, 2022, “by comparing it to~~
~~the declarations provided by Iran.” Tehran would also “need to provide all related records” to the~~
~~IAEA, which would then confirm the “consistency” of the records “through the application of~~
~~additional safeguards measures.”54~~
~~More recently, Iran agreed to allow IAEA implementation of “further appropriate~~installed in Iran for surveillance and monitoring under the JCPOA.”50 Currently, the only such recorded surveillance and monitoring data is that recorded by cameras which the IAEA installed to monitor workshops where Iran manufactures centrifuge components.51 Mohammad Eslami, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), stated on July 25, 2022, that Tehran will keep the other cameras “switched off until the nuclear deal is fully restored.”52 According to a March 4, 2023, IAEA-AEOI joint statement, Iran agreed to allow IAEA implementation of “further appropriate verification and monitoring activities.” 53 Grossi told reporters during a press conference the same day that these “activities” are the JCPOA-specific monitoring and measurement measures that Iran suspended in February 2021.54 The IAEA and Iran have made limited progress in implementing the March 4 joint statement:55 • the IAEA has installed additional monitoring devices in Iran’s Fordow and pilot enrichment facilities “in order to monitor the enrichment level” of the HEU produced in those facilities; • the IAEA has resolved questions concerning the presence of HEU particles in the Fordow facility containing up to 83.7% u-235;56 • the IAEA has resolved questions concerning the presence of nuclear material at one of three locations under IAEA investigation; and57 • as noted, the IAEA installed surveillance cameras in workshops where Iran manufactures centrifuge components. However, there has been no progress since May 2023, according to a September 4, 2023, report from Grossi.58 Another September 2023 report from Grossi states that Tehran’s reduced compliance “has seriously affected the Agency’s verification and verification and
~~monitoring activities,” according to a March 4 IAEA-AEOI joint statement.55 Grossi told~~
~~reporters during a press conference the same day that these “activities” are the JCPOA-specific~~
~~monitoring and measurement measures that Iran suspended in February 2021.56 Grossi explained~~
~~in a March 6 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors that renewed implementation of these~~
~~monitoring measures would enable the agency “to begin to establish a new baseline necessary in~~
~~the event of a resumption of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the~~
~~JCPOA.”57~~
~~Iran and the IAEA~~
~~As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement~~
~~with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are~~
~~designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to~~

~~49 GOV/2022/62.~~
~~50 GOV/2023/8.~~
~~51 GOV/2022/39.~~
~~52 GOV/2022/62; NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/34, June 8, 2022.~~
53monitoring in relation to the JCPOA.”59 The IAEA would face a complex verification task, should Iran and the P5+1 resume full JCPOA implementation. The agency “would not be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory” of items subject to JCPOA restrictions,” Grossi reported.60 The agency “would need to establish a new baseline in relation to” such items, according to Grossi’s September 4 report, which adds that establishing this baseline “would pose 50 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/39, September 7, 2022. 51 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/43, September 4, 2023. The IAEA installed the cameras in May 2023. 52 “AEOI Chief: Iran Not to Turn on Beyond-Safeguards Cameras Before JCPOA Revival,” “AEOI Chief: Iran Not to Turn on Beyond-Safeguards Cameras Before JCPOA Revival,” Fars News Agency, July , July
25, 2022. 25, 2022.
~~54 GOV/2023/8.~~
5553 “Joint Statement by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency “Joint Statement by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA),” March 4, 2023(IAEA),” March 4, 2023. 54
56 “Press Conference with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, posted by IAEAVideo, March 4, “Press Conference with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, posted by IAEAVideo, March 4,
2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLrCp0XCluA&t=29s. 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLrCp0XCluA&t=29s.
~~57 IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, March 6, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
9

~~link to page 28 link to page 28~~ 55 GOV/2023/43. 56 See Appendix A. 57 See “Other Potential Noncompliance” below. 58 GOV/2023/43. 59 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/39, September 4, 2023. 60 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 9 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations major challenges, including the difficulty in confirming the accuracy of any revised declarations by Iran for the period when no verification and monitoring equipment had been in operation.”61 Iran and the IAEA As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.5862 Safeguards Safeguards
include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although
comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such
agreements, are limited” according to the agency.agreements, are limited” according to the agency.5963
As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as
obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive
safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the
government. Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the government. Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the
agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the
IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from
member states.member states.6064 Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the
agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.6165
The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director
General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an all-General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an all-
encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to
make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”6266 Similarly, a February 2006 Similarly, a February 2006
report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the
agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is
limited.”limited.”6367 There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the
IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states
regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where ~~there is no reason to suspect~~
~~the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA board is~~
~~required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (see~~ ~~Appendix~~
B)~~. Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the~~
~~more likely the board would be to approve such an inspection.~~
~~The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the~~
~~National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information~~
~~during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built~~

58nuclear material may not be 61 Ibid. 62 IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2022 Edition. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in . Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in
INFCIRC 153, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According a INFCIRC 153, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According a
Amano’s May 2013 report from Amano, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since Amano’s May 2013 report from Amano, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since
as early as 1992,” that this model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-as early as 1992,” that this model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-
diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities
in the State (i.e. completeness)” (in the State (i.e. completeness)” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, , Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22,
2013). 2013).
5963 Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services IAEA Services
Series 21, May 2016. Series 21, May 2016.
6064 Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol
(INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. (INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
6165 Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a
resolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N. resolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N.
Security Council. Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021. Security Council. Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021.
6266 “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005, “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei. available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei.
6367 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006. GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.
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present. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA board is required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (see Appendix B). Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the more likely the board would be to approve such an inspection. The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware
of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former U.S. officials.officials.6468 Prior to the Prior to the
NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the
agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programsagency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs~~, but~~. But the agency had never found Tehran in had never found Tehran in
violation of its safeguards agreement. violation of its safeguards agreement.
In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the ~~sites named by the~~
~~NCRI;~~ NCRI-named sites; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the
matter in September 2003, the IAEA board called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the matter in September 2003, the IAEA board called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the
agency’s investigation, suspend agency’s investigation, suspend ~~its~~Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, and “unconditionally sign, uranium enrichment activities, and “unconditionally sign,
ratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.ratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.6569
In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment
activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to ~~its~~Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement, and IAEA safeguards agreement, and
comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.6670 As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain
from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional
Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.6771
Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as well as information Iran provided after the October 2003 Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as well as information Iran provided after the October 2003
agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities,
some of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (some of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (seesee Appendix A).C). After October After October
2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in
November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.6872 However, Iran resumed uranium However, Iran resumed uranium
conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who
had been elected two months earlier. had been elected two months earlier.
On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77) On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77)6973
that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
The board, however, did not report The board, however, did not report ~~Iran~~the matter to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran
additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran
• to implement transparency measures including access to individuals, to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,
documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military
owned workshops, and research and development locations; owned workshops, and research and development locations;
~~ to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity;~~
~~ to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;~~
~~ to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and~~
~~ to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.~~

64 68 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council, Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council,
personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s
WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/
tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html. tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html.
6569 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.
6670 The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.
6771 Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021. Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021.
6872 The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.
6973 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
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• to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity; • to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water; • to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and • to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol. No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September
2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the 2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the
IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran.” nuclear material and activities in Iran.”
Iran announced in January 2006 that Iran announced in January 2006 that itTehran would resume research and development on its centrifuges would resume research and development on its centrifuges
at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N. at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N.
Security Council.Security Council.7074 Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional
Protocol. (For details, Protocol. (For details, ~~see~~ see “Iran and the U.N. Security Council” ~~below~~below.) .)
Potential Noncompliance After September 2005
Design Information Provision Iran further reduced~~Iran further scaled back~~ its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told
the agency that the agency that itTehran would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for ~~its~~Iran’s
IAEA safeguards agreement.IAEA safeguards agreement.7175 That provision (called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed That provision (called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed
in February 2003, requires states to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as soon in February 2003, requires states to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as soon
as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken,
whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere
to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to
provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material
into it.into it.72
~~This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide~~
~~the IAEA with some information concerning its~~76 Iran later cited this decision when withholding some information from the IAEA concerning Tehran’s nuclear program. For example, nuclear program. For example, ~~Tehran~~Iran had had
refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at
Arak.Arak.7377 As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan ~~of Action, Iran submitted this information to the~~
~~IAEA on February 12, 2014.74 Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design~~

70 74 For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see “Iran and the U.N.
Security Council.”
7175 According to the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements are “[t]he document specifying in detail how According to the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements are “[t]he document specifying in detail how
the procedures laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” the procedures laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.”
7276 During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s
Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA
Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Tehran Times, ,
November 9, 2011. “Until 1992, the standard language” for code 3.1 “called for the state to provide the IAEA with November 9, 2011. “Until 1992, the standard language” for code 3.1 “called for the state to provide the IAEA with
completed design information questionnaires for new nuclear facilities as soon as possible but no later than 180 days completed design information questionnaires for new nuclear facilities as soon as possible but no later than 180 days
before the introduction of nuclear material.” The IAEA subsequently adopted the current notification requirement before the introduction of nuclear material.” The IAEA subsequently adopted the current notification requirement
(Michael D. Rosenthal, Lisa L. Saum-Manning, Frank Houck, and George Anzelon, (Michael D. Rosenthal, Lisa L. Saum-Manning, Frank Houck, and George Anzelon, Review of the Negotiation of the
Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) Volume I/III Setting the Stage: 1991-1996, Nonproliferation and , Nonproliferation and
National Security Department, Nonproliferation and Safeguards Division, Brookhaven National Laboratory, January National Security Department, Nonproliferation and Safeguards Division, Brookhaven National Laboratory, January
2010). 2010).
7377 This lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the This lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the
design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to Amano’s May 2013 report design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to Amano’s May 2013 report
(GOV/2013/27). A November 2013 report from Amano explains that the IAEA “needs updated design information as (GOV/2013/27). A November 2013 report from Amano explains that the IAEA “needs updated design information as
early as possible in order ... to ensure that all possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards early as possible in order ... to ensure that all possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards
~~measures and customized safeguards equipment are put in place.” (~~~~Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement~~
~~and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director~~
~~General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013.) Iran has concluded “a safeguards approach for the reactor” (~~~~Status of~~
~~Iran’s Nuclear Programme in Relation to the Joint Plan of Action, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8,~~
~~April 20, 2015).~~
74 ~~Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the~~
~~Islamic Republic of Iran,~~ ~~Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

(continued...) Congressional Research Service 12 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations of Action, Iran submitted this information to the IAEA on February 12, 2014.78 Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the
agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22, agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22,
2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information, 2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information,
according to a November 2009 report.according to a November 2009 report.75 79 Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had
“provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.“provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.7680 IAEA reports since 2012 IAEA reports since 2012
do not appear to address this issue. do not appear to address this issue.
Tehran Tehran has also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that ~~its~~the government’s failure to notify the IAEA before failure to notify the IAEA before
September 2009 that September 2009 that itIran had been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called had been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called
the Fordow facility, the Fordow facility, ~~near the city of Qom~~ was consistent with the government’s safeguards was consistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May
2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction 2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction
decision. But Tehran, according to decision. But Tehran, according to ~~Amano’s~~a November 2015 report November 2015 report from Amano, had not ~~, has not yet~~ provided all of provided all of
this information.this information. ~~Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue.~~
81 Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to
provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary
arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the
agreement does not agreement does not ~~provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of~~allow a state to modify or suspend unilaterally any portion of those any portion of those
arrangements.arrangements.~~77 Moreover, the~~82 The IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 ~~statement78~~statement83 that that
Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s
obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to
conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance
with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from
ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin
constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely
fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s
delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor.delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. ~~As noted, Iran notified the IAEA~~
~~on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.79~~
Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if itthe government has decided to construct other new has decided to construct other new
nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has
made such decisions. For example, the IAEA asked the government for information about Iranian made such decisions. For example, the IAEA asked the government for information about Iranian
statementsstatements indicating that Tehran is planning to construct new uranium enrichment that Tehran is planning to construct new uranium enrichment ~~facilities, is designing a~~
~~nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for four new~~
~~research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. Pursuant to its~~
~~November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this information to~~

75 measures and customized safeguards equipment are put in place.” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013.) Iran has concluded “a safeguards approach for the reactor” (Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in Relation to the Joint Plan of Action, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8, April 20, 2015). 78 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014. 79 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008. GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008.
7680 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010.
7781Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/65,November 18, 2015. 82 See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf. See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.
Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.” Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.”
7883 “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009. “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009.
~~79 In a February 16, 2021, letter to Tehran, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is a~~
~~legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified~~
~~unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of~~
~~provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” See GOV/2021/10.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
Congressional Research Service 13 13

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

~~the agency. According to Director General Grossi’s September 7 report, “Iran has informed” the~~
~~IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in the near future” and~~
~~that the government “was ready to work with” the agency “to find a mutually acceptable solution~~
~~to address the issue of modified Code 3.1.”80~~
facilities, designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, producing fuel for four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this information to the agency. Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the
basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to allow agency inspectors to verify design basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to allow agency inspectors to verify design
information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to
facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a
“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.8184 Moreover, Moreover,
the the March 2009 IAEA legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify the
Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its
safeguards agreement.safeguards agreement.8285 IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify
design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month.86 ~~month.83 Inspectors have~~
~~visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano.~~
In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to
produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency
inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from
Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.8487 Article 45 of that agreement requires Article 45 of that agreement requires
that Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for that Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for
safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when
necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly
relevant for safeguards purposes.” relevant for safeguards purposes.”
The IAEA board has neither The IAEA board has neither ~~formally~~ found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in
noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N. noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N.
Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, ~~that described~~
describing Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary
arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal
finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious
concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of
Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution also did not contain a formal did not contain a formal
finding of noncompliance.finding of noncompliance.85

~~80 GOV/2022/39.~~
8188 As noted, Iran began implementing the modified Code 3.1 pursuant to the JCPOA. However, Iran notified the IAEA on February 15, 2021, that the government would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.89 According to a September 2022 report from Director General Grossi, “Iran 84 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement. GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement.
8285 Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Tehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Tehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary
arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified. arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified.
8386 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009. GOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009.
8487 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010. GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010.
8588 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012. , GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012.
89 Reports from Grossi have repeatedly noted that Iranian is legally obligated to implement modified Code 3.1 For (continued...) Congressional Research ServiceCongressional Research Service
14 14

link to page 7 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

~~Post-2018~~
has informed” the IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in the near future” and that the government “was ready to work with” the agency “to find a mutually acceptable solution to address the issue of modified Code 3.1”90 However, Iran has not provided the agency with IAEA-requested “preliminary design information” for potential new nuclear facilities to which Iranian public statements have alluded, according to Grossi’s September 4 report. During an August 2023 meeting, “Iran reiterated its readiness to work with the Agency to find a mutually acceptable solution to address the issue of new nuclear facilities,” the report adds. Iran asserted in a September 14, 2023, letter to the IAEA that Iran will provide design information for new nuclear facilities “in due time.”91 Other Potential Noncompliance A March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board of Governors A March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board of Governors
states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear
material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three undeclared Iranian material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three undeclared Iranian
locations.locations.~~86 87~~92 93 Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have detailed what Director General Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have detailed what Director General
Grossi has described as “possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” in Grossi has described as “possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” in
Iran. Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected anthropogenic uranium particles at three Iran. Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected anthropogenic uranium particles at three
undeclared Iranian locations.undeclared Iranian locations.8894 Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and
additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as well as access additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as well as access
to these locations.to these locations.8995
In a March 4, 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of In a March 4, 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of
uranium) is very important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material uranium) is very important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material
that are not under international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the that are not under international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the
intent.”intent.”9096 A June 2020 report from Director General Grossi explained that Tehran’s inadequate A June 2020 report from Director General Grossi explained that Tehran’s inadequate
cooperation with the IAEA was “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve cooperation with the IAEA was “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve
the questions” raised by the IAEA’s findings described above.the questions” raised by the IAEA’s findings described above.9197 The IAEA Board of Governors example, Grossi’s September 4, 2023, report states that “implementation of modified Code°3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which, in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, cannot be modified unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangement.” See GOV/2023/43. Iran explained in a September 14, 2023, letter to the IAEA that Tehran suspended implantation of modified code 3.1 pursuant to JCPOA paragraphs 26 and 36. (INFCIRC/1131). See “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” above. 90 GOV/2022/39. 91 Communication from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, INFCIRC/1131, September 14, 2023. 92 ~~The IAEA Board of Governors~~
~~adopted a resolution later that month calling on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and~~
~~satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay, including by providing prompt access to~~
~~the locations specified by the Agency.”92 This resolution does not contain a formal finding of~~
~~noncompliance.~~
~~Although Iran has provided the IAEA with access to the relevant locations and provided some~~
~~related information, these actions did not resolve the outstanding issues. A December 2021~~
~~bilateral agreement stated that Iran and the IAEA would “continue to work on remaining~~
~~outstanding safeguards issues with the aim of resolving them.”93 According to Grossi’s March 5,~~
~~2022, report, the two sides in February 2022 conducted “technical discussions,” which “paved the~~
~~way” for a March 5 joint statement detailing a mutual agreement to “accelerate and strengthen~~
~~their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of the [outstanding] issues” and specifying~~
~~“a series of actions ... upon completion of which” Grossi intended to “report his conclusion” in~~

86NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March , Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March
3, 2020. 3, 2020.
8793 Iran has suggested that these agency investigations are based on “fabricated information” from foreign intelligence Iran has suggested that these agency investigations are based on “fabricated information” from foreign intelligence
services (services (Communication dated 8 June 2020 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
the Agency, INFCIRC/936, June 9, 2020; , INFCIRC/936, June 9, 2020; Communication dated 3 June 2022 received from the Permanent Mission of
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, INFCIRC/996, June 7, 2022), INFCIRC/996, June 7, 2022); INFCIRC/1131. 94According.
~~88According~~ to a February 2021 report from Director General Grossi, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no to a February 2021 report from Director General Grossi, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no
verification value in conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted verification value in conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted
undeclared nuclear activities. The agency instead decided to conduct “additional verification activities” at a different undeclared nuclear activities. The agency instead decided to conduct “additional verification activities” at a different
Iranian facility. (Iranian facility. (NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021). GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021).
8995 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2021/42, September 7, 2021. , GOV/2021/42, September 7, 2021.
9096 Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Agence
France Presse, March 4, 2020. , March 4, 2020.
9197 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/30, June 5, 2020. , GOV/2020/30, June 5, 2020.
~~92 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020.~~
~~93 “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December 15, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~time for the IAEA Board of Governors June 2022 meeting.94 But according to a May 30 report~~
~~from Director General Grossi, the relevant safeguards issues remained outstanding.95~~ Congressional Research Service 15 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations adopted a resolution later that month calling on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency.”98 This resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. Although Iran has provided the IAEA with access to the relevant locations and provided some related information, these actions have not completely resolved the outstanding issues. A December 2021 bilateral agreement stated that Iran and the IAEA would “continue to work on remaining outstanding safeguards issues with the aim of resolving them.”99 Subsequently, the two sides in February 2022 conducted “technical discussions,” which “paved the way” for a March 5, 2022, joint statement detailing a mutual agreement to “accelerate and strengthen” mutual “cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of the [outstanding] issues” and specifying “a series of actions ... upon completion of which” Grossi intended to “report his conclusion” in time for the IAEA Board of Governors June 2022 meeting.100 But according to a May 2022 report from Director General Grossi, the relevant safeguards issues remained outstanding.101
On June 8, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran “to act on an On June 8, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran “to act on an
urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up” Grossi’s “offer of further urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up” Grossi’s “offer of further
engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues.” This resolution does not engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues.” This resolution does not
contain a formal finding of noncompliance.contain a formal finding of noncompliance.96102 Iran “has fulfilled all its commitments in this Iran “has fulfilled all its commitments in this
respect and addressed all the Agency’s questions in a very substantive and cooperative manner,” respect and addressed all the Agency’s questions in a very substantive and cooperative manner,”
according to a June 9, 2022, statement from Tehran’s mission to the U.N. in Vienna.according to a June 9, 2022, statement from Tehran’s mission to the U.N. in Vienna.97103
Nevertheless, according to a September 7Nevertheless, according to a September 7, 2022, report from Grossi, Iran had not engaged with the report from Grossi, Iran had not engaged with the
Agency on the outstanding safeguards issues since the May Agency on the outstanding safeguards issues since the May 302022 report. report.98
A 104 A subsequent November 17, 2022, IAEA Board of Governors resolution states that “it is essential and urgent” November 17, 2022, IAEA Board of Governors resolution states that “it is essential and urgent”
~~that Iran take “without delay”~~for Iran to take several actions to resolve the outstanding safeguards matters. several actions to resolve the outstanding safeguards matters.99105 This This
resolution resolution also does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. A March 4, 2023, report from does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. A March 4, 2023, report from
Grossi notes that “by the end of February 2023 no progress had been made Grossi notes that “by the end of February 2023 no progress had been made ~~towards~~toward resolving any resolving any
of the outstanding safeguards issues.”of the outstanding safeguards issues.”~~100~~106 According to According to ~~the March 4~~an IAEA-AEOI joint statement IAEA-AEOI joint statement issued the same day, ,
~~“Iran expressed its readiness to continue its cooperation and provide further information and~~
~~access to address the outstanding safeguards issues” concerning the above-described locations.101~~
~~In a separate incident, Iran acted in a manner “contrary” to its IAEA safeguards agreement,~~
~~Grossi reported on March 4.102 Specifically, Iran began to operate two centrifuge cascades in the~~
~~Fordow facility in a manner inconsistent with the design information that Iran had provided to the~~
~~IAEA.~~
~~Iran and the U.N. Security Council~~
~~As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its~~
~~centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)103 on~~
~~February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its call for Iran to~~

~~94 GOV/2022/5.~~
95“Iran expressed its readiness to continue its cooperation and provide further 98 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020. 99 “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December 15, 2021. 100 GOV/2022/5. 101 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/26, May , Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/26, May
30, 2022. 30, 2022.
96102 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/34, June 8, 2022. , GOV/2022/34, June 8, 2022.
97103 Mr. Mohammad Reza Ghaebi, Acting Head of Mission and Charge d’Affaires, Iran Permanent Mission to the United Mr. Mohammad Reza Ghaebi, Acting Head of Mission and Charge d’Affaires, Iran Permanent Mission to the United
Nations Office and Other International Organizations, Nations Office and Other International Organizations, Statement before the IAEA Board of Governors on NPT
Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2022/26), June 9, 2022. , June 9, 2022.
98104 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/42, , Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/42,
September 7, 2022. September 7, 2022.
99105 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/70, November 17, 2022. The resolution , GOV/2022/70, November 17, 2022. The resolution
requires that Iran: provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic requires that Iran: provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic
origin at three undeclared locations in Iran; inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or origin at three undeclared locations in Iran; inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or
of the contaminated equipment; provide all information, documentation, and answers the Agency requires for that of the contaminated equipment; provide all information, documentation, and answers the Agency requires for that
purpose; and provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of purpose; and provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of
samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency. samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.
~~100~~106 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2023/9, March , Report by the Director General, GOV/2023/9, March
4, 2023. 4, 2023.
~~101 “Joint Statement by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency~~
~~(IAEA),” March 4, 2023.~~
~~102 GOV/2023/9.~~
~~103 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it~~
Congressional Research Service 16 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations information and access to address the outstanding safeguards issues” concerning the above-described locations.107 Iran has since “provided a possible explanation for the presence” of nuclear material at one of the three undeclared locations, Grossi reported on May 31, 2023, adding that “the matter is no longer outstanding.”108 However, Grossi reported on September 4 that the safeguards issues concerning the other two sites remain outstanding.109 Iran’s September 14 letter to the IAEA asserts that Tehran “has exhausted all its efforts so as to discover the origin” of the uranium particles. The lack of an explanation for the particles’ origin “would reasonably imply that possibly external elements, such as sabotage and malicious acts, have been involved in the contamination,” the letter adds.110 In a separate incident, Iran acted in a manner “contrary” to its IAEA safeguards agreement, Grossi reported on March 4, 2023.111 Specifically, Iran began to operate two centrifuge cascades in the Fordow facility in a manner inconsistent with the design information that Iran had provided to the IAEA. Subsequently, Tehran agreed to increased “frequency and intensity” of IAEA verification activities at the facility; Iran also provided the IAEA with updated information to reflect the aforementioned cascade operation.112 In addition, reports from Grossi have noted that, after verifying a quantity of nuclear material dissolved by Iran in the country’s uranium conversion facility, IAEA inspectors in March 2022 “identified a discrepancy” between the amounts of IAEA-verified and Iran-declared nuclear material.113 During an August 2023 meeting, Iran agreed to “continue working with” the IAEA to address the discrepancy, which remains unresolved.114 This discrepancy may indicate Iranian noncompliance with the government’s safeguards agreement. Iran and the U.N. Security Council As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that Tehran would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)115 on February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its call for Iran to take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that the government would stop implementing its Additional Protocol. would stop implementing its Additional Protocol.
On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not
legally binding, that called on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board legally binding, that called on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board
resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program: resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program:
1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835
(September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed
a variety of restrictions on Iran. a variety of restrictions on Iran.
107 “Joint Statement by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” March 4, 2023. 108 GOV/2023/26. 109 GOV/2023/43. 110 INFCIRC/1131. 111 GOV/2023/9. 112 GOV/2023/24. 113 GOV/2023/8. 114 GOV/2023/43. 115 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006. Congressional Research Service 17 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the U.N. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. That article empowers the council to “call upon” governments “to comply with such Charter. That article empowers the council to “call upon” governments “to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or
recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as well aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as well
as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to
adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its
decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”
Resolution 1696 was the first to place legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with Resolution 1696 was the first to place legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with
respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension
and called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures called for by the IAEA board’s and called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures called for by the IAEA board’s
February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the
suspension’s scope to include “work on all heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that suspension’s scope to include “work on all heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that
the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under
Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted, develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted,
Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its
subsidiary arrangement. subsidiary arrangement.
Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that all of the Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that all of the
previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from
the IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day, the IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day,
as described by the July 2015 as described by the July 2015 ~~Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action~~JCPOA. As noted, Implementation . As noted, Implementation
Day took place on January 16, 2016. The resolution stipulates that the council, which has been Day took place on January 16, 2016. The resolution stipulates that the council, which has been
seized of the “Iranian nuclear issue” since 2006, is to end its consideration of the matter in 2025. seized of the “Iranian nuclear issue” since 2006, is to end its consideration of the matter in 2025.
The resolution’s “snapback” mechanism described below will then cease to be operational. The resolution’s “snapback” mechanism described below will then cease to be operational.
Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to
resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports.” The resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports.” The aforementioned IAEA Board of Governors’ IAEA Board of Governors’
December 2015 resolution noted that the board had closed its consideration of the “outstanding December 2015 resolution noted that the board had closed its consideration of the “outstanding
issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.” issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”
The JCPOA spells out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over alleged breaches of The JCPOA spells out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over alleged breaches of
their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231
contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a
P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any
permanent U.N. Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution permanent U.N. Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution
that would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA that would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA
specifies that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would specifies that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would
be re-imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.” be re-imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.”
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Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state” may bring a noncompliance Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state” may bring a noncompliance
finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the United States is no longer finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the United States is no longer
participating in the agreement.participating in the agreement.~~104~~116 In an August 20 In an August 20, 2020, letter to letter to then-Security Council President Indonesian Security Council President Indonesian
Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo initiated the snapback Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo initiated the snapback
process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-performance” of its JCPOA process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-performance” of its JCPOA
commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the council that the “United commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the council that the “United
States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has withdrawn from” the States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has withdrawn from” the ~~JCPOA.105~~
~~Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal effect.” U.N. Secretary General~~
~~António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that~~ 116 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by Paul K. Kerr. Congressional Research Service 18 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations JCPOA.117 Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal effect.” According to a September 19, 2020, letter from U.N. Secretary General António Guterres, the “majority” of Security Council members the “majority” of Security Council members
have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the notification necessary for snapback. The have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the notification necessary for snapback. The
resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to refrain from proceeding on the matter. resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to refrain from proceeding on the matter.
On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Mills sent a letter to Security On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Mills sent a letter to Security
Council President Council President UKU.K. Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s
position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on
~~February 18~~the same day, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full , adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full
effect.”effect.”~~106~~118
Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security
Council Actions
The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security
Council is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss Council is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss
the relevant portions of those documents. the relevant portions of those documents.
IAEA ~~Statute107~~Statute119
Two sections of the IAEA Statute Two sections of the IAEA Statute ~~explain what the agency should do if~~govern IAEA responses in the event that an IAEA member state is an IAEA member state is
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.~~108~~120 Article III B. 4. of the statute Article III B. 4. of the statute
states that the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when states that the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when
appropriate,” to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the appropriate,” to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the
competence of the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall notify the Security competence of the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall notify the Security
Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security.” and security.”
Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the
agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The
board is then to “call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance board is then to “call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance

~~104 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by~~
~~Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~105~~which it finds to have occurred,” as well as “report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the board found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute; According to the resolution, the board also found 117 Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, S/2020/824 , S/2020/824
~~106~~118 “Briefing with Senior State Department Officials on Diplomacy to Constrain Iran’s Nuclear Program,” February 18, “Briefing with Senior State Department Officials on Diplomacy to Constrain Iran’s Nuclear Program,” February 18,
2021. 2021.
~~107~~119 The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual
governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model
described in INFCIRC 153. described in INFCIRC 153.
~~108~~120 The text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute. The text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute.
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~~which it finds to have occurred,” as well as “report the non-compliance to all members and to the~~
~~Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”~~
~~In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the~~
~~board~~
~~found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT~~
~~Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-~~
~~Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of~~
~~the Agency’s Statute;~~
~~According to the resolution, the board also found~~
that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director
General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in
the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002
and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the
Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. international peace and security.
ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003. ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.~~109~~121 It It
described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, ~~which are~~ detailed idetailed in Appendix A~~, that~~C, that violated violated
Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective
measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution called on Iran measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution called on Iran
to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not legally required to implement. to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not legally required to implement.
U.N. Charter and the Security Council
Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to
impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.~~110~~122 Article 24 confers on the council “primary Article 24 confers on the council “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that
the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that
the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.” aggression.”
Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that [i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council
resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program
invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shallaggression and shall make recommendations, or decidemake recommendations, or decide ~~what~~ what measures shall bemeasures shall be taken in taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension
required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40 required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40
states that states that
the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.

~~109 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.~~
~~110 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.~~
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Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of
Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
~~and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the~~
~~severance of diplomatic relations.~~
~~As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the~~
~~previous resolutions and called on Iran to comply with them.~~
~~It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry~~
~~out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that~~
~~[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations~~
~~under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,~~
~~their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.~~
121 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. 122 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/. Congressional Research Service 20 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the previous resolutions and called on Iran to comply with them. The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its
Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”~~111~~123 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231
requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of
Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the
JCPOA.” JCPOA.”
Has Iran Violated the NPT?~~112~~124
Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for
determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a
formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however, formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however,
be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination. be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.
The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the
council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations. council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.
However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has ~~apparently~~
evidently had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA
Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement. Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which
requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with
the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states-Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states-
parties shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive parties shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.” nuclear explosive devices.”
As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” ElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”

~~111 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11.~~
~~112 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials.~~
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~~Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above.~~
~~Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “until fall 2003,~~
~~Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear~~
~~weapons.”113 This past~~ Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above. Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”125 A December 2, 2015, report from then-Director General Amano assesses that “before the end of 2003, an organizational structure was in place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”126 Some Iranian nuclear weapons-related activities “took place after 2003,” the report adds, noting that these activities “were not part of a coordinated effort.”127 This past Iranian program could be program could be a violation of Article II. 123 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11. 124 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials. 125 Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S. official statements have been consistent with the NIE. 126 GOV/2015/68 127 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 34 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations A~~a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not~~
~~provide any detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has~~
~~attempted to develop nuclear weapons.~~
~~Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a~~ 2005 State Department report regarding states’ 2005 State Department report regarding states’
compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that ~~the country~~Iran had had
violated Article II of the NPT: violated Article II of the NPT:
The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which
they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement
channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and
to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification
for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear
weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of
the NPT.the NPT.~~114~~128
The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared
nuclear activities, as well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist, nuclear activities, as well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist,
including those that may be run solely by the military.” including those that may be run solely by the military.”
The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT
which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The
2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of 2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of
the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities
in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such
noncompliance.noncompliance.~~115~~129
The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.~~116~~130
Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a
nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two
examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the
production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster
also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United
States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.” States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.”

~~113 Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S. official~~
~~statements have been consistent with the NIE.~~
~~114~~ It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by all experts.131 The 2005 report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” A version of the report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”132 128 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, Department of State, August 2005. , Department of State, August 2005.
~~115~~129 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement
patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use
of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what
would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations
suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts
aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for
peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes. peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes.
~~116~~130 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July , Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July
10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appendix C.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
21

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the~~
~~notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to~~
~~determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by all experts.117 The 2005~~
~~report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the~~
~~State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the~~
~~report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through~~
~~December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding~~
~~Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”118~~ E. 131 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. 132 Quotations are from Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, July 2010. Congressional Research Service 22 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Subsequent versions of the report reiterated Subsequent versions of the report reiterated
the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous
issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”~~119~~133 As noted, As noted,
the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S. the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S.
official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear
~~weapons.120 The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary William Hague would not say~~
~~whether Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.121~~

~~117 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Training and~~
~~Information Centre.~~
~~118 Quotations are from~~ ~~Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament~~
~~Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, July 2010.~~
~~119~~weapons.134 133 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, Department of State, April 2016. , Department of State, April 2016.
~~120~~134 See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, U.S. Intelligence
Community Worldwide Threat Assessment, February 26, 2015. The State Department compliance report covering 2020 February 26, 2015. The State Department compliance report covering 2020
states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities
associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, April 2021.) The version of , Department of State, April 2021.) The version of
this report published in April this report published in April ~~2022~~2023 contains similar language contains similar language. (Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, April , Department of State, April ~~2022.~~
~~121 Developments in UK Foreign Policy, House of Commons: Oral Evidence Taken Before the Foreign Affairs~~
~~Committee, March 8, 2012~~2023). .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
22 23 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Appendix A. Iranian Adherence to JCPOA Commitments135 Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, LEU uranium-235 (u-235) concentration, and enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D), as well as centrifuge installation. In addition, Iran has produced uranium metal in violation of the JCPOA. Operating Centrifuges Under the JCPOA, Iran is to use only its commercial-scale facility at Natanz for enriching uranium. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for this purpose. Iran has retained these centrifuges and installed additional IR-1 centrifuges. Tehran has also installed JCPOA-prohibited IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges in the facility and is using all three types of centrifuges for enriching uranium. In addition, Iran is using IR-2m IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-6s centrifuges to produce enriched uranium at Tehran’s pilot enrichment facility. Iran is also enriching uranium using IR-1 and IR-6 centrifuges in Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility. Enriched Uranium Limits136 The JCPOA requires that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile must not exceed 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride containing 3.67% u-235 “or the equivalent in other chemical forms.” This quantity of uranium hexafluoride “corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”137 Iran has been producing uranium containing up to 2% u-235, up to 5% u-235, up to 20% u-235, and up to 60% u-235.138 The IAEA estimates Tehran’s total enriched uranium stockpile to be 3795.5 kilograms of uranium. Most of this uranium is in the form of uranium hexafluoride; the remainder is in other chemical forms. Centrifuge Manufacturing Iran has manufactured centrifuges for prohibited R&D activities and also manufactured centrifuge components using carbon fiber that has not received the required approval from the JCPOA-established Joint Commission. 135 Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is based on IAEA reports and the JCPOA text. As noted, Iran’s February 2021 decision to stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures” has impeded the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement. 136 The IAEA “has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile” since February 16, 2021 (GOV/2023/39). 137 GOV/2021/39. 138 IAEA inspectors detected highly enriched uranium particles in the Fordow facility containing up to 83.7% u-235. Iranian officials told the IAEA that Iran had produced the particles unintentionally. The IAEA has assessed that information provided by Iran to the agency “was not inconsistent with Iran's explanation for the origin of these particles.” The agency has “no further questions on the matter” (GOV/2023/24). Congressional Research Service 24 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Research and Development The JCPOA permits R&D with uranium using only several specified types of centrifuges and allows Iran to operate only one test cascade containing a maximum of 10 IR-4 centrifuges.139 Iran’s current enrichment R&D activities include JCPOA-prohibited centrifuge types, locations, and configurations. Uranium Metal The JCPOA prohibits Iran from “producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys” and “conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.” Producing uranium or plutonium metals is a key step in producing nuclear weapons. These prohibitions’ duration is 15 years. Iran has produced natural and enriched uranium metal, but IAEA reports indicate that Tehran has halted these activities.140 Heavy Water As noted, Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1 began implementing the agreement. Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have noted that Iran has on several additional occasions exceeded this limit. Since February 23, 2021, Iran has neither informed the IAEA about its heavy water inventory “nor allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced.”141 139 IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched uranium in quantity. 140 GOV/2021/39; GOV/2022/24. Iran has not since resumed these activities, according to subsequent reports from Grossi. 141 GOV/2023/39. Congressional Research Service 25

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA~~
~~Safeguards Agreement~~
~~The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the~~
~~agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as~~
~~“Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.”~~
~~The report stated that~~
~~Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its~~
~~obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear~~
~~material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such~~
~~material has been processed and stored.~~
~~The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier~~
~~reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.122~~
~~According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency:~~
~~ The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further~~
~~processing.~~
~~ The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production~~
~~and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.~~
~~Additionally, Iran failed to~~
~~ declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,~~
~~stored, and processed;~~
~~ provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor~~
~~located in Tehran; as well as~~
~~ provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.~~
~~GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA.~~
~~According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA:~~
~~ The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,~~
~~as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium.~~
~~ The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in~~
~~laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the~~
~~loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer~~
~~of resulting waste.~~
~~ The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different~~
~~imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes.~~
~~ The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research~~
~~Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of~~
~~plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of~~
~~unprocessed irradiated targets.~~

~~122 Those reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and~~
~~http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related~~
~~facilities, according to the report. These included the following:~~
~~ A centrifuge testing facility.~~
~~ Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.~~
~~ Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.~~
~~ The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),~~
~~the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the~~
~~relevant waste handling facility.~~
~~In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the~~
~~implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
24

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Appendix B. IAEA Special Inspections
As noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations As noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations
are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the
IAEA Director General could call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval IAEA Director General could call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval
from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be
special when it is executed in addition to IAEA routine inspections, “involves access to special when it is executed in addition to IAEA routine inspections, “involves access to
information or locations” that the state has not identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s information or locations” that the state has not identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s
implementation of safeguards in that country, or if the agency “considers that information made implementation of safeguards in that country, or if the agency “considers that information made
available” by the state, including government explanations and “information obtained from available” by the state, including government explanations and “information obtained from
routine inspections, is not adequate for the IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities under the routine inspections, is not adequate for the IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities under the
[comprehensive safeguards] agreement.”[comprehensive safeguards] agreement.”~~123~~142 Such inspections “are foreseen in all Agency Such inspections “are foreseen in all Agency
safeguards agreements, principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification safeguards agreements, principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification
problems,” according to a 1991 IAEA document.problems,” according to a 1991 IAEA document.~~124~~143 Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards
agreement, INFCIRC 153, states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for agreement, INFCIRC 153, states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for
the IAEA’s ability to “make special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency the IAEA’s ability to “make special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency
considers that information considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the made available by the State, including explanations from the
State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to
fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement. fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.
According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of
“plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by “plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by
other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of
IAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to IAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to
report to the agency. report to the agency.
The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the
carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.~~125~~144 In the event that In the event that
the IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold the IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold
immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection
request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153. request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153.
However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that
if the Board, upon if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is
essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to
safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action
without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been
invoked. invoked.
If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to
paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.~~126~~

~~123~~145 142 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. According to that . According to that ~~Glossary~~glossary, special inspections can also be used “to verify the , special inspections can also be used “to verify the
information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to submit a information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to submit a
special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and
surveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” The surveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” The
IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate
such changes. such changes.
~~124~~143 GOV/INF/613, May 29, 1991. GOV/INF/613, May 29, 1991.
~~125~~144 GOV/2554, November 12, 1991. GOV/2554, November 12, 1991.
~~126~~145 Ibid. Ibid.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
25 26 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Appendix C. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA Safeguards Agreement The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.” The report stated that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored. The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.146 According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency: • The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further processing. • The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste. Additionally, Iran failed to • declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received, stored, and processed; • provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor located in Tehran; as well as • provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites. GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA. According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA: • The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges, as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium. • The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste. • The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes. • The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets. 146 Those reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf. Congressional Research Service 27 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related facilities, according to the report. These included the following: • A centrifuge testing facility. • Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed. • Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds. • The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets), the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the relevant waste handling facility. In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities. Congressional Research Service 28 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Appendix D. IAEA Reports Cited The below list consists of IAEA reports about Iran’s nuclear program, beginning July 1, 2019. • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9, July 8, 2019; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2019/32, August 30, 2019. • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/51, November 17, 2021; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/4, March 3, 2022; Congressional Research Service 29 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/24, May 30, 2022; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/39, September 7, 2022; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/62, November 10, 2022; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2023/8, February 28, 2023; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/24, May 31, 2023; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/26, May 31, 2023; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/39, September 4, 2023; • Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2023/43, September 4, 2023. Congressional Research Service 30 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Appendix E. Extended Remarks by William Foster Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the following statement: Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive Devices The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as follows: “While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily deal with all such situations. “Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance. “It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.” Congressional Research Service 31 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Author Information Paul K. Kerr Specialist in Nonproliferation

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster~~
~~Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations~~
~~On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified~~
~~before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question~~
~~regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the~~
~~following statement:~~
~~Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive~~
~~Devices~~
~~The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties~~
~~undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear~~
~~explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be~~
~~interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production~~
~~and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of~~
~~this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives~~
~~were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon~~
~~or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as~~
~~follows:~~
~~“While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as~~
~~those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is~~
~~not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There~~
~~are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any~~
~~general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily~~
~~deal with all such situations.~~
~~“Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a~~
~~specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For~~
~~example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a~~
~~nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of~~
~~an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term~~
~~‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance~~
~~to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under~~
~~safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in~~
~~compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-~~
~~compliance.~~
~~“It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United~~
~~States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither~~
~~uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a~~
~~peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded~~
~~under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of~~
~~plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic~~
~~plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder~~
~~reactors under safeguards.”~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
26

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Appendix D. Iranian Adherence to JCPOA~~
~~Commitments127~~
~~Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, LEU uranium-235~~
~~(u-235) concentration, and enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also~~
~~conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D), as well as centrifuge~~
~~installation. In addition, Iran has produced uranium metal in violation of the JCPOA.~~
~~Operating Centrifuges~~
~~Under the JCPOA, Iran is to use only its commercial-scale facility at Natanz for enriching~~
~~uranium. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for this purpose. Iran has retained~~
~~these centrifuges and installed additional IR-1 centrifuges. Tehran has also installed JCPOA-~~
~~prohibited IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges in the facility and is using all three types of~~
~~centrifuges for enriching uranium. In addition, Iran is using IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR2m, and IR-6s~~
~~centrifuges to produce enriched uranium at Tehran’s pilot-scale enrichment facility. Iran is also~~
~~enriching uranium using IR-1 and IR-6 centrifuges in Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility.~~
~~Enriched Uranium Limits128~~
~~The JCPOA requires that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile must not exceed 300 kilograms of~~
~~uranium hexafluoride containing 3.67% u-235 “or the equivalent in other chemical forms.” This~~
~~quantity of uranium hexafluoride “corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”129 Iran has been~~
~~producing uranium containing up to 2% u-235, up to 5% u-235, up to 20% u-235, and up to 60%~~
~~u-235.130 The IAEA estimates Tehran’s total enriched uranium stockpile to be 3760.8 kilograms~~
~~of uranium. Most of this uranium is in the form of uranium hexafluoride; the remainder is in other~~
~~chemical forms.~~
~~Centrifuge Manufacturing~~
~~Iran has manufactured centrifuges for prohibited R&D activities and also manufactured~~
~~centrifuge components using carbon fiber that has not received the required approval from the~~
~~JCPOA-established Joint Commission.~~

~~127 Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is based on IAEA reports and the JCPOA text. As noted, Iran’s February~~
~~2021 decision to stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures” has impeded the IAEA’s~~
~~ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement.~~
~~128 The IAEA “has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile” since February 16, 2021 (~~
~~GOV/2023/8).~~
~~129 GOV/2021/39.~~
~~130 IAEA inspectors detected highly enriched uranium particles in the Fordow facility containing up to 83.7% u-235.~~
~~Iranian officials told the IAEA that Iran had produced the particles unintentionally. The two sides are engaged in~~
~~discussions meant to resolve the issue (GOV/2023/8).~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Research and Development~~
~~The JCPOA permits R&D with uranium using only several specified types of centrifuges and~~
~~allows Iran to operate only one test cascade containing a maximum of 10 IR-4 centrifuges.131~~
~~Iran’s current enrichment R&D activities include JCPOA-prohibited centrifuge types, locations,~~
~~and configurations.~~
~~Uranium Metal~~
~~The JCPOA prohibits Iran from “producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their~~
~~alloys” and “conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting,~~
~~forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.” Producing uranium or plutonium metals is a~~
~~key step in producing nuclear weapons. These prohibitions’ duration is 15 years. Iran has~~
~~produced natural and enriched uranium metal, but IAEA reports indicate that Tehran has halted~~
~~these activities.132~~
~~Heavy Water~~
~~As noted, Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on~~
~~two occasions since the P5+1 began implementing the agreement. Beginning in November 2019,~~
~~IAEA reports have noted that Iran has on several additional occasions exceeded this limit. Since~~
~~February 23, 2021, Iran has neither informed the IAEA about its heavy water inventory “nor~~
~~allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of~~
~~heavy water produced.”133~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Paul K. Kerr~~

~~Specialist in Nonproliferation~~

~~131 IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched~~
~~uranium in quantity.~~
~~132 GOV/2021/39; GOV/2022/24. Iran has not since resumed these activities, according to Grossi’s February 28, 2023,~~
~~report (GOV/2023/8).~~
~~133 GOV/2023/8.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

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