Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
March
March
9, 20235, 2024
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Kristin Archick
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Specialist in European
Specialist in European
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Affairs
Affairs
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has
reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK
(
(
unionists). ).
MostMany Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish
, and and
many desire a desire a
united Ireland (united Ireland (
nationalists). ).
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In
recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, human rights, and addressing Northern Ireland’s recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, human rights, and addressing Northern Ireland’s
legacy of violence (often termed legacy of violence (often termed
dealing with the past). Some Members also are concerned about how ). Some Members also are concerned about how
Brexit—the UK’s —the UK’s
withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland. withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement.
The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional
status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with
the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from
London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK
security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners. security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, implementing the peace agreement proved challenging. In 2007, the
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, implementing the peace agreement proved challenging. In 2007, the
pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated with the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated with the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however, and Brexit Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however, and Brexit
and other contentious issues have hindered the functioning of Northern Ireland’s government in recent years. Assembly and other contentious issues have hindered the functioning of Northern Ireland’s government in recent years. Assembly
elections took place in May 2022, but the DUP elections took place in May 2022, but the DUP
has blocked the work of the Assembly and prevented the formation of a new blocked the work of the Assembly and prevented the formation of a new
Executive to protest the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. Executive to protest the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.
As the 25th anniversary of the peace accord approaches in April 2023, addressing Brexit-related concerns and restoring the devolved government are key prioritiesIn late January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of measures proposed by the UK government to address Brexit-related concerns and ended its boycott on Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, paving the way for the devolved government to be reestablished in early February 2024. Other . Other
issues facing Northern Ireland in its search for peace and reconciliation include reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the issues facing Northern Ireland in its search for peace and reconciliation include reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the
past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development. past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market
and customs union, the land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping promote peace and a dynamic and customs union, the land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping promote peace and a dynamic
cross-border economy. The UK and the EU cross-border economy. The UK and the EU
ultimately agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs arrangements for Northern agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs arrangements for Northern
Ireland to retain this open border in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Implementation of the protocol—which began in Ireland to retain this open border in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Implementation of the protocol—which began in
January 2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and exacerbated tensions in the January 2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and exacerbated tensions in the
region. region.
In In late February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—
that seeks to resolve aimed at resolving challenges posed by the protocol. The challenges posed by the protocol. The
Windsor Framework still must be formally adopted. The DUP has not decided whether it will accept the new framework and agree to enter into a new power-sharing government with Sinn Fein. Brexit also DUP, however, asserted that the Windsor Framework did not fully address the party’s concerns and pressed for additional changes. The resulting January 2024 deal between the UK government and the DUP seeks to ease trade further between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and to reassure unionists of Northern Ireland’s place within the UK. Brexit has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others
for a for a
border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join Ireland. , or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join Ireland.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page
link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page
1413 link to page 14 link to page link to page 14 link to page
1514 link to page link to page
1615 link to page 17 link to page link to page 17 link to page
1917 link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page
2322 link to page 23 link to page link to page 23 link to page
2524 link to page link to page
2826 link to page link to page
2927 link to page 30 link to page link to page 30 link to page
3031 link to page link to page
3233 link to page 33 link to page link to page 33 link to page
35 link to page 36 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page
1312 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
The 1998 Peace Agreement ............................................................................................................. 2
Key Elements ............................................................................................................................ 2
Implementation ......................................................................................................................... 3
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions .............................................................................. 3
Decommissioning ............................................................................................................... 4
Policing ............................................................................................................................... 4
Security Normalization ....................................................................................................... 5
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity ............................................................... 5
Initiatives to Further the Peace Process ........................................................................................... 6
OngoingRecent Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil ..Latest Developments ..................................................................... 7
The May 2022 Assembly Election: Outcome and Aftermath .................................................... 8
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process ........................................ 8 2024 Reestablishment of the Devolved Government ...................................................... 10
Sectarian Divisions.......... 9
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process ..................................................................................... 10
Sectarian Divisions ............................. 10
Dealing with the Past ..................................................................................... 10 Dealing with the Past ............................... 11
Stormont House Agreement Provisions ................................................................................ 12
The May 2022 Troubles Bill 11
Stormont House Agreement Provisions ............................................................................ 13 The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 ............................ 13
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity ........................................................... 15
Paramilitary Concerns ....................................................................................................... 15
The Dissident Threat ......................................................................................................... 1516
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity .................................................................... 1617
Implications of Brexit .................................................................................................................... 1718
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal AgreementPost-Brexit Arrangements ..................................................................... 18
The Northern Ireland Protocol ................... 18
Post-Brexit Arrangements in the Northern Ireland Protocol ....................................................................... 19
The Protocol’s Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions ............................. 1920
The 2023 Windsor Framework ......................................................................................... 22 The 2024 UK-DUP Deal ................................................................. 21.................................. 23
Economic Concerns ................................................................................................................ 2426
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects ..................................................................... 2527
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests ........................................................................................ 2629
Support for the Peace Process ................................................................................................. 2629
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland .................................................................................... 2831
International Fund for Ireland ................................................................................................. 2932
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland ............................................ 2
Tables
Table 1. Northern Ireland 2022 Election Results ............................................................................ 98
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
link to page
link to page
3437 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 3033
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
link to page 6
link to page 6
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Overview
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the
Troubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map inTroubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map in
Figure 1).1 At its 1 At its
core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities.
Protestants in Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support Northern Protestants in Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support Northern
Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (
unionists). ).
MostMany Catholics in Northern Ireland Catholics in Northern Ireland
consider themselves Irishconsider themselves Irish
, and many Catholics and desire a united Ireland (desire a united Ireland (
nationalists). In the past, ). In the past,
more militant unionists (more militant unionists (
loyalists) and more militant nationalists () and more militant nationalists (
republicans) were willing to use ) were willing to use
force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2 Results from the 2021 census, released in force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2 Results from the 2021 census, released in
September 2022, indicate that for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, more people in September 2022, indicate that for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, more people in
Northern Ireland are from a Catholic background (45.7% of the population) than from a Northern Ireland are from a Catholic background (45.7% of the population) than from a
Protestant background (43.5% of the population).3 Protestant background (43.5% of the population).3
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights, Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights,
housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists, housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists,
loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans. loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans.
Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on
the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between
1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government). 1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government).
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to
the conflictthe conflict
in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate . Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s special Majority Leader George Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s special
adviser on Ireland. adviser on Ireland.
After many ups and downs, theThe UK and Irish governments and the Northern UK and Irish governments and the Northern
Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10, Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10,
1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was 1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was
concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.4 concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.4
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
implementation of the peace accord has been challenging. Tensions and distrust persist among implementation of the peace accord has been challenging. Tensions and distrust persist among
Northern Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more Northern Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more
broadly. Northern Ireland continues to grapple with a number of issues in its search for peace and broadly. Northern Ireland continues to grapple with a number of issues in its search for peace and
reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy
of violence (often termed of violence (often termed
dealing with the past) is particularly controversial. ) is particularly controversial.
Many analysts
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2020—or Brexit—has added to divisions within
1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in 1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally
declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland, declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland,
with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of
Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the
remaining one-sixth of the island. remaining one-sixth of the island.
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as
Ulster. Technically and . Technically and
historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland. historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
3 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, “Northern Ireland 2021 Census Results,” at
3 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, “Northern Ireland 2021 Census Results,” at
https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/2021-census/results/main-statistics. https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/2021-census/results/main-statistics.
4 The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
4 The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name
Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the
peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized
in the United States. in the United States.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
1
1
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2020—or Brexit—has added to divisions within Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland,
renewed questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK, and renewed questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK, and
contributed to political instability in the power-sharing institutions. contributed to political instability in the power-sharing institutions.
As the 25th anniversary of the peace accord approaches in April 2023, addressing concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland and restoring a functioning devolved government are key prioritiesIn late January 2024, Northern Ireland’s leading unionist party accepted new measures proposed by the UK government to address certain Brexit-related concerns, thereby enabling Northern Ireland’s devolved government to be restored in early February 2024 after a two-year suspension. .
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the Northern
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the Northern
Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, as Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, as
well as subsequent accords and initiativeswell as subsequent accords and initiatives
. President Biden visited Northern Ireland (and Ireland) in April 2023 to mark the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement to further the peace process. Some Members . Some Members
of Congress have been have been
particularly interested in police reforms and human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the particularly interested in police reforms and human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the
United States has provided United States has provided
development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a
means to encourage economic development and foster reconciliation. Some Members of means to encourage economic development and foster reconciliation. Some Members of
Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for Northern Ireland. Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for Northern Ireland.
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland
Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017). Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).
The 1998 Peace Agreement
Key Elements
The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political
settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the
UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the
consent principle——
that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
2
2
link to page 8
link to page 8
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
of Northern Ireland’s people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the
of Northern Ireland’s people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the
agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a
majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in
Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding
obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for
future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant. future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power (known as power (known as
Strand One). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several ). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several
issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary
weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of
prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentiousprisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious
. Experts assert that, and the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity
.” ” on such issues.
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
((
Strand Two and and
Strand Three, respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two , respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two
strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and
southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-
Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises
representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland,
Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Implementation
Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in
separate referendums on May 22, 1998, but implementing the agreement was difficult. For years, separate referendums on May 22, 1998, but implementing the agreement was difficult. For years,
decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in
Northern Ireland’s devolved government. Ongoing sectarian strife and sporadic violence from Northern Ireland’s devolved government. Ongoing sectarian strife and sporadic violence from
dissident republican and loyalist groups that refused to accept the peace process also fed mistrust dissident republican and loyalist groups that refused to accept the peace process also fed mistrust
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties. between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement mandated power-sharing in the devolved
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement mandated power-sharing in the devolved
government between unionists and nationalists and called for establishing a new Northern Ireland government between unionists and nationalists and called for establishing a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive. To ensure neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the Assembly and Executive. To ensure neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the
Assembly (of 108 members at the time), the agreement required that “key decisions” receive Assembly (of 108 members at the time), the agreement required that “key decisions” receive
cross-community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly cross-community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly
members). The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other members). The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other
ministers with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be ministers with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be
allocated to political parties according to party strength in the Assembly. allocated to political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.
The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The
The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The
devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, was delayed by unionist concerns about devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, was delayed by unionist concerns about
the status of weapons decommissioning. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority the status of weapons decommissioning. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority
over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December
1999. Over the next few years, the issue of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican 1999. Over the next few years, the issue of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican
Army (IRA)—contributed to the suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of Army (IRA)—contributed to the suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of
direct rule from London several times between 2000 and 2002. (See direct rule from London several times between 2000 and 2002. (See
“Decommissioning,” below.) ” below.)
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
3
3
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was
In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was
restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which
strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the
staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA.staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA.
5 Regularly scheduled Regularly scheduled
Assembly elections in 2011 and 2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led Assembly elections in 2011 and 2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led
by the DUP and Sinn Fein. At the same time, various incidents—including protests in 2012 and by the DUP and Sinn Fein. At the same time, various incidents—including protests in 2012 and
2013 over the use of flags and emblems and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein leader in connection 2013 over the use of flags and emblems and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein leader in connection
with the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the devolved government’s with the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the devolved government’s
stability. Brexit and other contentious issues led to the collapse of the power-sharing institutions stability. Brexit and other contentious issues led to the collapse of the power-sharing institutions
between 2017 and 2020, and again between 2017 and 2020, and again
inbetween February 2022 and February 2024 (see “Recent February 2022 (as of early March 2023, the devolved government has not yet been restored; see “Ongoing Political Instability and Political Instability and
Renewed TurmoilLatest Developments”). ”).
Decommissioning
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold
office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded
or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its
weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as
tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls. tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls.
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to
pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”
65 In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had
put all of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable put all of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable
matched estimates provided by the security forces.matched estimates provided by the security forces.
76 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning The IICD also confirmed decommissioning
by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011. by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.
Policing
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between
unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was
established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92% established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92%
Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and
human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in
fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent
commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers
(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI (from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI
introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.
87
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI
5 Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps Cherished Prize,” Irish Times, March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI Politics Moves Away from Edge,” BBC News, May 8, 2007. 6and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007, however, Sinn Fein members voted to support the police and join the Policing Board. Sinn Fein’s
5 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005. “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005.
76 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005. Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005.
87 See See
A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern , Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern
Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf. Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
4
4
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007, however, Sinn Fein members voted to support the police and join the Policing Board. Sinn Fein’s decision was seen as historic, given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. decision was seen as historic, given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target.
In 2010, the DUP and Sinn Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve In 2010, the DUP and Sinn Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve
policing and justice powers from London to Belfast. policing and justice powers from London to Belfast.
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded, with
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded, with
officials asserting that it had fulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commissionofficials asserting that it had fulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commission
(including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).9.8 As of late 2021, Catholic officers made up 32% of the PSNI’s roughly 7,000 officers. Concerns persist, however, that not enough Concerns persist, however, that not enough
Catholics are seeking to join the PSNI (due to both lingering suspicions about the police within Catholics are seeking to join the PSNI (due to both lingering suspicions about the police within
the Catholic/nationalist community and the Catholic/nationalist community and
ongoing fears that Catholic police recruits may be targeted by fears that Catholic police recruits may be targeted by
dissident republicansdissident republicans
). As of late 2021, Catholic officers made up 32% of the PSNI’s roughly 7,000 officers, especially following a 2023 data breach involving the personal information of more than 10,000 police officers and support staff). Budget . Budget
constraints and other issues, including low morale, also are impacting recruitment and could constraints are expected to freeze recruitment in general and lead to a lead to a
reduction in the overall size of the PSNI reduction in the overall size of the PSNI
in 2023 (to about 6,700) and in the years ahead.10to below 6,000 officers by 2025.9
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement called for “as early a return as possible to normal security
The Good Friday Agreement called for “as early a return as possible to normal security
arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security installations. In February arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security installations. In February
2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July 2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July
2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a 2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a
regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no
longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide. longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern
Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission
for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area
of human rights and equality and argue that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights. of human rights and equality and argue that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights.
Consideration for a Bill of Rights was provided for in the Good Friday Agreement, but the issue Consideration for a Bill of Rights was provided for in the Good Friday Agreement, but the issue
has long been controversial and consensus on the way forward—between unionists and has long been controversial and consensus on the way forward—between unionists and
nationalists, as well as with the UK government—remains elusive. nationalists, as well as with the UK government—remains elusive.
The Good Friday Agreement also calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
The Good Friday Agreement also calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
support for the Irish language (Gaelic). Giving Gaelic the same official status as English and calls support for the Irish language (Gaelic). Giving Gaelic the same official status as English and calls
for a stand-alone Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland, however, were sensitive issues for many for a stand-alone Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland, however, were sensitive issues for many
unionists. unionists.
TheA 2020 deal to restore the power-sharing institutions included a compromise to 2020 deal to restore the power-sharing institutions included a compromise to
recognize Gaelic as an official language in Northern Ireland and promote its use while also recognize Gaelic as an official language in Northern Ireland and promote its use while also
protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English that many unionists protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English that many unionists
consider important to their heritage). In October 2022, the UK Parliament approved legislation consider important to their heritage). In October 2022, the UK Parliament approved legislation
enacting the language and cultural measures agreed in 2020 into law.enacting the language and cultural measures agreed in 2020 into law.
11
910
8 BBC News, “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,”
BBC News, March 28, 2011. March 28, 2011.
109 Julian O’Neill, “Catholic Recruitment an Issue as PSNI Turns 20,” BBC News, November 2, 2021; Julian O’Neill, “Catholic Recruitment an Issue as PSNI Turns 20,” BBC News, November 2, 2021;
“PSNI Cuts Number of Police to Lowest Level Ever,” BBC News, January 26, 2023. 11Belfast Telegraph, “Damage Done to Police by Budget Cuts Will Take Years to Reverse, MPs Warned,” June 22, 2023; Ben Quinn, “Catholic Officers ‘Asking If They Should Bring Firearms to Mass,’ After PSNI Leak,” Guardian, September 5, 2023. 10 The Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Act 2022 received royal assent in December 2022. Enda McClafferty, The Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Act 2022 received royal assent in December 2022. Enda McClafferty,
“Irish Language and Ulster Scots Bill Clears Final Hurdle in Parliament,” BBC News, October 26, 2022. “Irish Language and Ulster Scots Bill Clears Final Hurdle in Parliament,” BBC News, October 26, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
5
5
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Initiatives to Further the Peace Process
Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish
governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation. governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation.
Major endeavors include the following: Major endeavors include the following:
• The 2013 Haass Initiative. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most
divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.
1211 In particular, Haass was tasked with In particular, Haass was tasked with
making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of
parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass
released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was
unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.
13
12
• The 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In 2014, financial pressures and In 2014, financial pressures and
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments
convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing
structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the
resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland
political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating
measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the
public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive
departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included
measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements
over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled
implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.
14
13
• The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. In November 2015, the UK and Irish In November 2015, the UK and Irish
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare
reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s
budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the
Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election
after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments, after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments,
and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start
Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the
parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to
deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing
concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein
official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.
15
1214
11 Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003. Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003.
1312 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf. http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf.
1413 The The
2014 Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-
agreement. agreement.
1514 The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,” The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,”
November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland. November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
6
6
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
OngoingRecent Political Instability and Renewed TurmoilLatest Developments
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns
remainpersist about the stability of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and the fragility of about the stability of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and the fragility of
community relations. In January 2017, the devolved government collapsed amid a scandal over a community relations. In January 2017, the devolved government collapsed amid a scandal over a
renewable energy program, differences between the DUP and Sinn Fein on a potential Irish renewable energy program, differences between the DUP and Sinn Fein on a potential Irish
Language Act and the legalization of same-sex marriage (Sinn Fein supported both measures, Language Act and the legalization of same-sex marriage (Sinn Fein supported both measures,
whereas the DUP opposed them), and unease in Northern Ireland over Brexit in the wake of the whereas the DUP opposed them), and unease in Northern Ireland over Brexit in the wake of the
June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Snap Assembly elections were held in March June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Snap Assembly elections were held in March
2017. It took nearly three years—until January 2020—to reestablish the devolved government, 2017. It took nearly three years—until January 2020—to reestablish the devolved government,
based on a new power-sharing agreement (known as “New Decade, New Approach”) and ledled at the time by by
then-First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and then-First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and
then-Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Sinn Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Sinn
Fein. The new power-sharing deal addressed a number of key issues, including health, education, language and cultural issues, and the sustainability of Northern Ireland’s political institutions.16
Since then, the devolved government hasFein.15
Over the last four years, Northern Ireland officials have been tested by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID- been tested by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19) pandemic and by challenges 19) pandemic and by challenges
due toresulting from the implementation of the post-Brexit trade and customs the implementation of the post-Brexit trade and customs
rules for Northern Ireland, which seek to preserve an open border on the island of Ireland while rules for Northern Ireland, which seek to preserve an open border on the island of Ireland while
also respecting the rules of the EU single market and customs union. Set out in a protocol to the also respecting the rules of the EU single market and customs union. Set out in a protocol to the
UK’s withdrawal agreement with the EU, many unionists UK’s withdrawal agreement with the EU, many unionists
view the viewed these post-Brexit arrangements as post-Brexit arrangements as
dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK (i.e., Great Britain) and endangering the UK’s dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK (i.e., Great Britain) and endangering the UK’s
constitutional integrity. Implementation of the protocol—which began in January 2021—constitutional integrity. Implementation of the protocol—which began in January 2021—
has led led
to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and
has contributed to contributed to
heightened tensions. (See “Implications of Brexit,” below.) heightened tensions. (See “Implications of Brexit,” below.)
Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit
Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit
arrangements arrangements
appear to havein the protocol exacerbated unionist concerns exacerbated unionist concerns
thatabout their British identity their British identity
is under threat. These arrangementsbeing under threat and may have been a factor in the violence and rioting that erupted in may have been a factor in the violence and rioting that erupted in
several cities and towns across Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Much of this several cities and towns across Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Much of this
rioting was carried out by young people and was concentrated in economically disadvantaged rioting was carried out by young people and was concentrated in economically disadvantaged
communities where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence. communities where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence.
Some analysts suggest that strong rhetoric against the protocol from unionist politicians may have contributed to instigating the unrest. At the same time, the violenceThe violence also followed a decision in late followed a decision in late
March 2021 against prosecuting violations of March 2021 against prosecuting violations of
COVID-19 social distancing restrictions at a large funeral in social distancing restrictions at a large funeral in
2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. For many unionists, this incident 2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. For many unionists, this incident
at the 2020 funeral reinforced their reinforced their
long-standing views of a double standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists. long-standing views of a double standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists.
Frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people, also Frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people, also
may have factored into the rioting.may have factored into the rioting.
1716
Although the DUP backed Brexit (it was the only major Northern Ireland political party to do so),
Although the DUP backed Brexit (it was the only major Northern Ireland political party to do so),
the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland prompted political turmoil within the DUP in the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland prompted political turmoil within the DUP in
2021. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader 2021. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader
at the end ofin late May 2021 and as first May 2021 and as first
minister in June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, a DUP member of the UK Parliament, became the minister in June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, a DUP member of the UK Parliament, became the
leader of the DUP in late June 2021 (the DUP’s second new leader in a month). Paul Givan, a leader of the DUP in late June 2021 (the DUP’s second new leader in a month). Paul Givan, a
DUP member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, succeeded Foster as first minister. DUP member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, succeeded Foster as first minister.
16
In February 2022, then-First Minister Givan resigned to protest the Northern Ireland protocol and the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations on resolving difficulties with the protocol. Givan’s
15 Northern Ireland’s devolved government was restored in 2020 following a power-sharing deal that addressed a number of key issues, including health, education, language and cultural issues, and the sustainability of Northern Ireland’s political institutions. Government of the UK, Government of the UK,
New Decade, New Approach, January 9, 2020, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/, January 9, 2020, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf. government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf.
1716 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,” Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,”
Politico, April 7, , April 7,
2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,” 2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,”
New York Times, April , April
8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” 8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,”
Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021. , April 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
7
7
link to page
link to page
1312 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
In early February 2022, First Minister Givan resigned to protest the Northern Ireland protocol and the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations on resolving difficulties with the protocol. Givan’s resignation also forced resignation also forced then-Deputy First Minister O’Neill to step down. The first minister and deputy Deputy First Minister O’Neill to step down. The first minister and deputy
first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns, the other also ceases to hold first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns, the other also ceases to hold
office. As a result, the Northern Ireland Executive was unable to meet or make decisions office. As a result, the Northern Ireland Executive was unable to meet or make decisions
(although (the Northern Ireland Assembly was able to continue working on legislation already in the Northern Ireland Assembly was able to continue working on legislation already in
progress).18 Regularly scheduled Assembly elections were held on May 5, 2022; as of early March 2023, the DUP has prevented the formation of a new devolved government due to objections to the Northern Ireland protocol.
The May 2022 Assembly Election: Outcome and Aftermath
In the May 2022 Assembly election, forprogress).17
The May 2022 Assembly Election Regularly scheduled Assembly elections were held on May 5, 2022. For the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, Sinn Fein won the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, Sinn Fein won
the largest number of seats in the 90-member Assembly and surpassed the DUP as the largest the largest number of seats in the 90-member Assembly and surpassed the DUP as the largest
party in the Assembly (seeparty in the Assembly (see
Table 1). Decreased support for the DUP appeared to be driven by . Decreased support for the DUP appeared to be driven by
dissatisfaction with the party’s leadership on Brexit and internal party divisions. Sinn Fein dissatisfaction with the party’s leadership on Brexit and internal party divisions. Sinn Fein
strongly supports a united Ireland but centered its election campaign on everyday concerns, such strongly supports a united Ireland but centered its election campaign on everyday concerns, such
as the rising costs of living and health care. The smaller, cross-community Alliance Party made as the rising costs of living and health care. The smaller, cross-community Alliance Party made
significant gains, attributed to voter frustration with Northern Ireland’s identity politics and significant gains, attributed to voter frustration with Northern Ireland’s identity politics and
frequent instability in the power-sharing institutions.frequent instability in the power-sharing institutions.
1918 Voter turnout was 63%. (Also see text box, Voter turnout was 63%. (Also see text box,
“Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland,” below.) “Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland,” below.)
SinceFollowing the election, the DUP the election, the DUP
has blocked the work of the Assembly and the blocked the work of the Assembly and the
formation of a new Executive to exert Executive to exert
pressure on the UK government to address unionist objections to the post-Brexit arrangements in pressure on the UK government to address unionist objections to the post-Brexit arrangements in
the Northern Ireland protocol. the Northern Ireland protocol.
The DUP maintains it will not agree to establish a new power-sharing government until the problems with the Northern Ireland protocol are resolved. Sinn Fein Sinn Fein
and other nationalists generally and other nationalists generally
support the protocolhave supported the protocol’s post-Brexit arrangements as necessary to maintain an open border on as necessary to maintain an open border on
the island of Ireland in light of Brexit. The UK government has twice extended the deadline for forming a new devolved government to avoid calling a new Assembly election.20 On February 27, the island of Ireland. In late February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—
that seeks to resolve to resolve
the challenges posed by the Northern Ireland challenges posed by the Northern Ireland
protocol. The DUP, however, asserted that the Windsor Framework did not fully address the party’s concerns about the protocol and that further progress would be necessary before the DUP would agree to reestablish Northern Ireland’s devolved government. (See “Implications of Brexit” and “The Windsor Framework,” below.)protocol. The Windsor Framework still must be formally adopted; the DUP has not decided whether it will accept the new framework and enter into a new power-sharing government. (See “Implications of Brexit” and “The Windsor Framework,” below).
A range of social and economic policy divisions between the DUP and Sinn Fein could further complicate restoring Northern Ireland’s devolved government. Another potential issue relates to the roles of first minister and deputy first minister. Having won the largest number of Assembly seats in the May 2022 election, Sinn Fein would be entitled to the position of first minister based on those results. Although the roles of first minister and deputy first minister are equal, a Sinn Fein first minister would be highly symbolic in light of the party’s history and its support for Irish unification. The position of first minister has always been held by a unionist party, and the DUP may face pressure (both from within the DUP and from other unionists) against filling the deputy 18 Jayne McCormack, “Givan Resignation Triggers Fresh Political Crisis in NI,” BBC News, February 3, 2022. 19 NPR.org, “Sinn Fein Celebrates an Historic Election Win in Northern Ireland,” May 7, 2022; Mark Landler, “As Britain Turned Away from EU, Northern Ireland Turned to Sinn Fein,” New York Times, May 7, 2022; Mark Devenport, “How Alliance Number Nerds Turned Single Digits into a Surge,” BBC News, May 9, 2022. 20 Jayne McCormack, “Stormont Assembly Election Delayed by up to a Year,” BBC News, February10, 2023; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Heartless: DUP Blocks Stormont from Passing Organ Donation Law to Aid 6-Year-Old,” Politico, February 14, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
8
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
first minister post alongside a Sinn Fein first minister. Meanwhile, the Alliance Party argues for reforming the devolved government’s power-sharing rules to promote greater stability and reflect growing support for nonsectarian parties.21
Table 1. Northern Ireland 2022 Election Results
Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
Political Party
# of Seats
+/- Seats
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
27
27
—
—
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
25
25
-3
-3
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
17
17
+9
+9
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
9
9
-1
-1
Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-
Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-
8
-4 -4
left)
left)
8
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing) Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
1
1
—
—
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
1
1
—
—
Independent (unionist)
Independent (unionist)
2
2
+1
+1
Source: BBC News, “Northern Ireland Assembly Election Results 2022,” at https://www.bbc.com/news/ BBC News, “Northern Ireland Assembly Election Results 2022,” at https://www.bbc.com/news/
election/2022/northern-ireland/results. election/2022/northern-ireland/results.
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. In late June 2021, fol owing a period of political turmoil within the party, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became leader of the DUP.
17 Jayne McCormack, “Givan Resignation Triggers Fresh Political Crisis in NI,” BBC News, February 3, 2022. 18 NPR.org, “Sinn Fein Celebrates an Historic Election Win in Northern Ireland,” May 7, 2022; Mark Landler, “As Britain Turned Away from EU, Northern Ireland Turned to Sinn Fein,” New York Times, May 7, 2022; Mark Devenport, “How Alliance Number Nerds Turned Single Digits into a Surge,” BBC News, May 9, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
8
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a
united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in Northern Ireland and Ireland (with united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in Northern Ireland and Ireland (with
members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political
party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received
considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein, considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein,
replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neil has led Sinn Fein in the Northern replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neil has led Sinn Fein in the Northern
Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader. Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader.
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson has led the DUP since June 2021. Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party that is centrist and liberal in political orientation. It argues for reforming the devolved government’s power-sharing rules to promote greater stability and reflect growing support for nonsectarian parties. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the
UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. Doug Beattie has UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. Doug Beattie has
led the UUP since May 2021. led the UUP since May 2021.
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that
supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the
negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015. negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015.
Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political orientation. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
21 Gerry Moriarty, “Significantly and Symbolically Damaging Election for Unionism,” Irish Times, May 7, 2022; “Northern Ireland Election Results 2022: Who Are the Alliance Party and What Do They Stand For?,” BBC News, May 8, 2022; Paul Lawlor, “Brexit: Protocol Deal No Guarantee of Stormont Return, Says Irish PM,” BBC News, January 12, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
9
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process
Nearly
2024 Reestablishment of the Devolved Government Throughout the rest of 2023, the UK government sought to address the DUP’s remaining concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland and facilitate the establishment of a new devolved government. In late January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of measures proposed by the UK government—set out in a new Safeguarding the Union command paper—that outlines some operational changes to the Windsor Framework to ease trade further between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and seeks to reassure unionists of Northern Ireland’s place within the UK.19 Despite some concerns among several DUP party officials about the command paper and accompanying implementing legislation, the DUP decided to end its boycott of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and enter into a new devolved government.20 (See “Implications of Brexit” and “The 2024 UK-DUP Deal,” below.)
Northern Ireland’s Assembly and new Executive began work on February 3, 2024. For the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, the position of first minister is now held by a Sinn Fein member, Michelle O’Neill. Sinn Fein was entitled to the position of first minister because it won the largest number of Assembly seats in the May 2022 election, although the roles of first minister and deputy minister are equal. DUP Assembly member Emma Little-Pengelly assumed the role of deputy first minister. Both First Minister O’Neill and Deputy First Minister Little-Pengelly have pledged to serve “all” people and communities in Northern Ireland.21
19 In the UK, command papers are official publications that present major government initiatives to Parliament “by command” of the sovereign. See UK Parliament, “About Command Papers,” at https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/publications/government/.
20 Shawn Pogatchnik, “DUP Agrees to Drop Boycott of Northern Ireland Power-Sharing,” Politico, January 30, 2024; Jayne McCormack and Finn Purdy, “Stormont: Assembly to Sit on Saturday as DUP Boycott Ends,” BBC News, February 1, 2024.
21 Brendan Hughes and Matt Fox, “Stormont: Michelle O’Neill Makes History as Nationalist First Minister,” BBC (continued...)
Congressional Research Service
9
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
As part of the deal to restore the devolved government, the UK government also agreed to provide a £3.3 billion (about $4.2 billion) financial package for Northern Ireland to help address budgetary pressures (due in part to the delay in reestablishing the devolved government). Funding priorities include increasing public sector pay amid high inflation and recent large-scale strikes (by health care and transportation workers, teachers, civil servants, and others), improving infrastructure, and enhancing investment. The UK government also recommitted to devolving corporate tax powers to Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, which would allow Northern Ireland to set a lower corporate tax rate than the UK rate (of 25%) to compete more effectively with the lower corporate tax rate in the Republic of Ireland.22
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process More than 25 years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the past remains ever-present in 25 years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the past remains ever-present in
Northern Ireland and the search for peace and reconciliation remains challenging. Difficult issues Northern Ireland and the search for peace and reconciliation remains challenging. Difficult issues
include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading, include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading,
protests, and the use of flags and emblems), dealing with Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence, protests, and the use of flags and emblems), dealing with Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence,
addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity, and furthering addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity, and furthering
economic development and equality. economic development and equality.
Sectarian Divisions
Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and
Catholic communities existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern Catholic communities existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern
Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities. In March 2022, despite some opposition from Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities. In March 2022, despite some opposition from
the DUP and other stakeholders, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation to increase the the DUP and other stakeholders, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation to increase the
number of integrated school places and establish targets for the number of children educated in number of integrated school places and establish targets for the number of children educated in
integrated schools.22integrated schools.23 As of May 2023, out of roughly 1,100 schools in Northern Ireland, there were 70 formally integrated schools, educating 8% of pupils.24
In some areas in Northern Ireland,
In some areas in Northern Ireland,
peace walls separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods. separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods.
Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s
Departments of Justice and Housing have responsibility for the majority of peace walls (currently Departments of Justice and Housing have responsibility for the majority of peace walls (currently
around 60), but when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed around 60), but when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed
roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is
estimated at over 100.estimated at over 100.
25 Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls
since 2013, but surveys of public attitudes indicate continued support for the walls in many since 2013, but surveys of public attitudes indicate continued support for the walls in many
communities.communities.
2326 One poll conducted in 2019 found that 42% of those interviewed wanted the walls
News, February 3, 2024; William Booth and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Ireland Gets Its First Sinn Fein First Minister in Historic Shift,” Washington Post, February 3, 2024. 22 Margaret Canning, “Northern Ireland Businesses Welcome Prospect of Corporation Tax Devolution Contained in DUP Deal,” Belfast Telegraph, January 31, 2024; Northern Ireland Office, “UK Government Confirms £3.3bn Spending Settlement for Restored Northern Ireland Executive,” press release, February 13, 2024. 23 Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated Education: Stormont Passes Bill Despite DUP Opposition,” BBC News, March 9, 2022. 24 Northern Ireland Department of Education, A Strategy for Integrated Education in Northern Ireland, May 3, 2023. 25 Rory Carroll, “Belfast’s Peace Walls: Potent Symbols of Division Are Dwindling—But Slowly,” Guardian, April 7, 2023; “What Is a Peace Wall? An Explainer,” Irish News, July 27, 2023. 26 Julian O’Neill, “NI Troubles: I Would Love to See That Wall Coming Down,” BBC News, January 29, 2023; Rebecca Black, “Progress Continues to Be Made in Bid to Transform Northern Ireland’s Peace Walls,” Irish News, December 31, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
10
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
One poll conducted in 2019 found that 42% of those interviewed wanted the walls to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same survey also found that 37% of to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same survey also found that 37% of
respondents had never interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the respondents had never interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the
nearest peace wall.nearest peace wall.
2427 Another 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in Another 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in
support of removing the peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.support of removing the peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.
2528
Sectarian divisions are often apparent during the annual summer
Sectarian divisions are often apparent during the annual summer
marching season, when many , when many
unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant history. unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant history.
Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held through or Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held through or
close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist parades as close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist parades as
triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often provoked fierce triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often provoked fierce
violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission, which arbitrates violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission, which arbitrates
disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have repeatedly argued for disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have repeatedly argued for
abolishing the commission.abolishing the commission.
2629 Efforts over the years to address the contentious issue of parading Efforts over the years to address the contentious issue of parading
and related protests have stalled repeatedly. and related protests have stalled repeatedly.
Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland.
Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland.
A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at
Belfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on such Belfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on such
22 Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated Education: Stormont Passes Bill Despite DUP Opposition,” BBC News, March 9, 2022.
23 Julian O’Neill, “NI Troubles: I Would Love to See That Wall Coming Down,” BBC News, January 29, 2023. 24 Northern Ireland Department of Justice, Public Attitudes to Peace Walls 2019 Findings, June 2020. 25 International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019. 26 The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades.
Congressional Research Service
10
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
issues between the unionist and nationalist communities. The protests, mostly by unionists and issues between the unionist and nationalist communities. The protests, mostly by unionists and
loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent. In loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent. In
2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess these 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess these
contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. After several contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. After several
delays, the commission’s report was published in late 2021. The report contains over 40 delays, the commission’s report was published in late 2021. The report contains over 40
recommendations, but the commission was unable to reach agreement on some key issues, recommendations, but the commission was unable to reach agreement on some key issues,
including related to flags and memorials. Critics question the report’s value given the delays, including related to flags and memorials. Critics question the report’s value given the delays,
costs (£800,000, or about $1.1 million), and lack of an accompanying implementation plan.costs (£800,000, or about $1.1 million), and lack of an accompanying implementation plan.
2730
Dealing with the Past
Fully addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence and pursuing justice for crimes committed Fully addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence and pursuing justice for crimes committed
during the Troubles has been exceedingly difficult and often contentious. Reaching consensus on during the Troubles has been exceedingly difficult and often contentious. Reaching consensus on
the best way to deal with the past is challenging in large part because many unionists and the best way to deal with the past is challenging in large part because many unionists and
nationalists continue to view the Troubles differently and retain competing narratives. Cases of nationalists continue to view the Troubles differently and retain competing narratives. Cases of
suspected collusion between UK security institutions, Northern Ireland’s former police force, and suspected collusion between UK security institutions, Northern Ireland’s former police force, and
paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles have been particularly difficult to resolve. paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles have been particularly difficult to resolve.
The Good Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the
The Good Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the
suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the
Northern Ireland Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors Northern Ireland Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors
aimed at supporting to support victims and their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming victims and their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming
from the Troubles also from the Troubles also
existexisted. These . These
includehave included investigations into investigations into
deaths related to the conflictconflict-related deaths by a by a
dedicated dedicated
unit within the PSNIPSNI unit; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland ; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland
(PONI) of historical cases involving allegations of police misconduct;(PONI) of historical cases involving allegations of police misconduct;
fact-finding coroner inquests; and public inquiries, such and public inquiries, such
as the Saville inquiry (concluded in 2010) into the January 1972 Bloody as the Saville inquiry (concluded in 2010) into the January 1972 Bloody
27 Northern Ireland Department of Justice, Public Attitudes to Peace Walls 2019 Findings, June 2020. 28 International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019. 29 The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades. 30 Jayne McCormack, “Flags Report: Stormont Publishes £800k Report Without Action Plan,” BBC News, December 1, 2021; Northern Ireland Executive Office, Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition – Final Report, December 1, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
11
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Sunday incident in Sunday incident in
which the British Army shot 28 people, resulting in 14 deaths.which the British Army shot 28 people, resulting in 14 deaths.
2831 Since 2016, an independent Since 2016, an independent
police team—known as Operation Kenova—also has investigated several cases of suspected police team—known as Operation Kenova—also has investigated several cases of suspected
collusion during the Troublescollusion during the Troubles
. and reviewed more than 200 related murders.32
Critics argue these various legal processes
Critics argue these various legal processes
representhave represented a piecemeal approach and a piecemeal approach and
give have given some deaths some deaths
or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been
slow and has resulted in few prosecutions. As of 2022, over 900 conflict-related cases (involving slow and has resulted in few prosecutions. As of 2022, over 900 conflict-related cases (involving
nearly 1,200 deaths) were awaiting investigation by the PSNI.nearly 1,200 deaths) were awaiting investigation by the PSNI.
2933 According to According to
the UK governmentUK authorities, between 2015 and 2021, historical reviews and investigations resulted in , between 2015 and 2021, historical reviews and investigations resulted in
prosecutions prosecutions
of nine people for Troubles-related deaths.34 Troubles-era criminal prosecutions have faced legal hurdles as the passage of time may make it more difficult to meet the high evidentiary bar. Some experts also point out the expense and time involved with some of these processes; for example, the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday cost £195 million (more than $300 million) and took 12 years to complete.35
The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the Troubles has been contentious. UK veterans groups and some Members of Parliament argue that Troubles-related investigations and prosecutions have disproportionately focused on the actions of the armed forces and former police officers. They note that PSNI investigations involving the British Army have accounted for 30% of its legacy case workload but that the Army was responsible for 10% of the overall deaths during the conflict.36
Other officials and analysts reject arguments that legacy investigations and prosecutions have predominantly targeted veterans. Between 2011 and 2019, Northern Ireland’s Public Prosecution Service (PPS) undertook prosecutions in eight legacy cases involving republican paramilitaries, four cases involving loyalist paramilitaries, and five cases involving former military personnel.37 Several prosecutions of former British soldiers have collapsed in recent years.38 The first and only conviction (since the 1998 peace agreement) of a member of the armed forces for a Troubles-related offense occurred in November 2022, when a Northern Ireland court convicted a British Army veteran of manslaughter for killing a civilian in 1988.39
Most recently, in February 2024, the PPS announced that four British Army veterans would be prosecuted for murder or attempted murder in two incidents that occurred in Belfast in May 1972. Veterans’ advocates have criticized the PPS decision as being “rushed through” ahead of the May 2024 deadline to end most Troubles-related prosecutions mandated in new UK legislation (see “The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023,” below). The only other
31of nine people for Troubles-related deaths.30 In addition, UK government data as of mid-2021 indicated that about 400 Troubles-related cases alleging police misconduct remained before PONI; around 1,000 civil claims were pending against the UK Ministry of Defense and other state agencies; and around 36 fact-finding inquests into Troubles-era deaths remained outstanding (some of these inquests relate to killings by the British Army or the Northern Ireland police).31 Others point out the expense and time involved with some of these processes; for 27 Jayne McCormack, “Flags Report: Stormont Publishes £800k Report Without Action Plan,” BBC News, December 1, 2021; Northern Ireland Executive Office, Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition – Final Report, December 1, 2021.
28 Thirteen deaths occurred on Bloody Sunday; another person wounded on Bloody Sunday died several months later. Thirteen deaths occurred on Bloody Sunday; another person wounded on Bloody Sunday died several months later.
2932 Operation Kenova, “Five Years On: More than 200 Murders Now Under Review by Kenova,” press release, August 10, 2021.
33 Government of the UK, Government of the UK,
Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill Explanatory Notes, May 17, , May 17,
2022, p. 6, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0010/en/220010en.pdf. 2022, p. 6, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0010/en/220010en.pdf.
3034 Government of the UK, Government of the UK,
Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021, p. 20, at , July 14, 2021, p. 20, at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
31 For PONI data, see Northern Ireland Assembly Plenary Debate, Official Report, October 18, 2021, pp. 58-75, at
Congressional Research Service
11
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
example, the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday cost £195 million (more than $300 million) and took 12 years to complete.32
The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the Troubles remains contentious. UK veterans groups and some Members of Parliament argue that Troubles-related investigations and prosecutions have disproportionately focused on the actions of the armed forces and former police officers. They note that PSNI investigations involving the security forces account for 30% of its legacy case workload but only 10% of the overall deaths during the conflict. Others reject arguments that legacy investigations and prosecutions are predominantly targeting veterans. Between 2011 and 2019, Northern Ireland’s Public Prosecution Service (PPS) undertook prosecutions in eight legacy cases involving republican paramilitaries, four cases involving loyalist paramilitaries, and five cases involving former military personnel.33
Troubles-era criminal prosecutions also may face legal hurdles given that the passage of time may make it more difficult to meet the high evidentiary bar. Numerous prosecutions of former British soldiers have collapsed in recent years. In November 2022, a Northern Ireland court convicted a British Army veteran of manslaughter for killing a civilian in 1988 (the first conviction of a former member of the armed forces for a historical offense since the 1998 peace agreement). The only 35 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010. 36 Claire Mills and David Torrance, Investigation of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland, UK House of Commons Library, May 18, 2022, pp. 20-21.
37 Ibid., pp. 29-30. Also see, Edward Burke, “The Trouble with Northern Ireland Legacy Cases,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), April 22, 2021.
38 David Young, “Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, “Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021. 39 Rory Carroll, “Ex-Soldier Who Shot Dead Civilian During Troubles Convicted of Manslaughter,” Guardian, November 25, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
12
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
prosecution of a former British soldier for Troubles-related offenses currently underway is prosecution of a former British soldier for Troubles-related offenses currently underway is
that against “Soldier F” for two of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killingsthat against “Soldier F” for two of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings
.34 and for attempted murder of five others wounded on Bloody Sunday.40
Stormont House Agreement Provisions
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy
issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative). These bodies were to issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative). These bodies were to
include a new Historical Investigation Unit (HIU) to take forward the work of the PSNI and include a new Historical Investigation Unit (HIU) to take forward the work of the PSNI and
PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the Troubles and a new Independent PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the Troubles and a new Independent
Commission for Information Retrieval to enable victims and survivors to seek and privately Commission for Information Retrieval to enable victims and survivors to seek and privately
receive information about conflict-related violence (separate from the judicial process). The receive information about conflict-related violence (separate from the judicial process). The
Stormont House Agreement also provided for establishing an oral history archive and an Stormont House Agreement also provided for establishing an oral history archive and an
Implementation and Reconciliation Group to promote reconciliation and reduce sectarianism.Implementation and Reconciliation Group to promote reconciliation and reduce sectarianism.
3541
Efforts to enact these legacy mechanisms in UK law, however, stalled for years amid differences
Efforts to enact these legacy mechanisms in UK law, however, stalled for years amid differences
between the UK government and various stakeholders on certain aspects of how these bodies between the UK government and various stakeholders on certain aspects of how these bodies
would function. In particular, some nationalists and many human rights advocates objected to the would function. In particular, some nationalists and many human rights advocates objected to the
UK government’s insistence on proposed “national security caveats” pertaining to the disclosure UK government’s insistence on proposed “national security caveats” pertaining to the disclosure
of sensitive or classified information. of sensitive or classified information.
Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that such caveats could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police http://data.niassembly.gov.uk/HansardXml/plenary-18-10- 2021.pdf; for civil claims and inquest data, see Government of the UK, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
32 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010. 33 Claire Mills and David Torrance, Investigation of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland, UK House of Commons Library, May 18, 2022.
34 David Young, “Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, “Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021; “Bloody Sunday: Soldier F Prosecution Resumes in Court,” BBC News, September 28, 2022; Rory Carroll, “Ex-Soldier Who Shot Dead Civilian During Troubles Convicted of Manslaughter,” Guardian, November 25, 2022. 35 The Unionists voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police officers. Successive government crises also impeded work on implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.42
The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023
As part of the 2020 agreement to reestablish Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, the UK government of then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson pledged to introduce legislation to set up the legacy bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020 and subsequently in July 2021, however, the UK government outlined new proposals to address Northern Ireland’s past, including changes to the legacy mechanisms called for in the Stormont House Agreement. These proposals informed the government’s decision to introduce the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill in the UK Parliament in May 2022. UK officials argued that the new approach set out in the bill would prioritize information recovery for victims and families, protect military veterans from prosecution, and encourage wider societal reconciliation.43
Despite considerable opposition to the legislation within and outside of Northern Ireland (discussed below), the UK House of Commons passed the bill in July 2022, by a vote of 282 to 217. The bill was supported mostly by the majority Conservative Party. The opposition Labour Party and others voted against the bill; no Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland
40 “Bloody Sunday: Soldier F Prosecution Resumes in Court,” BBC News, September 28, 2022; “Former British Soldier to Stand Trial over Bloody Sunday Killings Half a Century Ago,” Associated Press, December 14, 2023; James Crisp, “Four More Troubles Veterans Prosecuted as Cases ‘Rushed Through’ Before Amnesty Deadline,” Telegraph, February 8, 2024.
41 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-
agreement.
Congressional Research Service
12
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
officers. Successive government crises also impeded work on implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.36
The May 2022 Troubles Bill
As part of the January 2020 agreement to reestablish Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, the UK government of then-Prime Minister Johnson pledged to introduce legislation to set up the legacy bodies proposed in the Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020 and subsequently in July 2021, however, the UK government outlined new proposals to address Northern Ireland’s past, including changes to the legacy mechanisms called for in the Stormont House Agreement. These proposals informed the government’s decision to introduce the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill in the UK Parliament in May 2022.37
In this new legislation, known as the Troubles Bill, the UK government sought to emphasize information recovery for victims and families (especially before such information is lost to the passage of time), while also protecting military veterans from prosecution and promoting wider societal reconciliation. The Troubles Bill essentially would draw to a close most investigations and prosecutions into incidents during the Troubles. Among other measures, the bill would establish a agreement.
42 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth Gordon, “Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018. 43 Government of the UK, “Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Outline Way Forward to Address the Legacy of the Troubles,” press release, May 17, 2022; UK Parliament, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3160.
Congressional Research Service
13
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
supported it. In January 2023, the UK government of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (who became Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in October 2022) introduced several amendments to the bill, largely in response to concerns raised by victims and survivors. Following some delays and resistance in the UK House of Lords, the UK Parliament gave final approval to the bill in September 2023. The bill subsequently received royal assent and became UK law.44
Among other measures, the legislation (commonly referred to as the Legacy Act) establishes a new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR) new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR)
charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The
bill also would establishLegacy Act also establishes a conditional immunity scheme that would provide immunity from prosecution for a conditional immunity scheme that would provide immunity from prosecution for
Troubles-related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIRTroubles-related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIR
. The act essentially would draw to a close most investigations and prosecutions of incidents during the Troubles. (For more information . (For more information
on these and other key provisionson these and other key provisions
in the Troubles Bill, see the text box below.) , see the text box below.)
Many stakeholders haveAs noted above, many stakeholders responded negatively to the responded negatively to the
Troubles BillLegacy Act. Although UK veterans groups . Although UK veterans groups
and campaignersand campaigners
have largely welcomed the largely welcomed the
billlegislation, victims groups and human rights advocates have , victims groups and human rights advocates have
been critical. All Northern Ireland political parties been critical. All Northern Ireland political parties
have expressed oppositionexpressed opposition
. to the legislation.45 Nationalists Nationalists
contendcontended that ending investigations and that ending investigations and
most prosecutions would circumvent justice for victims and prosecutions would circumvent justice for victims and
families and families and
would allow the UK government to cover up the truth about the state’s actions during the allow the UK government to cover up the truth about the state’s actions during the
Troubles. Unionists Troubles. Unionists
objectobjected to what they to what they
viewviewed as establishing as establishing
“moral equivalencymoral equivalency
” between the between the
actions of soldiers and paramilitaries. The Irish government also actions of soldiers and paramilitaries. The Irish government also
has expressed serious concerns expressed serious concerns
about various aspects of the about various aspects of the
legacy legislation, including “regret” that legislation, including “regret” that
the billit departs from the departs from the
approach envisioned in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement.approach envisioned in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement.
38 46 Legal experts question whether Legal experts question whether
provisions in the billcertain provisions, especially those related to investigations and the immunity scheme, are , especially those related to investigations and the immunity scheme, are
compatible with UK commitments in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an compatible with UK commitments in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an
international treaty of the Council of Europe.international treaty of the Council of Europe.
39
The UK House of Commons passed the Troubles Bill in July 2022, by a vote of 282 to 217. The bill was supported mostly by the majority Conservative Party. The opposition Labour Party and
36 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth Gordon, “Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018. 37 Government of the UK, “Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Outline Way Forward to Address the Legacy of the Troubles,” press release, May 17, 2022; UK Parliament47
The ICRIR was established in December 2023 and is expected to begin work in summer 2024. The Legacy Act faces a number of judicial challenges in UK courts, however, and the Irish government has filed a case against the act before the ECHR’s European Court of Human Rights. In late February 2024, the Belfast High Court found that the immunity provisions in the Legacy Act were in breach of the ECHR. Responding to the High Court’s ruling, UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Chris Heaton-Harris asserted that the UK government remained committed to implementing the Legacy Act. The UK government is expected to appeal the High Court’s ruling.48
44 Government of the UK, “Government Tables Amendments to NI Troubles Legacy Legislation,” press release, January 17, 2023; BBC News, “Troubles Legacy Bill Enters Law After Receiving Royal Assent,” September 19, 2023.
45 See, for example, UK Parliament, Hansard, ,
Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation)
Bill, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3160.
38Bill, volume 717, debated on July 4, 2022, at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2022-07-04/debates/854CCB3A-19C5-4724-9CF2-A2B02E6D9086/NorthernIrelandTroubles(LegacyAndReconciliation)Bill.
46 Molly Killeen, “Irish PM Urges UK Not to Act Alone as Troubles Legacy Bill Introduced,” Molly Killeen, “Irish PM Urges UK Not to Act Alone as Troubles Legacy Bill Introduced,”
EurActiv, May 18, 2022; , May 18, 2022;
Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ireland Welcomes Decision by Council of Europe on Northern Ireland Legacy Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ireland Welcomes Decision by Council of Europe on Northern Ireland Legacy
Issues,” press release, June 10, 2022. Issues,” press release, June 10, 2022.
3947 The UK is a party to the The UK is a party to the
ECHREuropean Convention on Human Rights as a member of the Council of Europe, a leading European human rights body that as a member of the Council of Europe, a leading European human rights body that
the UK helped found in 1949. The Council of Europe is an entirely separate organization from the EU. Lisa O’Carroll, the UK helped found in 1949. The Council of Europe is an entirely separate organization from the EU. Lisa O’Carroll,
“Troubles Legacy Bill Risks Breaching Human Rights Law, UK Warned,” “Troubles Legacy Bill Risks Breaching Human Rights Law, UK Warned,”
Guardian, October 26, 2022. , October 26, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
13
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
others voted against the bill; no Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland supported it. The Troubles Bill is currently under consideration in the House of Lords, where it faces some resistance and potential delay. In January 2023, the UK government of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (who became Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in October 2022) introduced several amendments to the Troubles Bill, largely in response to concerns raised by victims and survivors. The amendments primarily seek to strengthen the conditions related to immunity from prosecution. Victims’ advocates and Northern Ireland political parties remain unsatisfied with the proposed amendments, however, and continue to urge the UK government to withdraw the bill.40
The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill: Key Provisions
For the purposes of the legislation48 BBC News, “Troubles Legacy: Controversial Bill Facing More Legal Challenges,” September 18, 2023; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Ireland to Sue UK over Law Blocking Probes into Northern Irish Violence,” Politico, December 20, 2023; Megan Specia, “Immunity for Troubles Violence Violates Human Rights, Belfast Court Rules,” New York Times, February 28, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
14
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act: Key Provisions
For the purposes of the legislation (commonly referred to as the Legacy Act), the period of the Troubles is defined as being from January 1966 to April 10, , the period of the Troubles is defined as being from January 1966 to April 10,
1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Key provisions 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Key provisions
of the Legacy Act include the fol owing. include the fol owing.
A New Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR). The ICRIR The ICRIR
would be is charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The ICRIR charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The ICRIR
wouldis to be be
“demand led”—it “demand led”—it
wouldwill not review every death or serious injury but rather not review every death or serious injury but rather
wouldwill do so at the request of family do so at the request of family
members, survivors, or certain government authorities. members, survivors, or certain government authorities.
For each review undertaken, findings wouldFindings are to be provided be provided
to the person who requested the review and to the person who requested the review and
would be made publicly available (in most cases). The ICRIR also made publicly available (in most cases). The ICRIR also
would beis required to produce and publish a historical record of all Troubles-related deaths not subject to a required to produce and publish a historical record of all Troubles-related deaths not subject to a
request for a review. request for a review.
Any review requestsRequests must be made within the first five years of the ICRIR’s operation. The must be made within the first five years of the ICRIR’s operation. The
ICRIR is to be composed of three to five commissioners,ICRIR consists of six commissioners, to be supported by ICRIR officers supported by ICRIR officers
, and equipped with the equipped with the
necessary expertise and police investigatory powers (for the primary purpose of information recovery). UK necessary expertise and police investigatory powers (for the primary purpose of information recovery). UK
government authorities government authorities
would beare required to provide “ful disclosure” to the ICRIR. required to provide “ful disclosure” to the ICRIR.
A New Conditional Immunity Scheme. The The
bil would provideLegacy Act provides immunity from prosecution for Troubles- immunity from prosecution for Troubles-
related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIR. Individuals must apply for immunity, and an ICRIR related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIR. Individuals must apply for immunity, and an ICRIR
judicial panel must be satisfied that a person requesting immunity has provided an account that is true to the best judicial panel must be satisfied that a person requesting immunity has provided an account that is true to the best
of that person’s knowledge or belief. Once granted by the ICRIR, immunity cannot be revoked. Immunity would of that person’s knowledge or belief. Once granted by the ICRIR, immunity cannot be revoked. Immunity would
not be granted to individuals for past Troubles-related convictions or to subjects of ongoing prosecutions.not be granted to individuals for past Troubles-related convictions or to subjects of ongoing prosecutions.
Ending Non-ICRIR Investigations and Limiting Prosecutions. Upon entering into force, the bil would ban The Legacy Act bans criminal investigations into Troubles-related incidents by any UK authority other than the ICRIR. All ongoing criminal investigations into Troubles-related incidents by any UK authority other than the ICRIR. All ongoing
investigations investigations
wouldare to cease, except those in support of prosecutions already underway cease, except those in support of prosecutions already underway
by May 2024 (which (which
wouldwill be allowed to be allowed to
continue to conclusion). The ICRIR continue to conclusion). The ICRIR
couldmay refer individuals not granted immunity for prosecution. refer individuals not granted immunity for prosecution.
Ending Inquests and Civil Claims. The The
bil would endLegacy Act ends inquests (a fact-finding investigation) that have not inquests (a fact-finding investigation) that have not
reached an advanced stage reached an advanced stage
and would prohibit(as of May 2024) and prohibits future inquests into Troubles-related deaths. The future inquests into Troubles-related deaths. The
bil also would preventact also bans future civil claims for Troubles-related conduct. future civil claims for Troubles-related conduct.
Memorialization Initiatives. The The
bil would provideLegacy Act provides for efforts to memorialize the Troubles. Among other for efforts to memorialize the Troubles. Among other
measures, the measures, the
bil act outlines and would fund an oral history initiative to encourage people from all backgrounds to outlines and would fund an oral history initiative to encourage people from all backgrounds to
share their experiences of the Troubles and listen to those of others. The share their experiences of the Troubles and listen to those of others. The
bil act also provides for the establishment also provides for the establishment
of an independent academic initiative to study themes and patterns related to the Troubles and of an independent academic initiative to study themes and patterns related to the Troubles and
would mandate the mandates the preparation and publication of a “memorialization strategy” with concrete recommendations (including preparation and publication of a “memorialization strategy” with concrete recommendations (including
whether a Troubles museum or similar project would be beneficial). whether a Troubles museum or similar project would be beneficial).
Sources: Joanna Dawson et al., Joanna Dawson et al.,
Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill 2022-2023, UK House of , UK House of
Commons Library, May 20, 2022; and Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office, Commons Library, May 20, 2022; and Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office,
Explainers Relating to the
Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, May 25, 2022. , May 25, 2022.
40 Government of the UK, “Government Tables Amendments to NI Troubles Legacy Legislation,” press release, January 17, 2023; Stephen Walker, “Troubles Legacy Bill: Victims Take Protest to Westminster,” BBC News, January 31, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
14
link to page 21 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the
Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. In 2015, the UK Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. In 2015, the UK
government commissioned a study on the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups. government commissioned a study on the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.
This review found that all the main paramilitary groups that operated during the Troubles still This review found that all the main paramilitary groups that operated during the Troubles still
exist, but they are on cease-fire and the leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is exist, but they are on cease-fire and the leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is
“committed to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives.” At the same time, the review “committed to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives.” At the same time, the review
concluded that individual members of paramilitary groups still represent a threat to national concluded that individual members of paramilitary groups still represent a threat to national
security, including through their involvement in organized crime.security, including through their involvement in organized crime.
4149
49 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20, 2015. This report focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks during the Troubles under the (continued...)
Congressional Research Service
15
link to page 22 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
In 2017, a new four-member Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) was established to
In 2017, a new four-member Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) was established to
monitor paramilitary activity and to report annually on progress toward ending such activity. The monitor paramilitary activity and to report annually on progress toward ending such activity. The
UK and Irish governments each named one representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland UK and Irish governments each named one representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland
Executive named two.Executive named two.
4250 In its In its
fifthsixth annual report, released in December annual report, released in December
20222023, the IRC states that , the IRC states that
paramilitary groups and structures continue to pose “a paramilitary groups and structures continue to pose “a
clear and present danger in and for Northern Ireland.” The IRC supports a “twin track”continuing threat to individuals and society” and “coercive control continues to be an unacceptable feature of life in many communities where the paramilitaries operate.” The IRC supports a holistic approach that combines policing and criminal approach that combines policing and criminal
justice responses with measures to address the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing justice responses with measures to address the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing
communities in which paramilitaries operate.communities in which paramilitaries operate.
43 The IRC also argues for direct engagement with paramilitary groups to promote voluntary action by the groups to bring about disbandment and a definitive end to paramilitarism.51
Concerns also exist about the degree to which divisions over Brexit could further enhance
Concerns also exist about the degree to which divisions over Brexit could further enhance
paramilitary influence, prompt a resurgence in paramilitary activity, and otherwise affect the paramilitary influence, prompt a resurgence in paramilitary activity, and otherwise affect the
peace process. In March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing peace process. In March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing
support for the Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about support for the Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about
the implementation of implementation of
the post-Brexit arrangements the post-Brexit arrangements
infor the Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland
protocol. Although these loyalist groups . Although these loyalist groups
remain on cease-fire, they also remain on cease-fire, they also
warnwarned that Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to that Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to
the “permanent destruction” of the peace accord (see the “permanent destruction” of the peace accord (see
“Implications of Brexit” below). below).
4452
The Dissident Threat
Security assessments indicate that dissident groups not on cease-fire and opposed to the 1998
Security assessments indicate that dissident groups not on cease-fire and opposed to the 1998
peace accord continue to present significant threats. Dissident republican groups are regarded as peace accord continue to present significant threats. Dissident republican groups are regarded as
posing the greatest terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, although concerns persist about the public posing the greatest terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, although concerns persist about the public
order challenges posed by smaller dissident loyalist groups.order challenges posed by smaller dissident loyalist groups.
4553 At the same time, dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.
According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblacht (ANP), and the New IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers, prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017, dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers, and two prison officers.54
Authorities are especially alarmed by the threat posed by the New IRA, which has carried out a string of high-profile attacks in recent years. Police suspect the New IRA of shooting and
At the same time, experts note that
41 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20, 2015. This report focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks during the Troubles under the name of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer name of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer
Force (LVF); the Irish Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and Force (LVF); the Irish Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and
the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
4250 The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on
the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007. the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007.
4351 Independent Reporting Commission FifthSixth Report, December , December
7, 20225, 2023, at https://www.ircommission.org/news, at https://www.ircommission.org/news
-centre/irc-fifth-report.
44/irc-sixth-report-published-5-december-2023.
52 As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support
for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists
Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,” Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,”
Politico, March 5, 2021. , March 5, 2021.
4553 MI5, “MI5 in Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/mi5-in-northern-ireland. MI5, “MI5 in Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/mi5-in-northern-ireland.
Congressional Research Service
15
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.
According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblacht (ANP), and the New IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers, prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017, dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers, and two prison officers.46
Authorities are especially alarmed by the threat posed by the New IRA, which has carried out a string of high-profile attacks in recent years. Police suspect the New IRA of shooting and 54 In 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a small splinter group formed in opposition to the cease-fire. MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland.
Congressional Research Service
16
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
critically wounding a senior and prominent PSNI detective, John Caldwell, in Omagh in February critically wounding a senior and prominent PSNI detective, John Caldwell, in Omagh in February
2023 (the New IRA has claimed responsibility).2023 (the New IRA has claimed responsibility).
55 The New IRA also was responsible for the April The New IRA also was responsible for the April
2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry
(or Derry).47 Following the McKee murder, the PSNI and UK security services ramped up efforts to degrade the New IRA, including targeting its leadership in a series of operations. Some analysts suggest the Caldwell attack could signal that the New IRA has reorganized and regained strength, a source of concern for authorities as the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement approaches in April 2023.(also known as Derry).56 Although less active than the New IRA, in Although less active than the New IRA, in
early March 2023, ANP March 2023, ANP
warned that it would consider the families of PSNI officers to be targets as well.warned that it would consider the families of PSNI officers to be targets as well.
4857
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity
Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny
dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal
opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable
advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average
of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from
over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.
4958 The 2008-2009 global recession led to a prolonged The 2008-2009 global recession led to a prolonged
downturn in the region and economic recovery was slow and uneven for many years but downturn in the region and economic recovery was slow and uneven for many years but
gradually improved between 2013 and 2019. Like elsewhere in the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic gradually improved between 2013 and 2019. Like elsewhere in the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic
and resulting restrictions on social and business activity affected Northern Ireland’s economyand resulting restrictions on social and business activity affected Northern Ireland’s economy
, but the speed of economic recovery in Northern Ireland was faster than expected. in 2020, but economic activity largely recovered in 2021.59
Since mid-2022, high energy costs
Since mid-2022, high energy costs
and inflation, inflation, and increased interest rates have been a drag on Northern Ireland’s economy have been a drag on Northern Ireland’s economy
. Northern Ireland’s economic output fell slightly (by 0.3%) in both the second and, resulting in some quarterly fluctuations in economic output and a rising cost of living. Between the third quarters third quarters
of 2022. At the same time, Northern Ireland’s output was 4.1% above pre-pandemic levels seen in 2019of 2002 and 2023, however, Northern Ireland’s economic output increased by 2.2%. Some analysts suggest that Northern Ireland has weathered . Some analysts suggest that Northern Ireland has weathered
the economic difficulties of the last few years better overall than the UK. In comparison to pre-pandemic levels in 2019, economic activity in Northern Ireland has shown stronger growth (6.2%, driven largely by the services sector) than the UK (1.5%). Northern Ireland’s unemployment rate for October-December 2023 was 2.6%, lower than the UK average unemployment rate of 3.8%.60 At the same time, the recent stalemate in restoring Northern Ireland’s devolved government impacted Northern Ireland’s budget and the authorities’ ability to respond to the rising cost of living, especially for public sector workers, and led to months of labor unrest and strikes in late 2023 and early 2024.61
Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities also persist in Northern Ireland. Income levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12
55 Julian O’Neill, “Omagh Police Shooting: John Caldwell Attack Causes Shockwaves in PSNI,” BBC News, February 25, 2023; Allison Morris, “New IRA Still Main Suspect in DCI Caldwell Shooting, Chief Constable Tells Policing Board,” Belfast Telegraph, March 2, 2023. 56 The New IRA claimed responsibility for McKee’s death but reportedly issued an apology; the group asserted that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the riots but had hit McKee by accident. See Ed O’Loughlin, “New IRA Apologizes for Killing of Journalist in Northern Ireland,” New York Times, April 23, 2019. 57the economic difficulties of the 46 In 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a small splinter group formed in opposition to the cease-fire. MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland. 47 The New IRA claimed responsibility for McKee’s death but reportedly issued an apology; the group asserted that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the riots but had hit McKee by accident. See, Ed O’Loughlin, “New IRA Apologizes for Killing of Journalist in Northern Ireland,” New York Times, April 23, 2019. 48 Julian O’Neill, “Omagh Police Shooting: John Caldwell Attack Causes Shockwaves in PSNI,” BBC News, February 25, 2023; Allison Morris, “New IRA Still Main Suspect in DCI Caldwell Shooting, Chief Constable Tells Policing Board,” Belfast Telegraph, March 2, 2023; Seanin Graham, “PSNI Officers Warned of Republican Dissident Threat to Seanin Graham, “PSNI Officers Warned of Republican Dissident Threat to
their Families,” their Families,”
Irish Times, March 7, 2023. , March 7, 2023.
49
58 Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic
Strategy, Strategy,
Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011. , January 2011.
Congressional Research Service
16
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
last few years better overall than the UK. As of the third quarter of 2022, for example, UK gross domestic product (GDP) was 0.8% below pre-pandemic levels (Northern Ireland economic output and UK GDP are considered similar measures but are not produced on a fully equivalent basis). Northern Ireland’s unemployment rate for October-December 2022 was 2.5%, lower than the UK average unemployment rate of 3.7%.50
Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities persist in Northern Ireland. Income levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12 59 Valentina Romei and Chris Giles, “Northern Ireland Economy Has Outperformed Rest of UK, ONS Figures Show,” Financial Times, November 29, 2021; John Campbell, “COVID-19: NI Economic Recovery May Be Weaker Than Originally Thought,” BBC News, February 28, 2022. 60 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 3 2023, January 11, 2024; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 14, 2024.
61 Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Ireland Grinds to a Freezing Halt Over Public Pay Dispute,” Reuters, January 18, 2024; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland in 2024: A Land of Misery,” Politico, January 19, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
17
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
economic regions, Northern Ireland had the third-lowest gross domestic product per capita in economic regions, Northern Ireland had the third-lowest gross domestic product per capita in
2020 (£25,5752021 (£27,154, or about $, or about $
30,79034,360), below the UK’s average (£), below the UK’s average (£
32,14133,967, or about $, or about $
38,700).5142,980).62 Northern Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (Northern Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (
roughly 26%)26.8% in the third quarter of 2023), exacerbated by long-term illness and disability in the aftermath of the pandemic, and a high proportion and a high proportion
of working-age individuals with no formal qualifications.of working-age individuals with no formal qualifications.
63 Studies indicate the historically poorest Studies indicate the historically poorest
areas in Northern Ireland remain so and areas in Northern Ireland remain so and
note that many of these bore the brunt of the Troubles. many of these bore the brunt of the Troubles.
Although many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, others are Although many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, others are
predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged areas in predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged areas in
Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called
peace dividend..
5264
At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The
At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The
gap in gap in
economic activity ratesworkforce participation between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since
1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference)1990 and has and has
largely converged in the last few converged in the last few
years. years.
TheAccording to the most recent data available most recent data available
indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70% for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.53
Implications of Brexit54from Northern Ireland’s Equality Commission, in 2021, for the first time, the share of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland’s workforce was 50:50. (In comparison, in 1990, the share of Protestants in Northern Ireland’s workforce was 65%, while the share of Catholics was 35%).65
Implications of Brexit66
In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored
remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The
UK began negotiations with the EU on the terms of its withdrawal in 2017 and concluded these UK began negotiations with the EU on the terms of its withdrawal in 2017 and concluded these
negotiations in late 2019. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020. The UK continued negotiations in late 2019. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020. The UK continued
to apply EU rules and to participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of to apply EU rules and to participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of
an 11-month transition period that concluded on December 31, 2020.an 11-month transition period that concluded on December 31, 2020.
5567 Brexit has added to Brexit has added to
divisions within Northern Ireland and divisions within Northern Ireland and
posesposed considerable challenges, with potential implications considerable challenges, with potential implications
for Northern Ireland’s peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status. for Northern Ireland’s peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status.
50 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 3 2022, January 12, 2023; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 14, 2023.
51
The Irish Border and Post-Brexit Arrangements At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law
62 Matthew Ward and Daniel Harari, Matthew Ward and Daniel Harari,
Regional and National Economic Indicators, UK House of Commons Library, , UK House of Commons Library,
February February
23, 2023.
5214, 2024.
63 Ulster University, Economic Inactivity: Who, What, Where, Why?, January 2024; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 14, 2024.
64 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,
Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November , November
2017; Duncan Morrow, 2017; Duncan Morrow,
Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony , University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony
of Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the of Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the
Environment and Cyber, Environment and Cyber,
The United States Role in Reaffirming the Good Friday Agreement, 117th Cong., 1st sess., May , 117th Cong., 1st sess., May
5, 20215, 2021
.
53 Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019. 54; Pivotal Public Policy Forum NI, Reconciliation and Deprivation: Twin Challenges for Northern Ireland, May 2023.
65 Data applies to Northern Ireland’s “total monitored workforce,” as defined in and required by Northern Ireland’s fair employment legislation; “total monitored workforce” does not include the self-employed, school teachers, or those in private sector companies with ten or less employees. Northern Ireland Equality Commission, Fair Employment Monitoring Report No. 32, released April 21, 2023.
66 For more background on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, For more background on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730,
Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, ,
coordinated by Derek E. Mix. coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
5567 In December 2020, UK and EU negotiators also concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which sets In December 2020, UK and EU negotiators also concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which sets
out terms for post-Brexit trade and economic relations, as well as cooperation on a range of other issues. out terms for post-Brexit trade and economic relations, as well as cooperation on a range of other issues.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
1718
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and
nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland
belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an
important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped
produce a dynamic cross-border economy. produce a dynamic cross-border economy.
Preventing a
Preventing a
hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland
was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with
the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-
Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent
dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets, dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets,
endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would
threaten the region’s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.threaten the region’s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.
5668
Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
“frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People “frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People
in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across
the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300 the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300
public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a
fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and
bureaucratic hurdles were common.bureaucratic hurdles were common.
5769
In early 2019, the UK Parliament rejected an initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in
In early 2019, the UK Parliament rejected an initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in
large part because of concerns that arrangements for the Irish border would have kept the UK tied large part because of concerns that arrangements for the Irish border would have kept the UK tied
too closely to the EU single market and customs union. Some Brexit advocates contended that too closely to the EU single market and customs union. Some Brexit advocates contended that
Ireland and the EU were exaggerating the security concerns about the border. Those of this view Ireland and the EU were exaggerating the security concerns about the border. Those of this view
also noted that, although the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security noted that, although the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security
arrangementsarrangements
— (including the removal of security installations “consistent with the level of including the removal of security installations “consistent with the level of
threat”threat”
—), it does not explicitly require an open border. The Irish government and many it does not explicitly require an open border. The Irish government and many
officials and stakeholders in in Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland
—as well as most UK officials— and the UK argued that an open border had become intrinsic argued that an open border had become intrinsic
to peace to peace
on the island of Ireland and to ensuring and to ensuring
the fulfillment of fulfillment of
provisions in the Good Friday the Good Friday
AgreementAgreement
’s provisions on north-south cooperation on cross-border issues ( on north-south cooperation on cross-border issues (
including transportsuch as transportation, agriculture, , agriculture,
and the environment).and the environment).
58
5670
The Northern Ireland Protocol
In October 2019, the EU and the government of then-UK Prime Minister Johnson reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of Ireland.71 Under the terms of the protocol, which also sought to safeguard the rules of the EU single market, Northern Ireland remains legally in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for all practical purposes in the EU single market and customs union for goods.
68 Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,” Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,”
Guardian, ,
February 7, 2018. February 7, 2018.
5769 Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,”
New York Times, August 5, , August 5,
2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,” 2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,”
Belfast Telegraph, December 17, 2018. , December 17, 2018.
5870 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom
McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,”
Politico, June 12, 2019. , June 12, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
18
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Post-Brexit Arrangements in the Northern Ireland Protocol
In October 2019, the EU and the government of then-UK Prime Minister Johnson reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of Ireland.59 Under the terms of the protocol, which also sought to safeguard the rules of the EU single market, Northern Ireland remains legally in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for all practical purposes in the EU single market and customs union for goods. 71 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration.
Congressional Research Service
19
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
This eliminates the need for checks on trade in goods at the land border between Northern Ireland This eliminates the need for checks on trade in goods at the land border between Northern Ireland
and Ireland, but essentially creates a regulatory and customs border in the Irish Sea between and Ireland, but essentially creates a regulatory and customs border in the Irish Sea between
Northern Ireland and Great Britain (often termed the Northern Ireland and Great Britain (often termed the
Irish Sea border). Any physical checks ). Any physical checks
necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance for goods moving from Great Britain to necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance for goods moving from Great Britain to
Northern Ireland would be conducted at ports or points of entry away from the politically Northern Ireland would be conducted at ports or points of entry away from the politically
sensitive land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. sensitive land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland.
The DUP and other unionists strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements,
The DUP and other unionists strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements,
contending the provisions in the protocol would treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of contending the provisions in the protocol would treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of
the UK and would jeopardize Northern Ireland’s economy, its participation in the UK’s internal the UK and would jeopardize Northern Ireland’s economy, its participation in the UK’s internal
market, and the region’s position as part of the UK. The DUP and other unionists also objected to market, and the region’s position as part of the UK. The DUP and other unionists also objected to
what they viewed as a lack of sufficient democratic consent in the development or amendment of what they viewed as a lack of sufficient democratic consent in the development or amendment of
EU rules that would apply in Northern Ireland. In an effort to address such concerns, negotiators EU rules that would apply in Northern Ireland. In an effort to address such concerns, negotiators
included a provision in the revised protocol making its renewal after four years subject to the included a provision in the revised protocol making its renewal after four years subject to the
consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In light of the large majority won by then-Prime consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In light of the large majority won by then-Prime
Minister Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, the Minister Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, the
DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal
agreement in the UK Parliament. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement in the UK Parliament. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal
agreement, thus enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020. agreement, thus enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020.
The Protocol’s Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit,
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit,
demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which Catholics now outnumber Protestants) and demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which Catholics now outnumber Protestants) and
changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who may not be as wedded to changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who may not be as wedded to
traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the unionist community to perceive traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the unionist community to perceive
a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The post-Brexit trade arrangements in the Northern a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The post-Brexit trade arrangements in the Northern
Ireland protocol appear to have enhanced the sense of unionist disenfranchisement, partly by Ireland protocol appear to have enhanced the sense of unionist disenfranchisement, partly by
raising fears that Northern Ireland would be drawn closer to the Republic of Ireland’s economic raising fears that Northern Ireland would be drawn closer to the Republic of Ireland’s economic
orbit and that this could be a precursor to a united Ireland. orbit and that this could be a precursor to a united Ireland.
As noted previously, unionist and loyalist concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol may have contributed to the riots and violence that erupted in spring 2021. Brexit also heightened long-standing nationalist doubts about the trustworthiness of the UK government and eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments. As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.60
59 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration.
60 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” Irish Times, January 30, 2020; Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Guardian, April 5, 2021; Pat
Congressional Research Service
19
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Significant challenges have arisen in implementing the Northern Ireland protocol, which took effect on January 1, 2021.61 The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain posed trade and administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland, despite initial grace periods ranging from three months to a year for full implementation of the new rules for agri-food products, medicines, and other items. Initial problems included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for Northern Ireland supermarkets dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK.62Brexit also eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments. As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.72
The Northern Ireland protocol took effect on January 1, 2021 and implementation and operational challenges soon emerged. The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain posed trade and administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland, despite initial grace periods for full implementation of the new rules for agri-food products, medicines, and other items.73 Problems included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for Northern Ireland supermarkets dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK.74
72 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” Irish Times, January 30, 2020; Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Guardian, April 5, 2021; Pat Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Irish Times, June 11, 2021. 73 Since the protocol took effect, physical checks necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance are being conducted at ports or points of entry on the northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain.
74 See, for example, Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021; “British Supermarkets May Shift Supply Chains to EU if Northern Ireland Trade Not Addressed,” Reuters, July 17, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
20
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Tensions within Northern Ireland and between the UK and the EU were aggravated further in
Tensions within Northern Ireland and between the UK and the EU were aggravated further in
2021 by several other issues related to implementation of the protocol. These issues included a 2021 by several other issues related to implementation of the protocol. These issues included a
dispute in late January 2021 over EU export controls on COVID-19 vaccines that could have dispute in late January 2021 over EU export controls on COVID-19 vaccines that could have
impacted Northern Ireland, as well as the UK’s unilateral decisions impacted Northern Ireland, as well as the UK’s unilateral decisions
in March 2021 to extend a to extend a
number of grace periods that limited regulatory checks on certain goods. The EU subsequently number of grace periods that limited regulatory checks on certain goods. The EU subsequently
initiated several legal infringement processes against the UK for breaching the terms of the initiated several legal infringement processes against the UK for breaching the terms of the
protocol, which ultimately could have led to the UK’s referral to the Court of Justice of the protocol, which ultimately could have led to the UK’s referral to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU, often commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ), European Union (CJEU, often commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ),
potential fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.potential fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.
6375
The UK government and the DUP increasingly argued that the protocol was not sustainable,
The UK government and the DUP increasingly argued that the protocol was not sustainable,
called for substantial changes to the protocol, and repeatedly threatened to suspend parts of it.called for substantial changes to the protocol, and repeatedly threatened to suspend parts of it.
64 As noted previously, the DUP has blocked the work of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive since 2022 in protest against the protocol. 76 Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish
government maintained that the protocol was the only viable option to avoid a hard border on the government maintained that the protocol was the only viable option to avoid a hard border on the
island of Ireland. The EU rejected UK and DUP calls to fundamentally renegotiate the protocolisland of Ireland. The EU rejected UK and DUP calls to fundamentally renegotiate the protocol
, asserting that it represented a joint, already-agreed UK-EU solution and and asserted that any measures to that any measures to
resolve implementation problems must be found “within the framework” of the protocol.resolve implementation problems must be found “within the framework” of the protocol.
65 The EU offered several proposals to mitigate trade disruptions, reduce administrative burdens, and ease tensions in Northern Ireland.66
UK-EU talks to address issues with the protocol were contentious and progress was slow. UK-EU positions diverged on a number of key issues, including customs checks, agri-food safety rules, medicines, UK subsidies to Northern Ireland businesses, and value added tax (VAT) and excise rules. The 77
UK-EU talks to address issues with the protocol were contentious and progress was slow. The role of the EU institutions—especially the Court of Justice of the EU—in enforcing EU role of the EU institutions—especially the Court of Justice of the EU—in enforcing EU
rules and settling disputes related to the protocol was particularly controversial. UK officials and rules and settling disputes related to the protocol was particularly controversial. UK officials and
the DUP the DUP
contended that such EU oversight infringed on UK sovereignty, while the EU firmly opposed any contended that such EU oversight infringed on UK sovereignty, while the EU firmly Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Irish Times, June 11, 2021. 61 Since the protocol took effect, physical checks necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance are being conducted at ports or points of entry on the northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain.
62 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021; “British Supermarkets May Shift Supply Chains to EU if Northern Ireland Trade Not Addressed,” Reuters, July 17, 2021.
63 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; Elizabeth Piper and John Chalmers, “EU Vows Legal Response as UK Moves Unilaterally on N.Ireland,” Reuters, March 3, 2021; Steven Erlanger, “Europe Says Britain Is Violating International Law Over Northern Ireland,” New York Times, March 15, 2021.
64 See, for example, Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, and Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021.
65 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021. 66 See, in particular, European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Proposes Bespoke Arrangements to Benefit Northern Ireland,” press release, October 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
20
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
opposed any changes to the role of the EU institutions, including the CJEU. EU officials also changes to the role of the EU institutions, including the CJEU. EU officials also
consistently raised concerns that the UK was not implementing certain aspects of the protocol consistently raised concerns that the UK was not implementing certain aspects of the protocol
(including building and properly staffing custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data, (including building and properly staffing custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data,
and properly declaring goods entering Northern Ireland).and properly declaring goods entering Northern Ireland).
67
78 In June 2022, with UK-EU discussions largely stalledIn June 2022, with UK-EU discussions largely stalled
and, in an effort to meet DUP demands, the , the
UK government led by then-Prime Minister Johnson introduced legislation UK government led by then-Prime Minister Johnson introduced legislation
in the UK Parliament to to give the government authority to unilaterally disregard parts of the protocol and make changes give the government authority to unilaterally disregard parts of the protocol and make changes
to to
its operationits operation.68 Among other measures, the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill would establish “green and red lanes” for goods, removing checks and paperwork for “green lane” goods going from Great Britain to Northern Ireland while leaving such checks in place for “red lane” goods meant for the EU market. The Protocol Bill also called for ending the role of EU institutions in overseeing the protocol’s implementation. The EU viewed the proposed UK legislation as . The EU viewed the proposed UK legislation as
violating the terms of the protocol and international law, and launched additional infringement violating the terms of the protocol and international law, and launched additional infringement
proceedings against the UK.69 The Protocol Bill passed the UK House of Commons in July 2022 (but still required approval by the House of Lords to be enacted into UK law).proceedings against the UK.79
Shortly after assuming office in late October 2022, new UK Prime Minister Sunak indicated that
Shortly after assuming office in late October 2022, new UK Prime Minister Sunak indicated that
he would prefer that the UK and EU reach a “negotiated outcome” to the challenges posed by the he would prefer that the UK and EU reach a “negotiated outcome” to the challenges posed by the
protocol.protocol.
7080 UK-EU talks on the protocol resumed and gained momentum in late 2022 and early UK-EU talks on the protocol resumed and gained momentum in late 2022 and early
2023. In January 2023, the UK and the EU reached a trade data-sharing agreement, giving the EU 2023. In January 2023, the UK and the EU reached a trade data-sharing agreement, giving the EU
access to UK technology systems and detailed, real-time information on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain and those possibly at risk of entering Ireland. EU officials had been seeking greater visibility and access on the flow of goods into Northern Ireland since the protocol took effect in early 2021. The new data-sharing agreement was widely viewed as a key step toward restoring trust and facilitating progress on a wider deal on the protocol.71
The Windsor Framework72
On February 27, 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement in principle—the Windsor Framework—to address implementation challenges and other concerns with the Northern Ireland protocol. The Windsor Framework consists of a command paper from the UK government presenting the solutions agreed to by the UK and the EU, a joint UK-EU political declaration, and several draft legal instruments that must be formally adopted for the Windsor Framework to take effect. Both the UK and the EU stressed that the Windsor Framework sought
67
75 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; Steven Erlanger, “Europe Says Britain Is Violating International Law Over Northern Ireland,” New York Times, March 15, 2021. 76 See, for example, Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, and Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021.
77 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021. 78 Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to Exert Brexit Pressure,” Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to Exert Brexit Pressure,”
Financial
Times, June 8, 2021; Institute for Government, “Northern Ireland Protocol: Ongoing UK-EU Disagreements,” January , June 8, 2021; Institute for Government, “Northern Ireland Protocol: Ongoing UK-EU Disagreements,” January
26, 2022. 26, 2022.
6879 Government of the UK, “Government Introduces Bill to Fix the Northern Ireland Protocol,” press release, June 13, Government of the UK, “Government Introduces Bill to Fix the Northern Ireland Protocol,” press release, June 13,
2022; UK Parliament, 2022; UK Parliament,
Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3182, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3182
.
69 Christina Gallardo and Shawn Pogatchnik, “EU Launches Legal Action Over UK’s Northern Ireland Brexit Bill,” Politico, June 15, 2022; European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Launches Four ; European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Launches Four
New Infringement Procedures Against the UK,” press release, July 22, 2022. New Infringement Procedures Against the UK,” press release, July 22, 2022.
70
80 “New British PM Rishi Sunak Tells Taoiseach He Wants ‘Negotiated Outcome’ to NI Protocol,” thejournal.ie, “New British PM Rishi Sunak Tells Taoiseach He Wants ‘Negotiated Outcome’ to NI Protocol,” thejournal.ie,
October 26, 2022; “Rishi Sunak: Where Does the New PM Stand on the NI Protocol?,” BBC News, October 27, 2022. October 26, 2022; “Rishi Sunak: Where Does the New PM Stand on the NI Protocol?,” BBC News, October 27, 2022.
71 Annabelle Dickson et al., “EU and UK Agree ‘Way Forward’ on Post-Brexit Goods Data in Fresh Sign of Progress,” Politico, January 9, 2023.
72 Information in this section is based on the package of documents that comprise the Windsor Framework, released February 27, 2023, and available from the Government of the UK, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework. This section also draws from various news sources and the European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework, a New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” February 27, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
21
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Congressional Research Service
21
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
access to UK technology systems and detailed, real-time information on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain and those possibly at risk of entering Ireland and the EU market.81
The 2023 Windsor Framework82
On February 27, 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement in principle—the Windsor Framework—to address implementation challenges and other concerns with the Northern Ireland protocol. The Windsor Framework includes a command paper from the UK government presenting the solutions agreed to by the UK and the EU and a joint UK-EU political declaration. Both the UK and the EU stressed that the Windsor Framework sought to provide solutions to protocol-related issues affecting everyday life for people and businesses in to provide solutions to protocol-related issues affecting everyday life for people and businesses in
Northern Northern
Ireland. UK and EU officials officially approved the Windsor Framework in March 2023. Ireland. Key areas addressed in the Windsor Framework include the following: Key areas addressed in the Windsor Framework include the following:
• Trade and Customs. The Trade and Customs. Similar to measures put forward by the UK government in
the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill introduced in 2022, the Windsor Framework would establish a new Windsor Framework establishes a system of “green system of “green
and red lanes” for goods moving from and red lanes” for goods moving from
Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Checks and customs paperwork Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Checks and customs paperwork
would be are significantly reduced for “green lane” goods remaining in Northern Ireland but significantly reduced for “green lane” goods remaining in Northern Ireland but
would stay in place for “red lane” goods destined for (or at risk of entering) stay in place for “red lane” goods destined for (or at risk of entering)
Ireland and the EU market. The UK and the EU also agreed to simpler rules Ireland and the EU market. The UK and the EU also agreed to simpler rules
and procedures for certain agri-food products entering Northern Irelandfor certain agri-food products entering Northern Ireland
. and that UK health UK health
and safety standards (rather than EU standards) would apply to all retail food and and safety standards (rather than EU standards) would apply to all retail food and
drink intended for end consumption in Northern Ireland drink intended for end consumption in Northern Ireland
(removing the prospect of a ban in Northern Ireland on(thereby ensuring that Northern Ireland consumers can still buy certain iconic British products, such as fresh certain iconic British products, such as fresh
sausages). sausages). These new trade rules came into force in October 2023. An expanded and strengthened UK trusted trader scheme and new An expanded and strengthened UK trusted trader scheme and new
data-sharing and labeling arrangements data-sharing and labeling arrangements
would be usedhelp to oversee the trade and to oversee the trade and
customs provisions and safeguard the EU single market. customs provisions and safeguard the EU single market.
• EU Rules and Governance. According to the UK government, the Windsor According to the UK government, the Windsor
Framework
Framework
would removeremoves 1,700 pages of EU law from applying in Northern 1,700 pages of EU law from applying in Northern
Ireland (including more than 60 EU food and drink rules covering over 1,000 Ireland (including more than 60 EU food and drink rules covering over 1,000
pages) and thus also pages) and thus also
would eliminateeliminates the EU Court of Justice’s “interpretation the EU Court of Justice’s “interpretation
and oversight in those areas.” In doing so, the Windsor Framework and oversight in those areas.” In doing so, the Windsor Framework
would narrow narrows the range of EU laws applicable in Northern Ireland to less than 3% overall, the range of EU laws applicable in Northern Ireland to less than 3% overall,
which “are there solely, and only as strictly necessary” to maintain Northern which “are there solely, and only as strictly necessary” to maintain Northern
Ireland’s access to the EU single market.Ireland’s access to the EU single market.
7383 The EU, however, stresses that the The EU, however, stresses that the
CJEU remains the “sole and ultimate arbiter of EU law” and has the “final say on CJEU remains the “sole and ultimate arbiter of EU law” and has the “final say on
EU law and single market issues.”EU law and single market issues.”
7484 In other words, the Windsor Framework In other words, the Windsor Framework
woulddoes not change the role of the
81 Annabelle Dickson et al., “EU and UK Agree ‘Way Forward’ on Post-Brexit Goods Data in Fresh Sign of Progress,” Politico, January 9, 2023.
82 Information in this section is based on the package of documents that comprise the Windsor Framework, released February 27, 2023, and available from the Government of the UK, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework. This section also draws from various news sources and the European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework, a New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” February 27, 2023.
83 not change the role of the CJEU in interpreting EU law in disputes over EU rules that continue to apply in Northern Ireland. Both the EU and the UK, however, have pledged to work together to resolve any future disagreements before resorting to formal dispute-settlement proceedings.
The Stormont Brake. A new mechanism known as the Stormont brake would
allow the UK government—at the request of 30 Members of Northern Ireland’s Assembly (from at least two parties)—to stop the application of amended or replacement EU goods rules that may have a “significant and lasting impact” on “everyday” life in Northern Ireland. UK officials assert that this brake gives the UK the power to “veto” changes to EU goods rules applicable in Northern Ireland.75 The EU emphasizes that the new mechanism would be triggered “under the most exceptional circumstances” and as a “last resort,” in accordance with a detailed process in the Assembly.76 Once the brake is triggered by the UK, the
73 See Government of the UK, See Government of the UK,
Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 3, 13, and 21, at , February 27, 2023, pp. 3, 13, and 21, at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1138989/https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1138989/
The_Windsor_Framework_a_new_way_forward.pdf. The_Windsor_Framework_a_new_way_forward.pdf.
7484 See, for example, European Commission, “A New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: See, for example, European Commission, “A New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland:
Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; and Comments by Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; and Comments by
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during press conference with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during press conference with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak,
February 27, 2023, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtxuqaFwsk0. February 27, 2023, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtxuqaFwsk0.
75 Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 5, 7, 23, and 24. 76 The Stormont brake process is set out in a Unilateral Declaration by the UK in Annex 1 of the Draft Decision of the
Congressional Research Service
22
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
EU rule Congressional Research Service
22
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
CJEU in interpreting EU law in disputes over EU rules that continue to apply in Northern Ireland. Both the EU and the UK pledged to work together to resolve any future issues before resorting to formal dispute-settlement proceedings.
• The Stormont Brake. A new mechanism known as the Stormont brake allows
the UK government—at the request of 30 Members of Northern Ireland’s Assembly (from at least two parties)—to stop the application of new or amended EU goods rules that may have a “significant and lasting impact” on “everyday” life in Northern Ireland. UK officials assert that this brake gives the UK the power to “veto” changes to EU goods rules applicable in Northern Ireland.85 The EU emphasizes that the new mechanism would be triggered “under the most exceptional circumstances” and as a “last resort,” in accordance with a detailed process in the Assembly.86 Once the brake is triggered by the UK, the EU rule change cannot be implemented; the UK and EU would engage in change cannot be implemented; the UK and EU would engage in
dialogue to try to resolve concerns and find a solution. If the EU disagreed with dialogue to try to resolve concerns and find a solution. If the EU disagreed with
the UK’s decision to trigger the Stormont Brake, the matter would be referred to the UK’s decision to trigger the Stormont Brake, the matter would be referred to
an independent arbitration panel (rather than the CJEU). an independent arbitration panel (rather than the CJEU).
• Taxes and State Aid. The Windsor Framework The Windsor Framework
would allowallows certain UK VAT certain UK VAT
rules to rules to
apply in Northern Ireland (rather than EU rules), and the UK may diverge apply in Northern Ireland (rather than EU rules), and the UK may diverge
from EU rules on the structure of excise dutiesfrom EU rules on the structure of excise duties
(enabling a recent UK cut in excise duty rates on alcoholic beverages to apply in Northern Ireland). The . The
framework also clarifies the circumstances in which EU state aid rules apply in framework also clarifies the circumstances in which EU state aid rules apply in
Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland.
• Other Issues. The Windsor Framework The Windsor Framework
also would easeeases rules in several other rules in several other
areas, areas,
including the movement of pets between Great Britain and Northern including the movement of pets between Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and on all types of parcels from people or businesses in Great Britain to Ireland and on all types of parcels from people or businesses in Great Britain to
friends, family, and consumers in Northern Ireland. Medicines approved for use friends, family, and consumers in Northern Ireland. Medicines approved for use
by the UK’s medicines regulator by the UK’s medicines regulator
wouldalso will be available in Northern Ireland at the be available in Northern Ireland at the
same time and under the same conditions as in the rest of the UKsame time and under the same conditions as in the rest of the UK
; new labeling and other safeguards were agreed to ensure medicines from Great Britain remain in Northern Ireland. .
As part of the Windsor Framework, the UK government agreed to halt the passage of the
As part of the Windsor Framework, the UK government agreed to halt the passage of the
Northern Ireland Protocol Bill in the UK Parliament and the EU agreed it would no longer Northern Ireland Protocol Bill in the UK Parliament and the EU agreed it would no longer
proceed with the seven legal infringement challenges pending against the UK in relation to the proceed with the seven legal infringement challenges pending against the UK in relation to the
protocol. Both the UK and the EU have sought to portray the Windsor Framework as opening a protocol. Both the UK and the EU have sought to portray the Windsor Framework as opening a
new era of UK-EU relations based on cooperation and dialogue.new era of UK-EU relations based on cooperation and dialogue.
Observers suggest the successful implementation of the Windsor Framework—especially the “green and red lanes” system—will depend largely on the ability of the UK and the EU to maintain trust, goodwill, and effective communication and data-sharing.77
The Windsor Framework must be formally adopted to take effect. The first step is for the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials that oversees implementation of the UK-EU withdrawal agreement to approve the documents and decisions that make up the Windsor Framework (expected to occur in March 2023). The UK and the EU also must take the necessary steps—including some legislative measures—to translate the solutions identified in the Windsor Framework into legal instruments. Prime Minister Sunak has pledged to hold a vote on the framework in the House of Commons and has said the outcome of this vote would be respected. Concerns exist about whether the strongly pro-Brexit wing of Sunak’s Conservative Party would support the framework. Former Prime Minister Johnson has criticized the new deal, but some staunch Brexit supporters have welcomed it and some news reports suggest the prospects for a Conservative parliamentary rebellion to the Windsor Framework have receded.78
Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee Laying Down Arrangements Relating to the Windsor Framework, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1139421/Draft_Decision_of_the_Withdrawal_Agreement_Joint_Committee_on_laying_down_arrangements_relating_to_the_Windsor_Framework.pdf.
77 Andy Bounds, “Freedoms Versus Safeguards—The Northern Ireland Deal Viewed from Brussels,” Financial Times, March 2, 2023; Christina Gallardo, “Devil in the Details: 5 Potential Snags in the UK’s Big EU Deal,” Politico, March 5, 2023.
78 Esther Webber and Eleni Courea, “Rishi Sunak Holds His Breath as He Awaits MPs’ Verdict on Brexit Deal,” Politico, February 28, 2023; Robert White and Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe, “Sunak’s Windsor Agreement Splits Tory Eurosceptics,” Financial Times, March 2, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
23
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
The UK government hopes the DUP will accept the new Windsor Framework and agree to reestablish a functioning Assembly and Executive in time for the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement in April 2023. UK government officials note that a key part of the new framework—the Stormont brake—can be triggered only if the Assembly is functioning. The DUP is reviewing the new framework; DUP leader Donaldson reportedly has remarked that the framework represents “significant progress” but that the DUP remains concerned about whether the solutions in the framework are sufficient. Critics point out that some EU laws would still apply in Northern Ireland. They also note that the Irish sea border may have been diluted but has not disappeared and that there appear to be some differences in interpretation between the UK government and the EU on certain elements of the new framework (especially with regard to the role of the CJEU). Questions also exist about how the Stormont brake would work, with some in the DUP arguing that a high bar has been set for triggering the mechanism and expressing unease that the ultimate decision to trigger it would rest with the UK government (not the Assembly).79
Economic Concerns
Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible economic consequences for Northern Ireland. Studies indicate that Northern Ireland depends more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the UK.80 In 2021, approximately 64% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU, including about 43% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.8187
The 2024 UK-DUP Deal
DUP leader Donaldson and other DUP officials recognized that the Windsor Framework represented a significant effort to address unionist concerns about the Northern Ireland protocol. However, the DUP ultimately found the solutions posed by the Windsor Framework to be insufficient and continued to block reestablishing Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions. DUP critics contended that among other issues with the Windsor Framework, some EU laws would still apply in Northern Ireland and that the Irish sea border remained. Some in the DUP
85 Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 5, 7, 23, and 24. 86 The Stormont brake process is set out in a Unilateral Declaration by the UK in Annex 1 of the Draft Decision of the Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee Laying Down Arrangements Relating to the Windsor Framework, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1139421/Draft_Decision_of_the_Withdrawal_Agreement_Joint_Committee_on_laying_down_arrangements_relating_to_the_Windsor_Framework.pdf.
87 Andy Bounds, “Freedoms Versus Safeguards—The Northern Ireland Deal Viewed from Brussels,” Financial Times, March 2, 2023; Christina Gallardo, “Devil in the Details: 5 Potential Snags in the UK’s Big EU Deal,” Politico, March 5, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
23
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
also wanted more clarity on the operation of the Stormont brake.88 The UK government continued negotiations with the DUP throughout 2023 to address remaining concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements and restore Northern Ireland’s devolved government.
On January 30, 2024, the DUP’s leadership endorsed a package of measures proposed by the UK government and agreed to end the party’s boycott of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions. The next day, the UK government published details of the deal in a command paper, Safeguarding the Union, along with draft legislation to implement parts of the proposed measures (two pieces of legislation were subsequently debated and approved by the UK parliament).89 UK officials reportedly have sought to portray the changes outlined in Safeguarding the Union as “significant” but also stressed that they do not alter the “fundamentals” of the Windsor Framework as agreed with the EU.90 Some analysts assess that the changes to the post-Brexit trading rules for Northern Ireland in the UK-DUP deal are relatively minimal and they characterize Safeguarding the Union as designed largely to reassure unionists of Northern Ireland’s place in the UK.91 Key measures in Safeguarding the Union include the following:
• Facilitating Trade and Protecting the UK’s Internal Market. Checks and
paperwork on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will be reduced. The Windsor Framework’s “green lane” (for goods remaining in Northern Ireland) is to be replaced with an “internal UK market system” for goods remaining within the UK, and there will be no routine checks except for those conducted as part of a risk-based approach to tackle criminality, smuggling, or disease. To use the new internal UK market system, businesses will still be required to join a UK trusted trader scheme. The Windsor Framework’s “red lane” will remain (for goods destined for or at risk of entering Ireland and the EU market), although the UK government assesses that more than 80% of goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will take place under the UK internal market system. DUP leader Donaldson asserts that these and other provisions effectively “[remove] the border in the UK’s internal market.”92 The command paper also includes measures to reinforce “unfettered access” for Northern Ireland goods and businesses to the UK internal market.
• Reaffirming Northern Ireland’s Place within the UK. Legislation introduced
with the command paper (and subsequently approved by the UK Parliament) seeks to make explicit that the Windsor Framework does not prejudice Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the UK or the region’s status as part of the UK economy (including the UK’s customs territory and internal market). In
88 Shawn Pogatchnik, “DUP Won’t Be Pushed into Accepting UK-EU Deal on Northern Ireland—But Sees an Attractive Veto,” Politico, February 27, 2023; Enda McClafferty, “Brexit Deal: Both Yes and No Carry Risks for DUP,” BBC News, February 28, 2023. 89 Government of the UK, Safeguarding the Union, released January 31, 2024, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ba3b7bee7d490013984a59/Command_Paper__1_.pdf. Also see, David Torrance, Northern Ireland Devolution: Safeguarding the Union, UK House of Commons Library, March 4, 2024.
90 As quoted in, “DUP Says Stormont Deal Has Delivered ‘Fundamental Change’ to UK-EU Trading Rules,” BreakingNews.ie, January 31, 2024.
91 John Campbell, “DUP Deal: Government Command Paper Bids to Reassure Unionists,” BBC News, February1, 2024; Peter Foster, “Four Years on and Brexit Still Isn’t Done,” Financial Times, February 1, 2024; Joël Reland, “The Northern Ireland Deal Offers Meaningful Change—If Westminster Keeps Its Word,” UK in a Changing Europe, February 2, 2024.
92 As quoted in, John Campbell, “DUP Deal Aimed at Restoring Power Sharing in Northern Ireland Is Published,” BBC News, January 31, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
24
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
addition, the UK government has committed to screening future UK legislation for “significant adverse implications for Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market.” The command paper also sets out several measures or proposals to strengthen ties between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, including through establishing a new East-West Council (to deepen connections between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK in areas such as trade, transport, education, and culture) and a new Intertrade UK body (to focus on promoting trade in both directions between Northern Ireland and Great Britain).
• Clarifying Operational Arrangements for the Stormont Brake. The UK
government has pledged to ensure that Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly have the information needed to make “full use” of the brake by publishing operational guidance. The UK government also committed to give Assembly members early warning and notice of new or amended EU legislation that could affect Northern Ireland and be subject to the brake.93
Some in the DUP continue to find the measures in Safeguarding the Union to be insufficient and opposed the party’s decision to agree to reestablish Northern Ireland’s devolved government. Those of this view argued that the changes in the UK command paper were largely cosmetic and that the Irish Sea border would still exist.94 DUP leader Donaldson pledged to continue working to deliver “further change” as needed in the future.95 Some nationalists also raised concerns that some elements in the UK command paper could undermine north-south cooperation (between Northern Ireland and Ireland) and the spirit of the Good Friday Agreement.96
The EU announced it would “analyze” the package of measures in Safeguarding the Union but Irish officials responded positively and press reports indicate that the operational changes to the Windsor Framework would be acceptable to the EU.97 Some experts assess that managing and overseeing implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland will continue to require careful attention and oversight by officials and authorities in the UK, EU, and Northern Ireland. A vote on maintaining Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit arrangements is expected to be held in the Northern Ireland Assembly in December 2024.98
93 For more information on the January 2024 UK-DUP deal and the measures outlined in the Safeguarding the Union command paper, also see Peter Foster and Jude Webber, “What Is in the New Northern Ireland Deal and How Will It Work?,” Financial Times, January 31, 2024; John Campbell, “DUP Deal: What Exactly Is in the Safeguarding the Union Paper?,” BBC News, January 31, 2024; John Curtis, Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework: New Devolution Deal, UK House of Commons Library, February 1, 2024; Jill Rutter and Matthew Fright, “Government Deal with the DUP to Restore Power Sharing in Northern Ireland,” Institute for Government, February 1, 2024. 94 See, for example, David Lynch and Nick Lester, “DUP Split over Stormont Deal as Nigel Dodds Says Sea Border Concerns Remain,” BreakingNews.ie., February 1, 2024; Adrian Rutherford, “Three Top DUP Figures Say There Is ‘No Dispute’ That Irish Sea Border Remains,” Belfast Telegraph, February 10, 2024. 95 As quoted in Jonathan McCambridge, “DUP Is Not Split and Support for New Deal Is Absolutely Decisive—Donaldson,” Independent.co.uk, January 31, 2024. 96 See, for example, Freya McClements, “UK Government ‘Undermining’ Belfast Agreement with Pro-unionist Stance, SDLP Leader Says,” Irish Times, February 12, 2024. 97 European Commission, “Joint Statement Following Today’s Call Between Executive Vice-President Sefcovic and UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron,” press release, January 31, 2024; John Campbell, “Deal Aimed at Restoring Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Is Published,” BBC News, January 31, 2024; Rory Carroll and Eleni Courea, “Northern Ireland: What Does the New Post-Brexit Deal Mean?,” Guardian, January 31, 2024. 98 Anton Spisak, “A New Equilibrium in Northern Ireland: Can It Last?,” Centre for European Reform, March 1, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
25
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Economic Concerns Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible economic consequences for Northern Ireland. Studies indicate that Northern Ireland depends more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the UK.99 In 2022, approximately 68% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU, including about 48% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.100
Maintaining an open border after Brexit was viewed as important to protecting the island’s cross-
Maintaining an open border after Brexit was viewed as important to protecting the island’s cross-
border economy and labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis. Many border economy and labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis. Many
manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north and manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north and
south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and
alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for
processing and packaging.processing and packaging.
82101 The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro and The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro and
small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.
83102
UK and DUP leaders asserted that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to
UK and DUP leaders asserted that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to
Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In
20212022, sales to other parts of the UK , sales to other parts of the UK
(£(£
1215.8 billion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£.8 billion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£
5.26.4 billion) and nearly billion) and nearly
fivesix times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.
6 billion).84 Among the DUP’s initial objections in 2019 to the Northern Ireland protocol were arguments that its trade arrangements 7 billion).103 The DUP consistently argued that the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol would be detrimental to the region’s economy andwould be detrimental to the region’s economy and
that the new rules and administrative burdens would increase costs for businesses and would increase costs for businesses and
consumers. The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct given the supply problems, shipping delays, administrative burdens, and other issues affecting Northern Ireland since the post-Brexit arrangements in the protocol began taking effect. One study from the University of
79 Shawn Pogatchnik, “DUP Won’t Be Pushed Into Accepting UK-EU Deal on Northern Ireland—But Sees an Attractive Veto,” Politico, February 27, 2023; Enda McClafferty, “Brexit Deal: Both Yes and No Carry Risks for DUP,” BBC News, February 28, 2023. 80consumers. Such economic concerns were a key reason that the DUP and other unionists pushed for changes to the protocol.104
Supporters of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland argue that they offer the region unique economic opportunities. Prime Minister Sunak touted the potential economic benefits of Northern Ireland’s privileged access to both the UK internal market and the EU single market, especially following agreement on the Windsor Framework in 2023.105 As part of the UK customs union, Northern Ireland also will be able to participate in future UK trade deals. Experts suggest the post-Brexit arrangements may help increase the competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland business leaders have reported broad satisfaction with the post-Brexit arrangements and noted that they have a number of benefits, including keeping cross-border trade open.106 In a February 2024 poll by Queen’s University Belfast, 56% of respondents viewed the Northern
99 Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee,
Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016; Lisa , December 2016; Lisa
O’Carroll, “Pro-Brexit UK Regions More Dependent on EU for Exports, Study Finds,” O’Carroll, “Pro-Brexit UK Regions More Dependent on EU for Exports, Study Finds,”
Guardian, July 17, 2022. , July 17, 2022.
81100 Northern Ireland Northern Ireland
Department for the EconomyStatistics and Research Agency, ,
Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics 2022, December , December
14, 2022. 8213, 2023, at https://datavis.nisra.gov.uk/economy-and-labour-market/northern-ireland-economic-trade-statistics-2022.html.
101 Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,”
Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How , March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How
Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019. Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019.
83102 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,
Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, ,
May 18, 2022. 84 Northern Ireland Department for the EconomyApril 4, 2023, at https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/Overview-of-NI-Trade-April-2023.pdf.
103 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, ,
Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics 2022, December , December
14, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
24
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Ulster estimated that the costs of the protocol to Northern Ireland’s public and private sectors could be around £850 million (around $1.2 billion) per year.85
Supporters of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland argue that they offer the region unique economic opportunities, which would be boosted further by improvements to the protocol in the Windsor Framework. In seeking DUP and unionist support for the Windsor Framework, Prime Minister Sunak has touted the potential economic benefits of Northern Ireland’s privileged access to both the UK internal market and the EU single market. As part of the UK customs union, Northern Ireland also will be able to participate in future UK trade deals. Experts suggest the post-Brexit arrangements may help increase the competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland business leaders report broad satisfaction with the protocol and note that it has a number of benefits, including keeping cross-border trade open.8613, 2023.
104 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019; Democratic Unionist Party, Remove the Protocol, at https://mydup.com/policies/remove-ni-protocol.
105 See, for example, Andrew McDonald, “Sunak Gives EU Windsor Framework the Hard Sell in Belfast,” Politico, February 28, 2023.
106 Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” Politico, July 9, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
26
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Ireland protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive impact on Northern Ireland’s economy and 68% regarded these post-Brexit arrangements as potentially beneficial.107
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein has argued Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein has argued
that “Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.that “Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.
87108 Since Since
the 2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a the 2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a
border poll (a referendum on (a referendum on
whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the
hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday
Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll, in line with the consent principle. Any Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll, in line with the consent principle. Any
decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the UK decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the UK
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who must call one if it “appears likely” that “a majority of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who must call one if it “appears likely” that “a majority of
those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United
Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”
88109
At present, most opinion polls indicate that a majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to
At present, most opinion polls indicate that a majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to
support the region’s position as part of the UK. A December support the region’s position as part of the UK. A December
2021 survey found that 542023 survey published in the Irish Times found that 51% of those % of those
polled support Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK versus polled support Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK versus
4630% in support of a united % in support of a united
Ireland.Ireland.
89 A110 Another poll from poll from
August 2022 found 48February 2024 found 54% in favor of Northern Ireland’s % in favor of Northern Ireland’s
continued position within the position within the
UK compared UK compared
to 41with 39% for a united Ireland.111 As such, the current UK government is not expected to call a border poll on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. In the January 2024 command paper Safeguarding the Union, the UK government asserted that based on recent polling, the UK government “sees no realistic prospect of a border poll leading to a united Ireland” and, following the restoration of the devolved government, “Northern Ireland’s future in the UK will be secure for decades to come and as such the conditions for a border poll are unlikely to be objectively met.”112% for a united Ireland.90 Another poll carried out by Ipsos and released in December 2022 found a wider difference in opinion, with 50% of respondents supporting Northern Ireland remaining in the UK and 27% favoring unification with Ireland.91 As such, experts believe there is not sufficient evidence to convince the current UK government to call a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status.
Several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and influence whether a border poll is
Several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and influence whether a border poll is
called in the called in the
years aheadmedium to longer term. As seen by Northern Ireland’s 2021 census results, . As seen by Northern Ireland’s 2021 census results,
demographics are shifting in Northern Ireland, with those of a Catholic background now outnumbering those of a Protestant background. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with Ireland and greater economic integration (data indicate a significant increase in cross-border trade since 2021).113 Sinn Fein’s success in
107 David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward, Testing the Temperature 10: What Do Voters in Northern Ireland Think About the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, the Windsor Framework, and the ‘Safeguarding the Union’ Deal?, Queen’s University Belfast, February 2024. 108demographics are
85 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019; Esmond Birnie, “The Irish Sea Border Is Costing Northern Ireland £850m a Year,” newsletter.co.uk, August 12, 2021. 86 Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” Politico, July 9, 2021; Andrew McDonald, “Sunak Gives EU Windsor Framework the Hard Sell in Belfast,” Politico, February 28, 2023. 87 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Sinn Fein Discussion Document,
Towards a United Ireland, November 2016. , November 2016.
88109 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998. UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
89 Colm Keena, “Majority of People in North Would Vote to Remain in UK in Referendum,” Irish Times, December 12, 2021.
90 Anthony Neeson, “Poll Shows Growing Support for Irish Unity,” Irish Echo, August 26, 2022. 91 Pat Leahy, “Northern Ireland Rejects Irish Unity by Large Margin, Poll Shows,” Irish Times, December 3, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
25
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
shifting in Northern Ireland, with those of a Catholic background now outnumbering those of a Protestant background. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with Ireland and greater economic integration (since the Northern Ireland protocol took effect in January 2021, data indicate a significant and consistent increase in cross-border trade).92 Sinn Fein’s recent electoral success in Northern Ireland (and its110 In December 2023, the Irish Times published the results of polls in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland examining public attitudes on Irish unification. For an overview of the results, see Pat Leahy et al., “North and South: What We Know Now, and What We Want to Investigate in Future,” Irish Times, January 27, 2024. The survey data is available from the Royal Irish Academy, at https://www.ria.ie/news/arins-analysis-and-research-ireland-north-and-south/north-and-south-surveys-data-now-published.
111 Suzanne Breen, “More People in NI Would Vote to Stay Part of UK If Border Poll Was Called,” Belfast Telegraph, February 18, 2024.
112 Government of the UK, Safeguarding the Union, released January 31, 2024, Annex B, p. 68, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ba3b7bee7d490013984a59/Command_Paper__1_.pdf.
113 Shawn Pogatchnik, “All-Ireland Trade Booming in Post-Brexit Economy,” Politico, February 15, 2022; Morwenna Coniam, “Irish Trade with Britain, Northern Ireland Climbs Despite Brexit,” Bloomberg.com, August 15, 2022; Ireland Central Statistics Office, “Record Levels of Exports and Imports in 2022,” February 15, 2023; Ryan McAleer, “Trade in 2023: The Year When the Protocol Became the Windsor Framework,” Irish News, December 27, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
27
link to page 31 link to page 31 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Northern Ireland’s May 2022 Assembly election and May 2023 local council elections, key party leader Michelle O’Neill’s new role as First Minister, and the party’s growing popularity and electoral growing popularity and electoral
gains in Irelandgains in Ireland
) also could increase momentum for a border poll. also could increase momentum for a border poll.
114
Societal attitudes in Northern Ireland are changing as well, especially among young people, who
Societal attitudes in Northern Ireland are changing as well, especially among young people, who
may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities. Analysts suggest that non-may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities. Analysts suggest that non-
aligned voters who do not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in aligned voters who do not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in
any future border poll and that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish any future border poll and that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish
unification more by its implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions unification more by its implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions
than by identity politics.than by identity politics.
In the aforementioned Ipsos poll from late 2022, 21% of the roughly 50% of respondents opposed to Irish unification were from a Catholic background, while 31% of those undecided did not identify as either Catholic or Protestant.93115 The aforementioned December 2023 poll indicates that roughly 21% of respondents in Northern Ireland from a Catholic background were opposed to Irish unification, as were 44% of those identifying as neither Catholic nor Protestant.116
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval.
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval.
Opinion polls in Ireland consistently show a relatively high level of support for unification (typically over 60%).117 The The Irish government Irish government
has launched a “Shared Island” initiative to promote cross-border dialogue and research on has launched a “Shared Island” initiative to promote cross-border dialogue and research on
common challenges. The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and south, must have common challenges. The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and south, must have
a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would be a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would be
accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.
94
Some experts question the current extent of support118
Some concerns exist in Ireland in Ireland
forabout unification, unification,
given concernsincluding the possibility that it that unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland
as well as theand its potential potential
economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about
$14$13 billion) budget subsidy to make up the shortfall in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of billion) budget subsidy to make up the shortfall in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of
this subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeable defense this subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeable defense
spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s
budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An
April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54% April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54%
reported they would be unwilling reported they would be unwilling
to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.119 In the December 2023 Irish Times poll conducted in Ireland, 52% of respondents believed that Irish unity would be costly in the short term but beneficial in the long term.120
114 See, for example, Megan Specia, “Northern Ireland Has a Sinn Fein Leader. It’s a Landmark Moment,” New York Times, February 3, 2024.
115 See, for example,to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.95
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full
92 John Campbell, “Northern Ireland Exports to Republic Set to Pass €3bn This Year,” BBC News, November 17, 2021; Morwenna Coniam, “Irish Trade with Britain, Northern Ireland Climbs Despite Brexit,” Bloomberg.com, August 15, 2022; Ireland Central Statistics Office, “Record Levels of Exports and Imports in 2022,” February 15, 2023. 93 Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,”
Financial Times, April 6, 2021; , April 6, 2021;
Rory Carroll, “It’s Closer Now Than It’s Ever Been: Could There Soon Be a United Ireland?,” Rory Carroll, “It’s Closer Now Than It’s Ever Been: Could There Soon Be a United Ireland?,”
Guardian, October 6, , October 6,
2022; Leahy, op. cit.
942022; Megan Stack, “Is Ireland Headed for a Merger?,” New York Times, November 21, 2023.
116 See footnote 110. 117 In the December 2023 Irish Times poll, for example, 64% of respondents in Ireland supported unification while 16% were opposed. See footnote 110.
118 “Leo Varadkar Says Border Poll Not Appropriate at This Time,” BBC News, July 3, 2022; Jude Webber, “Ireland’s “Leo Varadkar Says Border Poll Not Appropriate at This Time,” BBC News, July 3, 2022; Jude Webber, “Ireland’s
Reunification Talk Grows Louder,” Reunification Talk Grows Louder,”
Financial Times, October 9, 2022. , October 9, 2022.
95119 Fionnan Sheahan, “Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay for It,” Fionnan Sheahan, “Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay for It,”
Irish Independent, May 1, , May 1,
2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a United Ireland?,” 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a United Ireland?,”
Irish Times, ,
May 7, 2021. May 7, 2021.
120 John Garry et al., “Northern Protestants Pessimistic on Benefits of Irish Unity,” Irish Times, December 5, 2023.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2628
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the
restoration of the devolved government in 2007. restoration of the devolved government in 2007.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged
Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In
February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. The Obama February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. The Obama
Administration also welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and Administration also welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and
the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson asserted that the United States Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson asserted that the United States
remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement
and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”
96121 In March 2020, President Trump appointed In March 2020, President Trump appointed
his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy to Northern Ireland.his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy to Northern Ireland.
97122
President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
peace process. peace process.
In March 2022, President Biden reiterated “unequivocal” U.S. support for the Good Friday Agreement during a St. Patrick’s Day meeting with then-Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin.98President Biden has repeatedly asserted a strong and enduring U.S. commitment to the Good Friday Agreement.123 Following the May 2022 Assembly election, the U.S. State Department called Following the May 2022 Assembly election, the U.S. State Department called
on Northern Ireland political leaders to work together to reestablish a functioning power-sharing on Northern Ireland political leaders to work together to reestablish a functioning power-sharing
government and asserted that the United States “remains deeply committed to preserving the government and asserted that the United States “remains deeply committed to preserving the
peace dividend of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and will always strive to protect these peace dividend of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and will always strive to protect these
gains for all communities.”gains for all communities.”
99 News reports suggest124 President Biden President Biden
may visitvisited Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland in
connection withApril 2023 to mark the peace accord’s 25th anniversary the peace accord’s 25th anniversary
in April 2023.100.125 In February 2024, the Biden Administration welcomed the restoration of Northern Ireland’s devolved government.126
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
decades. decades.
Over the years, congressional hearings and resolutions have considered various aspects of implementing the Good Friday Agreement. A hearing in July 2022 centered on young people in Northern Ireland and their role in maintaining peace and shaping Northern Ireland’s future.101 Some Members of Congress also have a long-standing interest in policing issues and human rights in Northern Ireland, and the status of Troubles-related investigations and incidents of suspected collusion between state security agencies and paramilitary groups (including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 killing of Raymond McCord, Jr.).
Two hearings in 2022 discussed the continued need for accountability and justice for victims of the Troubles, sparked in part by congressional concerns about the UK government’s new legislation (the Troubles Bill, discussed above) that would establish a conditional immunity scheme and end most Troubles-era investigations and prosecutions.102 On March 17, 2022, the
96In the 118th Congress, for example, the Senate agreed S.Res. 157 (by unanimous consent in May 2023) reiterating support for the Good Friday Agreement and commemorating its 25th anniversary. Over the years, congressional hearings and resolutions have addressed various aspects of implementing the Good Friday Agreement. A hearing in July 2022 centered on young people in Northern Ireland and their role in maintaining peace and shaping Northern Ireland’s
121 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,”
November 1, 2017. November 1, 2017.
97122 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021. Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021.
98 The123 See, for example, the White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Virtual Bilateral White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Virtual Bilateral
Meeting,” March 17, 2022. 99Meeting,” March 17, 2022; and the White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar of Ireland,” March 17, 2023.
124 U.S. Department of State, “Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Results,” press release, May 7, 2022. U.S. Department of State, “Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Results,” press release, May 7, 2022.
100 See, for example, “President Joe Biden Reportedly Set to Visit Ireland Next Month,” IrishCentral.com, March 3, 2023.
101 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The Role of
Young People in Fostering Peace125 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden Marking the 25th Anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,” April 12, 2023. 126 The White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Restoration of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly,” press release, February 3, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
29
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
future.127 Some Members of Congress also have a long-standing interest in policing issues and human rights in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022.
102 Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland: Accountability at Risk, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2022; and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, Truth
Congressional Research Service
27
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
House passed H.Res. 888 , and the status of Troubles-related investigations and incidents of suspected collusion between state security agencies and paramilitary groups (including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 killing of Raymond McCord Jr.).
Two hearings in 2022 discussed the continued need for accountability and justice for victims of the Troubles, sparked in part by congressional concerns about the UK government’s plans to establish a conditional immunity scheme and end most Troubles-era investigations and prosecutions.128 In March 2022, the House passed H.Res. 888 (117th Congress) commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Bloody Sunday commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Bloody Sunday
killings; the resolution called for justice for the victims and their families, and noted opposition to killings; the resolution called for justice for the victims and their families, and noted opposition to
“any proposal” by the UK government to “implement amnesty or statute of limitation laws that “any proposal” by the UK government to “implement amnesty or statute of limitation laws that
would end or inhibit investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the Troubles, would end or inhibit investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the Troubles,
including on Bloody Sunday.” In January 2023, 27 Members of Congress sent a letter to UK including on Bloody Sunday.” In January 2023, 27 Members of Congress sent a letter to UK
Prime Minister Sunak expressing “grave Prime Minister Sunak expressing “grave
concern” that the proposed legacy legislationconcern” about the UK government’s decision to continue advancing the Troubles Bill, which “denies justice, suppresses the will of the people of “denies justice, suppresses the will of the people of
Northern Ireland, and conceals the truth of the past.”Northern Ireland, and conceals the truth of the past.”
103129 A subsequent August 2023 letter from 16 Members of Congress to Prime Minister Sunak and other UK officials expressed similar concerns ahead of the enactment of the legacy legislation in September 2023.130
In the 117th Congress, some Members urged President Biden to appoint a new special envoy to
In the 117th Congress, some Members urged President Biden to appoint a new special envoy to
Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process, especially in light of heightened Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process, especially in light of heightened
Brexit-related tensions and the Brexit-related tensions and the
current stalemate in reestablishing Northern Ireland’s devolved stalemate in reestablishing Northern Ireland’s devolved
government.government.
104131 In December 2022, the U.S. State Department announced the appointment of In December 2022, the U.S. State Department announced the appointment of
former Representative Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic former Representative Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic
Affairs.Affairs.
105132 The United States has long been a key trading partner and an important source of The United States has long been a key trading partner and an important source of
investment for Northern Ireland.investment for Northern Ireland.
106133 The The
new U.S. Special Envoy position is to focus on U.S. Special Envoy position is to focus on
supporting economic development and growth in Northern Ireland—including through attracting supporting economic development and growth in Northern Ireland—including through attracting
more U.S. more U.S.
investment to Northern Ireland—and strengthening people-to-people ties. In October 2023, Special Envoy Kennedy led a U.S. business delegation to Northern Ireland in an effort to
127 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The Role of Young People in Fostering Peace in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022.
128 Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland: Accountability at Risk, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2022; and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, Truth investment to Northern Ireland—and strengthening people-to-people ties.
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland
President Biden and other Administration officials have repeatedly stressed that Brexit must not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process or jeopardize the open border on the island of Ireland. The Biden Administration has expressed concerns about Brexit-related tensions in Northern Ireland and conveyed support for the Northern Ireland protocol as “a way to manage the practical challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island of Ireland.107 President Biden and other Administration officials consistently urged the UK to reach a negotiated solution with the EU to resolve the challenges in implementing the protocol’s post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.108 President Biden welcomed the February 2023 announcement that the UK and the EU had concluded the Windsor Framework to address challenges posed by the protocol, asserting that the new framework was “an essential step
and Accountability for Victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 2022. , 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 2022.
103129 The January 2023 letter is available at https://boyle.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/boyle.house.gov/files/evo-media- The January 2023 letter is available at https://boyle.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/boyle.house.gov/files/evo-media-
document/boyle-et-al-letter-to-pm-sunak.pdf. document/boyle-et-al-letter-to-pm-sunak.pdf.
104130 Ray O’Hanlon, “Congress Members Protest British Legacy Bill,” Irish Echo, August 13, 2023. 131 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,”
Irish Times, May 13, 2021; Kerry , May 13, 2021; Kerry
O’Shea, “Congressional Group Reiterates U.S. Commitment to Northern Ireland,” IrishCentral.com, August 5, 2022. O’Shea, “Congressional Group Reiterates U.S. Commitment to Northern Ireland,” IrishCentral.com, August 5, 2022.
105132 U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern
Ireland for Economic Affairs,” press statement, December 19, 2022. Ireland for Economic Affairs,” press statement, December 19, 2022.
106 According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive133 According to UK government statistics, the United States accounted for , the United States accounted for
1211.4% of Northern % of Northern
Ireland’s exports and Ireland’s exports and
6.7% of its imports in 7% of its imports in
2021, and is Northern Ireland2022. Officials in Northern Ireland regard the United States as the region’s “largest source of high-value, technology ’s “largest source of high-value, technology
rich” foreign direct investmentrich” foreign direct investment
—worth £1.5 billion (about $1.8 billion at current exchange rates) and responsible for generating nearly 13,000 jobs over the last decade. See, Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Trade in Goods
Data Analysis Northern Ireland – USA, May 26, 2022; and and according to U.S. officials, Northern Ireland has attracted nearly $2 billion in U.S. investment over the past decade; over 230 U.S. businesses operate in and employ more than 30,000 people in Northern Ireland. See Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, UK Regions Imports and Exports of Goods by Country and World Region, at https://uktradeingoodsmap.nisra.gov.uk; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, “US and NI Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, “US and NI
Investment Stronger Than Ever,” June 23, 2022. 107 The White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
108 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom,” press release, October 25, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
28
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
to ensuring that the hard-earned peace and progress of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is preserved and strengthened.”109Investment Stronger Than Ever,” June 23, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “Special Online Briefing with Joseph Kennedy III,” April 27, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
30
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
encourage investment opportunities in light of Northern Ireland’s unique access post-Brexit to both the UK and EU markets.134
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland President Biden and other Administration officials have repeatedly stressed that Brexit must not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process or jeopardize the open border on the island of Ireland. The Biden Administration has expressed concerns about Brexit-related tensions in Northern Ireland and conveyed support for the Northern Ireland protocol as “a way to manage the practical challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island of Ireland.135 President Biden and other Administration officials consistently urged the UK to reach a negotiated solution with the EU to resolve the challenges in implementing the protocol’s post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.136 President Biden welcomed the February 2023 announcement that the UK and the EU had concluded the Windsor Framework to address challenges posed by the protocol, asserting that the new framework was “an essential step to ensuring that the hard-earned peace and progress of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is preserved and strengthened.”137
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for
Northern Ireland. A hearing in October 2019 focused on maintaining peace and stability in Northern Ireland. A hearing in October 2019 focused on maintaining peace and stability in
Northern Ireland in light of Brexit; many Members expressed support for ensuring an open border Northern Ireland in light of Brexit; many Members expressed support for ensuring an open border
on the island of Ireland post-Brexit.on the island of Ireland post-Brexit.
110138 Like the Biden Administration, some Members have Like the Biden Administration, some Members have
welcomed the Windsor Framework as a way to resolve difficulties with the Northern Ireland welcomed the Windsor Framework as a way to resolve difficulties with the Northern Ireland
protocol, protect the gains of the peace process, and facilitate the return of Northern Ireland’s protocol, protect the gains of the peace process, and facilitate the return of Northern Ireland’s
devolved government.devolved government.
111
Amid heightened tensions in Northern Ireland139 S.Res. 157 (agreed in the 118th Congress, noted previously) also expressed support for the Windsor Framework and urged that it be implemented “in good faith ... to ensure trade continues to flow smoothly within the United Kingdom and maintain an open border on the island of Ireland, while protecting the European Union’s single market.”
Amid heightened tensions in Northern Ireland in recent years, some in Congress tied their support for a possible , some in Congress tied their support for a possible
future U.S.-UK free trade agreement to protecting the peace process (negotiations on a post-future U.S.-UK free trade agreement to protecting the peace process (negotiations on a post-
Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden
Administration has not resumed these talks to date). Both H.Res. 585 (116th Congress, passed in Administration has not resumed these talks to date). Both H.Res. 585 (116th Congress, passed in
December 2019) and S.Res. 117 (117th Congress, passed in May 2021) reaffirmed support for the December 2019) and S.Res. 117 (117th Congress, passed in May 2021) reaffirmed support for the
Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit and asserted that any future U.S.-UK trade or other Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit and asserted that any future U.S.-UK trade or other
bilateral agreements must consider Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland. S.Res. 134 (117th bilateral agreements must consider Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland. S.Res. 134 (117th
Congress, passed in May 2022) expressed support for concluding U.S. trade agreements with both Congress, passed in May 2022) expressed support for concluding U.S. trade agreements
134 Amanda Ferguson, “U.S. Business Delegation Probes Post-Brexit Opportunities in Northern Ireland,” Reuters, October 26, 2023.
135 The White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
136 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom,” press release, October 25, 2022. 137 The White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023. 138 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, Protecting the Good Friday Agreement from Brexit, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019.
139 See, for example, Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Statement on Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; Ray O’Hanlon, “Biden, Reps. Welcome Framework Deal,” Irish Echo, March 1, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
31
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
with both the UK and the EU; it noted that doing so should be “contingent” upon a UK-EU agreement that the UK and the EU; it noted that doing so should be “contingent” upon a UK-EU agreement that
“fully protects and preserves the Good Friday Agreement.”“fully protects and preserves the Good Friday Agreement.”
112140
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments
established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an
independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas
most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of
Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States
has contributed more than $549 million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI has contributed more than $549 million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI
funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well. funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well.
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in
the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.
113141
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities, located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities,
and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and
the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as
tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus
toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions. toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
109 The White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023. 110 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, Protecting the
Good Friday Agreement from Brexit, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019.
111 See, for example, Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Statement on Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; Ray O’Hanlon, “Biden, Reps. Welcome Framework Deal,” Irish Echo, March 1, 2023. 112 Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, U.S.-UK Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. 113 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland.
Congressional Research Service
29
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support
for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in
communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers
have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the
conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process. conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process.
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have encouraged the IFI to place greater
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have encouraged the IFI to place greater
focus on reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the focus on reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the
same time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as same time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as
largely wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way. largely wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way.
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call
for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members
asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern
Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the
final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation
for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years). for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years).
Since FY2011, successive Administrations have allocated funds from Economic Support Fund
Since FY2011, successive Administrations have allocated funds from Economic Support Fund
(ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and
reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year to the IFI from ESF reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year to the IFI from ESF
funding between FY2011 and FY2014, $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million funding between FY2011 and FY2014, $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million
for FY2020, for FY2020,
and $2.5 million for FY2021$2.5 million for FY2021
., and $3 million for FY2022.
140 Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, U.S.-UK Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. 141 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland.
Congressional Research Service
32
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Author Information
Kristin Archick Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Specialist in European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
R46259
R46259
· VERSION 1012 · UPDATED
3033