Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from March 31, 2023 to May 3, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues ~~and U.S.~~
~~March 31, 2023~~
, May 2023 May 3, 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
coup in Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 coup in Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019

procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the
Clayton Thomas
future of bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds future of bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
continued cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President (NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency have led to Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency have led to

speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) might speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) might
be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for May 14, 2023be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for May 14, 2023 (and a possible presidential run-off on May 28). The . The
aftermath of the disastrous February 6, 2023 earthquakes in southern Turkey is affecting Turkey’s politics, society, and aftermath of the disastrous February 6, 2023 earthquakes in southern Turkey is affecting Turkey’s politics, society, and
economy, and could influence election outcomes. If opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu were to win 2023 elections and economy, and could influence election outcomes. If opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu were to win 2023 elections and
take power, or if Erdogan were to win reelection but lose control of parliament, some domestic and foreign policy changes take power, or if Erdogan were to win reelection but lose control of parliament, some domestic and foreign policy changes
could be possible. could be possible.
U.S. relations and F-16s. Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation
on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S.
policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships
with with and arms exports to other countries that seek to counter Russian regional powerother countries that seek to counter Russian regional power ~~(including via the export of drone aircraft)~~; and openness to ; and openness to
rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade
Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly
provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment
and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional ~~deliberations include Turkey’s potential agreement to NATO~~
~~accession for Sweden~~consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey might agree to have Sweden join NATO alongside Finland, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and executive branch alongside Finland, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and executive branch
action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military
options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Turkey’s foreign policy approach. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain
their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing
Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships. Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships.
Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, and Greece. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey
faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-
Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and
energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these
dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important
mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. Turkey approved Finland’s mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. Turkey approved Finland’s
NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned final approval for Sweden on it taking action against people that NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned final approval for Sweden on it taking action against people that
Turkey considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Turkey considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and
Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece, but tensions have somewhat Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece, but tensions have somewhat
subsided in early 2023 after Greece provided some post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey. subsided in early 2023 after Greece provided some post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.
Syria: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further
during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the
Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
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Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and (Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air
defense system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and defense system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and
with Greece and Cyprus). with Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved
U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in
January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale, January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale,
plus associated equipment and munitions (see plus associated equipment and munitions (see “Possible F-16 ~~Sales~~Sale and Congressional Views”
below). below).
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey. Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being. policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and for a map and key facts and
figures about Turkey. figures about Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming ) has ruled Turkey since becoming
prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
institutions. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular institutions. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular

presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023. Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and 2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023. Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for 3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, August 24, 2022. Relations, August 24, 2022.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations

~~presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential~~
system of governance, which he cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and system of governance, which he cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and
parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the
referendum and the elections.4 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the referendum and the elections.4 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the
military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly
because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish
acronym MHP). acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 The AKP won the largest share of equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 The AKP won the largest share of
votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates
from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP). from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 Some leading opposition governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.7 suppress dissent and consolidate power.7
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued ~~their on-and-off~~ efforts to counter militants from efforts to counter militants from
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).
These efforts include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in These efforts include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in
Iraq and Syria.8 Iraq and Syria.8
February Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria ~~have~~ reportedly killed more than 48,000 reportedly killed more than 48,000
people in Turkey and 6,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living people in Turkey and 6,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living
situations and daily lives of millions. situations and daily lives of millions. ~~According to an assessment prepared by Turkey’s Strategy~~
~~and Budget Office with the assistance of various international organizations, as of March 2023~~
~~3.3 million people in Turkey had been displaced, and nearly two million are being sheltered in~~
~~tent or container camps.9~~ As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response involving As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response involving
significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings, observers significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings, observers
have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to help have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to help
victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.109 U.S. officials have provided or U.S. officials have provided or

announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in urgent humanitarian assistance.10 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be 4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final 4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). 2018 (published June 25, 2018).
5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two 5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
6 State Department, 6 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission, , Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022. , October 6, 2022.
7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” 7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” , July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. , April 7, 2021.
8 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 8 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022. 18, 2022.
9 9 ~~Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, available at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-~~
~~content/uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf.~~
10 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” Al-Monitor~~, March~~See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” Al-Monitor, March 20, 2023. 10 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations ~~and U.S. Relations~~

~~announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in urgent humanitarian~~
~~assistance.11 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be~~
around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—
international pledges of assistance to date total nearly $7.5 billion.international pledges of assistance to date total nearly $7.5 billion.12
~~The crisis is affecting~~11 The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy, particularly as the country Turkey’s politics, society, and economy, particularly as the country
prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections (discussed below). Parliament approved a prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections (discussed below). Parliament approved a
three-month state of emergency (scheduled to end in early May) in the three-month state of emergency (scheduled to end in early May) in the ~~ten~~10 southern Turkish southern Turkish
provinces most directly affected. These provinces account for about 10% of Turkey’s gross provinces most directly affected. These provinces account for about 10% of Turkey’s gross
domestic product and 15% of its population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing domestic product and 15% of its population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing
civil war.civil war.1312
Analysts speculate about how the crisis will affect support for President Erdogan and his Analysts speculate about how the crisis will affect support for President Erdogan and his
government.government.1413 A major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey killed approximately 18,000, A major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey killed approximately 18,000,
prompting legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.prompting legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.1514 However, some media However, some media
accounts and opposition politicians allege that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, accounts and opposition politicians allege that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes,
government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction
codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of damage and fatalities.codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of damage and fatalities.1615 Erdogan has denounced Erdogan has denounced
criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,1716 and Turkey’s justice ministry and Turkey’s justice ministry
has ordered prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal has ordered prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal
violations for substandard work.violations for substandard work.1817 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s
initial response,initial response,1918 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size. while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.2019 He has announced a He has announced a
government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000 government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000
in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a
quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave
the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.21

~~20, 2023.~~
~~11 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support~~
~~Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.~~
~~12 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment~~20 Major Economic Challenges Ongoing economic problems in Turkey considerably worsened in 2022 as its currency, the lira, depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021. After reaching a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, official annual inflation was around 44% 11 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, available at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria ; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria
earthquake victims.” earthquake victims.”
1312 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, February 13, 2023; , February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” New
York Times, February 13, 2023. , February 13, 2023.
1413 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” , February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023. , February 10, 2023.
1514 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Associated
Press, February 10, 2023. , February 10, 2023.
1615 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al., Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al.,
“Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” “Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” New York Times, February 24, 2023. , February 24, 2023.
1716 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.” Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.”
1817 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” New York Times, February 12, , February 12,
2023. 2023.
1918 Ibid. Ibid.
2019 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” New York Times, February 12, 2023. , February 12, 2023.
2120 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 , March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5
billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.” billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
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~~Major Economic Challenges~~
~~Ongoing economic problems in Turkey considerably worsened in 2022 as its currency, the lira,~~
~~depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021.~~
~~After reaching a 24-year-peak of 86% in October 2022, official annual inflation was at 55% in~~
~~February 2023~~.22 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish central bank’s repeated .22 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish central bank’s repeated
reductions of its key interest rate since September 2021, with additional inflationary pressure reductions of its key interest rate since September 2021, with additional inflationary pressure
possibly coming from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in possibly coming from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in
the United States and other major economies.23 The lira has been trending downward for more the United States and other major economies.23 The lira has been trending downward for more
than a decade, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of than a decade, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of
law and economy.24 law and economy.24
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.25 Erdogan also has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.25 Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.26 between rich and poor.26
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to sector companies. The government has sought to ~~stop or reverse~~lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax cuts, inflation by providing tax cuts,
minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.27 Turkey also has sought expenses, along with borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.27 Turkey also has sought
currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows that currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows that
contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and
Energy Cooperation” below).28 below).28
Costs of ongoing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from the earthquake crisis, along Costs of ongoing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from the earthquake crisis, along
with disruptions to agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity, will likely strain Turkey’s with disruptions to agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity, will likely strain Turkey’s
economy further.29 With the overall cost estimated to approach $104 billion, the Economist economy further.29 With the overall cost estimated to approach $104 billion, the Economist
Intelligence Unit predicts Intelligence Unit predicts ~~a 0.3% drop in economic growth and 1.4% increase in the budget~~
~~deficit-to-GDP ratio for 2023~~some drag on economic growth.30 Turkey’s modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 37% (.30 Turkey’s modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 37% (~~see~~se e Figure A-1) may permit it some space to boost fiscal spending in response to the crisis. One analyst has said that financial assistance from international development banks will be necessary but limited because of the Turkish government’s poor relations with the West.31 21 Reuters, “Turkish inflation slows to 44% ahead of landmark election,” May 3, 2023. 22 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test As Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2023. ~~Figure~~

~~22 “Turkey annual inflation dips to 55.18% in February,” Reuters, March 3, 2023.~~
23 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” 23 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April , April
28, 2022. 28, 2022.
24 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” 24 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. , April 25, 2022.
25 25 Associated Press, “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” ~~Associated Press~~, December 3, 2021; Carlotta December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. , December 11, 2021.
26 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” 26 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s , June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021. Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
27 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle 27 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023. East Institute, February 13, 2023.
28 Laura Pitel, “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” 28 Laura Pitel, “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022; M. , October 25, 2022; M.
Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East
Institute, November 7, 2022. Institute, November 7, 2022.
29 Mustafa Sonmez, “Massive earthquake cost to deepen Turkey’s economic woes,” 29 Mustafa Sonmez, “Massive earthquake cost to deepen Turkey’s economic woes,” Al-Monitor, February 11, 2023; , February 11, 2023;
Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.” Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.”
30 Economist Intelligence Unit, 30 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report, generated , generated ~~March 22~~May 3, 2023 (based on , 2023 (based on ~~March 8~~April 11, 2023 forecasts). 31 Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs.”~~, 2023 forecasts).~~
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link to page link to page ~~24 link to page 31~~33 link to page link to page 1012 link to page link to page 1012 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations May 2023 Elections Overview ~~and U.S. Relations~~

A-1) may permit it some space to boost fiscal spending in response to the crisis. One analyst has
~~said that financial assistance from international development banks will be necessary but limited~~
~~because of the Turkish government’s poor relations with the West.31~~
~~2023 Elections~~
Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are required under Turkey’s constitution to Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are required under Turkey’s constitution to
take place by June 18, 2023. In March, President Erdogan scheduled the elections to occur on take place by June 18, 2023. In March, President Erdogan scheduled the elections to occur on
May 14. Questions persist regarding how to overcome logistical challenges to voting that the May 14. Questions persist regarding how to overcome logistical challenges to voting that the
millions of persons displaced by the February earthquakes might face.millions of persons displaced by the February earthquakes might face.32
Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have
fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable
to a coalition of six opposition parties led by the CHP and the Good (to a coalition of six opposition parties led by the CHP and the Good (Iyi) Party () Party (~~see~~see Appendix B
for profiles of selected party leaders).for profiles of selected party leaders).3233 Some observers have debated whether (1) free and fair Some observers have debated whether (1) free and fair
elections could take place under Erdogan,elections could take place under Erdogan,3334 (2) opposition parties can convince potential swing (2) opposition parties can convince potential swing
voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,3435 or (3) or (3)
Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.3536 If no presidential candidate receives more If no presidential candidate receives more
than 50% of the vote, a presidential run-off election between the top two vote-getting candidates than 50% of the vote, a presidential run-off election between the top two vote-getting candidates
would take place two weeks later, on May 28.would take place two weeks later, on May 28.
The opposition coalition has agreed on a joint platform focused on returning Turkey to the The opposition coalition has agreed on a joint platform focused on returning Turkey to the
parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting
executive power.executive power.3637 Opposition figures also have criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to Opposition figures also have criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to
a range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see also a range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see also “Foreign
Policy Changes Under a Different President?”)..3738 In its platform, the opposition has hinted at In its platform, the opposition has hinted at
more orthodox economic policies, saying that it would reduce inflation and impose no more orthodox economic policies, saying that it would reduce inflation and impose no
responsibilities on the Central Bank other than ensuring price and financial stability.responsibilities on the Central Bank other than ensuring price and financial stability.38
~~In March 2023, the opposition nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (~~~~kuhl-utch-dahr-~~
~~oh-loo) as its joint candidate.39 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner, Good Party leader~~
~~Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after two other~~
~~potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor Ekrem~~
~~Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to Aksener’s last-~~

~~31 Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs.”~~
3239 32 Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey elections: Quake survivors face up to new life and voting challenges,” Middle East Eye, May 3, 2023; Ingrid Woudwijk, “ Voting amid rubble: How people in Turkey’s earthquake zone are thinking about elections,” Turkey recap, April 24, 2023. 33 See, for example, “Polls indicate close race between rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,” See, for example, “Polls indicate close race between rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,”
~~BIA News~~Bianet, October 12, 2022. , October 12, 2022.
3334 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to
Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?”
3435 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, ,
November 1, 2021. November 1, 2021.
~~35 Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023.~~
3636 Soner Cagaptay (editor and co-author), Turkey’s Pivotal 2023 Elections: Issues, Potential Outcomes, and What Comes After, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 19, 2023; Andrew Wilks, “Would Turkey’s Erdogan accept an election loss after recent comments?” Al-Monitor, May 3, 2023. 37 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023) CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).”
~~37 Ibid.~~”; Text of Agreement for a Strengthened Parliamentary System, February 28, 2022. 38 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023)”; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for ; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, November 2022. International Peace, November 2022.
3839 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).” CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).”
~~39 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see~~ Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 33 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations Turkey’s Electoral Process This year’s election is taking place under changes enacted in 2022 to Turkey’s electoral law. As in 2018, Turkey’s 600 parliamentary seats are assigned to party lists under a proportional system for each of Turkey’s 87 electoral districts. However, the 2022 amendment lowered the threshold for entering parliament. Under the modified law, parties that win seats can join parliament so long as they receive at least 7% of the national vote or belong to a larger electoral alliance that does so.40 The previous threshold was 10%. Most pol sters expect three alliances to win seats: • People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller parties. • Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures. • Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), which is running under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP). The fol owing process-based factors could affect electoral outcomes and perceptions associated with them: • Parliamentary seat allocation. It is unclear whether the modified law’s possible advantages for allocating more seats to larger parties might favor the AKP because it may get the most votes, or the CHP because it is combining its electoral lists more with its allied parties than the AKP is with its coalition partners.41 • Procedural questions or disputes. Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) administers elections. It also investigates and rules on all irregularities, complaints, and objections.42 Past YSK decisions favoring Erdogan’s position that attracted controversy were (1) its 2017 ruling not to enforce the normal requirement that only sealed ballots could be counted in that year’s constitutional referendum, and (2) its 2019 ruling to repeat that year’s Istanbul mayoral election (the AKP candidate lost the second election by a larger margin than the first).43 Additionally, the modified law changed the selection process for judges who wil preside over the provincial and district-level electoral boards that supervise voting, replacing a seniority system with a lottery. Critics have charged that the change may increase the chances of greater politicization of these boards.44 • Election observers. As in past elections, representatives from domestic political parties and civil society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE) of the Council of Europe, wil observe pol ing station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.45 Also as before, the OSCE is undertaking a longer-term observation mission to monitor voter registration, campaign activities and financing, media coverage, and other election administration or dispute resolution issues.46 In March 2023, the opposition nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo) as its joint candidate.47 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner, Good Party 40 Kayahan Cantekin, “Turkey: Parliament Passes Law Amending Election Laws and Lowering Electoral Threshold,” Law Library of Congress, April 24, 2022. 41 Ibid.; Volga Kuscuoglu, “How Turkey’s new electoral law will affect outcome of May 14 polls,” Bianet, April 10, 2023; Burhanettin Duran, “Candidate lists and two possible surprises in Turkish vote,” Daily Sabah, April 12, 2023. 42 YSK website available at https://www.ysk.gov.tr/en/supreme-election-council/1841. 43 “Five new members and new chair to be elected to Supreme Electoral Council,” Bianet, January 5, 2023. 44 Kayahan Cantekin, “Turkey: Parliament Passes Law Amending Election Laws and Lowering Electoral Threshold,” Law Library of Congress, April 24, 2022; Suzan Fraser, “Turkish parliament approves contentious election law changes,” Associated Press, March 31, 2022. 45 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023,” available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Ingrid Woudwijk, “Voting amid rubble: How people in Turkey’s earthquake zone are thinking about elections,” Turkey recap, April 24, 2023; and “Türkiye worried about potentially biased EU election observers,” Daily Sabah, April 14, 2023. 46 OSCE, “General Elections, 14 May 2023.” 47 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp contrast,” Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided opposition head Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided opposition head
who could dethrone Erdogan,” who could dethrone Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; , March 23, 2023; ~~Owen Matthews, “The mild-mannered economist who~~
could end Erdogan’s rule,” Spectator~~, March 25, 2023 issue~~“Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” James in Turkey, January 10, 2023. .
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Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations leader Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to Aksener’s last- ~~and U.S. Relations~~

ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been undermined by a ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been undermined by a
criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other opposition figures criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other opposition figures
charge is politically motivated.charge is politically motivated.4048
How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the
outcome. Kilicdaroglu has sought to enlist Kurdish support for his bid to unseat Erdogan “without outcome. Kilicdaroglu has sought to enlist Kurdish support for his bid to unseat Erdogan “without
antagonizing nationalist voters in the diverse opposition bloc that nominated him.”antagonizing nationalist voters in the diverse opposition bloc that nominated him.”4149 Some analysts question whether he can do so.50 While While
Aksener’s Good Party rejects a formal alliance between the opposition and the Aksener’s Good Party rejects a formal alliance between the opposition and the ~~Kurdish-led~~
~~Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), the HDP’s decision in March to drop plans~~
~~to field a presidential~~HDP, the HDP’s decision to support Kilicdaroglu instead of fielding its own candidate could assist Kilicdaroglu’s prospects in building an anti-Erdogan candidate could assist Kilicdaroglu’s prospects in building an anti-Erdogan
majority.majority.4251 The HDP The HDP ~~also~~ has arranged to run in parliamentary elections under the aegis of the has arranged to run in parliamentary elections under the aegis of the
~~Green Left Party~~YSP (see text box above) to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the
Constitutional Court could ban the HDP from campaigning under its own name.Constitutional Court could ban the HDP from campaigning under its own name.43
~~Some initial polling has suggested that voters may favor Kilicdaroglu over Erdogan, and that the~~
~~opposition also could prevent Erdogan’s AKP-MHP coalition from retaining its parliamentary~~
~~majority.44 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers have questioned the~~
~~opposition coalition’s prospects, citing obstacles posed by disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience,~~
~~and the government’s influence over the media, economic developments, and judicial rulings.45 It~~
~~is unclear how voters will respond to the earthquake crisis.46 An AKP official claimed in March~~
~~that internal polling showed Erdogan and the AKP-MHP coalition ahead in a close race.47 The~~
~~Economist Intelligence Unit has said that Erdogan could win the presidential election but lose his~~
~~parliamentary majority, while also assessing that a close contest could lead to “divisive court~~
~~challenges” and “political instability.”48~~
~~If the president’s party coalition does not control parliament after the elections, parliament could~~
~~check the president in various ways if a majority of members seeks to do so. The president has~~
~~broad powers to appoint cabinet ministers and act in the absence of parliamentary initiative, but~~
~~relies on parliament’s approval in certain matters such as budgeting, international treaty~~
~~ratification, and foreign military deployments.49~~

40 Possible Outcomes Polling has suggested a close presidential race.52 As of May 3, one Turkish poll aggregator shows a slight advantage for Kilicdaroglu in the first round of voting, suggesting that a run-off could be likely because two less-popular candidates may siphon votes from Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu.53 For the parliamentary election, the same poll aggregator estimates an outcome in which the pro-Erdogan People’s Alliance could win a plurality of votes, but might fall short of retaining its majority given the combined level of support for the pro-Kilicdaroglu Nation Alliance and the pro-Kurdish Labor and Freedom Alliance.54 It is unclear whether HDP support for Kilicdaroglu’s presidential candidacy could translate into coordination on parliamentary action. Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers have questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects, citing obstacles posed by disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over the media, economic developments, and judicial rulings.55 It is 48 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15, , December 15,
2022. 2022.
4149 Fehim Tastekin, “Erdogan’s challenger faces delicate balancing act to win over Turkey’s Kurds,” Fehim Tastekin, “Erdogan’s challenger faces delicate balancing act to win over Turkey’s Kurds,” Al-Monitor, March , March
11, 2013. 11, 2013.
4250 See, for example, Halil Karaveli, “Turkey’s Opposition Can’t Win Without the Working Class,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2023. 51 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Politico Europe, April 28, 2023; Reuters, “In vote setback for Erdogan, Turkey’s HDP will not field candidate,” “In vote setback for Erdogan, Turkey’s HDP will not field candidate,” ~~Reuters~~, March 22, 2023; Fulya Ozerkan, March 22, 2023; Fulya Ozerkan,
“Kingmaker party gives tacit backing to Erdogan rival in polls,” “Kingmaker party gives tacit backing to Erdogan rival in polls,” Agence France Presse~~, March 22, 2023.~~
~~43 Ibid.~~
~~44 Tuba Altunkaya, “Turkey opinion poll tracker: Erdoğan vs Kılıçdaroğlu,” Euronews, March 28, 2023; “Polls show~~
~~Erdogan lags opposition by more than 10 points ahead of May vote,” Reuters, March 13, 2023.~~
45, March 22, 2023. 52 Nazlan Ertan, “Turkey’s Kilicdaroglu pulls ahead of Erdogan in latest polls as campaign heats up,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2023; “Al-Monitor/Premise poll: Turkey’s election in dead heat, Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu tied at 45%,” Al-Monitor, April 26, 2023; Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election”; “Optimar research center pre-election survey: Turkey’s Erdogan to get 51.4%, Kilicdaroglu to garner 48.6% of votes,” News.am (Armenia), May 2, 2023. 53 600vekil.com, accessed on May 3, 2023 at https://600vekil.com/en. 54 600vekil.com, accessed on May 3, 2023 at https://600vekil.com/en. 55 “The opposition should win, but it has obstacles in its way,” “The opposition should win, but it has obstacles in its way,” Economist, January 16, 2023; , January 16, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be Dettmer, “It’s going to be
hard to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğanhard to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan”,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023; Tastekin, “Erdogan’s challenger faces delicate balancing act to win over Turkey’s ; Tastekin, “Erdogan’s challenger faces delicate balancing act to win over Turkey’s
~~Kurds.”~~
~~46 “Turkish earthquake survivors reconsider election loyalty to Erdogan,” Reuters, March 8, 2023.~~
~~47 “AK Party polls for upcoming Turkish vote show Erdoğan lead with 53%,” Daily Sabah, March 16, 2023.~~
~~48 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report.~~
~~49 Unofficial English translation of Turkish constitution available at~~
~~https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. See also Alan Makovsky,~~ ~~Erdoğan’s~~
~~Proposal for an Empowered Presidency, Center for American Progress, March 22, 2017.~~
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6

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~
Kurds.” Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 9 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations unclear how voters will respond to the earthquake crisis.56 The Economist Intelligence Unit has assessed that a close contest could lead to “divisive court challenges” and “political instability.”57 If the president’s party coalition does not control parliament after the elections, parliament could check the president in various ways if a majority of members seeks to do so. The president has broad powers to appoint cabinet ministers and act in the absence of parliamentary initiative, but relies on parliament’s approval in certain matters such as budgeting, international treaty ratification, and foreign military deployments.58
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought
greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system.
Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—
with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan.
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.actors and maintain its leverage with them.5059 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and
economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks
in those relationships while building other global relationships. in those relationships while building other global relationships.
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?
In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign
policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from
Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.5160 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment
among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have
difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern: difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern:
Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence), Greece and Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence), Greece and
56 See footnote 32. 57 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report. 58 Unofficial English translation of Turkish constitution available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. See also Alan Makovsky, Erdoğan’s Proposal for an Empowered Presidency, Center for American Progress, March 22, 2017. 59 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. 60 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 28 link to page 29 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its
regional and global consequences). regional and global consequences).
However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be
more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such
changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on
monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems, (2) giving monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems, (2) giving
greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish
support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions.
Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president
might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the
United States and European countries.United States and European countries.5261 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing ~~Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing~~

~~50 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;~~
~~Stephen J. Flanagan et al.,~~ ~~Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the~~
~~U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.~~
~~51 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen,~~
~~“Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”~~
~~52 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”~~
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some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less
inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western
states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in
northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish
government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate
multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s
reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition
might become more passive on foreign policy. might become more passive on foreign policy.
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. The State Department’s West. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.5362 Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas
in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the
stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO.
In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO
sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces
command in Izmir (secommand in Izmir (see Figure A-2). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea . Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea
through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—see Figure A-3).
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a
general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.5463 In more recent or In more recent or
ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.55
~~Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions~~
~~about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially~~
~~expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be~~
~~connected with concerns about Turkey.56 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey~~
~~expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the~~
~~United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation~~
~~in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,~~
~~Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”57~~

5364 61 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” 62 State Department, State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022. , May 13, 2022.
5463 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, , Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
5564 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” 2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
~~56 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph~~
~~Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Drive, January 14, 2019.~~
~~57 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and~~
~~Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs~~
~~Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,~~
~~the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-~~
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~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~
Congressional Research Service 9 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be connected with concerns about Turkey.65 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”66
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the
West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense. West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense.
Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine
and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.5867
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed
below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries.parallel with other NATO countries.5968 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the
Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including
Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,6069 Turkey has supplied Ukraine Turkey has supplied Ukraine
with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant
ambush-resistant (MRAP) ambush-resistant (MRAP) ~~vehicles61~~vehicles70—as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s —as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
~~this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate~~
~~the conflict (discussed below).~~
~~In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose~~
~~improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to~~
~~Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield~~
~~impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.62 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have~~
~~denied that any such transfers have occurred.63~~

65 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The Drive, January 14, 2019. 66 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/. challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
5867 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. , October 11, 2022.
5968 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
6069 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023. Availability,” February 20, 2023.
6170 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August , August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” 22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx, ,
November 21, 2022. November 21, 2022.
~~62 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy,~~
~~January 10, 2023.~~
~~63 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January~~
~~14, 2023.~~
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Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate the conflict (discussed below). In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.71 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have denied that any such transfers have occurred.72
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.6473 In 2017, a In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
respective defense industries.respective defense industries.6574 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer
cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.6675
In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.6776 Turkish expertise Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing
aerospace engines and missiles.aerospace engines and missiles.6877 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,6978 and some reports have suggested that the and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.7079 Additionally, Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.7180
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly
alleviate global supply concerns.alleviate global supply concerns.7281 Under the deal, which currently runs until May 2023, Turkey, Under the deal, which currently runs until May 2023, Turkey,
Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to
~~oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.73 President Biden has~~
~~expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.74~~
~~Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation~~
~~Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from~~
~~the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy~~
~~cooperation with Russia. These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving~~

64 71 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, January 10, 2023. 72 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January 14, 2023. 73 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. , by Cory Welt.
6574 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. , May 1, 2017.
6675 Associated Press, “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” ~~Associated Press~~, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
6776 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
6877 Ibid. Ibid.
6978 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, , February 4,
2022. 2022.
7079 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s , May 10, 2022. The TB2’s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, , November 7,
2022. 2022.
7180 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022. , October 3, 2022.
7281 Associated Press, “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” Associated Press,,” July 22, 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.82 President Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.83 Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia. These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving ~~July 22,~~
~~2022.~~
~~73 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.~~
~~74 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November~~
~~15, 2022.~~
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the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.7584 The Turkish government has not The Turkish government has not
joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.
In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.cooperation across economic sectors.7685 Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to
Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a
February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the
dangers of “dark money flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary dangers of “dark money flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary
of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to
leaders of Turkish financial institutions: leaders of Turkish financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in
agriculturalagricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic
activities. activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports
to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and
sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow.... sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put
themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and
correspondent relationships. correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions
related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian
military-industrial complex.military-industrial complex.7786
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.transactions and services with Russian businesses.7887 Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu
has denied that Turkish businesses are exporting electronic or technological products with has denied that Turkish businesses are exporting electronic or technological products with
potential defense applications to Russia, but has publicly welcomed information sharing with potential defense applications to Russia, but has publicly welcomed information sharing with
U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to bypass Western U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to bypass Western
~~sanctions.79 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods~~
~~transiting its territory to Russia.80~~
~~NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland~~
~~Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of~~
~~Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it~~

75 82 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. 83 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November 15, 2022. 84 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December , December
10, 2022. 10, 2022.
7685 Agence France Presse, “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” ~~Agence France Presse~~, August 5, August 5,
2022. 2022.
7786 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury'’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid
Moscow’s War Effort,” Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out , February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out
Illicit Trade With Moscow,” Illicit Trade With Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023. , February 5, 2023.
7887 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023.
~~79 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~80 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023.~~
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~~link to page 27 link to page 22 link to page 22~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

Reuters, February 4, 2023. Congressional Research Service 12 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations sanctions.88 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods transiting its territory to Russia.89 In April 2023, the Treasury Department placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.90 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing membersrequires the unanimous agreement of existing members ~~(Figure A-4)~~. .
The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or
harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations,
namely the Fethullah Gulen namely the Fethullah Gulen ~~movement81~~movement91 (which the government has blamed for involvement in (which the government has blamed for involvement in
the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.8292 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a
terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.8393 Turkey removed its objections Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the 2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.against the PKK.8494
Since then, Turkey has continued to press Sweden and Finland to extradite people that Turkey Since then, Turkey has continued to press Sweden and Finland to extradite people that Turkey
considers to be terrorists. Under the June 2022 trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland considers to be terrorists. Under the June 2022 trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland
agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests in various ways, but did agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests in various ways, but did
not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.8595 Sweden’s prime minister and other sources Sweden’s prime minister and other sources
have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are inclined to make political decisions on have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are inclined to make political decisions on
extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of
law.law.8696 In January 2023, Turkish presidential adviser Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey would only be In January 2023, Turkish presidential adviser Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey would only be
in a position to agree to Sweden’s accession after it passed new anti-terror laws, a process he in a position to agree to Sweden’s accession after it passed new anti-terror laws, a process he
~~estimated would take about six months.87 Erdogan then called on Sweden and Finland to extradite~~
~~“around 130” people.88~~
~~In January 2023, the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that~~
~~congressional approval of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see~~ ~~“Congressional Notification~~
~~Process”~~ ~~below) would be tied to Turkish approval of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession.89~~
~~Several Senators from both parties, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)~~
~~Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden,~~

81 88 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.” 89 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023. 90 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the World,” press release, April 12, 2023. 91 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
8292 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, , May 17,
2022. 2022.
8393 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak , Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. , Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
8494 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat- Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
memo.pdf. memo.pdf.
8595 Ibid. Ibid.
8696 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben , January 10, 2023; Ben
Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022. , October 28, 2022.
~~87 “Turkey ‘Not in a Position’ to Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,” Agence France Presse, January 14, 2023.~~
~~88 “Sweden, Finland must send up to 130 ‘terrorists’ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,” Reuters, January 16,~~
~~2023.~~
~~89 Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, January 13, 2023.~~
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Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 24 link to page 24 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations estimated would take about six months.97 Erdogan then called on Sweden and Finland to extradite “around 130” people.98 In January 2023, the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that congressional approval of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see “Congressional Notification Process” below) would be tied to Turkish approval of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession.99 Several Senators from both parties, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves
forward for both Sweden and Finland.forward for both Sweden and Finland.90100 In March, Erdogan hosted Finnish President Sauli In March, Erdogan hosted Finnish President Sauli
Niinisto in Turkey and expressed his support for Finland’s accession, and then Turkey’s Niinisto in Turkey and expressed his support for Finland’s accession, and then Turkey’s
parliament approved it later in the monthparliament approved it later in the month,101 paving the way for Finland’s formal accession in April.~~.91~~
Although Turkey’s parliament has ratified accession protocols for Finland, it is less likely to Although Turkey’s parliament has ratified accession protocols for Finland, it is less likely to
address Sweden’s case before the closely contested Turkish presidential and parliamentary address Sweden’s case before the closely contested Turkish presidential and parliamentary
elections scheduled for May.elections scheduled for May.92102 (As of (As of ~~late March~~early May, Hungary also has not approved Swedish , Hungary also has not approved Swedish
accession.) Sweden’s government hopes that its proposed anti-terror legislation will be approved accession.) Sweden’s government hopes that its proposed anti-terror legislation will be approved
by its parliament in time for it to take effect in early June.by its parliament in time for it to take effect in early June.93103 Turkish presidential spokesperson Turkish presidential spokesperson
Ibrahim Kalin has said that if Sweden enacts the legislation, it can start taking “more decisive, Ibrahim Kalin has said that if Sweden enacts the legislation, it can start taking “more decisive,
concrete, and fruitful steps to address our security concerns,” adding, “we’ll see how fast they can concrete, and fruitful steps to address our security concerns,” adding, “we’ll see how fast they can
move.”move.”94104 It is unclear (1) whether and when Turkish ratification might proceed after that, (2) if It is unclear (1) whether and when Turkish ratification might proceed after that, (2) if
Turkey’s leadership after its elections might demand further Swedish actions, and (3) whether a Turkey’s leadership after its elections might demand further Swedish actions, and (3) whether a
potential future Turkish parliament would act in line with the Turkish president’s wishes.potential future Turkish parliament would act in line with the Turkish president’s wishes.95105 Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and NATO NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg Secretary General Stoltenberg ~~has said that he aims to have~~have both stated hopes for Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO membership—thus placing both Sweden and Finland both Sweden and Finland ~~join~~within NATO NATO
—by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12 summit in Lithuania.106 97 Agence France Presse, “Turkey ‘Not in a Position’ to Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,” January 14, 2023. 98 Reuters, “Sweden, Finland must send up to 130 ‘terrorists’ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,” January 16, 2023. 99 Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2023. 100~~by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12 summit in Lithuania.96~~
~~Syria97~~
~~Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly~~
~~and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.98 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved~~
~~during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it~~
~~has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)~~
~~since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have~~
~~engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where~~
~~U.S. forces have been based.~~
~~Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from~~
~~establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government~~
~~considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major~~
~~threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the~~
~~PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.99 The~~

90 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,”
Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at , February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at
https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. In August 2022, Senate Treaty Document 117-3 https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. In August 2022, Senate Treaty Document 117-3
approved ratification by a 95-1 vote. approved ratification by a 95-1 vote.
91101 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023. , March 30, 2023.
92102 A. Wess Mitchell, Keep Urging Turkey to Admit Sweden, Finland as Allies,” U.S. Institute of Peace, February 24, A. Wess Mitchell, Keep Urging Turkey to Admit Sweden, Finland as Allies,” U.S. Institute of Peace, February 24,
2023. 2023.
93103 Reuters, “Sweden proposes security law seeking Turkey “Sweden proposes security law seeking Turkey'’s backing for NATO bid,”s backing for NATO bid,” ~~Reuters~~, March 9, 2023. March 9, 2023.
94104 “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Kalin.” “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Kalin.”
95105 Article 87 of Turkey’s constitution gives the Turkish parliament (or Grand National Assembly) the authority to ratify Article 87 of Turkey’s constitution gives the Turkish parliament (or Grand National Assembly) the authority to ratify
international treaties. Unofficial English translation available at international treaties. Unofficial English translation available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en.
96106 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Joint Press Conference with Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson in Stockholm, Sweden,” April 19, 2023; Reuters, “Stoltenberg sees progress in Sweden’s NATO bid, talks to resume in March,” “Stoltenberg sees progress in Sweden’s NATO bid, talks to resume in March,” Reuters, February 23, 2023.
~~97 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.~~
~~98 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the~~
~~Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.~~
~~99 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 28 link to page 15~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

February 23, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 30 link to page 17 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations Syria107 Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.108 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where U.S. forces have been based. Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.109 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.~~100~~110 Turkey has set Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-54). .
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. ~~As of early 2023, Russia is reportedly trying to~~
~~broker better ties.101~~Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.111 Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border
and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish
withdrawal in return.withdrawal in return.~~102~~112 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would
affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in
northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State
Department spokesperson has said that U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to Department spokesperson has said that U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to
normalize or upgrade relations with the Asad regime.normalize or upgrade relations with the Asad regime.~~103~~113
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,
~~Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and~~
~~other munitions to maintain military strength.104~~
~~Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,~~
~~U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds~~
~~Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia~~
~~delivered in 2019,105 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United~~
~~States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration~~
~~removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions~~
~~under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on~~
~~Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.106 In explaining the U.S. decision to~~

107 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. 108 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. 109 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates
in Syria), see footnoin Syria), see footnote 8393.
~~100~~110 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. , October 15, 2019.
~~101 Fehim Tastekin, “Fledgling Turkish-Syrian dialogue faces bumpy road ahead,” Al-Monitor, January 14, 2023.~~
~~102~~111 Associated Press, “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” April 25, 2023. 112 Reuters, “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” ~~Reuters~~, December 5, 2022. December 5, 2022.
~~103~~113 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.114 Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,115 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions under ~~State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.~~
~~104 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany~~
~~(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).~~
~~105 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,~~
~~Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a~~
~~second system to come later.~~
~~106 Archived CRS Insight IN11557,~~ ~~Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under~~ the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
~~Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition~~
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Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.116 In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.~~107~~117 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to
Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the 400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the
system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to
have CAATSA sanctions removed. have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The
executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.~~108~~118 Such a Such a
disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978 disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978
embargo over Cyprus.embargo over Cyprus.~~109~~119
Possible F-16 ~~Sales~~Sale and Congressional Views
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.~~110~~
~~President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20~~
~~meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation~~
~~and notification process with Congress.111 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72~~
~~Viper configuration would include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and~~
~~structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.112~~
~~After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and~~
~~military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the~~
~~Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey~~
~~has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic~~
~~location remains important for the alliance.113 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the~~

120 114 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 115 Reuters, “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” December 29, 2017. According to this source, Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a second system to come later. 116 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions. Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
~~107~~117 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
~~108~~118 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~109~~119 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, ,
August 12, 2020. August 12, 2020.
~~110~~120 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted , June 23, 2021 (posted
November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html. November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
~~111 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego~~
~~Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For~~
~~background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~112 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-~~
~~06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.~~
~~113 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.~~
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Congressional Research Service 16 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and notification process with Congress.121 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.122 After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic location remains important for the alliance.123 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic
and Mediterranean Sea regions.and Mediterranean Sea regions.~~114~~124
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022
letter,letter,~~115~~125 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an
important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”~~116~~126 While acknowledging that any sale While acknowledging that any sale
would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that
there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well
as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate
U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”~~117~~127
The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter,more advanced fighter,~~118~~128 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog. though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.~~119~~129
According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is
four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.~~120~~130 Other Other
countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan,
~~Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.121~~
~~Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of~~
~~148 aircraft.122 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to~~
~~start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs.~~
~~If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider~~
~~purchasing Western European alternatives.123 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter~~
~~Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,124 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany~~
~~would approve such a sale.125 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a~~

~~114~~ 121 Reuters, “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” October 31, 2021; Diego Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 122 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf. 123 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. 124 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu,
“Turkey,” “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time , pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time
since 2006,” since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne , July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne
Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022. Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
~~115~~125 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/ Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf. 20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
~~116~~126 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, April 6, 2022. , April 6, 2022.
~~117~~127 Ibid. Ibid.
~~118~~128 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, , March 9,
2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working 2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working
with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot
domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United
States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to
extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts , November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts
modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022. , June 3, 2022.
~~119~~129 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense
News, January 18, 2023. , January 18, 2023.
~~120~~130 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023. Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
~~121 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November~~
~~22, 2021.~~
~~122 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.~~
~~123 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023.~~
~~124 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye,~~
~~January 20, 2023.~~
~~125 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph~~ Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 24 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.131 Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of 148 aircraft.132 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs. If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider purchasing Western European alternatives.133 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,134 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany would approve such a sale.135 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a non-F-16 platform.136~~Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to~~
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~~non-F-16 platform.126~~ Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the
congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin
defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.~~127~~137 Previously, Congress received Previously, Congress received
notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar) notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar)
proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.~~128~~138 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and
encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military
aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS
for Turkey statesfor Turkey states:
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization, If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,
Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in
areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.~~129~~139
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden- At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.~~130~~140 However, However,
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has
termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”~~131~~141
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria, In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional
~~attention.132 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after~~
~~Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a~~
~~May 2022 joint session of Congress.133 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.~~
~~117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.~~
~~7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement~~
~~accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty~~
~~Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another~~
~~NATO ally’s airspace.”134 While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions have somewhat~~

~~‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023.~~
~~126~~ 131 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021. 132 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A. 133 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023. 134 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye, January 20, 2023. 135 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to ‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023. 136 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.” Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
~~127 See footnote 149.~~
~~128~~137 See footnote 159. 138 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May 61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May
24, 2019 (84 24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC
Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074, 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074,
September 2, 2021 (86 September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021). 73075, December 23, 2021).
~~129~~139 State Department, State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. .
~~130~~140 Reuters, “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” ~~Reuters~~, June 30, 2022. June 30, 2022.
~~131~~141 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/ Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/
status/1600519759493304321. status/1600519759493304321.
~~132 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,”~~ ~~Greece and Turkey in Conflict and~~
~~Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek~~
~~Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022.~~
~~133 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.~~
~~Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the~~
~~context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.~~
~~134 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-~~
~~RCP117-70-JES.pdf.~~
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Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 31 link to page 32 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations attention.142 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a May 2022 joint session of Congress.143 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”144 While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions have somewhat subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts in the context of positive subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts in the context of positive
diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.~~135~~145
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2017,2017,~~136~~146 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.countries.~~137~~147 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations
with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.~~138~~148
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).below).~~139~~149
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing ~~Issues140~~Issues150
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-65
andand Figure A-76 for maps of some of the areas in dispute). for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece, internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.~~141~~151 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot 142 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022. 143 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts. 144 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf. 145 ~~In 1983, Turkish Cypriot~~
~~leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other~~
~~than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim~~
~~to be legally invalid.~~
~~Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of~~
~~Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.142 U.S. officials have~~
~~explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as~~
~~part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.143 In the March 2022 congressional hearing~~
~~testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass~~

~~135~~ “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023. , March 22, 2023.
~~136~~146 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V
Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017. Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.
~~137~~147 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, , May 30,
2022. 2022.
~~138~~148 See CRS Report R41368, See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~139~~149 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.
~~140~~150 See CRS Report R41368, See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~141~~151 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
~~soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between~~
~~50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February~~
~~3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a~~
~~buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000~~
~~personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.~~
~~142 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American~~
~~Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022.~~
~~143 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense~~
~~Minister,” July 18, 2022.~~
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(continued...) Congressional Research Service 19 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim to be legally invalid. Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.152 U.S. officials have explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.153 In the March 2022 congressional hearing testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.~~144~~154 After Turkish After Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced
approach in the Aegean,approach in the Aegean,~~145~~155 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been
no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are
focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.~~146~~156
Congressional Notification Process
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden
Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter
aircraft to Turkey.aircraft to Turkey.~~147~~157 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported
that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales
for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these
reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16 reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16
Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total
value of $20 billion.value of $20 billion.~~148~~158
After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee
(HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major (HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major
defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS
or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State
Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.~~149 This time~~
~~period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review”~~
~~process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the~~
~~proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.150 Under provisions of the~~
~~Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed~~
~~with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece)~~
~~after formal notification.151~~
~~As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may~~
~~depend on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and Finland.152 With Turkey~~

~~144~~159 This time soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. 152 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022. 153 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense Minister,” July 18, 2022. 154 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.” U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
~~145~~155 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. , October 21, 2022.
~~146~~156 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/ Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928. 1582273449145212928.
~~147~~157 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.” Availability.”
~~148~~158 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden , January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden
Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to
Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023. , January 14, 2023.
~~149~~159 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO , by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO
allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or
~~upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and~~
~~defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all~~
~~other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.~~
~~150 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~151 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and~~
~~Liana W. Rosen.~~
~~152 See footnote 89 and footnote 90.~~
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(continued...) Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 18 link to page 18 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review” process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.160 Under provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece) after formal notification.161 As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may depend on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and Finland.162 With Turkey already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus has turned to Turkey’s already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus has turned to Turkey’s
approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal notifications of possible approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal notifications of possible
aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the New York Times cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming
the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Regarding the F-16 sale, the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Regarding the F-16 sale,
he saidhe said:
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and
against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human
rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and
begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.~~153~~163
In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on
objections he has against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey objections he has against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey
does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.~~154~~164
The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece
come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S. come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.
regional involvement (as mentioned above).regional involvement (as mentioned above).~~155~~165 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s
for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure
Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.~~156~~166
One journalist has arguedOne journalist has argued:
A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5- A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-
16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a 16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.~~157~~
~~In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu~~
~~called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.158~~
~~Congressional committee leaders’ concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale—whether or not tied to~~
~~Sweden’s NATO accession prospects—could conceivably endure beyond Turkish elections~~
~~scheduled for May. At some point, the Administration may consider whether, when, and how to~~
~~address congressional concerns, and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale.~~

~~153~~167 upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively. 160 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 161 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen. 162 See footnote 99 and footnote 100. 163 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al., Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al.,
“Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” “Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023. , January 13, 2023.
~~154~~164 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at
https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906. https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.
~~155~~165 CRS Report R41368, CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~156~~166 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong, Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,
“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”
~~157~~167 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,” Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023. , January 16, 2023.
~~158 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January~~
~~17, 2023.~~
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~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~Congressional Research Service 21 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.168 Congressional committee leaders’ concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale—whether or not tied to Sweden’s NATO accession prospects—could conceivably endure beyond Turkish elections scheduled for May. At some point, the Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale. In April 2023, the Administration formally notified a possible sale of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-16s on certain information sharing and flight safety issues.169 Despite apparent congressional acquiescence to the avionics sale, SFRC Chairman Menendez said afterward that he continues to oppose the sale of F-16s to Turkey.170 168 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January 17, 2023. 169 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023; CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023. 170 “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023. Congressional Research Service 22 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Elections, and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022) 22.1% (2022)
Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $36,176 $36,176
Real GDP growth: 2.8% 2.8%
Inflation: ~~55.2%~~43.7% (as of April 2023)
Unemployment: 10.4% 10.4%
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 3.8% 3.8%
Public debt as % of GDP: 37.0% 37.0%
Current account deficit as % of GDP: 4.4% 4.4%
International currency reserves: $128.3 bil ion $128.3 bil ion
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023 Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023
projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;
Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical ; and Turkish Statistical
Institute. Institute.

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Figure A-2. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011. outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate. All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-3. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022. , March 2022.

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~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure A-4. NATO Countries and Aspirants~~

Source: CRS Graphics. Map updated June 2022.
Notes: As indicated, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine are also formal aspirants for NATO
~~membership.~~

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~~Figure A-5~~. Syria Conflict Map

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Figure A-65. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/. sovereignty-16-maps/.

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Figure A-76. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. , with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid. claim to be legally invalid.
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Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party
Leaders
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President of Turkey and Leader/Co-Founder of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(pronounced (pronounced air-doe-wan) )
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul. secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office, Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP

won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister. election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers
assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of corruption assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of corruption
cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates. cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
((kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority
with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP,
which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish
nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and
social democratic constituencies. social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara, After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara. root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the
CHP’s failure to make electoral gains at the national level. The CHP made notable CHP’s failure to make electoral gains at the national level. The CHP made notable
gains—particularly in Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.gains—particularly in Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.
Devlet Bahceli—Leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
((bah-cheh-lee) )
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997 leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007. was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017 Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018. constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
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Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (Iyi) Party
((awk-sheh-nar) )
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan. alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker. 2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections. presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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