Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

Iran: Background and U.S. Policy
March 23September 8, 2023 , 2023
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing forauthorizing extensive U.S. sanctions, seeking to influence diplomatic engagement with Iran, funding and authorizing support Clayton Thomas to U.S. partners facing Iranian threats extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales to partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
Carla E. Humud
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress , and enacting legislation that allows Congress
to review Specialist Analyst in Middle in Middle Eastern
to review related agreements. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, its government’s support for
Affairs
agreements related to Iran’s nuclear program, a key concern for U.S. policymakers. The Iranian Eastern Affairs government’s support for armed proxies and terrorist groups, its human rights violations, and its armed proxies and terrorist groups, its human rights violations, and its increasingly close

increasingly close relationships with Russia and China relationships with Russia and China have all posedalso pose challenges for the United States. challenges for the United States.
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle
2022 PoliticalSelected issues on which Congress has engaged include: Iran’s Nuclear Program. U.S. policymakers have for decades signaled concern that Tehran might seek to develop nuclear weapons, though Iranian leaders deny such ambitions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. and U.N. Security Council economic sanctions. In 2018, the Trump Administration ceased U.S. participation in the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions that the Obama Administration had lifted. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. Iran has reportedly slowed some nuclear activities in the context of reported U.S.-Iran diplomatic engagement in 2023. U.S.-Iran Diplomatic Engagement. The Biden Administration sought to revive the JCPOA through indirect negotiations, but those stalled in fall 2022. In August 2023, the United States and Iran reportedly reached an informal understanding that includes mutual prisoner releases and the unfreezing of some Iranian assets abroad. Some in Congress have questioned whether the Administration has fulfilled its commitments under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of agreements related to Iran’s nuclear program and provides for consideration of legislation to block their implementation. Nationwide Protests. The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was Protests. The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was
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arrested by Iran’s Morality Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory arrested by Iran’s Morality Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head (or head

covering) law and died after reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide covering) law and died after reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide
unrest. The regime has cracked down violently against protesters, killing hundredsunrest. The regime has cracked down violently against protesters, killing hundreds, and restricted internet use. The protests . The protests

appear to have subsided in 2023 but could resurge as the grievances underlying them remain appear to have subsided in 2023 but could resurge as the grievances underlying them remain
unresolved. The Biden Administration unresolved. The Biden Administration has sanctioned a number of Iranian officials in response to the sanctioned a number of Iranian officials in response to the protestscrackdown and issued a and issued a
general license aimed at expanding secure internet access for Iranians. general license aimed at expanding secure internet access for Iranians.
Sanctions. Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to change various aspects of Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress. U.S. sanctions include measures targeting Iran’s energy sector, its arms and weapons-related technology transfers, its financial sector, and various non-oil industries and sectors. Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on Iranian behavior. Iran’s Military. U.S. officials have expressed Iran’s Military. U.S. officials have expressed long-standing concern with the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary concern with the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC), which provides arms, training, and support to a network of regional proxies and armed groups. In Guard Corps (IRGC), which provides arms, training, and support to a network of regional proxies and armed groups. In
addition to IRGC support to U.S. adversaries in the Middle East, Iran maintains what U.S. officials describe as “the largest addition to IRGC support to U.S. adversaries in the Middle East, Iran maintains what U.S. officials describe as “the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the regioninventory of ballistic missiles in the region.” Iran also maintains an arsenal” and has developed a range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones). of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones).
Iran’s Foreign Policy. . According to the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Iran’s Iran’s
government seeksgovernment seeks, among other goals, to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states. Iran-backed to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states. Iran-backed
militia forces in Iraq and Syria have carried out rocket, drone, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. militia forces in Iraq and Syria have carried out rocket, drone, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S.
and allied forces. Iran has provided and allied forces. Iran has provided thousands of rockets and short-range missilesweapons to Lebanese Hezbollah, which the group to Lebanese Hezbollah, which the group
has used in armed conflicts with Israelhas used in armed conflicts with Israel. Iran has provided, and to Houthi militants in Yemen Houthi militants in Yemen with ballistic and cruise missiles, as well
as UAVs, that have enabled, enabling the Houthis to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran also has the Houthis to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran also has soughttaken steps to to
strengthen its economic and military ties with China and Russia—for example, strengthen its economic and military ties with China and Russia—for example, by exporting exporting dronesUAVs to bolster Russian to bolster Russian
military operations in Ukraine. Iran’s March 2023 agreement to reestablish ties with Saudi Arabia, which was brokered by
China, also has implications for U.S. interests.
Iran’s Nuclear Program. U.S. policymakers have long signaled concern that Tehran might seek to develop nuclear
weapons, though Iranian leaders deny such ambitions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed
restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. and UN Security Council economic sanctions. In
2018, the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in
2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. As of
March 2023, indirect talks with Iran’s government to revive the JCPOA appear to be stalled.
Issues for Congress. In recent years, congressional action on Iran has focused on sanctions and the JCPOA.
 Sanctions. Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to
change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress. The United States has imposed sanctions on
Iran’s energy sector, arms and weapons-related technology transfers, financial sector, and various non-oil
industries and sectors. Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on Iranian behavior.
 Oversight of Nuclear Talks. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA,
P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides for consideration of
legislation to potentially block their implementation. Some in Congress who have opposed Biden
Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated that they might use INARA to block or at least
complicate a potential future agreement.
Outlook. Successive U.S. Administrations have used varyingmilitary operations in Ukraine. The U.S. government has used various policy tools, including comprehensive sanctions, limited policy tools, including comprehensive sanctions, limited
military action, and diplomatic engagement with leaders in Iran and other countries to counter military action, and diplomatic engagement with leaders in Iran and other countries to counter perceivedwhat the U.S. officials describe as Iranian threats to Iranian threats to
U.S. interests. As of 2023, the Iranian government U.S. interests. As of 2023, the Iranian government faces challenges at home but retains considerable influence in the Middle East region, is developing retains considerable influence in the Middle East region, is developing
new ties to Russia and Chinanew ties to Russia and China (including via its prospective BRICS membership), and remains able to , and remains able to challengecontest U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In this context, Members U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In this context, Members
of Congress may consider questions related to U.S. and Iranian policy goals, the stability of Iran’s government, and efforts to of Congress may consider questions related to U.S. and Iranian policy goals, the stability of Iran’s government, and efforts to
counter Iran’s regional influence and deter its nuclear development activities. counter Iran’s regional influence and deter its nuclear development activities.
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Contents
Overview and Issues for Congress .................................................................................................. 1
Iran’s Political SystemU.S.-Iran Relations: Background, Recent Approaches, and Developments in 2023 ....................... 2 Approaches under the Trump and Biden Administrations ............................................................................... 2 Trump Administration Policy ...................................... 2
2022-2023 Political Protests ........................................................ 3 Biden Administration Policy ............................................. 3
U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests .................................................. 4 Developments in 2023 ................................. 4
Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities ....................................................................... 5 Iran’s Political System .................................... 5
Foreign Policy and Regional Activities ........................................................................................... 7
Regional Proxies and Allies ......... 8 2022-2023 Political Protests ..................................................................................................... 8
Iran’s Relations with China and Russia9 U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests .................................................................................... 9 10
Iran’s Nuclear Program ......Military: Structure and Capabilities .................................................................................... 10 Foreign Policy and Regional Activities ........................ 11
U.S.-Iran Relations: History and Recent Approaches ..................................................................... 12
Approaches under the Trump and Biden Administrations 13 Regional Proxies and Allies ...................................................... 13
Trump Administration Policy .............................................. 14 Iran’s Relations with China and Russia.............................................. 13
Biden Administration Policy ..................................... 15 Iran’s Nuclear Program........................................................ 14
Issues for Congress .......................................................... 17 Issues for Congress .............................................................. 16
Sanctions .......................................................... 19 Sanctions ....................................................................... 16
Oversight of Nuclear Talks/Agreement .......................................................... 19 Oversight of Negotiations and Possible Nuclear Agreement .................................................. 1821
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 1922

Figures
Figure 1. Iran at a Glance ................................................................................................................ 1

Tables
Table 1. Select Sanctions Legislation Pertaining to Iran ............................................................... 1620

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 2124


Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

Overview and Issues for Congress
The Islamic Republic of Iran, the second-largest country in the Middle East by size (after Saudi The Islamic Republic of Iran, the second-largest country in the Middle East by size (after Saudi
Arabia) and population (after Egypt), has for decades played an assertive, and by many accounts Arabia) and population (after Egypt), has for decades played an assertive, and by many accounts
destabilizing, role in the region and beyond. Iran’s influence stems from its oil reserves (the destabilizing, role in the region and beyond. Iran’s influence stems from its oil reserves (the
world’s fourth largest), its status as the world’s most populous Shia Muslim country, and its world’s fourth largest), its status as the world’s most populous Shia Muslim country, and its
active support for political and armed groups (including several U.S.-designated terrorist active support for political and armed groups (including several U.S.-designated terrorist
organizations) organizations) throughout the Middle East. Figure 1. Iran at a Glance Geography Total Area: 1,648,195 sq km (636,372 sq. miles), 2.5 times the size of Texas People Population: 86,758,304 (17th in the world) % of Population 14 or Younger: 24.1% Religion: Muslim 99.6% (90-95% Shia, 5-10% Sunni), other (Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish) 0.3% (2016) Literacy: 85.5% (male 90.4%, female 80.8%) (2016) Economy GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $17,159 (2021) Real GDP Growth: 4.7% (2021); 3.2% (2022 projection) Year-on-year Inflation: 54% (July 2022) Unemployment: 8.9% (2021); 8.7% (2022 projection) Source: Graphic created by CRS. Fact information (2022 estimates unless otherwise specified) from Economist Intelligence Unit and Central Intel igence Agency, The World Factbook. throughout the Middle East.
Since the Iranian Revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has presented a Since the Iranian Revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has presented a
major foreign policy challenge for the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have major foreign policy challenge for the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have
identified Iran and its activities as a threat to the United States and its interests. Of particular identified Iran and its activities as a threat to the United States and its interests. Of particular
concern are the Iranian government’s nuclear program, its military capabilities, its partnerships concern are the Iranian government’s nuclear program, its military capabilities, its partnerships
with Russia and China, and its support for armed factions and terrorist groups. The with Russia and China, and its support for armed factions and terrorist groups. The United States
has alsoU.S. government has condemned the Iranian government’s human rights violations and detention of U.S. condemned the Iranian government’s human rights violations and detention of U.S.
citizens and others, citizens and others, though itand has wrestled with how to support protest movements in Iran. The has wrestled with how to support protest movements in Iran. The
U.S. government has used a range of policy tools intended to reduce the threat posed by Iran, U.S. government has used a range of policy tools intended to reduce the threat posed by Iran,
including sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic engagementincluding sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic engagement; however, . Despite these efforts, Iran’s regional Iran’s regional
influence and strategic capabilities remain considerable and have arguably influence and strategic capabilities remain considerable and have arguably increased. Congressional Research Service 1 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy increased.
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S. Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales for partners threatened by Iran, seeking to sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales for partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress
to review related agreements. In 2021-2022, as the Biden Administration engaged in negotiations to review related agreements. In 2021-2022, as the Biden Administration engaged in negotiations
intended to reestablish mutual compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action intended to reestablish mutual compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), (JCPOA), numerous Members expressed a range of views, some in support of and others opposed Members expressed a range of views, some in support of and others opposed
to renewing the agreement. The prominence of the JCPOA in U.S. policy towards Iran waned in to renewing the agreement. The prominence of the JCPOA in U.S. policy towards Iran waned in
late late 2022 as negotiations stalled amid other2022 because of developments developments, such as nationwide unrest in Iran. such as nationwide unrest in Iran.
Figure 1. Iran at a Glance

Geography
Total Area: 1,648,195 sq km (636,372 sq. miles), 2.5 times the size of Texas
Congressional Research Service

1In mid-2023, the Biden Administration reportedly reached an informal agreement with Iran that includes mutual prisoner releases and the unfreezing of some Iranian assets held outside of Iran, with potential implications for congressional interests and prerogatives. U.S.-Iran Relations: Background, Recent Approaches, and Developments in 2023 U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an authoritarian monarch who was a close U.S. ally, and led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The United States and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since 1980, following the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis.1 U.S.-Iran tensions continued in the following decade, punctuated by armed confrontations in the Gulf and Iran-backed terrorist attacks (including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut). U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 1979, continued apace with the U.S. government designating Iran as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism in 1984, an embargo on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran in 1995, and the first imposition of secondary sanctions (U.S. penalties against firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector) in 1996. After bilateral relations briefly improved during the late 1990s, tensions rose again in the early 2000s amid reports of Iran’s armed support for Palestinian groups and the revelation of previously-undisclosed nuclear facilities in Iran.2 The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program in response to concerns that the program could enable Iranian nuclear weapons development. The Obama Administration sought to address concerns about Iran’s nuclear program through continued economic pressure via sanctions as well as through diplomatic engagement.3 That engagement culminated in the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement (JCPOA, see below) that placed limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for relief from most economic sanctions. Approaches under the Trump and Biden Administrations In comparing recent Administrations’ approaches to Iran, various points of continuity and change emerge, with Biden Administration policy apparently adopting elements of both the Obama and Trump Administrations. The Biden Administration has sought diplomatic engagement with Iran, as pursued by the Obama Administration. At the same time, President Biden has kept in place, and added to, sanctions the Trump Administration reimposed after ending U.S. participation in the JCPOA. Reported U.S.-Iran diplomacy apparently led to an August 2023 informal U.S.-Iran 1 For an account of the crisis, see Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006). 2 John Ghazvinian, America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present (Knopf, 2021). 3 Statement by the President on Iran, White House, July 14, 2015. Congressional Research Service 2 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy arrangement involving mutual prisoner exchanges and the unfreezing of some Iranian funds.4 Prospects for more comprehensive engagement, let alone reviving the JCPOA, are uncertain as the Biden Administration pursues “a strategy of deterrence, of pressure, and diplomacy,” according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.5 Trump Administration Policy As a candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said “my number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”6 Then-President Trump initially certified to Congress in April and July 2017 that Iran was in compliance with the agreement (under an INARA requirement to submit such a report every 90 days).7 In October 2017 he announced he would not submit another certification of Iranian compliance, saying, “Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.”8 In January 2018, President Trump announced that he would again waive the application of certain energy-sector sanctions as a “last chance” to “secure our European allies’ agreement to fix” the JCPOA.9 No such deal was reached, and President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that the United States would cease participating in the JCPOA, reinstating all sanctions that the United States had waived or terminated in meeting its JCPOA obligations. All of those restrictions went back into effect as of November 2018. In articulating a new Iran strategy in May 2018, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that due to “unprecedented financial pressure” through reimposed U.S. sanctions, U.S. military deterrence, and U.S. advocacy, “we hope, and indeed we expect, that the Iranian regime will come to its senses.”10 He also laid out 12 demands for any future agreement with Iran, including the withdrawal of Iranian support for armed groups and proxies throughout the region. Iran’s leaders rejected U.S. demands and insisted the United States return to compliance with the JCPOA before engaging on a new or revised accord. The Trump Administration policy of applying “maximum pressure” on Iran after late 2018 took two main forms: additional sanctions and limited military action. After U.S. sanctions were reinstated in November 2018, the Administration designated for sanctions a number of additional entities under existing authorities (e.g., designating Iran’s Central Bank under Executive Order [E.O.] 13224, adding to the Central Bank’s designation as a proliferation entity under E.O. 13382); issued new authorities (e.g., E.O. 13876, sanctioning the office of the Supreme Leader); and designated the entirety of Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.”11 From mid-2019 on, Iran escalated its regional military activities, at times coming into direct military conflict with the United States (such as when Iran shot down an unmanned U.S. surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf in June 2019). Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and a September 2019 drone attack against Saudi Arabian oil production facilities 4 Farnaz Fassihi and Michael Shear, “U.S. reaches deal with Iran to free Americans for jailed Iranians and funds,” New York Times, August 10, 2023. 5 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a press availability, August 15, 2023. 6 “Full transcript: First 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, September 27, 2016; Sarah Begley, “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to AIPAC,” Time, March 21, 2016. 7 Sections 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as added by INARA (P.L. 114-17). 8 “Transcript: Trump’s Remarks on Iran nuclear deal,” NPR, October 13, 2017. The October 2017 decertification triggered a 60-day window for Congress to consider, under expedited procedures per INARA, legislation to reimpose sanctions lifted as part of the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. Congress did not do so. 9 Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, White House, January 12, 2018. 10 “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018. 11 Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 31 Code Federal Regulations Part 1010, 84 Federal Register 59302. Congressional Research Service 3 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy further increased tensions. Those tensions peaked with the Trump Administration’s January 3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, and Iran’s retaliatory ballistic missile strikes against U.S. forces in Iraq.12 Those strikes left over one hundred U.S. military personnel injured, and attacks by Iran-backed forces in Iraq against U.S. targets continued over the following year. Iran also began exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear activities in 2019, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Biden Administration Policy As a presidential candidate in 2020, Joe Biden described the Trump Administration’s Iran policy as a “dangerous failure” that had isolated the United States from its international partners, allowed Iran to increase its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and raised tensions throughout the region.13 He pledged to “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy” by promising to have the United States rejoin the JCPOA as long as “Iran returns to strict compliance” with it. Less than a month after taking office, the Biden Administration offered to restart talks with Iran to revive the JCPOA and appointed Robert Malley as Special Envoy for Iran. When Iran refused to engage directly with the United States until the United States decreased sanctions pressure, the Biden Administration turned to indirect negotiations facilitated by the EU and other JCPOA partners. During multiple subsequent rounds of talks, negotiators reported slow and uneven progress, with talks sometimes paused for weeks or months at a time. In August 2022, reports indicated that all sides were close to achieving agreement before stalling over Iran’s reported revival of some demands that the other parties had considered closed issues.14 The Iranian government’s violent crackdown against nationwide unrest the following month further diminished the prospects of a new agreement, though Biden Administration officials were reportedly unwilling to formally end negotiations.15 President Biden has said, “Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch,” and Administration officials have told Congress that a negotiated settlement akin to the JCPOA is the best way to achieve that goal.16 Administration officials also argue that it is not possible to resolve the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program militarily, while maintaining that all U.S. options remain available.17 In its October 2022 National Security Strategy, the Administration laid out its policy toward Iran, stating the United States would “pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail,” and that “we will respond when our people and interests are attacked.”18 The Strategy also states, “we will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied them by the regime in Tehran.” Other Biden Administration courses of action related to Iran, as laid out below, include military deployments and occasional strikes against 12 For more, see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions. 13 Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020. 14 Ishaan Tharoor, “Is the Iran deal worth salvaging?” Washington Post, August 26, 2022; “Iran nuclear talks in ‘stalemate,’ says EU foreign policy chief,” Arab News, September 15, 2022. 15 Nahal Toosi, “‘Everyone thinks we have magic powers’: Biden seeks a balance on Iran,” Politico, October 25, 2022. 16 White House, Remarks by President Biden and President Rivlin of the State of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting, June 28, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25, 2022. 17 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25, 2022. 18 White House, National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Iran-related targets; sanctions designations and enforcement actions; and security cooperation with regional partners. Developments in 2023 In 2023, points of conflict between the United States and Iran have continued, with Iranian or Iran-backed attacks against commercial shipping in the Gulf and against U.S. forces in Syria, additional U.S. military deployments, and the continued application of U.S. sanctions, including the interdiction of a tanker transporting Iranian oil. At the same time, the Biden Administration has reportedly engaged directly with Iranian diplomats in an attempt to decrease tensions. In August 2023, Biden Administration officials confirmed that five U.S. nationals detained in Iran were expected to be released.19 Those prospective releases are reportedly in exchange for the release of some Iranians held in the United States as well as the release for limited purposes of Iranian funds frozen in South Korea.20 Attacks on Gulf Shipping. The United States seeks to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, which has long been a flashpoint for U.S.-Iran tensions, including in 2023.21 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, said in a July 2023 statement that “Iran has harassed, attacked or seized nearly 20 internationally flagged merchant vessels” since 2021.22 This includes the Iranian seizure of two tankers in April-May 2023 and the attempted seizure of two more in July 2023.23 Iran’s April-May seizures came weeks after the United States confiscated the Suez Rajan, a Marshall Islands-flagged tanker suspected of carrying Iranian crude oil to China in violation of U.S. sanctions.24 The Suez Rajan has been anchored off Texas since May, though reportedly companies initially refused to offload the oil in light of threatened Iranian reprisals.25 In mid-August 2023, several Members of Congress reportedly wrote to President Biden requesting additional information on the Administration’s efforts to transfer and sell the seized oil.26 The vessel reportedly began offloading its cargo in late August.27 Some U.S. officials have indicated that such Iranian actions in the Gulf may not be closely related to developments in other policy areas; as one unnamed U.S. official told Al-Monitor, “There’s a level of disorganization and randomness in how they do things.”28 Then-Under Secretary of 19 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a press availability, August 15, 2023. 20 “U.S. reaches deal with Iran to free Americans for jailed Iranians and funds,” op. cit. 21 See White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States strengthens cooperation with Middle East partners to address 21st century challenges,” July 16, 2022. 22 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, “U.S. prevents Iran from seizing two merchant tankers in Gulf of Oman,” July 5, 2023. 23 Iranian forces seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Advantage Sweet and the Panama-flagged Niovi in April-May 2023, and attempted to seize the Marshall Islands-flagged TRF Moss and the Bahamas-flagged Richmond Voyager on July 5, 2023. “U.S. prevents Iran from seizing two merchant tankers in Gulf of Oman,” op. cit. Both tankers, and their crews, appear to remain in Iran. 24 Nahmeh Bozorgmehr et al., “US seizure of oil vessel triggered Iran tanker capture,” Financial Times, April 28, 2023. 25 Ian Talley, “Iranian oil is stuck off coast of Texas, but U.S. firms won’t touch it,” Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2023; “Iran warns against unloading Iranian oil from seized tanker,” Reuters, July 20, 2023. 26 Marc Rod, “Bipartisan group of lawmakers questions administration over seized Iranian oil,” Jewish Insider, August 16, 2023. Proceeds from the sale of seized Iranian oil have previously been directed to the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. See CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea. 27 Jon Gambrell, “A tanker believed to hold sanctioned Iranian oil starts offloading near Texas despite Tehran’s threats,” Associated Press, August 20, 2023. 28 Jared Szuba, “Why is US sending 3,000 Navy, Marines forces to Persian Gulf?” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2023. Congressional Research Service 5 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Defense for Policy Colin Kahl told reporters of the July 2023 incidents, “Why the Iranians are doing this at this moment is not at all clear to us.”29 U.S. Military Deployments. The United States has deployed additional military assets to the Gulf region, including B-52 and B-1 bombers in March and June 2023, respectively, and an Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit that arrived in Bahrain in August 2023. National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby said in July 2023 that because Iranian forces had “become more bellicose, more active, and more dangerous” in the Gulf, “the Secretary of Defense wants to make sure, as he should, that we’ve got the proper capabilities and assets, readiness in place to deal with that.”30 In response to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping, U.S. officials also have reportedly discussed plans to deploy U.S. military forces on commercial vessels requesting such assistance.31 U.S. naval forces have also interdicted or supported the interdiction of weapons shipments originating from Iran, including in February 2023.32 Elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran-backed attacks against U.S. forces have continued in 2023. The most prominent exchange of strikes was in March 2023, when the United States launched air strikes against IRGC-affiliated militia sites in Syria in response to a drone attack that killed a U.S. contractor in eastern Syria.33 The U.S. military and its partners have also continued to conduct joint military exercises, including some reportedly focused on Iran.34 Prisoner Release Deal. According to August 2023 media reports, the United States and Iran reached a tentative agreement whereby Iran will release five detained U.S. nationals in return for conditional access to $6 billion in Iranian assets frozen in South Korea, as well as the United States’ release of several Iranians jailed in the United States.35 Four of the five U.S. nationals have reportedly been released from prison and put under house arrest (the fifth was already under house arrest). Reportedly, Iran is to permit these detainees to leave the country when South Korea transfers the Iranian funds to an account in Qatar’s central bank. The funds are to be used “strictly for humanitarian purposes and in a strictly controlled way,” according to Secretary Blinken.36 Iranian officials have given multiple interpretations of the purposes for, and circumstances under, which Iran will be able to use the funds.37 Reports of the arrangement described above have generated some speculation that an informal agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program might follow.38 The day after the prisoner deal was 29 U.S. Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl holds press briefing,” July 7, 2023. 30 White House Press Briefing, July 17, 2023. 31 Lolita Baldor and Jon Gambrell, “US military may put armed troops on commercial ships in Strait of Hormuz to stop Iran seizures,” Associated Press, August 3, 2023. 32 U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Central Command supports partner forces in major Iranian weapons seizure,” February 2, 2023. 33 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. conducts airstrikes in Syria in response to deadly UAV attack,” March 23, 2023. 34 Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.. Israel send message to Iran with biggest-ever military exercises,” Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2023. 35 According to one account, the Iranians to be released from detention in the United States are “serving prison sentences for violating sanctions on Iran” and that “it is unclear whether they would want to [leave the United States] because many live in the United States with their families.” “U.S. reaches deal with Iran to free Americans for jailed Iranians and funds,” op. cit. 36 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a press availability, August 15, 2023. 37 See, for example, “Iran's Raisi says funds released by US will be used to enhance domestic production,” The National, August 16, 2023. 38 Zvi Bar’el, “U.S.-Iran prisoner deal signals possible path to new nuclear deal,” Haaretz, August 13, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy announced, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran had “significantly slowed” some of its nuclear activities.39 This article followed June and July media reports that the Biden Administration, mostly through the mediation of third countries but also through direct U.S.-Iran engagement, was seeking to de-escalate tensions with Iran via an informal understanding with Iranian leaders.40 Secretary Blinken said on August 14 that “there is no agreement between us [the United States and Iran] on nuclear matters” and that the prisoner release agreement “is an entirely separate matter.”41 Observers and some Members of Congress have responded in varying ways to news of the exchange. Some characterize the Biden Administration’s support for the conditional release of Iran’s South Korea-based funds as a “ransom” that incentivizes hostage-taking.42 Some of these critics argue that even if the regime is not able to use the unfrozen funds for malign activities, the regime’s access to additional funds for humanitarian purposes will free up other resources for those destabilizing activities.43 Supporters of the arrangement have lauded the Administration for securing the prospective release of U.S. citizens held abroad (a stated Administration priority) and argued that supporting the conditional release of Iranian funds for humanitarian purposes may deprive the regime of an excuse for domestic economic problems.44 Others have expressed more tempered support, with one former U.S. official acknowledging downsides but saying of the agreement, “it’s hard to imagine coming up with a better alternative.”45 Sanctions.46 The Biden Administration has not issued any new sanctions authorities but has continued to designate for sanctions Iranian and third-country-based entities pursuant to existing U.S. laws and executive orders. Entities designated in 2023 include individuals and companies involved in Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and ballistic missile programs; individuals involved in the production, sale, and shipment of Iranian oil to Asia; individuals involved in the crackdown on protesters and in other human rights abuses; senior IRGC officials involved in the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals in Iran; and individuals and companies facilitating the Iranian regime’s internet censorship.47 Status of Special Envoy. In late June 2023, Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley, who led U.S. diplomatic efforts including reported meetings with Iranian officials, was, according to media accounts, placed on unpaid leave, with Malley telling reporters that his security clearance was under review.48 In August 2023, Malley joined Princeton University as a guest lecturer, saying, “I 39 Laurence Norman, “Iran slows buildup of uranium needed for weapon,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2023. 40 Michael Crowley et al., “Hoping to avert nuclear crisis, U.S. seeks informal agreement with Iran,” New York Times, June 14, 2023. 41 U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, August 14, 2023. 42 See, for example, Senator Tom Cotton, “Cotton statement on Biden’s ‘ransom’ to Iran,” August 10, 2023. 43 See, for example, Congressman Joe Wilson, “Biden Administration capitulation to Iran,” August 11, 2023. 44 Ryan Costello, “The latest Iran deal is a win-win,” Defense One, August 10, 2023; Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy statement on release of wrongfully imprisoned Americans in Iran,” August 10, 2023; Congressman Joaquin Castro, “Congressman Castro celebrates negotiated release of five Americans held in Iran,” August 11, 2023. 45 Aaron David Miller, “There are no good deals with Iran,” Foreign Policy, August 14, 2023. 46 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12452, U.S. Sanctions on Iran, by Clayton Thomas. 47 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control press releases “Treasury sanctions international procurement network supporting Iran’s missile and military programs,” June 6, 2023; “Treasury sanctions companies involved in production, sale, and shipment of Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum,” February 9, 2023; “Treasury sanctions senior Iranian officials overseeing violent protest suppression and censorship,” April 24, 2023; “Treasury sanctions officials of Iranian intelligence agency responsible for detention of U.S. nationals in Iran,” April 27, 2023; “Treasury sanctions Iranian company aiding in internet censorship,” June 2, 2023. 48 Barak Ravid, “U.S. special envoy for Iran Rob Malley on leave, says security clearance ‘under review,’” Axios, June 29, 2023. Congressional Research Service 7 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy look forward to…returning to government service in due course.”49 Some Members of Congress have pressed the Administration for additional information related to the circumstances of Malley’s leave amid reports that the FBI is investigating his handling of classified materials.50 Iran’s Political System

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People
Population: 86,758,304 (17th in the world)
% of Population 14 or Younger: 24.1%
Religion: Muslim 99.6% (90-95% Shia, 5-10% Sunni), other (Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish)
0.3% (2016)
Literacy: 85.5% (male 90.4%, female 80.8%) (2016)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $17,159 (2021)
Real GDP Growth: 4.7% (2021); 3.2% (2022 projection)
Year-on-year Inflation: 54% (July 2022)
Unemployment: 8.9% (2021); 8.7% (2022 projection)
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Fact information (2022 estimates unless otherwise specified) from Economist
Intelligence Unit and Central Intel igence Agency, The World Factbook.
Iran’s Political System1
Iran’s Islamic Republic was established in 1979, ending the autocratic monarchy of the Shah, and Iran’s Islamic Republic was established in 1979, ending the autocratic monarchy of the Shah, and
is a hybrid political system that defies simple characterization. Iran has a parliament, regular is a hybrid political system that defies simple characterization. Iran has a parliament, regular
elections, and some other features of representative democracy. In practice, though, the elections, and some other features of representative democracy. In practice, though, the
government is authoritarian, ranking 154th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence government is authoritarian, ranking 154th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence
Unit’s 2022 Democracy Index.Unit’s 2022 Democracy Index.251 Shia Islam is the state religion and the basis for all legislation and Shia Islam is the state religion and the basis for all legislation and
jurisprudence, and political contestation is tightly controlled, with ultimate decisionmaking power jurisprudence, and political contestation is tightly controlled, with ultimate decisionmaking power
held byin the hands of the Supreme Leader. That title has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since 1989, the Supreme Leader. That title has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since 1989,
when he succeeded the Islamic Republic’s founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In when he succeeded the Islamic Republic’s founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In
September 2022, Khamenei appeared to September 2022, Khamenei appeared to have suffered asuffer a brief bout of significant illness; prospects for bout of significant illness; prospects for
leadership succession are unclear. leadership succession are unclear.
Iran’s top directly elected position is the presidency, which, like the directly elected unicameral Iran’s top directly elected position is the presidency, which, like the directly elected unicameral
parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the Majles) and every other organ ) and every other organ
of Iran’s government, is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Incumbent president Ebrahim Raisi, of Iran’s government, is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Incumbent president Ebrahim Raisi,
a hardliner close to Khamenei, won the June 2021 election to succeeda hardliner close to Khamenei, won the June 2021 election to succeed the moderate Hassan Rouhani, who won Hassan Rouhani, who won
elections in 2013 and 2017.elections in 2013 and 2017.52 Rouhani Rouhani, who oversaw Iran’s negotiations with the United States and oversaw Iran’s negotiations with the United States and
its entry into the JCPOAits entry into the JCPOA, was seen as relatively moderate. The 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA . The 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA
and reimposition of sanctions, as well as the January 2020 U.S. killing of Islamic Revolutionary and reimposition of sanctions, as well as the January 2020 U.S. killing of Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, appeared to shift public support Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, appeared to shift public support
away from moderates like Rouhani.away from moderates like Rouhani.353 Hardliners prevailed in Hardliners prevailed in the February 2020 February 2020 Majles elections. elections.
The June 2021 presidential election appears to have cemented this shift toward a more hardline The June 2021 presidential election appears to have cemented this shift toward a more hardline
approach to the United States. Rouhani was term-limited and ineligible to run; the government approach to the United States. Rouhani was term-limited and ineligible to run; the government
also banned several moderate candidates from running. These circumstances might have also banned several moderate candidates from running. These circumstances might have
contributed to this election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history; slightly contributed to this election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history; slightly
less than half (49%) of eligible Iranians voted. Raisi, who reportedly played a role in a judicial less than half (49%) of eligible Iranians voted. Raisi, who reportedly played a role in a judicial
decision to approve the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988, had lost the 2017 decision to approve the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988, had lost the 2017

1 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by
Kenneth Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
2presidential election to Rouhani. In 2019 Khamenei appointed Raisi to head Iran’s judiciary. Raisi’s presidential victory may boost his chances of succeeding Khamenei as Supreme Leader.54 49 Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, “Senior State Department official to join SIPA faculty as visiting professor and lecturer,” August 15, 2023. 50 Josh Rogin, “Inside the saga of the State Department’s missing Iran envoy,” Washington Post, September 6, 2023. 51 Economist Intelligence Unit, Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2022: Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine, February 2023. , February 2023.
3 52 In Iran’s political system, hardliners, who support the Islamic Republic and generally oppose accommodation with the West, are also known as conservatives or “principlists;” “reformists” generally support greater political openness and engagement with the West. “Moderates” exist between these groups, but are increasingly identified with the reformists. Benoit Faucon and David Cloud, “Confronting Iran protests, regime uses brute force but secretly appeals to moderates,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2022. 53 Garrett Nada, “Iran’s Parliamentary Polls: Hardliners on the Rise, Reformists Ruled Out,” United States Institute of Garrett Nada, “Iran’s Parliamentary Polls: Hardliners on the Rise, Reformists Ruled Out,” United States Institute of
Peace, February 12, 2021. In Iran’s political system, hardliners are also known as “principlists,” moderates as Peace, February 12, 2021. In Iran’s political system, hardliners are also known as “principlists,” moderates as
“reformists.” “reformists.”
54 Parisa Hafezi, “Winner of Iran presidency is hardline judge who is under U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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presidential election to Rouhani. In 2019 Khamenei appointed Raisi to head Iran’s judiciary.
Raisi’s presidential victory may boost his chances of succeeding Khamenei as Supreme Leader.4Elections for the Majles and the Assembly of Experts, a body whose constitutional responsibilities include selecting the Supreme Leader, are scheduled for March 2024.
Mass demonstrations shook Iran in 2009 and 2010, when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators Mass demonstrations shook Iran in 2009 and 2010, when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators
took to the streets of Iran’s urban centers to protest alleged fraud in the 2009 presidential election. took to the streets of Iran’s urban centers to protest alleged fraud in the 2009 presidential election.
Iran has experienced Iran has experienced significant unrest intermittently since then, including in December 2017, unrest intermittently since then, including in December 2017,
summer 2018, and late 2019, based most frequently on economic conditions but also reflecting summer 2018, and late 2019, based most frequently on economic conditions but also reflecting
other opposition to Iran’s leadership. The government has often used violence to disperse other opposition to Iran’s leadership. The government has often used violence to disperse
protests, in which hundreds have been killed by security forces. U.S. and protests, in which hundreds have been killed by security forces. U.S. and UNU.N. assessments have assessments have
long cited Iran’s government for a wide range of human rights abuses in addition to its repression long cited Iran’s government for a wide range of human rights abuses in addition to its repression
of political dissent and use of force against protesters, including severe violations of religious of political dissent and use of force against protesters, including severe violations of religious
freedom and women’s rights, human trafficking, and corporal punishment. freedom and women’s rights, human trafficking, and corporal punishment.
2022-2023 Political Protests
The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by Iran’s Morality The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by Iran’s Morality
Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab ((or head covering) law and died after head covering) law and died after
reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide unrest in late 2022. In protests reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide unrest in late 2022. In protests
throughout the country, demonstrators voiced a broad range of grievances, with some calling for throughout the country, demonstrators voiced a broad range of grievances, with some calling for
an end to the Islamic Republic and chanting “death to the dictator.” Women played a an end to the Islamic Republic and chanting “death to the dictator.” Women played a particularly
prominent prominent role in the protests.role in the protests.555 In response In response to the protests, the Iranian government deployed security forces who , the Iranian government deployed security forces who
reportedly killed hundreds of protesters and arrested thousands. Iranian officials, who blamed the United killed hundreds of protesters and arrested thousands. Iranian officials, who blamed the United
States and other foreign countries for fomenting what they called “riots,” also shut down internet States and other foreign countries for fomenting what they called “riots,” also shut down internet
access. access.
Throughout fall 2022, observers debated whether the protests, information about which remains Throughout fall 2022, observers debated whether the protests, information about which remains
opaqueopaque, fluid, and highly contested, represented the “turning point” that some activists claimed: and highly contested, represented the “turning point” that some activists claimed:
one observer compared 2022 unrest to the circumstances that preceded the 1979 Islamic one observer compared 2022 unrest to the circumstances that preceded the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, while another discounted the revolutionary potential of the protests.Revolution, while another discounted the revolutionary potential of the protests.656 The The
demonstrations of 2022 were smaller and more geographically dispersed than those of 2009, and demonstrations of 2022 were smaller and more geographically dispersed than those of 2009, and
reportedly included protestors from a diverse range of social groups. In December 2022, as the reportedly included protestors from a diverse range of social groups. In December 2022, as the
protests appeared to wane, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated, “this is not protests appeared to wane, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated, “this is not
something that we see right now as being … an imminent threat to the regime.”something that we see right now as being … an imminent threat to the regime.”757
As of As of MarchAugust 2023, the protest movement 2023, the protest movement seems to have receded. Thehas receded but the fundamental grievances that fundamental grievances that
motivated the outbreak of unrest in September 2022 (and in previous years) remain unresolved, motivated the outbreak of unrest in September 2022 (and in previous years) remain unresolved,
so further rounds of popular protests so further rounds of popular protests appear possible in the short term. However, the continued
absence to date of an organized opposition, a popular leader, orare possible. The protest movement apparently lacks an organized structure, a visible leader, and a shared alternative vision for a shared alternative vision for
Iran’s future may limit the existential risk protests pose to the Islamic Republic. The question of
who might succeed 83-year old Supreme Leader Khamenei may be a more acutely destabilizing
issue, though it is unclear how (if at all) Iranian foreign and domestic policy might change after
Khamenei leaves office and whether such changes would be advantageous for the United States.8

4 Parisa Hafezi, “Winner of Iran presidency is hardline judge who is under U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 20, 2021.
5Iran’s future, and therefore may have limited capacity to pose an existential risk to the Islamic Republic. Many Iranian women (particularly in urban areas) have reportedly stopped wearing mandatory head coverings, prompting Iran’s parliament to consider legislation that would impose new punishments on women who flout the mandate.58 Active enforcement of the hijab requirement reportedly waned when protests were most active, but resumed in July 2023.59 In advance of the anniversary of 55 Suzanne Kianpour, “The women of Iran are not backing down,” Suzanne Kianpour, “The women of Iran are not backing down,” Politico, January 22, 2023. , January 22, 2023.
656 Ray Takeyh, “A second Iranian revolution?” Ray Takeyh, “A second Iranian revolution?” Commentary, November 2022; Sajjed Safael, “Iran’s protests are , November 2022; Sajjed Safael, “Iran’s protests are
nowhere near revolutionary,” nowhere near revolutionary,” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2023. , January 17, 2023.
757 “DNI Avril Haines: Protests in Iran not an ‘imminent threat to the regime’” “DNI Avril Haines: Protests in Iran not an ‘imminent threat to the regime’” MSNBC, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
8 Murtaza Hussain, “The other giant crisis hanging over the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Intercept, December 9, 2022.
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58 Nasser Karimi and Jon Gambrell, “A year ago, an Iranian woman’s death sparked hijab protests. Now businesses are a new battleground,” Associated Press, August 10, 2023; “Iran’s politicians to debate hijab laws in secret,” BBC, August 13, 2023. 59 Maziar Motamedi, “Iran’s ‘morality police’ return as authorities enforce hijab rule,” Al Jazeera, July 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 9 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Amini’s death, which could spark renewed protests, Iranian authorities have reportedly arrested and sought to intimidate activists.60
U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests
New sanctions designations. Since September 2022, the Biden Administration has announced . Since September 2022, the Biden Administration has announced
sanctions designations targeting Iran’s Morality Police and dozens of other government entities sanctions designations targeting Iran’s Morality Police and dozens of other government entities
and officials for their role in the crackdown.and officials for their role in the crackdown. Legislation introduced in the 118th Congress (H.R.
589) would direct the Administration to review whether additional specified Iranian officials meet
the criteria for designation under certain existing sanctions authorities.
General license and Internet service. In September 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s . In September 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Iran General License D-2, designed to counter what Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Iran General License D-2, designed to counter what
officials described as Tehran’s move to “cut off access to the Internet for most of its 80 million officials described as Tehran’s move to “cut off access to the Internet for most of its 80 million
citizens to prevent the world from watching its violent crackdown on peaceful protestors.”citizens to prevent the world from watching its violent crackdown on peaceful protestors.”961
Treasury officials stated that the new license expands access to cloud-based services, Virtual Treasury officials stated that the new license expands access to cloud-based services, Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs), and anti-surveillance tools critical to secure communication. In March Private Networks (VPNs), and anti-surveillance tools critical to secure communication. In March
2023, a State Department spokesperson said “several U.S. companies have in turn taken 2023, a State Department spokesperson said “several U.S. companies have in turn taken
advantage of the expanded authorization that we’ve provided.”advantage of the expanded authorization that we’ve provided.”1062
Action at international bodies. In late November. In late November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Council authorized , the U.N. Human Rights Council authorized a
an independent fact-finding mission fact-finding mission (FFM) to investigate allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Iranian to investigate allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Iranian
government.government.1163 The FFM is expected to present a comprehensive report on its findings at the March 2024 meeting of the Human Rights Council. The United States also led a successful effort to remove Iran from The United States also led a successful effort to remove Iran from the U.N. U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women in December 2022. Commission on the Status of Women in December 2022.
Nuclear negotiations. In the context of the protests, some Members of Congress have renewed
calls on the Biden Administration to formally terminate stalled indirect talks with Iran over the
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. As outlined below, Biden
Administration officials are reportedly reluctant to do so, though they assert that negotiations are
moribund and no longer a focus of U.S. efforts.12 Secretary Blinken in December 2022 stated that
the regime’s actions in response to the protests “have only deepened our conviction that Iran must
never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. We continue to believe that the best way to ensure
this is through diplomacy.”13
Congressional Action. In the 118th Congress, some Members have introduced several resolutions
and bills related to the protests that have received consideration. In January 2023, the House
voted 420-1 to agree to H.Con.Res. 7 which condemns Amini’s death and the violent suppression
of protests and “encourages continued efforts” by the Biden Administration to respond to the
protests via sanctions and the expansion of unrestricted internet access in Iran. Another
introduced bill, H.R. 589, would direct the President to, within 90 days, review whether certain
existing sanctions authorities apply to specified persons (including the Supreme Leader and
associated persons and entities).

9Congressional Action. In the 118th Congress, some Members have introduced several resolutions and bills related to the protests. In January 2023, the House voted 420-1 to agree to H.Con.Res. 7, which condemns Amini’s death and the violent suppression of protests and “encourages continued efforts” by the Biden Administration to respond to the protests via sanctions and the expansion of unrestricted internet access in Iran. Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities Given the adversarial nature of U.S.-Iran relations and the centrality of various military-related entities in Iranian domestic and foreign policy, Iran’s military has been a subject of sustained engagement by Congress and other U.S. policymakers. In 2023 testimony, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Erik Kurilla said, “The advancement of Iranian military capabilities over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region.”64 The elements of Iran’s military that arguably threaten U.S. interests most directly are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the country’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone) programs. 60 David Cloud, “Iran cracks down on activists ahead of anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2023. 61 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury issues Iran General License D-2 to increase support for internet U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury issues Iran General License D-2 to increase support for internet
freedom,” September 23, 2022. freedom,” September 23, 2022.
1062 U.S. Department of State Press Briefing, March 1, 2023. U.S. Department of State Press Briefing, March 1, 2023.
1163 Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Council establishes fact-finding mission to investigate alleged Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Council establishes fact-finding mission to investigate alleged
human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022,” November 24, 2022. human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022,” November 24, 2022.
12 Nahal Toosi, “‘Everyone thinks we have magic powers’: Biden seeks a balance on Iran,” Politico, October 25, 2022.
13 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 202264 General Michael Kurilla, “Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,” March 13, 2023. .
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Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities14
Given the adversarial nature of U.S.-Iran relations and the centrality of various military-related
entities in Iranian domestic and foreign policy, Iran’s military has been a subject of sustained
engagement by Congress and other U.S. policymakers. In 2023 testimony, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Erik Kurilla said, “The advancement of Iranian
military capabilities over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region.”15 The elements of Iran’s
military that arguably threaten U.S. interests most directly are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and the country’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone) programs.
Iran’s traditional military force, the Iran’s traditional military force, the Artesh, is a legacy of Iran’s Shah-era military force. The , is a legacy of Iran’s Shah-era military force. The
Artesh exists alongside the IRGC, which Khomeini established in 1979 as a force loyal to the new exists alongside the IRGC, which Khomeini established in 1979 as a force loyal to the new
regime. Rivalries between the two parallel forces (each have their own land, air, and naval force regime. Rivalries between the two parallel forces (each have their own land, air, and naval force
components) stem from their “uneven access to resources, varying levels of influence with the components) stem from their “uneven access to resources, varying levels of influence with the
regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.”regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.”1665 While both serve to defend Iran While both serve to defend Iran
against external threats, the government deploys the against external threats, the government deploys the Artesh primarily along Iran’s borders to primarily along Iran’s borders to
counter any invading force, while the IRGC has a more ideological character and the more counter any invading force, while the IRGC has a more ideological character and the more
expansive mission of combating internal threats and expanding Iran’s influence abroad. Elements expansive mission of combating internal threats and expanding Iran’s influence abroad. Elements
of the IRGC includeof the IRGC include:
• The The Basij, a “volunteer paramilitary reserve force,” which plays a key role in , a “volunteer paramilitary reserve force,” which plays a key role in
suppressing protests and other forms of internal dissent. suppressing protests and other forms of internal dissent.1766
• The IRGC The IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which coordinates Iran’s regional activities, (IRGC-QF), which coordinates Iran’s regional activities,
providing arms, training, and other forms of support to the network of proxies providing arms, training, and other forms of support to the network of proxies
and armed groups that share Iran’s objectives (see “Regional Activities and and armed groups that share Iran’s objectives (see “Regional Activities and
Strategy” below). Strategy” below).
Ballistic Missiles
According to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran has “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles According to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran has “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles
in the regionin the region,” and, as of 2022, ” and, as of 2022, hashad steadily improved the range and accuracy of its more than steadily improved the range and accuracy of its more than
3,000 ballistic missiles over “the last five to seven years.”3,000 ballistic missiles over “the last five to seven years.”1867 Per CENTCOM Commander Kurilla, Per CENTCOM Commander Kurilla,
Iran has aggressively developed its missile capabilities to achieve “an asymmetric advantage Iran has aggressively developed its missile capabilities to achieve “an asymmetric advantage
against regional militaries.”against regional militaries.”1968 Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target U.S. regional assets Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target U.S. regional assets
directly, including a January 2020 attack (shortly following the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF directly, including a January 2020 attack (shortly following the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF
Commander Soleimani) against Iraqi sites where U.S. military forces were stationedCommander Soleimani) against Iraqi sites where U.S. military forces were stationed that left
scores of U.S. service members injured, and missile and drone, and attacks against Iraq’s Kurdistan attacks against Iraq’s Kurdistan
region in March and September 2022.region in March and September 2022.20

14 For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman;
congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
15 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,
March 13, 2023.
1669 Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles were assessed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2019 to have a maximum range of around 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders, reportedly capable of reaching targets as far as Israel or southeastern Europe.70 U.S. officials and others have expressed concern that Iran’s government could use its nascent space program to develop longer-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).71 According to a congressionally mandated report issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in June 2023, Iran’s work on space launch vehicles (SLVs) “shortens the timeline to an ICBM if it decided to develop one because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies.”72 In March 2022, the 65 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, ,
2019. 2019.
1766 Ibid. Ibid.
1867 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 8, 2023; Senate Armed Services Committee , March 8, 2023; Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358. Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358.
1968 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 13, 2023. Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 13, 2023.
2069 “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, August , August
8, 2021; “Iran attacks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,” Reuters, March 13, 2022; White House press release, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Iran’s Missile and Drone Attacks in Northern Iraq,” September 28, 2022. 70 Iran Military Power, op. cit. 43. 71 Annual Threat Assessment, op. cit.; Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is still growing in size, reach, and accuracy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2021. 72 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022, June 2023. Congressional Research Service 11 Congressional Research Service

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Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles were assessed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
in 2019 to have a maximum range of around 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders, reportedly
capable of reaching targets as far as Israel or southeastern Europe.21 U.S. officials and others have
expressed concern that Iran’s government could use its nascent space program to develop longer-
range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).22 In March 2022, the Biden
Administration designated for sanctions five Iranian individuals and entities for their involvement
in ballistic missile activities.23
UAVs
According to CENTCOM, Iran has also developed “the largest and most capable Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle force in the region,” with which it has attacked numerous foreign targets.24Biden Administration designated for sanctions five Iranian individuals and entities for their involvement in ballistic missile activities.73 Iran’s Missile Program and U.N. Sanctions “Snapback”74 In July 2015, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231), which, in addition to endorsing ful implementation of the JCPOA, also contained provisions related to Iran’s arms and missile development activities. Specifical y, Annex B of the Resolution provides for a ban on the transfer of conventional arms to or from Iran (the conventional weapons ban expired in October 2020), and restricts exports of missile-related items until October 2023. UNSCR 2231 also includes provisions that effectively allow any “JCPOA participant state” to force the reimposition of UN sanctions, including the arms transfer and ballistic missile bans as well as a ban on purchasing Iranian oil, in a process known as “snapback.” In August 2020, the Trump Administration invoked the snapback provision in an attempt to extend the conventional arms embargo, but most other members of the Security Council (including JCPOA participants France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China) asserted that the United States, having ceased implementing its JCPOA commitments in 2018, was not a participant and therefore did not have the standing to trigger the snapback of sanctions.75 The Biden Administration has reversed the Trump Administration’s position on the snapback provision. The approach of the October 18, 2023, sunset of U.N. sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile activities has again focused international attention on the snapback process. Some supporters of invoking snapback have viewed it positively, as a step that could, in tandem with additional pressure, “hasten the demise of the Islamic Republic regime.”76 Some opponents of this move have argued that the economic impact of reimposing U.N. economic sanctions would be “marginal” given the existence of more restrictive secondary U.S. sanctions, and that the practical impact of restoring/extending the bans would be similarly minimal given arguable Iranian violations, such as its weapons transfers to Russia.77 Iranian leaders have given differing indications of how Iran might respond to such a measure; some have reportedly threatened to retaliate (including by accelerating nuclear activities) while others have dismissed the practical effect of Western sanctions.78 Given U.N. Security Council members’ position on snapback, the provision would likely have to be invoked by another JCPOA participant, most likely U.S. allies France, Germany, and/or the United Kingdom (the “E3”). Some in Congress have urged those European nations to do so.79 According to media reports, the E3 in 2022 conveyed to Iran their intention to invoke snapback if Iran were to produce enriched uranium containing 90% uranium-235 (considered weapons-grade).80 In any case, according to some media reports, the E3 are likely to implement unilateral sanctions related to Iran’s missile activities.81 73 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” March 30, 2022. 74 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by Paul K. Kerr. 75 “UNSC dismisses US demand to impose ‘snapback’ sanctions on Iran,” Al Jazeera, August 25, 2020. For more, see CRS In Focus IF11429, U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback. 76 Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker, “Europe must trigger snapback of UN sanctions on Iran,” The Hill, October 6, 2023. 77 Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros, “Snapback sanctions on Iran: More bark than bite?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 25, 2022. 78 John Irish et al., “Exclusive: Europeans plan to keep ballistic missile sanctions on Iran,” Reuters, June 29, 2023; Arshad Mohammed et al., “Analysis: Smoldering Iran nuclear crisis risks catching fire,” Reuters, May 5, 2023. 79 See letter at https://tenney.house.gov/media/press-releases/reps-tenney-gottheimer-lead-letter-urging-european-allies-initiate-snapback. 80 Irish et al., op cit. 81 Ibid.; Lahav Harkov, “Europe not planning to ‘snapback’ Iran sanctions despite continued violations,” Jerusalem Post, July 5, 2023; Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros, “The Iran deal’s October sunsets: Sanctions without snapback,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 28, 2023. Congressional Research Service 12 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy UAVs According to CENTCOM, Iran has also developed “the largest and most capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicle force in the region,” with which it has attacked numerous foreign targets.82 While While
Iranian drones are not as technologically complex or advanced as the U.S. UAVs on which the Iranian drones are not as technologically complex or advanced as the U.S. UAVs on which the
Iranian versions are often modeled, they are a cost-effective way of projecting power, especially Iranian versions are often modeled, they are a cost-effective way of projecting power, especially
given Iran’s underdeveloped air force. Traditional air defense systems have difficulty intercepting given Iran’s underdeveloped air force. Traditional air defense systems have difficulty intercepting
UAVs, in part because such systems were designed to detect manned aircraft with larger radar UAVs, in part because such systems were designed to detect manned aircraft with larger radar
and/or heat signatures.and/or heat signatures.2583 Iran’s drone operations include attacks in September 2019 against Saudi Iran’s drone operations include attacks in September 2019 against Saudi
oil production facilities in Abqaiq, a complex assault that featured 18 drones and several land-oil production facilities in Abqaiq, a complex assault that featured 18 drones and several land-
attack cruise missiles; in July 2021 against an oil tanker off the coast of Oman; and in October attack cruise missiles; in July 2021 against an oil tanker off the coast of Oman; and in October
2021 against a U.S. military base in At Tanf, Syria. The Biden Administration has designated for 2021 against a U.S. military base in At Tanf, Syria. The Biden Administration has designated for
sanctions individuals and entities that have “provided critical support” to the IRGC’s UAV sanctions individuals and entities that have “provided critical support” to the IRGC’s UAV
programs,programs,2684 and in the 117th Congress the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations and in the 117th Congress the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported, a bill (H.R. 6089) that would have required the President to impose Committee reported, a bill (H.R. 6089) that would have required the President to impose
sanctions on persons that engage in activities related to Iranian UAVs.sanctions on persons that engage in activities related to Iranian UAVs.2785 In August 2022, Iran In August 2022, Iran
began transferring armed drones to Russia, which has used them against Ukrainian forces and began transferring armed drones to Russia, which has used them against Ukrainian forces and
civilian infrastructure.civilian infrastructure.28

8, 2021; “Iran attacks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,” Reuters, March 13, 2022; White House
press release, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Iran’s Missile and Drone Attacks in Northern
Iraq,” September 28, 2022.
21 Iran Military Power, op. cit. 43.
22 Annual Threat Assessment, op. cit.; Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is still growing in size, reach, and
accuracy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2021.
23 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,”
March 30, 2022.
24 Statement for the Record, op. cit.
2586 Foreign Policy and Regional Activities Iran’s foreign policy appears to reflect overlapping and at times contradictory motivations. These include: Threat Perception. Iran’s leaders argue that the United States and its allies seek to overturn Iran’s regime, claiming, for example, that the U.S. military presence in and around the Persian Gulf reflects an intent to intimidate or attack Iran. Per the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, “The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the United States and its regional allies.”87 Iranian officials describes the country’s missile program and other military programs as “defensive,” arguing that they serve as a deterrent to attacks by hostile powers.88 Iranian leaders have witnessed U.S. military intervention in two of Iran’s neighboring states (Iraq and Afghanistan), and continue to reference what former Secretary of State Albright described as the “significant role” played by the United States in “orchestrating 82 Statement for the Record, op. cit. 83 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran deploys drones to target internal threats, protect external interests,” Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran deploys drones to target internal threats, protect external interests,” RFE/RL, January 18, , January 18,
2022. 2022.
2684 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions network and individuals in connection with Iran’s unmanned U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions network and individuals in connection with Iran’s unmanned
aerial vehicle program,” October 29, 2021. aerial vehicle program,” October 29, 2021.
2785 The bill would amend Section 107 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA. P.L. The bill would amend Section 107 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA. P.L.
115-44) to include unmanned combat aerial vehicles. 115-44) to include unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
2886 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” Washington
Post, August 29, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian kamikaze drones creates , August 29, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian kamikaze drones creates
new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022. , September 17, 2022.
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Foreign Policy and Regional Activities29
Iran’s foreign policy appears to reflect overlapping and at times contradictory motivations. These
include
Threat Perception. Iran’s leaders argue that the United States and its allies seek to overturn
Iran’s regime, claiming, for example, that the U.S. military presence in and around the Persian
Gulf reflects an intent to intimidate or attack Iran. Per the 202387 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the
U.S. Intelligence Community, “The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle
with the United States and its regional allies.”30 Iranian officials describes the country’s missile
program and other military programs as “defensive,” arguing that they serve as a deterrent to
attacks by hostile powers.31 Iranian leaders have witnessed U.S. military intervention in two of
Iran’s neighboring states (Iraq and Afghanistan), and continue to reference what former Secretary
of State Albright described as the “significant role” played by the United States in “orchestrating
U.S. Intelligence Community, February 6, 2023. 88 Omer Carmi, “Khamenei’s First Speech of 2021: Reemphasizing U.S. Weakness, Iranian Self-Reliance,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2021; “Iran’s defensive power must increase daily and it does: Imam Khamenei,” Official Website of Ayatollah Khamenei (Khamenei.Ir), February 27, 2018. Congressional Research Service 13 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh” in 1953.the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh” in 1953.3289 Iranian Iranian
leaders describe U.S. sanctions as economic warfare against Iran.leaders describe U.S. sanctions as economic warfare against Iran.3390
Ideology. . Iran’sThe 1979 1979 IslamicIranian Revolution replaced a secular, U.S.-backed authoritarian leader Revolution replaced a secular, U.S.-backed authoritarian leader
with a Shia cleric-dominated regime, and that change infuses Iran’s foreign policy. Another with a Shia cleric-dominated regime, and that change infuses Iran’s foreign policy. Another
ideological element of the Islamic Revolution is the regime’s steadfast rhetorical opposition to the ideological element of the Islamic Revolution is the regime’s steadfast rhetorical opposition to the
existence of Israel. Since the revolution, that enmity has fed Iran-Israel tensions, with broad existence of Israel. Since the revolution, that enmity has fed Iran-Israel tensions, with broad
implications for the region and U.S. policy.implications for the region and U.S. policy.3491
Pragmatism. Iranian leaders have expressed a commitment to aiding other Shia Muslims, but at . Iranian leaders have expressed a commitment to aiding other Shia Muslims, but at
times have tempered that approach times have tempered that approach in order to advanceto preserve Iran’s geopolitical interests. For example, Iran has Iran’s geopolitical interests. For example, Iran has
supported Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than supported Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shi’aShia-inhabited Azerbaijan, possibly in part to -inhabited Azerbaijan, possibly in part to
thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority.thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority.3592 President Raisi has President Raisi has
also tried to improve relations with neighboring Gulf states, an effort that appears to place also tried to improve relations with neighboring Gulf states, an effort that appears to place
domestic economic concerns ahead of traditional regional rivalries.domestic economic concerns ahead of traditional regional rivalries.3693 Iran’s March 2023 Iran’s March 2023
agreement to reestablish ties with rival Saudi Arabia (see agreement to reestablish ties with rival Saudi Arabia (see textboxtext box below) may also reflect this below) may also reflect this
approach. approach.
Factional Interests and Competition. Iran’s foreign policy has reflected differing approaches . Iran’s foreign policy has reflected differing approaches
among key internal actors and groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei sits at the apex of several among key internal actors and groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei sits at the apex of several
decisionmaking and advisory councils dominated by hardliners decisionmaking and advisory councils dominated by hardliners thatwho seek to shield Iran from Western political and cultural influence. More moderate Iranian leaders, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, have at times sought to use engagement with the West as a way to attract greater foreign investment and boost Iran’s economy.94 Regional Proxies and Allies Iran backs a number of political and armed groups in the Middle East as part of what some experts call a “forward defense” strategy, guided by the principle that “Iran should fight its opponents outside its borders to prevent conflict inside Iran.”95 U.S. officials characterize the Iranian government’s support for these regional proxies and allies as a threat to U.S. interests and forces in the region. The 2023 intelligence community threat assessment predicted that Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states and minimize threats to regime security….Iranian-supported proxies will seek to launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and Syria, and perhaps in other countries and regions.96 89 seek to shield Iran from

29 For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman;
congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
30 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 6, 2023.
31 Omer Carmi, “Khamenei’s First Speech of 2021: Reemphasizing U.S. Weakness, Iranian Self-Reliance,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2021; “Iran’s defensive power must increase daily and it does:
Imam Khamenei,” Khamenei.Ir, February 27, 2018.
32 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, March 17, 2000; “Conflicts Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, March 17, 2000; “Conflicts
between Iran and US goes back to 1953 coup,” between Iran and US goes back to 1953 coup,” Khamenei.Ir, November 2, 2022. , November 2, 2022.
3390 “Sanctions are ‘US way of war’, Iranian President at UN,” UN News, September 21, 2021. “Sanctions are ‘US way of war’, Iranian President at UN,” UN News, September 21, 2021.
3491 For more information on Israel’s approach to threats it perceives from Iran, as relevant to U.S. foreign policy, see For more information on Israel’s approach to threats it perceives from Iran, as relevant to U.S. foreign policy, see
CRS Report R44245, CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
3592 Borzou Daraghi, “Nagorno-Karaback: An unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran,” Atlantic Council, Borzou Daraghi, “Nagorno-Karaback: An unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran,” Atlantic Council,
November 9, 2020; Vali Kaleji, “Iran increasingly uneasy about threats to common border with Armenia,” November 9, 2020; Vali Kaleji, “Iran increasingly uneasy about threats to common border with Armenia,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, October 14, 2022. , October 14, 2022.
3693 “Iran’s regional agenda and the call for détente with the Gulf states,” Middle East Institute, March 17, 2022. “Iran’s regional agenda and the call for détente with the Gulf states,” Middle East Institute, March 17, 2022.
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Western political and cultural influence. More moderate Iranian leaders, such as former94 “Iranian President President
Hassan Rouhani, have at times sought to use engagement with the West as a way to attract greater
foreign investment and boost Iran’s economy.37
Regional Proxies and Allies
U.S. officials characterize the Iranian government’s support for regional proxies and allies as a
threat to U.S. interests and forces in the region. The 2023 intelligence community threat
assessment predicted that, “Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S.
influence in the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states [...]
Iranian-supported proxies will seek to launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and
Syria, and perhaps in other countries and regions.”38Hassan Rouhani in Paris to court investors,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2016. 95 Amr Yossef, “Upgrading Iran’s military doctrine: An offensive ‘forward defense,’” Middle East Institute, December 10, 2019; Alex Vatanka, Whither the IRGC of the 2020s? Is Iran’s Proxy Warfare Strategy of Forward Defense Sustainable? New America, January 15, 2021. 96 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 6, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy
Iraq. Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq continue to carry out intermittent rocket, drone, and . Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq continue to carry out intermittent rocket, drone, and
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and support systems. improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and support systems.
These groups seek to revise or rescind Iraq’s invitation to the U.S. military to retain an advisory These groups seek to revise or rescind Iraq’s invitation to the U.S. military to retain an advisory
presence in Iraq beyond the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the country in December presence in Iraq beyond the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the country in December
2021. They also seek to retaliate for the January 2020 U.S. strike in Baghdad that killed IRGC-2021. They also seek to retaliate for the January 2020 U.S. strike in Baghdad that killed IRGC-
Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the head of the Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the head of the Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib
Hezbollah.Hezbollah.3997 Iran also has carried out strikes in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, targeting what Iran Iran also has carried out strikes in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, targeting what Iran
alleges are support networks for Israel and Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. alleges are support networks for Israel and Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.
Syria. Iran-backed militias have used Syria as a base from which to target U.S. armed forces and . Iran-backed militias have used Syria as a base from which to target U.S. armed forces and
facilities in Iraq. They also have targeted U.S. forces in Syria in what U.S. officials have facilities in Iraq. They also have targeted U.S. forces in Syria in what U.S. officials have
sometimes described as retaliation for Israeli airstrikes on Iranian forces in Syria.sometimes described as retaliation for Israeli airstrikes on Iranian forces in Syria.4098 U.S. officials U.S. officials
assess that Iran’s government seeks a permanent military presence in Syria to bolster its regional assess that Iran’s government seeks a permanent military presence in Syria to bolster its regional
influence, support influence, support Lebanon’sLebanese Hezbollah, and threaten Israel. Hezbollah, and threaten Israel.4199
Lebanon. Iran’s support for Hezbollah, including providing thousands of rockets and short-range . Iran’s support for Hezbollah, including providing thousands of rockets and short-range
missiles, helps Iran acquire leverage against Israel, a key regional adversary.missiles, helps Iran acquire leverage against Israel, a key regional adversary.42100 Israel has stated Israel has stated
that Iran may be supplying Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, and that Iran may be supplying Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, and
assisting Hezbollah in creating an indigenous production capability for rockets, missiles, and assisting Hezbollah in creating an indigenous production capability for rockets, missiles, and
drones that could threaten Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen.drones that could threaten Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen.43101
Yemen. Iran’s support to the Houthi movement in Yemen—including supplying ballistic and . Iran’s support to the Houthi movement in Yemen—including supplying ballistic and
cruise missiles, as well as unmanned systems—has enabled the group to target U.S. partners, cruise missiles, as well as unmanned systems—has enabled the group to target U.S. partners,
including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.44102 Iran reportedly agreed to halt arms shipments to the Houthis as part of its March 2023 agreement with Saudi Arabia (see text box below). Gaza and the West Bank. Iran continues to support the Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant groups Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), whose Gaza-based operations threaten parts of Israel with rockets, missiles, and drones. Both groups also have taken steps to make inroads into the West Bank, ostensibly to undermine Israeli and Palestinian Authority control there. Iran’s Relations with China and Russia Iran has acted to maintain and expand economic and military ties with Beijing and Moscow, reflecting what analysts describe as a “look East” strategy favored by hardline leaders, including President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei.103 In 2024, Iran is slated to formally join the 97 Iran reportedly agreed to halt arms

37 “Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Paris to court investors,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2016.
38 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 6, 2023.
39 For additional background see, CRS Report R46148, For additional background see, CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions, ,
coordinated by Clayton Thomas. coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
“Iran vows to avenge Qassem Soleimani’s killing three years ago,” Al Jazeera, January 3, 2023. 98 40 “Strike on U.S. Base Was Iranian Response to Israeli Attack, Officials Say,” “Strike on U.S. Base Was Iranian Response to Israeli Attack, Officials Say,” New York Times, November 18, 2021. , November 18, 2021.
4199 See, for example, Posture statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., before the Senate Armed Services See, for example, Posture statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 15, 2022. Committee, March 15, 2022.
42100 For more, see CRS Report R44245, For more, see CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
43101 Fabian Hintz, Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, , International Institute for Strategic Studies,
April April 26, 2021; “Israeli minister says Iran using Syria facilities for weapons production,” 2021; “Israeli minister says Iran using Syria facilities for weapons production,” Reuters, September 12, 2022. , September 12, 2022.
44 102 Seth Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi war against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Seth Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi war against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 21, 2021; Bruce Reidel, “Yemen war spreads to the UAE,” Brookings, February 10, 2022. December 21, 2021; Bruce Reidel, “Yemen war spreads to the UAE,” Brookings, February 10, 2022.
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shipments to the Houthis as part of its March 2023 agreement with Saudi Arabia (see textbox
below).
Gaza Strip. Iran continues to support the Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant groups Hamas and
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), whose Gaza-based operations threaten parts of Israel with rockets,
missiles, and drones. Both groups also seek to make inroads into the West Bank to undermine
Israeli and Palestinian Authority control there.
Iran’s Relations with China and Russia
Iran has sought to maintain and expand economic and military ties with Beijing and Moscow,
reflecting what analysts describe as a “look East” strategy favored by hardline leaders including
President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei.45
103 Javad Heiran-Nia, “How Iran’s interpretation of the world order affects its foreign policy,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2022; Pierre Pahlavi, “The origins and foundations of Iran’s “Look East” policy,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy BRICS group of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), along with Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.104 The economic and political impacts of Iran’s BRICS membership are likely to be minimal, at least in the short term, but Iranian leaders characterize joining the group as a “strategic victory” that will buttress the Iranian government’s efforts to resist U.S.-led attempts to isolate and pressure it (including sanctions).105 For the past several decades, the For the past several decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has taken steps to (PRC or China) has taken steps to
deepen its financial presence in numerous sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as to expand deepen its financial presence in numerous sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as to expand
military cooperation. China is Iran’s largest trade partner and the largest importer of Iran’s crude military cooperation. China is Iran’s largest trade partner and the largest importer of Iran’s crude
oil and condensatesoil and condensates.46; Chinese imports of Iranian oil have grown to nearly a million barrels per day in 2023.106 Over the years, the PRC has become a source of capital for Iran, in line Over the years, the PRC has become a source of capital for Iran, in line
with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a series of energy and transportation with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a series of energy and transportation
corridors extending throughout Eurasia. On March 27, 2021, Iran and the PRC signed a 25-year corridors extending throughout Eurasia. On March 27, 2021, Iran and the PRC signed a 25-year
China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan “to tap the potential for cooperation in areas such as China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan “to tap the potential for cooperation in areas such as
economy and culture and map out prospects for cooperation in the long run.”economy and culture and map out prospects for cooperation in the long run.”47107 Before doing so Before doing so
was banned by the was banned by the UNU.N. Security Council, the PRC openly supplied Iran with advanced Security Council, the PRC openly supplied Iran with advanced
conventional arms, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol boats that the IRGC Navy operates conventional arms, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol boats that the IRGC Navy operates
in the Persian Gulf; anti-ship missiles; ballistic missile guidance systems; and other technology in the Persian Gulf; anti-ship missiles; ballistic missile guidance systems; and other technology
related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).48108 U.S. officials also report U.S. officials also report
that PRC-based entities have supplied Iran-backed armed groups with UAV technology.that PRC-based entities have supplied Iran-backed armed groups with UAV technology.49109 The The
United States has imposed sanctions on a number of PRC-based entities for allegedly supplying United States has imposed sanctions on a number of PRC-based entities for allegedly supplying
Iran’s missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons programs. Tehran has Iran’s missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons programs. Tehran has reportedly viewed with
apprehensionreacted negatively to closer Chinese relations with Saudi Arabia (Iran’s primary regional rival) and the closer Chinese relations with Saudi Arabia (Iran’s primary regional rival) and the
UAE (with which Iran has strong economic ties but also some territorial disputes).UAE (with which Iran has strong economic ties but also some territorial disputes).50110
March 2023 China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement
In March 2023, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China announced that Iran and Saudi Arabia would reestablish diplomatic In March 2023, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China announced that Iran and Saudi Arabia would reestablish diplomatic
relations (suspended since 2016), reopen embassies in each other’s capitals, and reinitiate exchanges pursuant to relations (suspended since 2016), reopen embassies in each other’s capitals, and reinitiate exchanges pursuant to
bilateral accords signed during a previous period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (in 1998 and 2001).bilateral accords signed during a previous period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (in 1998 and 2001).51 In the

45 Pierre Pahlavi, “The origins and foundations of Iran’s “Look East” policy,” Australian Institute of International
Affairs, October 4, 2022.
46 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran,” November 17, 2022.
47111 In the China-brokered agreement, Iran and Saudi Arabia affirmed their respect for “non-interference in internal affairs of states.” One media source indicates that specific elements include a Saudi pledge to “tone down critical coverage of Iran” by a Saudi-linked media outlet and an Iranian pledge to halt arms shipments to the Houthis in Yemen.112 104 Farnaz Fassihi et al., “What to know about the 6 nations joining BRICS,” New York Times, August 23, 2023. 105 “Deep dive: Iran hails invite to join BRICS, but few expect major dividends,” Amwaj.media, August 25, 2023; Farnaz Fassihi, “With BRICS invite, Iran shrugs off outcast status in the West,” New York Times, August 25, 2023. 106 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran,” November 17, 2022; “China’s Iranian oil imports hit 10-year record high: report,” Tehran Times, August 16, 2023. 107 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif,” March 28, 2021. Zarif,” March 28, 2021.
48108 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,
2019. 2019.
49109 Testimony of Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the Testimony of Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022.
50110 Jacopo Scita, “When it comes to Iran, China is shifting the balance,” Jacopo Scita, “When it comes to Iran, China is shifting the balance,” Bourse and Bazaar, December 13, 2022; Tala , December 13, 2022; Tala
Taslimi, “China’s embrace of Saudi Arabia leaves Iran out in the cold,” Taslimi, “China’s embrace of Saudi Arabia leaves Iran out in the cold,” Nikkei Asia, December 13, 2022. , December 13, 2022.
51111 See Joint Trilateral Statement at https://twitter.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1634180277764276227. For more on past See Joint Trilateral Statement at https://twitter.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1634180277764276227. For more on past
agreements, see Faris Almaari, “Clarifying the status of previous Iran-Saudi agreements,” Washington Institute for agreements, see Faris Almaari, “Clarifying the status of previous Iran-Saudi agreements,” Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, March 16, 2023. Near East Policy, March 16, 2023.
112 Summer Said et al., “China plans new Middle East summit as diplomatic role takes shape,” Wall Street Journal, (continued...) Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

916 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy The Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers exchanged visits in June and August 2023, and both countries have, as of August 2023, reopened their embassies.

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China-brokered agreement, Iran and Saudi Arabia affirmed their respect for “non-interference in internal affairs of
states.” One media source indicates that specific elements include a Saudi pledge to “tone down critical coverage
of Iran” by a Saudi-linked media outlet and an Iranian pledge to halt arms shipments to the Houthis in Yemen.52 It
is unclear what commitments, if any, China may have made as part of the agreement.
The Biden Administration indicated that it conditionally welcomed the agreement, while highlighting uncertainty The Biden Administration indicated that it conditionally welcomed the agreement, while highlighting uncertainty
over “whether the Iranians are going to honor their side of the deal” given the legacy of Iran’s support to the over “whether the Iranians are going to honor their side of the deal” given the legacy of Iran’s support to the
Houthis in Yemen.Houthis in Yemen.53113 CENTCOM Commander General Kuril a cautioned, “ CENTCOM Commander General Kuril a cautioned, “an agreement is not implementation”
and “They have had diplomatic relations in the past while they were stil shooting at each other in the past.”They have had diplomatic relations in the past while they were stil shooting at each other in the past.”54
114 Some Administration officials have characterized the agreement as “a good thing” that advances the U.S. goal of Some Administration officials have characterized the agreement as “a good thing” that advances the U.S. goal of
“de-escalation in the Middle East,” while downplaying the significance of the deal and of China’s role in brokering “de-escalation in the Middle East,” while downplaying the significance of the deal and of China’s role in brokering
it.55it.115 Observers have expressed a range of views. Some view the PRC initiative as a sea change in regional Observers have expressed a range of views. Some view the PRC initiative as a sea change in regional
diplomacy and as an indication of China’s increased influence, while others see it as a modest win for China.diplomacy and as an indication of China’s increased influence, while others see it as a modest win for China.56116 The The
implications of the deal for U.S. policy also elicited a range of views. Some experts perceive the deal as a major implications of the deal for U.S. policy also elicited a range of views. Some experts perceive the deal as a major
blow to U.S. credibility, while others argue that, despite China’s foray into Middle Eastern diplomacy, the United blow to U.S. credibility, while others argue that, despite China’s foray into Middle Eastern diplomacy, the United
States remains the essential partner to Gulf Arab states.States remains the essential partner to Gulf Arab states.57117 Following Russia’s
Russia has traditionally been Iran’s main supplier of conventional weaponry and a significant
supplier of nuclear- and missile-related technology (for their role in the latter, Russian companies
have been subject to U.S. sanctions). U.S. officials have expressed concern with Iran-Russia
military cooperation, particularly in Syria. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, invasion of Ukraine in early 2022,
Russia and Iran—both under Russia and Iran—both under extensive U.S. sanctions—have deepened their relationship. Since August U.S. sanctions—have deepened their relationship. Since August
2022, Iran has transferred armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) to Russia, which 2022, Iran has transferred armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) to Russia, which
has used them against a range of targets in Ukraine. These transfers (and potential transfers of has used them against a range of targets in Ukraine. These transfers (and potential transfers of
ballistic missiles) have implications for the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine as well as for U.S. ballistic missiles) have implications for the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine as well as for U.S.
efforts to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia's invasion. In late 2022, Administration efforts to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia's invasion. In late 2022, Administration
officials warned that the relationship between Iran and Russia was advancing beyond the sale of officials warned that the relationship between Iran and Russia was advancing beyond the sale of
drones; a National Security Council spokesperson stated, “Russia is offering Iran an drones; a National Security Council spokesperson stated, “Russia is offering Iran an
unprecedented level of military and technical support that is transforming their relationship to a unprecedented level of military and technical support that is transforming their relationship to a
full-fledged defense partnership.”full-fledged defense partnership.”58 In February 2023, media reports suggested that118 According to media reports, Iran and Iran and
Russia were advancing plans to constructRussia have constructed and are operating a factory in Russia to produce a factory in Russia to produce thousands of Iranian-designed drones Iranian-designed drones
for Russia’s war in Ukraine.for Russia’s war in Ukraine.59

52 Summer Said et al., “China plans new Middle East summit as diplomatic role takes shape,” Wall Street Journal,
119 Iran’s Nuclear Program120 U.S. policymakers have signaled concern for decades that Tehran might attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons- March 12, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Iran agrees to stop arming Houthis in Yemen as part of pact with Saudi March 12, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Iran agrees to stop arming Houthis in Yemen as part of pact with Saudi
Arabia,” Arabia,” Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2023. , March 16, 2023.
53113 Patsy Widakuswara, “White House welcomes Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran deal,” Patsy Widakuswara, “White House welcomes Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran deal,” VOA, March 10, 2023. , March 10, 2023.
54114 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Authorization Request for Central “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Authorization Request for Central
Command and Africa Command,” Command and Africa Command,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 16, 2023. , March 16, 2023.
55115 Nahal Toosi and Phelim Kine, “U.S. officials project calm as China stuns world with Iran-Saudi deal,” Nahal Toosi and Phelim Kine, “U.S. officials project calm as China stuns world with Iran-Saudi deal,” Politico, ,
March 13, 2023. March 13, 2023.
56116 “Experts react: Iran and Saudi Arabia just agreed to restore relations, with help from China. Here’s what that means “Experts react: Iran and Saudi Arabia just agreed to restore relations, with help from China. Here’s what that means
for the Middle East and the world,” Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023. for the Middle East and the world,” Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023.
57 117 Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, “How China’s Saudi-Iran deal can serve U.S. interests,” Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, “How China’s Saudi-Iran deal can serve U.S. interests,” Foreign Policy, March , March
14, 2023; Adam Gallagher et al, “What you need to know about China’s Saudi-Iran deal,” United States Institute of 14, 2023; Adam Gallagher et al, “What you need to know about China’s Saudi-Iran deal,” United States Institute of
Peace, March 16, 2023. Peace, March 16, 2023.
58118 “Russia and Iran Military Ties Deepening Into Partnership, Biden Administration Warns,” “Russia and Iran Military Ties Deepening Into Partnership, Biden Administration Warns,” Wall Street Journal, ,
December 9, 2022. December 9, 2022.
59119 “Moscow, Tehran Advance Plans for Iranian-Designed Drone Facility in Russia,” “Moscow, Tehran Advance Plans for Iranian-Designed Drone Facility in Russia,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, , February 5,
20232023.
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Iran’s Nuclear Program60
U.S. policymakers have signaled concern for decades that Tehran might attempt to develop
nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently
the main source of concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Gas centrifuges can produce
both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-
; Dalton Bennett and Mary Ilyushina, “Inside the Russian effort to build 6,000 attack drones with Iran’s help,” Washington Post, August 17, 2023. 120 Material in this section is drawn from CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit which contains additional information on Iran’s nuclear program and the JCPOA. Congressional Research Service 17 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in
nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders claim that the country’s LEU production is only for Tehran’s nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders claim that the country’s LEU production is only for Tehran’s
current and future civil nuclear reactors. current and future civil nuclear reactors.
U.S. policy has focused on using various means of coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran to agree to U.S. policy has focused on using various means of coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran to agree to
limits on its nuclear program. The Obama Administration pursued a “dual track” strategy of limits on its nuclear program. The Obama Administration pursued a “dual track” strategy of
stronger economic pressure through increased sanctions coupled with offers of sanctions relief if stronger economic pressure through increased sanctions coupled with offers of sanctions relief if
Iran accepted constraints on the nuclear program. Many observers assess that U.S. and Iran accepted constraints on the nuclear program. Many observers assess that U.S. and
multilateral sanctions contributed to Iran’s 2013 decision to enter into negotiations that concluded multilateral sanctions contributed to Iran’s 2013 decision to enter into negotiations that concluded
in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).61 For more on Trump and Biden
Administration approaches, see below.
121 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S.
and and UNU.N. Security Council economic sanctions. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment and Security Council economic sanctions. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment and
heavy water reactor programs and provided for enhanced heavy water reactor programs and provided for enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)IAEA monitoring to detect Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weapons using either declared or monitoring to detect Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weapons using either declared or
covert facilities. The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement, according to U.S. officials, covert facilities. The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement, according to U.S. officials,
extended the nuclear breakout time—the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough extended the nuclear breakout time—the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough
weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon—to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon—to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at
least 10 years.least 10 years.62122 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production, In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production,
the JCPOA indefinitely prohibited Iranian “activities which could contribute to the design and the JCPOA indefinitely prohibited Iranian “activities which could contribute to the design and
development of a nuclear explosive device,” including research and diagnostic activities. The development of a nuclear explosive device,” including research and diagnostic activities. The
IAEA continues to monitor Iranian compliance with the JCPOA provisions but since 2019 has IAEA continues to monitor Iranian compliance with the JCPOA provisions but since 2019 has
reported diminishing Iranian cooperation with JCPOA-mandated monitoring.reported diminishing Iranian cooperation with JCPOA-mandated monitoring.63123
Sanctions relief..64124 In accordance with the JCPOA, the United States waived its secondary In accordance with the JCPOA, the United States waived its secondary
sanctions—restrictions on any third country engaging in some types of trade with Iran, primarily sanctions—restrictions on any third country engaging in some types of trade with Iran, primarily
in the energy sector—in 2016. The secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation in the energy sector—in 2016. The secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation
included (1) sanctions that limited Iran’s exportation of oil and foreign sales to Iran of gasoline included (1) sanctions that limited Iran’s exportation of oil and foreign sales to Iran of gasoline

60 Material in this section is drawn from CRS Report R43333, by Paul K. Kerr, Clayton Thomas, and Carla E. Humud,
which contains additional information on Iran’s nuclear program and the JCPOA.
61 Uri Berliner, “Crippled by sanctions, Iran’s economy key in nuclear deal,” NPR, November 25, 2013; Amir Toumaj,
“Iran’s economy of resistance: implications for future sanctions,” AEI, November 17, 2014; “Inside the Iran nuclear
deal,” Harvard Gazette, October 6, 2015.
62 “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iran,” July 14, 2015. U.S. Secretary of Energy
Ernest Moniz described this timeline as “very, very conservative” in an April 2015 interview (Michael Crowley,
“Ernest Moniz: Iran Deal Closes Enrichment Loophole,” Politico, April 7, 2015). See also CRS In Focus IF12106, Iran
and Nuclear Weapons Production, by Paul K. Kerr.
63 CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K.
Kerr.
64 For additional details on sanctions waived under the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
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and energy sector equipment, and whichand energy sector equipment, and that limited foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2) limited foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2)
financial sector sanctions, including trading in Iran’s currency, the financial sector sanctions, including trading in Iran’s currency, the rial; and (3) sanctions on ; and (3) sanctions on
Iran’s auto sectorIran’s auto sector. The European Union (EU) lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; The European Union (EU) lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran;
and Iranian banks were readmitted to the SWIFT financial messaging services system.and Iranian banks were readmitted to the SWIFT financial messaging services system.65125 The The UNU.N.
Security Council revoked its resolutions that required member states to impose restrictions. The Security Council revoked its resolutions that required member states to impose restrictions. The
JCPOA did not require the lifting of U.S. sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade or sanctions levied JCPOA did not require the lifting of U.S. sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade or sanctions levied
for Iran’s support for regional armed factions and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses, or its for Iran’s support for regional armed factions and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses, or its
efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. The United States
reimposed sanctions waived pursuant to JCPOA implementation in 2018 (see below).
Post-JCPOA developments. The International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) has
reported that some of Iran’s nuclear activities exceed JCPOA-mandated limits, including Iran’s
LEU stockpile and number of enrichment locations. In March 2023, after the detection of
uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent at Iran’s Fordow enrichment site sparked U.S. and
international concern,66 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the agency and Iran
“have initiated technical discussions to fully clarify this issue.”67 Following a January IAEA
inspection of the Fordow facility, during which inspectors observed that Iran was operating
centrifuges in a manner inconsistent with Tehran’s declaration to the agency, Iran agreed to
“facilitate the further increase in the frequency and intensity of Agency verification activities” at
the Fordow site, Grossi added.68 The U.S. Representative to the IAEA welcomed the
announcement but stated, “too many times in the past, Iran has issued similarly vague promises
for cooperation in order to avoid international censure, only to never follow through.”69
U.S.-Iran Relations: History and Recent Approaches
Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an authoritarian monarch who ruled from 1941 until 1979,
Iran was a close U.S. security partner, receiving a total of nearly $15 billion in U.S. foreign
assistance to buttress its position against the neighboring Soviet Union.70 Domestically, the
Shah’s social policies achieved some results but also alienated many Iranians; the government
jailed tens of thousands as political prisoners and tortured many. Many other Iranians went into
exile abroad, including prominent Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. Mass public protests by
both religious and secular Iranians against the Shah’s rule escalated throughout 1978, culminating
in the Shah’s January 1979 flight into exile, Khomeini’s return the following month, and the
March 1979 replacement of the monarchy with a new Islamic Republic that quickly moved to
suppress domestic opposition.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a turning point for U.S. policy toward Iran, and the two
countries have not had diplomatic relations since 1980, a result of the U.S. Embassy hostage
crisis.71 U.S.-Iran tensions continued in the following decade, punctuated by armed confrontations

65 121 Uri Berliner, “Crippled by sanctions, Iran’s economy key in nuclear deal,” NPR, November 25, 2013; Amir Toumaj, “Iran’s economy of resistance: implications for future sanctions,” AEI, November 17, 2014; “Inside the Iran nuclear deal,” Harvard Gazette, October 6, 2015. 122 “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iran,” July 14, 2015. U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz described this timeline as “very, very conservative” in an April 2015 interview (Michael Crowley, “Ernest Moniz: Iran Deal Closes Enrichment Loophole,” Politico, April 7, 2015). See also CRS In Focus IF12106, Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production, by Paul K. Kerr. 123 CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr. 124 For additional details on sanctions waived under the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. 125 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), based in Belgium, provides a financial The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), based in Belgium, provides a financial
messaging service to facilitate cross-border transactions, including payments involving multiple currencies. messaging service to facilitate cross-border transactions, including payments involving multiple currencies.
International energy-sector trade heavily depends on SWIFT services. International energy-sector trade heavily depends on SWIFT services.
66 Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran nuclear advance challenges U.S. as time to make potential bomb shortens,”
Washington Post, March 2, 2023.
67 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, March 6, 2023.
68 Ibid.
69 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, U.S. Statement as
Delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate, March 8, 2023.
70 Figure is in constant dollars (retrieved September 2022) from foreignassistance.gov.
71 For an account of the crisis, see Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).
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12Congressional Research Service 18 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. The United States reimposed sanctions waived pursuant to JCPOA implementation in 2018 (see below). Post-2019 developments.126 The IAEA has reported that some of Iran’s nuclear activities, including Iran’s LEU stockpile and number of enrichment locations, exceed JCPOA-mandated limits, and that the agency is unable to fully perform JCPOA verification and monitoring activities. In March 2023, after the detection of uranium particles enriched to 83.7% at Iran’s Fordow enrichment site sparked U.S. and international concern,127 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the agency and Iran “have initiated technical discussions to fully clarify this issue.”128 In June 2023, Grossi reported that “some progress has been made, but not as much as I had hoped,” though the agency reportedly had no further questions regarding the highly enriched uranium particles.129 In response, the U.S. Representative to the IAEA “underscored that Iran’s production of uranium enriched up to 60% has no credible peaceful purpose,” and called on Iran to “cease its nuclear provocations.”130 In June 2023, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities that would be necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”131 Issues for Congress Sanctions132 Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress.133 U.S. sanctions on Iran are multifaceted and complex, a result of over four decades of legislative, administrative, and law enforcement actions by successive presidential administrations and Congresses. U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, when President Jimmy Carter issued executive orders blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the United States. In 1984, Secretary of State George Schultz designated the government of Iran a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism (SSOT) following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s status as an SSOT triggers several sanctions including restrictions on licenses for U.S. dual-use exports; a ban on U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and support in the international financial 126 For more, see CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr. 127 Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran nuclear advance challenges U.S. as time to make potential bomb shortens,” Washington Post, March 2, 2023. 128 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, March 6, 2023. 129 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, June 5, 2023; Stephanie Liechtenstein, “International Atomic Energy Agency reports seen by AP say Iran resolves 2 inquiries by inspectors,” Associated Press, May 31, 2023. 130 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, U.S. Statement as Delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate, June 6, 2023. 131 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022, June 2023. 132 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12452, U.S. Sanctions on Iran, by Clayton Thomas. 133 For details on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 23

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Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

in the Gulf and Iran-backed terrorist attacks (including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy
and Marine barracks in Beirut). U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 1979, continued apace with the
government of Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1984, the
imposition of an embargo on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran in 1995, and the first
imposition of secondary sanctions (U.S. penalties against firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector)
in 1996.
Approaches under the Trump and Biden Administrations
In comparing recent Administrations’ approaches to Iran, various points of continuity and change
emerge, with Biden Administration policy apparently continuing elements of both the Obama and
Trump Administrations. The Trump Administration reimposed sanctions that the Obama
Administration had imposed prior to the JCPOA but lifted as part of that deal, and sanctions
newly imposed by the Trump Administration remain in place under the Biden Administration. At
the same time, the Biden Administration has sought to resuscitate the JCPOA, but the United
States and Iran have not engaged directly as happened under the Obama Administration. The
September 2022 outbreak of nationwide unrest in Iran appears to have shifted the Biden
Administration’s focus away from reviving the JCPOA, prospects for the revival of which were
reportedly already dimming.
Trump Administration Policy
U.S. policy toward Iran shifted significantly under the Trump Administration. As a candidate,
Donald Trump said “my number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”72
Though then-President Trump initially certified to Congress in April and July 2017 that Iran was
in compliance with the agreement (under an INARA requirement to submit such a report every 90
days),73 in October 2017 President Trump announced he would not submit another certification of
Iranian compliance, saying, “Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.”74 In January 2018,
President Trump announced that he would again waive the application of certain energy-sector
sanctions as a “last chance” to “secure our European allies’ agreement to fix” the JCPOA.75 No
such deal was reached, and President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that the United States
would cease participating in the JCPOA, reinstating all sanctions that the United States had
waived or terminated in meeting in meeting its JCPOA obligations. All sanctions went back into
effect as of November 2018.
In articulating a new Iran strategy in May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that due to
“unprecedented financial pressure” through reimposed U.S. sanctions, U.S. military deterrence,
and U.S. advocacy, “we hope, and indeed we expect, that the Iranian regime will come to its
senses.”76 He also laid out 12 demands for any future agreement with Iran, including the
withdrawal of Iranian support for armed groups and proxies throughout the region. Iran’s leaders
rejected U.S. demands and insisted the United States return to compliance with the JCPOA before

72 “Full transcript: First 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, September 27, 2016; “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to
AIPAC,” Time, March 21, 2016.
73 Sections 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as added by INARA (P.L. 114-17).
74 “Transcript: Trump’s Remarks on Iran nuclear deal,” NPR, October 13, 2017. The October 2017 decertification
triggered a 60-day window for Congress to consider, under expedited procedures per INARA, legislation to re-impose
sanctions lifted as part of the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. Congress did not do so.
75 Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, White House, January 12, 2018.
76 “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018.
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engaging on a new or revised accord. The Trump Administration policy of applying “maximum
pressure” on Iran after late 2018 took two forms: additional sanctions and limited military action.
After U.S. sanctions were reinstated in November 2018, the Administration designated for
sanctions a number of additional entities under existing authorities (e.g., designating Iran’s
Central Bank under Executive Order [E.O.] 13224, adding to the Central Bank’s designation as a
proliferation entity under E.O. 13382); issued new authorities (e.g., E.O. 13876, sanctioning the
office of the Supreme Leader); and designated the entirety of Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern.”77
From mid-2019 on, Iran escalated its regional military activities, at times coming into direct
military conflict with the United States (such when Iran shot down an unmanned U.S.
surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf in June 2019). Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf and a complex September 2019 drone attack against Saudi Arabian oil production
facilities further increased tensions. Those tensions peaked in the Trump Administration’s January
3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, and Iran’s
retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces in Iraq.78 Iran responded with ballistic missile attacks
against U.S. forces based in Iraq that left over one hundred U.S. military personnel injured, and
attacks by Iran-backed forces in Iraq against U.S. targets continued over the following year. Iran
also began exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear activities according to the IAEA.
Biden Administration Policy
As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Trump Administration’s Iran policy as a
“dangerous failure” that had isolated the United States from its international partners, allowed
Iran to increase its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and raised tensions throughout the region.79
He pledged to “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy” by promising to have the United
States rejoin the JCPOA as long as “Iran returns to strict compliance” with it.
Less than a month after taking office, the Biden Administration offered to restart talks with Iran to
revive the JCPOA and appointed Robert Malley as Special Envoy for Iran. However, Iran refused
to engage directly with the United States until the United States decreased sanctions pressure,
necessitating indirect negotiations facilitated by the EU and other JCPOA partners. During
multiple subsequent rounds of talks, negotiators reported slow and uneven progress, with talks
sometimes paused for weeks or months at a time. In August 2022, reports indicated that all sides
were close to achieving agreement before again stalling over Iran’s reported revival of some
demands that the other parties had considered closed issues.80 Since then, U.S. officials have
stated that JCPOA talks are not a U.S. policy priority.81
President Biden has said, “Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch,” and
Administration officials have told Congress that a negotiated settlement akin to the JCPOA is the
best way to achieve that goal.82 Administration officials also argue that it is not possible to resolve

77 Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 31 Code Federal Regulations Part
1010, 84 Federal Register 59302.
78 For more, see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions.
79 Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020.
80 Ishaan Tharoor, “Is the Iran deal worth salvaging?” Washington Post, August 26, 2022; “Iran nuclear talks in
‘stalemate,’ says EU foreign policy chief,” Arab News, September 15, 2022.
81 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on the Administration’s efforts to advance
the free flow of information for the Iranian people, September 23, 2022.
82 White House, Remarks by President Biden and President Rivlin of the State of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting, Jun
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the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program militarily, while maintaining that all U.S. options remain
available.83 In March 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, “President Biden’s
preference is to explore all diplomatic avenues to ensure that we constrain Iran’s progress in this
field...And my job as secretary of defense...is to provide the president options if he so desires.”84
Other Biden Administration courses of action related to Iran include:
 New sanctions. The Biden Administration has not exerted any new sanctions
authorities but has continued to designate for sanctions Iranian and third-country-
based entities pursuant to existing U.S. laws and executive orders. Newly
designated entities include individuals involved in oil smuggling networks; IRGC
financial facilitators; individuals involved in Iran’s UAV programs; an air
transportation service provider for its role in shipping Iranian UAVs to Russia for
use in Ukraine; and Iran’s Morality Police.
 Military activities. U.S. armed forces have reportedly struck Iran-related targets
in Iraq (June 2021) and Syria (February 2021, June 2021, January 2022, and
August 2022) in response to attacks by Iran-backed entities on U.S. forces.85 U.S.
naval forces have interdicted or supported the interdiction of weapons shipments
originating from Iran, including in February 2023.86
 Security cooperation with other regional partners. The Biden Administration
has continued the long-standing U.S. policy of bolstering the defense capabilities
of U.S. partners in the Gulf through arms sales, including an August 2022
proposed sale of 300 Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia ($3 billion) and 96 Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to the United Arab Emirates
($2.2 billion).87 The U.S. military and its partners have also continued to conduct
joint military exercises, including some seen as intended to counter Iran.88
In its October 2022 National Security Strategy, the Administration laid out its policy toward Iran,
stating the United States would “pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear
weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail,” and
that “we will respond when our people and interests are attacked.”89 The Strategy also states, “we
will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied
them by the regime in Tehran.”

28, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May
25, 2022.
83 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25,
2022.
84 Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Holds a Joint Press Conference with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant,
U.S. Department of Defense, March 9, 2023.
85 See for example, U.S. Central Command, “Statement regarding precision strikes in Syria,” August 23, 2022.
86 U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Central Command supports partner forces in major Iranian weapons
seizure,” February 2, 2023.
87 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 22-32 and 22-26, August 2, 2022.
88 Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.. Israel send message to Iran with biggest-ever military exercises,” Wall Street Journal,
January 26, 2023.
89 White House, National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022.
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Issues for Congress
Sanctions
Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to
change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress.90 U.S. sanctions on Iran are
multifaceted and complex, a result of over four decades of legislative, administrative, and law
enforcement actions by successive presidential administrations and Congresses.
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, when
President Jimmy Carter issued executive orders blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the
United States. In 1984, Secretary of State George Schultz designated the government of Iran a
state sponsor of acts of international terrorism (SSOT) following the October 1983 bombing of
the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah.
Iran’s status as an SSOT triggers several sanctions including restrictions on licenses for U.S.
dual-use exports; a ban on U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and support in the international
financial Iran: Background and U.S. Policy institutions; and the withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell institutions; and the withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell
arms to the designee.arms to the designee.91134
Later in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, other U.S. sanctions sought to limit Iran’s Later in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, other U.S. sanctions sought to limit Iran’s
conventional arsenal and its ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In the 2000s, as conventional arsenal and its ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In the 2000s, as
Iran’s nuclear program progressed, U.S. sanctions focused largely on trying to pressure Iran to Iran’s nuclear program progressed, U.S. sanctions focused largely on trying to pressure Iran to
limit its nuclear activities (seelimit its nuclear activities (see Table 1). Most of the U.S. sanctions enacted after 2010 were . Most of the U.S. sanctions enacted after 2010 were
secondary sanctionssecondary sanctions—essentially denying U.S. market access to on foreign firms that foreign firms that transactconduct transactions with with
major sectors of the Iranian economy, including banking, energy, and shipping. Successive major sectors of the Iranian economy, including banking, energy, and shipping. Successive
Administrations issued Executive Orders under which they designated specific individuals and Administrations issued Executive Orders under which they designated specific individuals and
entities to implement and supplement the provisions of these laws. entities to implement and supplement the provisions of these laws. The United States has also, United States has also,
pursuant to various authorities, imposed sanctions on a number of individuals and entities held pursuant to various authorities, imposed sanctions on a number of individuals and entities held
responsible for human rights violations. responsible for human rights violations.
Table 1. Select Sanctions Legislation Pertaining to Iran
Public Law
Legislation Name
Number
Final Votes
Target of Sanctions
The Comprehensive The Comprehensive
P.L. 111-195, P.L. 111-195,
Conference Report Conference Report
Codifies the U.S. ban on trade with and Codifies the U.S. ban on trade with and
Iran Sanctions, Iran Sanctions,
22 U.S.C. 22 U.S.C.
agreed to in the agreed to in the
investment in Iran, first imposed by Executive investment in Iran, first imposed by Executive
Accountability, and Accountability, and
§§8501 et seq. §§8501 et seq.
House 408-8 and in House 408-8 and in
Order 12959 of May 1995; imposes sanctions Order 12959 of May 1995; imposes sanctions
Divestment Act of Divestment Act of
the Senate 99-0. the Senate 99-0.
on foreign banks that facilitate transactions on foreign banks that facilitate transactions
2010 (CISADA) 2010 (CISADA)
for Iranian entities. for Iranian entities.
FY2012 National FY2012 National
Section Section
Conference Report Conference Report
Imposes sanctions on banks of countries that Imposes sanctions on banks of countries that
Defense Authorization 1245(d), P.L. Defense Authorization 1245(d), P.L.
agreed to in the agreed to in the
do not reduce Iran oil imports. do not reduce Iran oil imports.
Act (NDAA) Act (NDAA)
112-81, 22 112-81, 22
House 283-136 and House 283-136 and
U.S.C. 8513a U.S.C. 8513a
in the Senate 86-13. in the Senate 86-13.

90 For details on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic
Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
91 CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne
E. Rennack.
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Public Law
Legislation Name
Number
Final Votes
Target of Sanctions
Iran Threat Reduction Iran Threat Reduction
P.L. 112-158, P.L. 112-158,
Passed in the House Passed in the House
Expands sanctions relating to Iran’s energy Expands sanctions relating to Iran’s energy
and Syria Human and Syria Human
22 U.S.C. 22 U.S.C.
410-11; passed in the sector; prohibits foreign banks from allowing 410-11; passed in the sector; prohibits foreign banks from allowing
Rights Act of 2012 Rights Act of 2012
§§8701 et seq. §§8701 et seq.
Senate with an Senate with an
Iran to withdraw its funds; imposes sanctions Iran to withdraw its funds; imposes sanctions
(ITRSHRA) (ITRSHRA)
amendment by voice amendment by voice
relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
vote. vote.
(IRGC) and to human rights violations. (IRGC) and to human rights violations.
Iran Freedom and Iran Freedom and
Sections 1244- Sections 1244-
Conference Report Conference Report
Imposes sanctions on transactions with Iran’s Imposes sanctions on transactions with Iran’s
Counter-Proliferation Counter-Proliferation
1247, P.L. 112- 1247, P.L. 112-
agreed to in the agreed to in the
energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and
Act (IFCA) Act (IFCA)
239, 22 U.S.C. 239, 22 U.S.C.
House 315-107 and House 315-107 and
banks that conduct transactions with banks that conduct transactions with
§§8801 et seq. §§8801 et seq.
in the Senate 81-14. in the Senate 81-14.
sanctioned Iranian entities. sanctioned Iranian entities.
Notes: Congress grants to the President the authority to terminate most of the sanctions imposed on Iran in Congress grants to the President the authority to terminate most of the sanctions imposed on Iran in
CISADA, ITRSHRA, and IFCA. Before terminating these sanctions, however, the President must certify that the CISADA, ITRSHRA, and IFCA. Before terminating these sanctions, however, the President must certify that the
government of Iran has ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in government of Iran has ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in
Section 401 of CISADA, as amended. Section 401 of CISADA, as amended.
Impact of sanctions. U.S. sanctions imposed during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a . U.S. sanctions imposed during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a
substantial toll on Iran’s economy. A substantial toll on Iran’s economy. A UNU.N. official, in a May 2022 visit to Iran, said that economic official, in a May 2022 visit to Iran, said that economic
sanctions had increased inflation and poverty, exacerbating overall humanitarian conditions.sanctions had increased inflation and poverty, exacerbating overall humanitarian conditions.92135
Some analysts, while agreeing that sanctions have an impact, also have argued that Iran suffers Some analysts, while agreeing that sanctions have an impact, also have argued that Iran suffers
from “decades of failed economic policies.”from “decades of failed economic policies.”93136 The CIA World Factbook states, “Distortions— 134 CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack. 135 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Visit to Iran by controversial UN rapporteur provokes concerns,” RFE/RL, May 13, 2022; Amir Vahdat, “UN envoy: US sanctions on Iran worsen humanitarian situation,” ABC News, May 18, 2022. 136 Anthony Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 11, 2018. Congressional Research Service 20 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy The CIA World Factbook states, “Distortions—
including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of
non-performing loans—weigh down the economy.”non-performing loans—weigh down the economy.”94137
Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on the range of Iranian behaviors their imposition Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on the range of Iranian behaviors their imposition
has been intended to curb. As mentioned above, has been intended to curb. As mentioned above, manysome experts attribute Iran’s decision to enter experts attribute Iran’s decision to enter
into multilateral negotiations and agree to limits on its nuclear program under the JCPOA at least into multilateral negotiations and agree to limits on its nuclear program under the JCPOA at least
in part to sanctions pressure. in part to sanctions pressure. Many otherOther aspects of Iranian policy seen as threatening to U.S. aspects of Iranian policy seen as threatening to U.S.
interests, including its regional influence and military capabilities, appear to remain considerable interests, including its regional influence and military capabilities, appear to remain considerable
and have arguably increased in the last decade.and have arguably increased in the last decade.95138
Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has
decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and conducted decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and conducted
provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. Those nuclear advances and regional provocations provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. Those nuclear advances and regional provocations
continued as Iran and the United States engaged with other JCPOA signatories in indirect continued as Iran and the United States engaged with other JCPOA signatories in indirect
negotiations around reviving the JCPOA. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions after 2018 may also negotiations around reviving the JCPOA. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions after 2018 may also
have contributed to Iran’s growing closeness to China (with which Iran signed a March 2021 have contributed to Iran’s growing closeness to China (with which Iran signed a March 2021
agreement to deepen economic and security ties) agreement to deepen economic and security ties) 96139 and Russia.140 President Raisi has also said that Iran’s prospective BRICS membership “will definitely play [a] part in fighting the US sanctions.”141 and Russia. Following Russia’s invasion of

92 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Visit to Iran by controversial UN rapporteur provokes concerns,” RFE/RL, May 13, 2022; Amir
Vahdat, “UN envoy: US sanctions on Iran worsen humanitarian situation,” ABC News, May 18, 2022.
93 Anthony Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 11,
2018.
94 CIA World Factbook, “Iran,” updated September 28, 2022.
95 See, for example, “New report reveals extent of Iran’s growing Middle East influence,” Al Jazeera, November 7,
2019; Ariane Tabatabai et al., “Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts,” RAND Corporation,
2021; David Gardner, “Curbing Iran’s regional ambitions remains a distant hope for the west,” Financial Times, June
10, 2021; Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), March 23,
2022.
96 “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” New York Times, March 27, 2021.
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Ukraine in early 2022, Russia and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have explored expanding
bilateral and energy cooperation.97
As part of its oversight responsibilities and to better inform legislative action, Congress has As part of its oversight responsibilities and to better inform legislative action, Congress has
directed successive Administrations to provide directed successive Administrations to provide numerous reports on a wide array of Iran-related reports on a wide array of Iran-related
topics, including U.S. sanctions. In topics, including U.S. sanctions. In FY2022recent legislation, they include reports on the “status of legislation, they include reports on the “status of
United States bilateral sanctions on Iran” (§7041(b)(2)(B) of United States bilateral sanctions on Iran” (§7041(b)(2)(B) of FY2022FY2023 Consolidated Consolidated
Appropriations Act, P.L. 117-Appropriations Act, P.L. 117-103328) and the impact of sanctions on various Iranian entities and ) and the impact of sanctions on various Iranian entities and
Iran-backed groups (§1227 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-81). Iran-backed groups (§1227 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-81).
Congress has also held numerous hearings focused primarily or in part on U.S. sanctions on Iran. Congress has also held numerous hearings focused primarily or in part on U.S. sanctions on Iran.
Oversight of Negotiations and Possible Nuclear Nuclear Talks/Agreement
Congress has sought to influence the outcome and implementation of international negotiations Congress has sought to influence the outcome and implementation of international negotiations
over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides (INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides
for consideration of legislation to potentially block their implementation.for consideration of legislation to potentially block their implementation.98142
Among other provisions, INARA directs the President to submit to Congress within five calendar Among other provisions, INARA directs the President to submit to Congress within five calendar
days of reaching “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” that agreement days of reaching “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” that agreement
and a certification that it meets certain conditions, such as that the agreement ensures that Iran and a certification that it meets certain conditions, such as that the agreement ensures that Iran
will not be permitted to use its nuclear program for military purposes. It also provides Congress will not be permitted to use its nuclear program for military purposes. It also provides Congress
with a 30-day period following transmittal to review the agreement, during which the President with a 30-day period following transmittal to review the agreement, during which the President
may not waive or otherwise limit sanctions; if Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval during
that period, the executive branch may not take any “action involving any measure of statutory
sanctions relief.”
Indirect negotiations over potentially reviving the JCPOA (see above) have implications for
INARA. The Biden Administration would likely be required to report any JCPOA amendments to
Congress, triggering the congressional review process described above, but it remains unclear
whether reentering the JCPOA would do so.99 For their part, Biden Administration officials have
stated publicly that they are “committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are fully
satisfied” without engaging on the question of whether they would submit a hypothetical
agreement for congressional review.100 Many observers consider it likely that deal opponents
would be able to muster majorities against a potential agreement but would again fall short of
veto-proof majorities to block its implementation, as they did in 2015.101
Some in Congress who oppose Biden Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated
that they might use INARA to block or at least complicate a potential future agreement. Several
137 CIA World Factbook, “Iran,” updated September 28, 2022. 138 See, for example, “New report reveals extent of Iran’s growing Middle East influence,” Al Jazeera, November 7, 2019; Ariane Tabatabai et al., “Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts,” RAND Corporation, 2021; David Gardner, “Curbing Iran’s regional ambitions remains a distant hope for the west,” Financial Times, June 10, 2021; Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), March 23, 2022. 139 “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” New York Times, March 27, 2021. 140 “Russia’s Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022. 141 “Iran’s membership in BRICS, SCO to help overcome negative sanctions impact – Raisi,” TASS, August 29, 2023. 142 For a legislative history of INARA, and the several votes taken in Congress that demonstrated opposition to the JCPOA but failed to block its implementation, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard. Congressional Research Service 21 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy may not waive or otherwise limit sanctions; if Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval during that period, the executive branch may not take any “action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief.” Indirect negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program (see above) may have implications for INARA-mandated congressional review provisions. The Biden Administration would likely be required to report any JCPOA amendments to Congress, triggering the congressional review process described above.143 Several dozen senators wrote to President Biden in March 2022 urging him to submit any agreement for dozen senators wrote to President Biden in March 2022 urging him to submit any agreement for
congressional review congressional review and expressing opposition to any agreement that expressing opposition to any agreement that does not constrain Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile activities, and its support for international terrorism.144 For their part, Biden Administration officials have stated publicly that they are “committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are fully satisfied” without engaging on the question of whether they would submit a hypothetical agreement for congressional review.145 Moreover, these officials have emphasized since September 2022 that U.S. policy has not been focused on reviving the JCPOA, given objectionable Iranian behaviors in other areas; Secretary Blinken said in July 2023 that “We’re now in a place where we’re not talking about a nuclear agreement.”146 The August 2023 prisoner exchange/conditional release of frozen funds agreement has focused some additional congressional attention on INARA, particularly in light of reports that Iran has simultaneously slowed some of its nuclear activities. U.S. officials maintain that the two efforts are not connected, as noted above, but some speculate, as one former U.S. official wrote in August 2023, that the Administration is seeking an unwritten understanding with Iran to “avoid triggering” INARA.147 In August 2023, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul and other representatives wrote to President Biden to express “significant concern” about the agreement and to underscore the Administration’s obligations under INARA.148 Outlook A vigorous protest movement shook the Islamic Republic in fall 2022. Although visible unrest diminished in 2023, protests could resurge in the near future, and Iran is still beset by economic does not constrain Iran’s

97 “Russia's Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022.
98 For a legislative history of INARA, and the several votes taken in Congress that demonstrated opposition to the
JCPOA but failed to block its implementation, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020:
Selected Case Studies, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
99 CRS Report R46663, Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, by Kenneth
Katzman et al.
100 State Department Press Briefing, March 16, 2022.
101 See, for example, Dan De Luce, “Biden is betting Republican senators lack votes to derail revival of Iran nuclear
deal,” NBC News, March 2, 2022; Patricia Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed, “Analysis: U.S. Congress may squawk
over a new Iran deal but is unlikely to block it,” Reuters, February 17, 2022.
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nuclear program, its ballistic missile activities, and its support for international terrorism.102 In the
117th Congress, some Members also introduced legislation related to Iran’s nuclear program.103
Other Members issued public statements or introduced legislation in support of the Biden
Administration’s diplomatic efforts to revive the JCPOA.104 In the 118th Congress, legislation
directly relating to Iran’s nuclear program has been relatively limited to date.
Outlook
A vigorous protest movement shook the Islamic Republic in fall 2022. Although visible unrest
diminished in early 2023, protests could resurge in the near future, and Iran remains beset by
economic challenges that are at least partly a result of wide-ranging U.S. sanctions. At the same challenges that are at least partly a result of wide-ranging U.S. sanctions. At the same
time, Iran’s regional influence remains considerable, and its growing ties with China and Russia time, Iran’s regional influence remains considerable, and its growing ties with China and Russia
could benefit Iran’s economy, military capabilities, and regional relationships. Looming over all could benefit Iran’s economy, military capabilities, and regional relationships. Looming over all
of these domestic and foreign policy developments are Iran’s nuclear activities, which have of these domestic and foreign policy developments are Iran’s nuclear activities, which have
advanced in recent years.advanced in recent years.
Together, these dynamics pose a complex challenge for U.S. policymakers and Congress, which Together, these dynamics pose a complex challenge for U.S. policymakers and Congress, which
has long played an active role in overseeing U.S. policy toward Iran. The Biden Administration has long played an active role in overseeing U.S. policy toward Iran. The Biden Administration
and and many insome Members of Congress express support for demonstrators, but the United States’ ability to support Congress express support for demonstrators, but the United States’ ability to support
the right of Iranians to protest, or to aid the protesters in achieving their various the right of Iranians to protest, or to aid the protesters in achieving their various objectives,
appears limited. To counter Iran’s strategic clout, the United States has sought to marshal regional
opposition to Iran and isolate Iran on the world stage. Despite some successes on both fronts, Iran
remains diplomatically engaged with many of its neighbors, including some U.S. partners, and
the lack of U.S. relations with Tehran precludes direct U.S. involvement in those diplomatic
engagements.
It is unclear how the 2023 agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia may affect the likelihood of
a revival of JCPOA negotiations. On the one hand, Iranian leaders may calculate that, given
deeper ties with countries like China and Russia, they may not need the U.S. sanctions relief that
an agreement to limit their nuclear program would secure. On the other hand, the re-establishment
of relations with Saudi Arabia could possibly signal the beginning of a shift towards a policy of
greater re-engagement. Following the agreement, an IRGC-affiliated media outlet reportedly
stated, “The agreement with Saudi Arabia might pave the way for resolving the deadlock over the
revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).”105
Beyond the limitations of existing U.S. policy tools, a number of other factors may influence
congressional views of, and action toward, U.S. policies regarding Iran, including:

102 “49 Senate Republicans tell President Biden: An agreement without broad congressional support will not survive,”
Senator James M. Inhofe, March 14, 2022.
103 Such measures include legislation to condition potential U.S. entry into an agreement on IAEA inspectors having
full access to Iranian nuclear facilities (H.R. 1203); on the Administration’s commitment to submit the agreement for
approval by the Senate as a treaty (S. 1205/H.R. 1479); or on the President’s submission of the agreement as a treaty
(S. 2030). Other proposed measures would have created congressional review and disapproval procedures similar to
those of INARA for the lifting of any sanctions on Iran (S. 488/H.R. 1699).
104 See, for example, S. 434 and Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy: After four years of failed maximum pressure in Iran,
we know we’re better off with a nuclear agreement,” September 22, 2022.
105 “Deal With KSA May Facilitate Return To Nuclear Deal, Iran Media Say,” Iran International, March 14, 2023.
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 143 CRS Report R46663, Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions. 144 “49 Senate Republicans tell President Biden: An agreement without broad congressional support will not survive,” Senator James M. Inhofe, March 14, 2022. 145 State Department Press Briefing, March 16, 2022. 146 “US envoy reiterates nuclear talks with Iran not a priority,” Iran International, December 4, 2022; U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Fareed Zakaria of GPS, CNN, July 23, 2023. 147 “There are no good deals with Iran,” op. cit. 148 Letter available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/8.21.23-Scalise-Stefanik-McCaul-letter-to-President-Biden-re.-Iran-Deal50-1.pdf. Congressional Research Service 22 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy objectives, appears limited. To counter Iran’s strategic clout, the United States has sought to marshal regional opposition to Iran and isolate Iran on the world stage. Despite some successes on both fronts, Iran remains diplomatically engaged with many of its neighbors, including some U.S. partners, and the lack of U.S. relations with Tehran precludes direct U.S. involvement in those diplomatic engagements. Beyond the limitations of existing U.S. policy tools, a number of other factors may influence congressional views of, and action toward, U.S. policies regarding Iran, including: • A lack of detailed, current information about dynamics within Iran, at least A lack of detailed, current information about dynamics within Iran, at least
partially a result of the absence of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations. partially a result of the absence of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations. No Additionally, no Members of Members of
Congress or congressional staff appear to have visited Iran since 1979.Congress or congressional staff appear to have visited Iran since 1979.106
149 • The historical legacy of animosity between the United States and Iran, The historical legacy of animosity between the United States and Iran,
particularly the U.S. embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and subsequent Iranian particularly the U.S. embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and subsequent Iranian
government support for terrorism and attacks on U.S. military personnel in the government support for terrorism and attacks on U.S. military personnel in the
Middle East. Middle East.
• The large, diverse, and politically active Iranian diaspora community. The large, diverse, and politically active Iranian diaspora community.
In seeking to understand Iran and to shape U.S. policy, potential questions that Members of In seeking to understand Iran and to shape U.S. policy, potential questions that Members of
Congress may consider include: Congress may consider include:
• What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Iran? What U.S. policy What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Iran? What U.S. policy
approaches have been most and least successful in moving toward those goals? approaches have been most and least successful in moving toward those goals?
• How secure is the position of Supreme Leader Khamenei? Who might succeed How secure is the position of Supreme Leader Khamenei? Who might succeed
him? What other factions or power centers exist within the Iranian political him? What other factions or power centers exist within the Iranian political
system and how might they influence leadership succession and future regime system and how might they influence leadership succession and future regime
policy? policy?
• To what extent did protests in fall 2022 and early 2023 represent a threat to To what extent did protests in fall 2022 and early 2023 represent a threat to
regime stability? regime stability? How did they compare with similar periods of unrest in Iranian
history? What are the goals of the current protest movement and how likely are What are the goals of the current protest movement and how likely are
theythe protesters to achieve those goals? What, if anything, can the United States do to to achieve those goals? What, if anything, can the United States do to
support them?
promote democracy without endangering its supporters in Iran? • What are Iran’s regional aims, and what do they need to achieve them? What What are Iran’s regional aims, and what do they need to achieve them? What
additional assets/capabilities do U.S. partners need to counter Iran? What are the additional assets/capabilities do U.S. partners need to counter Iran? What are the
implications of diplomatic engagement and economic ties between Iran and U.S. implications of diplomatic engagement and economic ties between Iran and U.S.
regional partners for U.S. interests? regional partners for U.S. interests?
• Why has Iran provided Russia with weaponry for use in Ukraine and how has Why has Iran provided Russia with weaponry for use in Ukraine and how has
their partnership impacted Iran and its other bilateral relationships? What drives their partnership impacted Iran and its other bilateral relationships? What drives
the deepening Iran-Russia relationship and should the United States and its the deepening Iran-Russia relationship and should the United States and its
partners seek to impede it? partners seek to impede it?
• Why has Iran increased its nuclear activities and what is the ultimate purpose of Why has Iran increased its nuclear activities and what is the ultimate purpose of
the program? What additional steps would Iran need to obtain a nuclear weapon the program? What additional steps would Iran need to obtain a nuclear weapon
and how can the United States and partners prevent that? What might be the and how can the United States and partners prevent that? What might be the
implications of Iran’s obtaining a nuclear weapon for Iran’s broader foreign implications of Iran’s obtaining a nuclear weapon for Iran’s broader foreign
policy, regional stability, and other U.S. interests? policy, regional stability, and other U.S. interests?
 149 Some Members of Congress have visited other countries without a U.S. embassy such as Syria (in 2017), Cuba (in 2009), and North Korea (in 2003). Congressional Research Service 23 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy • What was the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s regional What was the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s regional
activities, domestic politics in Iran, and U.S.-Iran relations overall? What was the activities, domestic politics in Iran, and U.S.-Iran relations overall? What was the
impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA? impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA?
• What are the arguments for and against attempting to rejoin the JCPOA? Given What are the arguments for and against attempting to rejoin the JCPOA? Given
changes on both sides since 2015, is reviving the accord feasible? What changes on both sides since 2015, is reviving the accord feasible? What
alternative arrangements, if any, might meet the U.S. goal of securing limits on alternative arrangements, if any, might meet the U.S. goal of securing limits on
Iran’s nuclear activities?Iran’s nuclear activities?

106 Some Members of Congress have visited other countries without a U.S. embassy such as Syria (in 2017), Cuba (in
2009), and North Korea (in 2003).
Congressional Research Service

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Iran: Background and U.S. Policy


Author Information

Carla E. Humud
Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
• What are the implications for the United States of Iran’s prospective membership in the BRICS group? Author Information Clayton Thomas Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs



Acknowledgments
Ken Katzman provided knowledge, advice, and wisdom in the production of this report—and has been Ken Katzman provided knowledge, advice, and wisdom in the production of this report—and has been
indispensable in the indispensable in the authors’ careersauthor’s career. .

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